Copy No.

NASA PROGRAM GEMINI WORKING PAPER NO. 5050

1
SPACECRAFT 8 ATTITUDE CONTROL

ANOMALY REPORT

DISTRIBUTION AND REFERENCING

This paper is not suitable for general distribution or referencing. It may be referenced
only in other working correspondence and documents by participating organizations.

I
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
JUNE 27, 1966
 NASA PROGRAM GEMINI WORKING PAPER NO. 5050

SPACECRAFT 8 ATTITUDE CONTROL ANOMALY REPORT

Prepared by: James L. Gibbons, Test Evaluation Office

Victor P. Neshyba, Test Evaluation Office
Test Operations, Gemini Program Office

Approved by:

S. H. Simpkinson
Manager, Office of Test Operations

Authorized for Distribution:

Charles W. Ma thews
Manager, Gemini Program Office

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
JUNE 27, 1966
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 iii

FOREWORD

The attitude control anomaly which occurred on the Gemini VIII

mission became the focus of attention of many Manned Spacecraft Center
and vehicle contractor personnel. The authors sincerely acknowledge
the contributions of the personnel who participated on the Mission
Evaluation Team, and in the testing, analyses, and planning of design
modifications and procedural changes for subsequent flights. To a con-
siderable measure, this document is a report of their contributions.
In addition to the basic work accomplished by a large number of people,
the following personnel assisted directly in the documentation of this
report:

William H. Douglas, Test Operations Office

Gregory P. Mclntosh, Test Operations Office

Lonnie W. Jenkins, Propulsion and Power Division

John E. Williams, Test Operations Office

Edward P. Gammon, Test Operations Office

Charles S. Pinch, Guidance and Control Division

Page intentionally left blank
 CONTENTS

Section Page

FOREWORD iii

1.0 PURPOSE 1

2.0 SUMMARY 1

3.0 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS 1

k.O DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS RESULTS 2

5.0 ACTION TAKEN 5

5.1 Spacecraft Tests 5

5.2 Systems Analyses 6

5-3 Quality Evaluation 9

APPENDIX A A-l

APPENDIX B B-l

APPENDIX C C-l

APPENDIX D D-l

APPENDIX E E-l
vi

TABLES

Table Page

I SUMMARY OF POSTULATED FAILURES 12

FIGURES

Figure

1 OAMS Propellant consumption during TCA 8

quiescent period 16

2 Electrical circuitry associated with TCA 8 17

3 Circuit conditions necessary in order for a single

high-resistance short circuit to allow the oxidizer
solenoid valve only to be open 18
 1.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to document (l) the characteristics

of the Spacecraft 8 attitude control anomaly; (2) the analyses which
were undertaken to identify the cause of the anomalyj (j) the results
of the analyses; (k) the action taken to avoid a recurrence of the
anomalyj and (5) the procedures established to effect rapid vehicle
control "by the crew in the event of a recurrence of this anomaly on
future spacecraft.

2.0 SUMMARY

The Spacecraft 8 Orbital Attitude and Maneuver System (OAMS) thrust

chamber assembly (TCA) 8 started to fire in an uncontrolled and inter-
mittent manner while the spacecraft was docked with the Gemini Agena
Target Vehicle (GATV). By undocking the two vehicles, the crew isolated
the problem to the spacecraft, and they regained control by opening the
circuit breakers to remove power from the OAMS and by activating and
using the Reentry Control System (RCS). Analysis reveals that the
probable cause of the thruster firing was a short circuit to spacecraft
ground .which allowed current to flow through the thruster valve solenoid
coils, thus causing them to open the poppet valves. The intermittent
nature of the fault has not been clearly established, but it may have
resulted from an intermittent short circuit or a combination of short-
circuited and open-circuited wires.

3.0 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

The Gemini VIII attitude control anomaly occurred during revolu-

tion 5, approximately 26 minutes after docking, and while the spacecraft
was out of range of network stations and tracking ships. Prior to the
anomaly, the GATV was commanded by the flight crew to yaw the docked
vehicles 90s. This maneuver was successfully completed in 55 seconds
and with a yaw rate very close to the normal 1.5 deg/sec.
At 7:00:00 ground elapsed time (g.e. t.), the docked spacecraft-GATV
combination had been configured for the platform parallelism test, the
Attitude Control System (ACS) was in flight control mode 3, and the GATV
recorder had been turned on by a command from the flight crew. At
7: 00.26.7 g.e.t., roll and yaw rates began to develop without the crew
detecting any visual or audible evidence of spacecraft thruster firing.
In an attempt to isolate the source of the anomaly, the GATV ACS was
deactivated by a command from'the crew, and the spacecraft OAMS was
activated in the pulse mode at T: 00: 38.2 g. e. t. Prom 7: 00: 38.2 to
7:10:55 g.e.t., the crew attempted to control the spacecraft by utiliz-
ing the Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics (ACME) in direct, rate
command, and pulse modes without being able to completely stabilize the
docked vehicles. Thruster 8 either ceased to fire, or operated at a low
thrust level for k minutes ^2.9 seconds during this 10-minute period.
This further complicated the task of isolating the cause of the anomaly.
The GATV ACS was again commanded on to determine if the GATV
thrusters would reduce the angular rate. No improvement was noted and
the ACS was turned off at 7:12:38.6 g. e.t. The crew, in an effort to
isolate the problem, switched to secondary Attitude Control Electronics
(ACE) but with no apparent success. At 7:15:12.3 g.e.t., after the crew
had determined that «-n attitude rates had been sufficiently reduced to
avoid recontact, the vehicles were undocked by using the OAMS forward-
firing thrusters for separation.
After undocking, the angular rates immediately started to increase,
thus verifying that the problem was in the spacecraft attitude control
system. As rates increased to 30 deg/sec, the crew selected the OAMS
rate command mode. Rates were slightly reducedj however, the ACME bias
power was inadvertently interrupted and this deactivated all control of
the spacecraft but left TCA 8 firing. As rates began increasing toward
a level of 300 deg/sec, the crew activated the RCS in the previously
selected rate command mode; however, with no ACME bias power, no con-
trol could be obtained. Subsequently, the OAMS circuit breakers were
opened; the RCS was placed in DIRECT-DIRECT, which did not require ACME;
and the rates were controlled using both rings of the RCS. After the
crew determined that control was available with the RCS in DIRECT-DIRECT,
the RCS A-ring was turned off. Use of the RCS B-ring slowly decreased
the angular rates and.the spacecraft was finally brought to a stable
attitude at J: 25:30 g.e.t. Response in the other control modes was
then regained by resetting the ACME circuit breakers and switches. Con-
trol of the spacecraft with the OAMS was later reestablished after TCA 8
had been deactivated by placing its circuit breaker in the open position.

