NO.

05-14-00187-CV
____________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH J UDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS, TEXAS
____________________________________________________________

In re: Herbert Gears,

Relator,

____________________________________________________________

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
AND APPENDIX
____________________________________________________________


OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 825 W. Irving Blvd.
CITY OF IRVING, TEXAS Irving, Texas 75060
CHARLES R. ANDERSON, CITY ATTORNEY Telephone: 972-721-2541
canderson@cityofirving.org Telecopier: 214-721-2750

J ANET M. SPUGNARDI (Texas Bar No. 24039192) jspugnardi@cityofirving.org
KURUVILLA OOMMEN (Texas Bar No. 24007780) koommen@cityofirving.org
J ASON MCCLAIN (Texas Bar No. 00797032) jmcclain@cityofirving.org
SAUL PEDREGON (Texas Bar No. 00797231) spedregon@cityofirving.org

Assistant City Attorneys

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT AND REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

ACCEPTED
05-14-00187-CV
FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
2/21/2014 4:53:38 PM
LISA MATZ
CLERK
FILED IN
5th COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
2/21/2014 4:53:38 PM
LISA MATZ
Clerk
i
SUPPLEMENTAL LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.4 (a), the following is a
supplemental list of the name and address of appellate counsel not included in Relators
list:

Counsel for Respondent and Real Parties in Interest

J anet M. Spugnardi
Kuruvilla Oommen
J ason McClain
Saul Pedregon

Assistant City Attorneys
Office of the City Attorney
825 West Irving Boulevard
Irving, Texas 75060
Tel.: 972-721-2541
Fax: 972-721-2750

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUPPLEMENTAL LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .... i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ... iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ... vii

RESPONSE TO RELATORS ISSUES . viii

RECORD REFERENCES ... ix

FACTS . 1

OBJ ECTION TO RELATORS PETITION FOR MANDAMUS... 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ... 3

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES ... 4

I. Mandamus is not proper since the City has not failed
to perform a clear, ministerial duty. 4

A. The City has discretion to determine if the petition
complies with the Election Code 5

B. The Citys duty to call an election on a voter-initiated
petition is not clear... 10

II. A writ of mandamus should not be issued at this premature
stage before the City has had the time to act....... 11

III. Mandamus cannot be used to compel the City to violate the
Texas Constitution . 12

PRAYER . 14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.... 16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE... 17


iii
APPENDIX.. 18
Tab 1 Petition Requesting a City of Irving Special Election
1

Tab 2 Affidavit of City Secretary Shanae J ennings
Tab 3 Certified agenda posting of February 19, 2014 work session of Irving
City Council
Tab 4 Tex. Tax Code 11.13
Tab 5 Texas Constitution, Article 8, 1-b
Tab 6 Affidavit of Chief Financial Officer Max Duplant


VERIFICATION... 19



1
Due to some confidential personal information of the petition signers, Respondent is e-filing a representative
sample page with the confidential information redacted pursuant to Local Rule 3(d)(1). However, because the
petition is material to this proceeding, Respondent is also submitted the entire, unredacted petition under seal with
the Court pursuant to Local Rule 3(d)(3).
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Anderson v. City of Seven Points,
806 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1991) .................................................................................... 4
Boynton v. Brown,
164 S.W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1914, writ refd) .............................. 5
Chisholm v. Bewley Mills,
287 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1956) .................................................................................... 9
City Commission of Pampa v. Whatley,
366 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1963, no writ) ................................. 10
City Council of Austin v. Save Our Springs Coalition,
828 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App. Austin 1992, rehg overruled) ................................ 12
Coalson v. City Council of Victoria,
610 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1980) .................................................................................... 4
Determan v. City of Irving,
609 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1980, no writ) ...................................... 14
Eades v. Drake,
332 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. 1960) .................................................................................. 13
Edgewood Ind. School Dist. v. Meno,
917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995, rehg overruled) ....................................................... 14
Holt v. Trantham,
575 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, ref. n.r.e.) ..................................................... 5
In re Butler,
270 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App. Dallas 2008, no writ). .............................................. 3
In re Cercone,
323 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App. Dallas 2010, no writ) ............................................... 4
In re Smith,
279 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2007, no writ) ........................................... 3
In re Winters,
2008 WL 4816379 (Tex. App. Dallas 2008, no writ) ........................................... 3
v
Lueders v. Ehlinger,
31 S.W.2d 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1930, no writ) ....................................... 4
Lydick v. Chairman of Dallas County Republican Executive Committee,
456 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1970, rehg denied) ............................. 12
Morrison Seifert Murphy, Inc. v. Zion,
384 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App. Dallas 2012, reh'g overruled) ................................... 8
One 1985 Chevrolet v. State,
852 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1993, rehg overruled) ......................................................... 7
Oney v. Ammerman,
458 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. 1970) .................................................................................... 10
Pulliam v. Trawalter,
120 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1938, rehg overruled) .......... 5, 12
Satterfield v. Satterfield,
448 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1969) ................................................................................... 7
Taxpayers Political Action Committee v. City of Houston,
596 S.W.2d at 147 (Tex. App. - Houston [1
st
Dist.] 1979, no writ) ................. 10, 13
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs,
340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) .................................................................................... 8
Williams v. Sorrell,
71 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1934, no writ) ................................ 4
Womack v. Berry,
291 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. 1956) ............................................................................ 4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
TEX. CONST., art. 8, 1-b (b) ....................................................................................... 13, 14
TEX. TAX CODE ANN 11.13 (e) ......................................................................................... 7
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 11.13(n) ........................................................................................ 8
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 273.061 ......................................................................................... 4
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 11.13(d) ............................................................................... 7, 9, 11
vi
TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. 11.13(f) ......................................................................................... 6
OTHER AUTHORITIES

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Sixth Ed., p. 1162 (1990). ..................................................... 9
vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City is dissatisfied with Relators statement of the case. Pursuant to Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.4 (b) the City presents its own statement of the case.
1. This is an original proceeding seeking issuance of a mandamus ordering the City
of Irving to call an election under the Tax Code based upon a voter-initiated
petition related to residential homestead tax exemptions for persons sixty-five
years of age or older.

2. Respondent and the Real Parties in Interest have not failed to perform a ministerial
act in connection with the voter-initiated petition and have not violated a duty
under Section 11.13(d) of the Tax Code.

viii
RESPONSE TO RELATORS ISSUES
The City of Irving has not failed to take mandatory ministerial steps under either
the Election Code or Tax Code to certify Relators proposed tax ordinance for the
upcoming May 10, 2014 election.

ix
RECORD REFERENCES
In this response the record will be referred to as follows:
Appendix for Respondent and Real Parties: Citys Apx

1
NO. 05-14-00187-CV
____________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH J UDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS, TEXAS
____________________________________________________________

