Historia Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte - 'Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign Aims and Results' by Barbara Mitchel, 1991

Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign: Aims and Results Author(s): Barbara Mitchell Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd.
40, H. 2 (1991), pp. 170-192 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436189 . Accessed: 15/08/2013 13:35
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KLEON'SAMPHIPOLITANCAMPAIGN:AIMS AND RESULTS Kleon is recognisableas a new type of politicianin Athenianpublic life.' Labelled as a 'demagogue' by his contemporaries,he controlled policy throughhis speechesin the assemblyand, it will be argued,morecontinuously though less openly by his influenceover the juries,who were obliged to him for their rise in daily pay to three obols. This will have given him a hold over procedureat the end of their any magistrates who were subjectto the euthyna to the demoswas whose accountability termof office, includingthe strategoi, to become especially significantduringthe long years of the Peloponnesian war. Kleon did not belong to a family with landed wealth and a known its wealth was derived ancestry.His family backgroundwas nouveau-riche, from a tanning factory,his father being most probablythe Kleainetoswho contestin 460/59. Kleon,however, paid for the winningchorusin a dithyramb continued to employ the traditionaldynasticmethod of winning and using philoi. He probablymarried,about 450, a daughterof Dikaiogenes,son of Menexenos,a memberof an old and prominentfamily from his own deme, He laterused his son-in-law, Thoudippos,to proposethe great Kydathenaion. assessment decree of 425, generally acknowledged to implement Kleon's policy of increasingthe tribute of the Athenian Empire to three times its
pre-war-level.2
Unlikehis contemporary Nikias,probablyalso a 'newman',but a colleague beforethe war,he does not appearto have aimedat of Periklesin the strategia of the older families, the strategia,which remainedin generalthe prerogative He was bornabout470,since he or, if he did aspireto it, he was unsuccessful.?
1 For Kleon as a new type of politicianand demagogue, Propertied see J. K. Davies,Athenian Families(no. 8674);cf. W. R. Connor, New Men in AthenianPolitics. 2 Thoudippos:Meritt and Wade-Gery,AJP 57 (1936), 392 note 36. That he marriedthe daughterof Dikaiogenes(Davies op. cit. p. 320) is less certainbut 'a very temptingpossibility'. of grounds.Butthe appearance F. Bourriot (Historia31(1982),404-35) on chronological Contra a 'Menexenosson of Kleon'on the boule in the 370'ssuggestsa close connectionbetweenthe two families from Kydathenaion.Bourriotalso doubts whether Kleon, son of Thoudippos of the (IsaiosIX c. 370)was Kleon'sgrandson.Butin view of the unlikelihoodof the appearance two uncommon names except through a marriageof Thoudipposto Kleon's daughter,the procedure plausible,seems virtuallycertain.For euthuna which is chronologically relationship, of Law,pp. 201-4. to the Sovereignty Sovereignty and the courtscf. M. Ostwald,FromPopular For trialsof generalssee Pritchett,TheGreekState at Warii c. 1.Cf. below pp. 186-187. 3 Plutarch,Nicias2.2; Eupolisfrg. 117K(Demoi)says that generalsused to be chosen 'from the great houses'. Cf. Connor, op. cit. p. 76 with note 69 and p. 144. In the 430's Kleon of Kydathenaion,in the city tittys of tribe III Pandionis,may have been blocked by strong candidatesfrom the same tribe who had Perikles'support,e.g. certainlyHagnon,less certainly of the Kalliasdecreesand general the proposer Phormioand possiblyKallias,son of Kalliades, in the late 430's,who (since there is a fourth centuryKallias Kalliadoufrom Pandionis)can
Historia, Band XL/2 (1991) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart
Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign
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had a daughterof marriageable age before 425, and was already active in of a comedyby Hermippoliticsbeforethe deathof Perikles,since a fragment pos refersto 'fieryKleon' naggingat Periklesfor fightingthe war with words instead of resisting the Peloponnesiansin Attika in 431, during their first war (PlutarchPericles invasion of the Archidamian 33). Kleon eitherdid not understandthe principleof Perikles'sea strategy(the need for Athensto use her navy againstthe Peloponneseand avoid resistanceby land in Atticasince she was inferior to Sparta and her allies in hoplite warfare)or, if he did understand it, disagreedwith it, and was politicallyopposed to Periklesin the first year of the war. Given his age, it is likely that he was prominentin the yearsbeforethe war,but we do not hearof him in any military office, only as a criticof Pericleanstrategyin 431. Such criticismof a general'sstrategywas to be characteristic of his later political career. He may also have joined the attackon Perikleswhich led to his deposition from the strategiain 430 and made politicalcapitalout of the war-weariness and sufferingof Athensduring the plague, hoping to replace Penkles as the leading 'prostatestou demo'.4 Kleon does not appearin Thucydides(who at 2.21 ignores his part in the criticismof Periklesin 431),untilthe Mytilenedebateon the fate of the rebels (3.37-48). He is introducedas 'most violent' and 'by far the most persuasive with the demos at that time' and the debate was concernedwith the empire and the democraticconstitution,political ratherthan militarytopics. However, his influence over the assemblywas not completelyeffective,since his proposalto put all the adult male Mytilenaeansto death was overturnedin spite of his forcefulpowersof persuasionby the milderpunishmentproposed by the otherwiseunknownDiodotos. Eventually,afterhis involvementin the occupationof Pylos in 425, Kleon was officiallyelected strategosfor 424/3, but this was late in his career,at the
equallywell be restored as the generalof Pandionislistedin the Samossettlementoath of 439/8. See D. M. Lewis,JHS81 (1961),118-9and Meiggs-Lewis GHI56 line 28. Double representation of a tribewas of coursepossible,but other competentcontendersfrom traditional backgrounds in the same tribewould makethe electionof a new man less likely. 4 In 430 Plutarch ib. 35 says Idomeneusgave Kleon's name as accuserbut Theophrastos named Simmias and HeracleidesPonticus Lacratidas. There may have been more than one accuser.Thucydidesdoes not mention any, but he is reticentabout Perikles'deposition:ETt8' t (2.59.3) and (after they had fined him) 6CompOV 8'auOotb noX OytpattyC, , 6nEp qtXt 61ukXo ntoutEv, atpaM&yv cTXovxo(2.65.4),implythat he was deposedbut leave unclearwhen and for how long he remainedout of office. Latertraditionaddedpossiblyunreliabledetails: Plutarch gives 1STas the lowestamountof the fine and SOT as the highest,according to different authorities.Even 15Tis a very largesum and the variationshows that one or both figuresmust be invented.The story of the trial and its resultwas evidentlyembroideredin the 4th century accordingto politicaltaste,but Kleon could well have exploitedPerikles'unpopularity and the generalwarweariness at the time of the plagueby supporting or participating in the accusation in the hope that he wouldtake Perikles' placeas prostatestoudemou.Cf. Gomme'scommentary on Thuc. 2.65.3.
