BEFORE THE SPECJAL PANEL FOR SERIOUS CRIMES

DEPUTY GENERAL PROSECUTOR FOR SERIPUS CRIMES -AGAINST-

.. -- ...... -.......,.., .

-, ~

.,

,

-

NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS'

UNMJSET

Unircd N'llions Missioll nf Support in F.:~ls1 Timor

DISTRICT COURT OF DI Ll

Case No;

INDICTMENT

WIRANTO

ZACKY ANWAR MAKARIM

KIKf SY AHNAKRI ADAM RACHMAT DAMIRI SUHARTONO SURATMAN MOHAMMAD NOER MUIS

YAYAT SUDRAJAT ABlllO JOSE OSORIO SOARES

ORIGINAL IN ENGLISH

,·1 .

.; j" i ··1 .... , ...

. . I ',

.' ... ~ :.1 :. I

:. : .. ,. ~. :

I.:!" i

-: 1 .~, , -, : . ~

I. iNDICTMENT

1

-wlth-

The Deputy Genera! Prosecutor for Serious Crimes pursuant to her authority under UNTAET Regulattons 2000/16 and 2000/30 as amended by 2001/25 charges:

WIRANTO (1)

ZACKY ANWAR MAKARIM (2) .

KIKI S YAHNAKRI (J) ADAM RAC HMAT DAMI RI (4) SUHARTONO SURATMAN (5} MOHAMMADNOERMU~(~

YAYAT SUDRAJAT (7) ABIL'O JOSE OSORlO SOARES (8)

CRIMES AGAI NST HUMANITY:

MURDERt DEPORTATION and PERSECUTION

II. NAMES AND PARTICULARS OF THE ACCUSED

(1) Name:

Place of Birth:

Date of Birth:

N a ti ona I i ty:

Address:

PosItion held in 1999:

(2) Name:

Place of Srrth:

Date of 81 rth:

N a ti a n a Ii ty:

Address:

Position held ln 1999:

(3) Name:

PI ace of B j rth Date of Birth:

N atlo n a!i ty:

Address:

Pcsltion held in 1999:

WIRANTO . Yogyakarta, lndonesla Aprfl4,1947 Indonesian

Believed to be in Indonesia

Gen e ra I; I ndone S fa n Min is ter of Defe n ce and Security; Commander of the Armed Forces of Indonesia

Zacky Anwar MAKARlM Indonesia

1948

Indonesian

Believed to be in Indonesia

Major General; Head of the Special Team/Adjutant General's Task Force; Member af the Task Farce to Oversee the Pop u I a r Con s ul ta bon in Ea st Timo r

Klkr SYAHNAKRI

Karawang, West Java, lndonesta April 24, 1947

Indanesian

BeHeved to be in lndonesla

Major General; Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of Staff; Commander of the Martral Law Operations Command in East Timor

2

(4)

(5)

Name:

P~ace of Birth:

Dale of Birth:

N a tj 0 n a I i ty:

Address:

Position held in 1999:

Name:

Place of Birth:

Oate of Birth:

N a ti a n a U ty:

Address:

Position held in 1999:

(6)

Name:

Place of Birth:

Dale of 81 rth:

N ati a n a lity:

Address:

Positi 0 n held in 1 999:

(7)

Name:

Place of Birth:

Date of Birth:

N a bon a Ilty:

Address:

Pasibon held in 1999:

(8)

Name:

Place of Birth:

Date of Blrth:

Na no na I ity:

Address:

Position held in 1999:

I

Adam Rae hrnat OAMIRI Bandung. West Java, Indonesia November 29, 1949

Indonesian

Believed to be in lndonesia

Major General; Commander of Regional MiBtary Command IX (Bait, East and West Nusa Tenggara

and East Timor) .

