Summary.

The risk of overloading

an atmospheric mud/gas separator
(MGS) during high-volume gas kill
operations can be minimized. This
paper presents the theory and proce-
dure for minimizing this risk for high-
temperature/high-pressure (HT/HP)
wells. The method can be used to set
criteria for selecting the kill method
and for separator sizing.
570
A Method for Handling
Gas Kicks Safely in
High.Pressure Wells
Eric Low, SPE, and Case Jansen, Deminex U.K. Oil & Gas Ltd.
Introduction
The number of HT /HP wells being drilled
in the North Sea has increased rapidly. Pres-
sures > 15,000 psi are common with as-
sociated temperatures > 350 of. The drilling
and exploitation of these reservoirs have
been described as the new challenge to the
drilling industry. 1 However, serious well-
control incidents have compelled the indus-
try to re-examine the equipment and proce-
dures used to drill these wells.
2
This paper examines a major shortcom-
ing identified recently: the ability of rig
equipment to separate and vent large gas
volumes from mud safely. Venting rates
from kicks in high-pressure wells can ap-
proach the equivalent production of a com-
mercial gas well.
If the separator is overloaded, gas will be
blown back into the shale shaker room and
other mud-processing facilities, creating an
extremely hazardous environment with a
high explosion risk. Also; live crude, con-
densate, and drilling mud will be expelled
by the gas through the gas vent line. On off-
shore rigs, where the vent line often dis-
charges at the top ofthe derrick, the liquids
will fall back to the drilling rig or platform.
This creates a fire or explosion hazard. The
volatile condensate/oil mixture will accumu-
late close to the deck in any void space and
can be ignited by a spark. The hazards of
MGS blowdown are apparent.
High reservoir pressures and temperatures
increase the surface gas volume per unit
volume of gas influx. The ability of rig gas-
processing equipment to handle such in-
creased volumes concerns the industry. Nor-
mal practice does not take into account the
limitations of the separator but instead con-
centrates on well control, assuming that the
MGS can handle whatever gas volume is
present.
The problem is clear. As we continue to
explore for oil and gas in deeper and higher
pressure reservoirs, we often exceed the safe
operating limits of the MGS. Separator
modification and redesign has improved its
capacity considerably, but space restrictions,
especially on mobile rigs, impose an inher-
"Now at Deminex Norge.
Copyright t 993 Society of Petroleum Engineers
ent limitation. Our lack of understanding of
the complex separation process has done lit-
tle to improve operating procedures and
practices.
In this paper, the separation process is
considered from a functional standpoint, and
a procedural method is developed to reduce
the risk of blowdown in an MGS. This
procedural method may impose limitations
on a poorly designed separator that render
the separator unsuitable for high-pressure
work, but this method illustrates how blow-
down can be inhibited in any separator. On
the basis of the initial kick parameters,
criteria are produced for selection of the kill
method and parameters.
GaS-Handling Process
The atmospheric MGS, often called a
"poor-boy" degasser or gas buster, had
humble beginnings. It originally consisted
of a large-diameter pipe that stood in a mud
pit; gas was vented through the open top.
Modem versions are similar, but most now
include a smaller-diameter vent line to dis-
charge the gas farther from the rig. Evolu-
tion essentially stopped here. The only
noteworthy introduction has been internal
baffles. For many years, the only changes
made to the MGS were to make it smaller
and lighter to save space and weight, thus
reducing the gas-handling capacity. More
recently, as a result of increased deep, high-
pressure drilling, this trend has been
reversed. Larger MGS's, larger-diameter
vent lines, and longer mud seals now are the
order of the day. Upgraded separators still
are affected by the severe space limitations
of drilling units.
Fig. 1 illustrates a typical modem MGS
with the following features.
1. Internal baffles to encourage gas break-
out from the mud.
2. Large-diameter vent lines to reduce
backpressure caused by the gas venting
friction.
3. Extended dip tubes, often into the trip
tank, to improve the mud seal integrity.
4. The recent addition of vessel pressure
gauges to monitor the approach of
blowdown.