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age of at leastfifty.5Kleon'smilitary reputation is moredifficultto assessthan his political pre-eminence, which was undoubted(thoughnot unchallenged, as the Mytilenedebate shows) afterPerikles'death.The followingdiscussion is a re-examination of the variousclaimswhich have been made for him as a militarycommander.In the light of this re-assessment, the suggestionwill be made that Kleon'scareercan be seen as a turning-point in politicalmethodin that he initially separatedthe militaryfrom the political role in Athenian public life, as was to become common in the fourth century;but then he yielded to temptation,and revertedto combiningpolitics with militarycommand in the traditional Athenianway. This separationcan also be recognized in Demosthenes,who was first,foremostand always a general,and to some extent in Nikias, who, though regularlyelected general,was an unsuccessful contender in the assembly; he lost both the Pylos and Sicilian expedition debates. Normallyin the fifth centuryhowever,a man prominentin politics would still hold the strategiaif he could, and in the late fifth centuryAlkibiades, an ambitious man from a traditionalfamily, still tried to combine a demagogicwith a militarycareer.By the fourthcentury,thingshad changed took overin and the two kindsof careerdivergedas professionalism gradually war this as in other spheres.The length and seriousnessof the Archidamian hastened this process. It became ever more essential that Athens should appoint the best militarycommandersavailable and that the strategia,to which re-election was regularlyallowed, should cease to be treated as a office becauseof its built-inpossibilityof continuity career-enhancing through re-election.Kleon's careeris worthanalysingagainstthis background. Kleon'smilitarytalenthas to be judged by two Atheniancampaignsin the Archidamian war,the first,at Pylos,a successfuloperation,the second,which will be analysedin detail,his attemptto recapture Amphipolis,a failurewhich have to his For both we the led death. testimony of Thucydides,which is generally agreed to be hostile. Concerning Pylos it is generally accepted thatthe reinforcements which Kleontook to supportDemosthenes agreement in the late summer of 425 turned the fortunes of the Archidamianwar in Athens' favour.6Athens held hostage the Spartan prisoners captured on
501 to Clouds584-7. See C. W. Fornara,TheAthenianBoardof Generalsfrom S Aristophanes 404,pp. 61-2. now acceptthe defenceof Kleon'sactionsin 6 Pylos:Thuc.4.2-23 and 26-41. Most historians IV 13 Portraitof Cleon' Mnemosyne the Pylos campaign,cf. A. G. Woodhead,'Thucydides' was biasedagainstKleon,e.g. Histori(1960),esp. pp. 313-5. Gomme admittedthatThucydides vol. III 468-9; 478-9; 488-9. Grote'sanalysisof the episode on Thucydides cal Commentary c. 52, esp. pp. 252-71, new ed. 1906)did not find universalsupportbut in my (Historyof Greece comment(p. 267).'It has hithertobeen the his methodological view remainsvalid, in particular practice to look at Kleon only from the testimony of his opponents,(sc. Thucydidesand Aristophanes)through whose testimony we know him.' That Thucydideshas deliberately is the partplayedby chance (tyche)at the expenseof intelligentpre-planning over-emphasized the Athenianlandingat Pylosto the stormwhichchancedto difficultto deny,since he attributes
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Sphakteria, thus preventing further invasionsof Attika,whilethe epiteichismos at Pylos allowed Messenian helots to desert and facilitatedmore effective raids on the Peloponnese.ProbablyKleon'sreluctanceto lead the reinforcements himself was, as Grote thought, genuine, but either misunderstoodor misinterpreted by Thucydides.In any case, he relied on the general in the field, Demosthenes. That the enterprisewas pre-plannedand not due to 'chance'as Thucydideshas it (4.3.1),is suggestedby the factthat Demosthenes had Messenians(from Naupaktos)with him (ib. 3.3). Thucydidesexpressly says (ib. 3.2) thatthe fortification of Pylos en routeto Sicilywas Demosthenes' reason for joining the expedition, so it was probablyhis brainchild.Kleon either knew the aim of Demosthenes from the beginning or he was astute enough to realise that the investmentof Pylos must be made to succeed. Aristophanes' gibe that Demosthenesbakeda cake at Pylos and Kleon stole it accuses him of takingall the credit,but this could be a comic distortionof the truth.7 That Kleon knew of the plan fromthe beginningis perhapsmorelikely since Demosthenes could well have needed a politician's support in the assemblywhen he asked for permissionto use his ships aroundthe Peloponnese (Thuc. 4.2.3). Eitherway, he showed strategicgood sense both in his insistenceon sending reinforcements, and in includingtroops of appropriate type, the archers and peltasts, in addition to the hoplite klerouchs from Lemnosand Imbros(Thuc.4.28.4).Thucydidessays Kleon chose Demosthenes, by now in office, as his associateat Pylosbecausehe knewhe intendedto land on Sphakteria (ib. 29.1-2).The choice of Demosthenesat Pyloswould be all the morenaturalif he had knownof his plan fromthe beginning.Whatthe formalimplications of the choice wereis not clear,but Kleonwill have needed one of the strategoito give orders,not being on the boardhimself.
carrytheir ships in there, exactlywhere Demostheneswanted.Diodorushowever(12.61)says: 'Demosthenesnow led an expedition against Pylos, intending to fortify this strongholdas a threatto the Peloponnese', omittingthe debatebetweenthe generalsand the storm,which was the deciding factor for Thucydides,who can hardlybe emphasizingjust for its own sake the of the stormwhich put an end to the generals' contemporaneity argument(so Gomme, HCTIII, p. 488). He is surelydetractingfrom the creditof Demosthenesby choosingto tell the storyin this way,even if the stormwas historical.Diodorusmay be summarizing Thucydides (his main source) carelesslyhere, but it is tempting to think that there is another source underlying Diodoruswhich simplyattributed the executionof the plan to Demosthenesand eitheromitted the stormor did not stressits significanceas Thucydides does.Thucydidesprobablyunder-estimatedDemosthenes'role and the decisivenessof the Pylosepisodein Athens'favourbecauseit necessarily did creditto Kleon as well, which he could not allow. 7Thuc. 4.29.1;Knights54-7. Aristophanes, who consistentlyattackedKleon, would readily have madea joke at his expense.Co-operation betweenthe two men is the most likely scenario. S. Hornbloweraptly describes it as 'an early example of a fourth century phenomenon, a soldier-politician team workingin harmony,like the fourth-century 'team'Charesand Aristophon'(7he GreekWorld 479-323 B. C p. 133),a parallelto which Mr. G. L. Cawkwelldrewmy attention.Cf. Grote, op. cit.p. 267: 'Kleon, far from stealingawaythe laurelsof Demosthenes, (as Aristophanes represents in his comedyof the Knights), wasthe meansof placingthem on his head,thoughhe at the same time deservedlysharedthem.'
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differenceof opinionconcerningKleon'sattempt Thereis, however,greater to recoverAmphipolis for Athens in 422, after the year of the armisticeof 423/2 had ended. The economic and strategicimportanceof the Strymon valley and the colony, founded by Hagnon in 437, are not in doubt, but the backgroundof the longstandingAthenianinterestin the areais worthrecapitulatingin orderto estimatethe damage done to Athens and her empireby Brasidas'captureof Amphipolis and, conversely,by the failureof Kleon's it. The Strymonrivergave accessto a fertilecoastalplain, attemptto recapture to the eel fisheries of lake Kerkinitisand, beyond the Pangaionmountain ridge, running east and west of Amphipolis,to more fertile plains inland. Silverand gold were mined in the Mt. Pangaionarea.Timberwas abundant for shipbuildingand there may well have been shipyardson the Strymon A prosperouscolony of before Brasidasbuilt triremesthere(Thuc.4.108.1,7). landowners,Atheniansand locals, would providerevenuesfor Athens from and therewould havebeen harbourindirecttaxes on producesold to traders, dues payable to the nearby port Eion. Probablyin 513 Histiaios,tyrantof of the Miletos, asked Darius for Myrkinoson the Strymonin the territory Edonians as a reward for saving the Danube bridge for him during his Scythian expedition. The advantages he envisaged at Myrkinos - which, acording to Herodotus made Megabazos advise Darius to remove him to Sousa - were an ample supply of wood for shipbuildingand oars,silver-mifor the nes, and a friendly,numerouslocal population,hence the wherewithal of a navy(Hdt.5.23.2).Thracewas also a profitable buildingand maintenance source of slaves. If the natives were unfriendly,as the local Edonians on were,battlesagainstthem would providecaptives occasion not unsurprisingly In to be sold into slavery. addition,Herodotussays it was a Thraciancustom to sell their children as slaves (5.6.1).Thracianswould also have provided cavalry,like the Tokes whose tombstone(datableto 525-490) shows he was he was fightingfor Paros,showingthat killed defending Eion. Interestingly, this island, in the seventhcenturythe founderof Thasos,retainedan interest in the Thracianarea at least till the turnof the sixth-fifthcenturies. The Athenianinterestin Thracegoes back at leastto the mid-sixthcentury, had collected revenuesfrom silvermines in Mount Pangaion for Peisistratos to finance his return to Athens in 547 after his ten-year exile. Miltiades, marriedto a ThracianprincessHegesipyle,daughterof king Oloros,had led The gold he hoped an unsuccessfulexpeditionagainstParosafterMarathon. to acquirefor Athens (Hdt. 6.132)probablycame from some Pariandepentombstoneof dency in the Thracianarea, to judge by the above-mentioned Tokes. At any rate,it must have been fromhis fatherand motherthat Kimon gained his interest in the area. Leading the first expedition of the Delian Eion from the Persians, probablyin 476, in spite of the league, he recaptured heroic resistanceand self-sacrificeof Boges, the Persiancommander(Hdt.
