Kantian Robotics: Building a Robot to Understand Kants Transcendental Turn

Lawrence M. Hinman
Department of !ilosop!" Uni#ersit" of $an Diego %&&' (lcal) ar* $an Diego+ ,( &-../0-1&2.&0-2/013'3 4a5: 2.&0-2/0%&%/ 60mail: !inman7sandiego.edu

Kantian Robotics: Building a Robot to Understand Kants Transcendental Turn

(bstract
Kants transcendental turn is notoriously difficult to teach to students; by using a thought-experiment about building a robot, we can begin to understand the inner logic of the transcendental turn. In this paper, I argue that the problems that Kant faced in the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason are the same problems that computer scientists face in the design of a robot. Understanding the basic steps in designing a robot can help students in understanding the Transcendental nalytic and the Transcendental !eduction of the "ategories in the first Kritik. ll incoming #isual data needs to be

$stamped% with a time and place stamp if they are to be meaningful; or, to put it in Kants language, space and time are a priori forms of intuition. &urthermore, indi#idual pieces of data then must be related to one another according to certain basic rules. &or example, there must be some basic rule that #arious pictures of an ob'ect are pictures of the same ob'ect; in Kants words, the concept of a physical ob'ect is an a priori category of the understanding and a necessary condition of the possibility of any meaningful experience at all. Thin(ing about designing an elementary robot can help us to understand Kants transcendental turn. In so doing, we can begin to understand Kant as a

precursor of the computational turn that has characteri)ed recent wor( in information philosophy. *oreo#er, thin(ing about Kants transcendental turn in terms of elementary robotics allows us to understand the magnitude of the challenge that faced Kant+ imagine if we were robots, how could we disco#er and pro#e the #alidity of our own a priori structures of sensation and understanding,

8ntroduction
Teaching Kants first criti-ue can be notoriously difficult. The Kantian #ersion of the "opernican re#olution challenges students to thin( in new ways about human sub'ecti#ity and the nature of ob'ecti#ity, and Kants language certainly challenges them to read with an extraordinarily high le#el of attention to detail. Indeed, for many, the language can be so daunting that they simply gi#e up before they get to the good part.the intrinsic rewards of mastering a difficult philosophical text. /ere is a Gendankenexperiment, a thought-experiment, which may pro#e helpful in drawing students into the basic arguments of the transcendental analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason. Thin(ing through the process of building a robot forces us to ha#e many of the insights that Kant de#elops in the transcendental analytic and the first part of the transcendental dialectic. The purpose of this analogy is to help students understand the transcendental turn, not to ad#ance Kant scholarship, although I thin( the analogy raises some interesting -uestions about Kants position.i

Building the Robot

Imagine that you are as(ed to build a robot that will mo#e about a room and manipulate ob'ects. 0ets name this robot Immanuel.

8+ 8mmanuel
T!e Brain

age -

1e can begin to construct Immanuel by starting with a $brain%.typically a 2" that will act as the central processing unit. 3ut initially this will be of little use+ imagine a computer with no (eyboard, no mouse, no screen, no printer, etc.. only a power cord. It can run, but it would be completely isolated. 4pistemologically, this is solipsism; psychologically, it is more extreme than autism. "learly, for the computer to do anything, it must ha#e some ways of getting data 5input6 and some ways of displaying its results 5output6. The problem of the first Critique is the input problem. The output problem belongs to the second Critique.

Transcendental (est!etic: T!e 4orms of 8ntuition

If this robot is to be mobile and able to manipulate its en#ironment, one of the first things we need to do is to gi#e it ways of sensing that en#ironment. 1e might want to begin with a typically human mode of sensing the en#ironment+ sight. In order to gi#e Immanuel #ision, we need to hoo( up a camera to the 2". Imagine that the camera deli#ers a series of pictures, li(e frames in a mo#ie, to the central processing unit. If Immanuel 'ust had millions of snapshots cluttering up his memory, he would be totally confused. s the images come in, he needs

to process each one of them in two ways. &irst, he needs to apply a time7date stamp to each image, so that it is possible to figure out which comes before and which comes after. 8therwise he would ha#e no idea of the relationship between any two images. 9otice that at this stage 5before he tries to communicate with

