DEPART

Off I c e

n D-64/36
IFFICE i ~ l ~ l anJ. Date: S e ~ t e m b e r3. 1964

'0 Lonal S e c u r i t y Superv:Lsors

i o n a l S e c u r i t y Office1cs
----,
- - - ~ r l t y O f f i c -a-r-m (Tsrhnl 1r.ll

H : Depr~ t yA s s i s t a n t S e c r e t ;ary f o r Sec

: a c t s w i t h S o v i e t and Cornrnunis t Bloc Nstiol

CA-1471 o f August 6, 1964, e n t i t l e d k t --.,..,,.. S o v i e t end

otimluniet Bloc N a t i o n a l s , s e t s f o r t h s p e c i f i c b r i e f i n g r e q u i r e -
c n t s f o r KSOs and PSOs c o n c e r n i n g c l e r l c a l p e r s o n n e l 1

RSOs s h o t11d i n s u r e t h a t PSOs fin t h e i r a re a s a r e awl

71 and a t.e complying wtch t h e b r i e f i n g r qquirementl

-
F u t u r e S e c u r i t y S u rv e y s shoulcI i n c l u d e u n d e r S e c t i c>" A " ",
m,
D r t l n ~o f C o n t a c t s Po e c t i c>n t a k e n by t h e p o s t Ito implement
i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n t a i ne d i n CA-14 ~ 7 1 .

o automatic

IMTED OFF1:CCAL USE

l!!
l!!
 This aucumor~tcontams uuvrrnation afl re nationc
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Tit1
N
I TEUG
I EWCE OPI 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amendec
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or n
I NS ABROIAD
TAUATO ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
 This aucumor~tcontams uuvrrnation afl re nationc
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Tit1
N
I TEUG
I EWCE OPI 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amendec
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or n
I NS ABROIAD
TAUATO ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
 CONFIDENTIAL
-A 1959 directit>e of the leadership of the: Committee :for StotG SeaWUy [KGB]
entitled
. 'On Intc
tasks to KGB residencies. It brects l w e a r e a en-
ing in aU types of U.S. Government installations dwoad; Am& UIRI in em-
basks, in milituy units and on the stcrffs of mil*
the scope of the directive are AmeitcMc mgned to iflterncrtiOnol0rganizllNDRI.
o v e r s e ~ rrepresentatives of scientific institutfm and bu(ineSJ firm8, news cor-
?el dents, etc:
To the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet in-
lligence services in particular. the United States
the -main enemy: a term appearing in numerous
~vietdocuments. Against this "main enemy," the
3viet intelligence services have developed over
he years and are today conducting concerted,
,odd-wide programs to probe, seek out and re-
uit Amexicans-official and private, civilian and
lilitary-in order to penetrate our agenciles, acquire
rr cryptographic systems, intercept 01ur courier
nnmunications, discover our military-Idated re-
d and development, etc. In this dart, the
. -. .-
soviets bring to bear the conviction that Nnencws
--
are essentially materialistic, motivated principally
by monetary need or greed, and can therefore be
"bought" to serve Soviet interests.
This study describes and illustrates by examples
an important threat to the security of the United
States---the systematic and intensive program by the
Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and
GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) to recruit
' d e a n s abroad and penetrate U.S. installations.
It also pictures the average Am,.rican overseas as
le is seen through the eyes of So. t InteUigen-
~rirnarilyinterested in money all.. making more of
t, typically indifferent to the means and often to
the risks,a person with his guard down, talkative by
nature, easier to approach abroad than he is at
home:,, This provocative portrait is not imaginary;
CONFIDENTIAL
Against Amedcuna.W a s s t g .M important
J .
n
.,
. ,. -____:a A-"
w rw- mvawr-rw
-..A
W---
blocs. Also included in
(Top . k m
T h a Ro
United !
it is p ~ l tof Soviet Intelligenca doctrine and will
emerge throughout this study in direct quotatiom
from KGB documents. The actual case exampler
cited, some in detail, will show the doctrine in prac-
tice. There will be particular emphasis on a paral-
lel Soviet concept that certain categories of Ameri-
cans, such as enlisted military personnel, juniqem.
bassy employees, and students are, in effect, sec-
ond class citizens" and thus particularly worth-
while targets for aggressive Soviet intelligena? &-
cers and their agents.
The Soviet program, as it has been observed
a world-wide basis, parallels and supplemenol
viet espionage operations within the United Sta
One of its principal aims is to acquire a b m
American agents who have the potential an
be directed to serve Soviet espionage in
the United Stat- in various branches of
sonnel outside the USSR to step up already
ing operational activity against Americans.
instructions were repeated in the spring of
and again in December of the same year. The
I
KGB leadership directive cited in me quotation at
111ehead of this study rdects a Soviet policy-level
nlncision to further increase the scope of the opera-
l111naleffort. ClassPed Soviet material of consid-
~rnblymore recent date is also available which d o e
l~mentsthe enlargement of the Soviet threat and tE
111rreasedoperational sophistication which is toda
lming brought to bear against Americans abroad.
In recent years all KGB "trusted contacts" an
agents, whatever their nationality or activity, SI--
L~~uwn to have been reappraised for possible direc-
Ii(~nagainst the American target. There is avail-
sl~lemuch reliable information to con6rm that 1both
111rKGB and GRU are working with intense con-
8cntration against Americans and U.S. installa1
-1,road and that the:y have score
viet Serviar
It is
t .
~.anlzahoniuana recnxucal .3.
-man.. &.- .
to go into 1h e points 01: or-
at
D e w e e n1 rna
L - ~ -
'.81vletintelligence SI:rvices .1 tlleu respectivle ju-
I ~iclictionalspheres, hot bri .oerltion of the nlajor
m-l~nponentsmost a1:tive .
. ill the global opera1tions
1-11'gramagainst Amencans abroad is basic to Un-
~I~rstanding of the program itselft.
a. First and foremost of thes e c o r n p e n
the KGB's Foreign Diectoratt: (also know
the First Chief Directorate) vvhich, outside
lmrders of the USSR has ~rimarv .
, reswnslt
lor clandestine pclsitive intelligFence collectii
political, military, eCwOmic 6md sdenti6c
wull as for highly specialized covert activitia
..... .
FIGURE 1. KGB MOSCOW HEADQUARTERSi, KNOWN AS 'THE CENTEK
iduence policies and actions of foreign govern-
ments. The Foreign Directorate also has the IS
sponsibility for counterintelligence abroad, in-
cluding penetration of all foreign security and
intelligence services. KGB staff o5cers assigned
.oad under diplomatic, hade and other fa
~fficialcover are under the immediate di
n of appropriate gengraphic department!
: Foreign Duectorate. It has been nota
ent years that officers with American Der
ment expexiena? are being :gent inaeasin lgiy
to
PO1st$ remote from the United States on the tested
the ~ r (more
y aa this. later) that work 8%gainst
h" micans there3.--.is easier ar:id more rewiuding.
. . speclallstr
. ..
Msmy of the Kbn s merlcan i have
served tours in the United States, speak English
fluently, are familiar with many aspects of official
and private Amencan life, and concentrate their
~
operational efforts on the American target wher-
-"
.yer they are stationed.
1b. While the KGB as the larger and senior
SO. viet senice, plays the major role in operations
di,,cussed in this paper, the CRU (actuaUy the
Chuef Intelligence Directorate of the C:eneral
IE of the Minishy of Defense) works actively
d with equal professionalism to collect stra-
$c military intelligence abroad and is there-
,e I~rimarilypitted against American military
rsorlnel and installations. It is also eneaeed
operations ag,ainst American scientific an,a';&-
al personnel in the West,, particularly where
? field of s pdalization 11as a military appli-
a .
L r
 CONFIDENTIAL
-A 1959 directit>e of the leadership of the: Committee :for StotG SeaWUy [KGB]
entitled
. 'On Intc
tasks to KGB residencies. It brects l w e a r e a en-
ing in aU types of U.S. Government installations dwoad; Am& UIRI in em-
basks, in milituy units and on the stcrffs of mil*
the scope of the directive are AmeitcMc mgned to iflterncrtiOnol0rganizllNDRI.
o v e r s e ~ rrepresentatives of scientific institutfm and bu(ineSJ firm8, news cor-
?el dents, etc:
To the Soviet Government, and to the Soviet in-
lligence services in particular. the United States
the -main enemy: a term appearing in numerous
~vietdocuments. Against this "main enemy," the
3viet intelligence services have developed over
he years and are today conducting concerted,
,odd-wide programs to probe, seek out and re-
uit Amexicans-official and private, civilian and
lilitary-in order to penetrate our agenciles, acquire
rr cryptographic systems, intercept 01ur courier
nnmunications, discover our military-Idated re-
d and development, etc. In this dart, the
. -. .-
soviets bring to bear the conviction that Nnencws
--
are essentially materialistic, motivated principally
by monetary need or greed, and can therefore be
"bought" to serve Soviet interests.
This study describes and illustrates by examples
an important threat to the security of the United
States---the systematic and intensive program by the
Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and
GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) to recruit
' d e a n s abroad and penetrate U.S. installations.
It also pictures the average Am,.rican overseas as
le is seen through the eyes of So. t InteUigen-
~rirnarilyinterested in money all.. making more of
t, typically indifferent to the means and often to
the risks,a person with his guard down, talkative by
nature, easier to approach abroad than he is at
home:,, This provocative portrait is not imaginary;
CONFIDENTIAL
Against Amedcuna.W a s s t g .M important
J .
n
.,
. ,. -____:a A-"
w rw- mvawr-rw
-..A
W---
blocs. Also included in
(Top . k m
T h a Ro
United !
it is p ~ l tof Soviet Intelligenca doctrine and will
emerge throughout this study in direct quotatiom
from KGB documents. The actual case exampler
cited, some in detail, will show the doctrine in prac-
tice. There will be particular emphasis on a paral-
lel Soviet concept that certain categories of Ameri-
cans, such as enlisted military personnel, juniqem.
bassy employees, and students are, in effect, sec-
ond class citizens" and thus particularly worth-
while targets for aggressive Soviet intelligena? &-
cers and their agents.
The Soviet program, as it has been observed
a world-wide basis, parallels and supplemenol
viet espionage operations within the United Sta
One of its principal aims is to acquire a b m
American agents who have the potential an
be directed to serve Soviet espionage in
the United Stat- in various branches of
sonnel outside the USSR to step up already
ing operational activity against Americans.
instructions were repeated in the spring of
and again in December of the same year. The
I
KGB leadership directive cited in me quotation at
111ehead of this study rdects a Soviet policy-level
nlncision to further increase the scope of the opera-
l111naleffort. ClassPed Soviet material of consid-
~rnblymore recent date is also available which d o e
l~mentsthe enlargement of the Soviet threat and tE
111rreasedoperational sophistication which is toda
lming brought to bear against Americans abroad.
In recent years all KGB "trusted contacts" an
agents, whatever their nationality or activity, SI--
L~~uwn to have been reappraised for possible direc-
Ii(~nagainst the American target. There is avail-
sl~lemuch reliable information to con6rm that 1both
111rKGB and GRU are working with intense con-
8cntration against Americans and U.S. installa1
-1,road and that the:y have score
viet Serviar
It is
t .
~.anlzahoniuana recnxucal .3.
-man.. &.- .
to go into 1h e points 01: or-
at
D e w e e n1 rna
L - ~ -
'.81vletintelligence SI:rvices .1 tlleu respectivle ju-
I ~iclictionalspheres, hot bri .oerltion of the nlajor
m-l~nponentsmost a1:tive .
. ill the global opera1tions
1-11'gramagainst Amencans abroad is basic to Un-
~I~rstanding of the program itselft.
a. First and foremost of thes e c o r n p e n
the KGB's Foreign Diectoratt: (also know
the First Chief Directorate) vvhich, outside
lmrders of the USSR has ~rimarv .
, reswnslt
lor clandestine pclsitive intelligFence collectii
political, military, eCwOmic 6md sdenti6c
wull as for highly specialized covert activitia
..... .
FIGURE 1. KGB MOSCOW HEADQUARTERSi, KNOWN AS 'THE CENTEK
iduence policies and actions of foreign govern-
ments. The Foreign Directorate also has the IS
sponsibility for counterintelligence abroad, in-
cluding penetration of all foreign security and
intelligence services. KGB staff o5cers assigned
.oad under diplomatic, hade and other fa
~fficialcover are under the immediate di
n of appropriate gengraphic department!
: Foreign Duectorate. It has been nota
ent years that officers with American Der
ment expexiena? are being :gent inaeasin lgiy
to
PO1st$ remote from the United States on the tested
the ~ r (more
y aa this. later) that work 8%gainst
h" micans there3.--.is easier ar:id more rewiuding.
. . speclallstr
. ..
Msmy of the Kbn s merlcan i have
served tours in the United States, speak English
fluently, are familiar with many aspects of official
and private Amencan life, and concentrate their
~
operational efforts on the American target wher-
-"
.yer they are stationed.
1b. While the KGB as the larger and senior
SO. viet senice, plays the major role in operations
di,,cussed in this paper, the CRU (actuaUy the
Chuef Intelligence Directorate of the C:eneral
IE of the Minishy of Defense) works actively
d with equal professionalism to collect stra-
$c military intelligence abroad and is there-
,e I~rimarilypitted against American military
rsorlnel and installations. It is also eneaeed
operations ag,ainst American scientific an,a';&-
al personnel in the West,, particularly where
? field of s pdalization 11as a military appli-
a .
L r
 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

U""". However, the GRU lacks exclusive & now bas w visible millby &hation. w ica h o v m deployment of Soviet intelligesla, the intelligence ot tas East European Cam-
main, e 7 intelligenceI, and mnsider- be may be a k t seaetmy of emb~ q, or, perb rrrr, whether located within or outside offlcial mudst Bloc have given support in the Wart to n
able m 1 even rivalry with the KGB deputy c h i e f o f t h e :Soviet armme!mid represez ~allations,comes reasonably close to saturating Soviet Intelligence operation against an American.
isamu tion. available amedited cover positions. The ma- This is an outgrowth of the close working relation-
ty of Soviet news media personnel abroad are ship which is known to exist between t h e - ~ Gand ~
Deploymaat d KGB and --.- Opeau.>,- uIwK-w UU

a
- d KGB and (:

rd~ , " ~ ~ ~ ~- ! f ~ ~ , " $ ~

1-lllgence officers. Overall, more than 60% have the dvilian East European Communist sesvicea

I
nsiderlc3, a b m d
Few Americam a b d in diplomatic, militnry out . - ~ I I so identified nnd this is considered a minimal which share the Soviet concept of the United States
Mmponents a
or other official and private capacities fully appred- miosion. They have, hction on 1 .91m. Included in this categoly are camspond- as the main enemy.' (For purposes of this paper,
ate the overwhelming overseas deployment of S.+ '11 for the newspapen Rnvda and h e s t i a and these are the senices of East Germany,. Poland.
prut-timle basis-as 1 diplomatic seaeMes of
~....
viet Intelligence which can and is being brought mPh as Pollom and . C U ~and
~ ~

d ScieaaC,..~rrsentatives of the TASS and Novosti news Czechoslova!da, Hungary and to a limited degrea,
to bem against them as well as a w t non-Ameri- Lches. as 61DSUIS. vi8oecoDSUIS, presc and infon .ncies. A d o t , the world-wide and still ex- Rumania.) Laszlo Sznbo, a senior intellieence offi-
can targ&. The fact is that agout BO% of the tion of8Ian, foreign eDde r e p mmtatives and, )<lingSoviet civillan &line, provides both cover cer who defected from the Hungarian %H. r e
approrimately 7,000 Soviets abroad in ofacial in- indicated, in almost every counbry they far C I support to Soviet Intelligence, particularly the ferred to this collaboration in the following terms in
(1, and surveys in recent years have established testimonv before a mmmittee of the House of Rep
ices in n ratio of rouihlY two to one in favor of the .,.. .
stallations are intelligence d o e r s of the two m- number the legithat e diplomats of the Minis&)
..
Foreien NIPUS ana non-mreu~eenmrevresenran
... . .. t 70% of itd oversea rep-tatives are st& resentatiks of the Eigbty-ninth Congress:
KGB. Among Soviets with diplomatic rank the of &er Soviet mtnistries G a ,.enof that service. "TdodhUy, tba Snvlt& all mnfsraoar wlth the
percentage of intelligence of8oers is even higher; some ofsces, intellig;enm personr1 2 mnv haw .'ram numerous publicized eqionage cases in the Bloc so* La the USSR fan -
d of tnt.rngam
the world-wide average is about 75% and in some wmplete monopoly. Certpin consulpr dffices, 1 1 1 4 States, Americans have beoome generally Oblstlva pmblsmr. work bowam Swbt
countn'es it tops 80%. These statistics are based
on identifiations mads by Soviet intelligence om- ..
example, have been wholly st&c d by the K(
.
.A
And it is bv now a weu-vennea tact tner nu p s ~
.- .. ..
.
am that the United Nations in New York, in-
#lingthe internationally staffed Secretariat and ,,
i
,
''''',"'; :","zZ:E:E,";
pnd ths ~ u t yof the sovfst
cers who have defected to the West and are in a nel of Soh& milikrry attache (~ffices, includ
position to point out their former colleagues and Iow-rmiking ortealsible civilian enlployees, are
permanent Soviet U. N. Mission, is used W a . .
Vnfon. . Each Bloc amvim bnr agreed 4 th the
r r base by the Soviet intelli~enceservices. The So* m l e o to &b*s b m d o b j s t i m i.
on analyses by Western security and counterintelli- uofesional mi ilitnry 05cers and mesr ml is tru; of U. N. offices &d specialized sub- Ib own in- and tn the lntsrsl~ of 0th- ~loc
~ U ~ 'PJ Y q*
gence servim, including American, which have
been able to detect and observe the Soviets in
o p ~ t i o n a lintelligence activity.
b m of the GRU. 'Irhis .situation . . .
nse to some curious evolumns m cover and re
frequently gi