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7.107;Thuc. 1.98.1; becaAischines11(defalsa legatione)34). Eion thereafter me an Athenianbase and emporion (Thuc. 4.102.3).Later,about 465, at the height of Kimon'sinfluence,the Athenianssettled a colony at Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways),just north of Amphipolis,but were defeated by Edonians at Drabeskos(probablySdravik,about 13kms NNE of Amphipolis,ratherthan Drama,about 30 kms east, near the later Philippi).Though it is unlikelythat all 10,000 Athenian colonists were killed the settlementwas subsequently abandoned. However, Athenian interestsin gold-mining continued in the Thasian Peraia at Skaptesule,where Thucydides'family inherited mining interests.His patronymic'Oloros'shows that he too was relatedto the Thracian king Oloroswhose daughterHegesipylewas marriedto Miltiades.8 During Perikles'political ascendancy,in 437, the Atheniansreturnedand with Hagnonas oikistfounded a colony at Amphipolison the high groundin the bend of the Strymonbetween Eion and Ennea Hodoi, the most commanding and defensiblepositionin the area.By now, most of the Thraciantowns were under Athenian control and paying tributeto Athens, so Athens had strategicreasons in addition to her long-standingeconomic interestfor sending out a strongcolony. When Brasidasstruckin Thracein 424 Amphipolis was his most valuableprize since its loss was a blow to the heartof Athens' empire economicallyand at the same time underminedthe strategicadvantages which she had gainedthroughthe occupationof Pylos. It was therefore sound strategy on Kleon'spartto tryand recoverit, if this was feasible.It may been have over-optimistic to try to stormit, consideringthe naturalstrength and defences of the place and the undevelopedstate of siege-warfare in the fifth century.However,a siege mightlast long enough to starvethe defenders out, as at Potidaia(Thuc.2.70.1),or createthe conditionsfor internalstasisto betray the city, as had happened when an Argilian faction betrayed it to Brasidasin 424 (Thuc. 4.103.3-4).The city had a mixed population,with a
8 The best modernaccountof the historicalgeography of the Strymonvalley settlementsis thatof BenjaminIsaac,TheGreek in Thrace Settlements untilthe Macedonian Conquest (Studies of the DutchArchaeological SocietyVol. X, 1986)pp. 1-51.The Mt. Pangaiongold and silver mines:Hdt. 7.112. The AthenianSophaneswas killed fightingEdoniansin the areaof Daton for mines, probably those lost afterthe Drabeskosdisaster, to be distinguishedfromthe Skaptesyle gold mine (or 'mines'according to Hdt.6.46)on the mainlandoppositeThasos,recoveredin 463 after the Thasianrevolt (Hdt. 9.75;Thuc. 1.100.2 and 101.3); cf. Isaac,op. cit.pp. 27-30. W. M. Leake,(Travelsin Northern Greece (1835)vol. III pp. 161-4)says that in the 16thcenturythere were 500-60 furnacessmeltingsilverand gold frompyrites,fromwhich as muchas 30,000gold ducatsannuallywent as profitto the Turkishgovernment.In 1835silver and lead mines near Nizvoro were still being workedbut were due to be abandonedwhen exhausted(p. 164).Leake mentionsthe largeand prolificeels netted at the Strymondam above Amphipolis(p. 183)and was impressed by the fertility of the well-populatedupper and lower Strymon valleys (pp. 200-204).Cf. the early20thcenturydescription of S. Casson,Macedonia,Thrace and Illyria, theirrelations withGreece from theearliesttimesdownto the timeof Philipson of Amyntas (1926, repr.1968),c. 1.
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minority of Athenians (ib. 108).The following discussion is an attemptto the stronghold. re-assessKleon'sfailureto recapture accountof the Amphipoliscampaign Thucydides' As in the Pylosnarrative, is hostile to Kleon: he is an incompetentcommander,his troops have no confidencein him, he had no intentionof stayingto fightbut fled at once and was killed while in flight by a Myrcinianpeltast (Thuc. 5.10.9).It has been arguedthat not only is this pictureof Kleon'srole unfairbut that,in spite of his failureto recapture Amphipolis,he had manymoresuccessesthanThucyhe has been creditedwith dides recordsbefore the final battle. In particular, recapturingnot only Torone (on the Sithonian prong of Chalcidice) and Galepsos (on the Thraciancoast, a Thasiancolony in the peraiaof Thasos beyond Amphipolis,east of Eion), both of which are mentionedby Thucydides, but also the whole of the Sithonianpromontoryand severaltowns in As well as these Chalcidiantowns Kleon has been held additionto Torone.9 responsiblefor the returnto the Athenianalliance of some coastaltowns in Bottikewhich did undoubtedlymake a treatywith Athensfor whichwe have epigraphicevidence, eithershortly before or just afterthe peace of Nicias.'? The argumentsfor the recoveryof both groups of towns are epigraphic. They warrantcarefulexaminationbut in my view should be rejected,for the following reasons: 1.The claimsfor conquestsby Kleon in Chalkidike severalplaces in Chalcidiceis based Ttheinferencethat Kleon recaptured on the survivalof identicalrecordsfor six Thraciantowns in the Assessment Lists of the Athenianempirefor 425 and for a year, probably422, of which only three fragmentsand no prescriptsurvive."The six listed in 425 are Of these, SinGale, Trallosand Bormiskos. Herakleion,Singos, Mekyberna, gos, Mekybernaand Gale are assessed at the nominal sum of 10 drachmas each, whereasHeracleionand Bormiskospay 1000dr. each and Trallos I tawas also tributeof Mekyberna lent, which look like normalrates(the pre-war
9 Arguedfirstby A. Westand B. D. Meritt,AJA29 (1925),59-69; followedby, amongothers, Lists1II,90-1; J. de Romilly, Thucydides and McGregor,AthenianTribute Meritt,Wade-Gery Eng.tr. p. 192,note 2. Theirconclusionsweredisputedeffectivelyby and AthenianImperialism, 16 = Bulgare Archeologique P. Roussel,'Lacampagnede Cleon en Thrace',Bulletinde l'Institut 1 (1950),257-63, and by Gomme, HCT1II, p. 636. But they were accepted Serta Karazoviana Mnemosyne laterby A. G. Woodheadin his influentialarticle,op. cit.pp. 303-6. W. K. Pritchett, view was, for the most part,acceptedwithout 26 (1973),376-86, shows how the West-Meritt Geschichte3 of the epigraphicevidence,though H. Bengtson,Griechische furtherconsideration (1965), 228 note 6, assumes that Roussel had alreadyrefuted the theory of West and Meritt (Pritchett,op. cit.p. 376-7). 0 The Bottictreaty:see belowand note 18. 11 IG P 71 lines 108-113(from 425 assessmentlist).The names of the six Thraciantowns are restoredfromthe identicalsectionof the 422 list, IG P 77 lines 214.