4.0- DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS RESULTS

The failure to maintain attitude control was characterized by a

"thruster on" condition of the spacecraft OAMS TCA 8. Prior to the
anomaly, no inadvertent thrust had occurred; and at the onset of the
problem the valves were closed, and the OAMS control power was off. In
this configuration, the ACME system is disabled and should not signal
any thruster to fire. A mechanical failure would require the highly
unlikely opening of the independent oxidizer and fuel valves at the
same instant and against their respective closing springs and system
pressure. In the following discussion, it should become clear that the
cause of the inadvertent firing was a short circuit to spacecraft ground
in the circuitry between the Orbital Attitude and Maneuver Electronics
(OAME) package and the thruster valve solenoid coils.
The following information is presented as being pertinent to the
analysis of the problem:

(a) At 7:00:26.785 g.e.t., TCA 8 turned on for U.9 seconds, turned

off for 4.0 seconds, and then turned on again. The thruster on-off telem-
etry data and the rate-gyro telemetry data verified this condition. At
7:00:38.285, the OAMS was activated to stabilize the docked spacecraft-
GATV combination. The telemetry data indicated that TCA 8 stayed on for
the remainder of the mission. However, the rate-gyro telemetry data
indicate that at 7:02: 37. 4 TCA 8 either stopped thrusting or the thrust
level was sharply reduced. There was evidence of a continuing low level
of constant thrust. TCA 8 remained in this mode until 7:07:20.3 g.e.t.,
at which time the rate-gyro data indicate that TCA 8 resumed operation
with a full thrust and that it continued operating until the circuit
breaker was opened at approximately 7-18:15 g.e.t., although some vari-
ations in its thrust level occurred immediately subsequent to undocking.
During the 4-minute 42.9-second interval that TCA 8 was inoperative or was
thrusting at a very low level, the rate-gyro telemetry data show periods
of roll-left and yaw-left acceleration without any other thruster being
active. This acceleration is in the range of that which could be caused
by TCA 8 expelling only oxidizer.
(b) Figure 1 depicts for the period of degraded thrust, a compari-
son of propellant usage calculated from propellant temperature and pres-
sure parameters with propellant usage calculated from thruster activi-
ties during the same period. Three curves are portrayed. The first
curve is based on the measured thrust activity of TCA's 1 through 7 and
assumes that both the fuel and the oxidizer valves of TCA 8 were closed.
The second curve is based on the same activity of TCA's 1 through 7 plus
a continuous flow of oxidizer only from TCA 8 during this period. The
third curve includes flow of both oxidizer and fuel and is included to
aid in the interpretation of the other two curves. (Based on rate data,
the third curve is not a possible mode of TCA activity.) The effect of
temperature on flow rate has been included in the calculation of the
data. Based on the data, it is evident that no conclusion may be drawn
which eliminates or confirms either hypothesis. However, when the rate
data are considered, and in view of completely nominal GATV operation
for the rest of the mission, it must be acceded that this degraded
thrust probably originated from the spacecraft and, more precisely,
from TCA 8.
(c) Normal operation of the OAMS thrusters Is obtained by contin-
uously applying 24 V dc to one terminal of the thruster valve solenoids
and grounding the other terminal through the GAME. Each OAMS thruster
is operated by simultaneously energizing the fuel and oxidizer solenoid
valves with one transistorized valve driver in the GAME package. The
grounding circuit is shown in figure 2.
Enclosures 1 through k are extracted sections of the Gemini VTII
Mission Report and provide a detailed analysis of the respective opera-
tions and systems related to the anomaly in support of the contents of
this report:
(a) Pilots Report - Appendix A
(b) Guidance and Control - Appendix B
(c) Propulsion System - Appendix C
(d) Electrical System - Appendix D
The possible causes of the control anomaly have been carefully
weighed and considered in a detailed study of all available data in-
cluding the results of investigative action taken as detailed in Sec-
tion 5.0 of this report. A set of postulated failures has been derived
and table I is a listing of these postulated failures in relation to
the known factors and the sequence of events for the anomaly. Most of
the possible causes are ruled out on the basis of inconsistency with all
known factors, although each could provide a solution to some of the
factors involved. These possibilities are separately listed in
table I a. Based on evidence uncovered to date, the most probable cause
is that a short circuit occurred either at the four-wire Junction or be-
tween this junction and the fuel-valve solenoid. This was probably fol-
lowed with a rupture of wire so that the wire from the solenoid became
open circuited while the other end of the ruptured wire remained short
circuited to ground during the degraded thrust period. Finally, the
open-circuit wire was again recontacted and remained short circuited
at least until the circuit breaker was opened.
It is noted that if the low-level continuous thrust during the
quiescent period is attributed -to some cause other than the flow of
oxidizer only from TCA 8, the probability of the above solution of the
anomaly is not materially affected. The factors, (l) a continuous
telemetry indication of TCA 8 being on, (2) the inability to fire the
TCA 8 thruster on command, and (3) the failure of attempted thruster
operation using either the primary or the secondary drive circuits of
the ACME, are effective in limiting the anomaly to an area between the
four-wire junction and either the fuel or oxidizer-valve solenoid.
 5.0 ACTION TAKEN

The following is a summary of investigative actions taken as a re-

sult of the spacecraft anomaly and the results of each action. Also
included is a summary of preventive measures which have been accomplished
and a listing of procedures which have "been formulated to assure recovery
of spacecraft control in the event of a similar occurrence.

