This discussion appeared in Mind and Language 19:1 (2004) 85-98.

It is prompted by
erry !odor"s paper #$a%in& 'oncepts" in the same issue.
Interre(ations: 'oncepts) *no+(ed&e) ,e-erence and .tructure
'hristopher /eacoc0e
1hat are the re(ations bet+een the items mentioned in my tit(e2 This 3uestion is raised
by erry !odor"s discussion in his paper #$a%in& 'oncepts" o- the &enera( species o- %ie+
4accordin& to +hich concept possession is epistemic) dispositiona( and normati%e5.
1
erry
ca((s such %ie+s #concept pra&matism") and ar&ues that they are thorou&h(y mista0en. $e
ta0es my o+n %ie+) at (east as &i%en in A Study of Concepts) to be an instance o- the type
he aims to re-ute.
2
.ome o- erry"s criticisms) such as the char&e that my %ie+s cannot
e6p(ain compositiona(ity) +ou(d be decisi%e i- correct. I am to address such criticism
head-on. 7ther criticisms) ha%in& to do +ith the epistemic and the normati%e) seem to me
best considered in the presence o- more distinctions) and a correspondin&(y +ider ran&e
o- theoretica( options than erry ad%ances. It +ou(d be possib(e to spend a (i-etime on
these apparent(y ine6haustib(e and -undamenta( issues (I am a(ready on the +ay to doin&
so). 7n the +ider issues) a(( I can hope to do here is to ar&ue in support o- one particu(ar
conception o- these interre(ations.
Epistemology and the Theory of Concepts
$o+) to ta0e the -irst and second items on the (ist in the tit(e) shou(d +e concei%e o- the
re(ations bet+een the theory o- 0no+(ed&e and the phi(osophica() constituti%e theory o-
concepts2 In the matter o- priority in the order o- phi(osophica( e6p(anation) there are
three (i%e possibi(ities:
1
#$a%in& 'oncepts8 9 :rie- ,e-utation o- the 20
th
'entury" this ;ourna() pp.<<<-===)
at >..p.2.
2
A Study of Concepts ('ambrid&e) >ass.: >IT /ress) 1992
1
(i) ?pistemo(o&y is prior in the order o- phi(osophica( e6p(anation to the theory o-
concepts.
(ii) The theory o- concepts is prior in the order o- phi(osophica( e6p(anation to
epistemo(o&y.
(iii) @either is phi(osophica((y prior to the other but each re(ies) e6p(icit(y or
imp(icit(y) on distinctions dra+n -rom the other.
erry re&ards a commitment to (i) as a core -eature o- +hat he ca((s #concept pra&matism".
I myse(- re;ect each o- the priority c(aims in (i) and (ii)) and endorse the c(aim (iii). '(aim
(iii) +e can (abe( as a no-priority c(aim +ith a commitment to interre(ations.
There is a &enera( ar&ument a&ainst (i)) the priority o- epistemo(o&y) an ar&ument
that is independent o- the %arious considerations erry marsha(s. There are many pairs o-
e6amp(es in%o(%in& be(ie- states that ha%e the -o((o+in& -eature. To e6p(ain +hy one
member o- the pair in%o(%es 0no+(ed&e) and the other does not) +e need to appea( to
distinctions dra+n -rom the theory o- concepts. 9 perceptua( e6perience can ma0e it
rationa() in certain circumstances) to ;ud&e that a presented ob;ect -a((s under an
obser%ationa( concept) but not under a theoretica( one. The obser%ationa( ;ud&ement can
amount to 0no+(ed&e) and does so because a +i((in&ness to app(y the concept in the
&i%en circumstances is mentioned in its possession condition. .imi(ar(y) a perceptua(
e6perience can ma0e it rationa( to ;ud&e that a presented ob;ect -a((s under one but not
under a second obser%ationa( concept) precise(y because the e6perience is o- a 0ind
mentioned in the possession condition -or the -irst) but not -or the second concept. This is
the case -or the no+-hoary pair o- concepts square and regular-diamond-shaped. 9
;ud&ement that a ti(e is s3uare may in such perceptua( circumstances be 0no+(ed&e) +hi(e
the ;ud&ement that the ti(e is a re&u(ar diamond is not.
9&ain) a premise can ma0e it rationa( to accept a conc(usion in%o(%in& a &i%en
(o&ica( constant) +hi(e not ma0in& it rationa( to accept a (o&ica((y e3ui%a(ent conc(usion.
This too can be a case in +hich one o- the conc(usions is 0no+(ed&e) and the other is not.
The p(ausib(e e6p(anation is that the possession condition -or one o- the (o&ica( constants
2
in%o(%ed in the -irst conc(usion mentions transitions to such conc(usions -rom such a
premise) +hi(e there is no such mention -or the second conc(usion.
.imi(ar(y) i- Aescartes is in pain) and su--erin& -rom amnesia) a-ter an accident) he
can 0no+ that he is in pain) and not 0no+ +hether Aescartes is in pain. The natura(
e6p(anation o- the di--erence in%o(%es a di--erence in possession-conditions. The
possession condition -or the concept pain mentions the thin0er"s +i((in&ness to ma0e
-irst-person app(ications o- the concept in the presence o- the thin0er"s o+n pain. The
possession condition +i(( not mention third-person +ays o- thin0in& such as that in%o(%ed
e%en in Aescartes" o+n concept Descartes.