5. Hydrostatic head sensors to monitor the
mud seal for excessive gas cutting or oil or
June 1993 JPT
1. Gas Vent Line
2. Pressure Sensor
3. Spray Tube
4. Baffle Plates
5. Dip Tube
6. Hydrostatic Sensor
7. Choke Manifold
8. Automatic Choke
9. Choke Line
10. Mud Processing Facilities
Fig. 1-Typical MGS.
condensate contamination, which could
reduce the mud seal integrity.
Fig. 2 shows the mud/gas separation proc-
ess. The gas/mud/oil/condensate mixture is
circulated from the well through the drill-
ing choke. The gas now expands rapidly and
cools in these near-atmospheric conditions,
accelerating the mixture through the choke
manifold directly to the MGS spray tube.
The free gas is released, and the spray ac-
tion releases a high proportion of the gas en-
trained in the mud. The mud and liquid
components then cascade over a series of
baffle plates, which increases retention time
in the separator and provides further agita-
tion to encourage the release of additional
entrained gas. The liquid discharge is gravity
fed to the dip tube, where the liquid replaces
the old mud in the tube, which returns to
the mud-processing facilities. The separat-
ed gas takes the path ofleast resistance, the
gas vent. This vent safely discharges the gas
some distance from the rig. The process is
simple, if somewhat crude, but has the major
advantage of preventing blockages, which
could easily happen considering the high
solids content of drilling mud.
By far the largest proportion of gas is
released during primary separation, which
occurs during initial impact on entry to the
separator. The gas must then travel through
the mud spray to the gas vent.
Separation Capacity. Prieur
3
outlines a
criterion for calculating the separation ca-
pacity of an MGS based on API Spec.
121.4 Prieur states that effective separation
can be achieved only when the settling ve-
locity of the liquid droplets exceeds the up-
ward velocity of the gas stream. The
separation capacity can be calculated from
JPT June 1993
_Mud
_ Mud/Gas at Pressure
!ISlJ Mud/Gas at Atmospheric
Fig. 2-Separation process.
the liquid density, gas density, gas flow rate,
and cross-sectional flow area. He quotes the
following equation for the maximum allow-
able superficial velocity for good separa-
tion
4
:
(va)max=K[(PL -Pg)/Pg]o.S, ...... (1)
where K = constant depending on design and
operating conditions quoted in AP1 Spec.
121. The range for 5-ft vertical separators
is 0.12 to 0.24 ft/sec and for lO-ft vertical
separators is 0.18 to 0.35 ft/sec. The lowest
in the range should be selected to give the
maximum safety margin.
The following equation for separation ca-
pacity can be derived from Prieur's con-
clusions:
.............. (2)
Fig. 3 illustrates the typical range of
values this equation will give for various
mud weights and separator sizes.
Note that Eq. 1 is valid for the separation
of liquid droplets larger than 100 J..tm only
if (1) the operating temperature exceeds the
oil cloud point, (2) the operating tempera-
ture exceeds the gas hydrate point, (3) the
liquid has a minimal or no foaming tenden-
cy, and (4) uniform flow exists.
It is not possible yet to assess with any
degree of confidence whether any of these
conditions apply to the mud/gas separation
process. In particular, the requirement for
uniform flow is probably the most difficult
to achieve because the flow can vary from
100% gas to 100% mud. This rudimentary
expression of mud/gas separation unfor-
tunately is the best available in the indus-
try. It has been applied widely and appears
to give reasonable results.
The construction of Eq. 1 is not the pur-
pose of this paper, so the equation has been
accepted and used as stated. The develop-
ment of a more realistic expression should
be a priority because it is a fundamental
building block for advancing our knowledge
on this subject.
Blowdown Capacity. The second important
limiting criterion for MGS's is blowdown
capacity: the gas rate that will create suffi-
cient backpressure in the vessel, from fric-
tion in the gas vent line, to overcome the
hydrostatic fluid head in the dip tube.