5.1 Spacecraft Tests

A series of tests to investigate the OAMS thruster anomaly were con-
ducted on Spacecraft 8 during the postflight evaluation at the contrac-
tor "s facility. These tests were conducted in response to Spacecraft
Test Requests (STR's) written during the evaluation. Additional tests
were conducted on equipment similar to that installed in the Spacecraft 8
adapter equipment section which was not recovered.
5.1.1 Propulsion (STR's 8050 and 851$).- Six solenoid valves were
dissected and visually inspected to evaluate the quality of the wiring
insulation and potting. Four of these valves were removed from TCA's 5B
and 3A of the Spacecraft 8 RCS. TCA 5B was selected "because it was man-
ufactured at approximately the same time as the OAMS TCA 8. The other
two valves inspected were selected at random from scrapped valves loca-
ted at the Manned Spacecraft Center and at the spacecraft contractor's
plant.
The valves and the electrical risers were sectioned and inspected
and no indication of poor quality or any other abnormality that would
contribute to a solenoid-valve malfunction was found.
Two TCA propellant valves with the same configuration as those on
Spacecraft 8 were subjected to a series of functional and high-potential
dielectric-strength tests to determine the effect of usage on dielectric
characteristics. The valves tested had accumulated a total of 1230.6 sec-
onds of firing time and 25 100 valve cycles. These valves proved to be
unaffected by their previous usage. In addition, a 1000 V ac dielectric
test was employed rather than the normal 500 V ac test.
5.1.2 Hand controller and attitude control system (STR's 803^ and
8503).- An analysis of the attitude hand controller was performed to iso-
late any abnormal condition. The Pre-installation Acceptance (PIA) test
of the hand controller revealed some force measurements that were out-
of-specification; however, no wiring problems existed inside the handle.
When the cover was removed, the performance of the PIA test yielded
handle forces within specification tolerances. The investigation was
continued to verify continuity of the wiring and control switches in the
attitude control system. The cover of the ACE package was removed be-
fore starting the test. Evidence of salt-water corrosion and arcing
were visible. The tests were performed using the Aerospace Ground
Equipment (AGE) connectors to the maximum extent possible. Some abnor-
mal readings were encountered, but later these were resolved as having
been caused by the condition of the ACE package. During the next tests,
the flight wires were disconnected from the ACE and their continuity,
to the spacecraft wiring was checked. No abnormal readings were found.
The evidence of arcing in the ACE indicated that the ACME control 1 and
2 circuit breakers may have been on at landing. The results of these
tests indicated no anomalies in the spacecraft reentry-section wiring.
5.1.3 Electrical wire bundle clamps.- A detailed evaluation of
the wiring was conducted to Investigate the condition of cable clamps
and wire-bundle chaffing protection. Ten areas were investigated where
wire-bundle clamps were close to wire-bundle branch segments. Wire
bundles with bent radii under clamps were particularly selected. The
areas were photographed and the clamps were then removed to inspect for
damage to wire bundles caused by clamping. No damage was found. Clamp
cushions were also examined for cold flow and the results were negative.

5. 2 Systems Analyses
5.2.1 Propulsion system.- A review of valve design, testing pro-
cedures, and system tests was conducted. Acceptance test data for
TCA 8, and the history- of- failure records of all Gemini thruster sole-
noid valves during manufacturing, development, qualification, and reli-
ability testing were examined. The probability that the failure can be
attributed to a short circuit within the valves is considered remote.
The coil windings are insulated from the bobbin by two layers of
mica and a silicon varnish in addition to the wiring insulation. The
coil is insulated from the valve case by fiberglass wrappings and
silicon varnish. The coil lead wires are insulated by Teflon sleeving
in addition to the normal insulation and are also potted with Sylgard
in the valve riser to within a very short distance of the solder pins ;
on the electrical receptacle. Soldered connections to the receptacle
are protected by Teflon sleeves extending from the receptacle into the
potting compound.
A review of »n pertinent valve test results for this thruster
was acconiplished and no unusual data were noted. Each valve of this
type received a 1000- volt rms dielectric- strength test, a 500- V dc
insulation- resistance check, and a coil- resistance test after completion
of solenoid assembly. These tests were then repeated during acceptance
testing except that a 500-V rms level was used during the dielectric
test. Coil- resistance and dielectric- strength (500-V rms) tests were
conducted again during engine pre-delivery acceptance and in PIA testing.
During all 500-V rms dielectric-strength tests, the potential was ap-
plied for 1 minute with an allowable maximum current of 500 |jA. The
minimum allowable insulation resistance is 500 Mf> During dielectric-
strength testing performed in PIA tests, the flow of current between
the pins of the electrical receptacle and the oxidizer valve case was
47 pA, and similarly for the fuel valve, the current was 39 |jA- The
coil resistances were 43.1 ohms and 42.7 ohms on the oxidizer and fuel
valves, respectively, and were within the 42 (±2) ohm limits. X-rays
taken during manufacturing of the fuel and oxidizer valves for TCA 8
show that these valves were assembled normally in the riser to the re-
ceptacle, the most suspected area.
Relevant valve failures encountered on all configurations (25 and
100-pound thrusters) and modifications (Spacecraft 2 through 6 types)
were reviewed by the spacecraft contractor, the thruster manufacturer,
and the NASA. These revealed only one failure which could have produced
the anomaly. A metal chip between the coil and solenoid case caused a
short circuit which would have had the effect of either grounding the
power supply or of actuating the valve, depending upon attachment of
the coil lead. This type of failure would normally be detected by means
of the dielectric-strength testsj however, this particular valve did not
have the chip and burr controls that were exercised on the valves used
for Spacecraft 4 and subsequent spacecraft. The sample size investi-
gated was in excess of 2000 valves. During pre-delivery acceptance
testing, a total of 11 thrusters were rejected for failure to pass the
dielectric requirements previously discussed. None of these thrusters
were ever close to the point of indicating an incipient short circuit
to ground.
5.2.2 Attitude control and maneuver electronic (ACME).- The OAME
circuitry was reviewed and it was determined that a short circuit in the
driver transistors or in the circuitry between the driver transistors
and the output or AGE terminal connectors (connectors 5J2 and Jl — see
fig. 2) could cause TCA 8 to fire. A malfunction in other portions of
the ACME could cause inadvertent thruster firings, but would fire a pair
of thrusters rather than a single thruster.
This analysis limited the area of possible failure within the OAME
to the following:
(a) A short circuit in relay KL06
(b) A short circuit in diode CR20
(c) A short circuit to ground in the wiring connecting relay KL06,
diodes CR20 and CR3, and the pin in connector 5J2 leading to the thrus-
ter 8 solenoid valves
8