Suhartono SURATMAN

Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia 1952

Indonesian

Be Ii eyed to be in Indo nesla

Colonel; Commander of Sub-Regional Military Command 164 {East Timor} until August 13, 1999

Mohammad Noer MUIS

Kuala Simpang, Aceh, Indonesia 1953

Indonesian

Believed to be in Indonesia

cotonef: Commander of Sub-Regional Military Command 164 (E ast Timor) fro m August 1 3, 1999

Yayat SUORAJAT Indonesia

Not known Indonesian

Belleved to be in In d a nesia

lieutena nt Co lone I; Commander of the T rj b uan a VIII Task Force: Com m a nd er of the Intelligence Task Force Sub-Reglonal Military Command 164 (East Tlmor)

AblUo Jose Osorio SOARES Laclubar, Manatuio, East Timor June 21 1947

East Timorese

Betieved to be in [ndonesla Governor of East Timor

3

1

4

III. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND

1. On December 12, 1975 in response to the lndonesian mihtary intervention during th e preced i ng month S, th e United Na ti on s Gene ra I As sem bly adopte d re sol uti 0 n 3485 which called upon the Government of lndonesia to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of East Timor.

2. On December 22, 1975 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 384 which repeated the caU for the Government of Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces from East Timor.

3. On July 17.1976 the President of the Republic of Indonesia declared East Timor to be th e 27th provi nee of the Repu b lie of I ndones la .

4. The Q ues tion of East Timor con ti n ued to be the sub j e ct of debates with j n the United Nations General Assembly and Security CounciL Efforts to resolve the issue were intensified during 1998, leading to an announcement on January 27, 1999 by the Government of Indonesia that the people of East Timor would be allowed to choose between auto n amy wah in the Re pub U c of I nd on esia or independence.

5. On May 51 1999 an agreement was reached between the Governments of I nd on es ta an d Portugal, and the Un I ted N ano ns upon the process a nd modalities for a popular conscttauon. Included within that agreement and its annexes were the followl n 9 term s:

17h& Government of Indonesia will be f9sponsiblfjJ tor maintaining peace and secunty in East T;mor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out In a fair and peaceful way in en atmosphere free of in ttm ida tion , violence or intelierence from any side. N

"Officials of the Governments of Indonesia and Pot1ugaJ will not participate· in the campajgn In support of eUher option. ~

~ East Timorese government officials may csmpa;gn in their HersonaJ capacity. All such campaigning will be carried out ... without use of public funds and go vemment resources or recourse to pressure of office. ~

"A secure environment devoid of violence or of her forms of intimldaUon ;s B prerequisite for the holding of 8 (ref) and fair ba/Jot in East Timor. Respon s/blJlty to ensure such an en vironmen t 8S waif 8 s for the gen eral maintenance of law end order rests with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The absolute neutrality of the TNI (Armed Forces of Indonesia) and the IndonBsian Pol/eels essenflal in this regard.~

"The police wiU b 6' soJely responsible for the main ten ence of 1a w an d oroer"

6. From December 1975 until October 1999 the Armed Forces of Indonesia were present in the territory of Ea.st Timor. Durlng this time military structures were established and mllita ry personnel deployed within these structures.

THE AR M ED FORCES OF I NOO N ESIA I N EAST TIM OR

7. The Armed F orees' territorial unit in East Timor was Sub-Reglona I Milita ry Command 164 with its headquarters ln Dili. This unit was subordinate to the larger Regional Military Command IX (covering Bali, East and West Nusa T enggara and East Timor) wah its headquarters in BaiL

8. In 1999 territorial and combat military units from outside of Regional Military Command IX were deployed in East Timor. Officers from the Special Forces Command [Komando Pasukan Khusus ~ KOPASSUS] were also assigned to billets in the Sub-Regional Military Command 164.

9. On September 7, 1999 the Government of indonesia declared martial law in East Timor and the Minister of Defence and Security and Commander of the Armed Forces of Indonesia established the Martial Law Operations Command in East Tlrnor.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITIA GROUPS

10. During the period leading up to the popular consultation, indonesian officials established and strengthened clvlllan groups to campaign for the autonomy option. Those groups included both non-vlolentpolltlcal groups and violent miHtja gro ups wh a we re intended to promote the autono m y opti a n in th e pop u la r consuttat I on. I n both ca ses, such 9 rou ps we re esta b lis hed and maintai ned by the active conduct of officials wlthin the Armed Forces of Indonesia [Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - ABRil renamed Tentara Nas;onaf Indones;a ~ TN I from AprU 1 9 9 9. Here afte r "T N III I n a III ns ta ncesj and th e ci lillian gove rn me nt.