The U.K. Dept. of Energy
5
favors a cal-
culation based on a light crude oil (0.3 psi/ft)
in the mud seal. This calculation accounts
for the possibility of condensate or light
crude being a constituent of the influx and
contaminating the mud. The maximum safe
working pressure of the separator,
(Psp)max, can be expressed as
(Psp)max=Lm . ................. (3)
Eq. 3 may be invalid if the mud seal ar-
rangement does not contain a substantial
mud volume (e.g., "u" tube) in which case
an overall 0.3-psi/ft gradient should be
applied.
Pressure gauges fitted to the separator ves-
sel to monitor for blowdown must be high-
accuracy/low-pressure gauges because the
maximum safe working pressure will nor-
mally be < 9 psi.
The blowdown capacity can be calculat-
ed with the Weymouth equation.
6
The
Weymouth equation is a gas pipeline expres-
sion commonly used to calculate friction
losses in small-diameter pipelines. The fol-
571
"Normal practice does
not take into account
the limitations of the
separator but instead
concentrates on well
control, assuming that
the MGS can handle
whatever gas volume is
present."
lowing form of the equation should be used
to calculate the gas flow rate:
qg =433.45(T
abs
/Pa)df-667 [(prp -P'lJ/
Leq'Y gTz]O.S. . .................. (4)
Typical solutions to this equation are 15
to 20 MMscflD for an 8-in.-diameter vent
line and 25 to 35 MMscflD for a lO-in.-
diameter vent line.
The blowdown capacity, as calculated
above, assumes that there is no liquid car-
ryover to the vent. Comparing Fig. 3 with
the typical solutions quoted above indicates
that the separation capacity is exceeded, so
liquid carryover must occur. The blowdown
capacity, therefore, depends not only on the
gas rate but also on the proportion of mud
vented with the gas. The Weymouth equa-
tion gives good results if only dry gas is
processed. The separation capacity rate also
ensures that only gas is vented. Between
these two capacity figures, variable condi-
tions allow for variable mud/gas ratios in
the vent line. The blowdown pressure (Eq.
3) will be approached rapidly as mud con-
tent increases in the vent line.
Some older MGS designs with short (3 to
4 ft) mud seals and small (6-in.) vent lines
can have separation capacities that exceed
their blowdown capacity. Such separators
will have very low gas-handling capacities,
and safe separator working pressures can be
< I psi. Thankfully, most of these separa-
tors have been replaced; they should be
avoided, even for normally pressured wells.
So far we have determined the two
primary capacity figures and how to calcu-
late them for an MGS under specific condi-
tions. For typical modern oilfield MGS's,
a safety factor of 5 to 10 exists between
separation and blowdown capacity. This
safety factor is important because it provides
for the various conditions that exist during
a well kill.
We can conclude that if a modern sepa-
rator can be controlled to operate at or be-
low its separation capacity, the risk of
blowdown is virtually eliminated.
572
10 MMSCFD
8
6
0
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mud Weight (ppg)
20" Separator -+- 24" Separator -+- 3 ~ ' ' Separator
-a- 36" Separator ~ 42" Separator -+- 48" Separator
Fig. 3-Separation capacity.
Controlling the Separator
During well kill operations, well control is
always emphasized. The concept of adjust-
ing well kill parameters to control the MGS
may appear foolish or even dangerous. "If
the separator can't handle it, then change the
separator" has been the main thrust of the
industry's approach to the problem. One
major well kill parameter, however, is
selected arbitrarily: the kill pump rate. This
parameter controls the rate that the mud/gas
mixture enters the MGS.
Consider I bbl of mud/gas mixture dis-
placed through the choke. The gas will ex-
pand rapidly in the near-atmospheric
conditions, but the mud will not. The worst
possible case occurs if the barrel contains
100% gas. The whole barrel then will ex-
pand, providing the maximum rate at which
gas can enter the MGS. Ifwe can adjust this
maximum rate to the separation capacity of
the separator, we shall have gained control
under the worst possible scenario.