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1Talent). The most likely explanation of the nominal sums is that Singos, Mekybemaand Gale wereamongthe Chalcidiancoastaltowns whichThucydides says were persuadedby Perdikkasto revolt from Athens in 432 and synoecizewith Olynthosto make it a stronghold (Thuc.1.58.2). Mekybema,to the northwest of the Sithonianpeninsula,on which Singos and Gale also lie, was at one time, Strabo reports,(VII 390 and frg.29) the port of nearby in the year 425 when Olynthos.'2 The nominal assessments,uncharacteristic the total tributewas trebled,may be due to the presence of a few Athenian loyalistsstill residingin these places or may simply indicatethat Athens still allies. claimedthem as tributary The assessmentof these smallplacesfor a nominalsum both in 425 and 422 does not prove that they were under the control of Athens in 425, lost to Brasidasin 424 and then recoveredfor Athensby Kleon in the late summerof 422. This inferencewas originallymade by Mentt and West and acceptedin ATLiii though not by Gomme, or earlierby Roussel."3 It depended on two assumptions.First,thatthe assessmentof 422, on which paymentswere made in 421 at the Dionysia,so afterthe Peace of Nicias, was delayeduntilafterthe Panathenaea,delayed in fact until after peace had become a certainty,and reflectedthe mood of the peace with a rateof assessmentwhich was lowered to somethingmore like the 'Aristidean' (understoodto mean 'pre-war') level. Secondly,this view assumedthat all placesassessedunderthis delayedassessment actuallypaid their due amount of phorosin 421 and were under Athenian control.This view has now been generallyabandoned,for the following reasons: first,the great assessmentdecree of 425 laid down penaltiesif any Panathenaea should pass withoutan assessment.As Meiggs and Lewis point in out their commentary, there is no reasonto thinkthat the next assessment was not in fact made when it was due, at the Panathenaea of 422. At the time when Kleon had just taken commandas strategosfor 422/1 and was embarking on a campaign of re-conquest,the assessment would not have been omittedand it would not have substantially loweredthe rate.'4 It was, afterall, Kleon who had been principallyresponsiblefor the high raise in 425.'5The 422 assessmentmust undoubtedlyhave been carriedout, and if some rates
12 See endnote for the identification of Sane with Gale and the confusion of Gale with the better known Galepsos. Cf. A. B. West, AJP58 (1937), 166-73, whose argumentsfor 'Gale' instead of 'Sane'in the text of the peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5.18.6)still seem convincing,pace Gomme'sdoubtsad loc.(HCTIII pp. 672-4). 13 Westand Meritt,AJA29 (1925), pp. 64-5; ContraGomme, HCTIII635-6 and MoreEssays, 112-21,'Thucydides and Kleon, The Second Battleof Amphipolis',es. p. 115note 2, agreeing with Roussel op. cit.,though pointingout the bias of Thucydides' narrativeagainstKleon. Cf. Pritchettop. cit.note 9 above,esp. 383-4. 14 Meiggsand Lewis,GHI69 pp. 225-7; cf. Meiggs,CR(1952),99 in a reviewof ATLIII. 15Assumingthat the Thoudipposwho proposedthe decree was Kleon'sson-in-lawand was actingunderhis instructions. Cf. note 2 above.
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were lowered,they will have been relaxedonly for pragmaticreasonsif, for example, they had been utterlyunrealistic,or, perhaps,in the case of cities which had complainedof excessiveassessmentsunderthe provisionfor such Moreover,the tributequota list which used to complaintsin the 425 decree.'6 entries be assignedto 422/1 is almostcertainlythatof 418/17 and its surviving (for the Hellespont)do not suggest that even after the peace the Athenians of the 422 assessIn any case, the fragments loweredthe phorossubstantially. are now mainlyagreed,must reflectthe situationbefore ment,as epigraphists and before Kleon'sconquestsin the Panathenaeaof 422, in Hekatombaion, the late summerof that year,just as he was about to embarkon the re-conGale and Singoswere Mekyberna, region.Therefore, quest of the Thraceward assessedbefore Kleon'scampaignand theirassessmentcannothave been the resultof his activitiesbeforehis attempton Amphipolis. Secondly,it cannot be assumedthat all cities assessedin 422 were actually underAtheniancontroland paid theirassessedamountsof tributedutifullyat the following Dionysia. The assessmentlist for 425 was certainlyinflated, since it includesboth Melos, which was not even in the empire,and Olynthos But the assessmentsfor Mekyberand Spartolos,which wereboth in revolt.'7 If these werenominalin 425, no in both lists. na, Gale and Singosareidentical more than a statementof Athens' claim to control them, and since their assessmentsare identical in 422, they are surely nominal in 422 also. It is thereforeimpossibleto infer from the 422 list that all three places had been If their recoveredby Athensas the authorsof the originaltheorymaintained. situationwas the same in both years,and if Athens did not occupy them in 425, then she cannot have been occupyingthem in 422 either,whetheror not they were still inhabitedby a few Atticizers. A little more informationabout the statusof these towns at the time of the peace can be derived from Thucydides.That Mekybernawas occupied by Athens at some time before the winterof 421/0 is indicatedby his statement that an Atheniangarrisonwas expelled from there by the Olynthiansduring thereafter was probablyestablished this winter(Thuc.5.39.6).Butthe garrison the peace treaty,for the following reason:the clause in the treatyconcerning should live Sane (sc. Gale) and Singos says thattheirinhabitants Mekyberna, This and Acanthians 5.18.6). (Thuc. in theirown cities, as also the Olynthians is consistentwith theirnominaltributeof 10drachmasand, perhaps,with the the same situationas at the time inhabitants, presenceof a few pro-Athenian of the two assessments.But they are evidentlynot in the same categoryas Skione, Torone and Sermylion,the group of Thraciancities which Athens These arethe possesses(or, in the case of Skione,is certainto possess shortly).
16
IG i3 71 lines 21-2; Meigs-Lewis GHI69 lines.
17 IG i3 71 line 65, Melioi 15T; line 166, Olynthioi; line 167, Spartolioi.
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subjectsof a later clause which allows Athens to make what provisionsshe chooses concerningthem and any othercitiesin her possession(Thuc.5.18.8). If Mekybernahad been occupied before and not after the treaty it would probablyhave appearedin the same categoryas Torone,which we know to have been taken for Athens by Kleon. Skione was admittedlynot yet in Athenian hands, but the fact of her revolt after the armisticeand Kleon's decree,passedby the assembly,enactingthat all adultmales should be put to death and the remaininginhabitantssold into slavery(the same harshprovisions as in the originaldecreewhich he had supportedagainstMytilene)must have made the Atheniansinsist that Skione should appearby anticipationin the list of places already in their possession. They actually carriedout the provisionsof the decree in the summerof 421 (Thuc. 5.32.1),so it must have fallen soon afterthe peace was signed.The Atheniangarrison which occupied Mekybernaand was expelled by the Olynthiansduringthe following winter (Thuc. 5.39.1)could have been establishedeither before or after the peace treaty, but since it does not appear with Torone and Sermylion,whereas Skione (even though not yet recaptured) does, it seems much more likelythat it was occupied by the Athenians after the treaty. If it had already been occupied, it should have been in the list of places actuallyin Athenianhands and not along with Sane (Gale) and Singos. Furthermore, the provisionthat the inhabitantsof these three places should live in their own cities is also applied to Olynthosand Akanthos,places certainlynot in Athenianhands at the time of the peace. It thereforeseems likelythat Mekybemawas still only claimed by Athens and had not yet been occupied by her at the time of the treaty,and that the garrisonwas put in as a resultof some action taken soon afterwards, perhapsat the same time as the recapture of Skione.Thereis then no reasonto connectthe recoveryof Mekyberna with Kleon'sexpedition,and there is no evidence that Sane (Gale) or Singos were ever recovered.Sermylion, also on the Sithonianpeninsula,presumablywas, since it is listed with Torone and Skione in the treaty,but at what time is uncertain.It seems then thatthe narrative of Thucydidesand the text of the treatysupportthe interpretation of the epigraphicevidence given above, namely, that Kleon was not responsible for the recovery of any Chalcidic cities in Thrace apart from Torone and Galepsos. 2. The Botticcities It has also been claimedthatthe recoveryat some time beforethe peace of a numberof small cities in the coastal areaof Bottikewas the resultof Cleon's operations en route for Amphipolis.18 The cities of the Bottic league had
18 The treaty with Bottic coastal towns: IG 76; i3 IG il 90; Tod, GHI 68; SEG X 89; Bengtson,
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revoltedfromAthensat the same time as Chalcidikein 432 (Thuc.1 58,1) and had probablybeen disaffectedthroughoutmost of the war.An attemptby an Athenianexpeditionin 429 to recoverSpartolos, the leadingcity of the Bottic league, was thwartedby the interventionof a force from Olynthos(Thdc. 2.79). The epigraphicevidence for their returnto the Athenian alliance at around the time of the peace is, however,convincing.The text of the treaty which lay betweenAthensand these smalltowns does not mentionSpartolos, inland. It is named in the peace of 421 as one of the six cities still resisting Athens in the north,includingOlynthosand Akanthos,which are to be allies of neitherside. A treatybetweenthe Atheniansand Bottiaeans made at about the time of the peace would thereforenot includeSpartolos, which,as head of the league, would normally be expected to head the list. Although it is chronologicallypossible that the returnof the coastal cities to alliancewith Athens was due to Kleon'spresencein the area,they could equallywell have been recovered by the successfulexpeditionof Nikias in 423 whichresultedin the recapture of Mende(Thuc.4.124-132).He took fifty ships and would have been operatingin the Thermaicgulf opposite the Bottic coastal cities but would not have threatenedSpartolosinland.That Nikias' successhad repercussions is suggestedby Perdikkas'readinessto break off his alliance with when Spartaand revertto Athens late in 423 (Thuc. 4.132.1).Furthermore, Kleon arrivedin Chalcidikein the summerof 422, he not only summoned Perdikkas,who was already allied with Athens, but was able to summon to Eion(Thuc. Polles,kingof the Odomantian Thracians, to bringmercenaries 5.6.2).Theseswingsin favourof Athensaretoo earlyto be due to Kleon'sown expedition and the effect of Nikias' presence late in 423 may have been underestimated.The return of the Bottic cities to Athens, the change in Perdikkas'alliance (albeit from personalmotives, since his joint expedition with Brasidas of Lynkoshad failed)and the understanding againstArrhabaios with Polles may all owe somethingto Nikias' success,as well as to local and personalrivalries. of a numberof It is thereforenot possibleto creditKleonwiththe recapture Thracian towns for Athens other than those Thucydides records, and to againstKleon. explain the omissions as the resultof the bias of his narrative Thoughbias can be detectedin the accountof Kleon'smotives,his cowardly flight and death, and perhaps in the historian'sevident approval of the hoplites' reasons for mistrustingKleon as a commander,(though not, as things turned out, without reason) it does not seem to be manifested in deliberate suppressionof factsaboutthe campaign.Butwas Kleon necessarily an incompetentgeneral?He capturedTorone,which had servedBrasidasas
187;Tod, GHI i 68; ATLi, Gazetteers. v. Spartolioi(p. 550) and s. v. Tripoai Staatsvertrdge (p. 556).