11. I n or a bout Au gus t 1998 Ad am Rae h ma t OA M I RI a rra ng ad fo r a pro-I nd a nesian Ea st T I morese I e ada r to fl y from Ea 5t Timor to Den pa sar, BaH fa ram e etl ng. At . this meeting, DAMIRI told the East Tlmorese leader to establlah a group to pro mote integration.

12. In or about August 1998 DAMJRI travelled to Dili and met with TNI commanders and pro-tnconeslen East Timorese leaders. Suhartono SURATMAN was present at this meeting. DAMJR' told the group that international attention was focused on East Timor and this was a problem for Indonesia. He told them that they needed to come up wUh a plan forereating organisations that would spread pro-I n d 0 nes Ian senti m ent throu 9 hout E as t Timor. He to td th e m th a t they must fo rm a solid civil defense force ba sed on previous TN I-suppa rted mode I sand that this force should be expanded and developed to protect integration.

5

13. In or about November ~ 998 DAMIRllravelled to East Timor. During this visit he again met with pro-l ndonesian East Tirnorese readers in Dili. including individuals who later became leaders of militia groups. DAMIR1 asked the men to join together and assist TNI to fight the pro-independence group Revolut~onary Front for an Independent East Timor [Frente RevoJucionar;a de Timor Lesle Independenfe - FR ETILI NJ. During mls meeting wHh pro-Indonesian leaders, DAMIRI praised future militia leader Eurico Guterres as being a young man eager to fight for integration and said that he was wiHing to give Guterres fifty mllllon rupiah to begin his work.

14. In or about November 1998 SURATMAN met with pro-Indonesian East Tlrnorese leaders at his headquarters in Dili. Yayat SUDRAJAT was present at this meeting. SURATMAN told the group that he wanted future militia leader Eurico Guterres to form a new organisation to defend integration similar to the proI ndonesian youth organisation Gada Paks;.

15. tn early 1999 Zacky Anwar MAKARIM received the founding members of the pro-Indonesian East Timor People's Front (Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur - BRTT] at his office in Jakarta. During the meeting he said that guerilla warfare would be necessary to overcome independence supporters if the autonomy option lost at the ballot.

16. In or about February 1999 DAMIRI met wlth pro-Indonesian East Tlmorese leaders at Regional MiUtary Command IX headquarters rn Denpasar. Ball. DAMIRI told the men that TNI was ready to give secret support to proIndonesian forces. He explained that it must be secret in order to avoid international scrutiny and crlticlsm. DAMIRI asked the men to gather East Timorese who had served in TNt. He told them that they should meet with 5 U RATM AN fo r fu rther ins tru ctlons

17. In or about February 1999 SURATMAN met with a pro-Indonesian East Timorese teadsr in Dill. He told him that because TNI was under a reformist regime, it could not take part in open operatlons against the independence movement SURATMAN asked the pro-Indonesian leader to form a militia group. SURATMAN said that TNI was willing to provide any form of assistance required by militia groups.

18- ln or about February 1999 SUDRAJAT met with TNI personnel and prolndoneslan East Tlmorese leaders at Intelligence Task Force headquarters in DiU. SUDRAJAT told the group that the Intelligence Task Force had a list of independence supporters that were to be kUled. He stated that the IntelUgence Task Force and th e pro-l n d 0 nesi an grou ps would co 0 perate to ca rry 0 ut these killings. He said that KQPASSUS dressed as thugs would start to carry out murders of pro-lndependence supporters.

-.

6

19. In or about March 1999 Kiki S YAHNAKRI met with pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders at tN I headquarters in Jakarta. S YAH NAKRI totd the group that TNI would support their pro-lndoneslan efforts and that MAKARIM was respon slbl e for coord in ati ng a ctivi ti e s I e ad i ng up to the pap ul a r co n suit a lion" SYAHNAKRi told them that firearms had been sent to East Timor. and that when the men returned to Oili they should contact SURATMAN to arrange distribution of the nrearm s.

20. In early 1999 AblUo Jose 050rio SOARES issued a written directive to government staff stating that any government employee who supported independence would be sacked from their jobs.