In re: Herbert Gears,

Relator,


RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS


TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Respondent City of Irving (the City) and Real Parties in Interest, City Secretary
Shanae J ennings and Mayor Beth Van Duyne, submit this response to Relators
complaint that the City of Irving, its City Secretary and its Mayor have failed to perform
a ministerial act of certifying Relators tax ordinance in a timely manner.
FACTS
On February 10, 2014, the Irving City Secretarys Office received a voter-initiated
petition requesting a City of Irving special election to amend Article I, Sec. 16-3.1 of
Irvings code of ordinances to increase the homestead tax exemption for persons sixty-
five years of age or older to 100 percent of the assessed value of the homestead. (Citys
Apx. Tab 1). The voter-initiated petition was purportedly filed pursuant to Section
11.13(f) of the Texas Tax Code. (Citys Apx. Tab 1). After receipt of the voter-initiated
petition, City Secretary Shanae J ennings began to verify the signatures on the petition on
2
February 11, 2014. (Citys Apx. Tab 2). In order to verify the petition, the City
Secretary searched the Dallas County Elections website by the voter identification
numbers provided that information on the voter-initiated petition to ensure that those
individuals are registered voters of the City of Irving. (Citys Apx. Tab 2). On February
12, 2014, the City Secretary completed the petition signature verification. (Citys Apx.
Tab 2). Of the 818 signatures submitted with voter identification numbers, the City
Secretary verified 789 as qualified voters in Irving. (Citys Apx. Tab 2). The City
Secretary only verified whether the voter-initiated petition had the requisite number of
signatures. (Citys Apx. Tab 2). She did not, nor was she required to, verify whether the
voter-initiated petition met the other conditions precedent of the statute. (Citys Apx.
Tab 2).
Eight days after the City received the voter-initiated petition, Relator filed this
petition for writ of mandamus. Importantly, during those eight days, the City of Irving
did not have any City Council meeting scheduled such that it could consider the voter-
initiated petition. In fact, at the time that Relator filed this original proceeding in this
Court, the City had an item posted on its work session agenda to receive legal advice
from its attorney in closed, executive session about the voter-initiated petition. (Citys
Apx. Tab 3). Without waiting for that meeting to occur to see what the Irving City
Council would decide to do with the voter-initiated petition, Relator filed this hasty
proceeding for mandamus relief.


3
OBJECTION TO RELATORS PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
Respondent and the Real Parties in Interest object to Relators petition for
mandamus as it is defective and should be rejected by the Court. Specifically, Relator
does not have an appendix or any factual statements supported and verified by affidavit
made by someone with personal knowledge who is competent to testify on the matters
stated. Therefore, Relators petition for mandamus does not comply with the
requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3 and 52.7 and should be denied based upon the
deficiencies in the petition. In re Winters, 2008 WL 4816379 (Tex. App. Dallas 2008,
no writ); In re Smith, 279 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2007, no writ). Due to the
lack of an appendix, Relators certification also fails and without a certification, the
request for mandamus relief should be denied. In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App.
Dallas 2008, no writ).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Relators request for a writ of mandamus commanding the City and the Real
Parties in Interest to certify Relators voter-initiated petition and to add it to the May 10,
2014 election ballot does not meet the extraordinary standard for mandamus relief. The
City and Real Parties in Interest have the ability to exercise judgment and discretion in
reviewing and certifying a voter-initiated petition under the Tax Code and to call an
election on the proposal and therefore these acts do not qualify as ministerial. There is
not a clear duty on the part of Respondent or the Real Parties in Interest and thus
mandamus is not proper. Further, mandamus may not lie to compel an unconstitutional
4
act, as this voter-initiated petition would require. Accordingly, the Court should not grant
the Relators petition for writ of mandamus.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. Mandamus in not proper since the City has not failed to perform a clear,
ministerial duty.

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only to compel
the performance of a purely ministerial duty by an election official in connection with the
holding of an election. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.
1991); Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1980); TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. 273.061. An act is ministerial when the law clearly spells out the duty to be
performed by the official with sufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of
discretion. Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 793. The Election Code does not grant a court
power to issue mandamus relief ordering performance of a duty not clearly and precisely
identified as a duty by statute. In re Cercone, 323 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App. Dallas 2010,
no writ). A mandamus is not proper to review or control an action that involves the
exercise of judgment or discretion. Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. 1956);
Williams v. Sorrell, 71 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1934, no writ);
Lueders v. Ehlinger, 31 S.W.2d 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1930, no writ). As has
been aptly stated,
Under the operation of this rule, whenever the law directs an officer or
officers to order an election when a certain number of qualified voters have
joined in a petition for the same, it is made the duty of the officers to
ascertain whether the requisite number of voters have joined in the petition,
and whether they are qualified, and mandamus will not lie to control them
in the exercise of that duty; but the officers upon whom is devolved the duty
5
of calling the election will be allowed to exercise their own judgment. Their
action must be based upon reason and fairness, however, and not be
impelled by fraud, caprice or unfairness.
Boynton v. Brown, 164 S.W. 893, 895 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1914, writ refd)
(emphasis added).
Election officials are entitled to exercise discretion in determining whether a
voter-initiated petition is sufficient, i.e. whether it complies or does not comply with the
conditions precedent to call an election on a voter-initiated petition. Holt v. Trantham,
575 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978, ref. n.r.e.). Only on the presentation of a
proper petition where the conditions precedent have been complied with will a mandamus
be granted. Id. Conversely, if a submitted petition is not proper and does comply with
all conditions precedent, then mandamus may not lie. The Relator bears the burden to
show he is entitled to mandamus relief under applicable law. Pulliam v. Trawalter, 120
S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1938, rehg overruled).
A. The City has discretion to determine if the petition complies with the
Election Code.
Relators argument appears to be that submission of a voter-initiated petition,
regardless of whether it is a proper petition, is sufficient to create a non-discretionary,
ministerial duty on the part of the City to call an election on the petition. This argument
is without merit. If the petition is not proper, the City may exercise its discretion and
judgment in not calling an election. Holt, supra at 86. There are fatal errors with
Relators voter-initiated petition, and thus no ministerial duty attached to calling an
election on the petition because the condition precedent of the petition had not been met.
6
First, and quite notably, the voter-initiated petition purports to be filed pursuant to
Section 11.13(f) of the Texas Tax Code. (Citys Apx. Tab 1). That provision of the
Texas Tax Code provides that:
Once authorized, an exemption adopted as provided by Subsection (d) of
this section may be repealed or decreased or increased in an amount by the
governing body of the taxing unit or by the procedure authorized by
Subdivision (2) of Subsection (d) of this section. In the case of a decrease,
the amount of the exemption may not be reduced to less than $3,000 of the
market value.
TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. 11.13(f) (emphasis added) (Citys Apx. Tab 4).
Section 11.13(f) does not authorize any voter-initiated petition. Id. Thus, the
petition is not proper because the statutory authority relied upon by Relator does not
confer any right to submit a voter-initiated petition related to residential tax exemptions.
Likewise the City does not have any ministerial duty under Section 11.13(f). Any action
to be taken by a governing body of a taxing unit under Section 11.13(f) is discretionary,
as that subsection of the statute specifically uses the word may. Since Section 11.13(f)
does not authorize a voter-initiated petition, the City has the discretion to refuse to call an
election for an improper petition that does not comply with the conditions precedent of
the statute. Relator has not met his burden to show a clear right to the relief he seeks.
Secondly, there is a provision in the Tax Code which allows a voter-initiated
petition for a tax exemption for individuals who are 65 years or older, but Relators
petition does not meet those requirements either. Section 11.13(d) of the Tax Code reads:
In addition to the exemptions provided by Subsections (b) and (c) of this
section, an individual who is disabled or is 65 or older is entitled to an
exemption from taxation by a taxing unit of a portion (the amount of which
7
is fixed as provided by Subsection (e)
2
of this section) of the appraised
value of his residence homestead if the exemption is adopted either:

(1) by the governing body of the taxing unit; or
(2) by a favorable vote of a majority of the qualified voters of the
taxing unit at an election called by the governing body of a
taxing unit, and the governing body shall call the election on the
petition of at least 20 percent of the number of qualified voters
who voted in the preceding election of the taxing unit.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 11.13(d) (emphasis added) (Citys Apx. Tab 4).