To illusitrate, Pavel I[vanovich Lamakin, a dvi 1

- ,*ry organizations in ~ u r o p e . One example is

, 111~1ral
I'nris headquarters of the U.N. Economic and
OrE&tton (UNESCO) where over @
-'
mJn ensmy."
Ir

I periodic conferences mentioned bv SzDbo

The
to bo

Intelligence units (known as legal d d e n d e :I ) chauffan of the military attache oface in RCm e
of both KGB and GRU exist independently of eacA from l!5 4 to t om. next a P Fd in Crpy in
other in Soviet missions abroad, and stall pasonoel 1 W a s a full-fledget1 Lt Colonel . with the htlc3 of
. -.
... -. ..
of hoth services are protected by diplomatic irD asistant military attacne. a m a r l y , noDerpler N.
. . , I the true percentage ir believed to be much
munity or have other official status. The o p - Filatov, a lowly civilian driver/interpreter for the
tions chief of each residency (ref& to ss the military attache in Ottawa from 1857 to. 1880, war
resident) normally has a senior cover position. posted to Rio de Janeiro in 1963 with diplomatic
In the case of the KGB, the resident may be coun- rank as seoond seaetary. Filatov, it is known, was
selor of embassy or at a minimum a k t smetary. Pctually n lieutenant senlor grade of the Soviet
Since 1961 the GRU resident has been d i d nrmy wbile in Canada; Lomakin wm pmbnbly n
~~ctm are ukployed i n the ~ ~ c r e t h ior
a t attached teke pl&e annually and the inter-senice n~eementr
111s Soviet UNESCO Mission. Approximately made are followed up with day-to-day coordination
. "., are IdentiEd or suspect intelligence o 5 m and guidance by a small group of KGB officers as-
signed to the headquarters of each counterpart Bloc
.Ivr. Another exampla is the International senice. ~lthdirghmuch of the emphasis is on
' , tv~lcEnergy Agency ( i,. 1 3 ) with headquarters operations against American and other Western per-
Vs~nna. Out of 55 Soviets working in the multi- sonnel and installations within the Bloc area ( a
-@i,,11a1 IAEA Secretariat ss technical erperto, subject outside the scope of this paper), there is
.,,-lators, etc., or attached to the permanent So- evidence that the Bloc services,where they are r e p
IAEA Mission, nearly half an, identified or resented abroad in the West, cooperate closely with
3

from the bxwbviou mle of military attache and major while in Rome .-
.81uJysuspect intelligence o f f i m with the mar- the KGB, occasionally to the extent of making

-
, # , I orror believed to be on the conservative side.
picture is much the same in Geneva with a
-1, foncenbation of KGB and GRU 05- in tbe
th* ,IWII personnel and local agents available to
the latter.
In the of military apentlOIU,
' I European a c e (EOUN), the permanent So- particularly those involving American military per-
* hflsslon to EOUN; the Economic Commission
and wnnected with NATO, =*
, I.'~~rope (ECE), the World Health Organiza-
.s

I c I),
,
,, ( WHO I , the world ~&eoroloeicalOrcaniza- lationships are b o close between the GRU and the
WMOj: he~ ~
the ~ ~ t ~ Telerommounictionr
&Ation ~
~ t i ~ ~ service
East
~ European
l
~ military intelligence
~ services.
~
agreements on intelligence requirements are
Inter-~

.n (.ITV) and others. reached at annual meetings of the Wanaw Pact

powers. There is evidence that the GRU and the
ud 'Ioc 'Imud B1, military Intelligence services regularly share
\ I n v m l points there will bs n reference to views, experiences, technial knowledge and opera-
.q.twu In which agents or personnel of one of tional task not only at the headquprtm level within
HGURE 2. GRU OFFICERS LOMAKIN (LEFO AND FllATOV

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
~*
 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

U""". However, the GRU lacks exclusive & now bas w visible millby &hation. w ica h o v m deployment of Soviet intelligesla, the intelligence ot tas East European Cam-
main, e 7 intelligenceI, and mnsider- be may be a k t seaetmy of emb~ q, or, perb rrrr, whether located within or outside offlcial mudst Bloc have given support in the Wart to n
able m 1 even rivalry with the KGB deputy c h i e f o f t h e :Soviet armme!mid represez ~allations,comes reasonably close to saturating Soviet Intelligence operation against an American.
isamu tion. available amedited cover positions. The ma- This is an outgrowth of the close working relation-
ty of Soviet news media personnel abroad are ship which is known to exist between t h e - ~ Gand ~
Deploymaat d KGB and --.- Opeau.>,- uIwK-w UU

a
- d KGB and (:

rd~ , " ~ ~ ~ ~- ! f ~ ~ , " $ ~

1-lllgence officers. Overall, more than 60% have the dvilian East European Communist sesvicea

I
nsiderlc3, a b m d
Few Americam a b d in diplomatic, militnry out . - ~ I I so identified nnd this is considered a minimal which share the Soviet concept of the United States
Mmponents a
or other official and private capacities fully appred- miosion. They have, hction on 1 .91m. Included in this categoly are camspond- as the main enemy.' (For purposes of this paper,
ate the overwhelming overseas deployment of S.+ '11 for the newspapen Rnvda and h e s t i a and these are the senices of East Germany,. Poland.
prut-timle basis-as 1 diplomatic seaeMes of
~....
viet Intelligence which can and is being brought mPh as Pollom and . C U ~and
~ ~

d ScieaaC,..~rrsentatives of the TASS and Novosti news Czechoslova!da, Hungary and to a limited degrea,
to bem against them as well as a w t non-Ameri- Lches. as 61DSUIS. vi8oecoDSUIS, presc and infon .ncies. A d o t , the world-wide and still ex- Rumania.) Laszlo Sznbo, a senior intellieence offi-
can targ&. The fact is that agout BO% of the tion of8Ian, foreign eDde r e p mmtatives and, )<lingSoviet civillan &line, provides both cover cer who defected from the Hungarian %H. r e
approrimately 7,000 Soviets abroad in ofacial in- indicated, in almost every counbry they far C I support to Soviet Intelligence, particularly the ferred to this collaboration in the following terms in
(1, and surveys in recent years have established testimonv before a mmmittee of the House of Rep
ices in n ratio of rouihlY two to one in favor of the .,.. .
stallations are intelligence d o e r s of the two m- number the legithat e diplomats of the Minis&)
..
Foreien NIPUS ana non-mreu~eenmrevresenran
... . .. t 70% of itd oversea rep-tatives are st& resentatiks of the Eigbty-ninth Congress:
KGB. Among Soviets with diplomatic rank the of &er Soviet mtnistries G a ,.enof that service. "TdodhUy, tba Snvlt& all mnfsraoar wlth the
percentage of intelligence of8oers is even higher; some ofsces, intellig;enm personr1 2 mnv haw .'ram numerous publicized eqionage cases in the Bloc so* La the USSR fan -
d of tnt.rngam
the world-wide average is about 75% and in some wmplete monopoly. Certpin consulpr dffices, 1 1 1 4 States, Americans have beoome generally Oblstlva pmblsmr. work bowam Swbt
countn'es it tops 80%. These statistics are based
on identifiations mads by Soviet intelligence om- ..
example, have been wholly st&c d by the K(
.
.A
And it is bv now a weu-vennea tact tner nu p s ~
.- .. ..
.
am that the United Nations in New York, in-
#lingthe internationally staffed Secretariat and ,,
i
,
''''',"'; :","zZ:E:E,";
pnd ths ~ u t yof the sovfst
cers who have defected to the West and are in a nel of Soh& milikrry attache (~ffices, includ
position to point out their former colleagues and Iow-rmiking ortealsible civilian enlployees, are
permanent Soviet U. N. Mission, is used W a . .
Vnfon. . Each Bloc amvim bnr agreed 4 th the
r r base by the Soviet intelli~enceservices. The So* m l e o to &b*s b m d o b j s t i m i.
on analyses by Western security and counterintelli- uofesional mi ilitnry 05cers and mesr ml is tru; of U. N. offices &d specialized sub- Ib own in- and tn the lntsrsl~ of 0th- ~loc
~ U ~ 'PJ Y q*
gence servim, including American, which have
been able to detect and observe the Soviets in
o p ~ t i o n a lintelligence activity.
b m of the GRU. 'Irhis .situation . . .
nse to some curious evolumns m cover and re
frequently gi

To illusitrate, Pavel I[vanovich Lamakin, a dvi 1

- ,*ry organizations in ~ u r o p e . One example is

, 111~1ral
I'nris headquarters of the U.N. Economic and
OrE&tton (UNESCO) where over @
-'
mJn ensmy."
Ir

I periodic conferences mentioned bv SzDbo

The
to bo

Intelligence units (known as legal d d e n d e :I ) chauffan of the military attache oface in RCm e
of both KGB and GRU exist independently of eacA from l!5 4 to t om. next a P Fd in Crpy in
other in Soviet missions abroad, and stall pasonoel 1 W a s a full-fledget1 Lt Colonel . with the htlc3 of
. -.
... -. ..
of hoth services are protected by diplomatic irD asistant military attacne. a m a r l y , noDerpler N.
. . , I the true percentage ir believed to be much
munity or have other official status. The o p - Filatov, a lowly civilian driver/interpreter for the
tions chief of each residency (ref& to ss the military attache in Ottawa from 1857 to. 1880, war
resident) normally has a senior cover position. posted to Rio de Janeiro in 1963 with diplomatic
In the case of the KGB, the resident may be coun- rank as seoond seaetary. Filatov, it is known, was
selor of embassy or at a minimum a k t smetary. Pctually n lieutenant senlor grade of the Soviet
Since 1961 the GRU resident has been d i d nrmy wbile in Canada; Lomakin wm pmbnbly n
~~ctm are ukployed i n the ~ ~ c r e t h ior
a t attached teke pl&e annually and the inter-senice n~eementr
111s Soviet UNESCO Mission. Approximately made are followed up with day-to-day coordination
. "., are IdentiEd or suspect intelligence o 5 m and guidance by a small group of KGB officers as-
signed to the headquarters of each counterpart Bloc
.Ivr. Another exampla is the International senice. ~lthdirghmuch of the emphasis is on
' , tv~lcEnergy Agency ( i,. 1 3 ) with headquarters operations against American and other Western per-
Vs~nna. Out of 55 Soviets working in the multi- sonnel and installations within the Bloc area ( a
-@i,,11a1 IAEA Secretariat ss technical erperto, subject outside the scope of this paper), there is
.,,-lators, etc., or attached to the permanent So- evidence that the Bloc services,where they are r e p
IAEA Mission, nearly half an, identified or resented abroad in the West, cooperate closely with
3

from the bxwbviou mle of military attache and major while in Rome .-
.81uJysuspect intelligence o f f i m with the mar- the KGB, occasionally to the extent of making

-
, # , I orror believed to be on the conservative side.
picture is much the same in Geneva with a
-1, foncenbation of KGB and GRU 05- in tbe
th* ,IWII personnel and local agents available to
the latter.
In the of military apentlOIU,
' I European a c e (EOUN), the permanent So- particularly those involving American military per-
* hflsslon to EOUN; the Economic Commission
and wnnected with NATO, =*
, I.'~~rope (ECE), the World Health Organiza-
.s

I c I),
,
,, ( WHO I , the world ~&eoroloeicalOrcaniza- lationships are b o close between the GRU and the
WMOj: he~ ~
the ~ ~ t ~ Telerommounictionr
&Ation ~
~ t i ~ ~ service
East
~ European
l
~ military intelligence
~ services.
~
agreements on intelligence requirements are
Inter-~

.n (.ITV) and others. reached at annual meetings of the Wanaw Pact

powers. There is evidence that the GRU and the
ud 'Ioc 'Imud B1, military Intelligence services regularly share
\ I n v m l points there will bs n reference to views, experiences, technial knowledge and opera-
.q.twu In which agents or personnel of one of tional task not only at the headquprtm level within
HGURE 2. GRU OFFICERS LOMAKIN (LEFO AND FllATOV