21. I nearly 1999 SOARES encouraged the District Administrators [Bupal/l to form mllltla groups ln their districts- Some of these District Administrators became militia leaders.

22. In or about March 1999 SOARES held a meeting in his office in Dili.

SURATMAN and SUDRAJAT were present at the meeting. SOARES told a group of pro-t ndoneslan East Timorese leaders that independence supporters who sought protection with priests and nuns were communists and ought to be killed. He also told the group that TNI would supply weapons to pro-tndoneslan forces. He said that if TNI could not supply enough weapons, he would do so himself. He said that he would provide the pro-Indonesian organisation BRTI with funding.

23- In or about March 1999 SUDRAJAT and other members of TN I delivered a large number of firearms to a pro-Indonesian East nmorese leader. SUDRAJAT asked the East Timorese leader to give the weapons to pro-Indonesian militia

groups"

24. In or about AprH 1999 MAKARtM told TNI commanders and pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders that they should work hard for autonomy because if autonomy los t, more b too d wo ul d flow. He offered pro -i nd a nesi a n East T lmorese lea de rs the use of automate firearms and ordered SURATMAN to arrange for the coBection and distributlon of these firearms.

25 .. "In or about April 1"999 SURATMAN, after being asked by MAKAR1M to provide a utom atic fi rea rms to p ro ~I nd on es; a n East T lm orese lea d e rs, orde red h ls subordinate SUDRAJAT to arrange for the collectlon and distribution of the

firearms.

26. TNI and civUlan government officials helped estabHsh an umbrella organisation under which all militia groups were organised. The organisation was called the Integration Fighters' Force [Pesukan Peju8ng Intergras/- PPI]. Joao Tavares was the commander of the organisation and Eurlco Guterres was his deputy.

27. On Aprll 17, 1999 PPI organised a raUy In front of the main government building in Dill, SYAHNAKRl, SURATMAN and SOARES were present during the rally.

,

7

I

8

28. ln or about Apr~! of 1999 SOARES requested a nd received Presidential approval to divert 60% [53 billion rupiah] of East Timor's Regional Development Budget to support the "Socia!isation of Autonomy" programme; a progra mme designed to promote pro-Indonesian sentiment in East Timor.

29. After receiving approval to divert funds to the Socialisation of Autonomy programme I SOARES issued a written directive to. all District Adrmnlstrators advising them how the money should be spent. SOARES required that at least 20% of this money be used to support militia groups.

3D. I n or about May 1999 MAKARIM held a meeting in Farol, Dili which included prol ndonesian East Timorese leaders. At the meeting MAKARIM said that if independence won the ballot then querrlllas would be used to create disruption

in East Timor.

31. In or about June 1999 SURATMAN held a meeting at his headquarters in Dili.

He informed a group of TN I sotdters and militia that if autonomy lost in the popular consultation I everything that had been given to East Timor by the Government of I ndonesia had to be destroyed. 5 U RATMAN told them that if independence won, there would be a scorched earth policy so that an independent East Timor would have to start with nothtng. He stated that all forces in East Timor would have to carry out the order.

32, In or about July 1999 SUDRAJAT gave money to a militia group and instructed one of the militia members to go to Roti lsland to buy home made guns.

33. l n the period leadlng up to the popular consultation, the Government of tndonesla and TN! were lnstrurnental in the establishment of pro-l ndonesian militias. They provided trainlngt funding, weapons and other forms of material support to these mnitias. In some districts of East Tjrnor, TN1 commanders appointed thetr TNl subordinates to lead militia groups, in others TN I commanders gave orders and support to the militia groups.

34. During 1999, with the backing of TN ~ and the civil administration, more than 25 militia groups operated throughout East Timor. Thetr goal was to intimidate and persuade the population of East Timor to support the option of autonomy within Indonesia at the popular consultation,

35. Once the militia groups were established, TNI commanders in the dlstrlcts of East Timor ordered and directed the militia in their conduct. The militia groups, with the support and assistance of TNI and acUng together with TNI soldiers, participated in a widespread or systematic attack acting and operating with Impunity.