The e6istence o- cases in +hich one can e6p(ain the boundaries o- 0no+(ed&e
on(y by dra+in& on -eatures o- concept-possession a(ready su--ices to sho+ that
epistemo(o&y cannot be e6p(anatori(y prior to the theory o- concepts. 1e shou(d)
ho+e%er) aim -or a deeper understandin& than is &i%en ;ust by e6amp(es. 1hy are there
such e6amp(es) and is there some more &enera( phenomenon that they i((ustrate2 There
are %arious hypotheses o- increasin& &enera(ity that one mi&ht propose at this point) but
one sa(ient and hi&h(y &enera( hypothesis is that the %ery nature o- the 0ind o- entit(ement
to ;ud&e a &i%en content that is in%o(%ed in 0no+(ed&e is to be &i%en in part in terms o-
the possession conditions o- the content ;ud&ed. This idea is inc(uded in +hat in recent
years I ha%e ca((ed #the .econd /rincip(e o- ,ationa(ism". It states that the rationa( truth-
conduci%eness o- any &i%en transition to +hich a thin0er is entit(ed is to be
phi(osophica((y e6p(ained in terms o- the nature o- the intentiona( contents and states
in%o(%ed in the transition.
B
This is no p(ace to ar&ue a&ain -or that princip(e. $ere I
simp(y note that anyone +ho accepts the ar&uments -or such a princip(e cou(d not
consistent(y a(so accept that epistemo(o&y is phi(osophica((y e6p(anatori(y prior to the
theory o- concepts.
.hou(d +e then thin0 that the theory o- concepts is phi(osophica((y e6p(anatori(y
prior to epistemo(o&y) that is) accept option (ii) abo%e2 7n any approach under +hich
concepts are indi%iduated by their possession conditions) the indi%iduation o- concepts
+i(( in%o(%e the notion o- ;ud&ement. I +ou(d ar&ue that there is a basic 0ind o-
B
4Three /rincip(es o- ,ationa(ism5) European Journal of Philosophy 10:B (2002)) BC5-
B9C) and 'hapter 2 o- The ealm of eason (76-ord: 76-ord Dni%ersity /ress) 2004).
B
;ud&ement) +hich can be ca((ed #outri&ht ;ud&ement") +hich is not a matter o- de&ree. It
is part o- the nature o- such ;ud&ement that it aims at 0no+(ed&e. I- this is correct) the
theory o- concepts cannot be e6p(anatori(y prior to epistemo(o&y.
There are many points at +hich this reasonin& cou(d be 3uestioned. I +i(( in
particu(ar address the ob;ection that thou&h outri&ht ;ud&ement aims at 0no+(ed&e) this is
a conse3uence o- the nature o- outri&ht ;ud&ement) and does not imp(y that ;ud&ement
cannot be e6p(ained phi(osophica((y +ithout mentionin& 0no+(ed&e. 9ccordin& to this
ob;ector) ;ud&ement aims at rationa( acceptance o- truths. !u(-i((in& this aim may brin&
0no+(ed&e in its train) but the aim is speci-iab(e +ithout mentionin& 0no+(ed&e. $ence)
the ob;ection runs) option (ii) is sti(( in the -ie(d.
I rep(y that rationa(ity itse(- cannot be e(ucidated +ithout re-erence to 0no+(ed&e.
1hat it is rationa( to do and to thin0 depends on +hat you 0no+ and +hat you seem to
0no+. I doubt that #0no+" in this c(aim can be rep(aced by #;ud&e" +ithout reduction o-
si&ni-icance. 9 rationa( person"s outri&ht ;ud&ements and other actions must a(+ays be
sensiti%e to e%idence that he does not rea((y 0no+ the contents +hich he is ;ud&in&)
outri&ht) to be the case. .uch sensiti%ity is precise(y +hat one +ou(d e6pect i- outri&ht
;ud&ement aims at 0no+(ed&e.
.uch in %ery brie-est out(ine are some o- the reasons that option (ii) does not seem
to be correct. I su&&est that +e ou&ht to ho(d the no-priority %ie+ (iii). This is not to
imp(y that one cannot +rite possession conditions -or particu(ar concepts that do not
e6p(icit(y use the notion o- 0no+(ed&e. 7n the contrary) the possession conditions that I
+rote out in A Study of Concepts +ere a(( -ormu(ated in terms o- outri&ht ;ud&ement) not
0no+(ed&e. :ut these conditions sti(( in%o(%e the notion o- 0no+(ed&e o---sta&e i-
outri&ht ;ud&ement has to be e(ucidated in terms o- 0no+(ed&e. '(auses in the possession
condition -or a concept may in%o(%e the epistemic) and a(so ha%e conse3uences -or the
epistemic) e%en i- they do not e6p(icit(y emp(oy the notion o- 0no+(ed&e.
The !ormati"e Dimension# A $lirtation %ith &dealism'
erry +rites 4I- concept possession is an intrinsica((y epistemic condition) then menta(
states are intrinsica((y sub;ect to epistemic e%a(uation. 9nd) p(ausib(y) e%a(uabi(ity
4
imp(ies the possibi(ity-in-princip(e o- an e%a(uator. .o the -acts to +hich psycho(o&y is
supposed to be responsib(e are interpretation-dependentE9 -ortiori) the -acts o-
psycho(o&y are someho+ mind-dependent in a +ay that the data o- &eo(o&y are not. This
0ind o- -(irtin& +ith idea(ism is part o- +hat ma0es concept pra&matism bona -ide
pra&matist5 (>. 4). $e &oes on to mention Aona(d Aa%idson as someone c(ear(y in the
tar&et area o- this ar&ument.