The kill pump rate at which 1 bbl of 100%
gas is expelled through the choke into the
MGS at its separation capacity can be cal-
culated with the normal gas laws:
Plq/Tlz
l
=P2qsp/T
2
z
2
, .......... (5)
or
q=(P2qsp/PI)(T
l
z
I
/T
2
Z
2
) . ....... (6)
For Eq. 6, PI must be calculated from in-
itial kick parameters, P2 can be verified
with the Weymouth equation, TI is
unknown, but can be estimated (the lowest
TI can be is ambient North Sea tempera-
ture-i.e., 40F), and T2 is unknown, so it
must be estimated. Because we are con-
cerned mainly with high gas rates, adiabat-
ic expansion may result in extremely low
temperatures. However, if we select OF we
obtain a worst case for q. Note that it is the
ratio TI/T2 that is important, not the abso-
lute values. z I has a significant influence on
the result and should not be ignored. It can
be obtained from gas tables or calculated
with an iterative routine by computer. Be-
cause the conditions inside the separator will
be close to atmospheric, z2 = I should be
used.
Although we have had to estimate the tem-
peratures, the other variables are known or
can be calculated. PI is the only variable
that has not yet been addressed.
Calculating the Casing Pressure. The
maximum possible casing pressure that any
given kick can generate will occur if the en-
tire kick volume is gas and that gas is im-
mediately upstream of the choke in an
expanded condition at the pressure required
to balance the bottornhole pressure (BHP).
This is the classical view of the well-control
mechanism and does not account for kick
dispersion or for gas solubility in oil-based
mud. Gas solubility and miscibility in oil-
based mud have attracted a great deal of at-
tention lately, especially in relation to high-
pressure wells.
7
-
11
The effects of these
phenomena can be significant, and all per-
sonnel involved in well control should be
made aware of this. However, if gas is still
in solution in the oil component of the mud,
the gas rate entering the MGS will neces-
sarily be reduced owing to the presence of
the mud. Gas solubility and dispersion have
some benefits. They reduce gas rates at sur-
face and at maximum casing pressures. The
classical view, therefore, provides an op-
timal basis for the worst-case approach we
opted for. It is fully consonant with the
previously mentioned premise that the
highest gas rates are produced when 100%
gas expands through the choke.
To calculate the maximum possible casing
pressure, we can turn to any good well-
control textbook to obtain the equations or
we can derive them from first principles.
The driller's method should be used in this
calculation because, if the effect of kill-
weight mud is ignored, the calculation is
simplified and will result in a worst-case
casing pressure. This is recommended
regardless of the kill method used to increase
the safety margin.
June 1993 JPT
The formula for calculating the maximum
possible casing pressure is
(Pcs)max =0.5{X +[X2 +4(p
ws
VbhTjZjgm)
l(VannTbhZbh)] 0.5 }, ............... (7)
where X=Pws-[(LclVclIVann)+Drv
-Lcl]gm'
Kick Decision Model
A kick decision model (KDM) was devel-
oped to establish a logical basis for deter-
mining whether a given gas influx could be
handled safely by the MGS of the rig. Ifnot,
it would be safer to bullhead this influx back
to the formation. However, there are several
serious concerns with bullheading.
1. What bullhead pressure will be re-
quired?
2. Will the well-control equipment with-
stand this pressure?
3. Will the wellbore withstand this
pressure?
4. Will an underground blowout occur if
the formation is fractured?
5. Can the influx be pumped back into the
formation if this influx has dispersed in the
mud?
These are all unknown risks. Even if an
injection rate can be established, is the in-
flux being pumped back or is mud being
pumped into a weaker zone? At best, bull-
heading can be considered only an influx
disposal method. It is not a kill method be-
cause kill circulations will still be required.
Bullheading sometimes can be the safest op-
tion, but if the influx can be disposed of safe-
ly at surface, circulating normally will carry
far less risk.
To fulfill the objective of the KDM as a
decision-making tool, the KDM must be
based on initial kick parameters and must
be able to be run immediately after a kick
is taken. The chances of a successful bull-
heading operation are enhanced greatly if
this procedure is attempted when the influx
is still close to the zone of origin.