WI DES P READ 0 R SY STEMA TIC A TTAC K

36, A widespread or systematic attack was dtrected against the civman populatlon in East Timor during 1999. The attack occurred during two interconnected periods of Intensified vlolence. The first period followed the announcement on January 27, 1999 by the Government of Indonesia of the popular consultation. This period ended on September4, 1 999, the date of the announcement of the result of t he po pula r con sui tenon in wh ich 78.5 per ce nt voted aga i ns t the auto nom y o plio n. Th e secon d pe ri od foBowed the a nne u ncemen t of th e res un of th e pop u! a r co nsulta t Ion on September 4, 1999 th roug h to Octo ber 25. 1 999.

37. The widespread or systemaUc attack was carried out by the cooperative action of TN~ soldiers and the militia groups whom they controlled. That attack was part of a poUcy to maintain East Timor under the authority of the Government of I nd onssia.

38. The widespread or systematic attack was part of an orchestrated campaign of violence that Included threats to life] intimidation, assault and killings. The attack also included wIdespread arsons and destruction of property.

39. The widespread or systematic attack resulted in the internal displacement of thousands of clvlliane and the forc1ble transfer of large parts of the population to West Timor.

40. T he wi d as pre ad or systematl c attack was d irecte d a 9 a1 n st cl vii ian s of a II ag e s, but predommantly against individuals who were believed to be independence supporters. Those persons who were believed to be active members of the National Council of Timorese Resistance [Conse{ho Nacional da Res/stencia nmorense - CNRT] were targeted in partlcular:

--~

9

10

IV. SPECIFlC STATEMENT OF FACTS MURDER

41. During 1999 numerous civilians were murdered by TNI or by the militia groups they controlled. The murders were carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population. A common feature of the murders was that the victims were believed to be independence supporters. The widespread or systematic attack included but was not Umited to the following murders:

BOBONARO OISTRtCT

Callaco ~ April 12, 1999

42. On April 12, 1999 Manuel Gama, the Head of Finance of Bobonaro District Administrailon, was killed by unknown assailants while traveHing from Cailaco sue-d i strict to Mal i an a.

43. When the Bobonaro Ofstrict Military Commander heard of the kHUng of Gama, he ~ed a group of TNI soldiers and civU administrators to the village of Marco where Gama had lived. From the veranda of Gama's house, the Commander announced that the villagers of Cailaco would be killed. TNI soldiers and militia then bega n to ro u nd up in d tvid ua Is they be I ieved to be ind e pen dence suppa rte rs.

44. TNI soldiers took Joao Evangelista Lima Vidal, Car1ito Mau Leto and Domingos Resi Mau to the top of a hill in the village of Poegoa, where they shot and killed them.

45. TNI soldiers and militia took Paulino Soares, Jose Pau tete, Antonio Soares and Manuef Maulelo Araujo to the TN~ IntelUgence post at Marco where they shot and killed them.

46. The Commander told the crowd gathered around Gama's house that, if need be, more independence supporters would be killed.

47. I n the days that foU owe d 1 TN I sol d lers and m Wtia trave ned to vUl age 6 s urroundi ng Cai I a co and ki lied fu rther civi I ians they suspected of bei ng ind e p e nde nee sup porters.

48. On April 19, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia abducted Aparicio Mali Tae and cados Sa m a La 10 fro m the TN I post In Purug ua. The! r dea d bod i e s we re found buried near the TNI Intelligence Command in Marco.

49. On AprU 19, 1999 rnllltla kllled Armando Soares and Antonio Bazile by attacking them with swords.

50. On AprU 2011999 TNI soldiers and militla shot and killed Cornelius da Silva and Jose Barros.

Malianll Police Station· September a and 9, 1999

51. In the months leading up to the popular consultation, elements of TNI stationed tn Maliana directed the establishment and activHies of the Dadurus Merah Pulih militia. A TNl I ntelligence lieutenant acted as overall commander of the militia.

52. From about September 2, 1999 miBtia and elements of TNl and police began a campaign to force the civilian population who lived ln and around Maliana to leave their homes. They ordered independence supporters to move to the Maliana Police Station and lndonesian supporters to move to the District Military Command ~n Maliana.

53. On September 2, 1999 TN! soldiers and militia attacked Ruben B. Soares at his house at Raifun. They beat him and stabbed rum to death. During the attack, Domingos Pereira intervened and was shot by a TNI soldier; militia then stabbed him to death.