Assuming that Relator intended to submit the petition pursuant to subsection (d)
and not subsection (f)
3
, the petition importantly still does not meet the conditions
precedent for a voter-initiated petition on a tax exemption because it does not specify an
amount. Section 11.13(d) requires that for a tax exemption for an individual who is 65
years or older, the exemption must be for an amount which is fixed. Id. It is a basic
rule of statutory construction that clear statutory language should be given its common
everyday meaning. One 1985 Chevrolet v. State, 852 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. 1993, rehg
overruled) (When a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not use rules of
construction or extrinsic aids to construe it, but should give the statute its common
meaning); Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1969) (Words in
common use, when used by the Legislature in a statute are to be interpreted as
intending to express the meaning in which they are ordinarily understood.). The clear
interpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the amount of which is fixed

2
Subsection (e) provides that The amount of an exemption as adopted by Subsection (d) of this section is $3,000 of
the appraised value of the residence homestead unless a larger amount is specified by: (1) the governing body
authorizing the exemption if the exemption is authorized as provided by Subdivision (1) of Subsection (d) of this
section; or (2) the petition for the election if the exemption is authorized as provided by Subdivision (2) of
Subsection (d) of this section. TEX. TAX CODE ANN 11.13 (e) (emphasis added) (Citys Apx. Tab 4).
3
This appears to be what Relator in fact intended based upon the citations given in Relators petition for mandamus.
8
means and is ordinarily understood to mean a fixed amount. Despite the clear language
in the statute, Relators petition is not for a fixed amount. Relators petition requests a
100 percent tax exemption for individuals 65 years or older. If there is any doubt that the
statutory language in subsection (d) would allow for a percentage instead of a fixed
amount, the Court need look no further than the rest of the statute to aid in its
construction. In another part of the same statute, subsection (n), the Legislature has
provided:
(n) In addition to any other exemptions provided by this section, an
individual is entitled to an exemption from taxation by a taxing unit of a
percentage of the appraised value of his residence homestead.If the
percentage set by the taxing unit produces an exemption in a tax year of
less than $5,000 when applied to a particular residence homestead, the
individual is entitled to an exemption of $5,000 of the appraised value. The
percentage adopted by the taxing unit may not exceed 20 percent.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 11.13(n) (emphasis added) (Citys Apx. Tab 4).
The use of the word percentage in subsection (n) when contrasted with the
words amount of which is fixed in subsection (d) provides further confirmation that
subsection (d) does not authorize a percentage, but in fact requires a fixed amount.
Certainly, if the Legislature intended for a percentage to be authorized for a voter-
initiated petition under subsection (d), it could have used the word percentage as it does
in subsection (n). In construing a statute, courts are to presume that the Legislature
chooses a statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while
purposefully omitting words not chosen. Morrison Seifert Murphy, Inc. v. Zion, 384
S.W.3d 421, 427-28 (Tex. App. Dallas 2012, reh'g overruled), citing TGS-NOPEC
Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). The fact that the
9
Legislature does not use the word percentage in subsection (d) must mean that the
Legislature did not intend for a percentage to be allowed, but instead intentionally
requires that a voter-initiated petition for a tax exemption under subsection (d) may only
be for a fixed amount. Any other interpretation of the statute would be contrary to the
legislative intent as guided by the plain meaning of the words in the statute when
construed together as a whole. The Court should also consider the consequences were it
to construe an amount which is fixed to mean percentage, as urged by the Relator.
Sayre v. Mullins, 68 S.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Tex. 1984), citing Chisholm v. Bewley Mills, 287
S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1956) (consideration should be given to the entire act, its nature and
object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction). The Relators
construction of the statute would result in wildly different tax relief depending on the
value of a persons residential homestead. Such an outcome would be manifestly unjust
and the Court should decline to construe the statute in the manner.
Additionally, the use of the word a portion in Subsection (d)
4
affirms that
Relators petition is improper and does not comply with the statutory prerequisites.
Relators voter-initiated petition requests a tax exemption for persons 65 or older of 100
percent of the assessed value of their homestead. The common meaning of portion is
defined as an allotted part; a share, a parcel. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, Sixth Ed., p.
1162 (1990). A portion is not a whole. Relators petition requesting a 100 percent tax
exemption results in all of the appraised value being exempt, not just a portion (the

4
The relevant statutory language, cited in full on page 6, is as follows: [a]n individual who is disabled or is 65 or
older is entitled to an exemption from taxation by a taxing unit of a portion (the amount of which is fixed as provided
by Subsection (e) of this section) of the appraised value TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 11.13(d) (emphasis added).
10
amount of which is fixed) of the appraised value of his residence homestead as
required by Subsection (d).
Relators petition is infirm for several reasons as outlined above. The result of
these deficiencies means that this petition is not proper under Section 11.13(d) of the Tax
Code and the City has the ability to exercise discretion and judgment to determine that
the petition does not meet the conditions precedent of the statute. With the Citys
discretion intact, there is no ministerial duty on the part of the City to call an election on
the voter-initiated petition and mandamus may not issue to compel the City to call an
election. City Commission of Pampa v. Whatley, 366 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (Tex. Civ.
App. Amarillo 1963, no writ).
B. The Citys duty to call an election on a voter-initiated petition is not clear.
Furthermore, even if Relators petition complied with the statutory conditions
precedent for a voter-initiated petition under the Tax Code, the Citys duty as to when to
call an election is not clearly defined in the statute. Mandamus will not lie to compel
performance of an official act unless the complaining party shows a clear right to such
performance and a clear duty to perform by the official. Taxpayers Political Action
Committee v. City of Houston, 596 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston [1
st
Dist.]
1979, no writ. The duty must be one clearly fixed and required by the law, or the writ
will not issue. Oney v. Ammerman, 458 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. 1970).
The statute in question, Tex. Tax Code 11.13, does not impose a clear duty on the
City to call an election within a certain timeframe. (See Citys Apx. Tab 4). The statute
is silent as to if the governing body receives a proper petition and must call an election,
11
when that duty must be carried out. One of Relators main arguments appears to be that
if the City Council does not call the election by February 28, 2014, then Relators petition
will not appear on the May 10, 2014 ballot. However, nothing in the statute gives Relator
a clear right to have the election on a voter-initiated petition under 11.13(d) at a
particular election or at the election of the Relators choosing. (See Citys Apx. Tab 4).
Nor does the statute impose a clear duty on the City to call an election by a certain
deadline or to ensure that the petition is presented to the voters at the next available
election. (See Citys Apx. Tab 4). Significantly, Relators petition for mandamus does
not cite this Court to any authority as when the City must call election on the voter-
initiated petition. If the statute does not impose a clear duty on the City to act within a
certain timeframe, then the City retains the discretion on when to act on the voter-
initiated petition. Without that clear duty as to when the City must call an election or as
to Relators clear right to have an election at a date of his choosing, there is not a
ministerial duty to call the election by February 28
th
or to have the election on May 10
th
.
Therefore, mandamus should not issue compelling such action.
II. A writ of mandamus should not be issued at this premature stage before the
City has had the opportunity to act.

