Svetlana Novikova

Philosophy of Buddhism

March 17, 2014

The transcendental conditions of even inquiring into my subjectivity, presuppose that I am a person among persons, and embedded in an external world. (Garfield, p. 228.) Why does Garfield think this? Is he right?

Garfield believes that inquiring into ones own subjectivity presupposes being embedded among persons, because he views any kind of inquiry as a necessarily social activity. An inquiry gets off the ground only if there is a language of inquiry as well as certain practices, such as questioning, justification, and doubt. On Garfields account, both language and practices of inquiry are created by communities of people based on pragmatic considerations and are learned by each individual mind. According to him, neither language nor practices of inquiry can originate within a completely isolated mind. Therefore, concludes Garfield, a community of people is a necessary condition for the existence of an inquiry. However, even if language and practices of inquiry cannot originate in an isolated mind, Garfields conclusion does not follow. After all, Garfields account concerns only the origination of language and inquiry practices, but not their persistence. Once language and practices are in place, a mind can utilize them on its own: we can inquire internally, without interacting with other people. Imagine an isolated eternal mind that has always existed and has always been capable of language and inquiry practices. If such a mind could exist without an origin, then one would not need an explanation for the origin of its various capabilities. Therefore, an eternal mind eternally capable of inquiry could examine its own subjectivity, without necessitating other minds.