I ar&ue that reco&niFin& the normati%e dimension o- concept possession does not
ha%e to in%o(%e any commitment to interpretation-dependence) nor to the mind-dependent
character o- norms) or o- correctness in psycho(o&ica( ascriptions. The normati%e
dimension o- concept possession is a conse3uence o- the -act that one o- the constituti%e
aims o- ;ud&ement is truth. .uppose that the possession conditions -or the concepts
composin& a &i%en conceptua( content p are such that they ;oint(y imp(y that in &i%en
circumstances a thin0er +i(( be +i((in& to ;ud&e outri&ht that p. I- semantic %a(ues are
assi&ned to concepts in such a +ay as to ensure that ;ud&ements made in accordance +ith
the possession conditions -or concepts come out true) then p +i(( be true in those &i%en
circumstances. This +ay o- assi&nin& semantic %a(ues seems to be re3uired i- ;ud&ement)
constituti%e(y) aims at truth. I- the ;ud&ement cou(d be -a(se in these circumstances) then
it cou(d not rationa((y be re3uired o- thin0ers that they be +i((in& to ma0e the ;ud&ement
in these circumstances) and a -ormu(ation o- the possession conditions -or concept that
says they shou(d be so +i((in& +ou(d be incorrect.
I- a ;ud&ement"s truth in &i%en circumstances is &uaranteed by the %ery +ay
semantic %a(ues are assi&ned to its constituents) it seems that bein& in those
circumstances is as &ood a position as one cou(d be in -or 0no+in& that content to be true.
I- this reasonin& is sound) circumstances +hich ma0e outri&ht ;ud&ement o- a content
rationa() on the basis o- the possession conditions o- the concept in%o(%ed) +i(( a(so yie(d
0no+(ed&e o- the content. .o -rom a startin& point in%o(%in& ;ust considerations o-
;ud&ement) its aim) semantic %a(ue and rationa(ity) +e can dra+ conc(usions about
conditions -or 0no+(ed&e.
This account o- +hat ma0es ;ud&ement in accordance +ith a possession condition
-unction as an epistemic norm does not ma0e any mention o- an e%a(uatin& person or
thin0er) and does not in%o(%e any commitment to mind-dependence o- the norms
5
in%o(%ed. The norms are a conse3uence o- the ne6us o- re(ations bet+een truth)
;ud&ement) semantic %a(ue) and concepts. 9n e%a(uator can e%a(uate in accordance +ith
these norms) but the e%a(uator is responsib(e to the norms i- his assessments are to be
correct. Their correctness does not consist in matters o- ho+ he +ou(d e%a(uate.
1hen de%e(oped in the ri&ht +ay) the epistemic and normati%e aspects o- a
possession condition ha%e the resources to address the prob(em about sortin& that erry
raises. erry says that it is an inade3uate -orm o- theory to say o- a concept C that to
possess it in%o(%es the abi(ity to sort Cs -rom other thin&s. This abi(ity +i(( not
distin&uish possession o- the concept C -rom distinct concepts that are a priori
coe6tensi%e +ith it. $e notes that tryin& to remedy this by addin& that the sortin& capacity
in 3uestion is the abi(ity to sort Cs as Cs is circu(ar and une6p(anatory. I +ho((y a&ree on
both points.
Theories o- concepts that ho(d that some reasons -or app(yin& a concept contribute
to the indi%iduation o- that concept can e6p(ain the di--erence bet+een possessin& one)
rather than another) o- t+o distinct but a priori e3ui%a(ent concepts. They can e6p(ain this
di--erence e%en in the case o- perceptua( concepts. Ta0e once a&ain the case o- the
property
(a) o- bein& a ri&ht-an&(ed 3uadri(atera( o- e3ua(-(en&th sides that is symmetrica(
about the bisectors o- its opposite sides) and
(b) o- bein& a ri&ht-an&(ed 3uadri(ateria( o- e3ua(-(en&th sides that is symmetrica(
about the bisectors o- its opposite an&(es.
/roperties (a) and (b) are a priori coe6tensi%e. :ut a thin0er can see an ob;ect as ha%in&
property (a) +ithout seein& it as ha%in& property (b). 9 thin0er can a(so see an ob;ect as
ha%in& property (b) +ithout seein& it as ha%in& property (a). These speci-ications o- the
contents o- the seein&s-as are statements o- the nonconceptua( representationa( content o-
the e6perience.
4
Thou&h the t+o e6periences (ead to the discrimination) or sortin&) o-
e6act(y the same-shaped thin&s) the di--erent e6periences contribute to the indi%iduation
o- distinct perceptua( concepts) the concepts square and regular-diamond-shaped
respecti%e(y. 9n e6perience o- an ob;ect as symmetrica( about the bisectors o- its an&(es
4
!or more on non-conceptua( content) see my paper 4Aoes /erception ha%e a
@onconceptua( 'ontent25) The Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001) 2B9-G4.
G
can &i%e reason to app(y the second concept to an ob;ect +ithout in itse(- &i%in& reason to
app(y the -irst concept to the same ob;ect. /ossession conditions o- the sort I ha%e been
proposin& ha%e no di--icu(ty distin&uishin& a priori coe6tensi%e cases) e%en in the
perceptua( case.
Epistemic Constraint( eference and Compositionality
erry and I a&ree that systematicity and producti%ity are non-ne&otiab(e -eatures o-
conceptua( content. 1e di%er&e in our %ie+s o- the source o- these -eatures. $e has (on&
re&arded them as empirica( matters o- psycho(o&ica( (a+) and sti(( does so) +hi(e I ho(d
them to be a priori -eatures o- contents composed -rom concepts.
5
:ut +hate%er their
source) +e a&ree that theories that are incompatib(e +ith this systematicity and
producti%ity must be re;ected. erry"s stri0in& c(aim is that this &round -or re;ection
app(ies to epistemica((y-constrained theories o- concepts.
erry"s ar&ument proceeds -rom the case o- reco&nitiona( concepts. 9 thin0er may
ha%e the capacity to reco&niFe $s as such) and the capacity to reco&niFe )s as such. :ut
i- the circumstances in +hich these reco&nitiona( capacities are e6ercised are di--erent)
and are maybe e%en mutua((y e6c(usi%e) then the thin0er may not ha%e the capacity to
reco&niFe $)s as such. In this sense) reco&nitiona( capacities do not compose. erry is
c(ear(y ri&ht on this point. In a nutshe(() erry"s ar&ument -rom this point out+ards is then
that since reco&nitiona( capacities don"t compose) but concepts do) concepts can"t be
reco&nitiona( capacities) nor any other epistemic capacities -or +hich there is such a
-ai(ure o- compositiona(ity. 9s erry puts it) o- the theory he (abe(s #:'/" (bare-bones
concept pra&matism)) 4E epistemic capacities don"t themse(%es compose. :ut :'/ says
that there are epistemic conditions on concept possession. .o :'/ isn"t compatib(e +ith
the compositiona(ity o- concepts. .o :'/ isn"t true.5 (>. p.14).