8+ 8mmanuel

age 9

any other robots6, Immanuel does not need any more sophisticated notion of time than $before% and $after.% :econd, Immanuel needs to put some (ind of place or location stamp on each of these images. 1hat would that loo( li(e, If Immanuel were stationary, it would be sufficient to stamp each image with the number of degrees of rotation from a central axis 5e.g., ;<= left or >?;= right from the central axis6 that the camera has when it is ta(ing the picture. /owe#er, if Immanuel is to be mobile, then presumably some system that is less Immanuel-centric would be appropriate. If Immanuel were to stay in a single s-uare room, then his location could be plotted on a simple two or three dimensional grid, depending on whether his ele#ation could change or not. Today we would probably use a @2: de#ice to pro#ide the coordinates from which the picture was ta(en as well as the direction in which the camera was pointed, and all of this would e#entually be measured in three dimensional spatial coordinates 5longitude, latitude, ele#ation6.

T!e (s"mmetr" of $pace and Time

It is interesting to note that there is an asymmetrical relationship between space and time for the mobile robot. The mobile robot can use a purely internal or agent-centered time system 5$before% and $after%6 without encountering any problems, but it cannot use a purely internal or agent-centered spatial system 5$left% and $right%6 if it is mobile. 4ach incoming picture, in other words, needs both a time and place stamp put on it as it comes in.or, as Kant would put it, space and time are necessary forms of intuition. If Immanuel had a picture without these stamps, he would

8+ 8mmanuel

age 1

ha#e to discard it simply because he wouldnt (now where to put it. It could not count as experience, in Kants language, until it had a time and place stamp on it. It would not be coherent because, without those stamps, there would be no way that we could determine how it should cohere with the other incoming pictures. 58b#iously, #ision wont be the only sense+ hearing, smell, touch, and taste may also be added here. *oreo#er, once we ha#e multiple sources of sensory data, then the need for a common sense A sensus communusB becomes e#ident+ all these #arious sensory inputs need to be stitched together or related to one another. Ta(en together, in computer language these comprise Immanuels 3asic Input-8utput :ystem or 3I8:.6 Thin(ing about building a robot in this way may help students to see more clearly what Kant meant when he said that space and time were necessary forms of intuition. The incoming pictures can be li(ened to intuitions, and the necessary forms of intuition 5space and time6 correspond to the way in which each of these incoming pictures must recei#e a stamp indicating location and time. Thus, to say that space and time are necessary forms of intuition is to say that incoming data must be stamped to indicate the location and time of the incoming data. . Interestingly, we can see in this example of building a robot the priority of time o#er space, a point that /eidegger among others has made central to his reading of Kant. "learly, incoming data has to be $stamped% in regard to both space and time, but.as mentioned abo#e.the structure of the spatial stamp changes, depending on whether the robot is stationary or mobile. If the robot is stationary, it needs no sense of place, that is, no sense of its changing location

8+ 8mmanuel
#is-C-#is ob'ects outside of itself.

age %
n immobile robot merely needs to note the

coordinates of those ob'ects. 8nce it begins to mo#e, howe#er, it needs to (now where it is 5the sense of place6, and this in turn presupposes that it (nows what time it is 5i.e., where it is along a temporal continuum, brac(eted by $before% and $after.6. lthough Immanuels sense of place is optional, depending on whether he is mobile or not, his sense of time is not. /e is always necessarily already in time, already dating things with a $before% and $after.% 8ddly, there is no temporal mobility in the same sense that there is spatial mobility. Immanuel can mo#e across the room, going from 2oint to 2oint 3, or not do so. 9o such

option in a#ailable in regard to time. Immanuel simply mo#es through time at a constant rate which he can neither slow down nor accelerate. /e always has a sense of $now% in a way which is different from his sense of $here.%

Categories of the Understanding

8f course, when we tal( about incoming $pictures,% this is in fact #ery misleading. The term $picture% implies a le#el of coherence to these data that they dont initially possess. Dather, the incoming data are 'ust a series of pixels or dots of #arious colors. 0et me illustrate the problem in two ways. &irst, for those who ha#e used image processing programs 5such as 2hotoshop6, they may ha#e encountered the following problem. Imagine telling the program to trace, say, the outline of one person in the photo 5so that you can then copy that portion of the photo alone and paste it into another document6. /uman beings do this -uite easily, but computers ha#e an extraordinarily difficult