54. By September 8, 1999 a large group consisting mostly of independence sup porte rs had be end riven fro m th e tr homes an d were she Itaring in the ground s of the Maliana Police Station.

55. On the afternoon of September B, 1999 there were rail calls at many of the militia posts In MaUana. The roll cans were conducted by TNl Intelligence personnel and oth e r TN I sol d iers. At these ro II ca Us , th 6 mi litia we re told to bri ng their weapons for an operation at the police station. The militia were also provided with swords.

56. On the afternoon of S e pte m b e r 8, 1 999 at th e Mal ian a Sub -OJ strict M Unary Command a TNllnteHigence officer called together a iarge numberof mUitia and TN I sol d iers. He gave th e 9 ro u p the na mes of seve ra I in depend e nee su ppo rters seeking refuge at the police station. He ordered the militia to go to the police station and kill them. A TNI sergeant directed the militia to wear masks and blacken their faces.

57. A large group of TNI soldiers and militia drove to the police station and surround ad It. They then attacke d th e una rm e d civHi a ns insi de. T hey attacked them wi th mach etes and other sharp instrumen ts. They kiUed at lea s t 13 people:

Manuel Barros, Julia Barros, Domingos Goncalves Ferreiral Jose da Costa Guterrea, Francisco Barreto, Francisco Martins, Jose Abel, Martinho Marquesj Jose Barros scares, Damlao cruz, Joaquin Monteiro Goncalves, Jose Moniz da Cunha and Daniel Barreto.

58. D u ri ng the attack, arm e d mem bers of Pollce Mob i Ie Br~g ade [Bn·ga de Mobil - BR I MOB] did n oth I ng to p rotect the eMI i a ns in 8 r de and in some cases, they prevented people from escaplng from the front gate aftha compound by beating them back with the butts of their guns. After the attack, the TNI Intelligence officer 0 rde red TN I so Id le rs an d militia to coil e ct the bod ies of the pe 0 p Ie they had killedt load them onto a truck and dispose ot them. FoHowing thesa orders, the bodies were dumped into the sea.

11

12

59, On September 8,1999 TN I SOldiers and militia attacked viUagers in an area ca lied Sibi. During the attack Mariana da Costa was shot and killed. Carlito Freitas was hiding in the bushes aboul250 meters from where Mariana da Costa was killed and he was found dead after the attack.

60, On September 9, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia discovered that a number of men had escaped from the police station during the attack and were hiding in the countryside, A TNI sergeant led militia In a search for these men. They found them hiding in a riverbed near the area of Mulau, They killed at least 13 of these men: Carlos Maia, Manuel Magalhaes, Augustino dos Santos Marques, Lamberto Benevides, AbUio Marques Vicente, Jose Barreto, Paul da Silva Barreto, Ernesto da Coli, Luis Soaresl Pedro Luis, Lucas dos Santos, Jonl Lopes and Adeline. Afterwards they loaded the bodies onto a truck, The bodies were la te r dum ped In to the sea, Most of th e bo die s were neve r recovere d.

61, On September 16, 1999 militia shot, beat and hacked to death Augosto Noronha at Ralrnea.

62, On September 16, 1999 TNJ soldiers and militia beat to death Antonio Franca, an independence supporter, at Raimea,

COVA LIMA 01STRICT

63, On April 12,1999 militia stabbed to death Sabino Gusmao.

64, On April 23, 1999 militia hacked to death Benedita des Nascimento.

65. On April 23, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia attacked, stabbed and killed Alexio Xiemenes, Tomas Cardoso and Paulus Xlemenes, who were independence sup porters.

66_ On May 13, 1999 milltia shot and hacked to death Jose Afonso Amaral,

67. On May 28,1999 mflltla shot and kiUed Domingos Martins and Gabriel Amaral, who we re both i ndepend e nee su p porters.

68. On May 28, 1999 mHitia abducted Vasco Amaral, an independence supporter.

His dead body was found two days later,

69. On August 27, 1999 militia stabbed to death Jaime da Costa Nunes, who had bee n dis tri b uti ng voting cards to j n dependen ce su pporters.