I ob;ect: the a&reed sense in +hich reco&nitiona( capacities do not compose is not
the sense in +hich concepts do compose. The crucia( point is that the composition o-
5
erry"s %ie+s on this issue are in his boo0 Psychosemantics# The Pro*lem of Meaning in
the Philosophy of Mind ('ambrid&e) >ass.: >IT /ress) 198C)) and mine are in A Study of
Concepts.
C
concepts is to be e6p(ained at the (e%e( o- re-erence) or) better) at the (e%e( o- semantic
%a(ue:
!or a comp(e6 concept to consist o- the concept A conceptua((y composed +ith +
(-or it to be identica( +ith A,+) is -or the -o((o+in& to ho(d: the -undamenta(
condition -or any entity to be the semantic %a(ue o- the comp(e6 concept A,+ is
-or that entity to be the semantic %a(ue o- the concept A app(ied to the semantic
%a(ue o- +.
This -ormu(ation presupposes a !re&ean -rame+or0 in +hich) at the (e%e( o- semantic
%a(ue) -unctiona( app(ication is the on(y operation correspondin&) at the (e%e( o- semantic
%a(ue) to composition. That characteristic o- the !re&ean -rame+or0 is e%ident(y not
compu(sory) but in any acceptab(e -rame+or0 there +i(( be somethin& p(ayin& the ro(e
+hich -unctiona( app(ication p(ays in the !re&ean account. That is) in any acceptab(e
semantic -rame+or0) the -o((o+in& +i(( sti(( be the case:
-or somethin& to be the comp(e6 concept A,+ is -or there to be some operation ,
on semantic %a(ues such that the -undamenta( condition -or an entity to be the
semantic %a(ue o- A,+ is -or it to stand in the re(ation , to the semantic %a(ues o-
the concepts A and + respecti%e(y.
This condition is sti(( -ormu(ated +ho((y at the (e%e( o- re-erence and semantic %a(ue.
It -o((o+s that an account o- +hat it is -or a reco&nitiona( concept to -eature as one
constituent o- a comp(e6 concept has to distin&uish t+o steps. !irst) there is the step that
e6p(ains ho+ a reco&nitiona( capacity contributes to the -i6in& o- a possession condition
-or a concept. .econd) there is the step o- e6p(ainin& ho+ this possession condition p(ays
a ro(e in -i6in& the condition -or somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- the concept. 1hen
this second step has been ta0en) +e ha%e e%erythin& +e need -or the concept to be a
constituent o- comp(e6 concepts) and -or producti%ity and systematicity to obtain.
In describin& the -irst step) it is important to respect the -act that there is a(+ays
more to a reco&nitiona( concept than a reco&nitiona( capacity. The re(ation bet+een
8
reco&nitiona( capacity and reco&nitiona( concept in%o(%in& it is one-many. 7ne and the
same reco&nitiona( capacity can contribute to the indi%iduation o- many di--erent
concepts. I can reco&niFe -(o+ers) but my reco&nitiona( concept flo%er is to be
distin&uished -rom a(( o- these: flo%er-seen-*y-me8 flo%er-seen-*y-someone-or-other8
flo%er-in-my-light-cone8 and so -orth. =et the same basic capacity to reco&niFe -(o+ers
contributes to the indi%iduation o- each o- these concepts) -or each o- +hich one cou(d
-ormu(ate possession conditions that treats them as unstructured. .omeone +ho possesses
our concept flo%er has not on(y a capacity to reco&niFe -(o+ers as such) but a(so has the
tacit 0no+(ed&e that -or any ob;ect in the uni%erse) it is a -(o+er i- and on(y i- it is o- the
same botanica( 0ind as those he can reco&niFe. (The concept flo%er ar&uab(y has a(( the
indeterminacies that this condition imports.) This is di--erent -rom the tacit 0no+(ed&e
in%o(%ed in &raspin& the condition -or somethin& to be a flo%er-seen-*y-me8 it is di--erent
a&ain -rom the tacit 0no+(ed&e in%o(%ed in &raspin& the condition -or somethin& to be a
flo%er-seen-*y-someone-or-other8 and so -orth.
The second step to be characteriFed is that o- the -i6in& o- a condition -or
somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- a concept +ith a possession condition that in%o(%es
a reco&nitiona( capacity. This is an instance o- the &enera( tas0 o- pro%idin& +hat) in A
Study of Concepts) I ca((ed a Aetermination Theory -or a concept. !or a reco&nitiona(
concept) the condition -or an ob;ect to be in the e6tension o- such a concept is that it both
actua((y be o- a 0ind that tri&&ers the reco&nitiona( capacity in 3uestion) and that it meets
the additiona( re3uirement in the content o- the tacit 0no+(ed&e in%o(%ed in possession o-
the reco&nitiona( concept in 3uestion. 1hich ob;ects meet this con;unction condition
depends on ho+ the +or(d is - +hich is +hy) -or such concepts) sense determines
re-erence on(y in combination +ith the +ay the +or(d is.
9n o%erarchin& and constrainin& ro(e is p(ayed here at many points by the
c(assica( idea) present in !re&e and ri&ht(y emphasiFed by Aummett) that a sense is
indi%iduated by the condition -or somethin& to be its re-erence (or) better) as a(+ays) its
semantic %a(ue).