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
~*
 CONFIDENTIAL
the Bloc area but also in the West through coUabo-
mtive relationships between residencies through
their respective military attaches.
In summe, this introduction bas sought to iden-
tlfy the existence and steady intensification of the
Soviet Intelligence threat to Americans and U.S.
imtdhtions abroad and brirll! describe the So-
viet components involved ar~tl. I O C variety of w e r
wsitions from which t h y ooerate on a truly massive
scale. The d o n s which follow win be prtnprl
concened with the goals of Soviet Intelligenceopc
ations against Americana a h 4 the target cat
gories of highest priority (and th& vulnmbilitia
the Sovi* approach to t h e targ- frontally a~ rLS AND I ABROAD I ENCE
i n M y and, by illustratior~, Soviet techniqu
both d e and subtle which, ns we will see, fi
quently fail but too often hove succeeded wi 'The r KGB ~ m ]
serious security damage to tbs United States. mn 1m ~ a w e wuh officialdooumentx from Anrcncrm irrna~urnmo. rru
ml to agents 1witi acccsd to d other remet mexponden c i )UJI
Mi6 clerk$, d lpher machlne J% c h k r and nmetmlu .... It
rcts our @e TX to be morc n dsocloplng p e r d contact8 and
broad who mn obtaln wawk &her
.....
denttar relathd i p s with
-.-
m. U . S . overmu tnstauat~11 or wuh u . S . 5 . e n f and rcbnl$c orgm-
zuflon, <n the United Statea. Similar mn$dmthl reloHonrhlp are a h &tired
with Amerlmn, abroad who m k ln Amerlcun d l b h m e n t r ln any mpacity.
...
auch a, tronrkltorr. d r i w x or cucn domattlcx m h agent wtumka rhmld
be wed to obtain a complete plchrre of the atatfing and work s h e d d e r wUh9
A-rtfCM fdaUaHonr in order to obtain renet documents and to maplam a u d b
b p Servlm oBcer, or any 0 t h sedor U.S. &dad
'r primary goals of Soviet Intelligenm opm- - r m b i t is clew from Soviet InteUgenm doc-
, frine and from scorns of reported and often ob-
.- -4 aplnst Americans a b m d are to obtain crypt*
,. , mderiak so as to be able to mad mdpbered served KGB and GRU developmental opemtiom
and recruitment approaches that the most aggres-
-. ,ss-anIcations.and to acquire, preferably in doc- sive Soviet operational activity is directed against
. -.~.ry fonn, o5cial secrets through recruitment
tt-dcans--civilian and military and of d junior employees of American diplomatic and other
,..
1
..I -who themselves have access to the %
-'di establisl~mentcand Isgainst enlisted over-
b. .t.18rrmntion. u peesonnel of the militwry servicer. It is thia
bnoad categoy of code clerlcr, secretarleri, Bvlnrine
.--. lvrn ue, of course, other objectives: to collect
,. an rcientisc and technological info1mation
ards, etc., wlhich
. ,. . . .
the Sovietc regard asP srticu-
.ly vulnerable since (in tne worm ot one! KGB
i . -...,
.t.8allyevery field, industrinl as well as n"litpry. &,d v e ) 'they do not bslong to the dvileged
.-3 wrll ns clnsi8ed; to work t o w d u~ltimate che s and are worse off Bnancidy.'
.tlzrn nnd manipulation of American Fmlitical
, 1 . 1 4 1 . life throu& identification nnd ass: %¶lent Code and conr- Pnronnsl
.Ins with the potential tobe politico1action
.lid, in acidition, to cuIdtivat' variwIS cate-
I . -. 01 non-ofElcinl Am1 :Ins abroad, such PI
In 1881, a g a d diredive sent to KGB1 111-
cr abmd, signed by AldLIMdr Nikolnyevich Shel-
bin, then Chairman of tlm KGB, emphnsizad force-
.*I,, whocan be b n ~ t under wnbrol and
.
.. . . .. .. ..
.~(rnclar, mcluctmg me mnlugenca and
...
...lql to seek pbs everrt;ralUy with U.S. (h m -
':
lly that the %st priority task of every residency
es -to recruit cipher clerks.' It noted tersely
.
8
at "the most fruitful rrpuld w m obtained in
a
-
-..
. -
IIV trrvias. All of these, however, are.
tltn basic goal of getting secret info1
Antrrlcnn overseas installations by eve
is manner. KGB residendes were instructed to
~ncentrateon 'the identification of American code
-erran:.
~b in p q ~ ~ ~ ~for t i aop pn m h t n g and recruit-
): th,.ln.- It is known that at least one KGB resi-
I "p
,
1
d(..leg&
11. the
* . ~ r r l n ntarget--an ~ m b -
KGB would not I'y~loolrany :pmmis-
er For-
dc:ncy m the W
M oscow headq~
directive. Tbi!
bllow-up sup]port from
3 heels of the Sbelepin
'om of a prep d list
 CONFIDENTIAL
the Bloc area but also in the West through coUabo-
mtive relationships between residencies through
their respective military attaches.
In summe, this introduction bas sought to iden-
tlfy the existence and steady intensification of the
Soviet Intelligence threat to Americans and U.S.
imtdhtions abroad and brirll! describe the So-
viet components involved ar~tl. I O C variety of w e r
wsitions from which t h y ooerate on a truly massive
scale. The d o n s which follow win be prtnprl
concened with the goals of Soviet Intelligenceopc
ations against Americana a h 4 the target cat
gories of highest priority (and th& vulnmbilitia
the Sovi* approach to t h e targ- frontally a~ rLS AND I ABROAD I ENCE
i n M y and, by illustratior~, Soviet techniqu
both d e and subtle which, ns we will see, fi
quently fail but too often hove succeeded wi 'The r KGB ~ m ]
serious security damage to tbs United States. mn 1m ~ a w e wuh officialdooumentx from Anrcncrm irrna~urnmo. rru
ml to agents 1witi acccsd to d other remet mexponden c i )UJI
Mi6 clerk$, d lpher machlne J% c h k r and nmetmlu .... It
rcts our @e TX to be morc n dsocloplng p e r d contact8 and
broad who mn obtaln wawk &her
.....
denttar relathd i p s with
-.-
m. U . S . overmu tnstauat~11 or wuh u . S . 5 . e n f and rcbnl$c orgm-
zuflon, <n the United Statea. Similar mn$dmthl reloHonrhlp are a h &tired
with Amerlmn, abroad who m k ln Amerlcun d l b h m e n t r ln any mpacity.
...
auch a, tronrkltorr. d r i w x or cucn domattlcx m h agent wtumka rhmld
be wed to obtain a complete plchrre of the atatfing and work s h e d d e r wUh9
A-rtfCM fdaUaHonr in order to obtain renet documents and to maplam a u d b
b p Servlm oBcer, or any 0 t h sedor U.S. &dad
'r primary goals of Soviet Intelligenm opm- - r m b i t is clew from Soviet InteUgenm doc-
, frine and from scorns of reported and often ob-
.- -4 aplnst Americans a b m d are to obtain crypt*
,. , mderiak so as to be able to mad mdpbered served KGB and GRU developmental opemtiom
and recruitment approaches that the most aggres-
-. ,ss-anIcations.and to acquire, preferably in doc- sive Soviet operational activity is directed against
. -.~.ry fonn, o5cial secrets through recruitment
tt-dcans--civilian and military and of d junior employees of American diplomatic and other
,..
1
..I -who themselves have access to the %
-'di establisl~mentcand Isgainst enlisted over-
b. .t.18rrmntion. u peesonnel of the militwry servicer. It is thia
bnoad categoy of code clerlcr, secretarleri, Bvlnrine
.--. lvrn ue, of course, other objectives: to collect
,. an rcientisc and technological info1mation
ards, etc., wlhich
. ,. . . .
the Sovietc regard asP srticu-
.ly vulnerable since (in tne worm ot one! KGB
i . -...,
.t.8allyevery field, industrinl as well as n"litpry. &,d v e ) 'they do not bslong to the dvileged
.-3 wrll ns clnsi8ed; to work t o w d u~ltimate che s and are worse off Bnancidy.'
.tlzrn nnd manipulation of American Fmlitical
, 1 . 1 4 1 . life throu& identification nnd ass: %¶lent Code and conr- Pnronnsl
.Ins with the potential tobe politico1action
.lid, in acidition, to cuIdtivat' variwIS cate-
I . -. 01 non-ofElcinl Am1 :Ins abroad, such PI
In 1881, a g a d diredive sent to KGB1 111-
cr abmd, signed by AldLIMdr Nikolnyevich Shel-
bin, then Chairman of tlm KGB, emphnsizad force-
.*I,, whocan be b n ~ t under wnbrol and
.
.. . . .. .. ..
.~(rnclar, mcluctmg me mnlugenca and
...
...lql to seek pbs everrt;ralUy with U.S. (h m -
':
lly that the %st priority task of every residency
es -to recruit cipher clerks.' It noted tersely
.
8
at "the most fruitful rrpuld w m obtained in
a
-
-..
. -
IIV trrvias. All of these, however, are.
tltn basic goal of getting secret info1
Antrrlcnn overseas installations by eve
is manner. KGB residendes were instructed to
~ncentrateon 'the identification of American code
-erran:.
~b in p q ~ ~ ~ ~for t i aop pn m h t n g and recruit-
): th,.ln.- It is known that at least one KGB resi-
I "p
,
1
d(..leg&
11. the
* . ~ r r l n ntarget--an ~ m b -
KGB would not I'y~loolrany :pmmis-
er For-
dc:ncy m the W
M oscow headq~
directive. Tbi!
bllow-up sup]port from
3 heels of the Sbelepin
'om of a prep d list
 CONFIDENTIAL
of code clerks, cornpleto with namw and biographi-
cal data, who were at that time assigned to the
Weturn country and aguimt whom residency ef-
forts were to b concentrat~d.
The majorlty of cldo 1:k:l.l .md other Americm
communicationr pirso~s~cl : ,ad tend to fall in
the 'junior etnployrrr" cutrgtrly in terms of grade
and salary. For the most part, they u s relatively
young, often u~~nttached (both male and female),
often L s politically sophiiticatrd t h smior ~ per-
sonnd, and tend to spend the& 05-duty social Ume
in compmy with each othrr and with other junior
employees. Unlika their Soviet m u n t e p u b
abroad, who are reqitired to live within Soviet 05-
cis1 installations and are not allowed on the s h e a s
without a prowtive escort, American smbDuy code
Jerks live where they please and are free to cir-
culate socially, to associate with l d citlzena and
non-oEicial Americans at their foreign pasts. Under
these conditions their specialized and ~ensltiwoc-
cupations tend to become widely known and, in
fact, it is relativelv easy for an a g g r d v e and a-
pbk : Soviet intelligenm residency, especially one
whiclh makes e5ective use of a local agent network,
to id,entify them and develop means of direct a
indinr t access for sLssessment purposes and, in some
, ror r m l t m e n t attempts.
The Soviet effort against oode <clerks takes ahm a t
"Timaginable form, ranging; f m m t h e wildly
crude! to subtle, well-planned ax~d highly corn~plex
. .--..
L--> :
Itions in which the Soviet bmu rr -waled
the last moment and the Iintended victirn is
~t completely by surprise.
-- ,-
-. example of Soviet m d i t y in particularly bla-
form din 1888
Tanzania V l a d W T. Putyatov,
in , n"-
Soviet
0-1,
second
secretary and CRU deer known to specialize in
operations against communications pe~mnnel,a p
proached an American Embasay cods clerk who wpr
ententaining an em1b n s q secret9r at a beach nesort
m t a l rant. An ass:iduous d t i v r tor of Amerkm.
h t y a~tov
. had met the code .d.erk sodally a few
-
w e e k betore and unquestionably was aware of his
occupation The Soviet invited himself to dinner
with the American couple, p d e d to get drunlc,
them offered to make both of the Americana rich if
they would give him embassy documents for which
he would pay in Amuican dollan. He kept insist-
ing the code clerk meet him privately. Mom an-
CONFIDENTIAL
14
n o d than nlYmsd by PutyaWa pmhaw, tb
1q.a
Amerlcaar, even with polnted I ~ u wom , not able
to m& the GHU oglcer leave them h.They
were flnolly m d by m o t h Soviet ( a Imcm
KCB 0 5 ~ who ) cpme ovor to the table m d
hls staggering mllssgue away. Pulyatov, h
ever, rbmnlned p l s t e n t evm when l .A
o b
weeh later he rhowed up uoindted at a dk
puty given by an AID amploybe for aevsnl Amun-
I
CPN, including the urns oode clerk. ThL time,
m d without drinking, Putptov again mncankated
hlr nttentlon on tha code Jerk. The latter, bow-
ever h11.1been keeping the smbpuy lscvrlty a
informed of Putyatov'r aggrcsdve actionr and th
ce
Soviet h n y abandoned bL efforts.
. The second Soviet approach, this time in
Not infrequently, an indire method Involvbq
use of local (non-Swlet) agents m d mmpromlm a
the tnrget individual through m a l i n v o l m w *
is a favorite Soviet Bnt step. A few para ago In I
North Africnn country, a Soviet inteU1gcmca d8ca
told one of his agents. a Eum- burinarman an(
h l mident, that bll prlnclpnl objective w u b
I
penetrate the Arnsrlcan Embaaay c o m m u n l m h
satlon. He p h e d to achleve thh by 4cam-
promise of a female embassy cluk whom he i d s ~
fled to the agent. The latter, at that tlme only
sllghtly acquainted Wth the American glrl, wu 08
dered to seduce her and waa pmrnlrad a larp b a n
dal mward if s u d In thh CPU), he wu no1
Similnrly, in a Near Eastern county, a local go-
ment o5dal who bad been recruited nr an agem
I
by the Soviets, waa instructed to meat and culti-
vate two American @Is who were c l w frimds-
one of them an embassy code clerk, the other. r
CIA employee. The Soviet ofewr darcribed both
girls ns athactive, single. and Pecond class citlzemD
In telling the agent to bearme s a d l y involved
with either one of the glrls. the Soviet ofecer dL-
played a diamond ring which be promised would
be available for pmsentation as a (pH if the agent
waa able to carry out hL assignment.
Onca havtng aet its dgbb on a code or caamtr-
nications target believed even remotely awcaptibb
on a long-range ba& to Soviet inducements OI
threats, the KGB is both relentless m d p a t i a t
One Department of State communications techni-
dan who, althougb America0 by birth, bad m Eut
European ethnic and educational background and
once served in a very junior capadty in an Amsr'
dipbmotic mirdon in the USSR durtrg World '
CONFIDENTIAL
mince been the object of two developmental
. w h e in di5erent parts of the world, followed
sllbsequent recruitment attempt at a third
.-TI post. In this particular case,the KGB con-
m "accidental" encounter in the Far East
Soviet citizen (coached by the KGB for the
r if not a regular s M o5cer) whom the
an had last h o w n and Last seen 16 years
< us a young and friendly electricianhan~'
the USSR. This time the Soviet posed
I81mt civilian TV factory director from L --
.
I. temporarily in the Far East on burinc
,ally, travel remrds showed the Soviet v
t in the area with a diplomatic passport on
( d r y duty from the Ministry of Foreign Af-
P, came hvo years later and involved a KCB
Rn operations specialist under diplomatic
xho presented himself to the American bear-
rtings and a letter from the original Soviet
The new Soviet attempted to follow up
81 approach with renewed efforts at cultiva-
. , M I rapport. A third-and crucial-approach
~,lrcethree years later in a difterent West
. ,111 country. The American unsuspectiogly
.,,4 made friends with a p e ~ who o passed
' 1 nff as a naturalized South American busi-
~ I Iof the samt? East Europ!an origin as the
an himself. The hvo we:re in occasional
v mntact for alpproximately eight months be-
,"thing bapperled. When ttle completely un-
.I recruitment proposal wns made--and re-
it was ostensibly on behalf of the foreign
C , I I C ~service of the East European country
unted information on "all types of American
.,.aphic equipment.' in return for which the
1 American was offered financial security for
I 11f his life. The circumstances of the un-
tu1 recruitment bid indicated strongly that
..ndble naturalized Soutlt merican was ac-
.I Soviet "Illegal," i.e.,
:L Soviet intellige
llving and working in the West carnodal:ed
- umented with a false, non-Soviet nationality.
lollowing caw, although not new and giro.
mvuntion in the press at the time, is m u n t e d
.t l~rllwdetail than befora Although there
*M inexplicable aspects which are not likely
. In resolved the Soviet attempt to -recruit
'-.k Donald Ultan is a clarslc example of a
.t~tud,devious operation in which the Sc-
CONFIDENTIAL
viet ha ". completely concealed UI ~ t i l
the las
don^.. .,., ..& 30, BmkIy~----."aL. -~~,jee
-4-
of the American Embury in Vienna, graduate of
the University of California, npplioant for career
status in the Foreign S e h and accustomed to
European life from previous residenm in Paris, was
of soecial interest to Soviet Intelligence for a variety
)ns. First ancI foremost, he was a mde clerk
IS automatically in the top priority category
for r aWtment. Se~ondly, his father was an
from Czarist Russia to the United States,
EfT, L
anu arrnougn-9 ., son had been brought up to speak
me
only English at home, from the somewhat myopic
viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence there war a bars
chance that he might harbor some'elements of
sympathy for the homeland of his father. Thirdly,
he was Jewish with apparently strong feelings
about Nazi pmecutions and an interest in the
Resistam movements of World War U. And,
finally, he was fluent in French, liked to converse
in it, and was interested in languages in general.
All of t h m factors, plus undoubtedly others, had
come to Soviet attenhon in Vienna through their
excellent local capability to monitor closely the job
status, pasonal characteristics and social pattern
of the young Am- group in Vienna, including
embassy code clerk and secretaries, graduate stu-
dents at the University ot Vienna and some expabi-
ate types with vague means of support. Inter-
woven with this group were others of various na-
tionalities, including Austrian employees of the
American Embassy. Although this gmup was by
no means a single, clubby unit in the relaxed charm
of Vienna's coffee house, concert and cocktail party
circuit, the Soviets had within it an agent, exc-
sively directed against the Americans in the p r
who had long since spotted Ultan, knew him a
hk friends, shared some of their social life and w
wiUine and able to assist the KGB in mountina
hat bizarre op t the m i e cG
The sidewalk cafe of the old an1d famous Sac1
-
was me openmg scene. ~ n agent e
...- .
HoteL a pleasant spc* f m a n a p e r i itif in May 19
.
ot me m t .
a natumlized citizen of a friendly W e t e m country
and a trillimt mathematician, had invited an un-
employad American teacher, a close friend of Ultan
and, like him, a fluent French-apeaker, to join him
for a drink. The plan was quite simple; merely
to bring about a ' c h m d meeting betwan the
15
 CONFIDENTIAL
of code clerks, cornpleto with namw and biographi-
cal data, who were at that time assigned to the
Weturn country and aguimt whom residency ef-
forts were to b concentrat~d.
The majorlty of cldo 1:k:l.l .md other Americm
communicationr pirso~s~cl : ,ad tend to fall in
the 'junior etnployrrr" cutrgtrly in terms of grade
and salary. For the most part, they u s relatively
young, often u~~nttached (both male and female),
often L s politically sophiiticatrd t h smior ~ per-
sonnd, and tend to spend the& 05-duty social Ume
in compmy with each othrr and with other junior
employees. Unlika their Soviet m u n t e p u b
abroad, who are reqitired to live within Soviet 05-
cis1 installations and are not allowed on the s h e a s
without a prowtive escort, American smbDuy code
Jerks live where they please and are free to cir-
culate socially, to associate with l d citlzena and
non-oEicial Americans at their foreign pasts. Under
these conditions their specialized and ~ensltiwoc-
cupations tend to become widely known and, in
fact, it is relativelv easy for an a g g r d v e and a-
pbk : Soviet intelligenm residency, especially one
whiclh makes e5ective use of a local agent network,
to id,entify them and develop means of direct a
indinr t access for sLssessment purposes and, in some
, ror r m l t m e n t attempts.
The Soviet effort against oode <clerks takes ahm a t
"Timaginable form, ranging; f m m t h e wildly
crude! to subtle, well-planned ax~d highly corn~plex
. .--..
L--> :
Itions in which the Soviet bmu rr -waled
the last moment and the Iintended victirn is
~t completely by surprise.
-- ,-
-. example of Soviet m d i t y in particularly bla-
form din 1888
Tanzania V l a d W T. Putyatov,
in , n"-
Soviet
0-1,
second
secretary and CRU deer known to specialize in
operations against communications pe~mnnel,a p
proached an American Embasay cods clerk who wpr
ententaining an em1b n s q secret9r at a beach nesort
m t a l rant. An ass:iduous d t i v r tor of Amerkm.
h t y a~tov
. had met the code .d.erk sodally a few
-
w e e k betore and unquestionably was aware of his
occupation The Soviet invited himself to dinner
with the American couple, p d e d to get drunlc,
them offered to make both of the Americana rich if
they would give him embassy documents for which
he would pay in Amuican dollan. He kept insist-
ing the code clerk meet him privately. Mom an-
CONFIDENTIAL
14
n o d than nlYmsd by PutyaWa pmhaw, tb
1q.a
Amerlcaar, even with polnted I ~ u wom , not able
to m& the GHU oglcer leave them h.They
were flnolly m d by m o t h Soviet ( a Imcm
KCB 0 5 ~ who ) cpme ovor to the table m d
hls staggering mllssgue away. Pulyatov, h
ever, rbmnlned p l s t e n t evm when l .A
o b
weeh later he rhowed up uoindted at a dk
puty given by an AID amploybe for aevsnl Amun-
I
CPN, including the urns oode clerk. ThL time,
m d without drinking, Putptov again mncankated
hlr nttentlon on tha code Jerk. The latter, bow-
ever h11.1been keeping the smbpuy lscvrlty a
informed of Putyatov'r aggrcsdve actionr and th
ce
Soviet h n y abandoned bL efforts.
. The second Soviet approach, this time in
Not infrequently, an indire method Involvbq
use of local (non-Swlet) agents m d mmpromlm a
the tnrget individual through m a l i n v o l m w *
is a favorite Soviet Bnt step. A few para ago In I
North Africnn country, a Soviet inteU1gcmca d8ca
told one of his agents. a Eum- burinarman an(
h l mident, that bll prlnclpnl objective w u b
I
penetrate the Arnsrlcan Embaaay c o m m u n l m h
satlon. He p h e d to achleve thh by 4cam-
promise of a female embassy cluk whom he i d s ~
fled to the agent. The latter, at that tlme only
sllghtly acquainted Wth the American glrl, wu 08
dered to seduce her and waa pmrnlrad a larp b a n
dal mward if s u d In thh CPU), he wu no1
Similnrly, in a Near Eastern county, a local go-
ment o5dal who bad been recruited nr an agem
I
by the Soviets, waa instructed to meat and culti-
vate two American @Is who were c l w frimds-
one of them an embassy code clerk, the other. r
CIA employee. The Soviet ofewr darcribed both
girls ns athactive, single. and Pecond class citlzemD
In telling the agent to bearme s a d l y involved
with either one of the glrls. the Soviet ofecer dL-
played a diamond ring which be promised would
be available for pmsentation as a (pH if the agent
waa able to carry out hL assignment.
Onca havtng aet its dgbb on a code or caamtr-
nications target believed even remotely awcaptibb
on a long-range ba& to Soviet inducements OI
threats, the KGB is both relentless m d p a t i a t
One Department of State communications techni-
dan who, althougb America0 by birth, bad m Eut
European ethnic and educational background and
once served in a very junior capadty in an Amsr'
dipbmotic mirdon in the USSR durtrg World '
CONFIDENTIAL
mince been the object of two developmental
. w h e in di5erent parts of the world, followed
sllbsequent recruitment attempt at a third
.-TI post. In this particular case,the KGB con-
m "accidental" encounter in the Far East
Soviet citizen (coached by the KGB for the
r if not a regular s M o5cer) whom the
an had last h o w n and Last seen 16 years
< us a young and friendly electricianhan~'
the USSR. This time the Soviet posed
I81mt civilian TV factory director from L --
.
I. temporarily in the Far East on burinc
,ally, travel remrds showed the Soviet v
t in the area with a diplomatic passport on
( d r y duty from the Ministry of Foreign Af-
P, came hvo years later and involved a KCB
Rn operations specialist under diplomatic
xho presented himself to the American bear-
rtings and a letter from the original Soviet
The new Soviet attempted to follow up
81 approach with renewed efforts at cultiva-
. , M I rapport. A third-and crucial-approach
~,lrcethree years later in a difterent West
. ,111 country. The American unsuspectiogly
.,,4 made friends with a p e ~ who o passed
' 1 nff as a naturalized South American busi-
~ I Iof the samt? East Europ!an origin as the
an himself. The hvo we:re in occasional
v mntact for alpproximately eight months be-
,"thing bapperled. When ttle completely un-
.I recruitment proposal wns made--and re-
it was ostensibly on behalf of the foreign
C , I I C ~service of the East European country
unted information on "all types of American
.,.aphic equipment.' in return for which the
1 American was offered financial security for
I 11f his life. The circumstances of the un-
tu1 recruitment bid indicated strongly that
..ndble naturalized Soutlt merican was ac-
.I Soviet "Illegal," i.e.,
:L Soviet intellige
llving and working in the West carnodal:ed
- umented with a false, non-Soviet nationality.
lollowing caw, although not new and giro.
mvuntion in the press at the time, is m u n t e d
.t l~rllwdetail than befora Although there
*M inexplicable aspects which are not likely
. In resolved the Soviet attempt to -recruit
'-.k Donald Ultan is a clarslc example of a
.t~tud,devious operation in which the Sc-
CONFIDENTIAL
viet ha ". completely concealed UI ~ t i l
the las
don^.. .,., ..& 30, BmkIy~----."aL. -~~,jee
-4-
of the American Embury in Vienna, graduate of
the University of California, npplioant for career
status in the Foreign S e h and accustomed to
European life from previous residenm in Paris, was
of soecial interest to Soviet Intelligence for a variety
)ns. First ancI foremost, he was a mde clerk
IS automatically in the top priority category
for r aWtment. Se~ondly, his father was an
from Czarist Russia to the United States,
EfT, L
anu arrnougn-9 ., son had been brought up to speak
me
only English at home, from the somewhat myopic
viewpoint of Soviet Intelligence there war a bars
chance that he might harbor some'elements of
sympathy for the homeland of his father. Thirdly,
he was Jewish with apparently strong feelings
about Nazi pmecutions and an interest in the
Resistam movements of World War U. And,
finally, he was fluent in French, liked to converse
in it, and was interested in languages in general.
All of t h m factors, plus undoubtedly others, had
come to Soviet attenhon in Vienna through their
excellent local capability to monitor closely the job
status, pasonal characteristics and social pattern
of the young Am- group in Vienna, including
embassy code clerk and secretaries, graduate stu-
dents at the University ot Vienna and some expabi-
ate types with vague means of support. Inter-
woven with this group were others of various na-
tionalities, including Austrian employees of the
American Embassy. Although this gmup was by
no means a single, clubby unit in the relaxed charm
of Vienna's coffee house, concert and cocktail party
circuit, the Soviets had within it an agent, exc-
sively directed against the Americans in the p r
who had long since spotted Ultan, knew him a
hk friends, shared some of their social life and w
wiUine and able to assist the KGB in mountina
hat bizarre op t the m i e cG
The sidewalk cafe of the old an1d famous Sac1
-
was me openmg scene. ~ n agent e
...- .
HoteL a pleasant spc* f m a n a p e r i itif in May 19
.
ot me m t .
a natumlized citizen of a friendly W e t e m country
and a trillimt mathematician, had invited an un-
employad American teacher, a close friend of Ultan
and, like him, a fluent French-apeaker, to join him
for a drink. The plan was quite simple; merely
to bring about a ' c h m d meeting betwan the
15