The theoretical basis of the KDM has been
detailed in preceding sections. First, the
model calculates the safety factor between
separation and blowdown capacity for the
mud weight in use. Second, it dynamically
links the initial kick parameters with the
separation capacity of the MGS to give the
resulting kill pump rate (Eq. 6). These two
parameters are themselves an assessment of
the MGS's ability to handle the influx. The
lower the values, the poorer the MGS de-
sign. The time it takes to circulate the in-
flux out at surface will be the criterion, and
this length of time may be impractical. The
KDM only shows what will be involved in
killing the well safely. The judgment of what
route should be taken is influenced by other
considerations, including weather, equip-
ment, and crew experience.
The form of these calculations lends it-
self to computerization for speed and accura-
cy. The fixed geometric data and most of
the basic data can be preprogrammed easi-
ly in data files. This limits the input require-
ment to the initial kick parameters, which
JPT June 1993
Fig. 4-0verload MGS.
makes the computer model quick and sim-
ple to use. The model results are illustrated
in the examples.
Well-Control Procedure. Assuming that
the KDM results have been used to assist
in selection of the kill method and it has been
decided to circulate out the influx, prepara-
tion and calculations for the kill program
then proceed normally. The reduced kill
pump rate may be selected to begin the kill,
but this is unnecessary and in some circum-
stances may prolong the strain on equipment
and personnel. The reduced kill pump rate
is required only when the influx reaches
surface.
The reduction of heat dissipation from the
influx is a very sound argument for circulat-
ing out gas kicks as fast as practical. Two
main advantages can be achieved from keep-
ing the influx' as warm as possible.
1. Gas expansion through the choke will
be reduced if the gas is warmer. The KDM
can be used to confirm this effect.
2. A warm gas at surface reduces the risk
of hydrate formation. The initial tempera-
ture used when examining adiabatic expan-
sion has a dramatic effect on the final
temperature.
Therefore, the recommended initial kill
circulation rate should be as high as the
(1) choke manipulation for startup,
(2) weighting up of mud (wait-and-weight
method), and (3) sufficient time to react to
pressure anomalies will allow.
The kill proceeds normally until the in-
flux approaches surface, when the reduced
kill pump rate from the KDM must be ap-
plied. Changing the kill circulation rate dur-
ing a kill is a procedure commonly taught
and practiced in well-control courses. It is
recommended that circulation be stopped
and that the well be shut in before establish-
ing the new rate. The rate change should be
made well before the influx reaches surface
to establish the new rate before the pressure
fluctuations of gas being expelled at surface
begin. Shut-in should take place when the
" .. as a result of
deep, high.pressure
drilling, ... larger
MGS's, larger.diameter
vent lines, and longer
mud seals now are the
order of the day."
influx is approximately 3,500 to 4,000 ft
from surface to provide an adequate safety
margin. For larger influxes, earlier shut-in
would be prudent.
There are other significant advantages to
stopping the kill at this point. Final checks
can be made to prepare for receiving the gas
at surface. This also is a good time to begin
methanol injection into the chokeline. This
practice is becoming more common owing
to increasing awareness of the risk of hy-
drate formation. Stopping the kill also pro-
vides an opportunity to check well pressures
and mud volumes before entering this criti-
cal phase of the kill.
The kill continues with the reduced kill
pump rate or an even lower rate. The re-
duced rate allows more time for the choke
manipulation required when the gas reaches
surface. Use of the lower rate also allows
more time to read and react to MGS pres-
sure changes and to blowout preventer
(BOP) and chokeline temperature changes.
Although this technique will drastically
reduce the risk of MGS blowdown, contin-
gency plans should always be in place in
case blowdown occurs. Blowdown will first
be detected by the MGS vessel pressure
gauge, but reaction to and implementation
of these plans will have to be speedy.
Procedure Summary.
1. Begin kill with the highest practical kill
pump rate.
2. Shut down the kill and shut in the well
when the influx is still some distance from
surface.
3. Prepare for handling the influx at sur-
face, check equipment, and confirm well
pressures and mud volumes. Begin methanol
injection (if required).
4. Resume kill circulation with the re-
duced kill pump rate, maintaining that rate
until all the gas is expelled.
5. Monitor MGS vessel pressure and be
prepared to proceed with the blowdown con-
tingency plan if required.