G
9 possession condition) in the conte6t o- a Aetermination Theory) -i6es
a sense on(y because it determines a condition -or somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o-
G
.ee especia((y The &nterpretation of $rege-s Philosophy (Hondon: Auc0+orth) 1981).
9
the sense. This is ho+ reco&nitiona( concepts -i6 a sense by the means ;ust described) and
+hy they di--er -rom reco&nitiona( capacities.
The c(assica( idea a(so e6p(ains +hy +e ha%e -u((y &i%en the nature o- conceptua(
composition +hen +e ha%e speci-ied ho+ the semantic %a(ue o- the comp(e6 concept
depends on that o- its constituents. In &i%in& that speci-ication) +e supp(y the
-undamenta( condition -or somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- the comp(e6. This is
precise(y) under the o%erarchin& constraint) +hat is re3uired to indi%iduate the comp(e6
sense.
$oundering on the $ailure of the Analytic.Synthetic Distinction'
erry ar&ues that no princip(ed reason has e%er been &i%en -or c(assi-yin& some
proposition as ana(ytic) and that no one has e%er said +hat ana(yticity consists in. erry
may be surprised by the e6tent o- my a&reement +ith his points about the
ana(yticIsynthetic distinction. The reason that this a&reement can e6ist +ithout
incoherence is that +e ou&ht to distin&uish %ery sharp(y bet+een a theory o- the ana(ytic
and a theory o- the a priori. 9n attac0 on the app(icabi(ity and the %ery inte((i&ibi(ity o-
the notion o- the ana(ytic) the idea o- truth pure(y in %irtue o- meanin&) is not thereby an
attac0 on the app(icabi(ity and inte((i&ibi(ity o- the a priori. In -act) many o- the points
erry ma0es in the present paper ha%e been emphasiFed by those de-enders o- the a priori
(myse(- inc(uded) +ho re;ect the app(icabi(ity and inte((i&ibi(ity o- the notion o- the
ana(ytic.
C
The approach to concept possession that I ha%e ad%ocated does in%o(%e a
commitment to the notion o- the a priori. The intuiti%e notion o- the a priori is that o-
somethin& +hich can be 0no+n in a +ay that is ;usti-icationa((y independent o-
perceptua( e6perience. There are se%era( parameters in this intuiti%e characteriFation that
can be set di--erent(y (e6perience cou(d be +idened to inc(ude ima&ination) or a(( menta(
states)) but it contains the core ideas on +hich a(( the %ariants are based. It is one thin& to
ha%e an intuiti%e characteriFation) and another to ha%e some theoretica( understandin& o-
C
.ee in particu(ar my paper 4$o+ 9re 9 /riori Truths /ossib(e25) European Journal of
Philosophy 1 (199B) 1C5-199.
10
ho+ the intuiti%e characteriFation can be instantiated. I thin0 the a priori is possib(e on(y
because certain princip(es and transitions are mentioned in the possession condition -or a
&i%en concept) and semantic %a(ues are assi&ned to that concept in such a +ay as to ma0e
these princip(es and transitions true or truth-preser%in& respecti%e(y. This approach
immediate(y -ounds a priori status in re(ations that in%o(%e re-erence and re(ations to the
+or(d. I am +ho((y in a&reement +ith erry that many o- the princip(es thou&ht to be
ana(ytic are not a priori) and in many cases not e%en true. The idea that they +ere a priori
+ent hand-in-hand +ith acceptance o- incorrect possession conditions -or the concepts in
3uestion. :etter -ormu(ations o- the possession conditions +i(( a(so &i%e a better
de(ineation o- +hich princip(es and transitions rea((y are a priori.
These remar0s are intended on(y as a de(ineation o- the position in (o&ica( space
that I intend to be occupyin&. 9r&uments +i(( continue o%er particu(ar cases) as they +i((
o%er possib(e a(ternati%e e6p(anations o- the phenomenon o- the a priori.
8
>y point here
is ;ust that the Juinean criti3ue o- ana(yticity) both in its epistemo(o&ica( and its
constituti%e aspects) does not carry o%er to those approaches to the a priori +hich re;ect
the notion o- ana(yticity.
/nderstanding( &mplicit Conceptions( &mplicit Definition
In some respects) erry is c(oser to my position) and in other respects -urther -rom it) than
he represents himse(- as bein&. In the mid-1990s) my %ie+s on concept-possession
chan&ed some+hat) in +ays re-(ected in a series o- papers.
9
I became con%inced that there
8
!or an utter(y di--erent) non--actua(ist approach to the a priori) see $artry !ie(d"s paper
#9priority as an ?%a(uati%e @otion") repr. in his Truth and the A*sence of $act (76-ord:
76-ord Dni%ersity /ress) 2001).
9
.ee 4Imp(icit 'onceptions) Dnderstandin& and ,ationa(ity5) in eflections and eplies#
Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler +urge) ed. >. $ahn and :. ,amber& (>IT /ress)
200B)8 a(so in Concepts) ed. ?. Ki((aneu%a) %o(ume 9 (1998) o- Philosophical &ssues
(9tascadero) 'a.: ,id&e%ie+)) 4B-888 4Imp(icit 'onceptions) the 9 /riori) and the
Identity o- 'oncepts5) a(so in Ki((aneu%a"s co((ection) pp. 121-1488 4?6p(ainin& the 9
/riori: The /ro&ram o- >oderate ,ationa(ism5) in !e% Essays on the A Priori) ed. /.