Although foreign diplomatic personnel r d t e d
in Moskow may have immediate value as sources
of intelligence information, t111.i.~lsefulnessto the
KGB is often greater atter thr leave the USSR.
Normally, control of them is p:~isedto the KGB's
Foreign Directorate and their long-range exploita-
tion continues as Soviet agents in subsequent as-
signments at home or elsewhere abroad. In addi-
tion to serving as Soviet Intelligence penetrations
of t h e i ~own governments, they frequently play a
hard to detect role in Soviet operations against
Americans in their own countries and in other coun-
I i
hies. As neutral or Western diplomats they are
able to establish official and often close personal
relationships with American counterparts m o p
easily than Soviet representatives in the same area.
Thus, their most important contribution to Soviet
Intelligence operations against Americans is their
capability, under normal-appearing circumstances,
to cultivate and thoroughly assess American officials
on Soviet behalf. They also serve as convenient
channels for the introduction of Americans to Soviet
Intelligence officers at times and places of Soviet
choosing. Diplomatic "collaborators" fmm neutral
countries, whether recruited in Moscow or brought
under Soviet influence elsewhere, are favorite inter-
mediaries for Soviet approaches to Americans, as
the followhg quotation from a KGB document il-
luslrates:
.-- -.-. . Wennerstmem was told it was not Sweden tl
'No matter the I m t h , o m . . . effective way to
a h b l h b mntsd wlth Americans h indirectly vln mllab-
o n t o n from nsutrAl munkiw, perti&ly embassy
pnonnel of nuutrnl muntries which nevertheless main-
tdll gmd l'Gltlri0~with ~ ~ & ~ I IEXUnpleS
S . of Such
mbPuks would ba thow of India, Bwma, the Arab
atntor md the Lstln American munhiw. In ordsr to
mme In mntact wlth Americans in thk way, our in-
tslligsnos officers reek to establish cMpaativa reb-
d o d i p with mpresentntlves of such neutral munhh."
The case summary which follows is a vivid ex-
ample of Soviet Intelligence use against Americans
of a high-level third-national agent who was re-
cruited in Moscow-in this instance by the GRU
since it had already handled the preparatory phase
of the recruitment operation outside the USSR
Many readen are probably familiar with the web-
publicized highlights of the espionage career of
Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroern,
secretly a highly s u d l agent of the GRU for
nearly 15 years until his arrest in 1983 and subse-
quent sentence to life imprisonment. He is best
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
known for having betrayed to the Soviets the entb ~viets)came almost by itself.' It uppears to be rccluiremcnts continued to be important. On GHU
Swedish air defense system, an incalculable l m i anks chiefly to tlle "confid<:nccs' of Americun inst~clio~ heuwus to muintuin inlimnto connections
his country. Also well awered has been that pa Ileagu~3,who accepted l1i111 witl~outyuestion for with ~niliturypersonnel of tha Americun Embnssy.
of his career (195257) when he was Swedish A Ilut he uppeamd to I*, tllut Wennerstmcln col- Onw uguin, he found this eusy since he was p p u -
Attache in the United States and systematically I0.1.tcdisfonnalion not only on prsonnel. but also Iar with Americum and regulurly invite
d e c t e d or microfhed literally tens of thousands slvms of infor~niilionon the ltawly fornled Strategic r~nl;~ssy ?kiul ullnirs. In his Defense C
of American technical publications and military
documents, many of them highly classi6ed, for his 1
, 41rCummaud (almut wllicll the Soviets deslwrntely
wuntrd intelligc~~cc) incltltli~~g
likely SAC t q e t
office he wus ublc to obtain nnd microfilr
Soviets voluminous publicatiow on Amcd
Soviet masters, meanwhile cutting an elegant swath 1 41cas within the USSR in the event of wu. tury uireruft and equipment
in Washineon diplomatic and official societ I\rtunling ~ I U I I I o Stockllol~nIIn I857 In 1051) Wen1lerstrwm wa!I invited to a]p n d nw-
Published \tudies have dwelt on the absorbu Ile U.S. assignal u noted, wus un 1111- en11 duys in W.iesbudcn, Gelnnany, as h ouse
~ gusst
psychological makeup of the man himself, an ab rcsceli bonus n Soviets were con- of u close friand, a promirlent general at head-
and impeccable career officer of a Yrtendly" nel
m l counhy with a calm facade behind which L
, m ~ d )Wenncrs
, ~stcdto the S.wedish
...
y .. . . .
urtcrs of thca U.S. Air Forces, Eum~p.The
o*lcn.scComn~slrlullrll rnur~-n~cnt
from acti! viets insisted tnat. ne accept MU even set tho
a Walter Mitty world of fantasy, an unsatis6t
ego of fantastic proportions, a hunger for person v du act time for Ihis visit the month of ]
recognition and for involvement in worldhapir --
events. These were fatal personality wealmess,
which the GRU m e c t l y analyzed in the late 1940
if not even earlier, and thereafter faultlessly e
ploited and financially rewarded.
Most pa'hmt to the subject matter of d
study, however, is the clear "Americans abroac
aspect of the Wennerstmem case which nu
thmugh it from beginning to end. At the time
his formal recruitment in 1849 by the GRU in Mo
cow, where he was serving as Swedish Air Attach
Soviets were W e d about, but rather the United
States, against which all possible resources had to
be emplqyed. F m the &st day of his GRU ca-
reer he vvas dhxted against Americans-first in
Mormw then in Stockholm, Germany and Spain
(and, of course, in the United States).
Wennerstmem's 5& mission was to obtain, a h
all, the closest possible contacts within the Amel
can Embassy in Moscow which the Soviets in 1%
regarded as the key ounpost of the I
He wa!s asked to a names, positions, bi,
graphic . Idetails and pemnal chrmcteristics t
.~. .
embassy personnel, an assignment he could full
easily since he h d y knew many American dip18
mats and military officers, some of whom had pr
viously served in Stoclcholm. As Wennmtroe
himself said after his arrest: "I very quickly g
in at the Ameriqn Embassy. This embassy had ,
distinctly dominating position among the diplomat- FIGURE 1ID. SWEDISH AIR FORCE C:OL. STlG WIENNERSTROW
ic corps in Moscow, a d if one secured en& While An~sricancolleagluas trusted hi1m, his GRU mcasters paid hin
there, the rest (id-tion of interest to the and fed his hidelen ago
CONFIDEN:
38
 CONFIDENTIAL
Although foreign diplomatic personnel r d t e d
in Moskow may have immediate value as sources
of intelligence information, t111.i.~lsefulnessto the
KGB is often greater atter thr leave the USSR.
Normally, control of them is p:~isedto the KGB's
Foreign Directorate and their long-range exploita-
tion continues as Soviet agents in subsequent as-
signments at home or elsewhere abroad. In addi-
tion to serving as Soviet Intelligence penetrations
of t h e i ~own governments, they frequently play a
hard to detect role in Soviet operations against
Americans in their own countries and in other coun-
I i
hies. As neutral or Western diplomats they are
able to establish official and often close personal
relationships with American counterparts m o p
easily than Soviet representatives in the same area.
Thus, their most important contribution to Soviet
Intelligence operations against Americans is their
capability, under normal-appearing circumstances,
to cultivate and thoroughly assess American officials
on Soviet behalf. They also serve as convenient
channels for the introduction of Americans to Soviet
Intelligence officers at times and places of Soviet
choosing. Diplomatic "collaborators" fmm neutral
countries, whether recruited in Moscow or brought
under Soviet influence elsewhere, are favorite inter-
mediaries for Soviet approaches to Americans, as
the followhg quotation from a KGB document il-
luslrates:
.-- -.-. . Wennerstmem was told it was not Sweden tl
'No matter the I m t h , o m . . . effective way to
a h b l h b mntsd wlth Americans h indirectly vln mllab-
o n t o n from nsutrAl munkiw, perti&ly embassy
pnonnel of nuutrnl muntries which nevertheless main-
tdll gmd l'Gltlri0~with ~ ~ & ~ I IEXUnpleS
S . of Such
mbPuks would ba thow of India, Bwma, the Arab
atntor md the Lstln American munhiw. In ordsr to
mme In mntact wlth Americans in thk way, our in-
tslligsnos officers reek to establish cMpaativa reb-
d o d i p with mpresentntlves of such neutral munhh."
The case summary which follows is a vivid ex-
ample of Soviet Intelligence use against Americans
of a high-level third-national agent who was re-
cruited in Moscow-in this instance by the GRU
since it had already handled the preparatory phase
of the recruitment operation outside the USSR
Many readen are probably familiar with the web-
publicized highlights of the espionage career of
Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroern,
secretly a highly s u d l agent of the GRU for
nearly 15 years until his arrest in 1983 and subse-
quent sentence to life imprisonment. He is best
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
known for having betrayed to the Soviets the entb ~viets)came almost by itself.' It uppears to be rccluiremcnts continued to be important. On GHU
Swedish air defense system, an incalculable l m i anks chiefly to tlle "confid<:nccs' of Americun inst~clio~ heuwus to muintuin inlimnto connections
his country. Also well awered has been that pa Ileagu~3,who accepted l1i111 witl~outyuestion for with ~niliturypersonnel of tha Americun Embnssy.
of his career (195257) when he was Swedish A Ilut he uppeamd to I*, tllut Wennerstmcln col- Onw uguin, he found this eusy since he was p p u -
Attache in the United States and systematically I0.1.tcdisfonnalion not only on prsonnel. but also Iar with Americum and regulurly invite
d e c t e d or microfhed literally tens of thousands slvms of infor~niilionon the ltawly fornled Strategic r~nl;~ssy ?kiul ullnirs. In his Defense C
of American technical publications and military
documents, many of them highly classi6ed, for his 1
, 41rCummaud (almut wllicll the Soviets deslwrntely
wuntrd intelligc~~cc) incltltli~~g
likely SAC t q e t
office he wus ublc to obtain nnd microfilr
Soviets voluminous publicatiow on Amcd
Soviet masters, meanwhile cutting an elegant swath 1 41cas within the USSR in the event of wu. tury uireruft and equipment
in Washineon diplomatic and official societ I\rtunling ~ I U I I I o Stockllol~nIIn I857 In 1051) Wen1lerstrwm wa!I invited to a]p n d nw-
Published \tudies have dwelt on the absorbu Ile U.S. assignal u noted, wus un 1111- en11 duys in W.iesbudcn, Gelnnany, as h ouse
~ gusst
psychological makeup of the man himself, an ab rcsceli bonus n Soviets were con- of u close friand, a promirlent general at head-
and impeccable career officer of a Yrtendly" nel
m l counhy with a calm facade behind which L
, m ~ d )Wenncrs
, ~stcdto the S.wedish
...
y .. . . .
urtcrs of thca U.S. Air Forces, Eum~p.The
o*lcn.scComn~slrlullrll rnur~-n~cnt
from acti! viets insisted tnat. ne accept MU even set tho
a Walter Mitty world of fantasy, an unsatis6t
ego of fantastic proportions, a hunger for person v du act time for Ihis visit the month of ]
recognition and for involvement in worldhapir --
events. These were fatal personality wealmess,
which the GRU m e c t l y analyzed in the late 1940
if not even earlier, and thereafter faultlessly e
ploited and financially rewarded.
Most pa'hmt to the subject matter of d
study, however, is the clear "Americans abroac
aspect of the Wennerstmem case which nu
thmugh it from beginning to end. At the time
his formal recruitment in 1849 by the GRU in Mo
cow, where he was serving as Swedish Air Attach
Soviets were W e d about, but rather the United
States, against which all possible resources had to
be emplqyed. F m the &st day of his GRU ca-
reer he vvas dhxted against Americans-first in
Mormw then in Stockholm, Germany and Spain
(and, of course, in the United States).
Wennerstmem's 5& mission was to obtain, a h
all, the closest possible contacts within the Amel
can Embassy in Moscow which the Soviets in 1%
regarded as the key ounpost of the I
He wa!s asked to a names, positions, bi,
graphic . Idetails and pemnal chrmcteristics t
.~. .
embassy personnel, an assignment he could full
easily since he h d y knew many American dip18
mats and military officers, some of whom had pr
viously served in Stoclcholm. As Wennmtroe
himself said after his arrest: "I very quickly g
in at the Ameriqn Embassy. This embassy had ,
distinctly dominating position among the diplomat- FIGURE 1ID. SWEDISH AIR FORCE C:OL. STlG WIENNERSTROW
ic corps in Moscow, a d if one secured en& While An~sricancolleagluas trusted hi1m, his GRU mcasters paid hin
there, the rest (id-tion of interest to the and fed his hidelen ago
CONFIDEN:
38