573
Application to North Sea
Well Kicks
Example 1. This method was applied
retroactively to North Sea well kicks with
known parameters to validate the KDM. In
one example of a well kick, in a 12IA-in.
hole, the MGS was overloaded (see Fig. 4).
The initial kick parameters were shut-in
drillpipe pressure, 2,433 psi; shut-in casing
pressure, 2,553 psi; pit gain, 25 bbl; true
vertical depth (TVD), 7,800 ft; mud (oil-
based) weight in use, 10.6 Ibm/gal; and bot-
tornhole static temperature (BHST), 180F
(estimated). The following data also are re-
quired for the calculations: Lel=40.0 ft,
Vel =0.0087 bbllft, Vann =0.1245 bbl/ft,
d
i
=6.0 in., Leq =0.0652 miles, Ti = 1.208
ft, and K =0.12. The typical North Sea gas
specific gravity relative to air, 0.7, was
used.
The kick was circulated out at 30
strokes/minute (3.47 bbllmin). The KDM
was run with the well data listed above, and
the results indicated that the kill pump rate
should have been reduced to 0.8 bbl/min to
prevent liquid carryover to the gas vent.
Although the eruption was short lived-l to
2 minutes-gas rates could have reached
more than 7 MMscf/D during that period.
This example shows that ifKDM concepts
had been applied, this dangerous incident
may have been avoided.
Example 2. Turner
2
published the data for
this example. Some peripheral geometric
data were not included in Turner's publica-
tion, but these have been assumed from
general rig layouts. In Turner's publication,
Well E experienced a severe kick in a 9.5-in.
hole at 14,818 ft. Severe gassing and freez-
ing were reported when the influx was at
surface. The initial kick parameters were
shut-in drillpipe pressure, 4,400 psi; shut-
in casing pressure, 5,300 psi; pit gain, 90
bbl; TVD, 14,818 ft; mud weight in use,
12.2 Ibm/gal; and BHST, 260F (estimat-
ed). The following data also are required for
the calculations: Lel=400.0 ft, Vel=0.<t>87
bbl/ft, V
ann
=0.0634 bbl/ft, d
j
=8.0 in.,
Leq =0.062 miles, Ti = 1.208 ft, and
K=0.18. The typical North Sea gas specif-
ic gravity relative to air, 0.7, was used.
The KDM calculations show that a maxi-
mum kill pump rate of 1.0 bbllmin should
have been used. A secondary kick was al-
lowed into the wellbore, however, resulting
in 8,OOO-psi casing pressure. The KDM was
adjusted to reflect this situation, with a re-
sulting kill rate of 0.7 bbllmin.
This was a problematic kill, partly be-
cause of the large gas/condensate disposal
problem. The KDM could have assisted with
this problem to reduce severe gassing of the
rig.
Example 3. Here, the kick decision and
separator control concepts were integrated
fully into the policies of Deminex U.K. Oil
& Gas Ltd. when they drilled a high-
pressure well in Block 22/16b of the U.K.
Continental Shelf in 1990. On this well, a
severe kick was taken at 13,080 ft in a
574
12 IA-in. hole. The initial kick parameters
were shut-in drillpipe pressure, 2,000 psi;
shut-in casing pressure, 2,170 psi; pit gain,
7 bbl; TVD, 13,080 ft; mud (oil-based)
weight in use, 13 Ibm/gal; and BHST,
276F (calculated). The following data also
are required for the calculations: Lcl=
400.0 ft, Vel =0.0087 bbllft, Vann =0.1237
bbllft, d; = 10.0 in., Leq =0.0642 miles,
T;=1.239 ft, and K=0.18. The typical
North Sea gas specific gravity relative to air,
0.7, was used.
The KDM was run and an anomaly was
highlighted. The influx hydrostatic gradient
was negative. This situation can occur if the
influx volume has been underestimated, the
influx has migrated, or pressure has been
trapped during shut-in. None of these
provided a satisfactory explanation in this
case. Gauge error is believed to have caused
the problem. The difference between the
drillpipe and casing pressures is used in the
gradient calculation. This value is small, and
the normal inaccuracy of both gauges would
be sufficient to account for the anomaly.
