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THE INCHON

LANDING
Japan’s Colony INTRODUCTION

Divided in 38th Parallel

North Korean Invasion

38th Parallel
UNSC Intervene and UN Force formed to
retaliate
INTRODUCTION
US JCS chose Gen MacArthur as FECOM

5000-to-one bet for Inchon

Strategic and Operational advantage

Utilisation of Principle of War and created


impact on Korean War
AIM

The aim of our presentation is to chronologically analyse Inchon Landing


and to evaluate the application of principles of war to Inchon landing
operation
SCOPE
 Backgd of the War - Capt Habeeb
 Location - Lt Christopher
 Assembly and Mov of Force - Lt Cdr Rajapaksha
 Pre Assault Prep - Lt Jaber
 Assault Ops - Lt Fadil
 Application of POW - Lt Zahir
 Impact of Inchon Landing - Lt (JG) Imam
 Lessons Learnt - S Lt Rajaofara
 Conclusion - Lt Cdr Balasooriya
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
Causes

 Korea divided in to two-part: North and South

 North under communist Kim Sung II backed by


USSR & China

 South under military govt of Syngman Rhee backed


by US & UN

 Conflict of Ideology between Communism and Free


Capitalism
BACKGROUND
Causes

 DPRK invaded ROK on 25 Jun 50 & took control up


to Pusan in a quick succession

 Plan was to conquer South and unify under one


communist Korea

 UNSC passed a resolution and urged members for


armed retribution in order to provide support to ROK

 Gen MacArthur was given the comd of FECOM


BACKGROUND
Causes

 MacArthur planned a risky amph op in order


to cut off KPA supply line

 Plan was to utilise tactical surprise over


NKA

 23 Jul 1950 plan was discussed over US Inchon


Joint Staff Command

 15 Sep 1950 UN forces quickly landed in


Inchon & recapture Seoul from KPA
 After this ldg, UN forces pushed back KPA
BRIEF CHRONOLOGY
OF THE LANDING
OPERATION
LOCATION

 Close to Seoul

 Two sea approach: Flying Fish & East Inchon


Channel

 Good seaport, rail and road connection

 Max tidal range in harbour and channel was


31 ft

 Low tide made mud flat of 12-13 ft

 Flying Fish is 50 nm channel with depth of 30-


60 ft
ASSEMBLY OF FORCES
 1st Marine Div - Gen Smith and staff officers arrived
in Japan on 22 Aug from USA.

 7th Marine - Arrived Japan between 28 Aug – 6 Sep

 Battalion of marine in 2 vessels - Left Mediterranean


on 16 Aug

 Arrival at Pusan on 9 Sep to join 7th Marine as its 3rd


Battalion

 Remainder of 7th Marine - Arrived at Kobe on 17


Sep

 5th Marine in Korea - Received WngO on 30 Aug to


prepare for moving to Pusan to join the Division
FORCE ALLOCATION

 1st Marine Div - at Kobe (Japan)

 5th Marines - at Pusan (S Korea)

 7th Inf Div - at Yokohama (Japan)

 Most of the escorting vessels, the Gunfire Sp Gp,


and the Comd ships assembled - at Sasebo
(Japan)
FORCE MOVEMENTS
7th Inf Div –
11 Sep

5th Marine Div –


12 Sep
Flagship Rochester –
12 Sep

Mt McCkinley –
12 Sep
1st Marine Div –
11 Sep
Deception PRE-ASSAULT OPERATIONS
Spl Op

Mine Clearance Op

Recce

Preliminary Bombardment
ASSAULT OPERATIONS

 Landing on Green Beach and Securing Radio

Hill

 Securing Wolmi-Do

 Securing So-Wolmi-Do
ASSAULT OPERATIONS

 Landing on Red Beach and Blue Beach

 Securing Observatory Hill

 Securing the Beach head


Application of Principal Of War

Selection and Maintainance of Aim

1. MacArthur choose Inchon as landing


site as entire NKA was comitted to assault
Pusan

2. Not merely to land and form a beachhead

3. Despite the initial opposition from Jt Chiefs The Inchon MacArthur


of Staffs, MacArthur was determined on his Plan‘’We shall Plan &
plan land at Inchon and Strategy
I shall crush
Application of Principal Of War
Surprise