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 CONFIDENTIAL
-7-
>
.
.
I-
4 Ogorodnikov's reac!tion was 01
* ..
-
SURE 12. VITJ4LIY D. BALA
Belgion agent found him "rc
Sovlets. She also lost interest in American employ-
ment and, in facf left her embassy job in August
1864.
Until January 1985 the KGB left her alone. In
that month, Zelenin, the Soviet who had recruited
her in Tunis and to whom she clearly felt a stronl,
sense of personal attachment, huned up briefly h
Brussels to bring her back under Soviet controlI.
He came at the right time since her affair with thc
lawyer was by then in a period of estrangemen,
and she was ripe for renewed involvement
Zelenin urged her strongly to re-apply for work at
the American Embassy and introduced her to a
new Soviet who would handle her, TASS corres-
pondent Anatoliy Trifonovich Ogorodnikov. Per-
haps to make the new Soviet more palatable to
her than his predecessor had been, Zelenin played
him up as a Ymyhood friend." Zelenin then re-
turned to his post in Algiers, believing his mission
accomplished.
It did not quite turn .t that way-again due
to her love affair. "Mau~meX" did, in facf re-
apply for American Embassy employment but was
turned down on the basis of an undistinguished
job performance record in the -past. Having
patched up her on-again off-again romance with the
lawyer, she failed to keep several appointments
CONFIDENTIAL
44
CONFIDENTIAL
with Ogorodnikm, and one day in the late spring tive in Belgium since 1864. Ogorodnikov told h a
that for the sake of security she would not see
or early summer, when she happened to meet him
on the street, she told the Soviet that she was preg- him again and her next meeting with Semikov
nant ( h e ) , expected to be married soon, and would not take place until July 1987. If, however,
.
..
.
.
IIIUIIC" no further contact She followed this -UP - she was able to ueet into SHAF'E at Casteau before
by writimg a letter to Zelenin, confinning what :she 1 that time (it was to move there in March l W ) ,
hail told his colleagut she was instructed to give the appropriate signal
for an imergency meeting to inform Semikov. To
Ice. )
There w ere no threats. as tnere coula nave been. 1
keep her content, Ogorodnikov then paid her a
sum in advance equivalent to five months' salaxy.
n e mert:ly said he wrould-continu,
established meeting place month 'Madame X war 81~e.stedby Belgian security
should c:hange her mind authorities in April 1967. She did not know it at
Nearl)1 a year went by without :further inddt!nf the time, hut more than six months earlier her frus-
..-.-
but the evcta- ...L:-L i'-11- ...^.I
wtuul ruuuwcu augxcsr ..
..L_.
ular .
L. V.
UIL. hCB
trated lover had betrayed her to several Belgian
kept a watchful eye: on '~ada; ne X." In 1ate of ficials on the basis of diary notes he had seen
July 1% 3, the Belgian woman (whc) had meanwilile re garding her contacts with Soviets, and the allega-
experiensced a misatrriage and had not bt:en tic)n of her espionage work had been under investi-
tio on by both American and Belgian authorities.
married)I, had an un usually violent quarrel wpith
. . . .
her lawyer-lover. When the latter actually at-
E gorodnikov's arrest and expulsion came shortly
tempted to strangle her, the romance broke up ter the confession of his agent, and, as previously
)ted, Balashov and Semikov were quietly and
completely. It most likely was no coincidence that
Ogomdnikov suddenly reappeared on the scene,
handed her a gratuitous payment of several hun-
II FIGURE l ?
This KGB
iOLlY I
. was patiri..
Fectively discouraged from remaining longer in
dgium.
dred dollars in Belgian francs and asked her to
apply for a job at SHAPE Headquarters which \V B I
scheduled to be moved from Paris to Casteau,
south of Brussels, within less than a year and WOIuld
be in need of many new employees - . with her qua!li6-
cations. New rehlrur meeting arrangements were
made an~d at each of these she wias paid appn)xi.
mately $ 120 in francs
oegan ro .ualn . .. r .
g the period .which followc:d, Ogorodnil(OV
.. 0
NS remale agent m some or me m
..
complicated techniques of espionage tradecraf
obviously anticipating need for more professio
agent management after she should obtain t
ployment with SHAPE and again become opt
tionally active for the KGB.
She obtained a camera suitable for docum
photography, was trained in its us,e and submitted
- ...
test films to her Soviet handler. Vgorodnikov set
up a complicated system of clandestine meeting 81. _
rangements which included the use of danger sig.
nals and provision for. emergency contacts. Fi.
nally, after personally reviewing her SHAPE a p
plication forms, Ogorodnikov in December lW
told her he would be going home in the suml-- ..v.
of 1887 and introduced her to the Soviet who would
handle her after he was g o n d)leg Aleksanclro.
vich Semikov, a Soviet f i b &hi ution represe~ ItP.
CONFIDEN
 CONFIDENTIAL
-7-
>
.
.
I-
4 Ogorodnikov's reac!tion was 01
* ..
-
SURE 12. VITJ4LIY D. BALA
Belgion agent found him "rc
Sovlets. She also lost interest in American employ-
ment and, in facf left her embassy job in August
1864.
Until January 1985 the KGB left her alone. In
that month, Zelenin, the Soviet who had recruited
her in Tunis and to whom she clearly felt a stronl,
sense of personal attachment, huned up briefly h
Brussels to bring her back under Soviet controlI.
He came at the right time since her affair with thc
lawyer was by then in a period of estrangemen,
and she was ripe for renewed involvement
Zelenin urged her strongly to re-apply for work at
the American Embassy and introduced her to a
new Soviet who would handle her, TASS corres-
pondent Anatoliy Trifonovich Ogorodnikov. Per-
haps to make the new Soviet more palatable to
her than his predecessor had been, Zelenin played
him up as a Ymyhood friend." Zelenin then re-
turned to his post in Algiers, believing his mission
accomplished.
It did not quite turn .t that way-again due
to her love affair. "Mau~meX" did, in facf re-
apply for American Embassy employment but was
turned down on the basis of an undistinguished
job performance record in the -past. Having
patched up her on-again off-again romance with the
lawyer, she failed to keep several appointments
CONFIDENTIAL
44
CONFIDENTIAL
with Ogorodnikm, and one day in the late spring tive in Belgium since 1864. Ogorodnikov told h a
that for the sake of security she would not see
or early summer, when she happened to meet him
on the street, she told the Soviet that she was preg- him again and her next meeting with Semikov
nant ( h e ) , expected to be married soon, and would not take place until July 1987. If, however,
.
..
.
.
IIIUIIC" no further contact She followed this -UP - she was able to ueet into SHAF'E at Casteau before
by writimg a letter to Zelenin, confinning what :she 1 that time (it was to move there in March l W ) ,
hail told his colleagut she was instructed to give the appropriate signal
for an imergency meeting to inform Semikov. To
Ice. )
There w ere no threats. as tnere coula nave been. 1
keep her content, Ogorodnikov then paid her a
sum in advance equivalent to five months' salaxy.
n e mert:ly said he wrould-continu,
established meeting place month 'Madame X war 81~e.stedby Belgian security
should c:hange her mind authorities in April 1967. She did not know it at
Nearl)1 a year went by without :further inddt!nf the time, hut more than six months earlier her frus-
..-.-
but the evcta- ...L:-L i'-11- ...^.I
wtuul ruuuwcu augxcsr ..
..L_.
ular .
L. V.
UIL. hCB
trated lover had betrayed her to several Belgian
kept a watchful eye: on '~ada; ne X." In 1ate of ficials on the basis of diary notes he had seen
July 1% 3, the Belgian woman (whc) had meanwilile re garding her contacts with Soviets, and the allega-
experiensced a misatrriage and had not bt:en tic)n of her espionage work had been under investi-
tio on by both American and Belgian authorities.
married)I, had an un usually violent quarrel wpith
. . . .
her lawyer-lover. When the latter actually at-
E gorodnikov's arrest and expulsion came shortly
tempted to strangle her, the romance broke up ter the confession of his agent, and, as previously
)ted, Balashov and Semikov were quietly and
completely. It most likely was no coincidence that
Ogomdnikov suddenly reappeared on the scene,
handed her a gratuitous payment of several hun-
II FIGURE l ?
This KGB
iOLlY I
. was patiri..
Fectively discouraged from remaining longer in
dgium.
dred dollars in Belgian francs and asked her to
apply for a job at SHAPE Headquarters which \V B I
scheduled to be moved from Paris to Casteau,
south of Brussels, within less than a year and WOIuld
be in need of many new employees - . with her qua!li6-
cations. New rehlrur meeting arrangements were
made an~d at each of these she wias paid appn)xi.
mately $ 120 in francs
oegan ro .ualn . .. r .
g the period .which followc:d, Ogorodnil(OV
.. 0
NS remale agent m some or me m
..
complicated techniques of espionage tradecraf
obviously anticipating need for more professio
agent management after she should obtain t
ployment with SHAPE and again become opt
tionally active for the KGB.
She obtained a camera suitable for docum
photography, was trained in its us,e and submitted
- ...
test films to her Soviet handler. Vgorodnikov set
up a complicated system of clandestine meeting 81. _
rangements which included the use of danger sig.
nals and provision for. emergency contacts. Fi.
nally, after personally reviewing her SHAPE a p
plication forms, Ogorodnikov in December lW
told her he would be going home in the suml-- ..v.
of 1887 and introduced her to the Soviet who would
handle her after he was g o n d)leg Aleksanclro.
vich Semikov, a Soviet f i b &hi ution represe~ ItP.
CONFIDEN

'S.
81YnP UOllq[F!lw arg ~norl%noqlluau
ur opaaq peq s:nXoldwa lea01 'uoyvpe
--.. ..- -..-
i o j aaioj pren3 au!leN e 3uqnel sew '4u!pl!nq
)uawliede pue le!arawww aZie1 e jo uo!pas auo u!
palea01 'uo!~sanb u! Xsseqwa aql 'aseo ea!qv aql
UI 'saaXoldma 1eml Bulpnlav lauuosiad Xssequra
lie 01 alq!ssaaoe uaaq peq h e i q ! ~aq, 'pa[ripayos u! aseoTooq e jo lea1 a q ~01 paqnrrlle punoj rv*
wm aouaiajuoo e uaqm qdaoxa ' X ~ ~ e u u .hnp o~
uo sew aaXolJwa Ieml e 'smoq S u q ~ o mBu!inp
'alaqm earn u o ~ d a n aayl
i Zu!u!oIpe ioog pun08 aq,
uo mm woo1 aouanjuoa/heiqq Xssaqwa aq, 'aseo
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palaalas aq, 03 ssaoae Xpeai pue X~!~!loe Xssequn
jo u~alledarg 30 a 3 p a ~ m o q11nj Zu!~!oldxa UOIJ
-endo zua%e.*ap!su!,, ue jo q~morS1noaq, sem ssao
o n s $a!AoS aiaq pauoyuaw sasea ~ 9 6 1qloq u1
.paaaldwa-ar uayl 'samqeq jo ,uawaae[dai
soj X~qeqoid'paAowai X[lr!o!pnuad uaaq pet1 pue
sqluour jo po!rad e raho w39p OMJ aqj U! aaeld O~II!
~ n dXl[npsaoans uaaq peq adXl awes aql jo saalnap
o p e OM^ ,seal le leq) aauap!na a ~ e % ropesseq
-we rauuoj aql p aaglo Jueaen arg [I! aseoqooq iel
-:qs e iapun purr aseqooq a m s aql mpun slot1
~ a mo1awnN
~ j .uo!le)uasaidai g 3 Suoas~ e SI [eao[ y .am11 awes aq) lnoqe 1s Xr~unoaiarllollr
araq; aiaqm a![qndai uea!~jy Iei1uas r! u1 sai!am,p
a3req3 ueopamy aql jo aago aql u! asrrqnoq e
jo ap!siapun at() ol paqaens paraAoos!p sem 'ahoqe
paq!iasap 1eql 03 leaquap! Xlle~luassa'aslnap ran!ur
-suca-auoydoia!~la!AoS iargoue LNI j s n 3 n ~u1
.pus qnea
ae q . e l 7-lpnq 'd~eqsXq aoeld q plaq uaq1 s! 11
.aoejins poom e ISUI~SB X~wig41 ssilrd 01 XIUO setl
zua% aqL ,spuooas 01 ueql ssal sai!nbai 'laV!q1
qanw 1ou pue ialru uowuroa e ueq) iauoqs 'aagn.
-ap e qnns Xtdde OJ, 'Xld dns mmod halleq patlrrt
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o!uoi~oala on Xq [I!, . . 110 lllqs 10 u o p a w ."I
p~noam y a p aq3 qa! . XI^) J;ln!a.>ai qol!ms [orjt~,
e 'auoqdoraw pue ra,l!wsueil q!nq-lo!~o~e palttvl
-003 11 . ~ 9 6 1iIi& u! st?^ ' a @ p h ag, u! X s ~ l
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%uo[ saqou! 51 ueq) ssa[ poom pal[!w jo ~ m I I~I I ( * q
e 'alclmexa iod qsaraju! jo sango 01 ssaaae qitr
lua3e ua Xq paoeldura Xlp!dei pue Xl!saa aq tlr
aAoqe 01 paua3a.l asoql se Vans saqAap aiaqm ~ t t t r w l
oNoilaa1a pue uo!jezpnle!u!w jo nnb!tnpa.l.
'saqaea~eo w aql uaawaq uo!lesraAuoa aq) pio.>.~a
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paleiado-haueq e 3uaSe aq) ah@ uaq1 plnom . H I
p!es ralpueq 63)1 S!H .ro!radns s,)uaSe aq1 J!SIA
pa~npaqossew atpeuy asuojaa ueo!raW aql rn*
-uaqm aauehpe u! lrodai or pqlonilsrl! unaq 3rr!nny
03 pue wa%e g3)1 e Su!nq o; passiyuw 'hlun~n
~ e q )30 aqoeuy I(-re)![!~ arll jo aoglo aq) u! YIII
-yiom 'Xrlunoa OLVN c jo Xssequra ue jo aaXo1tl111
u! parrnano uo!)e!reA ?t1Z![s y 'alqnl ruooi % U I I I I ~ .
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laws e aneld w!q 3u!~eq jo asoclind nql ioj lop*..
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aql uaqm '~961u! pannaoo aldwex.~JuaaaI airtlnl
v ,ahoqe pnuo!quaw uo!lerado rol~ue! bl;f$~,~
aql u! se suo!jc~[c)su! olpni! 01 ~ ( [ I P I I I J ! U
sanl
~~
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3- 'SUO!SS!Ul qJWJIo[dlp W l m M )SU!E%
p uaaq aAsy Xlawwqn plnbm 'nsamlu! 831
{aq uo pue a3qa)w )avos iapun 'j!un ayl
iq lqnop oo aq m amp, 'iaAamo[l .siaqlo
J qo! a m ap, op 01 anoqe sum pus sla)oq
om1 ga2%nq,, Xpeaqe peq iwglo 8 3 iaylo
la ~aXa'puyp uogedp&vd aq, yl!m
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n ' p p y d a ~ s8 3 X B '&gwej ue!meq3 Xl1sm
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pus sia1l!tusmq p w 'sra&!wsueq wue[[!aA
ea3 suo!leo!ununuca aua%eaugsapuep la!AoS
'u! (,,ia;oleioqs? qonrasag wua!oS [euoy
~qse p a 3 e g n o m ) siamnbpeaq C-nL alald
! - l p ayl jo sdoqqiom o~uoqaa~a paddtnba
H aq) u! punoj ~uawd!nba leuo!~eiado/lm!u
9) p a ~ ~ d d n s - j a y
joo ~q m ~ as % q a y ~ ,
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1
03 par8!m s u e p ~ q ~ o!pne
a ~ ue!eueq3 i~i:~ n o q e
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D!WN uslraueq3 ayl $0 ( c - n ~ c ) 1!Un P!T=L
ural )Fun aauel[!ams olpne ue 'siosupe ,a!ho~
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aiaqm suo!)erado oTpne % q m d am slayos aq1
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$a1 q a u n q ~l a p o p i d ap, pasno rp!qm
(81
sauaAms!a
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arrg )daql y LIT&
klaJq amyl Jnq toae s m ~ uq
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I
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jo p p g q
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punoj sauoqdoiqw jo saiws aq1 Sulpnlatq '..--.-
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p ~uawdo~anap ----=
'nmoqs Xpeaq~se ' a w m p :

'S.
81YnP UOllq[F!lw arg ~norl%noqlluau
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--.. ..- -..-
i o j aaioj pren3 au!leN e 3uqnel sew '4u!pl!nq
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palea01 'uo!~sanb u! Xsseqwa aql 'aseo ea!qv aql
UI 'saaXoldma 1eml Bulpnlav lauuosiad Xssequra
lie 01 alq!ssaaoe uaaq peq h e i q ! ~aq, 'pa[ripayos u! aseoTooq e jo lea1 a q ~01 paqnrrlle punoj rv*
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uo sew aaXolJwa Ieml e 'smoq S u q ~ o mBu!inp
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i Zu!u!oIpe ioog pun08 aq,
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o n s $a!AoS aiaq pauoyuaw sasea ~ 9 6 1qloq u1
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a3req3 ueopamy aql jo aago aql u! asrrqnoq e
jo ap!siapun at() ol paqaens paraAoos!p sem 'ahoqe
paq!iasap 1eql 03 leaquap! Xlle~luassa'aslnap ran!ur
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 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
" ..-