8+ 8mmanuel
time distinguishing between the figure and the bac(ground. ll computer

age 2

programs $see% are pixels, points of color; they dont see people or meaningful shapes. If there is a sharp difference between the person and the rest of the picture, the computer program can successfully trace it because it can see the differences between the colors. This is not true if there is not a sharp color difference, for the computer program has no meaningful concept of an ob'ect. It only $sees% pixels. :econd, engineers who ha#e put robots on assembly lines ha#e encountered a #ariant of this same problem. 0ets say that the robots 'ob was hexagonal nuts into two categories+ E% and ;7F% si)es. The difficulty that the robot faces is that nuts can loo( -uite different, depending on the angle from which they are #iewed. This is all the more difficult if the nuts are piled on top of one another. /uman beings can distinguish these with comparati#e ease 5and great boredom6, but computers ha#e a #ery difficult time. :b;ects+ $ameness+ and $ubstance. The first step in sol#ing these (inds of problems is that computers ha#e to be programmed to see the world 5i.e., incoming data6 in terms of ob'ects. 1ithout the concept of a physical ob'ect, the world is utterly chaotic. This has to be written into the computers software at the most basic le#el. Incoming data 5with its time7place stamp6 has to be processed in terms of ob'ects before it can ma(e any sense at all. In other words, #ery low-le#el software would ha#e to be written for the robot to insure that it structured incoming data in a particular way, namely, that it loo(s for continuity o#er a series of $pictures% by loo(ing for ob'ects that remain the same

8+ 8mmanuel

age 3

across time e#en though we may ha#e different spatial perspecti#es on those ob'ects so that they dont loo( identical from one frame to another. Thin(ing about these issues in terms of how we would structure a robots incoming data is helpful in terms of understanding what Kant means by a priori and $transcendental.% Kant argues that certain concepts are not deri#ed from experience 5that is, they are not a posteriori6, but rather they are prior to experience. &or example, the idea that ob'ects persist o#er time is not something that we learn from experience. In fact, sensation 5that is, the raw incoming data6 simply pro#ides us with an unending stream of data, each of which contains a time7place stamp. :uch data only become meaningful when they are organi)ed or structured according to certain rules, such as the notion that there are physical ob'ects that persist o#er time. This is a notion that we impose on experience, a notion that we use to structure incoming data in order to ma(e those data meaningful. It is prior to experience.in other words, a priori.and necessary if we are to structure experience in a meaningful way. It is a necessary condition of the possibility of ha#ing meaningful experience at all, and this is what Kant means by $transcendental.% "onsider two examples of this. "hildren sometimes wonder whether the light remains on when the refrigerator door is closed. 3ut we could wonder e#en more radically about this. 8nce the door of the refrigerator is closed, do the things inside continue to exist, 8f course, we say, but in fact we dont see those ob'ects while the door is closed, and neither would a robot. 1e ha#e to $teach% 5i.e., program6 the robot that these ob'ects continue to exist within the

8+ 8mmanuel

age '

refrigerator, e#en when there is no incoming data that indicate their existence. This programming has to exist before experience rather than be deduced from it. "onsider a second example. Imagine two photos, each of which depicts the same ob'ect from a slightly different perspecti#e. /owe#er, considered as incoming data, they are #ery different. 4ach photo is composed of a number of pixels or dots of color. Imagine that we were to draw a grid o#er each photo, di#iding it into thousands of tiny s-uares of color. :ameness on the le#el of incoming data occurs when the same pixel within each grid has the same color. nytime there is e#en a small change in the color, that pixel is no longer the same. 1e could easily imagine two photos being of the same ob'ect but, on the le#el of pixels, the two would be -uite different. The challenge in ob'ectrecognition computer programming is to write a set of rules that will allow the computer to determine when two ob'ects are the same and when they are not. The Kantian point about the categories of the understanding here is that these rules ha#e to be in place before experience. It is also easy to see the incoherence of a world without physical ob'ects. Imagine loo(ing across the room and seeing a boo( on a des(. 9ow mo#e a few feet to the side and loo( at the same des( and boo(. 1e automatically stitch these images together in our mind, identifying it as the same boo( and the same des(, e#en though both of them now loo( different because we are #iewing them from different angles. 1ithout this automatic wor( of stitching together these different perspecti#es into #iews of the same ob'ects, each moment of experience would be uni-ue and incomparable with any other. There must be

