Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abnormal
Situation
Management
Defining the way things
will be.
The birth of ASM...
Lost Revenue
Loss
Fixed Costs
Additional Shut down (Idle Plant)
Effic iency
unplanned costs
Accident Equipment
Plant Perfor mance damage, etc.
Losses due to
Savings from reducing the comfort
incidents, accidents
margin
(about 10% of
operating costs)
A Look At Plant Operations
A typical Production
Profile for an Asset 95 days
Intensive Facility for a
calendar year. 79 days
62 days
47 days
23 days
30 days
Days per Year
16 days
8 days
5 days
Production
Plant Incidents
Days per Year
Effectiveness
Asset Utilization
Plant Capacity Limit
Agility/Flexibility
Frequency Frequency
# Days
# Days
10
15
20
0
5
100
150
200
250
300
50
10
12
14
16
18
0
100
150
200
250
300
0
2
4
6
8
50
0
280
280 112
457
290
290
115
300 463
300
310 118
310 468
320
320
121
474
330
330
340 124
480
340
350
350 127
486
360
360
130
370 492
370
380 133
380 3.2% 497
$33.5 M
390
390
136 503
400
400
139
410 509
410
420
420 142
515
24.2M
5.8%
430
$24.2M
430
5.8%
145
520
440
440
$38.5 M
450 148
526
450
Feed Ra te
Rate
460
Production rate
Rate
Total Feed
Total Feed
470
470
154
480 538
480
490
490 157 543
500
500
160
549
510
510
520 163 555
520
530
530 166 561
540
540
169 567
550
550
560
172 572
560
570
570 174 578
580
580
590 177 584
590
600
600 180 590
610
1503
610
183 595
620
620
Real Life Examples
$38.5M!
capacity!
incidents!
5.8% in lost
lost $33.5M!
And this plant
This plant had
This plant had
DCS/APC/
Asset Management Optimization efforts
Reliability & CMMS
Plant Capacity Limit
lost capacity!
Days per Year
About 2-1/2 hours later, the debutanizer vented to the flare a third time AND
CONTINUED VENTING FOR 36 MINUTES. The high level alarm for
the flare drum was activated at this time. But with alarms going off every
2 to 3 seconds, there appears to be no evidence that that alarm was ever
seen. By this time, the flare KO drum had filled with liquid well beyond
its design capacity. The fast-flowing gas through the overfilled drum
forced liquid out of the drum’s discharge pipe. The discharge line was not
designed for liquid, so the force of the liquid caused a rupture at an elbow.
This released over 20 tons of highly flammable hydrocarbon.
continued
Organization Individual
Stylistic or Cultural General Failure Poor workplace Near miss
Indicators Types design Auditing
Top Down: Accidents High workload
Unsociable hours Du Pont
Commitment Incidents
Inadequate Training
Competence Near-Misses training Workspace
Cognizance 1-10 hit list Poor perception
Motivation
data collected & of hazards
Proactive Design Attitude
analyzed Alarms
SI Projects Human Factors
Safety Information System
Control room Group Factors
Diagnostic and
Best Practices design Working Practice
remedial measures
Various cost elements
Theoretical Limit
F uture upgrades (e.g., Theore tically possible; cu rrently unsustainable
Advanc ed Control) Current Limit
Comfort Margin
Lost opportunity Operating Target
(Cost of comfort)
Profit
Lost Profit
Incident Break-even
Lost Revenue
Loss
Fixed Costs
Additional Shut down (Idle Plant)
Effic iency
unplanned costs
Accident Equipment
Plant Perfor mance damage, etc.
Losses due to
Savings from reducing the comfort
incidents, accidents
margin
(about 10% of
operating costs)
Managing Abnormal Situations
Anatomy of a Disaster from Operations Perspective
10
15
20
0
5
100
150
200
250
300
50
10
12
14
16
18
0
2
4
6
8
0
100
150
200
250
300
50
0
280
280
457
112
290
290
463
300 115
300
Days per Year 310
310 468
118
320
320
474
121
330
330
340 480
124
340
350 350
486 127
360 360
492 130
370 370
380 133
380 497
3.2%
$33.5 M
390 390
503 136
400 400
509 139
410 410
420 420
515
142
$24.2M
430 430
5.8%
145
520
< 60%
440 440
$38.5 M
148
450 450 526
Feed Ra te
Rate
Producti on rate
Total Feed
460 460
Rate
151
Total Feed
532
470 470
154
538
480 480
500 500
160
549
510 510
163
520 520 555
540 540
169
567
550 550
172
560 560
572
578
580 580
177
590 584
590
180
600 600
590
Summarized Production Data
610
610 183
1503
595
620
620
Daily Production
95%
100%
Plant Operating Target
Planning Constraints
Operational Constraints
Unexpected Upsets Cost 3-8% of Capacity
Optimization efforts
t
System internal Time for Time for reaction of the Process
diagnostic time corrective action on the corrective action
Risk reduction achieved by all SRSs & External Risk Reduction Facilities
SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVELS
2 10 -3 to < 10 -2 10 -3 to < 10 -2
1 10 -2 to < 10 -1 10 -2 to < 10 -1
Reliability requirements for alarms
Claimed PFDavg Alarm system Human reliability
integrity/reliability requirements
requirements
0.1 – 0.01 Alarms system should The operator should be
be designated as safety trained in the
related & categorized as management of the
SIL 1 specific plant failure
that the alarm indicates;
Alarm system should The alarm presentation
be independent from arrangements should
the process control make the claimed alarm
system very obvious to the
operator and
distinguishable from
other alarms
The alarm should
remain on view to the
operator for the whole
of the time it is active
EMMUA Alarm Systems Guide page 17
Reliability requirements for alarms
Claimed PFDavg Alarm system Human reliability
integrity/reliability requirements
requirements
Below 0.01 Alarms system would It is not recommended
have to be designated as that claims for a PFDavg
safety related and below 0.01 are made
categorized as at least for any operator action
SIL2 even if it is multiple
alarmed and very
simple.