11
are phenomena that cannot be accommodated +ithin the strict -rame+or0 o- A Study of
Concepts. 7ne such phenomenon I ca((ed the phenomenon o- ne+ princip(es. This
phenomenon consists in the -act that -or some concepts) a thin0er can come) rationa((y) to
appreciate that a ne+ princip(e) +hich essentia((y contains a &i%en concepts) and +hich
does not -o((o+ -rom those he a(ready accepted) is correct -or the concept -or the concept
he possessed a(( a(on&. The disco%ery o- ne+ a6ioms) emphasiFed in LMde("s
phi(osophica( +ritin&s that became more +ide(y a%ai(ab(e in the second ha(- o- the 90s) is
one instance o- this phenomenon.
10
:ut the phenomenon does not ha%e to in%o(%e
anythin& o- hi&h sophistication. ?%en the %a(idity o- the ru(e o- or-e(imination can come
as ne+s to someone +ho has used the concept o- a(ternation -or many years) as anyone
+ho remembers teachin& (o&ic is (i0e(y to be ab(e to attest.
The bearin& o- such -acts on the theory o- A Study of Concepts is mu(tip(e. !irst)
e%en some primiti%e ru(es (i0e or-e(imination seems to be rationa((y reached on the basis
o- a thin0er"s understandin& o- a(ternation. This is a state o- a--airs that is simp(y not
pro%ided -or in the theory o- that boo0. The theory needed to be re%ised to pro%ide a
theory o- understandin& that does permit +hat is actua((y the case. .econd) that re%ised
theory had better be accompanied by a better account o- ho+ semantic %a(ue is
determined -rom possession conditions than simp(y the o(der %ie+ that the semantic %a(ue
ma0es truth-preser%in& the %arious ru(es and transitions the thin0er -inds primiti%e(y
compe((in&. I- e%en underi%ed ru(es do not ha%e to be -ound primiti%e(y compe((in& by a
thin0er) that account +i(( underdetermine the correct semantic %a(ue. 9 better account has
a(so to say ho+ a semantic %a(ue is determined (to&ether +ith the +or(d) -rom the
condition -or understandin&. The impro%ed account has to do so in such a +ay that ne+(y
disco%ered a6ioms are correct N correctness bein& somethin& at the (e%e( o- semantic
%a(ue N -or the ne+(y disco%ered a6ioms.
9(ready) any theory +hich accommodates these points +i(( be in a&reement +ith
t+o o- the points erry ma0es. 7ne point o- a&reement is that sometimes a princip(e is
accepted because a thin0er possesses a &i%en concept) and this can be a &enuine
:o&hossian and '. /eacoc0e) (76-ord: 76-ord Dni%ersity /ress) 2000)) 255-85.
10
*. LMde() Collected 0or1s 2olume &&&# /npu*lished Essays and Lectures (@e+ =or0:
76-ord Dni%ersity /ress) 1995).
12
e6p(anation. 9 second point o- stron& a&reement is that simp(y bein& ab(e to &i%e an
imp(icit de-inition o- a concept is not yet to &i%e a theory o- understandin& (a theory o-
concept-possession). I- someone can possess the concept) but not yet accept) and ha%e to
en&a&e in rationa( thou&ht) be-ore acceptin& some part o- an imp(icit de-inition) that sort
o- acceptance cannot be +hat possession o- the concept consists in.
In -act I am much more sceptica( than erry o- the possibi(ity o- imp(icit de-inition
e%en in the case o- some (o&ica( concepts (the (ac0 o- scepticism on erry"s part is not a
crucia( -eature o- his position). The prob(em is especia((y acute in the case o- ne&ation.
1hat 0ind o- imp(icit de-inition o- ne&ation emer&es -rom LentFen"s se3uent ca(cu(us2 In
the case in +hich +e ha%e no -ormu(ae in the antecedent) and on(y one ne&ated -ormu(a
in the succedent) a(( +e obtain -rom LentFen"s ru(es is that that is somethin& obtainab(e
-rom the -o((o+in& transition bet+een se3uents: -rom
9 OP Q
to
Q OP R9.
I -o((o+ *(eene"s +e((-0no+n notation.
11
# S OP T" means that i- a(( e(ements o- S are
true) then at (east one e(ement o- T is true. 1e a((o+ speci-ications o- sets o- sentences by
(istin& their members8 and Q is the empty set. The disp(ayed transition is ob%ious(y
correct) but does it rea((y &i%e a means o- introducin& ne&ation that does not in%o(%e
some prior use either o- ne&ation) or o- -a(sity2 'onstrued as part o- an imp(icit
de-inition) this characteriFation te((s us that R9 is true ;ust in case: i- 9 is true) some
e(ement o- the empty set is true. This +i(( &i%e one a satis-actory imp(icit de-inition o- the
ne&ation o- 9 on(y in the presence o- the in-ormation that it is not the case that somethin&
is an e(ement o- the empty set. @o prob(em +ith thatU N but ho+ is this su--icient
condition -or the truth o- a ne&ation e%en to be -ormu(ated +ithout usin& the notion o-
ne&ation) -a(sity or somethin& co&nate2 I- it cannot be so -ormu(ated) +e do not a-ter a((
ha%e a ne&ation--ree imp(icit de-inition o- ne&ation in the LentFen ru(es.
11
.ee .. '. *(eene) Mathematical Logic (@e+ =or0: 1i(ey) 19GC) esp. 'hapter G. The
disp(ayed transition is ne&ation-introduction on the ri&ht) as &i%en on p. 289 o- *(eene"s
boo0) in the case in +hich the sets S and V are empty.
1B
To the best o- my 0no+(ed&e) some -orm o- this prob(em a--ects a(( attempts to
&i%e an imp(icit de-inition o- ne&ation. This is not to say that LentFen"s ru(es are +ron&:
on the contrary) they are ob%ious(y correct. @or is it to say that the LentFen se3uent
ca(cu(us does not pro%ide important insi&hts. The insi&hts it pro%ides) ho+e%er) are not
those o- a set o- imp(icit de-initions) but o- a contribution to proo--theory.