8+ 8mmanuel
something that stands underneath this series of pictures and stitches them

age &

together, as it were, as the same ob'ect. This is the 2rinciple of 2ermanence of :ubstance that Kant discusses in the :ystem of ll 2rinciples of 2ure Understanding in 3oo( II of the Transcendental nalytic.

,ause and 6ffect

second necessary category of the understanding is that of cause and effect. $4xperience itself.in other words, empirical (nowledge of appearances .is thus possible,% Kant argues, $only in so far as we sub'ect the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, to the law of causality.% 53?;G6 0ets consider this in terms of our robot. s Immanuel $loo(s% around a room, he recei#es a series of changing pictures. 8ne of the (ey distinctions that the robot has to draw is between those changes which occur because of his mo#ement 5presuming for the moment that Immanuel, li(e human beings, can turn his head, mo#e around the room, etc.6 and which changes occur because the ob'ects themsel#es are changing. The concept of substance accomplishes part of this 'ob, but not all of it. 1e must also ha#e some rule for interpreting these pictures that indicates how one ob'ect affects another, a law of cause and effect. Kants point is that the concept of causal connection is not a concept that we deri#e from experience; rather, it is a concept that we impose prior to experience as a condition of its possibility.

8+ 8mmanuel
T!e ,ategories of t!e Understanding

age ./

1e can now see the general outline of the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of our robot analogy. ll incoming data must first be gi#en a

time and place stamp, that is, they must be subsumed under space and time as forms of intuition. Then they must be organi)ed by certain basic concepts.such as substance and cause-and-effect.in order to be meaningful to us. This second-le#el of organi)ation in#ol#es what Kant calls the categories of the understanding, a set of twel#e categories 5highly reminiscent of ristotles categories6 by means of which incoming data 5with a time-place stamp6 is transformed into meaningful experience. The transcendental deduction of the categories of the understanding is Kants attempt to show that these twel#e categories are necessary structures of the mind that are imposed prior to experience.indeed, that they ha#e to be imposed on incoming data before those data can count as meaningful experience.

,onclusion: Kants Transcendental Turn

The robot analogy helps us to understand Kants transcendental turn more easily. Kant is saying that there are certain basic structures.forms of intuition 5space and time6 and categories of the understanding 5substance, cause-andeffect6.that are necessary structures that the mind must impose on experience for it to be meaningful at all. Kants point is that these structures are not deri#ed from experience 5as the empiricists would ha#e it6, but rather are prior to experience 5a priori6 and thus constituti#e of it. Het they are not arbitrary.it is

8+ 8mmanuel

age ..

necessary that all incoming data be sub'ected to these structures.and they do not #ary from one indi#idual to the next. Thus they are sub'ecti#e in one sense 5they come from the sub'ect6, but they are not sub'ecti#e in the ordinary sense of that term. They do not #ary from one sub'ect to the next. They are necessary structures of experience that come from the sub'ect as necessary conditions of the possibility of experience at all. It is precisely this combination of sub'ecti#e 5coming from the sub'ect6 and necessary that constitutes Kants transcendental turn, and it is precisely this which we see in building Immanuel. In order for our robot to function, we ha#e to structure its experience according to something #ery much li(e the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. 1e may, of course, debate whether Kants twel#e categories are all necessary and whether ta(en together they comprise the categories that are 'ointly sufficient for meaningful experience, and such a debate will ta(e us into the heart of the transcendental deduction of the categories of the understanding. t that point, whate#er the specific answers

are to our -uestions, it is clear that we ha#e ta(en Kants transcendental turn.

8+ 8mmanuel

age .-

I ha#e tried to a#oid a number of contro#ersies in Kant interpretation, and I am sure that I ha#e inad#ertently ignored e#en more than I reali)e.