CIVIL LAW

Gerbert R. Corpuz v. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Brion, J.)

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married

respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to
work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines,
he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another
man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada
which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen
in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry
Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of
National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists
under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the
Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien
spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion - i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
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the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose
the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a
right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Rosalino L. Marable v. Myrna F. Marable

G.R. No. 178741, 17 January 2011, THIRD DIVISION, (Villarama, Jr., J.)

It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.

Rosalino L. Marable and Myrna F. Marable were sweethearts since they

were still students at Arellano University. Later on in their relationship, they
eloped from their homes and married through civil rites before the mayor of
Tanay, Rizal. Within the same month after the civil wedding, a church wedding
was celebrated. They had five children. However, after years of being together,
they started to fight verbally and even physically more frequently. This was
aggravated when they encountered problems with their daughter who was
transferred from one school to another because of misbehavior and then later
on became pregnant untimely. Rosalino’s way of of spoiling their children also
was a cause of quarrels between him and his spouse, Myrna. Rosalino, who is
beginning to get worn out by their unhealthy relationship, had an affair with
another woman. When Myrna discovered it, Rosalino immediately ended the
relationship with his mistress. The quarrels between them unfortunately
worsened and this led to Rosalino’s departure from their home, leaving his wife
and children. After some time, he converted to Islam after going out with many
women.

Rosalino decided to legally end his marriage with Myrna so he filed a

petition for absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of his psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He went to a clinical
psychologist to be examined for the purpose of presenting evidence in court. Dr.
Tayag, the clinical psychologist who examined him, concluded that Rosalino is
suffering from “Anti-Social Personality Disorder” which manifests a pervasive
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pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,

deceitfulness, and lack of remorse. It was said to be rooted from Rosalino’s
childhood hardships due to a dysfunctional family, deep feelings of rejection,
and constant need for attention. Because of this finding, Dr. Tayag concluded
that Rosalino was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.

The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo rendered judgment annulling the

marriage of the Marable spouses. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC upon granting the appeal of the Office of the Solicitor
General which declared the marriage as still valid and subsisting. The Court of
Appeals held that the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove
psychological incapacity. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the
RTC which granted the annulment of marriage of the Marable spouses based on
the evidence of Rosalino’s psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Appeal DENIED for lack of merit. CA Decision AFFIRMED.

In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code,

as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist
from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled
that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of Rosalino’s alleged
psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder
but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that Rosalino is a socially
deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.

For sure, the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles and differences in

handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts
on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity
which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Rosalino even
admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments
together. Also, the records would show that the Rosalino acted responsibly
during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his
family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a
personality disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Rosalino tried to make it appear that his family history of having a

womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital
affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became
unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize,
assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a
psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records
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show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In
short, Rosalino’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not
sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Rosalino completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage. That not being the case with Rosalino, his claim of
psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals. the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

Alain M. Diño v. Caridad L. Diño

G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.)

In this case, Alain’s marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership.

Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have been

childhood friends and sweethearts. They lived together for ten years then
separated. After two years, they reunited and later on decided to get married.

However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based

on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad. He
alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their
marriage and was irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that
Caridad tends to be violent toward him. Extrajudicial service of summons was
sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that time. She did file any
answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she already filed
a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California, and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas
declared that there was no collusion between the two parties.

Furthermore, a psychological report was submitted by Dr. Tayag, a clinical

psychologist, stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to
be long-lasting and incurable. The Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas granted
Alain’s petition. However, the dispositive portion requires that a decree of
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absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s]
50 and 51 of the Family Code. Alain filed a petition questioning that
requirement. The RTC partially granted the petition with modifications stating
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

HELD:
RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian
and Caridad.

The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section
19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or

bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, “[t]he absolute nullity of a
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previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis

solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable

marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. In both instances
under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree
to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into
before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need
to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.

Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et al. v. Danilo Pangilinan et al.

G.R. No. 185920, 20 July 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)

There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially
or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective
mantle cannot be availed of by Ramos, et. al.