(d) A short circuit in the wiring leading to AGE terminal Jl

(e) A short in the driver transistors.
The crew reported they had switched from the primary to the sec-
ondary drivers. If this action were accomplished while the OAMS power
switch was turned on,' it would eliminate the driver transistors and the
circuit "between the driver transistors and relay K106 as suspect.
Any of the five possible short--circuits previously listed would
normally activate "both the oxidizer and fuel solenoids, and would simu-
lanteously cause a telemetry indication of thruster ON. An interruption
of this short circuit would cause "both solenoids to drop out and close
the fuel and oxidizer poppet valves. The same interruption would cause
a telemetry thruster-off indication.
If it were possible to have a high-resistant short circuit in the
GAME package that would cause the fuel solenoid to drop out without
affecting the oxidizer solenoid, the resultant voltage at the input to
the telemetry system high-level multiplexer would "be greater than the
5- to 11-V minimum required to cause a telemetry indication of TCA 8
off. This is illustrated in figure 3- There were periods positively
established during the anomaly, when the telemetry indicated a thrust-
ing and no acceleration resulted. Because the telemetry data are not
consistent with the known factors, the only possibility'that the GAME
package caused the Gemini VTII anomaly would have to include a simul-
taneous and separate failure in the telemetry system high-level multi-
plexer or associated wiring which resulted in the continuous telemetry
indication of TCA 8 being on. The failure history of the components
were reviewed and no failures were recorded which could result in a
short circuit to ground. The Spacecraft 8 GAME had no failures during
buildup, or pre-delivery acceptance, or PIA testing. There were no ACME
problems during Spacecraft Systems Tests (SST). Component installation
drawings and procedures were reviewed in detail to determine if a proba-
bility for misinterpretation existed. All drawings and procedures were
found to be adequate.
The system was then reviewed to determine if improvements were re-
quired or could be effected. It was decided to coat all exposed elec-
trical circuitry in the GAME package with a soft epoxy conforms! coating
to prevent the occurrence of an electrical short by foreign material
being introduced into the GAME package. There is no history of any
foreign material having been found in any GAME package; however, the
coating would guard against this eventuality.
5.2.3 Instrumentation system.- The design of the PCM high-level
multiplexer (which accepts the TCA 8 on-off inputs) and its associated
connectors and wiring was reviewed.
 The design of the modules and printed circuit "boards surrounding
the parameter module in question was investigated to determine the pos-
sible existence and characteristics of ground circuitry or mechanical
structure in the proximity of the signal circuits.
The TCA input is isolated from the instrumentation system by a
105 000-ohm resistance. The cable area containing the wiring from the
input connectors to the Microdot connectors was investigated. All
shielded wiring within this section has an outer cover of transparent
insulation. The entire cable area is filled with high-density foam
potting which presents any relative motion between wires, connectors,
and structure. The modules are also foam potted to the individual
mother boards, and the mother boards are separated with a layer of ap-
proximately l/l6 inch of mica-mat and mylar insulation board.
A review of the failure history of the connectors involved revealed
that six failures of this type connector had occurred. In one of the
failures, two pins broke off within the connector; this condition was
detected when the connector was demated. The remaining five failures
were caused by misalignment of the connector pins when the connector
was mated. As a result of this misalignment, the affected pin was
crushed within its individual pin well. None of the recorded failure
modes of these connectors displayed any tendency to expose the faulty
pin to other circuitry in the vicinity or to ground. Any failure which
existed prior to launch and which would result in an open-circuited or
short-circuited connector pin will be detected by normal testing.
Nothing was found in the design of the, instrumentation system which
would be suspected of causing an anomaly such as that experienced on
Spacecraft 8.

5« 3 Quality Evaluation
5. 3-1 Test histories.- A list of postulated failure modes was de-
rived as part of the anomaly investigation. The test histories of com-
ponents which could contribute to postulated failure modes were reviewed
to determine if there was any history of failures similar to the postu-
lated failure modes. The results of this analysis was negative. The
only spacecraft system test failures similar to the Gemini VTII postur
lated failures were experienced during the SEDR 371-^ and 383-7 tests.
In both instances, test histories of TCA's indicated inadvertent fir-
ings caused by cable clamps short circuiting a wire bundle.
5.3«2 Special evaluation of quality control.- A special quality
evaluation of the spacecraft wiring was conducted on the Spacecraft 6
and Spacecraft 7 reentry sections and on the Spacecraft 9 adapter-
assembly electrical harnesses. The purpose of these evaluations was to
10

determine the adequacy of the quality of the wiring harness, the wire
protective techniques, the Inspection criteria, and the effectiveness
and timeliness of the wiring-harness inspections. The following are
examples of some of the discrepant conditions that were found:
(a) Wire "bundles laying against structure edges, rivet heads, nuts,
"bolt heads, and coaxial-cable fittings. In these cases, neither the wire
"bundle nor the edge, et cetera, was covered to prevent contact and con-
sequent wire insulation damage.
(b) Excessively long ground wires
(c) Wire "breakouts from wire "bundles where the wire "broken out was
under tension
(d) Excessive harness lengths.
As a result of this evaluation, the following actions were taken:
(a) Reworked discrepant conditions in Spacecraft 9 adapter
assembly
C"b) Established more stringent criteria for wire installation and
inspection
(c) Established a formal physical spacecraft inspection, prior to
shipment, to reinforce in-process inspection during spacecraft fabri-
cation
(d) Established a more rigid spacecraft receiving inspection at
Kennedy Space Center and implemented formal shakedown inspections at
specific milestones in the preflight test plan
(e) Established a special NASA spacecraft acceptance inspection
team to perform detailed spacecraft inspections with the results of
these inspections being reported at the Spacecraft Acceptance Review
(SAR) Board meetings.
Ground rules covering critical wiring installation aspects were
documented and coordinated between the NASA Gemini Program Office and
the spacecraft contractor. Beginning on April 28, 1966, approximately
200 contractor personnel involved in the manufacturing, inspection, and
engineering of the Gemini spacecraft are being refamiliarized with these
ground rules in k hours of class training each.
5.3.3 Design changes.- Design changes resulting from the Space-
craft 8 anomaly investigation were as follows:
 11
(a) CAMS thruster disabling: A single switch which will provide
the crew with a rapid means of disabling »"n QAMS thrusters has been
incorporated into the OAMS circuitry.
(b) Circuitry protection: All exposed electrical circuitry in the
OAME package has been coated with a soft conformal epoxy to protect
against possible inadvertent electrical short circuits.
(c) Wiring configuration: Grommet material has been added to the
structure in six general areas to increase clearance of wire bundles.
The Z-10J fairing has been trammed to increase clearance between the
fairing and the wire bundle. Engineering orders have been issued to
remove the tape from the TCA heater and solenoid wiring.
(d) Wire-bundle changes: Specially selected clamps are being used
exclusively for Gemini wire-bundle retention.
5.3'^ Flight procedures.- Flight procedures have been re-evaluated
and revised to provide the crew with optimum operating procedures for
a.n. known possible flight emergencies. A copy of these procedures is
attached as Appendix E.
 12
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 A-l