1. KPA fortified defence expecting attack


from southeast
Inchon
Seoul
2. UN forces utilised the unpreparedness
of KPA on the NW coast
Yokoham
3. Bypassing the fortified eastern coastline Kobe a

4. UN forces surprised KPA fol


unexpected route and catch the en off guard

5. Attacking unguarded spot


Application of Principal Of War
Concentration of Force

1. Initial naval gun and aerial


bombardment on Sep 14

2. Concentrated attack on Green


beach (Wolmi Is), Red Beach and Blue
Beach

3. Assault from three direction


scattered KPA defenses

5. Aerial bombardment by Marine


F4U Corsairs on the tanks.
Application of Principal Of War
Offensive Action

1. 43 American warplanes dropping 93 napalm canisters


over Wolmidoto clear the way for American troops

2. Naval Bomabrdment over fortification

3. Amphibious assaut from three direction

Logistics

1. Preparing logistic battlefield


2. Organizing the logistic force
3. Sourcing the resources
Application of Principal Of War
Cooperation

1. Navy landing the forces

2. the 1st Marine Division conducting the initial assault, followed by the
7th Infantry Division

3. Tactical air support was provided by the Navy and Marine Corps initially

4. LSTs were brought from Shipping and Control Administration, Japan


(SCAJAP)

5. Chartered Japanese merchant vessels.


IMPACT OF INCHON LANDING
IMPACT OF INCHON LANDING
Turning the Tide
 Caught KPA Off Guard

 Cutting Off KPA supply line

 Liberated Seoul

 Neutralised KPA significant gains

 International support
IMPACT OF INCHON LANDING

Altered Strat Bal

 Compelled KPA to reverse their


advance

 UN force could break out of


Pusan

 South Korean govt was restored


in Seoul

 Halted Korean march towards


communism
IMPACT OF INCHON LANDING

Extension of War

 Compelled KPA to fight on multiple fronts

 Severely damaged North Korean forces

 Compelled to retreat

 Capture of Pyongyang by UN forces

 Induction of China in the war


IMPACT OF INCHON LANDING

Boosted Morale

 Instilled a sense of confidence and pride


among the soldiers

 Foreseen the possibility of victory

 Restoration of control over capital

 International support and Recognition

 Confidence on Leadership
IMPACT OF INCHON LANDING

Effectiveness of Jt Op

 Proven the demand for excelling jointness


among services

 Halted KPA efforts due to a lack of


confidence

 Mass trust was achieved by the acts of UN

 Future large-scale joint op were encouraged


LESSONS LEARNT

Value of Sun Tzu’s Dictum

 Significant for a country’s warfare tactics

 Strategic planning, exploiting own strength while target enemy weakness

 Guideline to improve tactics, reduce causalities and win efficiently


LESSONS LEARNT

Importance of Intelligence

 Decisive factor in military operation

 Predicting and countering threats

 Turning the tide of a conflict

 Gathering intelligence to improve maritime domain awareness


LESSONS LEARNT

Importance of Joint Ops

 Modern warfare demands coordinated reactions to complex challenges

 Improves operational efficiency, effectiveness and combat capaity

 Sister services should develop a credible joint operation doctrine

 Requirement of Multi national effort for modern complicated conflict scenarios


LESSONS LEARNT

Risk of Overconfidence

 Overconfidence and underestimating en may protract conflicts

 Can lead to neglecting necessary preparation which may have adverse effect

 Can be a good lesson while planning a naval operation


CONCLUSION

 Inchon Landing is regarded as one of the most successful


amphibious operation

 The Inchon Landing shaped the Korean War

 Meticulous planning by General McArthur

 Boosted morale of the UN forces

 Overconfidence led to an extension of the war

 Justifies Sun Tzu’s dictum and a valuable lesson in the art of war
OPEN FORUM

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