Respondents Danilo Pangilinan, et. al. filed a complaint of illegal dismissal

before the Labor Arbiter against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc. which was owned by
Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos). The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of
Pangilinan, et. al. and ordered Ramos to pay the latter their backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive pay. Ramos’ property in
Pandacan, Manila was ordered to be levied. However, it was alleged by Ramos
that the Pandacan property is a family home and therefore exempted from
execution to satisfy the judgment award. Pangilinan, et. al. countered that such
property is not a family home because it bears the address of the company and,
supposing it is a family home, only P300,000 is exempt from execution.

During Ramos’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, he passed away and he

was thereafter substituted by Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et. al., the herein
petitioners. The Court of Appeals held that the Pandacan property was not
exempted from execution notwithstanding Article 153 of the Family Code which
provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. The article, however, has no
retroactive effect. Moreover, it was also held that the applicable laws were
Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code which require that it is necessary to either
judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as their family
home prior to its exemption. Ramos, et. al. unfortunately failed to comply with
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the requirement resulting to the denial of the motion to quash the writ of
execution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the levy upon the
Pandacan property.

HELD:
Petition DENIED.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be

made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what
requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either
judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231
and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires
the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the
court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to
242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which
must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with
either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from
availing of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its
value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must
have been incurred after August 3, 1988.

And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is
not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved.

In the present case, since Ramos, et. al. claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with
the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof
that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the
Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by
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Ramos, et. al. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all
means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were
already closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already
been transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan property.

Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. Archbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her

mother Araceli Lopez
G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)

The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of
the putative father’s legitimate family.

Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and

support of filiation against petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. She was
represented by her mother, Araceli Lopez. She assailed that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the handwritten
note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. She also demanded for
financial support along with filial recognition. On the other hand, Nepomuceno
denied the assertions reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the
handwritten note due to the threats of the National People’s Army. As the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of Archbencel, Nepomuceno
thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the
trial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the case
against Nepomuceno.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s
decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of Ben-
Hur Nepomuceno is established by the handwritten note submitted as
documentary evidence.

HELD:
Petition GRANTED.

Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to

petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles,
the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent
set forth in the preceding article:
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1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate
and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-
blood.

Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on

establishing filiation:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

xxxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.

In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note
executed by petitioner. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever
about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial
agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable
evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted
filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of

her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner,
the latter not having signed the same.

At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten

undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to
establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the
child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is,
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however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause
to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.

Ma. Virginia V. Remo v. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs

G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.)

Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which

is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be
countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of
passport holders will arise.

Petitoner Virginia V. Remo is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. In her

passport, she used the last name of her husband as her surname and her
maiden name as her middle name. Before the expiration of her passport, she
filed an application for its renewal with a request to revert her surname to her
maiden name. Her request was denied.

Consequently, Remo’s counsel sent a letter to the Secretary of Foreign

Affairs to express the same request. However, it was also denied. The Office,
although recognizing the non-mandatory use of the husband’s surname, stated
that the request can only be granted in cases where a woman had not used her
husband’s surname in a previous passport, and that reverting to one’s maiden
name is only permitted in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, or death of
the husband which was neither the case with Remo and her husband.

Remo filed an appeal to the Office of the President which was dismissed.
The same action was filed to the Court of Appeals resulting also to denial. All
motions for reconsiderations filed to both offices were also denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.

HELD:
Petition DENIED.

Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER
HUSBAND’S SURNAME, OR
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(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR

(3) HER HUSBAND’S FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD
INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS “MRS.”

We agree with Remo that the use of the word “may” in the above
provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory.

Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil
Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided
in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited
from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil
status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that
surnames indicate descent.

In the present case, Remo, whose marriage is still subsisting and who
opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her
from using her maiden name.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA
8239 “limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to
the use of her maiden name in her passport.” These instances are death of
husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage.

Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside
of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married
woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.

The Court notes that Remo would not have encountered any problems in
the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use
her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first
applied for a Philippine passport. However, Remo consciously chose to use her
husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application, and now
desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present request,
definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use
of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity
in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport
issuance purposes, a married woman, such as Remo, whose marriage subsists,
may not change her family name at will.