• A contract of suretyship naturally gives rise to
personal rights between the main parties – the surety and the creditor. • It also gives rise to certain rights or entitlements between the surety and the principal debtor. • The duties and responsibilities arising in this arrangement at common law can best be appreciated by studying the following: – The so - called rights or benefits of a surety; and – some of the defences the surety may raise when called upon to perform. Beneficium excussionis • This is one of the common law rights of surety against a creditor seeking to enforce the suretyship • It is a right to demand that the creditor should first attempt to recover from the principal debtor. • It follows from the accessory nature of suretyship that this must be so. • In Moosa v Mahomed, the Court held that the benefit must be claimed early in the proceedings. • Dorfman v Pering is also an illustration of the proposition that a court will not insist on a fruitless excussion. • The benefit can and is easily renounced by a surety undertaking to be liable as surety and co-principal debtor. Beneficium divisionis • This is a benefit or defence that one out of several sureties could maintain against the creditor’s action. • The effect would be to require the creditor to divide up the claim, and recover from each surety the proportionate share of the debt. • As with excussion, however, this benefit is regarded as renounced where sureties agree to be liable as “sureties and co-principal debtors”. • In Construction Supplies and Services Ltd v Greenwood, the Court held a surety who agreed to be liable as surety and co – principal debtor could not claim division. The sureties were , applying Van der Vyver v De Wayer, liable singuli in solidum. Summary judgment could therefore be entered against the surety selected for action by the creditor. Beneficium cedendarum actionum • A surety who pays or arranges for the clearance of the debt is entitled to a cession of rights, actions and hypothecations by the creditor so that the surety could proceed against the principal debtor or other parties liable for the debt. • In early Roman times, when a surety paid, the debt was so completely wiped out that the creditor had nothing left to cede to the surety. • Courts however began to consider it as equitable that the creditor ought to give every assistance to the surety to recover. • The surety was considered as paying in his name to free himself, and not so as to free the debtor. (For these propositions see Wessels C.J., African Indemnity and Guarantee Co Ltd v Thorpe, 1933 AD 330, 336-340.) Right of recourse • Even without cession of actions, a surety who pays, or arranges for the liquidation of the debt, is through the process of subrogation entitled to recourse, against the debtor, and other sureties. • This right (of recourse) has effectively rendered the benefit of cession otiose. • In Taylor and Thorne NNO v The Master, it was held that the right of recourse accrues where the obligation secured has been discharged. It would not suffice if only a claim for payment is lodged against the surety. • In Rutowitz’s Flour Mills v The Master, where through negotiations over seen by the surety, the creditor withdrew his claim from the estate of the principal debtor, it was held that the surety was entitled to recourse. Recourse against co-sureties • In modern Roman – Dutch law as well as English law, a surety who pays would have, de jure, a right of recourse (contribution) against co-sureties. • No cession of actions would be necessary. • This would clearly be so where the sureties agreed to be liable in one instrument. (Kroon v Enschede 1909 TS 374). • In Gerber v Wolson remarks in some of the judgments suggest that there could be contribution where co sureties do not subscribe to one instrument, but they all renounce division and excussion, and the one made liable for the debt takes cession from the creditor. Gerber v Wolson • In Gerber v Wolson, seven co-sureties, subscribed to the same instrument; they renounced excussion and division; Wolson paid the entire amount of the debt; took cession of the creditor’s rights; and claimed from Gerber what he had paid, minus his own contribution. • The Appellate Division, reversing a decision of the lower Court, held that he should recover from Gerber only the latter’s proportionate share of the debt, i.e. 1/7ths. • The reasoning is elusive. This was a 4:1 majority decision. • Some find the minority decision intellectually more appealing. • Key Roman Dutch authorities canvassed, Voet and Pothier, are also not in agreement. The majority relied on Pothier, but the dissenting judge preferred Voet. Defences • In additions to the so called benefits, which can easily be renounced, a surety called upon to perform can raise a number of defences. • Interesting cases have arisen in the recent past with regard to the exceptio doli generalis defence, and terms or agreements contrary to public policy. • First, however, it needs to be noted that the surety may raise any contractual defence that would be available to the principal debtor. • Thus in Arend and Another v Astra Furnishers, 1974 (1) 298 the defence of duress was open to both the principal debtor and the surety. Any defence available to principal debtor? • In Goldberg v Grosvenor Finance 1950 (4) SA 154, it was held that a surety was entitled to benefits under a Usury Act conferred upon a borrower. • In Worthington v Wilson 1918 TPD 104 the court held that the surety could be availed of a defence arising upon the obligation itself, but not upon some personal privilege conferred upon the debtor. So, the surety could not avail himself of a moratorium on recovery of debts for persons enlisted for active military service. • In Barclays Bank Ltd v Chingapane [2002] 1 BLR 511, Lesetedi ,J. cited Worthington v Wilson with approval , but held that on the peculiar facts of the case, the surety had absolutely no defence to the creditor’s claim. Exceptio doli generalis (1) • This is a plea of lack of good faith in the creditor’s claim against the surety. • The exception may be pleaded where, for example, the suretyship is invoked for a purpose different from that for which it was granted. • In Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein, the surety undertook to be liable for payment by the debtor “of all his obligations of whatever nature “ to the creditor; and for payment by the debtor “of each and every amount which he may hereafter owe the creditor, however such indebtedness may arise.” • The suretyship was provided in support of financing a township development in 1972. It was invoked in respect of a lean transaction extended in 1975 . The defence was successfully raised. Exceptio doli generalis (2) • Although the Court in Rand Bank Ltd appeared to expand possibilities of application of the excepti doli generalis defence, it recognised that this is “ a last ditch defence”. • In Neuhoff v York Timbers Ltd the Court reiterated the narrow scope of the defence. • It was applicable only in a context favouring its invocation, where the exigency was mot clearly covered by the contract. • A deed covered debts that a company “may now or at any time owe or … become liable to perform”. It also provided that the suretyship shall remain in force “as continuing covering security” notwithstanding fluctuations in levels of indebtedness, and until cancelled by the creditor. • The deed was signed in Feb 1978. the Court held that it was not in bad faith to invoke it in respect of liabilit5y incurred 10 months after the surety had ceased to be a director and shareholder of the principal debtor. Public policy arguments (1) • At common law a contract or a clause in a contract may be declared unlawful and unenforceable on grounds of being contrary to public policy. • A question that has arisen is whether unfair or unconscionable terms should be so declared. • In Sasfin v Beukes, a clause in a deed of cession providing it shall remain of full force and effect at all times , notwithstanding any intermediate discharge, or settlement of fluctuation in the obligations of the creditor, was held to be unconscionable , incompatible with public interest , and unenforceable • This appeared to be an exciting development in the regulation of unfair contract terms at common. Public policy arguments(2) • If Sasfin v Beukes appeared to open the floodgates to litigation on public policy grounds, the gates were shut in Botha v Finanscredit Pty Ltd. • The Court reiterated also prefers upholding of contractual bargains. If there is a sound commercial reason for restricting the surety’s right to cancel the contract without the creditor’s input, the contract would have to be enforced. • In Pangbourne Properties Ltd v Nitor Construction Ltd, the Court held, in the light of Botha’s case, that renounciation of the benefit of error in calculation (errore calculi) in a deed of suretyship was not contra bonos mores.. It further held that if a clause restricting the surety’s right to cancel the contract was unlawful, then, only that clause could be struck off from the agreement.