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base in 424 and was by its position a good springboard in the rearof Eion for an attack on Amphipolis,and a dangerousplace to leave in enemy hands when he moved forward.He had to abandon an attemptto take Stageiros (probablyalong the coast beyond Akanthosin the directionof Amphipolis), which would have been useful in case of intervention but by the Akanthians, succeededin occupyingGalepsos,on the Thraciancoast beyond Amphipolis, which would have been likewisestrategically in case any attack advantageous came from that directionagainstthe Atheniansduringtheir attempton Amphipolis. From a strategicpoint of view, the places Thucydidessays Kleon took or attemptedto take were all threeconnectedwith the main objectof his expedition,the recapture of Amphipolis.To have delayedhis attackby besieging all the small and unimportant towns on the Sithonianpeninsulawould havebeen not only out of character with his hastytemperament, but, arguably, not sound strategy. That he aimed at capturingother towns to the east of Galepsos and even had some success theretoo has been suggested,becauseof the appearanceof Trallosin the 422 assessment.But this dependson the same unlikelyassumption aboutthis list as the argument aboutthe Chalcidiccities,namely,thatany city listed in it must have paid, and thereforehave been broughtback into the Athenianempire.Moreover,Trailosis now thoughtto be situatednot on the latersite of Philippibut at Aidonochori,about 111/2 kms west northwest of Amphipolison the oppositeside of the Strymon, northof Mt. Kerdylion.The evidence from the number of Trailos coins found at Aidonochori, where almost no other types apart from regal Macedonian issues appear, seems conclusive.'9 The re-sitingof Trallosalso strengthens the view that Kleon was directinghis expeditionsimplytowardsAmphipolisand was not aimingat the recoveryof the whole areafor Athens,at leastnot until afterhe had dealtwith Amphipolis. It is possible to assess Kleon more fairlyas a generalif it is borne in mind thatthis was his objective.His inadequacylay in the spherenot of strategy but of tactics.Whatever the precisemovementsand positionsin the battleoutside Amphipolis,it is clearthat Brasidaswas able to outmanoeuvre him. His first, and major,mistakewas to give in to the restlessnessof his troops,who found
19For the location of the site of TraYlos(Tragilos), near Aidonochori rather than the later Philippi, east of Amphipolis, see Pritchett, op. cit. 380-1. Cf. ATL i Gazetteer s. v. p. 556 (same location). It is described as an extensive site near the monastery of St. John Prodromos 3 kms south of Aidonochori. Perdrizet had identified it as Trailos in the report of the Congres Numismatique de Paris, 1900, 153-4. The guardian of the site gave him 8 coins, including 1 of
Philip 11,1 of Alexanderand 5 of Tragilos.They had been found in the monastery grounds,so
were not acquired through the antiquities trade. No coins of Tragilos or Trailos have appeared anywhere else. D. Hereward (AJA 67 [19631,73-4) reported remains at the site. J. and L. Robert REG 83 (1970), 409-10, (Bulletin tpigraphique no. 377), reviewing Koukouli's excavations of a heroon at the site, summarize the evidence for the identification. Cf. Fig. I p. 191.
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their inactivityirksomeand thoughthim incompetentas a commandercompared with Brasidas.In order to keep them occupied, he led them out on a reconnaissanceexpedition without waiting for the reinforcementswhich might have enabled him to encircle and retake Amphipolis, and so gave Brasidashis chance to make a sortie and catch the Atheniansbefore they could retireto the safetyof theirbase on the coast at Eion. Such is the outline accountin 5.6-10,which,however,raisesproblemsof interpreof Thucydides' in the light of tation in detail. What follows is a discussionof his narrative surveysand discussions. recenttopographical 3. Thucydides'accountof the battleoutside Amphipolis Thucydides'description(5.6-10) of the positionsand movementsof Brasidas and Kleonbeforeand duringthe battleis full of difficultiesand uncertaininfonnation,it is writtenas ties because,in spite of its detailedtopographical though the readerwas as familiarwith the terrainas Thucydideshimselfwas. It has every indication of being based on an eye-witnesssource, and one hostile to Kleon, probablyone of the hoplites or their officers.Eye-witness accountsof battlesare notoriouslydifficultto makesense of at any periodand to dangerous these chaptersare no exception.It is, however,methodologically in dismissthe accountas hopelesslybiased againstKleon and untrustworthy account.Gomme'scareful everyrespectwhen we haveno othercontemporary has to be updatedon some pointsof topographyin the analysisof the battle20 that but he demonstrated light of the surveysof Lazaridisduringthe 1970's21 convict about Kleon'sactionsdo not necessarily thefacts Thucydidesnarrates shaftsof malice,no doubtderived him of cowardicein spite of the historian's arrived from his sources.Kleon did not intendto fight before reinforcements intended he had not 'since (5.7.3-4),so Thucydides'referenceto this at 5.10,9, to fight in the first place' would not alone imply cowardice. It would be consistent with a strategicwithdrawal,his original intention if it were not
followed by the loaded ?V50ix;?pci5yov and his death from the Myrcinian
action of the peltast'sjavelin throw and contrastedwith the brave rearguard and made theirway ranks AthenianhoplitesagainstKlearidasas they closed (I takethis to (Thuc.5.10.9). back towardstheiroriginalpositionon the 6Mpo; Kleon's of id. 5.7.4.)On this interpretation be the same as Hill 133,the X6(pog to disengagehis men and retreat 'flight'was in realityno morethanan attempt to Eion, following the left wing which had already got away safely. The peltast'sjavelin may not have struck him in the back, as has often been assumed, but from the side or side front, since the Myrcinianswere with
20 Gomme, HCT III pp. 648-9, takes 'the first gates'of c. 10.6 to be the first to Athenians coming from Eion, hence in the SE. 21 See note 23 below.
