World Conference of Humanitarian Studies Groningen, 4-7 February 2009

Humanitarian Response and Governance in Pakistan: Overcoming Elite Capture

Syed Mohammad Ali (Pakistan/Hungary), Lahorebased research consultant and columnist; former International Policy Fellow, Central European University Center for Policy Studies, Budapest. E-mail: ali@policy.hu Pamela Kilpadi (India/Hungary/UK), University of Bristol School for Policy Studies postgraduate and International Policy Fellowships founding director, Budapest. Email: pamela@kilpadi.com and kilpadi@policy.hu

Paper: Primary Objectives

Examine OCHA/Pakistan coordination of the response to recent disasters in Pakistan within the context of the problem of elite capture of public goods such as aid; Explore the evolution of Pakistans feudal-colonial systems of governance and its implications for relief, recovery and reconstruction programs; Demonstrate how activities such as participatory mappingalong with development programs such as cash for roads and work schemescan promote local ownership of programs while utilizing and strengthening Pakistans emerging civil and local governance sectors.

What can be done when a national government fundamentally ignores the knowledge base of its own civil society?
What can be done to combat the problem of the elite capture of public goods by national military and civilian personnel?

Currently, there are over 2,600 [UN] accredited NGOs. These organizations are rarely (if ever) actively involved in relief effort planning or decision-making activities This reflects the low priority many UN agencies and international organizations give to understanding the sociocultural context of the people they are trying to assist We would contend that in the South Asia disaster, the military, together with the international agency-run clusters, were the response and relief operation The Pakistan military, not known for its decision-making transparency or open communication policy, independently made [at times disasterous] decisions...
Esther K. Hicks and Gregory Pappas (WHO), 2006 Coordinating Disaster Relief After the South Asia Earthquake, Society

Tents are now the most important commodity in Kashmir. But they are being used for power and patronage by the military and civilian authorities that control the territory.
Asma Jahangir, 2005 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan United Nations Special Rapporteur

Mostly, [Pakistans NGOs] share many weaknesses with the state they so righteously deplore: dependency on foreign assistance; lavish expenditure on overheads; lack of transparency; fixed notions aboutdevelopment [But] the top-down approach has failed to deliver goods Our state is highly overcentralized. Local government bears major responsibilities but, with few exceptions, has no administrative, financial and technical capability... Unless we accept communities as equal partners in the process of development and start a participatory mode of governance, our problems will not go away [A] new class of young activists [including local government representatives] is emerging... It is vital that professionals follow suit and use the political and social space available to develop home grown solutions.
Tasneem Ahmed Siddiqui, 2006 Senior civil servant and head of the Squatters Improvement Authority The Dynamics of Bureaucratic Rule in Pakistan, in Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Jacobsen, John Kurt (eds), Experiencing the State, pp 177-80

Test for UN cluster-sectoral approach for improved coordination

By mid-2005, the United Nations finalized its major new cluster-sectoral approach reform strategy Soon thereafter, on October 8, 2005, the earthquake struck Within six minutes, roughly 80 percent of the total infrastructure of a 30,000 kilometer area inhabited by some 4-5 million people was destroyedkilling some 78,000 and injuring more than 72,000 The earthquake killed almost everyone working in hospitals, schools, and government buildings at the timeincluding many of the local government officials required for immediate response The South Asia earthquake was as a test case for the UNs new cluster approach for improved response coordination. For the first time, all participating agencies were placed under a single structure led by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
(ADB/World Bank, 2005 in Hicks and Pappas, 2006)

Problems of transparency and accountability within the UN System

Inability to absorb lessons from other disasters Lack of standardized monitoring and evaluation Weakness of human resource management Inability to constructively engage civil society actors (Hicks and Pappas, 2006)

Implications of the role of Military, Inc. in disaster relief

Given the traditional governing role assumed by Pakistans military, the political sensitivity of many of the affected areas, the countrys lack of an adequate National Disaster Preparedness Plan and, crucially, the weak capacity of systems of local government, it is not surprising that the military has taken the central role in disaster response, relief and recovery operations. However, what the common people protest against isthe nexus between the West and [Pakistans] authoritarian elite which is the source of the overall dictatorial environmentthe existing elite are agents of the old colonial system...
Siddiqa, A., 2009 (Military, Inc. author). Democracy in the Muslim World, Dawn, 23 January, emphasis added. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/2009/01/23/op.htm#1

Politically motivated actions of military in relief operations

Several reported examples following Pakistans earthquake:

Graft by elite members of the militarysuch as the hoarding of lifesaving tents for purposes of political patronage; Decisions to depute mobile hospitals and other facilities to relatively well-off communities of political constituents/allies while denying such services to rival group dominated areas; Utilization of military personnel with inadequate language skills to (mis)record crucial personal data for compensation purposes; Resistance to relocating earthquake-impacted populations at higher altitudes to safer, warmer areas possibly to keep politically sensitive areas from being depopulated.

