MOISES JOCSON, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON- date of the registration w/the Register of Deeds.
n w/the Register of Deeds. All documents actually &
VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents
Petition for Certiorari to review CA decision [February 16, 1989]
Facts:
 Spouses Emilio Jocson & Alejandra Poblete had 2 children: Moises Jocson &
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. Alejandra
died intestate.
 April 1, 1972 – Emilio died intestate.
 June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents
executed by Emilio during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared
null & void and that the properties involved be partitioned bet him & his sister:
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6
parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilio’s
manifestation that the lands was sold at a low price because it was his
loving, helpful & thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his
son possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not
violate any law & that he did not touch his wife’s properties. He
acknowledged receipt of payment.
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills & a camalig in
Naic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too.
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition & Adjudication w/Sale executed March 9,
1969 wherein Emilio & Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially
partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio sold
his share to Agustina.
 All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 & 2 were registered
w/the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled & new certificates
issued in the name of Agustina.
 Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null & void because his father’s consent was obtained by fraud,
deceit, undue pressure, influence & other illegal machinations. He also
alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that his
sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the
contract is fictitious, simulated & fabricated.
2. Same allegations re #2 & #3 with additional allegation that he was
deliberately excluded & they intended to defraud him of his legitimate
share. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents’
business & they must have used business earnings or simulated
consideration in order to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad & daughter living under same roof.
4. Dad didn’t need money since sold properties were all income-producitng.
5. #1 & #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio can’t validly sell.
6. #3: he only questions sale of dad’s share to sister but not extrajudicial
partition.
 RTC: decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated & fictitious
because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were
grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability
of sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. Declared #1 &
#2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers w/c
declared: “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.” Ordered
registration of prop to 2 children.
 CA: reversed. Nos. 1 & 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract
based on fraud must be filed 4 yrs from discovery of such w/c begins on the
intended to be binding & effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new
titles. Partition w/sale in #3 is valid since it was done in accordance w/New CC
Art. 996 on intestate succession & Moises’ 1/3 has not been prejudiced.
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription
NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consent’s obtained by fraud
is voidable (CC Art. 1330) & action for annulment must be filed w/in 4 yrs from time
of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contract
was registered w/Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman).
If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further
assailed that sale was w/o consideration since amount paid were merely simulated.
Contracts w/o cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC Art. 1352).
A sale w/simulated price is void (CC Art. 1471 & 1409[3]) and action for declaration
of its nullity does not prescribe (CC Art. 1410).
2. WON sales were w/o consideration.
NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations,
especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of
price & they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome
the presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own
witness contradicted his claim that his sister & her husband had no source of
income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina & Ernesto were into buy & sell of palay &
rice. Even he himself said that he didn’t know if his sister had other businesses.
Agustina testified that she was into buy & sell even prior to her marriage.
3. WON prices were simulated
NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than
assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs.
P24,840.00). Besides difference bet market value & purchase price is
understandable considering father’s filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of
price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect in
consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent.
4. WON sale is improbable.
NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that all
essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object & cause.
5. WON properties in #1 & #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio & wife.
NO. CC Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CP
unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party
who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage
(Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in
question were indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can
invoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP
(see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesn’t say when properties
were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different from
registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor &
only registered such after marriage.
“Married to” phrase is a mere description of Emilio’s civil status at the time of
registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner,
property registered in his name alone & that he is married. Consistent w/principle
that registration of property in name of only one spouse doesn’t negate possibility of
it being conjugal (Bucoy vs. Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear & convincing
proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof to
show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the
presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus,
properties are considered exclusive to Emilio.
HOLDING: Petition dismissed. CA affirmed.
FRANCISCO v. CA
299 SCRA 188 (1998)
Facts:
 Teresita (petitioner), is Eusebio’s (private respondent) legal wife second
marriage. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private
respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
 Teresita’s allegations:
o Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they’ve acquired properties in Barangay
Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.
o These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to
administer them.
o Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general
power of attorney which authorized Conchita to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
 Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of
attorney, thus enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared
administratrix of properties in dispute.
 RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that
said properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they
pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to
Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed
this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that:
o CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has
already been repealed by art. 253, FC
o It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC
 However, issue in Teresita’s reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art.
253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil
Code" 4
Issue: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio
exclusively.
Held and Ratio:
 Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC,
specifically by Art. 254, FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in
relation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158&160 doesn’t operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and vested
while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be
resolved based on provisions of New CC.
 Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must
first show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption
refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate
when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong,
clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.
 In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage
with Eusebio.
 As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebio’s testimony that
he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought
into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it
was not yet registered in his name.
 Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is
inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own exclusively,
pursuant to Art. 148, New CC.
 Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and
include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's
acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the
land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him,
"during the marriage, by lucrative title."
 As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for the
house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of
Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone
in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not
prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The
fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to
whether or not the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as
her documents all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures (Art. 1431,
New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence).
 Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of
Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the
proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (Art.
158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on
the source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there is
also lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage.
 Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at
San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property
was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing
and phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.
 Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties
considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are
conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as
to incapacitate him to administer property.