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gate and engagedwiththe AtheniKlearidas, who emergedfromthe Thracian towardsEion,as I shallattemptto an rightafterBrasidasand thereforefurther show. In Diodorus' account of the battle, Kleon is not a coward and this althoughthe battle scene is entirelyconventional, should not be disregarded, It thereforeadds nothingto ourknowledge both commanders dyingbravely.22 version was of what actuallyhappened,but may indicatethat an alternative as a coward.Even if availableto Diodorusin which Kleon was not portrayed such a version did exist and was given a carelessconventionaltreatmentby Diodorus, it does not mean that the details given by Thucydidesabout the battlehave necessarily to be rejectedexceptfor the 'flight'of Kleon,which,as Gomme has shown, can be contradictedfrom his own earlierstatementof (5.7.3-4). His moveKleon's intention not to fight without reinforcements which does not withdrawal, mentshave thereforeto be regardedas a strategic imply cowardice.On this point, though perhapsonly on this point, the conventionalaccountin Diodorusmay be right. In spite of its anti-Kleonbias, Thucydides'account remainsbasic to our of whathappenedin the battle,but it has to be examinedin the understanding light of the topography of Amphipolis and its defences, which have been re-examinedby Pritchett(1980) in a study based on the excavations and surveysof Lazaridis,carriedout in the 1970's,and on his own observations. This archaeologicalevidence was not of course availableto Gomme, whose when he commentary summarizes the views of earlierscholars,norto Pritchett first studied Amphipolis (1965).The crucial discoveryof Lazaridiswas the remains of a bridge across the Strymonto the north and of a gate leading towardsit, both datableto the classicalperiod.Anothergate was discoveredto the east of this one, with largerdimensions,in the NE angleof the wall, also of the classicalperiod,this is probablythe 'Thracian gate'throughwhich Klearidas made his attack.The 'firstgate' from which Brasidasmade his sortieis fromthe bridge,on the northside likelyto be the 'first'for those approaching of Amphipolis,the one Brasidashad crossed in 424, and not a gate in the south east, that is to say, the 'first'from the point of view of the Athenians This coming from Eion, as manyhistoriansincludingGomme have thought.23
Amphipolis, its walls and gates, see Pritchett,Studies in Ancient GreekTopography pt. 1 (1965)and the importantrevisionsin pt. III (1980),'AmphipolisRestudied', basedon personalobservationand the excavationsand surveysof D. Lazaridis' surveys and excavationsmade duringthe 1970's.Referencesto the latterare given in H. W. Catling's annual reportsof archaeologyin Greece (AR), in particular1977-78,p. 48; 1978-9,pp. 29-30; 1979-80,p. 43. Cf. Lazaridis, CRAI1977,pp. 194-212, 'LaCite grecqued'Amphipolis'; To Ergon
1977 (1978), pp. 26-38; PAE (I1paKTE1Ka Tun; 'ApXttokoytKlq
22 Diodorus12.74. 23 For the topographyof
pp. 88-98. One of the gatesin the NW led to a bridgeclose to the wall. 1200treetrunksand posts from its foundationswere found, including,77 wooden piles belongingto the earlierphase of construction, datedby rf potteryto the end of the 5th-beginning of the 4th cent. B. C.'(Catling, AR 1979-80,p. 43). This mustbe the locationof the bridgeby which Brasidas enteredthe city in
'EtatpEtaq) 1976 (1978),
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of the hill (X6(po) to whichKleon locationis consistentwiththe identification finds suggestwas also the site of advancedas Hill 133which archaeological Ennea Hodoi, wherethe Atheniansfirstattemptedto found a colony in 465, about 2 km NNW of Amphipolis.The northernaspect towardsThracewas the importantone for Athens,since the point of the settlementwas access to Thraciangold and timber. Althoughit is likelythatthere wereothergates in the circuitof the AmphithatThucyPritchett in his second studyhas arguedconvincingly polis walls,24 sense if makes better retreat the Athenian and of of the battle dides' account Kleon's position was on and aroundHill 133and if Brasidasmade his sortie from the northerngate leading to Lazaridis'northem bridge. Brasidashad placed himselfwith his force on Kerdilion,a hill just acrossthe StrymonSW of Amphipolis,from where he could keep an eye on the movementsof the Atheniansat Eion (Thuc. 5.6.3).When he saw that Kleon had led his troops out, Brasidastook his force back to join Klearidasand the rest of his army inside Amphipolis, crossing back by the same northernbridge, which for securitywould have been the only access to the town from beyond the river. He then instructedKlearidasand his men to prepare for a sortie. Kleon meanwhilehad observedhis movementsand was also told that a sortiewas imminent by a scout who was far enough forward to be able to see the movementof the legs of men and animalsthroughthe gap beneathone of the made his gatethroughwhich Klearidas gates.This was probablythe Thracian as a wide (It has been identifiedby Lazaridis attackas instructed by Brasidas. gate in the NW sector of the walls.) Kleon then went forwardhimself to ordered KaCi X5 d?icv - 5.10.3)and immediately confirmthe report(tRfXOEV. the Atheniansto retreat,with those on the left moving towards Eion in a southerlydirection.The Athenianswere not, so Brasidastold his men, in any particularorder while on reconnaissance(5.9.3) and were demoralizedas much by their own &Tcata as by the daringof Brasidaswhen he attacked them unexpectedlyat a runfromthe 'firstgates'.These were evidentlynot the 'Thraciangates' under which they had observedthe readinessof men and horses, and thereforethe attackwas, as Brasidashad planned,all the more unexpected. explainsKleon'spuzzlingorder I believethatthe Athenian'ataxia'partially
and be relatedto the palisadeand gate fromwhich he made his 424 (Thuc.4.103.4-5and 108.1) III pp. 191,197, Greece in Northern sortieto attackKleon in 422 (Thuc.5.10.6).Leake, Travels olderview (Clio Beiheft in the same place.Papastavru's long causeway-bridge found a 300-yard 24 (1936)was thus proved right,againstthe surmiseof Gomme, who puts the bridgeon the westernside nearthe modernone and the 'firstgate'in the SE towardsEion (HCTIII, 648-50). The 'Thraciangate' through which Klearidascame as instructed,was probablyalso in the northern sector of the wall (as its name implies), where Lazaridisidentified remains of a Hellenisticgate. 24LazaridisCRAI1977p. 210f.
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to the rightwing to swivel round(5.10.4). They would have been the rearof a stragglingcolumn afterhis orderto retreat, 'right','centre'and 'left'being the termsrelevantto an attackon Amphipolisfrom the NE, the directionof the Athenianposition on the k6(pog,Hill 133.(See sketchmap,p. 191.)As strategos, Kleon would naturally be withthe rightwing,the positionof most danger and gloryin a hoplitebattle,and at the rearof his force as it retreated towards Eion. Thinkingmistakenly thattherewas time for the movementto be carried out, he orderedthe rightto turn,probablyintendingthem to make a quarterturnto the left. This changeof directionwould have takenthem furtherfrom the NE cornerof the Amphipoliswalls and over slightlyhighergroundacross the low saddle at the base of Mt. Pangaionand more directlyto Eion than by following the valley closer to the E walls of Amphipolis. Carryingout the orderwould have ensureda more orderlyretreat, and this may have been the main purposeof it. However,as a resultof obeyingit, they exposed theirright sides, now unprotectedby their neighbours'shields,to the enemy. This was, Thucydidesimplies, Kleon's fault, and led to casualties on the right (rear) because Kleon did not foresee the effect of his command.25 Thucydides' judgementmust have been sharedby the hoplites.They may well have been right.It was the Atheniansin the centre,on the left of the rightwing,who were firstroutedby Brasidas,whose sortiewas followed swiftlyby Klearidas'from the Thracian gate' as instructed(5.9.7 and ib. 10.7). It was therefore the Atheniansin the centrewho were attacked'fromboth sides' by Brasidasand Klearidas. The right,to the north,was thenattackedby Brasidas, who received his death wound in this engagement,unobservedby the Athenians.The left wing, cut off from the centre and right,escaped to Eion. Those on the right offered some resistanceto Klearidasbefore they were overwhelmed,and Kleon must have been with them, since it was one of Klearidas'Myrcinian peltastswho killed him with a javelin, not 'in flight' as Thucydidessays, but more likelyretreating accordingto plan, as arguedabove. Whetheror not Kleon'sinabilityto get the rightwing out of dangerwas due to his ignoranceof the righttype of command,the inexperienceof Kleon as a general is undeniable.Thucydides'narrative, though guilty of bias, reflects what musthave been genuineunwillingness of his men to be led by him. As a memberof a family which had not traditionally held the strategiahe had, by good judgement, succeeded at Pylos, where the experienced Demosthenes was alreadyin command.Made over-confident by this success,his failureat Amphipoliswas the resultof tryingto combine,as politicianshad traditionally done at Athens,the double role of generaland statesman.The two kinds of
25 Thucydides' tone at c. 7.2, describingthe hoplites'mistrustof Kleon's capacitycompared with Brasidas, is consistentwith the hostile reactionof the chorusto Kleon'selectionas general
in Aristophanes' Clouds 584-7.