APPENDIX A

PILOT'S REPORT

(Excerpted from Section 7.1.2 of the

Gemini Program Mission Report for Gemini VIII)
A-2

THIS PAGE DJTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

 A-3

7.1.2.9 Control system problem.- At approximately 7 hours g.e. t.,

the two spacecraft were configured for the platform-parallelism test,
which was to have provided a comparison of the spacecraft and GATV
attitude reference systems. The GATV Attitude Control System (ACS) was
active, and the TDA L-band transponder was off. The spacecraft attitude-
control power switch and maneuver-control switches were off. The radar
was off, and the control mode switch was in PULSE.
Shortly after sending encoder command C4l (recorder OK), roll and
yaw rates were observed to be developing. No visual or audible evidence
of spacecraft thruster firing was noted, and the divergence was attrib-
uted to the GATV.
Commands were sent to de-energize the GATV ACS, geocentric rate,
and horizon sensors, and the spacecraft Orbital Attitude and Maneuver
System (OAMS) was activated.
The rates were reduced to near zero, but began to increase upon
release of the hand controller. The ACS was commanded on to determine
if GATV thruster action would help reduce the angular rates. No im-
provement was noted and the ACS was again commanded off. Plumes from a
GATV pitch thruster were visually observed, however, during a period
when the ACS was thought to be inactivated.
After a period of relatively stable operation, the rates once again
began to increase. The spacecraft was switched to secondary bias power,
secondary logics, and secondary drivers in an attempt to eliminate pos-
sible spacecraft control-system discrepancies. No improvement being
observed, a conventional troubleshooting approach with the OAMS com-
pletely de-energized was attempted, but subsequently abandoned because
of the existing rates.
An undocking was performed when the rates were determined to be
low enough to preclude any recontact problems. Approximately a 3 ft/sec
velocity change was used to effect separation of the two vehicles.
Angular rates continued to rise, verifying a spacecraft control-
system problem. The hand controller appeared to be inactive. The
Reentry Control System (RCS) was armed and, after trying ACME-DIRECT
and then turning off all OAMS control switches and circuit breakers, was
found to be operative in DIRECT-DIRECT. Angular rates were reduced to
small values with the RCS B-ring. Inspection of the OAMS revealed that
the number 8 thruster had failed open. Some open Attitude Control and Man-
euver Electronics (ACME) circuit breakers probably accounted for the in-
operative hand controller noted earlier. All yaw thrusters other than
number 8 were inoperative. Pitch and roll control were maintained by
using the pitch thrusters.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 B-l

APPENDIX B

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

(Excerpted from Section 5.1.5 of the

Gemini Program Mission Report for Gemini VIII)
B-2

THIS PAGE DJTEOTIONAIiLY LEFT BLANK

 B-3

5-1.5-3 Control system performance evaluation.- Continued

At 7:00:26.7 g.e.t., approximately 27 minutes after docking, the
telemetry signal from thruster 8 indicated ON for ^.9 seconds, OFF for
k.O seconds, then ON for the remainder of the flight. The spacecraft/
GATV combination was being controlled by the GATV Attitude Control
System (ACS) at this time in Flight Control Mode 3. The system was
gyrocorapassing, in-plane, with geocentric (GEO) rate ON. The OAMS
attitude control power was OFF, the ACME mode select switch was in
PULSE, and the IMU was in 0KB RATE. In this configuration, the ACME
is incapable of transmitting valid firing commands to the thrusters.
Figure 5.1.5-19 contains the sequence of significant events as
they occurred during the anomaly plotted in relation to spacecraft roll
rate. As indicated, the initial telemetry firing indications from
thruster 8 were correct, in that the dynamic response matched the dis-
turbance which should have been present. The first corrective action
was taken, with the ACME in pulse mode, 11.5 seconds after the anomaly
occurred. This mode was ineffective due to the short firing times
associated with pulsed operation; therefore, DIRECT and then RATE
COMMAND were selected with more success. In fact, while in the rate-
command mode, the rates were essentially reduced to zero. At
7: 02:37« ^ g« e.t., the dynamic responses indicate that thruster 8 stop-
ped firing, although the telemetry indication remained ON. Low grade
accelerations were present which were representative of those which can
resialt from a thruster expelling oxidizer only. Accelerations of this
order could also have been obtained from the GATV ACS (for which no
telemetry data are available), but in a very unlikely set of conditions.
During this period, several firing commands were sent to thruster
number 8 with no response. At 7*07*20.3 g.e.t., after an interval of
k minutes ^2.9 seconds, the original disturbance returned, indicating
that thruster number 8 was again operating at or near full thrust. From
this time until the spacecraft was separated from the GATV at
7: l^: 12.3 g.e« t., the disturbance was present and, as seen in fig-
ure 5.1.5-20, was controllable in the direct mode. The pitch and yaw
rates were held to low values during this period; however, the roll
rate did exceed 10 deg/sec for a total of approximately 100 seconds in
six 15-to-20 second intervals. Each time the roll rate exceeded
10 deg/sec, it was quickly brought back to near zero using the direct
control mode, and did not exceed 20 deg/sec at any time prior to
undocking. The status of the GATV ACS throughout this period is un-
certain except for one data point at 7:12:38. 6 g.e.t., but appears
from combined-vehicle acceleration calculations to have been cycled
ON and OFF several times. The selection of redundant ACME logic and
secondary thruster valve-driver circuitry, as reported by the crew,
cannot be corroborated because these functions were not telemetered^
however, the data does indicate that ACME bias power was turned off
momentarily at 7:13:38. 8 g-e.t. There was no telemetry channel to
indicate the utilization of the yaw/pitch roll-logic switch or the
motorized fuel shut-off valves; however, by analyzing the combination
of thruster firings in response to roll hand-controller commands, it
was determined that the pitch logic was not selected for roll control
during the anomaly period.
Separation from the GATV occurred at 7:15:12.3 g.e.t. with thrus-
ters 11 and 12 firing for 6.6 seconds. Rates at this time were +3;
-5, and -2 deg/sec in pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively. After
separation, moderate hand-controller activity was present, although
the direct mode was not sufficient to contain the roll rate. At
7:15:^^7 g.e.t., the ACME bias power was inadvertantly removed, dis-
abling the control system, and the roll rate increased to 296 deg/sec
over the next three minutes, due to the uncontrolled firing of
thruster 8, although short periods of intermittent or degraded
thruster 8 performance appeared to exist. It is clear that the crew
was not aware that ACME bias power was off because significant hand-
controller activity is evident during this period. As noted in fig-
ure 5.«1«5-19> the RCS squib valves were actuated at 7;l6:25.1 g.e.t.,
but no RCS thrusters were fired until 7:19:03.8 g.e.t., probably be-
cause the ACME-DIRECT switch was in the ACME position with the ACME
bias power off. When the ACME-DIRECT switch was apparently placed in
the DIRECT position, RCS control was normal. The disturbance torque
from thruster 8 ceased at 7:18:15-7 g.e.t. when the CAMS attitude-
thruster circuit breakers were opened. Control was regained using the
RCS in DIRECT-DIRECT. Subsequent checks of the CAMS thruster 8 cir-
cuit breaker and the RCS using ACME modes indicated correct ACME per-
formance; in addition, telemetry indications and fault characteristics
lead to the conclusion that the malfunction probably was external to
the control system. (See sections 5-1.7 an(i 5-1.8 for further discus-
sions of the flight-control anomaly.)
 B-5