The reduced kill pump rate was calculat-
ed as 1.6 bbllmin. The kick was circulated
out with the reduced kill pump rate through-
out. The small volume of the influx made
identification difficult even at surface. It did
contain gas but in an insufficient amount to
account for the entire volume.
Perhaps this illustration of the usefulness
of the KDM is less-than-optimal, but it does
indicate that the concept has been adopted
and applied by a North Sea operator. The
advantages of using the KDM on this occa-
sion may have been limited, but its use
provided clear insight, boosted confidence
in the company's ability to dispose of the
influx, and strengthened the company's
resolve to devote 15 hours to completing the
kill circulation.
Conclusions
The procedural technique presented will in-
hibit atmospheric MGS blowdown during
well-control operations. The technique has
been verified with high-severity-kick data
from North Sea wells. The following con-
clusions are drawn.
1. It is feasible and desirable to control
the maximum rate at which gas enters an
MGS.
2. The risk of blowdown in an MGS is
reduced greatly if gas is limited to separa-
tion capacity.
3. A kill pump rate that expels the influx
at a rate that does not exceed the separation
capacity can be calculated.
4. This kill pump rate itself is an assess-
ment of the ability of the MGS to handle the
influx safely.
5. This assessment can be used as a basis
for selecting optimal well-control proce-
dures.
Acknowledgments
We thank Deminex U.K. Oil & Gas Ltd.,
for whom this work was carried out, for
their kind permission to publish this paper.
Thanks also are due Eric Turner, who en-
couraged us to publish.
Nomenclature
A = 86,400 seconds (conversion
constant from seconds to
days), t, seconds
d
j
= ID, L, in.
DIV = TVD, L, ft
gm = mud gradient, psi/ft
K = constant, Lit, seconds
Lel = chokeline length, L, ft
Leq = equivalent length, L, miles
Lm = mud seal length, L, ft
P = pressure, m/Lt
2
, psi
P a = atmospheric pressure, m/Lt
2
,
14.7 psi
P
cs
= shut-in casing pressure,
m/Lt2, psi
Ps
p
= MGS pressure, m/Lt2, psi
Pws = shut-in BHP, psi
PI = choke pressure with 100%
gas, m/Lt2, psia
P2 = pressure in the separator
vessel that, at separation
capacity rates, will be close
to atmospheric pressure
(14.7 psia), m/Lt2
q = kill pump rate, L
3
1t, bbl/min
qg = gas flow rate, L
3
1t, sefID
qsP = separation capacity, L3/t,
scf/D
Ti = internal radius, L, ft
T = temperature, T, OR
Tabs = standard absolute temperature,
T,520oR
Tbh = BHST, T, OR
TI = gas temperature upstream of
the choke, T, OR
T2 = temperature inside the
separator, T, OR
va = allowable superficial velocity,
Lit, ft/sec
V = volume, L3, bbl
Vann = annular volume, L3/L, bbllft
V
bh
= bottornhole influx volume,
L3, bbl
Vel = chokeline volume, L3/L,
bbllft
z = gas compressibility factor,
dimensionless
Zbh = gas compressibility factor in
bottomhole conditions,
dimensionless
Z I = gas compressibility factor in
conditions upstream of the
choke, dimensionless
Z2 = gas compressibility factor in
the conditions inside the
separator, dimensionless
'Y g = specific gravity of gas relative
to air, dimensionless
P
g
= gas density, m/L3, Ibm/ft3
PL = liquid density, m/L3, Ibm/ft3
Subscripts
max = maximum
June 1993 JPT
References
1. Low, E. and Seymour, K. P.: "The Drilling
and Testing of High-Pressure Gas Conden-
sate Wells in the North Sea," paper SPE
17224 presented at the 1988 IADC/SPE Drill-
ing Conference, Dallas, Feb. 28-March 2.
2. Turner, E.B.: "Well Control When Drilling
With Oil-Based Mud-Recent British Expe-
rience in Deep Wells," Offshore Technolo-
gy Report OTH 86 260, Her Majesty's
Stationary Office, London (1986).
3. Prieur, J.M.: "Drilling and Control Aspects
of High-Pressure Deep Wells," paper SPE
19245 presented at the 1989 SPE Offshore
Europe Conference, Aberdeen, Sept. 5-8.
