Administrative Law (Assignment)

1. Definitions a. Administrative Law- that branch of modern law under which the executive department
of the government, acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community. Administrative law is a recent development , being a consequence of the ever increasing complexities of society and the proliferation of problems of government that cannot readily or effectively be addressed by the public agencies or solved by other disciplines of public law. It was felt that thelegislative and judicial departments no longer had either the time or the needed expertise to attend to these new problems.

b. Law of Public Administration c. Administrative Agency- a body endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
for the purpose of enabling it to carry out the laws entrusted to it for enforcement or execution. Administrative agency may be regarded as an arm of the legislature insofar as it is authorize to promulgate rules. It may also be loosely considered a court because it performs functions of a particular judicial character, as when it decides factual and sometimes even legal questions as an incident of its general power of regulation.

2. Distinctions A. Administrative Law v Law on Public Administration

B. Administrative Law v Constitutional Law

C. Administrative Law v Penal Laws

D. General Law v Administrative Law

E. Administration v Politics

F. Administration v Law

3. Kinds of Administrative Law

1) Statutes setting up admin authorities either by: officers or boards, commission or officers to: amplify, execute, supervise the operations of, and determine controversies arising under particular laws in the enactment of which the legislature decided for matters of convenience or for quicker or more efficient administration to withhold the

controversies, at least in the first instance, from the courts of law. 2) Rules, regulations or orders of such administrative authorities enacted and promulgated in pursuance of the purposes for which they were created or endowed. 3) Determinations, decisions and orders of such admin authorities made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields 4) Body of Doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of determinations and regulations of such admin authorities.

4. Origin of Administrative Law 5. Scope of Administrative Law

1) Statutes setting up admin authorities either by: officers or confiding the powers and duties to existing boards, commission or officers to: amplify, execute, supervise the operations of, and determine controversies arising under particular laws in the enactment of which the legislature decided for matters of convenience or for quicker or more efficient administration to withhold the controversies, at least in the first instance, from the courts of law. 2) Rules, regulations or orders of such administrative authorities enacted and promulgated in pursuance of the purposes for which they were created or endowed. 3) Determinations, decisions and orders of such admin authorities made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields 4) Body of Doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of determinations and regulations of such admin authorities.

6. Nature of Adminstration (As function, organization)

What is the Nature of Administration? function or as an organization.

What is Administation as a function? -judicial matters, of the law or will of the state as expressed by the competent authority. It is the activity of the executive officers of the govt taken in this narrow but proper sense. s opposed to deliberation of the rendering of judicial decision and can be found in all the manifestations of executive action. their application to the current affairs by way of management and oversight, including investigation, regulation and control, in accordance with and in execution of the principles prescribed by the lawmaker. What is Administration as an Organization? hands, the reigns of government are for the time being. anization extending down from the Pres to the most humble of his subordinates. It is the totality of the executive and administrative authorities.

7. Administration of government and Administration of Justice

8. Kinds of Administration (Internal and External)

9. Classification of Administrative Law

A. That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative agencies and endowing them with power and duties; B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and orders promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions; C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of public agents which conflict with private rights; D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of administrative bodies made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.

10. Administrative Process

Administrative process: includes whole of the series of acts of an administrative agency whereby the legislative delegation of a function is made effectual in particular situations; embraces matters concerning procedure in the disposition of both routine and contested matters, and the matter in which determinations are made, enforced, and reviewed

11. Creation/Establishment or Abolition of Administrative Agencies

The administrative body may be created by the Constitution or by a Statute. If created by the Constitution itself, the administrative body can be altered or abolished only by Constitution. But where the body was created only by statute, the legislature that breathed life into it

can amend or even repeal its charter, thereby resulting in its abolition which is justified if made in good faith.