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEIFT BLANK

 B-6

-340

-320

-300

-280

-260
^

-240

-220

-200

<_}
-180
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ST
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OJ
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« -140

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-100 PL Ise Direct i— Ratf commar Direct Ise *• Direct

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_ T C A 8 ^>
"off

-*•
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1,

- TCA 8 off for 4.0 sec

TCA 8 fires for 4. 9 sec
\ Son TC A 8 not f ring but telemetrj/ indicate s on
TC A 8 does not fire vi hen com manded
FCA Son

HCME bia s power t urned of for 1.6 >econds. TCA 8 st II fires. (07:13:3 1.6) — -

!
- In tial cond tions: A CS on fl ght contr ol mode 3. OAMS 1attitude control
i
power off (07:00:25)
i i i GATV elemetry indicate; ACS is urned ol
:
(07:12::•8.6)—,
-20 I 1
r - TCA 8 stops firing. Telemetry indicates TCA Son or remai nder of m ission ( 37:02:37. '1) [— TCA 8 starts iring agj in (07:0 ':20.31
%O00 i/^&C o t
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07:00 07:01 07:02 07:03 07:04 07:05 07:06 07:07 07:08 07:09 07:10 07:11 07:12 07:13 07:14 07:15
Ground elapsed time, hr:min

(a) Docked.

Figure 5. L5-19. - Spacecraft roll rates during anomaly.

 B-7

-340

-320 — 0AM 5 circuit breakers Off (07: IS :15. 7)

f 8 ;S A-rin 3 and
-300
r '
)O
B-r ing activ B control of space<:raft (07. 19:03. 8)

O °
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-280
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-260
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-220

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-180
r" ;ME bias power of (07: 15:' 4. 7)
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-20 TCA 8 100 percent e f feet ive ^~ i.po

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^c ifj^jOO O-O — C >— 0— C >—o— c >—O— < >—•o— c^^ v AD —C)

XJ^ O S
~
+20 -
07:15 07:16 07:17 07:18 07:19 07:20 07:21 07:22 07:23 07:24 07:25 07:26 07:27 07:28 07:29
Ground elapsed time, hr: min
(b) Undocked

Figures. L 5-19. - Concluded.

 B-8
NASA-S-66-3539 APR 21
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7:00 7:02 7:04 7:06 7:08 7:10 7:12 7:14 7:16 7:18 7:20 7:22 7:24 7:26 7:28
Ground elapsed time, hr:min.
Figure 5,1.5-20. - Attitude control anomaly - time history.
 C-l

APPENDIX C

PROPULSION SYSTEM
(Excerpted from Section 5.1.8 of the
Gemini Program Mission Report for Gemini VIII)
C-2

THIS PAGE IETENTIOKALLY LEST BLANK

 C-3

5.1.8.1 Orbital Attitude and Maneuver System. - Continued

Figure 5-1-5-19 shows that nominal thrust was being produced by
thruster 8 at the beginning of the failure period, 7:00:26 g.e.t., and
during the firing at 7:17:30 g.e.t., just prior to opening the circuit
breaker. However, during this interval, accelerations were indicated
to be less than nominal in a few instances. In one case, thruster 8
ceased to fire while the spacecraft and the GATV were still docked,
(from 7:02:37 to 7:07:20 g.e.t.), but a small roll acceleration reflect-
ing a 0.5-pound disturbance force was recorded. This force was approxi-
mately the same as that produced by oxidizer flow alone; however, the
corresponding yaw accelerations appeared to be lower than that expected.
The value in yaw was very small and in the same order of magnitude as
the accuracy of the data. Varying accelerations after undocking but
prior to opening the circuit breakers are presumed to result from in-
termittent thruster firings or from closing and opening the motor valves;
however, the crew did not report operating the motor valves at this time.
The thrust levels of thruster 8 are believed to have been nominal when-
ever both propellant valves were open. This is based on the nominal
accelerations measured just prior to opening the circuit breaker and
on OAMS thruster lifetime capabilities.

During troubleshooting of the OAMS after the spacecraft was

stabilized, rates produced by attitude thrusters decreased to essen-
tially zero until 7 hours ^0 minutes g.e.t. when pitch thrusters 1
and 2 appeared to be producing some low-level thrust, ~By 7 hours
50 minutes g.e.t., pitch-control authority was fully restored, and
at 9 hours 5 minutes g.e.t., the yaw thrusters appear to have been
operating normally. These changes in thrust are attributed to the
closing and opening of the motor valves. The precise total sequence
of events cannot be obtained because motor-valve positions were not
telemetered. After opening the valves, satisfactory pitch-thruster
performance was restored prior to the restoration of the yaw-thruster
performance because a greater amount of pitch control was first
demanded. (Approximately 1.5 seconds were required to restore full
control authority to pitch thrusters 1 and 2; 1-9 seconds to pitch
thrusters 5 and 6; 0.7 second to yaw thrusters 3 and U; and 0.9 sec-
ond to yaw thruster 7>) A large number of pulses, ranging from 17 on
thrusters 3 and ^ to 60 on thruster 2, were required to restore engine
performance due to the use of the pulse mode. In this mode, a
20-millisecond signal is transmitted to fire the thrusters. The
phenomenon associated with opening and closing the motor valves has
been experienced previously and is under investigation to determine
the cause.
c-k
The sequence of events during the failure period is presented in
section 5. 1.5. 3- At the time of failure, thruster T had been off for
27 minutes. There was no apparent anomalous performance of this
thruster prior to the firing that occurred at 7:00:26 g.e.t., nor was
its duty cycle any more severe than that of the other engines.