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career were to become gradually more and more separated, the typical 'dem-
agogues' or 'rhetores'not usually aspiringto the strategiain the fourthcenThe firstsignsof this divisionof function,however,arenoticeablein the tury.26 fifth centuryand become moremarkedwiththe almostcontinuousfightingof the Peloponnesianwar years,as the followingindicationsshow. In Aristophanes'Knights164-7, the Sausage-seller is promisedthat as a demagogue he will be able to trample over the boule and imprison the generals.The courtsand juries are a familiartargetfor Aristophanes, but the referenceto generals here must refer specificallyto the euthynaprocedure, which was evidentlyfearedby them duringthe Archidamian war.Demosthenes' reluctanceto returnto Athens after the Aetolian disasteris a relevant example. His returnwas made less dangerousby his subsequentvictoriesat Olpai and Idomene and the three hundredpanoplies he broughtback with him as spoils.27 Further examplesare Pythodoros, Sophoklesand Eurymedon, afterthey had made the unpopularpeace of Gela with Hermokrates in Sicily. On their returnto Athens Pythodorosand Sophokleswere exiled and Eurymedon fined (Thuc. 4.65.3).The mock trial of the dog Labes for 'stealinga Sicilian cheese' in Waspsis a parody of some kind of charge,perhapsembezzlement, against Laches, who had been in command in Sicily in 425. Presentationof their accounts formed part of the euthynaprocedureand sometimes led to chargesof embezzlement. The euthynoiwere officials appointed by the boule and if they and the logistai were satisfied with the generals' account of their actions and finances nothing furtherhappened. However, if complaints were raised by anyone against the generalsat the euthynaprocedure,they could be brought for trial before the appropriate dikasterion.28 Here was the opportunityfor an accuser,maybe an ambitious politician like Kleon or the young Alkibiades,to bring charges.This is the in the obviouslink betweenKleon and the dikastswhichis parodiedin Wasps
26 For the separation of politicalfrom militaryroles in the 4th centurysee MogensHansen, and Strategoiin FourthCenturyAthens',GRBS24(1983),149-77. 'Rhetores
27Thuc. 3.114.1 (d68E6aTLpCt1 KA4o5o;); Thuc. 4.4. At the beginning of the Pylos campaign
permissionwas grantedto him 6VTr [5trirtq after his returnfrom Akarnaniato use his ships after deposedafterhis defeatin Aitoliabut re-elected aroundthe Peloponnese.He was probably at the beginningof the campaigning his successesat Idomeneand Olpai and so strategos-elect he was alreadygeneral,(4.29.1)and season 425/4. When Kleon 'chose'him as his collaborator evidently had not attackedhim for his defeat in Aitolia. Perhapsthis was the origin of the betweenDemosthenesand Kleonin the followingyear,cf. p. 173and note 7 above. co-operation 40 (1971),568-9; 28 Pritchett,TheGreekState at Warii c. 1; M. Pierart,LAntiquiteclassique Ostwald, op. cit.62-66. I accept Ostwald'sview that the generals were subject to euthyna but with variations.The assemblycould act procedurein the same way as other magistrates, in mid-term.In such cases(e. g. Periklesin 430, e. g. to deposea strategos directlyif necessary, wouldbe broughtforward for the euthyna Demosthenesin 426) the normaltime and procedure if a generalwas recalled,and would inevitablylead to moreseriouscharges.
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name 'Philokleon'and the mock trial of Labes.29 Obviouslythe chorus,portrayed as wasps with stings, enjoy condemningthe accused, who would in reality,as in the play, often be generals. The catalogueof known accusationsagainstgeneralsduringthe Peloponnesian war is presumably incomplete,but thereare enough to show that they were a featureof politicallife. The lengthand seriousnessof the war will have contributedto the demands of the demosto be satisfied that their generals were doing theirjob as effectivelyas possible and euthynatrials must have war.Amongthose threatened become morefrequentduringthe Archidamian was presumably Thucydides,for his failureto save Amphipolisfrom Brasidas in 424, which occasionedhis self-imposedexile. Fearof prosecutionby Kleon to the historian's is likelyto have contributed personaldislike,detectablein his narrativeof the Kleon episodes in spite of his impersonalaccount of these events (4.104-7)and his dispassionatereferenceto his long exile (5.26.5).It is possiblethat Perikles' in 430 may have been due depositionfromthe strategia to a similaraccusation,and as we have seen, Kleon may have had a hand in this too. The Arginusaitrialshows how farthe accountability of strategoihad gone by 406 when the assemblytried en bloc and executed six generalsfor failing to pick up shipwreckedcrews afterthe battle of Arginusai.30 This trial was a substitutefor the normal and legal euthynaprocedurewhich would have ended in a trial before the appropriatedikasterion.It is an extreme example of the way in which controlover generalscould be exercisedby the politiciansand Xenophon'snarrative supportedby Diodorus(probablyusing the Oxyrhynchus historianhere(who is at leastas earlyas Xenophon))reveals clearlythe role of the demosand the demagogueKallixenosin the trial.31 The responsibility for the disasterhad to be saddled on the generals,who triedto shift it on to Theramenes and Thrasyboulos, theirformercolleagues,who had been presentas trierarchs at the battleand been orderedto pick up the crews. That such trialsshould have become more frequentin wartimewas perhaps inevitableto ensurethat generalswere both honest and competent. To summarise:As Aristophanes'Knightsshould be enough to show, Kleon's careerbefore Pylos had been closely linked to these trials,in which a privatecitizen could act as accuserat any time. This presumably gave ambitious politicians like Kleon and Alkibiades their major opportunitiesfor
29
Cf. too Knights 255, where Paphlagon(Kleon) calls on the dicasts,his fellow-phrators, the
whom he nourishes, to help him against conspirators, implying that he
was responsiblefor the rise in the dikastikosmisthos threeobols for each day served. 30 Xen. Hell. 1.7.The illegalityconsisted,as Socratessaw (ib. ? IS), in tryingthe generals en bloc and not individually.The accusationof Erasinidesby Archedemosfor embezzlement beforethe main trial showsthat the generalswere required to go throughwhat must have been partof any normal euthynaand presenttheir accounts(probably to the logistai). The other five presumably cannot have facedany financialcharges. 31 Xen. Hell.i. 7.8-16 and 55; Diod. 15.101-3.