V. REVIEW OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ,TECHNIQUES AND GAMBITS

l l ~ ecase examples cited so far to illustrate KGB

...I GRU use of staff and agent personnel against
I""'
fl;~kl
~trricans abroad have reflected various opera-
~ u techniques
l and gambits employed by the
18-t intelligence officer to spot his targets, to
..,I direct or indirect access to them, and to assess
Wood block with cover removed. Note built-in tacks ot each end.
I ~ I Iin the unceasing search for vulnerability or
.svptibility. This section will review some of
,,. technique-and refer to others not yet men-
QUICK
I ACK wrl-and seek to put them into focus on a
rail-r basis without reference to individual types
1 .drjiets.
+lthough various Soviet Intelligence doctrinal
epts about Americans abroad have already be-
,,- clear (i.e., that junior employees are, in ef-
"tecond class citizens" and thus more vulner-
omponents as identified by X- ray photo
n~ldthat students are good targets because of
1 rrlative immaturity and lack of funds), there
(81l1rrpractical as well as doctrinal considera-
lhat have much to do with the inten:'.*----
S..L..W.,
wanes, a
ike to remain PI broad for extenthd perinds
.
le various mate,rial benefits such as higher
ro save money aue ca . ,lower overwar I
living caots, certain tax exemptions, rent-free quarters,
longer vacstionr, and the opportunity to engap in
profiiabls foreign cumncy exchange."
Whatever the accuracy of the above observation,
luept, urr-
it is a known and recognized Soviet cor---- - -
questionably drawn from oprational e.xperience,
that Americans away from home tend tc) let t h e i ~
guard down, to talk more freely, and to enter more
freely into contact with foreigners, inchuding So-
, . rnere
viets. There is recognition, of course, I:nar .,
are exceptions to the general rule, that itt some
areas Americans refuse to have contact w,ith Soviet
nationals and are increasingly prone to rc?port con-
. .
tacts when they do 'take place. However, in prin-
ciple and practice, the KGB and GRU work on
the theory that overseas Americans in general, by
their open conduct, talkative nature, and freedom
of movement and associations, are relatively ap-
proachable--directly and indirectly-and that the
ertire operational process 1from spottint; through

Quickly trmplaced by pressing to underside of bookcoIse
FIGURE 14,. SOVIET MI(:ROPHONE AND TRANSMITTER DEVICE FOUND I N
AMERICAN EMBASSY. 1967
br Soviet effort against overseas Americ;ms and
twhniques employed.
rc View of the American Abroad Tar1
%tonthe Soviet viewpoint, operations against
tt1.11nsin overseas assignments outside the Bloc
arc, generally speaking, easier and more r e
1~11ji than the same operations would be in the
, . I States. Obviously, one factor in this con-
..*lionis the severity of FBI counterintelligence
v a ~ nwhich inhibits, if it does not entirely pre-
hCB and GRU efTorts to recruit Americans
mnr.. But there are other mnsiderations as well
113~-elargely relate to the Soviet image, based
.p-ricnce, of the indivi.' 11 American outside
, , ~ ~ nenyironment.
sl
.- fiverage Arn&can, as the Soviets see bim,
(n l o serve abroad for basically materialistic
s--lflrh reasons. The KGB summarizes this
- .&111t in the following words.
df?velopment t~3 remitmenlt is less difficult than
the United Sitates.
.
An additiona1 factor (mer
" . the intensity or me ao-
rerent context) also anecrs
viet program against Americans and permits the
often free-wheeling, shotgun approach techniques
frequently employed abroad. This is Soviet
knowledge that in working aggressively against
Americans outside the United States, including re-
cruitment and use of local agents against them,
they are violating, in most cases, no local laws
since the activity is not directed against the host
country. Thus the Soviets, as well as their local
agents, are not normally punishable in the event
'
an operation against Americans fails and is exposed.
of Incentives
Soviet Intelligence literally believes that Ameri-
cans will do almost anything for money, and the
factor of material incentive is somewhere present

CON FlDENTIAL

48
 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
" ..-

V. REVIEW OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ,TECHNIQUES AND GAMBITS

l l ~ ecase examples cited so far to illustrate KGB

...I GRU use of staff and agent personnel against
I""'
fl;~kl
~trricans abroad have reflected various opera-
~ u techniques
l and gambits employed by the
18-t intelligence officer to spot his targets, to
..,I direct or indirect access to them, and to assess
Wood block with cover removed. Note built-in tacks ot each end.
I ~ I Iin the unceasing search for vulnerability or
.svptibility. This section will review some of
,,. technique-and refer to others not yet men-
QUICK
I ACK wrl-and seek to put them into focus on a
rail-r basis without reference to individual types
1 .drjiets.
+lthough various Soviet Intelligence doctrinal
epts about Americans abroad have already be-
,,- clear (i.e., that junior employees are, in ef-
"tecond class citizens" and thus more vulner-
omponents as identified by X- ray photo
n~ldthat students are good targets because of
1 rrlative immaturity and lack of funds), there
(81l1rrpractical as well as doctrinal considera-
lhat have much to do with the inten:'.*----
S..L..W.,
wanes, a
ike to remain PI broad for extenthd perinds
.
le various mate,rial benefits such as higher
ro save money aue ca . ,lower overwar I
living caots, certain tax exemptions, rent-free quarters,
longer vacstionr, and the opportunity to engap in
profiiabls foreign cumncy exchange."
Whatever the accuracy of the above observation,
luept, urr-
it is a known and recognized Soviet cor---- - -
questionably drawn from oprational e.xperience,
that Americans away from home tend tc) let t h e i ~
guard down, to talk more freely, and to enter more
freely into contact with foreigners, inchuding So-
, . rnere
viets. There is recognition, of course, I:nar .,
are exceptions to the general rule, that itt some
areas Americans refuse to have contact w,ith Soviet
nationals and are increasingly prone to rc?port con-
. .
tacts when they do 'take place. However, in prin-
ciple and practice, the KGB and GRU work on
the theory that overseas Americans in general, by
their open conduct, talkative nature, and freedom
of movement and associations, are relatively ap-
proachable--directly and indirectly-and that the
ertire operational process 1from spottint; through

Quickly trmplaced by pressing to underside of bookcoIse
FIGURE 14,. SOVIET MI(:ROPHONE AND TRANSMITTER DEVICE FOUND I N
AMERICAN EMBASSY. 1967
br Soviet effort against overseas Americ;ms and
twhniques employed.
rc View of the American Abroad Tar1
%tonthe Soviet viewpoint, operations against
tt1.11nsin overseas assignments outside the Bloc
arc, generally speaking, easier and more r e
1~11ji than the same operations would be in the
, . I States. Obviously, one factor in this con-
..*lionis the severity of FBI counterintelligence
v a ~ nwhich inhibits, if it does not entirely pre-
hCB and GRU efTorts to recruit Americans
mnr.. But there are other mnsiderations as well
113~-elargely relate to the Soviet image, based
.p-ricnce, of the indivi.' 11 American outside
, , ~ ~ nenyironment.
sl
.- fiverage Arn&can, as the Soviets see bim,
(n l o serve abroad for basically materialistic
s--lflrh reasons. The KGB summarizes this
- .&111t in the following words.
df?velopment t~3 remitmenlt is less difficult than
the United Sitates.
.
An additiona1 factor (mer
" . the intensity or me ao-
rerent context) also anecrs
viet program against Americans and permits the
often free-wheeling, shotgun approach techniques
frequently employed abroad. This is Soviet
knowledge that in working aggressively against
Americans outside the United States, including re-
cruitment and use of local agents against them,
they are violating, in most cases, no local laws
since the activity is not directed against the host
country. Thus the Soviets, as well as their local
agents, are not normally punishable in the event
'
an operation against Americans fails and is exposed.
of Incentives
Soviet Intelligence literally believes that Ameri-
cans will do almost anything for money, and the
factor of material incentive is somewhere present

CON FlDENTIAL

48
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 CONFIDENTIAL
American target's wile and c~ltildwn. The KCB
covers this aspect in thc follou~iltgwords:
"In urdcr lo nnli<lrfyca.crtly ;tcl~icvrdf r
An~sricsnn,our olli~r.ra urider Sovwt LIIIVUJJ). UYVV~
wuully Ilrrsrrh gifts 01, New Yc.,rr' 1hy ax ulllcr up-
pro~lrl~il~ I)UC~S~OIIS. l.hU intclllgt:ncr: ol[iwr will de.
liver Itis gtft ro parsml at the Alneric~n'sIIOIIIL. at u
tlms wheu the Isttor is ~>r>n>,idly tlrere. Thc purlwse
is to itqrct i w u~~ollic:iinl,
frietally H;tvur illto tht relit-
tia11r111p.111retun), thc An~cncilnUSUOIIY resl)otdsby
visitillg the Soviel's ltozlle to prwmt u gift."
As in the case of the American data processing
technician in a Moslem country, language lessons
are often 1)rought into the picture at about this
point. And it is here that the wife of the Soviet
intelligence officer has been seen on many oc-
casions to play a supporting operational role.
Without specific referencv to lanbwage lessons
which am by now a standard develonmental
gambit, the KGB outlines the role of thlo Soviet wife
in these words:
"It is often helpful if tl~,
e intelligcn~voRimr takes his
.......,.,. ,., ..,., ". ...,
wife with him when vi siting the hutncr of a person
under drvclopmrot. Wi... ,.h hi. ..... .I...
ir.... ....<...
officer ciln clarify ~~:rtdin points of infurtniltlon or
arsesmunt wnct*mingtllc turgct individual and thereby
dstmnine huw h i t to stmngthm h
with him."
In the early stages of direct culti .-..-.., --..
venation is on harmless topics, sport, art, life in
each other's country, etc. The Soviet may say
he is bored with life in a foreign country, perhaps
bored with his own countrymen, lonely for new
and stimulating companionship. Controvisial sub-
'
jects are avoided or glos.>,, over. This whole
preparatory process 11.c~ a I .hose; assessment of
the American's potential 11i c t~lnessfor espionage
and assessment of him from the standpoint of the
possibility of recruitment. This requires knowl-
edge of the American's personal history, his family
situation, his 6nancial standing (most important,
as already indicated), his unfulfilled ambitions and
possible weaknesses for women. During this assess-
ment stage, the Soviet seeks to cement the friend-
ship and at the same time--usually through gifts-
create a sense of obligation for hospitality. Given
the Soviet concept that money is the all-important
American motivation, tactics may sometimes be
ludicrously crude and include direct and very per-
sonal questioning about the American's income and
debts, how much he pays for rent, the amount of
his taxes, etc.
48 CONFID
Sooner or later in the developmental prowlis,
assu~tling tll;~t the Soviets have concluded th at
they have it11 intemsting prospect on the lir~e,smil111
nspectsof clandcrtirrity will IJC gradu;llly insert<.I
into the relationship. Less p111,lic and more u!
us~li~l;neetir~gplaces will be sl~ggated. Tho ta
get will be rc~1uested not to call the Soviet at 11
oUicial number "to avoid e~nbarrassment Ior yo1
and meetings may bc suggest~xl at pre-arrangt
limes ;~ndplaces. All unditioning f,
what may follow.
. - -.-
Eve-ntoally-pcrl~nps within week:s. perhaps nj
for months-tl~e Sovi-,.. l,ulr"3=
.. -., will begin
emerge, it1itl~oughat first it may not 1),e recogai.zabl
as in the case of the Vienna studc nt already d
scribed. The Soviet u(ill ask his American trier
to help hi1n collect irtfo~
rmation of an overt nature-
. . . 3.
nerhens f~or a journa~~st .*. ,
friend, poss~n~y
scitrch paper or article which the Soviet himse
tor a r
claims he is writing, perhaps even for an inform
public opinion poll. The Vienna student was askr
for character assessments of his fellow Amcrical
and saw nothing disturbing ahout the request.
Eoropc:an national in the Middle East, under Sm
viet cultivation because of his access to American
was dealt with somewhat more frankly by l k Ss
viet officer. The request went somt:thing like thi
"You know many people here. They will tell yt
what they won't tell me . . . they utill speak i o
frankly to you than to Ime because I am a* diplom
and represent a count ry that, unfortunately, d o
not find much favor vvith them. 'Irherefore, as
. .. -. . .
personal favor, will you ask MI. Blank. whom vt
know, what. .. ."
Requests of this kind, even for I
information, may be coupled with an ofier ot pa
ment. If payment is accepted, a receipt will us-
ally be requested under some plausible pretext.
The process of gradual involvement is by this
time well under way and elements of clandestinity
and po:, lble potential compromise factors already
pres :nt.
Finally, one day, un an atmospthere of war
friendshipI and mutual trust, the re<:mitment pm
ess will ble brought to a head wit11 a request f
. * .
information or a servlce that is clearly ot an I
telligence nature. Typically, generous financial re-
wards will be promised. If the American becomes
frightened or refuses, he will be met at first with
reasoned argument and renewed professions
.I friendship. Depending on the course of the
~viet assessment and softening-up process, a
~rrlerLine may follow: threats and warning to
I ,811kmatters over-particularly if the American
nr already slipped over the line and exposed him-
If to compromise. Whatevcr the American's ini-
.I reaction, the Soviet, as in the case of code clerk
$n~ald Ultan, will press for one or more additional
,.stings.
Ilsdaneous Dc
r rhniques
No hypothetica
I vrtual cases, ca.. ---.-.,.....strate the tul.. -.--D-
! Soviet operational practice employed tc) meet,
, vr-lop and recruit Americans abroad. Several
1811.hhave not yet been mentioned or arcr worth
Iblilional clarification and emphasis by way of
w i n g are briefly discussed L-'----
I :ompromise
Although the E:GB, by its own doctrine, regards
ioduccmcnt as normalIly the decisive factor
ra.~t~cial
\~~ccessfuI
.. .
recruitment of Amerlcans aDr<
1 ..1
5
.
lttcnt of contpromise is also an essential
.*
11 such operation. It is brought into
8v.r which are often not fully appreciate
From the viewpoint of Soviet 1ntelliger.--, -..,
~.nr.ricanwho agrees to an unofficial and personal
I ttionship with a Soviet and conceals the 'fact
t~nhis (or her) superiors has already taken a
..I compromising step. As the relationship d e e p
~lndbecomes more intimate along typical lines,
It as described above, each Soviet move is in-
led to increase the degree of compromise. By
,.ping the small aspects of clandestinity which
I:radually introduced, such as not calling the
.vwt at his official number or agreeing to meet-
z4r nt unorthodox times and places, the American
etpounds his original compromise. The initially
tats.unt sm;tll "favors" which the Soviet asks on
I,nsis of friendship are a calculated part of the
~npromiseprocess. So is the offer of payment
I the seemingly plausible request for a signed
vipt. Meanwhile, the Soviet through probing
I other means uncovers indications of personal
.
dkness and vulnerability (the presence of debt,
-%rivedrinking, promiscuous sexual habits, etc.),
..WII are treated as "secrets" between the Ameri-
6 - t end his Soviet "friend and thus also become
Part of the COInpromise web. The effec:t of this
Prmess over a I)eriod of time is to draw tlle ~mAmeri-
which
ca n into a "cor~fidential"relationship, frc
.. . .
thcL? American Iyadually c o m a to rea1i.n: that he
-.. - -
cannot wltharaw excent at the cost of oLCULd dl',-
barrassrpent-a nd perhaps !severe persorla1 conse-
qucncesLby clisclosing t h;.~ compromise to his
superiors.
- ..
Actually, the build-up and use ot comp ,
)viet Intelligence is largely for psychological effect
)th during the period of development and at the
n e of recruitment is attempted. In operations in
le West, the Soviets normally have no serious in-
. .- -.--..
18ntion of using compromising informatior +" hl*-k-
ail an American into doing their biddint ;. Use of
cc)ercive threats to destroy an American s career
b:y exposure of compromising information is a re-
...
CIuitment technique only rarely employerd outside
the Sovit I Bloc area. This is because in wesreru
.L.-
countries the Soviets lack total conhol of the en-
vironment, such as they enjoy in the USSR, in their
operations against Americam. It is thus difficult
for them to acquire truly damaging evidence in a
)nn which ca.n be effectively exploited for black. '
'
tail.
In Moscow and the East European c o d e s ,
owever, hlackmail is stanldard operatisonal prac-
. . ... n..
tlce agalnst wesrerners, ~ncludingAmen L-a"". v y
erating on their own grounds, the KG1B and the
cooperating Bloc services can work ulnder con-
trolled conditions to secure disasterously compro-
mising evidence (usually photographic and/or re-
corded on tape) which is then used as a means or
recruitment. The well-publicized case of Irwin
Scarbeck, the Foreign Service officer stationed in
Warsaw who became involved with a female Polish
agent and was blackmailed into accepting recruit-
rnenf is only one of nume]mus example? nf nnera-
t ions of this 1dnd.
Sexuul and
A number of actual ana lnclplenr sexual ap-
proaches overseas to Americans outside the Com-
munist Bloc have been mentioned both in detail
and in passing reference in this study. Although
the KGB attempt to recruit Eleanor, the Bonn
embassy file clerk, was based on shock tactics and
threats against her own safety and the life of he1
supposed American fiance, the operation against her
was, in its opening stages, a clear-cut case of seduo
NTIAL
i
 CONFIDENTIAL
American target's wile and c~ltildwn. The KCB
covers this aspect in thc follou~iltgwords:
"In urdcr lo nnli<lrfyca.crtly ;tcl~icvrdf r
An~sricsnn,our olli~r.ra urider Sovwt LIIIVUJJ). UYVV~
wuully Ilrrsrrh gifts 01, New Yc.,rr' 1hy ax ulllcr up-
pro~lrl~il~ I)UC~S~OIIS. l.hU intclllgt:ncr: ol[iwr will de.
liver Itis gtft ro parsml at the Alneric~n'sIIOIIIL. at u
tlms wheu the Isttor is ~>r>n>,idly tlrere. Thc purlwse
is to itqrct i w u~~ollic:iinl,
frietally H;tvur illto tht relit-
tia11r111p.111retun), thc An~cncilnUSUOIIY resl)otdsby
visitillg the Soviel's ltozlle to prwmt u gift."
As in the case of the American data processing
technician in a Moslem country, language lessons
are often 1)rought into the picture at about this
point. And it is here that the wife of the Soviet
intelligence officer has been seen on many oc-
casions to play a supporting operational role.
Without specific referencv to lanbwage lessons
which am by now a standard develonmental
gambit, the KGB outlines the role of thlo Soviet wife
in these words:
"It is often helpful if tl~,
e intelligcn~voRimr takes his
.......,.,. ,., ..,., ". ...,
wife with him when vi siting the hutncr of a person
under drvclopmrot. Wi... ,.h hi. ..... .I...
ir.... ....<...
officer ciln clarify ~~:rtdin points of infurtniltlon or
arsesmunt wnct*mingtllc turgct individual and thereby
dstmnine huw h i t to stmngthm h
with him."
In the early stages of direct culti .-..-.., --..
venation is on harmless topics, sport, art, life in
each other's country, etc. The Soviet may say
he is bored with life in a foreign country, perhaps
bored with his own countrymen, lonely for new
and stimulating companionship. Controvisial sub-
'
jects are avoided or glos.>,, over. This whole
preparatory process 11.c~ a I .hose; assessment of
the American's potential 11i c t~lnessfor espionage
and assessment of him from the standpoint of the
possibility of recruitment. This requires knowl-
edge of the American's personal history, his family
situation, his 6nancial standing (most important,
as already indicated), his unfulfilled ambitions and
possible weaknesses for women. During this assess-
ment stage, the Soviet seeks to cement the friend-
ship and at the same time--usually through gifts-
create a sense of obligation for hospitality. Given
the Soviet concept that money is the all-important
American motivation, tactics may sometimes be
ludicrously crude and include direct and very per-
sonal questioning about the American's income and
debts, how much he pays for rent, the amount of
his taxes, etc.
48 CONFID
Sooner or later in the developmental prowlis,
assu~tling tll;~t the Soviets have concluded th at
they have it11 intemsting prospect on the lir~e,smil111
nspectsof clandcrtirrity will IJC gradu;llly insert<.I
into the relationship. Less p111,lic and more u!
us~li~l;neetir~gplaces will be sl~ggated. Tho ta
get will be rc~1uested not to call the Soviet at 11
oUicial number "to avoid e~nbarrassment Ior yo1
and meetings may bc suggest~xl at pre-arrangt
limes ;~ndplaces. All unditioning f,
what may follow.
. - -.-
Eve-ntoally-pcrl~nps within week:s. perhaps nj
for months-tl~e Sovi-,.. l,ulr"3=
.. -., will begin
emerge, it1itl~oughat first it may not 1),e recogai.zabl
as in the case of the Vienna studc nt already d
scribed. The Soviet u(ill ask his American trier
to help hi1n collect irtfo~
rmation of an overt nature-
. . . 3.
nerhens f~or a journa~~st .*. ,
friend, poss~n~y
scitrch paper or article which the Soviet himse
tor a r
claims he is writing, perhaps even for an inform
public opinion poll. The Vienna student was askr
for character assessments of his fellow Amcrical
and saw nothing disturbing ahout the request.
Eoropc:an national in the Middle East, under Sm
viet cultivation because of his access to American
was dealt with somewhat more frankly by l k Ss
viet officer. The request went somt:thing like thi
"You know many people here. They will tell yt
what they won't tell me . . . they utill speak i o
frankly to you than to Ime because I am a* diplom
and represent a count ry that, unfortunately, d o
not find much favor vvith them. 'Irherefore, as
. .. -. . .
personal favor, will you ask MI. Blank. whom vt
know, what. .. ."
Requests of this kind, even for I
information, may be coupled with an ofier ot pa
ment. If payment is accepted, a receipt will us-
ally be requested under some plausible pretext.
The process of gradual involvement is by this
time well under way and elements of clandestinity
and po:, lble potential compromise factors already
pres :nt.
Finally, one day, un an atmospthere of war
friendshipI and mutual trust, the re<:mitment pm
ess will ble brought to a head wit11 a request f
. * .
information or a servlce that is clearly ot an I
telligence nature. Typically, generous financial re-
wards will be promised. If the American becomes
frightened or refuses, he will be met at first with
reasoned argument and renewed professions
.I friendship. Depending on the course of the
~viet assessment and softening-up process, a
~rrlerLine may follow: threats and warning to
I ,811kmatters over-particularly if the American
nr already slipped over the line and exposed him-
If to compromise. Whatevcr the American's ini-
.I reaction, the Soviet, as in the case of code clerk
$n~ald Ultan, will press for one or more additional
,.stings.
Ilsdaneous Dc
r rhniques
No hypothetica
I vrtual cases, ca.. ---.-.,.....strate the tul.. -.--D-
! Soviet operational practice employed tc) meet,
, vr-lop and recruit Americans abroad. Several
1811.hhave not yet been mentioned or arcr worth
Iblilional clarification and emphasis by way of
w i n g are briefly discussed L-'----
I :ompromise
Although the E:GB, by its own doctrine, regards
ioduccmcnt as normalIly the decisive factor
ra.~t~cial
\~~ccessfuI
.. .
recruitment of Amerlcans aDr<
1 ..1
5
.
lttcnt of contpromise is also an essential
.*
11 such operation. It is brought into
8v.r which are often not fully appreciate
From the viewpoint of Soviet 1ntelliger.--, -..,
~.nr.ricanwho agrees to an unofficial and personal
I ttionship with a Soviet and conceals the 'fact
t~nhis (or her) superiors has already taken a
..I compromising step. As the relationship d e e p
~lndbecomes more intimate along typical lines,
It as described above, each Soviet move is in-
led to increase the degree of compromise. By
,.ping the small aspects of clandestinity which
I:radually introduced, such as not calling the
.vwt at his official number or agreeing to meet-
z4r nt unorthodox times and places, the American
etpounds his original compromise. The initially
tats.unt sm;tll "favors" which the Soviet asks on
I,nsis of friendship are a calculated part of the
~npromiseprocess. So is the offer of payment
I the seemingly plausible request for a signed
vipt. Meanwhile, the Soviet through probing
I other means uncovers indications of personal
.
dkness and vulnerability (the presence of debt,
-%rivedrinking, promiscuous sexual habits, etc.),
..WII are treated as "secrets" between the Ameri-
6 - t end his Soviet "friend and thus also become
Part of the COInpromise web. The effec:t of this
Prmess over a I)eriod of time is to draw tlle ~mAmeri-
which
ca n into a "cor~fidential"relationship, frc
.. . .
thcL? American Iyadually c o m a to rea1i.n: that he
-.. - -
cannot wltharaw excent at the cost of oLCULd dl',-
barrassrpent-a nd perhaps !severe persorla1 conse-
qucncesLby clisclosing t h;.~ compromise to his
superiors.
- ..
Actually, the build-up and use ot comp ,
)viet Intelligence is largely for psychological effect
)th during the period of development and at the
n e of recruitment is attempted. In operations in
le West, the Soviets normally have no serious in-
. .- -.--..
18ntion of using compromising informatior +" hl*-k-
ail an American into doing their biddint ;. Use of
cc)ercive threats to destroy an American s career
b:y exposure of compromising information is a re-
...
CIuitment technique only rarely employerd outside
the Sovit I Bloc area. This is because in wesreru
.L.-
countries the Soviets lack total conhol of the en-
vironment, such as they enjoy in the USSR, in their
operations against Americam. It is thus difficult
for them to acquire truly damaging evidence in a
)nn which ca.n be effectively exploited for black. '
'
tail.
In Moscow and the East European c o d e s ,
owever, hlackmail is stanldard operatisonal prac-
. . ... n..
tlce agalnst wesrerners, ~ncludingAmen L-a"". v y
erating on their own grounds, the KG1B and the
cooperating Bloc services can work ulnder con-
trolled conditions to secure disasterously compro-
mising evidence (usually photographic and/or re-
corded on tape) which is then used as a means or
recruitment. The well-publicized case of Irwin
Scarbeck, the Foreign Service officer stationed in
Warsaw who became involved with a female Polish
agent and was blackmailed into accepting recruit-
rnenf is only one of nume]mus example? nf nnera-
t ions of this 1dnd.
Sexuul and
A number of actual ana lnclplenr sexual ap-
proaches overseas to Americans outside the Com-
munist Bloc have been mentioned both in detail
and in passing reference in this study. Although
the KGB attempt to recruit Eleanor, the Bonn
embassy file clerk, was based on shock tactics and
threats against her own safety and the life of he1
supposed American fiance, the operation against her
was, in its opening stages, a clear-cut case of seduo
NTIAL
i