The valves on thruster 8 opening unintentionally was probably

caused by an electrical short to ground. The design of the control
system is such that voltage is normally applied to one end of the
solenoid coils and a firing command is effected by grounding the
other end of the coils. As discussed in section 5-1-7, there were
several locations in the spacecraft at which the fault could have
occurred. One possible location is within the valve itself. However,
from a review of the valve design, the acceptance test data of
thruster 8, and the past history of the failure records of all Gemini
valves during manufacturing, development, qualification, and relia-
bility testing, the probability that the failure can be attributed to
a short within the valve, other than from an isolated quality- type
problem, is considered remote.

The regulator maintained 298 to JOO psia throughout the flight.

No tendency to creep was observed. From 7:11:29.^ hours g. e.t. until
adapter separation, the regulated pressure data indicated essentially
zero pressure. This can only be attributed to a failure in the regu-
lated pressure transducer or its associated circuitry. Satisfactory
regulator performance has been verified by spacecraft angular acceler-
ations, indicating correct propellant pressure at the injector, as well
as from the F-package transducer which, at the time of the indicated
failure, was sensing correct ullage pressure in the reserve fuel tank.
The total quantity of usable oxidizer and fuel was ^11 and
pounds, respectively. When referenced to the pref light-determined
mixture ratio of 1.05, 698 pounds of propellant would have been avail-
able to the crew. The propellant consumed during the mission is com-
pared with the pref light planned usage rate in figure 5.1.8-1; also
included are the mixture ratios used to establish the flight propellant
quantities. The figure also shows the ground-computed values as deter-
mined from the general gaging equation during the flight and from the
flight values read by the crew from the onboard propellant quantity
indicator (PQl). The PQI value at activation was 101 percent, as com-
pared to a preflight estimated value of 105 percent. This introduced
an initial +k percent correction factor in addition to corrections re-
quired for mixture ratio excursions from the fixed QPI gage reference
of 1.05. When the readings obtained from the crew were corrected for
the flight mixture ratio variations and decreased by k percent, the
values correlated closely with the ground-computed values.
 C-5

A comparison of the two measurements of propellent quantity, PQI

and the gaging equation, shows good agreement. The propellant required
through docking was somewhat greater than the flight-plan estimates.
This was caused partly by the added real-time requirement of a plan-
change and a vernier height-adjust maneuver, which consumed 27.6 pounds
of maneuver propellant. Additional quantities were also consumed be-
cause the maneuver firing durations were greater than planned due to
the post-maneuver corrections discussed previously. The lower flight
mixture ratio realized up through docking, as compared with the pre-
flight estimates, indicates that more attitude propellant was required
than had been planned.

During the period 7:00:26 to 7:25:30 g.e.t., the attitude thrusters

consumed 190 pounds of propellant, according to the results obtained
from the gaging equation. From engine acceptance-test data measured by
the manufacturer and the flight engine firing-duration data, 203 pounds
were consumed by all attitude thrusters, which is in agreement with the
gaging-equation results within the accuracy of the system.

5.1.8.2 Reentry Control System. - Continued

Activation of the RCS occurred at approximately 7:16:25 g.e.t. to
enable the crew to control spacecraft rates following spacecraft GATV
separation. Typical rates measured during operation of the RCS, pre-
sented in table ^.I.Q-TV, show nominal performance of the system. Al-
though the first RCS firing indication occurred at 7:18:15.2 g.e.t.,
when yaw-right and yaw-left B-ring engines (3, ^, 7> and 8) appear to have
received an 8.9-second-duration firing signal, the first actual RCS firing
command occurred at 7:19:03 g.e.t. with both A and B rings operational
and normal system response was observed. ACME bias power had been off
since 7:^5:^5 g.e.t., and there was no hand-controller movement. Also,
the control system does not contain the logic which would provide yaw
or roll, simultaneous left .and right commands. The most reasonable
explanation is that the two RCS B-ring yaw circuit breakers were inad-
vertantly cycled, thereby providing the false 8.9-second engine-firing
indication.

After system activation, the A-ring and B-ring regulators, respec-

tively, remained within a range of 296 (+2, -0) psia and 298 (+6, -0)
psia. The minimum B-ring source pressurant temperature of 35° P re-
flected a high control-system demand rate. The 72"to 101 F oxidizer-
feed temperature range encountered is well within the operational capa-
bility of the system.

The A-ring was turned off at 7:19:38 g.e.t. after 79.7 seconds of
firing time accumulated over k pulses. The B-ring was then used to
achieve control, with the command pilot using 126 pulses and an accumu-
lated firing time of 306.Jj- seconds, until 7:31:25-7 g.e.t. when the
c-6

B-ring was turned off. A check of the B-ring system operation from
9:01:49 to 9:07:27 g.e.t. in pulse and orbit rate-command modes showed
nominal performance. A final check of the A-ring operation in rate-
command, pulse, direct, and reentry rate-command modes, performed from
9:52:19 to 9:54:07 g.e.t., also provided nominal data.
 c-7

TABLE 5.1.8-IV.- QAMS AND ECS ATTITUDE ENGINE

&
PERFORMANCE

Angular acceleration,
Thrust, Ib
Engine
deg/sec
numbers
Preflight Flight Preflight Flight

QAMS
1-2 45.7 43 3-7 3-5
3-4 46.1 44 3-7 3-5
5-6 ^5.8 44 3-7 3-5
7-8 46.4 ^3 3-7 3-6
RCS
A-ring
1-2 46.9 44 3-5 3-3
3-4 47.1 44 3-5 3.4
5-6 47.0 44 3.5 3-4
4-8 46.9 47 1.7 1.7
RCS
B-ring
1-2 46.9 44 3-5 3.3
3-7 47-3 47 1-7 1-7
5-6 47.1 44 3-5 3.3
4-8 47.0 47 1-7 1.7

a
Typical values determined at various times through-
out the mission.
C-8
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 D-l