As discussed above, Relator is pressing the urgency of this matter by insisting that
the election must be called by February 28
th
and that the petition must appear on the May
10
th
ballot. The assumptions underlying this argument are without merit and without
support in the law. Accordingly, Relators request for mandamus relief at this time is
premature. In City Council of Austin v. Save Our Springs Coalition, 828 S.W.2d 340,
12
343 (Tex. App. Austin 1992, rehg overruled), the Austin Court of Appeals held that a
writ of mandamus to compel a city council to set an election on a certified initiative
petition from citizen organizations was premature, where the city council still had
discretion in determining their response to petition and when to set the election. That
court held that [city] council does and should have a reasonable time to deliberate. Id.
Here, the City Council has had virtually no time to deliberate its response to the Relators
petition. The petition was filed on February 10
th
, and a mere eight days later, during
which no City Council meetings occurred, the Relator seeks a writ of mandamus
compelling the City Council to act when it has not yet had any time to act.
5
Relators
request for issuance of a mandamus is thus premature and should be dismissed. Save Our
Springs Coalition, supra at 343.
III. Mandamus cannot be used to compel the City to violate the Texas
Constitution.

It is elementary that a mandamus will not be issued to compel the doing of that
which the law forbids Pulliam v. Trawalter, 120 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.
San Antonio 1938, rehg denied. In fact, this Court has previously held that it does not
have jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus to compel performance of duties which
would be in defiance of the law. Lydick v. Chairman of Dallas County Republican
Executive Committee, 456 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1970, rehg denied).
It is clear that mandamus will not lie to compel election officials to take action which

5
The City acknowledges that the item was not posted for the regular City Council agenda for February 20, 2014 for
any action to be taken. However, as evidenced by Citys Apx Tab 3, the item was posted for a closed, executive
session for City Council to receive legal advice regarding the petition. The City Council could still take action on
the petition at a future agenda.
13
violates a constitutional provision. Taxpayers Political Action Committee v. City of
Houston, 596 S.W.2d at 149-150, citing Eades v. Drake, 332 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. 1960).
This Court should not issue a mandamus ordering the City to call an election on
Relators petition for a 100 percent tax exemption for persons 65 or older because the
petition would be unconstitutional if approved for two reasons.
First, the Texas Constitution provides that:

[U]pon receipt of a petition signed by twenty percent (20%) of the voters
who voted in the last preceding election held by the political subdivision,
the governing body of the subdivision shall call an election to determine by
majority vote whether an amount not less than Three Thousand Dollars
($3,000) as provided in the petition, of the market value of residence
homesteads of disabled persons or persons sixty-five (65) years of age or
over shall be exempt from ad valorem taxes thereafter levied by the
political subdivision.

TEX. CONST., art. 8, 1-b (b) (emphasis added) (Citys Apx. Tab 5).

Like the Tax Code, the Texas Constitution uses the word amount, not
percentage. As previously briefed herein, the word amount should be construed to
mean a fixed number, not a percentage. Since the Texas Constitution does not
authorize a percentage for residential tax exemptions, the Relators petition is
unconstitutional and mandamus is improper. Taxpayers Political Action Committee, 596
S.W.2d at 149-150.
Second, the Texas Constitution also states in pertinent part:
Where any ad valorem tax has therefore been pledged for the payment of
any debt, the taxing officers of the political subdivision shall have authority
to continue to levy and collect the tax against the homestead property at the
same rate as the tax so pledged until the debt is discharged, if the cessation
of the levy would impair the obligation of the contract by which the debt
was created.
14
TEX. CONST. art. 8, 1-b (b) (Citys Apx. Tab 5).
The effect of a 100 percent tax exemption for residential homesteads of persons 65
or older in the City of Irving would be to impair the Citys debt obligations under existing
contracts. Specifically, the City has outstanding bond obligations in the principal amount
of over $349 million (through the year 2033) to which the ad valorem tax has been
pledged. (Citys Apx. Tab 6). If the voter-initiated petition were approved, the Citys
ability to repay its $349 million of debt obligations would be impaired. (Citys Apx. Tab
6). Practically, the effect of this voter-initiated petition could result in a huge influx of
persons over 65 to the City of Irving so that they could avail themselves of a 100 percent
property tax exemption on their residential homesteads. To the extent that this is a
possibility, the potential financial loss to the City is unquantifiable if the voter-initiated
petition were approved. (Citys Apx. Tab 6). It would harm the Citys ability to repay its
existing bond indebtedness. (Citys Apx. Tab 6). Since the Citys tax rate would be
insufficient to meet its debt service requirements if the voter-initiated petition were
approved, the petition constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of the Citys contracts.
Determan v. City of Irving, 609 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas 1980, no writ),
distinguished on other grounds, Edgewood Ind. School Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717
(Tex. 1995, rehg overruled).
PRAYER
For the reasons stated in this brief, the City asks the Court to deny Relators
Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
15
Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
CITY OF IRVING, TEXAS
CHARLES R. ANDERSON
City Attorney

/s/ J anet M. Spugnardi
J ANET M. SPUGNARDI
Texas Bar No. 24039192
KURUVILLA OOMMEN
Texas Bar No. 24007780
J ASON MCCLAIN
Texas Bar No. 00797032
SAUL PEDREGON
Texas Bar No. 00797231
Assistant City Attorneys
825 West Irving Boulevard
Irving, Texas 75060
Tel.: 972-721-2541
Fax: 972-721-2750

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT AND
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the Response to Petition for Mandamus and
Appendix was served, in accordance with Local Rule 3(B)(c)(1), through an electronic
filing service provider (EFSP) upon each party below who has consented to e-service and
by facsimile transmission to each party below who has not so consented on February 21,
2014 in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure:

Scott Phillips
Bryce King
Attorneys for Relator
777 Lonesome Dove Trail, Suite A
Hurst, Texas 76054
Facsimile: (817) 485-7588



/s/ J anet M. Spugnardi
J ANET M. SPUGNARDI
























17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4
Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation,
Typeface requirements and Type Style Requirements

1. This motion complies with the type volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2)
because:

this brief contains 4,210 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(l).

2. This motion complies with the typeface requirements and the type style
requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because:

this brief has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word 2007 in 13-point Times New Roman.

/s/ J anet M. Spugnardi
J ANET M. SPUGNARDI


Dated: February 21, 2014
18
CITYS APPENDIX

Respondent, City of Irving, and Real Parties in Interest, Shanae J ennings and Beth
Van Duyne, submit the following documents in support of their response to petition for
writ of mandamus.

Petition Requesting a City of Irving Special Election
6
............................................... Tab 1

Affidavit of City Secretary Shanae J ennings Tab 2

Certified agenda posting of Feb. 19, 2014 work session of Irving City Council......... Tab 3

Section 11.13 of the Texas Tax Code.. Tab 4

Texas Constitution, Article 8, 1-b...Tab 5

Affidavit of Chief Financial Officer Max Duplant.. Tab 6






6
See fn. 1, p. iii.
VERIFICATION
STATE OF TEXAS
DALLASCOUNTY
Before me the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Shanae
Jennings, a person whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath to her,
upon her oath under penalty of perjury, she said the following.
1. "My name is Shanae Jennings, and I am capable of making this affidavit, and the
facts in this affidavit are true and correct and based upon my personal knowledge.
2. I am the City Secretary for the City of Irving, Respondent, and am a Real Party in
Interest in this matter.
3. I have reviewed the facts stated on pages 1 and 2 within the foregoing Response to
Petition for Mandamus and the facts are true and correct and based upon my personal
knowledge. "
Sworn to and Subscribed before me by _.....) .:;.. / ... _ l_l_ a_,_l t_te.. _' _' __ "_J _1 J_1_1_ll_tfi _,i2> ___ on
q