For all credible
accident scenarios the
designer should
demonstrate that the
total number of safety
related alarms and their
maximum rate of
presentation does not
overload the operator
Limit at which
Time for operator B protection operates
to respond to alarm
and correct fault Abnormal Operating Region
Alarm Setting
A
Limit of largest normal
operational fluctuation
EMMUA Alarm Systems Guide page 17
120 Explosion
Lower Explosive Limit (LEL)
Gas Concentration (Percentage of LEL)
100
Actual Gas
Concentration
80
Actual trip point
Normal
60 operating Level Error Measured Gas
Set trip point Concentration
Gas concentration
prior to fault
40
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Time after onset of fault (Seconds)
Redesign Choices
• Redesign - the plant or its controls to provide greater margin between the
normal operating limits & the trip limits. This is the most desirable solution but
is often impractical or too expensive;
• Setting within normal operating limits - setting the alam within the limits of
normal operating fluctuations & accepting that spurious alarms will occur
during large normal disturbances. This is ergonomically very undesirable and
will tend to increase alarm rates and reduce the operator confidence in the alarm
system. In effect it increases the Average Probability of Failure on Demand
(PFDavg) for the alarm system as a whole;
• setting nearer trip limits - setting the alarm closer to the trip limits and
accepting that some fast transients will not be corrected by the operator before
they reach the trip level. This will increase the production losses due to plant
trips, & because there are more demands on the protection system, tend to make
the plant less safe. It also implies an increase PFDavg for the alarm system.
Potential
Impact
of
Initiating
Abrupt/Catastrophic
Event
Manageable
Insidious
Time
Impact of DCS Alarm System
Awareness of Disturbances
With typical alarm systems,
orienting begins after an event Incident
creates an abnormal plant state.
The extent of the problem can
impact operator’s ability to be fully
aware of the locations of process
Potential disturbances.
Impact As disturbances propagate the
number of conditions to be aware of
of increases as well as the response
Initiating requirements and the likelihood of
missing important information.
Event Failure is
Detected
Safe status of the
Process assured
Failure Occurrence in the
Process or in the Safeguarding System Time
Time
• Increases likelihood of
awareness of disturbances
Potential • Reduces time to awareness
• Hence, reduces the average
Impact impact of initiating events
of
Initiating
Event
Time
UN-SAFE
Incident
Trip SAFE
Emergency Alarm Loss
Impact
of
Initiating Quality
Event High Alarm
Operator
diagnostic time
Profit
Time FTT
Process Safety Time
Trip from SIS Emergency High FTT= Fault Tolerance Time
No response
Incorrect
Potential
Impact
of
Initiating
Event Suboptimal
Best
Time
Impact of Decision Support System
Support for Optimal Response
• Reduces errors
• Decreases time to implement
response
Potential • Manages side effects
• Increases awareness
Impact
of
Initiating
Event
Time
ASM Alarm Management Solutions
Education for Management, Engineers, Technicians
and Operators.
Collect
Collect Data
Data
Change
Change
Management
Management Analyze
Analyze
Develop Plant
Alarm Management
Standards & Philosophy
Identify
Identify
Implement
Implement Enhancements
Enhancements
Verify
Verify Against
Against
Standards
Standards
Alarm Management Optimization
Alarm Management Before - 30 Points Account for ~ 85 %
management software
– UserAlert
– Optimization Suite
• Alarm Rationalization and Documentation
• Alarm Metrics and Analysis
• Advanced Alarm Handlers
Optimization Suite…
Alarm Rationalization
• Alarm priority (class) is based on severity and
level of impact and time
• Available priority options in TPS:
– No Action
– Journal
– Print
– Print & Journal
– Low
– High
– Emergency
Optimization Suite…
Alarm Rationalization
• Recommends alarm priorities based on plant
philosophy
– Severity of impact
– Time to respond
– Trip Point
• Electronically captures plant alarm
management philosophy
– Time to respond rules definition
– Impact and severity rules definition
• Apply manual priority override
• Use Alarm Impact Templates
• Generate EC Files (Honeywell)