I su&&ested that +e can account -or the phenomenon o- ne+ princip(es i- +e
ac0no+(ed&e that certain concepts are such that to possess them is to ha%e an imp(icit
conception. 9n imp(icit conception is a subpersona( menta( state +ith a content that
speci-ies the conditions under +hich the concept app(ies. ?%idence that a thin0er has one
imp(icit conception rather than another can be mu(tip(e and %arious. 7ne important
source o- e%idence is the -actors that are causa((y in-(uentia( in (eadin& the thin0er to
app(y the concept. 9 thin0er may misdescribe the conditions under +hich he app(ies a
concept) and may e%en -ind them hard to articu(ate at a((. The conditions may be &i%en in
reducti%e terms) as seems to be possib(e -or some concepts. In other cases) such as that o-
ne&ation) I doubt that any reducti%e speci-ication is possib(e at a((.
$o+ do imp(icit conceptions &i%e an e6p(anation o- the phenomenon o- ne+
princip(es2 The content o- an imp(icit conception +hich is operati%e in e6p(ainin& a
person"s app(ication o- a concept may entai( the correctness o- a ne+ princip(e that the
thin0er had not pre%ious(y ac0no+(ed&ed) and +hich may come as a disco%ery -or him.
This e6p(anation is a%ai(ab(e on(y i- +e a(so accept that the semantic %a(ue o- a concept
+hose possession consists in ha%in& an imp(icit conception has its semantic %a(ue -i6ed
thus: it is the entity (o- the appropriate cate&ory) +hich satis-ies the condition &i%en in
the content o- the imp(icit conception. 1ith that bac0&round in p(ace) there +i(( not
mere(y be ne+ princip(es that are imp(ied by the content o- the imp(icit conception.
Those ne+ princip(es +i(( a(so be true.
:oth in the case o- a concept -or +hich there is an imp(icit conception) and in the
case o- a concept -or +hich a possession condition can be &i%en in the -orm ad%ocated in
A Study of Concepts) I continue to identi-y meetin& the possession condition +ith
0no+in& +hat it is -or somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- the concept. The notion o-
0no+in& +hat it is -or somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- a concept is important in
se%era( +ays. It is important in e(ucidatin& +hat it is -or a transition in thou&ht to be
14
rationa() -rom the thin0er"s o+n standpoint. 9 transition is rationa() -rom the thin0er"s
o+n point o- %ie+) +hen he is in a position to 0no+ that it is truth-preser%in&) on the
basis o- his 0no+(ed&e o- +hat it is -or somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- the crucia(
concept or concepts in%o(%ed in the transition.
This apparatus bears upon the possession condition -or the (o&ica( concept o-
con;unction) +hich erry discusses in some detai(. The concept o- con;unction is a specia(
case) because t+o %ery di--erent thin&s coincide -or it. 7ne is 0no+in& +hat it is -or
somethin& to be the semantic %a(ue o- the concept. The other is -indin& primiti%e(y
compe((in& those transitions that ha%e to be -ound compe((in& in order to possess the
concept. There does not seem to be any more to 0no+in& +hat it is -or somethin& to be
the semantic %a(ue o- the concept o- con;unction than -indin& in-erences o- the -orm o-
the introduction and e(imination ru(es primiti%e(y compe((in&. There are no ne+
princip(es essentia((y in%o(%in& con;unction) or truths in%o(%in& con;unction) that are (e-t
une6p(ained by the condition that the semantic %a(ue o- con;unction is the truth--unction
-or +hich these ru(es are a(+ays truth-preser%in&. :ut -rom the -act that +e need no more
in capturin& understandin& and the determination o- semantic %a(ue than the princip(es
+hich must be -ound primiti%e(y compe((in& in this particu(ar case o- con;unction) it by
mo means -o((o+s that +e do not need more in the case o- other concepts. !or this
reason) it can be dan&erous to ta0e the possession condition -or con;unction as a
paradi&m.
erry does not thin0 that e%en the -ormu(ation o- the possession condition -or
conunction that I o--ered in A Study of Concepts is correct. I address his ob;ections
brie-(y) +hi(e tryin& not to become +hat the :ritish courts condemn as a #%e6atious
(iti&ant".
(i) erry emphasiFes that ro(e in %a(id in-erences shou(d not be con-used +ith ro(e
in a thin0er"s psycho(o&ica( economy8 and o- course I a&ree. >y approach to the
phi(osophica( theory o- concepts has in%o(%ed an attempt to (in0 these t+o distinct thin&s
in some cases %ia a theoretica( c(aim) about ho+ semantic %a(ue o- a concept is
determined by a certain psycho(o&ica( ro(e) possib(y in combination +ith the +ay the
+or(d is. In the case o- con;unction) my c(aim is that +e can speci-y that ro(e +ithout
presupposin& the thin0er"s possession o- the concept o- con;unction (sub;ect to ha%in&
15
ans+ers to erry"s other ob;ections). The psycho(o&ica( ro(e in 3uestion is certain(y not
de%oid o- intrinsic connections +ith other intentiona( matters. Thin0ers ha%e some &rasp
o- the in-erentia( transitions they are ma0in& as aimin& at truth-preser%ation. $ence my
ans+er to erry"s 3uestion #compe((in& as +hat2" is: compe((in& as transitions -urtherin&
the &oa( o- acceptin& on(y +hat is true. @onethe(ess) the characteriFation o- a tar&et
concept as one -or +hich a thin0er -inds +hat are in -act instances o- the introduction and
e(imination ru(es -or con;unction to be compe((in&) and does so because they are o- a
certain -orm) sti(( does not seem to me to import circu(arity into the characteriFation o-
&rasp o- the tar&et concept. I- the semantic %a(ue o- the concept is then -i6ed as the
-unction that ma0es transitions o- those -orms a(+ays truth-preser%in&) those transitions
in%o(%in& that concept +i(( rea((y be truth-preser%in&. The e6p(anation o- +hy they are so
does not in%o(%e a commitment to the app(icabi(ity o- the idea o- #%a(idity pure(y in %irtue
o- -orm". Truth and semantic %a(ue p(ay an essentia( part in this account.