e of Texas
19
City's Appendix Tab 1
City of Irving, Texas
Certificate of City Secretary
THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS
CITY OF IRVING
CERTIFICATION
I, Shanae Jennings, City Secretary for the City of Irving, Texas, do hereby certify that I am the
custodian of the records of the City of Irving, Texas, and that the attached document is a true
and correct copy of page 1 (out of 203 total pages) of the petition requesting a Special Election
to amend the city's ordinance to increase homestead exemption for persons sixty-five years of
age or older to 1 00% of the assessed value of the homestead that was submitted to the Office
of the City Secretary on February 10, 2014, with the confidential personal information of the
petition signers redacted.
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL of the City of Irving, Texas this the 21st day of
February, 2014.
f i ~ ~ ~
City Secretary
City of Irving
Name of Petition Clrculator ;k.g 6f..<r ,4. bf/Yt S Page -)_. of2D2- @)
PETITION REQUESTING A CITY OF IRVING SPECIAL ELECTION
As a qualified voter In Irving, Texas, I am requesting that the City of Irving conduct a special election, allowed by Section 11.13(f) of the Texas Tax Code, In
order to amend the current Irving, Texas, Code of Ordinances, Article I, Section 16-3.1, entitled Homestead tax exemption for persons sixty-five years of
age or older", by Increasing the current exemption amount to 10(),.; of the assessed value of the homestead.

Kb6i la4&A li:b
Jill i blYl DeWS
&



A 4
_ -r- . C -

4(\d

Irving 7 S {f(i)

Irving
Irving
Irving 15"oG:o
-oi/1t'
-
/S/1'1

lJ/ Sf /4-
'-fs /tlf
AFFIDAVIT OFCIRCULATOR 'J--, Q /'/. 6 eLJA
STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF DALLAS, BEFORE ME, the undersigned, on this personally appeared i1:l lftLT" f7 " r-'-5 ,
(Name of person who circulated petition) -who being duly sworn, deposes and says: "I called each signer's attention to the above statements and read them
to the signer before the signer affixed their signature to the petition. I witnessed the affixing of each signature. The correct date of signing Is shown on the
petition. I verified each signer's registration status and believe that each signature Is the genuine signature of the person whose name Is signed and that the
corresponding lnformallon lor each signer is
SWOJlA TO AND BEFORE ME THIS DATE It 'f (SEAl)

ll\istering oath
Alo Tit,l. Pt-t
Title of officer .fdmlnlsterlng oath
AMANDA RODRIGUEZ
-...... lc.Sioleot- " Mv CommiSsion Expires
!! bruqrv l A 2017
' . . a
: FEB f 0 2014
City Secretary's Office
City's Appendix Tab 2
AFFIDAVIT OF SHANAE JENNINGS
STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF DALLAS
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Shanae Jennings, who
being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated:
"My name is Shanae Jennings. I am the City Secretary for the City of Irving, Texas. I am
over the age of 18 years. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and am fully
competent and able to testify here, and all the facts and statements herein contained are
true and correct and based upon my personal knowledge.
1. On February 10, 2014, the Irving City Secretary's Office received a voter-initiated
petition requesting a City of Irving special election to amend Article I, Sec. 16-3.1
of Irving's code of ordinances to increase the homestead tax exemption for persons
sixty-five years of age or older to 100% of the assessed value of the homestead.
2. After receipt of the voter-initiated petition, I began to verify the signatures on the
petition on February 11, 2014. In order to verify the petition, I searched the Dallas
County Elections website by the voter identification numbers provided on the voter-
initiated petition to ensure that those individuals are registered voters of the City of
Irving.
3. On February 12, 2014, I completed the petition signature verification. Of the 818
signatures submitted with voter identification numbers, I verified 789 as qualified
voters in Irving.
4. In my capacity as City Secretary, I only verified whether the voter-initiated petition
had the requisite number of signatures. I did not verify whether the voter-initiated
petition was otherwise sufficient or proper.
5. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Further, Affiant sayeth not.
Affidavit of Shanae Jennings
Page 1
This Affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before me on this J/ 9-day of February, 2014.
I have verified the identity of the affiant by a current identification card or other document
used by a state or federal government containing a photograph and the signature of the