APPENDIX D

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
(Excerpted from Section 5.1.7 of the
Gemini Program Mission Report for Gemini VTII)
D-2

THIS PAGE INTENTIOKAIiLY LEFT BLANK

 D-3

5.1.7.4 Control system anomaly. - Figure 5-1-7-6 shows a more

detailed plot of control-bus voltage from the initial inadvertent fir-
ing of GAMS thruster 8 to the eventual in-flight identification and
correction of the problem. This period can be divided into seven
parts:
(a) 7:00:26.7 to 7: 02: 37. 4 g. e.t. -This period was characterized
by voltage transients caused by thruster 8 first coming on, then going
off, then staying on continuously, and by the counter thruster responses
commanded by the flight crew.
(b) 7:02:37.4 to 7:07:20.3 g.e.t. - In this period, although
telemetry was indicating thruster 8 to be on, spacecraft dynamics in-
dicated that thruster 8 was not producing significant thrust; however,
a low-grade spacecraft acceleration, representative of the thrust ob-
tained when only the oxidizer valve is open, was present (see sec-
tion 5.1.5). The average bus voltage should have recovered to the
initial value of 25.35 volts at this time; therefore, the incomplete
recovery of the bus voltage to only 25.20 volts supports the
possibility of a single thruster solenoid being energized. It is im-
portant to note that during this 4 minutes 53 second period, thruster 8
was commanded on in several command modes, was indicated on contin-
uously by telemetry, but apparently did not fire at any time.
(c) 7:07:20.3 to 7:15:44.7 g.e.t. - During this period,
thruster 8 once more(was on continuously and the bus voltage transients
indicate the continued countering efforts by commanded thruster fir-
ings. At 7:15:12 g.e.t., thrusters 11 and 12 (forward-firing maneuver
thrusters) were fired, separating the spacecraft and the Gemini Agena
Target Vehicle (GATV).
(d) 7:15:44.7 to 7:18:15.7 g.e.t. - The RCS was activated during
this period. Just prior to this operation it is a possibility that the
motor valves were closed because, electrically, thruster 8 appears to
have been on; however, spacecraft dynamics indicate it was not thrust-
ing from 7:17:04 to 7:17:24 g.e.t. At 7:17:24 g.e.t., though not
recorded, the motor valves would have to have been reopened, as space-
craft dynamics indicated that thruster 8 was thrusting. No electrical
change was evident at that time.
(e) 7:18:15.7 to 7:19=03.8 g.e.t. - At the start of this period,
the OAMS thruster circuit breakers for the solenoid-valve power were
opened. Thruster 8 was off; this is evident in the telemetry records
from the recovery of the bus voltage and from the spacecraft dynamics.
 D-U

(f) 7:19:03.8 to 7:25:JO g.e.t. - In this period, the continuous

set of voltage transients indicated the activity of the RCS thrusters
when commanded by the flight crew in gaining control of the spacecraft.
At 7: 25:30 g. e. t., the rates were nulled in all axes.

(g) 7:25:30 to 7:28:30 g.e.t. - The flight crew reactivated the

OAMS and found that thruster 8 would fire continuously when its circuit
breaker was closed, even when the hand controller was in a neutral
position. The voltage transient at 7:28:27 g.e.t. amounted to a de-
pression of 1.25 volts in bus voltage when only the one thruster,
no. 8, was firing.

The following four facts stand out from the preceding data:

(a) Telemetry indicated thruster 8 was on for ^.9 seconds and

off for k. 0 seconds at the beginning of this sequence, then on for the
remainder of this period.

(b) During the period from 7: 02:37-k to 7:07:20.3 g.e.t. when

thruster 8 was not full on, it was commanded on several times without
a successful reaction.

(c) The only times after the malfunction started when common-
control-bus data, spacecraft-dynamics data, and telemetry bi-level data
agree that thruster 8 was off was during the times when the thruster 8
circuit breaker was opened.

(d) There were periods of low-grade accelerations that were in-

dicative of a single thruster valve opening. These occurred in periods
(b) and (d) of figure 5-1.7-6.

From the above facts, it may be deduced that the failure was
electrical rather than mechanical, and was complex in nature.

The circuits involved with the anomalous condition of the flight

control system are shown in figure 5.1.7-7. The firing of the thrusters
is normally accomplished by switching one end of each of the fuel and
oxidizer solenoid coils to ground by means of transistor switches.
The transistor switches are activated by logic circuits, commanded
directly by the flight crew or automatically by the control system.
Either primary or secondary transistor switching circuits may be se-
lected by the crew.

From figure 5«l«7-7 it can be seen that the thruster will fire
±f,
(a) False inputs are sent to the valve drivers
 D-5

(b) The valve drivers malfunction

(c) A low-resistance short exists in any of the wiring from the

solenoids to the drivers
(d) A wire failure exists in the thruster solenoids.

Failure modes 1 and 2 can be eliminated for three reasons:

(a) The flight crew reported switching from the primary to the
secondary drivers without a successful commanded response from
thruster 8.
(b) A failure in this portion of the circuitry will not explain
the low-grade accelerations characteristic of a single thruster valve
operating.
(c) If it were possible to have a high-resistance short suffic-
ient to drop out only one solenoid (2.0 volts across the solenoid),
then the telemetry voltage would be greater than 15 volts. Hence,
telemetry would have indicated off rather than on as it did during
periods of low-grade accelerations.

It is evident from the above that the failure was in the solenoids
or in the spacecraft wiring between the solenoids and the junction of
the two solenoid ground returns.

Further isolation of the failure has met with little success.

The fault is not a simple one; it must vary in resistance sufficiently
to enable either or both thruster solenoids to fire and still meet the
ON requirements of telemetry (less than 5 volts).

On Spacecraft 9 and subsequent spacecraft, the OAMS thrusters will

be powered from a separate bus which will be armed and disarmed by a
single switch. This will provide the crew with a rapid means of dis-
abling all OAMS thrusters before dynamic rates have time to build up.
D-6
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CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES

(Excerpted from Section III of
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SECTION 3.4

CONTROL

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