12. Cases
a. Buklod EIIB v Zambora Gr 142801-802(2001) FACTS: On June 1987 Pres. Cory issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of Finance. Aquino issued another memo providing that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations in all land areas and inland water and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On January 2000 Pres. Estrada issued EO 191 entitled Deactivation of the EIIB. The order of deactivation was motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223 providing for the separation from the service of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting in the abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. ISSUES: Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive department?How shall the reorganization be carried out? RULING: YES, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department are under the Presidents power of control. Hence he is justified in deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in carrying out reorganizations when a certain law grants him such power. Sec. 31, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President with the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in order to achieve economy and efficiency. b. The reorganization should be carried out in good faith. The EOs issued by Estrada was motivated by the fact that the functions of EIIB are also being performed by other agencies. The Court also pointed out that the deactivation of EIIB was intended to lessen the expenses of the government. b. Larin v Executive Secretary 280 S 713 Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service of the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct. Acting on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner submitted a position paper as required by the committee. Consequently, the president issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR abolishing some of the offices which included the office of excise tax and another memorandum dismissing

herein petitioner from office as a result of the investigation. Petitioner contends that he is a Career Executive Service officer and he cannot be removed. On the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the president. Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner? Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant to the power of removal by the president. However, the power of removal is not absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor the security of tenure who may only be removed through a cause enumerated by law. c. Louis Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission Facts: the petitioners raised in court that EO No. 1, which created the Truth Commission, should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. Petitioners argue that EO NO. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of congress to create public office and appropriate funds for its operation. The respondent on the other hand, contested that EO No. 1 did not arrogate the power of the congress to create public office because the Presidents Executive power and power of control includes the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed. More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers as alleged by the petitioners. They strongly argue that the said EO is valid and constitutional. Issue: Does control power allow the President to create the Truth Commission? Ruling: The power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. Majority of members of the Supreme Court also rejected the OSGs claim that the EO finds basis under Section 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the President to restructure the office of the President. Clearly, restructure under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. The Court held that the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. The President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Held: Legal Standing of the Petitioners The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

Decision The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1. SO ORDERED. d. Edsel Lagman v Executive Secretary Gr 193036 Louis Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 and Rep. Edcel Lagman et al. vs. Executive Secretary Pacquito Ochoa et al. are consolidated petitions decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines invalidating the creation of a truth commission tasked to investigate a previous president. Contents [hide]

1 Creation of the Truth Commission 2 The Court's Ruling

o o o

2.1 The president has the authority to create the Truth Commission 2.2 The PTC will not erode the powers or independence of the Ombudsman

2.3 The purpose of the PTC offends the equal protection clause Creation of the Truth Commission[edit] After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough factfinding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the

constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration. The main issues raised before the High Court were: (1) Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of Congress; (2) Whether the PTC supplants the powers already vested on the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ); and, (3) Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Court's Ruling[edit] The president has the authority to create the Truth Commission[edit] Majority of the members of the Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC finds basis on the presidents power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that control is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The majority also rejected the OSGs claim that that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly, restructure under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason of economy or redundancy. This presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Nonetheless, the ponencia agreed with the argument of the OSG that the presidents power to create the PTC may find justification under the presidents duty under sec. 17, Article VII of theConstitution to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The Court held that while it is true that the authority of the president to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes, it does not necessarily mean that he does not have such authority. The president has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees (whether from past or present administrations) faithfully comply with the law. The purpose of ad hoc investigating bodies such as the PTC is to allow an inquiry into matters which the president is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. The PTC will not erode the powers or independence of the Ombudsman[edit] The Court also held that the investigative function of the commission will not supplant nor threaten the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. If at all, it will complement the functions of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the function of the PTC is merely to recommend prosecution, which is just a consequence of its fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the PTC. The purpose of the PTC offends the equal protection clause[edit] While the Court was almost unanimous in holding that the president indeed had the authority to create the PTC and that it would not unduly duplicate the powers of the Ombudsman, nine (9) of the justices joined Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza in refusing to uphold the constitutionality of E.O. 1 in view of

its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was joined by four (4) others in their strong dissent. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. Applying this precept, the majority held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution and that E.O. 1 is only an adventure in partisan hostility. While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that the end does not justify the means. It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds, for ours is still a government of laws and not of men. e. Alfeo Vivas v Monetary Board Gr. 191424 (2013)