pp&Tope; TpolP6Xou
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in the Mytilenedebate may have been Kleon's participation public action.32 of the councilin the year428/7, but serviceon occasionedby his membership the boule was not repeated more than once, and was never consecutive. Generally,then, the courts will have provided him with more continuous political opportunities.His role, apartpresumablyfrom hoplite service,was by that of a rhetorin the assemblyand the courts.Hence he is characterized the in Thucydidesas pithanotatoswhen he is introducedfor the first time Mytilene debate (Thuc. 3.36.6) and again at 4.21.3 when he persuadesthe Atheniansnot to make peace when the Spartansare besiegedon Sphakteria. He is seen as the patternof a demagogueboth by Thucydidesand Aristophanes. He does not appear to have aspired to the strategiauntil after Pylos, Thiscould fame late in his career. whichhad broughthim unexpectedmilitary of other candidatesfor electionas strategoi have been due to the availability for his tribe(III Pandionis)in the 440'sand 430's.The obviouslywell qualified Phormioand Hagnon,probablyboth from Pandionis,are likelyto have had the supportof Periklesand would have made election for this tribedifficult, especially for a 'new man'. Although he wished to supplant Periklesand Kleon's ambitionstook him in a different inherithis control of the demos,33 directionand his militarycareerbegan only because of the turn events had takenin the Pylos debate.The assemblyhad insistedon sendinghim with the when Nikiasrefusedto go, the audiencehavingtakenhis taunt reinforcements Kleon's reluctance of Nikias and the generalsliterally.In the circumstances, but his swift recoveryof confidento take on the commandis understandable forces once he had takenon the task ce and decisive requestfor appropriate of the man. He gained a militaryreputationthroughthe are characteristic Pylos campaignlargelyby relying on Demosthenes,the generalin the field (Thuc. 4.29.1).His own position at Pylos was unofficial, since he was not The nor did Nicias resignhis generalship. electedgeneralbeforehis departure success of Pylos was responsiblefor Kleon'sfirstelectionas generalin spring 425 for the year424/3. He may or may not have been on the boardof 423/2, since anothermemberof his tribeheld the strategia the year of the armistice, in this year,dependingon whetheror not there was a double representation,
32 Alkibiadesis labelledas a youngaccuserof oldermen (assuminghe is the 'sonof Kleinias') 716. in Acharnians 33 Kleon claimedthe politicalinheritanceof Periklesin the Mytilenedebateby echoing his phrasesdeliberately(Thuc. 3.37.2 and 40.4, cf. 2.62.3;3.38.1,cf. 2.61.2).The echoes must be dissociates in Perikles' obituary inventions,sinceThucydides genuine,ratherthanThucydidean so would not have inventedthem. him from the demagogueswho succeededhim (2.65.10-11), For him, Kleon was an unworthyimitatorof Periklesin the politicalsphere.CompareAristoof Demos, claimsto be the 'lion'who to the surprise phanes Knights1036-44wherePaphlagon, a storyevidently succeededPerikles,as a lion in his mother'spropheticdream (Hdt. 6.131.2), knownto Aristophanes.
189
which of coursedid sometimesoccur.34 Whetheror not Kleon was droppedin the morepacificclimateof 423, followingBrasidas' successesin the northand his election loss of for 422/1 must have depended on the the Amphipolis, success of his political pressurefor the renewal of the war and recoveryof Athens'alliesin the northrather than on his militaryreputation. It was natural that the Atheniansshould re-appoinfhim generalin recognitionof his successfulstrategic and imperialpolicy and expecthim to succeedas he had done earlierat Pylos.That Kleon himself thoughthis good fortunetherewould be repeatedat Amphipolisis statedby Thucydidesand is psychologically convincing, even thoughthereis ironyin Thucydides' commentat 5.7.3,standingas it does just before Brasidas' successfulsortie. Historically, generalshave to be judged by success,and not by apology for failure,howeverjustified.It is ironicalthat Kleon's failureshould have been occasioned by his attemptto combine a militarycareerwith politicalleadership of the demosin the assembly and in the courts. Having devised a new method of political ascendancy,he failed because he abandoned it in his attemptto revertto the traditional dual role of militaryleaderand statesman. The demagogueswho followed Kleon as prostataitou demou,with the exception of Alkibiades,who tried to emulate Periclesand combine both roles, mainlyused politicalmethodsand the courtsto the exclusionof the strategia, two notable examples being Hyperbolosand Kleophon, of whom the latter had a fatherwho had held the strategiaand could thereforehave aspiredto it himself.35 The divergence between the two kinds of career, political and military, becameeven moremarkedin the fourthcentury.In becomingprominent in politics without being elected general, Kleon had, perhapsthrough force of circumstances (sinceit is possiblethathe would not have shunnedthe offi1ce if it had been within his grasp earlier),discovered a new political method,but, havingsignpostedthe way, he failed to follow it. His failureand death at Amphipoliswerethe result. Endnote: Gale has been convincinglyidentifiedas the same place as 'Galepsos',one of the places in Sithoniafromwhich Xerxes'navypickedup men and ships in
34 Kleon'sfirstelection:AristophanesClouds584-7. See C. W. Fornara,TheAthenianBoard of Generalsfrom 501 to 404,p. 61-2. For double representation in the strategia see D. M. Lewis, op. cit.note 3. 35 Avoidanceof the strategia by Kleophonis particularly significant,since his father,Kleippides, was general in 429/8 (Thuc. 3.3.2) and he could presumablyhave emulated him. The patronymicis given by an ostrakonon him. See E. Vanderpool,Hesperia21 (1952), 114-15; Thomsen,Origin of Ostracism, 76,93and 100.Cf. B. Baldwin, 'Noteson Cleophon', ActaClassica 17 (1974)35-47. His family backgroundtherefore would have not excluded him from the strategia. The traditionin the scholiaston Frogs679 that he was strategos is probablyunsound.
190 <4<
BARBARA MITCHELL
To Myrkinos
",Hill 133 The Loplhos
0000m at 40 m intervals Contours

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49 CS
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-;--nTa"1"
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| Moulnt Kerdylion
Pangaion
Fig. 2. Map to illustratethe movementsof Kleon and Brasidas. The physicalfeaturesand walls arebasedf with his kindpermission, on W. K. Pritchett s map in Stundies in GreekTopographyIII (1980),p. 306. Shortlybefore his death in 1982D. Lazaridis described, on the basisof hi.slater excavationsand survreys (1979-81),a much widercircuitof walls, over 7 kms. in all, following the contoursin the west and south, which he took to be part of the originalcolonial plan of pp. 31-38). I have not attemptedto reproducethis, since no map is given and the 5th century datingappears at presentto be conjectural. It does not affectthe northernand easternline of the
wall or the topography of the battle. Hagnon (La Fortification dans l'Histoire du Monde Grec, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Colloque international 614, D&eembre 1982 (Valbonne), ed. Leriche et Treziny, ScienItifiquwe,
191
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BARBARAMITCHELL
480 (Hdt. 7.122). Herodotus lists them in the order Torone, Galepsos, Sermyle,Mekybemaand Olynthos,apparentlyconfusingGale with the real Galepsos,the Thasiancolony on the Thraciancoast beyond Amphipoliseast of Eion capturedby Kleon afterTorone (Thuc.5.6.1).Since Thucydideshad local knowledgeof the area throughhis familyconnectionwith gold mining there and throughhis own commandin 424, he must have knownwherethe real Galepsos was, thereforeit is eitherHerodotusor a latercopyistwho has made the error.PerhapsThucydides'description of Galepsosas T-v OactiOv the colony of Thasos, suggeststhat he was aware of a confusion 6intotKiav, of Gale alongwith Singosand Mekybemain with Gale. Fromthe appearance the 422 assessment list, it is likely that the clause in the Peace of Nikias mentioning Mekybema,Sane and Singos (Thuc. 5.18.6)should read 'Gale' and not 'Sane',which was perhapslikewisea copyist'salterationfor the less familiar'Gale'.Sane, an Andriancolony on the Acte peninsula,had remained and loyal to Athens,resistingBrasidasalong with Dion in 424 (Thuc.4.109.5), had probablynot rebelledin 432. As A. B. West convincinglyargued(AJP58 and Singoseithergeographically (1937),166f.),it does not fit with Mekyberna or politicallyand should be emended to 'Gale' from the 422 assessmentlist, pace Gomme'sdoubts(HCTIII pp. 672-4). version I am especiallygrateful to Mr.G. L. Cawkwellfor readingan earlier of this articleand for some acute and helpfulsuggestions.His sharpeye saved aremy own. Dr.JeanDunbabin me froma numberof errors. Those remaining and Dr. StephenMitchellalso read it and made useful suggestionsleadingto improvementsof presentationand clarity.Stephen Mitchell kindly assisted with the maps. St.Anne'sCollege,Oxford Barbara Mitchell

Historia Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte - 'Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign Aims and Results' by Barbara Mitchel, 1991

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Historia Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte - 'Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign Aims and Results' by Barbara Mitchel, 1991

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Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign: Aims and Results Author(s): Barbara Mitchell Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd.

IG i3 71 lines 21-2; Meigs-Lewis GHI69 lines.

'EtatpEtaq) 1976 (1978),

in Aristophanes' Clouds 584-7.

",Hill 133 The Loplhos

0000m at 40 m intervals Contours

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