affiant.
Affidavit of Shanae Jennings
Page2
lll
Notary Public Signi ture
My Commission Expires
(PERSONALIZED SEAL)
City's Appendix Tab 3
..;:;;w
IRVING
T E X A S
City of Irving, Texas
Certificate of City Secretary
THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS
CITY OF IRVING
CERTIFICATION
'{kolm Bald,;ge
.... Quli t Aw .. d
1\ward Recipient
I, Shanae Jennings, City Secretary for the City of Irving, Texas, do hereby certify that I am the
custodian of the records of the City of Irving, Texas, and that the attached is a true and correct
copy of City of Irving Work Session Council Agenda for Wednesday, February 19, 2014. This
record is a public document kept by me in the regular course of business as my duties as City
Secretary.
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL of the City of Irving, Texas this the 19th day of
February 2014.
Shanae Jennin
City Secretary
City of Irving
City of Irving 1 825 W. lrvi ng Blvd I Irving, TX 75060 I (972) 721-2600 I www.cityofi rving.org
IRVING CITY COUNCIL AGENDA
WORK SESSION
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19,2014
1:00PM
First Floor City Council Conference Room - Civic Center Complex - 825 West Irving Boulevard - Irving, Texas
This meeting can be adjourned and reconvened, If necessary, the following regular business day.
DISCUSSION TOPIC
1 Review of Regular Agenda
2 Affordable Care Act
3 Home Restoration Program
4 Update on Transportation RFP
5 Urban Center Development Requirements
6 Natatorium Update
EXECUTIVE SESSION
7 Economic Development - Consider Economic Incentives for the North Shore
Development
Texas Open Meetings Act 551.087
8 legal Advice- Petition Under Section 11.13, Texas Tax Code
Texas Open Meetings Act 551.071
CERTIFICATION
I, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that this Notice of Meeting was posted on the Kiosk at the City Hall of the City of Irving, Texas,
a place nvenient and readily accessible to the general public at all times, and said Notice was posted by the following date and lime:
14 2 1 ., and remained so posted at least 72 hours before said meeting convened.
Date Notice Removed
ANY ITEM ON THIS POSTED AGENDA COULD BE DISCUSSED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION AS LONG AS IT IS WITHIN
ONE OF THE PERMITTED CATEGORIES UNDER SECTIONS 551.071 THROUGH 551 .076 AND SECTION 551 .087 OF
THE TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE.
This facility is wheel chair accessible and handicap-parking spaces are available. Requests for Interpretation services of
assistive hearing devices must be made 48 hours prior to the meeting. Contact the City Secretary's Office at (972)
721-2493 or (TOO) 1-800-RELAY TX (1-800-735-2989) for assistance.
City's Appendix Tab 4
TAX CODE
TITLE 1. PROPERTY TAX CODE
SUBTITLE C. TAXABLE PROPERTY AND EXEMPTIONS
CHAPTER 11. TAXABLE PROPERTY AND EXEMPTIONS
SUBCHAPTER A. TAXABLE PROPERTY
Sec. 11.13. RESIDENCE HOMESTEAD. (a) A family or single
adult is entitled to an exemption from taxation for the county
purposes authorized in Article VIII, Section 1-a, of the Texas
Constitution of $3,000 of the assessed value of his residence
homestead.
(b) An adult is entitled to exemption from taxation by a
school district of $15,000 of the appraised value of the adult's
residence homestead, except that $10,000 of the exemption does
not apply to an entity operating under former Chapter 17, 18,
25, 26, 27, or 28, Education Code, as those chapters existed on
May 1, 1995, as permitted by Section 11.301, Education Code.
(c) In addition to the exemption provided by Subsection
(b) of this section, an adult who is disabled or is 65 or older
is entitled to an exemption from taxation by a school district
of $10,000 of the appraised value of his residence homestead.
(d) In addition to the exemptions provided by Subsections
(b) and (c) of this section, an individual who is disabled or is
65 or older is entitled to an exemption from taxation by a
taxing unit of a portion (the amount of which is fixed as
provided by Subsection (e) of this section) of the appraised
value of his residence homestead if the exemption is adopted
either:
(1) by the governing body of the taxing unit; or
{2) by a favorable vote of a majority of the
qualified voters of the taxing unit at an election called by the
governing body of a taxing unit, and the governing body shall
call the election on the petition of at least 20 percent of the
number of qualified voters who voted in the preceding election
of the taxing unit.
(e) The amount of an exemption adopted as provided by
Subsection (d) of this section is $3,000 of the appraised value
of the residence homestead unless a larger amount is specified
by:
(1) the governing body authorizing the exemption if
the exemption is authorized as provided by Subdivision (1) of
Subsection (d) of this section; or
(2) the petition for the election if the exemption is
authorized as provided by Subdivision (2) of Subsection (d) of
this section.
(f) Once authorized, an exemption adopted as provided by
Subsection (d) of this section may be repealed or decreased or
increased in amount by the governing body of the taxing unit or
by the procedure authorized by Subdivision (2) of Subsection (d)
of this section. In the case of a decrease, the amount of the
exemption may not be reduced to less than $3,000 of the market
value.
(g) If the residence homestead exemption provided by
Subsection (d) of this section is adopted by a county that
levies a tax for the county purposes authorized by Article VIII,
Section 1-a, of the Texas Constitution, the residence homestead
exemptions provided by Subsections (a) and (d) of this section
may not be aggregated for the county tax purposes. An
individual who is eligible for both exemptions is entitled to
take only the exemption authorized as provided by Subsection (d)
of this section for purposes of that county tax.
(h) Joint, community, or successive owners may not each
receive the same exemption provided by or pursuant to this
section for the same residence homestead in the same year. An
eligible disabled person who is 65 or older may not receive both
a disabled and an elderly residence homestead exemption but may
choose either. A person may not receive an exemption under this
section for more than one residence homestead in the same year.
(i) The assessor and collector for a taxing unit may
disregard the exemptions authorized by Subsection (b), (c), (d),
or (n) of this section and assess and collect a tax pledged for
payment of debt without deducting the amount of the exemption
if:
( 1) prior to adoption of the exemption, the unit
pledged the taxes for the payment of a debt; and
(2) granting the exemption would impair the
obligation of the contract creating the debt.
(j) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Residence homestead" means a structure
(including a mobile home) or a separately secured and occupied
portion of a structure (together with the land, not to exceed 20
acres, and improvements used in the residential occupancy of the
structure, if the structure and the land and improvements have
identical ownership) that:
(A) is owned by one or more individuals, either
directly or through a beneficial interest in a qualifying trust;
(B) is designed or adapted for human residence;
(C) is used as a residence; and
(D) is occupied as his principal residence by an
owner or, for property owned through a beneficial interest in a
qualifying trust, by a trustor of the trust who qualifies for
the exemption.
(2) "Trustor" means a person who transfers an
interest in residential property to a qualifying trust, whether
by deed or by will, or the person's spouse.
(3) "Qualifying trust" means a trust:
(A) in which the agreement, will, or court order
creating the trust provides that the trustor of the trust or the
beneficiary of the trust if created by court order has the right
to use and occupy as the trustor's or beneficiary's principal
residence residential property rent free and without charge
except for taxes and other costs and expenses specified in the
instrument or court order:
(i) for life;
(ii) for the lesser of life or a term of
years; or
(iii) until the date the trust is revoked
or terminated by an instrument or court order that describes the
property with sufficient certainty to identify it and is
recorded in the real property records of the county in which the
property is located; and
(B) that acquires the property in an instrument
of title or under a court order that:
(i) describes the property with sufficient
certainty to identify it and the interest acquired;
(ii) is recorded in the real property
records of the county in which the property is located; and
(iii) in the case of a trust that is not
created by court order, is executed by the trustor or the
personal representative of the trustor.
(k) A qualified residential structure does not lose its
character as a residence homestead if a portion of the structure
is rented to another or is used primarily for other purposes
that are incompatible with the owner's residential use of the
structure. However, the amount of any residence homestead
exemption does not apply to the value of that portion of the
structure that is used primarily for purposes that are
incompatible with the owner's residential use.
(1) A qualified residential structure does not lose its
character as a residence homestead when the owner who qualifies
for the exemption temporarily stops occupying it as a principal
residence if that owner does not establish a different principal
residence and the absence is:
(1) for a period of less than two years and the owner
intends to return and occupy the structure as the owner's
principal residence; or
(2) caused by the owner's:
(A) military service outside of the United
States as a member of the armed forces of the United States or
of this state; or
(B) residency in a facility that provides
services related to health, infirmity, or aging.
(m) In this section:
(1) "Disabled" means under a disability for purposes
of payment of disability insurance benefits under Federal Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance.
(2) "School district" means a political subdivision
organized to provide general elementary and secondary public
education. ''School district" does not include a junior college
district or a political subdivision organized to provide special
education services.
(n) In addition to any other exemptions provided by this
section, an individual is entitled to an exemption from taxation
by a taxing unit of a percentage of the appraised value of his
residence homestead if the exemption is adopted by the governing
body of the taxing unit before July 1 in the manner provided by
law for official action by the body. If the percentage set by
the taxing unit produces an exemption in a tax year of less than
$5,000 when applied to a particular residence homestead, the
individual is entitled to an exemption of $5,000 of the
appraised value. The percentage adopted by the taxing unit may