4. Spec. 12J Oil and Gas Separators, seventh
edition API, Dallas (Oct. 1, 1989).
5. Safety Notice PED4 11170, U.K. Dept. of
Energy, Her Majesty's Stationary Office,
London, Nov. 1990.
6. Slider, H.C.: Worldwide Practical Petrole-
um Reservoir Engineering Methods, Penn-
Well Publishing Co., Tulsa, OK (1983).
7.0'Bryan, P.L. and Bourgoyne, A.T. Jr.:
"Swelling of Oil-Based, Drilling Fluids Re-
sulting From Dissolved Gas," SPEDE (June
1990) 149-55.
8. O'Bryan, P.L. and Bourgoyne, A.T. Jr.:
"Methods for Handling Drilled Gas in Oil-
Based Drilling Fluids," SPEDE (Sept. 1989)
237-46; Trans., AIME, 287.
9. Thomas, D.C., Lea, J.F., and Turek, E.A.:
"Gas Solubility in Oil-Based Drilling Fluids:
Effects on Kick Detection," JPT(June 1984)
959-68.
10. O'Brien, T.B.: "Handling Gas in Oil Mud
Takes Special Precautions," World Oil (Jan.
1981) 83-86.
11. Swanson, B.W. et al.: "Experimental Meas-
urement and Modeling of Gas Solubility in
Invert-Emulsion Drilling Fluids Explains Sur-
face Observations During Kicks, " paper SPE
18371 presented at the 1988 SPE European
Petroleum Conference, London, Oct. 16-19.
JPT June 1993
General References
Turner, E.B.: "Rig Procedures and Handling De-
cisions for Kicks in Deep Hot Holes With Oil-
Based Mud," Drilling and Production Train-
ing Centre, Aberdeen.
Hoopingarner, J.B. et al.: "Rig Modifications
Meet New U.K. High-Pressure Require-
ments," paper SPE 19976 presented at the 1990
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, Houston, Feb.
27-March 2.
White, D.B. and Walton, I.C.: "A Computer
Model for Kicks in Water- and Oil-Based
Mud," paper SPE 19975 presented at the 1990
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, Houston, Feb.
27-March 2.
SI Metric Conversion Factors
bbl x 1.589 873
ft x 3.048*
ft3 x 2.83\ 685
OF (OF-32)/1.8
gal x 3.785412
in. X 2.54*
Ibm x 4.535 924
mile x 1.609 344"
psi x 6.894 757
OR R/I.8
Conversion factor is exact.
Provenance
E-OI = m
3
E-OI = m
E-02 = m
3
= C
E-03 = m
3
E+OO = em
E-OI = kg
E+OO = Ian
E+OO = kPa
= K
Original SPE manuscript, A Method for
Handling Gas ,Kicks Safely in High-
Pressured Wells, received for review
March 11, 1991. Revised manuscript re-
ceived Nov. 19, 1992. Paper accepted for
publication Jan. 4, 1993. Paper (SPE 21964)
first presented at the 1991 SPE/IADC Drill-
ing Conference held in Amsterdam, March
11-14.
JPT
Authors
Low Jansen
Eric Low Is a consultant drilling su-
perintendent for Demlnex U.K. 011 & Gas
Ltd. His experience with HPHT wells be-
gan in 1979, when he worked in the Tus-
caloosa trend, with Chevron U.S.A. It
continued with Ranger Oil U.K. Ltd
where he became drilling manager. He
holds a as degree in physics and a
diploma In offshore engineering from
Robert Gordon U. in Aberdeen. Ca ..
Jan .. n Is head of Drl1l1ng with Deml
nex Norge In Stavenger. In 1964. he
joined Royal Dutch Shell and worked as
a drilling operations engineer In various
countries. He Joined Demlnex In 1980 as
drilling manager. In 1989-90, he was In-
volved in the programming and manage-
ment of their first HTIHP well In the U.K.
Jansen holds a as degree In mechanl-
cal engineering from the Technical U. at
Delft, The Netherlands.
575