tion which was accomplishrul In a matter of weeks.
In the case of the c~nbu~sy src.rr.lltry in Africa whose
local lover was in con1ut.l with u Soviet intelligence
olcer, it seems likcly tllnt 11t.rsrxui~linvolvement
wns to Iiave In?on io<lirvctly c-xploited on Soviet
behalf. '1'11~AID Mirsir~n .icc.rctary in the Far
E u t who scccptcd II lotlcr from a Soviet visitor
and appur~:~~lly gi~vein to his romuntic overtures
prior to her Illrnovrr to :I I c r d KGB officer was
almost c~.rt:tir~ly
spotted in udvuncc as being sus-
ceptible to this type of ~~ppronch.
In at lcast one n-ccnt instance outside the Com-
munist Bloc, 1110 KCD is known to have recruited-
'hen clir~,ctrd agiiir~st Americans--a European
~omoscxu~~l. l'hc: recruitment itself was not on the
,asis of black mail (thc European made no secret
~fhis homosrxuulity and had no fear of exposure
..
In this scorc), but onru: the agent had been re-
cruited, thr: Soviets sought to exploit the homo-
sexuul aspec't. l'11r:y financed the agent's move to
an apnrimcnt sl~itablelor entertaining and asked
him to report on oEcial Americans of his acquaint-
ance who might be active or latent homosexuals.
The np?,ent W I I ~unsuccessful in this assignment, but
if he hnd Ina~:n able to identify and establish a
compron>ising rclntionship with such a person, it
is likcly tl~ut the KCB would have considered
blackmi~ilus a recruitment technique. The KGB
is known to regnrd evidence of homos(?xuality as
particularly damaging information which is ex-
ploitable by blilckmail.
Trips to the Communist Bloc
The KGB is known to have instruct€d its resi-
,dencies, as part of the operational progr;am against
Americans abroad, to "find opportunities to or-
ganize trips to the USSR and ; :he Peoples' Demc-
cracies for targets under dr\ ,,)merit." TI.- =.-. -e..
son for this technique is ob\ i 0 . s . It gives the Sc-
viets an opportunity, on their own gmunds and at
leisure, to assess an agent prospect in greater depth
1. than is often possible in the West and to carry
through the operation to recruitment under cir-
cumstances overwhelmingly favorable to them.
:. (In some cases where recruitments have been made
in the West, the new agent is taken to the USSR or
to one of the Bloc countries for intensive training
in his agent assignment. The KGB and GRU can
arrange this without a Soviet visa showing in the
American's passport.) Examples of such invita-
CONFIDENTIAL
ENTIAL
tions are numerous and one will s d c e to illustrate
how they usually come about. Several years ago,
~ .. l~niqueinvolves the
an AID o5cer in Pakistan was cultivated on a social
relationship basis by Leonid Gavrilovich Kuimov,
an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover as
a first secretary. In the now familiar pattern, the
Soviet drought small gifts to the American's family
and the two men before long were in the habit
of seeing each other several times a week, often
dropping in on one another. The Soviet finally
asked for an AID Mission pocket telephone direc-
tory and was given an outdated and generally
available copy. He then probed several times to
see if the American might be interested in a 'spe-
cial deal" on a vacation tr,ip to Moscow., When itlis
was refused, the Soviet I~fficerswitch1ed to a ne'w
tack; he urged the American to come to the USSiR
for a period and accept work as a teacher. . - ''It
would be a valuable experienm,' he said. -and
you would be highly paid."
The Soviets are also interested in attracting to
the USSR as tourists persons whom they have
spotted as potential recruitment targets. For ex-
ample, in 1966 three female Peace Corps volunteers
in Turkey visited the Ankara office of Intourist, the
Soviet travel agency, to arrange a tourist trip to
the USSR. While in the ofice, they met three So-
viets (all of them intelligence officers) who were
persistent irI attempts to cultivate them. A short
time later, tlle local PeaceI Corps director persuaded
the volunte~ :IS to cancel their plans for the trip.
. . - .
When the local lntounst representative, a KGB
agent, was told of the cancellation, he promptly
lowered his previously set "minimum" price for the
tour from $250 to $102. (The Peace Corps, of
course, is an attractive target for Soviet Intelligence
since many former volunteers have entered U.S.
Government service and others can be expected
to do so in future. Various types of Soviet efforts
at cultivation of Peace Corps personnel have been
reported from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.)
False Flog
The S~.\iettechnique of 'false flap cultivation
or attempted recruitment has been ill ustrated sc3v-
era1 times and is mentioned again ,for emphasis
because it is extremely hard td recognize or detect
until the Soviet hand comes out in the open (if
it ever does). In its purest form the Soviet hand
should not show at all since the essence of this
54
CONFIDENTIAL
tii~t~-Soviet
recruiter (Soviet national
agent) pretending to represent a non-
.\lr.t intelligence service or commercial or indus-
*I organization, in cases where the American
.g,:rt is considered unlikely to have any a5nity
the Soviet cause. An American of German
.*ractionmight be asked to covertly help his coun-
of origin or an American of Jewish faith might
wked to serve the Israeli intelligence service.
Department of State communications tech-
man, whose case has been described, was asked
. ollsborate with the intelligence service of his
. $ I European country of ethnic origin-yet the
rution was Soviet and involved a Soviet Illegal.
- Ultan case was a variation ol
Ibnique.
uic
:ombits for Conta
* which exemplars he would like to have. This. of
. '' tovariety
I he of ways
'pen up
wnlcn lnrerugence
contact with Americans
atad and to ensure the prospect of follow-up
..clngs is impressive. In the case histories al-
Iv we have seen Soviet officers ap
trh Americans on the street, in bars. at private
I W S and receptions, through the intermediary of
, a dationals, e t c A KGB instructional docu-
41 makes further suggestions:
'-In order- to widcn the mpe of hir mVFr far meeting
Anmwicnns . . . the intelligence officer may engage in
..
ntnrtE, actively concern hir~urlfwith certain aspeits of
trnce or art, or take up a hobby. Examples include
I~*lming,.tennir,stamp collecting and coin collecting."
ilen above instructions have been faithfully fol-
. . < I in every part of the world and actually
ouved on. Soviets, as already shown, have or-
,,rd games such as the volley ball series played
\'l~.nna, have sought out Americans to give
uage lessons to themselves or their wives and
taken to frequenting bowling alleys and even
nrln guard quarters abroad. Grigoriy Iosifovich
I~arov,a GRU officer recently in Rabat, spent a
I part of his time on the beach looking for
tlrnn military personnel with whom he could
CONFIDENTIAL
strike up an informal acquaintance. X few Years
ago in Syria it was noted that Konstantin Ldoze],
.
a Soviet intelligenoe 05a?r, was in the ha1bit of
spending the greater part of three days a weev at.
the diplomatic community swimming pool, engag-
ing ,English-speaking wives in conversation while
their h~~+~ands were at work,
In Tripoli the KGB instruction about stamp col-
lecting was taken quite literally by Soviet intelli-
gence personnel. Some of them were seen carry-
ing folders of postage stamps about town and using
them to strike up conversations in bars, cafes and
other public places. If the person approached in
this manner admitted an interest in stamps, the So-
viet would hand over his packet, suggest that the
potential target take it home to study and decide
course, wouid open the door to another meeting
at which stamps would indeed be &cussed, and
possibly exchanged, but the bulk of the time would
,
be spent by the Soviet officer in building rapport,
,ogaphic and employment information
and la iing the groundwork for subsequent meetings.
The GRU showed considerable ingenuity in stag-
ing an incident in Brussels in 1988 which was in-
tended to bring one of their officers into contact
with an American female employee of the M U G
Mission. Returning home one day, the American
woman found a Soviet female, apparently ill, lean-
ing against the wall outside her door. Her agitated
male companion, Vladimir I. Cheretun who posed
as Aeroflot representative in Belgium, asked if he
could bring his wife into the American home to rest.
Once inside, the Soviet female (never identified)
made a rapid recovery while Cheretun attempted
to ingratiate himself with the American woman.
He made a second-and unsuccessful-attempt at
cultivation a few months later by approaching the
American on the street. Cheretun was appre-
hended by Belgian authorities in 1967 and forced
to leave the country because of his intelligence
activities.
55