not exceed 20 percent.
(o) For purposes of this section, a residence homestead
also may consist of an interest in real property created through
ownership of stock in a corporation incorporated under the
Cooperative Association Act (Article 1396-50.01, Vernon's Texas
Civil Statutes) to provide dwelling places to its stockholders
if:
(1) the interests of the stockholders of the
corporation are appraised separately as provided by Section
23.19 of this code in the tax year to which the exemption
applies;
(2) ownership of the stock entitles the owner to
occupy a dwelling place owned by the corporation;
(3) the dwelling place is a structure or a separatel y
secured and occupied portion of a structure; and
(4) the dwelling place is occupied as his principal
residence by a stockholder who qualifies for the exemption.
(p) Exemption under this section for a homestead described
by Subsection (o) of this section extends only to the dwelling
place occupied as a residence homestead and to a portion of the
total common area used in the residential occupancy that is
equal to the percentage of the total amount of the stock issued
by the corporation that is owned by the homestead claimant. The
size of a residence homestead under Subsection (o) of this
section, including any relevant portion of common area, may not
exceed 20 acres.
(q) The surviving spouse of an individual who qualifies
for an exemption under Subsection (d) for the residence
homestead of a person 65 or older is entitled to an exemption
for the same property from the same taxing unit in an amount
equal to that of the exemption for which the deceased spouse
qualified if:
(1) the deceased spouse died in a year in which the
deceased spouse qualified for the exemption;
(2) the surviving spouse was 55 or older when the
deceased spouse died; and
(3) the property was the residence homestead of the
surviving spouse when the deceased spouse died and remains the
residence homestead of the surviving spouse.
(r) An individual who receives an exemption under
Subsection (d) is not entitled to an exemption under Subsection
( q)
(s) Expired.
Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 2234, ch. 841, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1,
1980. Amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., 1st C.S., p. 127, ch.
13, Sec. 31, eff. Jan. 1, 1982; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 4822,
ch. 851, Sec. 6, eff. Aug. 29, 1983; Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch.
301, Sec. 1, eff. June 7, 1985; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 547,
Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 20, Sec.
18, eff. Aug. 26, 1991; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 20, Sec.
19(a}, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 391, Sec.
14; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 347, Sec. 4.08, eff. May 31,
1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 854, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994;
Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 76, Sec. 15.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1995;
Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 610, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Acts
1997, 75th Leg., ch. 194, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 1997,
75th Leg., ch. 592, Sec. 2.01; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1039,
Sec. 6, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1059, Sec.
2, eff. June 19, 1997; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1071, Sec. 28,
eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1199, Sec. 1,
eff. June 18, 1999; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1481, Sec. 1,
eff. Jan. 1, 2000; Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 240, Sec. 1, eff.
June 18, 2003.
Amended by:
Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 159, Sec. 1, eff. January 1,
2006.
City's Appendix Tab 5
THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 8. TAXATION AND REVENUE
Sec. 1-b. RESIDENCE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. (a) Three
Thousand Dollars ($3,000) of the assessed taxable value of all
residence homesteads of married or unmarried adults, male or
female, including those living alone, shall be exempt from all
taxation for all State purposes.
(b) The governing body of any county, city, town, school
district, or other political subdivision of the State may exempt
by its own action not less than Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000)
of the market value of residence homesteads of persons, married
or unmarried, including those living alone, who are under a
disability for purposes of payment of disability insurance
benefits under Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance or its successor or of married or unmarried persons
sixty-five (65) years of age or older, including those living
alone, from all ad valorem taxes thereafter levied by the
political subdivision. As an alternative, upon receipt of a
petition signed by twenty percent (20%) of the voters who voted
in the last preceding election held by the political
subdivision, the governing body of the subdivision shall call an
election to determine by majority vote whether an amount not
less than Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) as provided in the
petition, of the market value of residence homesteads of
disabled persons or of persons sixty-five (65) years of age or
over shall be exempt from ad valorem taxes thereafter levied by
the political subdivision. An eligible disabled person who is
sixty-five (65) years of age or older may not receive both
exemptions from the same political subdivision in the same year
but may choose either if the subdivision has adopted both.
Where any ad valorem tax has theretofore been pledged for the
payment of any debt, the taxing officers of the political
subdivision shall have authority to continue to levy and collect
the tax against the homestead property at the same rate as the
tax so pledged until the debt is discharged, if the cessation of
the levy would impair the obligation of the contract by which
the debt was created.
(c) Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000) of the market value
of the residence homestead of a married or unmarried adult,
including one living alone, is exempt from ad valorem taxation
for general elementary and secondary public school purposes.
The legislature by general law may provide that all or part of
the exemption does not apply to a district or political
subdivision that imposes ad valorem taxes for public education
purposes but is not the principal school district providing
general elementary and secondary public education throughout its
territory. In addition to this exemption, the legislature by
general law may exempt an amount not to exceed Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000) of the market value of the residence homestead
of a person who is disabled as defined in Subsection (b) of this
section and of a person sixty-five (65) years of age or older
from ad valorem taxation for general elementary and secondary
public school purposes. The legislature by general law may base
the amount of and condition eligibility for the additional
exemption authorized by this subsection for disabled persons and
for persons sixty-five (65) years of age or older on economic
need. An eligible disabled person who is sixty-five (65) years
of age or older may not receive both exemptions from a school
district but may choose either. An eligible person is entitled
to receive both the exemption required by this subsection for
all residence homesteads and any exemption adopted pursuant to
Subsection (b) of this section, but the legislature shall
provide by general law whether an eligible disabled or elderly
person may receive both the additional exemption for the elderly
and disabled authorized by this subsection and any exemption for
the elderly or disabled adopted pursuant to Subsection (b) of
this section. Where ad valorem tax has previously been pledged
for the payment of debt, the taxing officers of a school
district may continue to levy and collect the tax against the
value of homesteads exempted under this subsection until the
debt is discharged if the cessation of the levy would impair the
obligation of the contract by which the debt was created. The
legislature shall provide for formulas to protect school
districts against all or part of the revenue loss incurred by
the implementation of Article VIII, Sections 1-b(c), 1-b(d), and
1-d-1, of this constitution. The legislature by general law may
define residence homestead for purposes of this section.
(d) Except as otherwise provided by this subsection, if a
person receives a residence homestead exemption prescribed by
Subsection (c) of this section for homesteads of persons who are
sixty-five (65) years of age or older or who are disabled, the
total amount of ad valorem taxes imposed on that homestead for
general elementary and secondary public school purposes may not
be increased while it remains the residence homestead of that
person or that person's spouse who receives the exemption. If a
person sixty-five (65) years of age or older dies in a year in
which the person received the exemption, the total amount of ad
valorem taxes imposed on the homestead for general elementary
and secondary public school purposes may not be increased while
it remains the residence homestead of that person's surviving
spouse if the spouse is fifty-five (55) years of age or older at
the time of the person's death, subject to any exceptions
provided by general law. The legislature, by general law, may
provide for the transfer of all or a proportionate amount of a
limitation provided by this subsection for a person who
qualifies for the limitation and establishes a different
residence homestead. However, taxes otherwise limited by this
subsection may be increased to the extent the value of the
homestead is increased by improvements other than repairs or
improvements made to comply with governmental requirements and
except as may be consistent with the transfer of a limitation
under this subsection. For a residence homestead subject to the
limitation provided by this subsection in the 1996 tax year or
an earlier tax year, the legislature shall provide for a
reduction in the amount of the limitation for the 1997 tax year
and subsequent tax years in an amount equal to $10,000
multiplied by the 1997 tax rate for general elementary and
secondary public school purposes applicable to the residence
homestead.
(d-1) Notwithstanding Subsection (d) of this section, the
legislature by general law may provide for the reduction of the
amount of a limitation provided by that subsection and
applicable to a residence homestead for the 2007 tax year to
reflect any reduction from the 2006 tax year in the tax rate for
general elementary and secondary public school purposes