Legacy of Pakistans ruling civilmilitary-landlord triumvirate

Newly formed state of Pakistan inherited nonproductive governing elites focused on law and order and the preservation (largely through patronage and bribes) of strategic alliances between state bureaucrats and military officials, large landowners, and powerful members of an emerging industrial bourgeoise The phenomenon of Khanism - or rule of Khans (as in Pakistans first military Commander-in-Chief-come-President Ayub Khan) - is a term used to describe the prevalent feudal system which continues to characterize many parts of the NWFP Under Khanism, the Khan clan (the inner family or those genealogically close to the last deceased patriarch) dominates local institutions, including jirga arbitration mechanisms, land tenure arrangements, and systems of local governance

BAID Khan ASAD KHAN

30 Years MNA

Khans of Alvi valley

Ali Khan Habat Khan

PML (Q)

Fasi Khan
MNA (6 times)

S. Khan
Step Brother

A. Khan

Prince Nur EX - MPA

Jamil Bakh

Iqbal Khan T. Khan Basit Khan Z. Khan M. Khan

N. Khan T. Nazim (MMA)

Fakhar
Religious Leaders

Wasif Hameed Abid Hamid Atif Naveed Waqas Moulana Taki Siraj Hashim Aqil Shah Saad Khan Saifullah Khan

Union Council Nazim Biari

Tariq Khan TALIB KHAN

Affiliation

SYED Q. KHAN

Affiliation

M. Khan (Ex MPA) Jamil Ali Nasir

(Ex. Dist. Nazim 20014)

Shahgee

Shah Haq MPA

Anwar Shah

Source: Ali, S. M. and Brigitta Bode (2007). The State, Feudal Lords, and Poverty in Rural Pakistan. Unpublished paper for an INGO.

Devolution of governance in Pakistan: Hostage to repeated centerperiphery power struggles

A basic awareness of the dynamics of political incentives underlying devolution of governance functions can prove useful in the design of humanitarian operations and development programs. Although each attempt to devolve power throughout Pakistans brief history differed significantly in fundamental ways, they shared at least one common characteristicthey were all led by military regimes. Devolution was seen as a useful tool for weakening the power base of political parties, thereby fragmenting opposition to the respective military regimes.

LGO 2001
Local government made a comeback in the national political landscape with the 2001 Local Government Ordinance (LGO) of General Musharraf, who assumed power through a coup in 1999.
Local government system 2001

Local government manipulations

Zila Nazims (local elected representatives) who are known to be aligned with opposition parties have complained that they are ineffective and that the administration bypasses them. Community Citizen Boards (CCBs) often have loyalties to political parties rather than development needs. External donor support has built forms of citizen solidarity, but sustainability remains questionable.

Future of devolution
Despite the aim of Musharrafs militarybacked government to utilize local government bodies for political gain, allies suffered major setbacks in the elections, with surprisingly high levels of popular support for secular parties. It has yet to be seen whether the current, democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan will chart a new path for the future of local governance.

Source: Dawn http://dawn.com/events/election08/results/ images/pakistan.gif

Participatory rapid appraisal: Mapping power and public resources

Given that communities are the basic disaster response units, OCHA stresses the importance of developing the capacities of local governments. Power maps can prove useful tools for both purposes of needs assessments and field-based monitoring as well as development of community-level capacities for disaster preparedness, relief, recovery and reconstruction. A correlation between the availability of physical infrastructure such as schools, basic health facilities, electricity, and roads and the presence of feudal and political representatives within particular localities is evident, as is the lack of any infrastructure in areas where feudal and political power do not converge:

Power mapping
Map of Basti Union

Spatial strategy for development of remote disaster hit areas (utilizing cash for roads/work schemes) Utilizing such spatial strategies for development in remote, disaster hit (and prone) areas via cash for road and work schemes provides a means for overcoming problems of access while providing immediate relief to what would otherwise remain marginalized communities

Main road

Villages Existing link roads Existing branch roads

Proposed access road

Proposed vocational center Proposed school location

Political will of humanitarian agencies and governments required

The stranglehold of Pakistans ruling civilmilitary-landlord triumvirate over the majority of Pakistans citizens will only be loosened if the countrys newly emerging civil society and local government leaders are given adequate space and assistance to function development authorities can assimilate the role of the informal sector as a reform strategy. A prerequisite for a successful programme is popular involvement at all stages. Siddiqui 2006, p. 177

The great owners ignored the three cries of history. The land fell into fewer hands, the number of the dispossessed increased, and every effort of the great owners was directed at repression. The money was spent for arms, for gas to protect the great holdings, and spies were sent to catch the murmuring of revolt so that it might be stamped out. The changing economy was ignored, plans for the change ignored; and only means to destroy revolt were considered, while the causes of revolt went on. Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2003 (quoting John Steinbecks Grapes of Wrath in a court ruling in favor of a peasant whose land had been seized by a military brigadier)