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cit, oi l|oal, c:t:al l:cia, a oiso:ous vaou: |u:st i:ou t|c
tall stac|s oi t|c u:io: a:|icc csticicc la:t.
W I|is vaou: was a |ig|l, toxic clouc oi uct|,l isoc,a:atc.
W,000 cicc iuucciatcl,
W!00,000 wc:c i:|u:cc
W,000 a:iuals wc:c i:|u:cc, oi w|ic| a|out o:c t|ousa:c wc:c
|illcc.
THE BHOPAL DISASTER
1L AllLC1LU ARLA
THE POSSIBLE CAUSES
O A Lank conLalnlng meLhyl lsocyanaLe (MlC) leaked
O MlC ls an exLremely reacLlve chemlcal and ls used ln
producLlon of Lhe lnsecLlclde carbaryl
O 1he sclenLlflc reason for Lhe accldenL was LhaL waLer enLered
Lhe Lank where abouL 40 cublc meLers of MlC was sLored
O When waLer and MlC mlxed an exoLhermlc chemlcal reacLlon
sLarLed produclng a loL of heaL
O As a resulL Lhe safeLy valve of Lhe Lank bursL because of Lhe
lncrease ln pressure
O lL ls presumed LhaL beLween 20 and 30 Lonnes of MlC were
released durlng Lhe hour LhaL Lhe leak Look place
O 1he gas |eaked from a 30 m h|gh ch|mney and th|s he|ght was
not enough to reduce the effects of the d|scharge
THE WEATHER EGGED ON THE
PROCESS.
O The high moisture content (aerosol) in the
discharge when evaporating, gave rise to a heavy
gas which rapidly sank to the ground.
O A weak wind which Irequently changed direction,
which in turn helped the gas to cover more area in
a shorter period oI time (about one hour).
O The weak wind and the weak vertical turbulence
caused a slow dilution oI gas and thus allowed the
poisonous gas to spread over considerable
distances.
THE POSSIBLE REASONS.
O One oI the main reasons Ior the tragedy was Iound to
be a result oI a combination oI human Iactors and an
incorrectly designed saIety system.
O A portion oI the saIety equipment at the plant had been
non-operational Ior Iour months and the rest Iailed.
UNION CARBIDE`S VERSION..
O ' A disgruntled plant employee, apparently bent on
spoiling a batch oI methyl isocyanate, added water to a
storage tank.
-------B. Browning Jackson
(Vice President)
LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE
GOVERNMENT
O The Madhya Pradesh State government had not
mandated ,3 saIety standards.
O Union Carbide Iailed to implement its own saIety
rules.
O The Bhopal plant experienced six accidents between
1981 and 1984, at least three oI which involved MIC
or phosgene.
WHY DID THE PEOPLE STAY
QUITE??
O The country needed pesticides to protect her agricultural
production
O MIC is used to produce pesticides that control insects which
would in turn, help increase production oI Iood as a part oI
India`s GREEN REVOLUTION.
O Initially, India imported the MIC Irom the United States.
O In an attempt to achieve industrial selI-suIIiciency, India
invited Union Carbide to set up a plant in the state oI
Madhya Pradesh to produce methyl isocyanate.
O To the people oI the city oI Bhopal, Union Carbide was a
highly respected , technically advanced Western company.
O This coupled with political power and scientiIic expertise
worked together to changed the people`s perception oI what
was dangerous and more importantly what was saIe.
UNION CARBIDES AMERICAN
PLANT
O Dr. Paul Shrivastava, an Associate ProIessor oI
Business in New York University conducted
studies that revealed that Bhopal was neither an
isolated incident nor the Iirst oI its kind in the
corporation.
O There had been many accidents oI similar nature in
UCC's American plants prior to the Bhopal
accident.
O He Iound that 28 major MIC leaks had occurred in
UCC`s West Virginia plant during the Iive years
preceding the Bhopal incident, the last one
occurring only a month beIore.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
O Du:i:g t|c s|iit c|a:gc a: oc:ato: c:tc:cc t|c sto:agc a:ca a:c
|oo|cc u o:c oi t|c :cacil, availa|lc :u||c: watc: |oscs to Ia:| wit|
t|c i:tc:tio: oi co:taui:ati:g a:c soili:g t|c ta:|'s co:tc:ts.
O lc u:sc:cwcc t|c local :cssu:c i:cicato:, w|ic| ca: |c casil,
accoulis|cc |, |a:c, a:c co::cctcc t|c |osc to t|c ta:|. I|c c:ti:c
oc:atio: coulc |c coulctcc wit|i: iivc ui:utcs.
O \i:o: i:cicc:ts oi :occss sa|otagc |, culo,ccs |ac occu::cc
:cviousl, at t|c l|oal la:t.
O I|c watc: a:c \l :cactio: i:itiatcc t|c io:uatio: oi ca:|o: cioxicc
w|ic|, togct|c: wit| \l vaou:s, was ca::icc t|:oug| t|c |cacc:
s,stcu a:c out oi t|c stac| oi t|c vc:t gas sc:u||c: |, a|out 11.!0 to
11.+. .u
LAPSES ON PART OF UNION
CARBIDE
O Improper design oI chimneys (without consideration oI
weather conditions in all seasons)
O Improper design and maintenance oI saIety equipment.
O Not Iollowing saIety regulations as that Iollowed by UCC
plants in USA.
O Decision to neglect a Ilare system in need oI repair.
O Inadequate emergency planning and community awareness.
O Lack oI awareness oI the potential impact oI MIC on the
community by the people operating the plant.
O Inadequate community planning, allowing a large
population to live near a hazardous manuIacturing plant.
STEPS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN
O These principles would have averted the
disaster.
O Eliminate or reduce the production oI
Hazardous chemicals.
O Hazardous chemicals produced should not be
stored and should be consumed in the course oI
the reaction.
O The inventory oI Hazardous chemicals iI
inevitable should be oI many small containers
and not oI one large container.
Alternate Chemistry (suggested solution)
O Alpha Napthol on carbonyl group addition Iollowed by
reaction with methyl amine would eventually gives
carbaryl.
O This process does not generate or require handling the
oI Phosgene.
O This process does not require storage oI MIC.
O Inherently saIe process.
Conclusion
O The Bhopal gas tragedy could have been averted.
O There were lapses on part oI the government and
UCC.
O The actual reason Ior the tragedy is contrary to
popular belieI.
O An alternate way to produce carbaryl was
suggested.
O Design oI Inherently saIer process was required.