(ii) erry +onders +hat notion o- -orm I cou(d possib(y ha%e in mind +hen I say
that someone +ho possesses the concept o- con;unction -inds certain in-erences
compe((in& by %irtue o- their -orm. I a&ree that thin0ers do not ha%e to ha%e any &rasp)
e%en tacit) o- the distinction bet+een (o&ica( and non-(o&ica( concepts in order to possess
the concept o- con;unction (and I a&ree it +ou(d not ser%e any o- my purposes to su&&est
that they do). :ut I do not see any insuperab(e di--icu(ty o- princip(e in the notion o- a
!re&ean Thou&ht as ha%in& a certain -orm. ?ach !re&ean Thou&ht has a tree-(i0e
structure) one +hich !re&e +ou(d say mirrors the structure o- the sentence that e6presses
it. 9ny such tree-(i0e structure may be ana(yFed in many di--erent +ays. There is no such
thin& as #the" -orm o- a !re&ean Thou&ht) any more than there is such a thin& as #the"
-orm o- a structured sentence. Ai--erent ana(yses may brin& out di--erent re(ationships
bet+een constituents) and a(( o- these re(ationships may be rea(. It is this notion o- -orm
to +hich I +as intendin& to appea( +hen I said that con;unction is a concept C such that
thin0ers must -ind in-erences o- the -orm pCq . p to be primiti%e(y compe((in& because o-
their -orm. I thin0 that some appreciation o- this -orm is a(so psycho(o&ica((y rea(. 1hen
one ma0es an in-erence o- this sort) one is a+are o- the -orm) e%en i- nonconceptua((y so.
It is in the phenomeno(o&y o- conscious thou&ht (+ith a sma(( #t"). I a(so do not doubt
that the on(y +ay that menta( states +ith such structured Thou&hts as their contents can
1G
e6ist) and be causa((y in-(uentia() is -or somethin& (i0e erry"s hypothesis o- a subpersona(
(an&ua&e o- thou&ht to e6ist.
The state o- possessin& a &i%en concept) +hether that state consists in possession
o- an imp(icit conception) or +hether it in%o(%es a possession condition o- the -orm &i%en
in A Study of Concepts) is a state that can be casua((y e6p(anatory8 and not mere(y under
some -aWon de par(er) or in some Lrade : idiom. /ossession o- the concept itse(-) and not
;ust some rea(iFin& state) can be causa((y e6p(anatory o- ;ud&ements) understandin&)
rationa( acceptance o- ne+ princip(es) appreciation o- the rationa(ity o- a ;ud&ement) and
much e(se. /ossession o- the concept has e6p(anatory po+ers) po+ers in particu(ar to
e6p(ain content-in%o(%in& phenomena) that no mere rea(iFin& state can reproduce. I
re&ard this point as an instance o- a (esson (earned -rom the better t+entieth-century
(iterature. Indeed some o- the most important core points are made in erry"s o+n
discussion o- e6p(anation in the specia( sciences) in The Language of Thought.
12
.omeone
mi&ht try to combine the account o- possession conditions that I ha%e been de%e(opin&
+ith the sort o- une6p(anatory pure dispositiona(ism that erry criticiFes in #$a%in&
'oncepts". .uch a dispositiona(ism +ou(d be a &ratuitous add-on) not at a(( re3uired by
the theory o- concepts itse(-. In this respect) the #concept pra&matism" that is erry"s
tar&et is a pac0a&e +hose e(ements are) in my %ie+) best unbund(ed -rom one another)
and the dispositiona(ism shou(d be discarded in any case.
!or the record) I a(so re&ard particu(ar menta( e%ents +ith conceptua( content)
+hether those e%ents are conscious or unconscious) as rea( e(ements o- the causa( order)
+hich can e6p(ain other menta( and non-menta( e%ents and states o- a--airs. Their
possessin& the conceptua( content they do can a(so be the property in %irtue o- +hich they
e6p(ain +hat they do.
In this area) as in others) it is %ery important to distin&uish dispositiona(ism -rom
re(ationa( indi%iduation. /ossession o- a &i%en concept is a re(ationa((y indi%iduated state)
in the sense that +hat ma0es it the state it is has to do +ith +hat ;ud&ements and
transitions in thou&ht that a thin0er is +i((in& to ma0e) +hen nothin& inter-eres. :ut a
re(ationa((y indi%iduated state can be a cate&orica( one) and not somethin& mere(y
counter-actua( or dispositiona(. These are metaphysica( distinctions that ob%ious(y need
12
@e+ =or0: Thomas 'ro+e(() 19C5.
1C
more theory) but I thin0 they are in%o(%ed in our conception o- &enuine e6p(anation)
These distinctions are imp(icated i- +e ho(d that concept-possession is a causa((y
e6p(anatory state.
I conc(ude +ith a comment about the #'artesian" %ie+ o- concepts that erry
presents in this paper as a ri%a( treatment to my o+n %ie+s and their i(0. erry +rites 4To
ha%e the concept A7L is to be ab(e to thin0 about do&s as such8 and) con%erse(y) to be
ab(e to thin0 about do&s as such is to ha%e the concept A7L5 (>. p.B). It seems to me
that these are neutra( points about concepts that +i(( be accepted by any theory that
a((o+s that concepts ha%e re-erences) and essentia((y -eature in the contents o- thin0in&s N
that is) by any theory that is not a non-starter. It is entire(y consistent +ith these neutra(
points that the concepts themse(%es are actua((y indi%iduated by their possession
conditions.
@e+ =or0 Dni%ersity
18