applicable to the homestead. A general law enacted under this
subsection may also take into account any reduction in the tax
rate for those purposes from the 2005 tax year to the 2006 tax
year if the homestead was subject to the limitation in the 2006
tax year. A general law enacted under this subsection may
provide that, except as otherwise provided by Subsection (d) of
this section, a limitation provided by that subsection that is
reduced under the general law continues to apply to the
residence homestead in subsequent tax years until the limitation
expires.
(e) The governing body of a political subdivision, other
than a county education district, may exempt from ad valorem
taxation a percentage of the market value of the residence
homestead of a married or unmarried adult, including one living
alone. In the manner provided by law, the voters of a county
education district at an election held for that purpose may
exempt from ad valorem taxation a percentage of the market value
of the residence homestead of a married or unmarried adult,
including one living alone. The percentage may not exceed
twenty percent. However, the amount of an exemption authorized
pursuant to thi s subsection may not be less than Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000) unless the legislature by general law
prescribes other monetary restrictions on the amount of the
exemption. An eligible adult is entitled to receive other
applicable exemptions provided by law. Where ad valorem tax has
previously been pledged for the payment of debt, the governing
body of a political subdivision may continue to levy and collect
the tax against the value of the homesteads exempted under this
subsection until the debt is discharged if the cessation of the
levy would impair the obligation of the contract by which the
debt was created. The legislature by general law may prescribe
procedures for the administration of residence homestead
exemptions.
(e-1) Expired.
(f) The surviving spouse of a person who received an
exemption under Subsection (b) of this section for the residence
homestead of a person sixty-five (65) years of age or older is
entitled to an exemption for the same property from the same
political subdivision in an amount equal to that of the
exemption received by the deceased spouse if the deceased spouse
died in a year in which the deceased spouse received the
exemption, the surviving spouse was fifty-five (55) years of age
or older when the deceased spouse died, and the property was the
residence homestead of the surviving spouse when the deceased
spouse died and remains the residence homestead of the surviving
spouse. A person who receives an exemption under Subsection (b)
of this section is not entitled to an exemption under this
subsection. The legislature by general law may prescribe
procedures for the administration of this subsection.
(g) If the legislature provides for the transfer of all or
a proportionate amount of a tax limitation provided by
Subsection (d) of this section for a person who qualifies for
the limitation and subsequently establishes a different
residence homestead, the legislature by general law may
authorize the governing body of a school district to elect to
apply the law providing for the transfer of the tax limitation
to a change of a person's residence homestead that occurred
before that law took effect, subject to any restrictions
provided by general law. The transfer of the limitation may
apply only to taxes imposed in a tax year that begins after the
tax year in which the election is made.
(h) The governing body of a county, a city or town, or a
junior college district by official action may provide that if a
person who is disabled or is sixty-five (65) years of age or
older receives a residence homestead exemption prescribed or
authorized by this section, the total amount of ad valorem taxes
imposed on that homestead by the county, the city or town, or
the junior college district may not be increased while it
remains the residence homestead of that person or that person's
spouse who is disabled or sixty-five (65) years of age or older
and receives a residence homestead exemption on the homestead.
As an alternative, on receipt of a petition signed by five
percent (5%) of the registered voters of the county, the city or
town, or the junior college district, the governing body of the
county, the city or town, or the junior college district shall
call an election to determine by majority vote whether to
establish a tax limitation provided by this subsection. If a
county, a city or town, or a junior college district establishes
a tax limitation provided by this subsection and a disabled
person or a person sixty-five (65) years of age or older dies in
a year in which the person received a residence homestead
exemption, the total amount of ad valorem taxes imposed on the
homestead by the county, the city or town, or the junior college
district may not be increased while it remains the residence
homestead of that person's surviving spouse if the spouse is
fifty-five (55) years of age or older at the time of the
person's death, subject to any exceptions provided by general
law. The legislature, by general law, may provide for the
transfer of all or a proportionate amount of a tax limitation
provided by this subsection for a person who qualifies for the
limitation and establishes a different residence homestead
within the same county, within the same city or town, or within
the same junior college district. A county, a city or town, or a
junior college district that establishes a tax limitation under
this subsection must comply with a law providing for the
transfer of the limitation, even if the legislature enacts the
law subsequent to the county's, the city's or town's, or the
junior college district's establishment of the limitation. Taxes
otherwise limited by a county, a city or town, or a junior
college district under this subsection may be increased to the
extent the value of the homestead is increased by improvements
other than repairs and other than improvements made to comply
with governmental requirements and except as may be consistent
with the transfer of a tax limitation under a law authorized by
this subsection. The governing body of a county, a city or town,
or a junior college district may not repeal or rescind a tax
limitation established under this subsection.
(i) The legislature by general law may exempt from ad
valorem taxation all or part of the market value of the
residence homestead of a disabled veteran who is certified as
having a service-connected disability with a disability rating
of 100 percent or totally disabled and may provide additional
eligibility requirements for the exemption. For purposes of
this subsection, "disabled veteran" means a disabled veteran as
described by Section 2(b) of this article.
(j) The legislature by general law may provide that the
surviving spouse of a 100 percent or totally disabled veteran
who qualified for an exemption in accordance with Subsection (i)
of this section from ad valorem taxation of all or part of the
market value of the disabled veteran's residence homestead when
the disabled veteran died is entitled to an exemption from ad
valorem taxation of the same portion of the market value of the
same property to which the disabled veteran's exemption applied
if:
(1) the surviving spouse has not remarried since the
death of the disabled veteran; and
(2) the property:
(A) was the residence homestead of the surviving
spouse when the d i sabled veteran died; and
(B) remains the residence homestead of the
surviving spouse.
(k) The l egislature by general l aw may provide that if a
surviving spouse who qualifies for an exemption in accordance
with Subsection (j) of this section subsequently qualifies a
different property as the surviving spouse's residence
homestead, the surviving spouse is entitled to an exemption from
ad valorem taxation of the subsequently qualified homestead in
an amount equal to the dollar amount of the exemption from ad
valorem taxation of the former homestead in accordance with
Subsection (j) of this section in the last year in which the
surviving spouse received an exemption in accordance with that
subsection for that homestead if the surviving spouse has not
remarried since the death of the disabled veteran.
(Added Nov. 2, 1948; Subsec. (b) added Nov. 7, 1972; Subsecs.
(a) and (b) amended Nov. 6, 1973; Subsec. (b) amended and (c)
and (d) added Nov. 7, 1978; Subsecs. (e) and (e-1) added Nov. 3,
1981; Subsec. (e-1) expired Jan. 2, 1982; Subsec. (d) amended
Nov. 3, 1987; Subsecs. (b) and (e) amended Aug. 10, 1991;
Subsec. (f) added Nov. 7, 1995; Subsecs. (c) and (d) amended
Aug. 9, 1997; Subsec. (g) added Nov. 4, 1997; Subsec. (b)
amended Nov. 2, 1999; Subsec. (d) amended and (h) added Sept.
13, 2003; Subsec. (d-1) added May 12, 2007; Subsec. (i) added
Nov. 6, 2007; Subsecs. (j) and (k) added Nov. 8, 2011.)
(TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 1-b: see Appendix,
Notes 1 and 5. )
City's Appendix Tab 6
AFFIDAVIT OF MAX DUPLANT, C.P.A.
STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF DALLAS
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Max Duplant, C.P.A., who
being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated:
"My name is Max Duplant. I am the Chief Financial Officer for the City of Irving, Texas
and a Certified Public Accountant. I am over the age of 18 years. I have personal
knowledge of the following facts and am fully competent and able to testify here, and all
the facts and statements herein contained are true and correct and based upon my personal
knowledge.
1. The City of Irving has outstanding bond obligations in the principal amount of over
$349 million, through the year 2033, to which the ad valorem tax has been pledged.
2. If the voter-initiated petition were approved, the City's ability to repay its $349
million of debt obligations would be impaired or present undue hardship on other
taxpayers.
3. If persons 65 years or older were to receive 100% ad valorem tax exemption on their
residential homesteads in Irving, depending on the future influx of persons 65 or
older, this could result in a potential financial burden to the City that is
unquantifiable.
4. The voter-initiated petition if approved would harm the City's ability to repay its
existing bond indebtedness and would result in harm to other taxpayers.
5. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Further, Affiant sayeth not.
Affidavit of Max Duplant, C.P.A.
Page 1
This Affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before me on this Jl ':)'day of February, 2014.
I have verified the identity of the affiant by a current identification card or other document
used by a state or federal government containing a photograph and the signature of the
affiant. J I . '
'1 b u ~ ~ r&/ l o.itUuu
Affidavit of Max Duplant, C.P.A.
Page2
Notary Public Signat e
1-J lf -J.o/7
My Commission Expires
(PERSONALIZED SEAL)