tion which was accomplishrul In a matter of weeks.
In the case of the c~nbu~sy src.rr.lltry in Africa whose
local lover was in con1ut.l with u Soviet intelligence
olcer, it seems likcly tllnt 11t.rsrxui~linvolvement
wns to Iiave In?on io<lirvctly c-xploited on Soviet
behalf. '1'11~AID Mirsir~n .icc.rctary in the Far
E u t who scccptcd II lotlcr from a Soviet visitor
and appur~:~~lly gi~vein to his romuntic overtures
prior to her Illrnovrr to :I I c r d KGB officer was
almost c~.rt:tir~ly
spotted in udvuncc as being sus-
ceptible to this type of ~~ppronch.
In at lcast one n-ccnt instance outside the Com-
munist Bloc, 1110 KCD is known to have recruited-
'hen clir~,ctrd agiiir~st Americans--a European
~omoscxu~~l. l'hc: recruitment itself was not on the
,asis of black mail (thc European made no secret
~fhis homosrxuulity and had no fear of exposure
..
In this scorc), but onru: the agent had been re-
cruited, thr: Soviets sought to exploit the homo-
sexuul aspec't. l'11r:y financed the agent's move to
an apnrimcnt sl~itablelor entertaining and asked
him to report on oEcial Americans of his acquaint-
ance who might be active or latent homosexuals.
The np?,ent W I I ~unsuccessful in this assignment, but
if he hnd Ina~:n able to identify and establish a
compron>ising rclntionship with such a person, it
is likcly tl~ut the KCB would have considered
blackmi~ilus a recruitment technique. The KGB
is known to regnrd evidence of homos(?xuality as
particularly damaging information which is ex-
ploitable by blilckmail.
Trips to the Communist Bloc
The KGB is known to have instruct€d its resi-
,dencies, as part of the operational progr;am against
Americans abroad, to "find opportunities to or-
ganize trips to the USSR and ; :he Peoples' Demc-
cracies for targets under dr\ ,,)merit." TI.- =.-. -e..
son for this technique is ob\ i 0 . s . It gives the Sc-
viets an opportunity, on their own gmunds and at
leisure, to assess an agent prospect in greater depth
1. than is often possible in the West and to carry
through the operation to recruitment under cir-
cumstances overwhelmingly favorable to them.
:. (In some cases where recruitments have been made
in the West, the new agent is taken to the USSR or
to one of the Bloc countries for intensive training
in his agent assignment. The KGB and GRU can
arrange this without a Soviet visa showing in the
American's passport.) Examples of such invita-
CONFIDENTIAL
ENTIAL
tions are numerous and one will s d c e to illustrate
how they usually come about. Several years ago,
~ .. l~niqueinvolves the
an AID o5cer in Pakistan was cultivated on a social
relationship basis by Leonid Gavrilovich Kuimov,
an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover as
a first secretary. In the now familiar pattern, the
Soviet drought small gifts to the American's family
and the two men before long were in the habit
of seeing each other several times a week, often
dropping in on one another. The Soviet finally
asked for an AID Mission pocket telephone direc-
tory and was given an outdated and generally
available copy. He then probed several times to
see if the American might be interested in a 'spe-
cial deal" on a vacation tr,ip to Moscow., When itlis
was refused, the Soviet I~fficerswitch1ed to a ne'w
tack; he urged the American to come to the USSiR
for a period and accept work as a teacher. . - ''It
would be a valuable experienm,' he said. -and
you would be highly paid."
The Soviets are also interested in attracting to
the USSR as tourists persons whom they have
spotted as potential recruitment targets. For ex-
ample, in 1966 three female Peace Corps volunteers
in Turkey visited the Ankara office of Intourist, the
Soviet travel agency, to arrange a tourist trip to
the USSR. While in the ofice, they met three So-
viets (all of them intelligence officers) who were
persistent irI attempts to cultivate them. A short
time later, tlle local PeaceI Corps director persuaded
the volunte~ :IS to cancel their plans for the trip.
. . - .
When the local lntounst representative, a KGB
agent, was told of the cancellation, he promptly
lowered his previously set "minimum" price for the
tour from $250 to $102. (The Peace Corps, of
course, is an attractive target for Soviet Intelligence
since many former volunteers have entered U.S.
Government service and others can be expected
to do so in future. Various types of Soviet efforts
at cultivation of Peace Corps personnel have been
reported from Africa, the Middle East and Asia.)
False Flog
The S~.\iettechnique of 'false flap cultivation
or attempted recruitment has been ill ustrated sc3v-
era1 times and is mentioned again ,for emphasis
because it is extremely hard td recognize or detect
until the Soviet hand comes out in the open (if
it ever does). In its purest form the Soviet hand
should not show at all since the essence of this
54
CONFIDENTIAL
tii~t~-Soviet
recruiter (Soviet national
agent) pretending to represent a non-
.\lr.t intelligence service or commercial or indus-
*I organization, in cases where the American
.g,:rt is considered unlikely to have any a5nity
the Soviet cause. An American of German
.*ractionmight be asked to covertly help his coun-
of origin or an American of Jewish faith might
wked to serve the Israeli intelligence service.
Department of State communications tech-
man, whose case has been described, was asked
. ollsborate with the intelligence service of his
. $ I European country of ethnic origin-yet the
rution was Soviet and involved a Soviet Illegal.
- Ultan case was a variation ol
Ibnique.
uic
:ombits for Conta
* which exemplars he would like to have. This. of
. '' tovariety
I he of ways
'pen up
wnlcn lnrerugence
contact with Americans
atad and to ensure the prospect of follow-up
..clngs is impressive. In the case histories al-
Iv we have seen Soviet officers ap
trh Americans on the street, in bars. at private
I W S and receptions, through the intermediary of
, a dationals, e t c A KGB instructional docu-
41 makes further suggestions:
'-In order- to widcn the mpe of hir mVFr far meeting
Anmwicnns . . . the intelligence officer may engage in
..
ntnrtE, actively concern hir~urlfwith certain aspeits of
trnce or art, or take up a hobby. Examples include
I~*lming,.tennir,stamp collecting and coin collecting."
ilen above instructions have been faithfully fol-
. . < I in every part of the world and actually
ouved on. Soviets, as already shown, have or-
,,rd games such as the volley ball series played
\'l~.nna, have sought out Americans to give
uage lessons to themselves or their wives and
taken to frequenting bowling alleys and even
nrln guard quarters abroad. Grigoriy Iosifovich
I~arov,a GRU officer recently in Rabat, spent a
I part of his time on the beach looking for
tlrnn military personnel with whom he could
CONFIDENTIAL
strike up an informal acquaintance. X few Years
ago in Syria it was noted that Konstantin Ldoze],
.
a Soviet intelligenoe 05a?r, was in the ha1bit of
spending the greater part of three days a weev at.
the diplomatic community swimming pool, engag-
ing ,English-speaking wives in conversation while
their h~~+~ands were at work,
In Tripoli the KGB instruction about stamp col-
lecting was taken quite literally by Soviet intelli-
gence personnel. Some of them were seen carry-
ing folders of postage stamps about town and using
them to strike up conversations in bars, cafes and
other public places. If the person approached in
this manner admitted an interest in stamps, the So-
viet would hand over his packet, suggest that the
potential target take it home to study and decide
course, wouid open the door to another meeting
at which stamps would indeed be &cussed, and
possibly exchanged, but the bulk of the time would
,
be spent by the Soviet officer in building rapport,
,ogaphic and employment information
and la iing the groundwork for subsequent meetings.
The GRU showed considerable ingenuity in stag-
ing an incident in Brussels in 1988 which was in-
tended to bring one of their officers into contact
with an American female employee of the M U G
Mission. Returning home one day, the American
woman found a Soviet female, apparently ill, lean-
ing against the wall outside her door. Her agitated
male companion, Vladimir I. Cheretun who posed
as Aeroflot representative in Belgium, asked if he
could bring his wife into the American home to rest.
Once inside, the Soviet female (never identified)
made a rapid recovery while Cheretun attempted
to ingratiate himself with the American woman.
He made a second-and unsuccessful-attempt at
cultivation a few months later by approaching the
American on the street. Cheretun was appre-
hended by Belgian authorities in 1967 and forced
to leave the country because of his intelligence
activities.
55
 CONFIUCNI 1 . u
VI. CO
The efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain secret
information through recruitment of Americans and
penetration 01 U.S. installatio~lsabroad are, as this
study has shown, world-wide in scope, massive in
proportions, tenacious and persistent, and often
highly imaginative. KGB and CRU targets are.
varied and include privute as well as official Ameri-
cans. But the most aggressive operational activity
I :
is directed against junior employees of diplomatic
and other official establisllments and against enlisted
personnel atf the military services. Priority is given
to code a!nd cornmunil:ations personnel, Marine
guards, file clerks and 1iecretaries, a broad group-
ing which 'the Soviet reg;ard as particularly vulner-
. . .
able and relatively easy to approach
The KCB doctrinal concept of the average Ameri
can, his psychological makeup, matelialistic natun
and primary interest in money and how to. makl
..
more of it, which this study has documenteo, IS
a challenging one and may seem grossly distorted
to most readers. Nevertheless, it has obviously
proven to be true in many individual cases in
which the Soviets have made successful and highly
rewarding recruitments. As a sweeping generali-
zation, the: concept ha: i been proven in error by
many Soviet recmitmerit failures, even after care-
ful assessnlent and preparation. The record shows
that Americans as a grc)up are loyal to their coun-
try and have proven harder for the Soviets to IC
cruit than any other nationality. However, thiis
advantage is partially offset by the fact that th
United States is "the main enemy" and the KG
and CRU devote more time and effort to recrul!-
ment ope1.ations against Americans than nationals
of any otller co~~niTy.
There i!9 no reason to doubt the validity of the
Soviet rxp~erienwthat it is easier to recruit hmeri-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
INDEX OF NAMES
Aodreyev, Andray N i l r o l a ~ c h .........................
Balashov, Vitaliy Dmitriyevich .........................
cans abrcbad than in the United States, nor of ths Beck, Jd.......... ............
Soviet mvi ew that the American we~earten& to Cheretuq Vladirnir I. ............
have his guard down, to talk freely about himself, Drummond, Nelson C. ............
to associa~ t without
- .
e suspicion +ith foreignm. The 1 -Eleanor1 . . . . . . . . . . . ............
soviets take fuU advantaee of the off-duty freedom , Fateyev, Albert Geoagl, ............
of movement and assoc:iarion which A m e r i w have Filatov, Robespier N. ...........
abroad. They find it relatively erasy to establish Goncharov, Grigoriy Iosifovich ..
direct personal contac% for cultivaltion and assess. Ilyintsev, Valentin Ivanovich .....
ment; they also manit)date a variety of local non-
. . . .
Soviet agents and willing coUaaoratOrJ.
Johnson, Robert L. ...............
Korotkikb, Nikolay Ckqiyevich . ............. a
Examples of many Soviet operational t-91 Kuimov, Leonid Gavrilovich ............................... 50
have been shown in this study. Sometimes tl Lomakiu, Pave1 Ivanovicb ................................ 3
are apparent, even obvious. But they are of Losev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ........................... 17
subtle and indirect. Soviet methods of spotti 'Madame X ........................................... 33.37,
assessment, cultivation and recmihnent are ex. / Matzdorff, Emst .....
tremely varied and limited only by local opem Mintkenbaugh, James 1
tional resources and by the imagination of thr MozeS Konstanti~~ . .
Soviet intelligence officer. The effectiveness d
these methods is conditioned by the degree d
American appreciation of Soviet intentions,
Muratov, Yevgeni, :eo
Ogorodnikov, Annroliy ..-,
Prokhorov, Yevgeniy Mikhayhvich
.....................
...........
understanding of Soviet techniques and a const
alertness to any possible manifestations of eitl
Putyatov, Vladimir T. ...........
Ranov, Nikolay Ivanov ...........
It is most important to remember that SOV Roganov, Aleksandr I. ..................................
in the West, as a general rule, are not permitt- Runge, Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich . . . ..........
to make unofficial, social contacts with American Sakharovskiy, hleksahdr Mikhaylov
unless there are intelligence reasons for doing an Savelev, Mikhail Stepanovich .....
Casual, seemingly non-contrived contact with 8 Scarbeck, Irwin ..................
Soviet should be reported in all cases to approprialc
security authorities. Abnormally inquisitive no / Semikov, .Oleg Aleksandrovich ............................. -*
Shchukin, Mikhail. ............... .. -
11
tions on the part of non-Soviets, especially regard I
Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikohyevich . .. 7
ing biog;raphic information, private and official .o
tivities, and the personal financial status of Ameh
Sorokin, Vadirn Vladimirovich . . . . .. 15
Stein, George ........................................ 18,19,2C
can 06%:ials and employees abroad should be notd
; ~ authoritie:s will frecP e
and rep~orted. ~ e c .ity szabo, Laszlo ................... ............. 4
possess, or are in a ]position to ot,tain, informa IJltan, Donald ................... ............. 9,lo,11
identifying Soviet i!ntelligence officeI-9 andI t Volotskov, Viktor I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 17
agents amd are able tc provide applmpriate guiida Vyrodov, Ivan Yakovlavlch ....... ............. 15
Wennerstroem, Stig .............. ............. 32.33.34
%ostrovtsev, Yevgeniy Aleltseyevicl
Yrlenin, Andrey Nikohyevid ....
yorln, Vderian Aleksandrovich . . .
56
 CONFIUCNI 1 . u
VI. CO
The efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain secret
information through recruitment of Americans and
penetration 01 U.S. installatio~lsabroad are, as this
study has shown, world-wide in scope, massive in
proportions, tenacious and persistent, and often
highly imaginative. KGB and CRU targets are.
varied and include privute as well as official Ameri-
cans. But the most aggressive operational activity
I :
is directed against junior employees of diplomatic
and other official establisllments and against enlisted
personnel atf the military services. Priority is given
to code a!nd cornmunil:ations personnel, Marine
guards, file clerks and 1iecretaries, a broad group-
ing which 'the Soviet reg;ard as particularly vulner-
. . .
able and relatively easy to approach
The KCB doctrinal concept of the average Ameri
can, his psychological makeup, matelialistic natun
and primary interest in money and how to. makl
..
more of it, which this study has documenteo, IS
a challenging one and may seem grossly distorted
to most readers. Nevertheless, it has obviously
proven to be true in many individual cases in
which the Soviets have made successful and highly
rewarding recruitments. As a sweeping generali-
zation, the: concept ha: i been proven in error by
many Soviet recmitmerit failures, even after care-
ful assessnlent and preparation. The record shows
that Americans as a grc)up are loyal to their coun-
try and have proven harder for the Soviets to IC
cruit than any other nationality. However, thiis
advantage is partially offset by the fact that th
United States is "the main enemy" and the KG
and CRU devote more time and effort to recrul!-
ment ope1.ations against Americans than nationals
of any otller co~~niTy.
There i!9 no reason to doubt the validity of the
Soviet rxp~erienwthat it is easier to recruit hmeri-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
INDEX OF NAMES
Aodreyev, Andray N i l r o l a ~ c h .........................
Balashov, Vitaliy Dmitriyevich .........................
cans abrcbad than in the United States, nor of ths Beck, Jd.......... ............
Soviet mvi ew that the American we~earten& to Cheretuq Vladirnir I. ............
have his guard down, to talk freely about himself, Drummond, Nelson C. ............
to associa~ t without
- .
e suspicion +ith foreignm. The 1 -Eleanor1 . . . . . . . . . . . ............
soviets take fuU advantaee of the off-duty freedom , Fateyev, Albert Geoagl, ............
of movement and assoc:iarion which A m e r i w have Filatov, Robespier N. ...........
abroad. They find it relatively erasy to establish Goncharov, Grigoriy Iosifovich ..
direct personal contac% for cultivaltion and assess. Ilyintsev, Valentin Ivanovich .....
ment; they also manit)date a variety of local non-
. . . .
Soviet agents and willing coUaaoratOrJ.
Johnson, Robert L. ...............
Korotkikb, Nikolay Ckqiyevich . ............. a
Examples of many Soviet operational t-91 Kuimov, Leonid Gavrilovich ............................... 50
have been shown in this study. Sometimes tl Lomakiu, Pave1 Ivanovicb ................................ 3
are apparent, even obvious. But they are of Losev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich ........................... 17
subtle and indirect. Soviet methods of spotti 'Madame X ........................................... 33.37,
assessment, cultivation and recmihnent are ex. / Matzdorff, Emst .....
tremely varied and limited only by local opem Mintkenbaugh, James 1
tional resources and by the imagination of thr MozeS Konstanti~~ . .
Soviet intelligence officer. The effectiveness d
these methods is conditioned by the degree d
American appreciation of Soviet intentions,
Muratov, Yevgeni, :eo
Ogorodnikov, Annroliy ..-,
Prokhorov, Yevgeniy Mikhayhvich
.....................
...........
understanding of Soviet techniques and a const
alertness to any possible manifestations of eitl
Putyatov, Vladimir T. ...........
Ranov, Nikolay Ivanov ...........
It is most important to remember that SOV Roganov, Aleksandr I. ..................................
in the West, as a general rule, are not permitt- Runge, Yevgeniy Yevgenyevich . . . ..........
to make unofficial, social contacts with American Sakharovskiy, hleksahdr Mikhaylov
unless there are intelligence reasons for doing an Savelev, Mikhail Stepanovich .....
Casual, seemingly non-contrived contact with 8 Scarbeck, Irwin ..................
Soviet should be reported in all cases to approprialc
security authorities. Abnormally inquisitive no / Semikov, .Oleg Aleksandrovich ............................. -*
Shchukin, Mikhail. ............... .. -
11
tions on the part of non-Soviets, especially regard I
Shelepin, Aleksandr Nikohyevich . .. 7
ing biog;raphic information, private and official .o
tivities, and the personal financial status of Ameh
Sorokin, Vadirn Vladimirovich . . . . .. 15
Stein, George ........................................ 18,19,2C
can 06%:ials and employees abroad should be notd
; ~ authoritie:s will frecP e
and rep~orted. ~ e c .ity szabo, Laszlo ................... ............. 4
possess, or are in a ]position to ot,tain, informa IJltan, Donald ................... ............. 9,lo,11
identifying Soviet i!ntelligence officeI-9 andI t Volotskov, Viktor I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. 17
agents amd are able tc provide applmpriate guiida Vyrodov, Ivan Yakovlavlch ....... ............. 15
Wennerstroem, Stig .............. ............. 32.33.34
%ostrovtsev, Yevgeniy Aleltseyevicl
Yrlenin, Andrey Nikohyevid ....
yorln, Vderian Aleksandrovich . . .
56