70. On September 4t 1999 militia arrested and beat to death Raimundo Mali, Martlnho do Rego and Abel Pereira.

71. On September 5. 1999 militia stabbed to death Feltx Mall.

72. On September 6,1999 militia abducted A~bino Nahak, who they beBeved to be an independence supporter. His dead body was found on 15 October 1999,

73. On 6 September 1999 miHtla shot, stabbed and kilted Agapito Amaral who was an independence supporter, Later they stabbed to death Rosalina BelakJ Agapito

Amaral's mother. •

13

Sual Church· Suptember 6, 199~

74. Between January and September 1999 villagers from around the district of Suai sought refuge in the Ave Maria Church, also known as the Suai Church. They sought refuge from violence perpetrated by TNl soldiers and the laksaur militia.

75. On September 4 and 5, 1999 TNI soldters and militia armed with swords, mach etas and firea rm S,S ta rte d to move a ro un d outs ide the c hu rch com po un d , discharging their firearms into the air and threatening the villagers who were

mstde

76, On September 5, 1,999 the villagers were told by one or the priests that the ch urch was no long er safe fo r th e m and that there cou Id be an a tta ck on it by TNI soldiers and militia. He advised the vUlagers to seek refuge elsewhere. Approximately 500 villagers fled the church compound.

77. ln the early afternoon of September 6, 1999 militia marched towards the church. rn e 01 strict Adm ini stra to r, d ressed ~n TN I u nl fa rm a nd a rmed with a rl fie I followed. behlnd the militia. TNI soldiers and rnllltla surrounded the church com p 0 u nd a nd beg a n to shoot into the compo u nd .

78. As a result of the attack, many civilians including 3 priests were killed and many others sustained serious injuries.

79. On September 7 I 1999 TNI soldiers and miUtia returned to the church and gathered th e dead bod ies. Th ey p Ued some of the bo dl es up a nd set fi re to them. They loaded other bodies onto trucks and took them to West Timor. The bodies of 30 vlctl m S of the atta ck were recove re d later from graves ln West Tim 0 r.

80. On September 7, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia abducted Jose dos Reis, an independence supporter. He was subsequently stabbed and beaten to death by

TNI soldiers and militia.

81. On September 7,1999 militia abducted and kllled Domingos Bau Kali, an i ndepe ndence s u pporte r.

82. On Sa ptember 7, 1999 rnllltl a a bd ucted Alfred 0 N a hak, a n active 1 nd ep e nde nee su pporte r. Hl s dead bod y was foun din N ovembe r 1999.

83. On September 8, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia hacked Suri Atok and Jose Ram a s wtth machete s, ki Iling both of them.

84. On September at 1999 mllilla stabbed and killed Simplicio Doutei Sarmento.

85. On September at 1999 militia abducted Manuel Noronha. His dead body was found later by nls family.

86. On September 9, 1999 militia arrested Johanes Tahu and Paulus Xiemenes, who were both independence supporters. On the orders of a TNI officer the mi 11 tl a shot, stabbed and kill ed both men.

87. On september 9, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia abducted E1izar~o- Martins and Mateu$ Amaral. Tne dead bodIes of the two men were found later.

14

88. On September 12, 19~ TNI soldiers and militia attacked the village of Laktos. In the viUage they shot and killed or hacked to death 14 civilians: Jeraldo Amaral Bau, Ernesto Carvalho, Anito Mali, Anita Carvalho Manis, Danial Monis Acl, Darual Monis Taek, Domingos l.uan Amaral, Abel Soares, Alberto Fereira, Antonio Amaral Sau, Jose do Rego, Anito Amaral, Buavenlura de Araujo and

Eurico Amaral Bau.

89. On September 15, 1999 militia hacked to death Carlos Yosep and Patrlcio de J e sus Xi emen es M a uk, both i nde pe ndence su p porte rs.

90. On September 19, 1999 TN~ soldiers and militia arrested Jose Pereira Coli, an independence supporter. He was interrogated and severely beaten. A TNI sold ie r th e n took hi m away 0 n a motorcycle. His dead body was tou n d I a ter by

his family.

91. On September 25, 1999 militia attacked and shot at a group of viUagers hiding in .a forest near Nikir, kUl1ng Titus MaU, Damiao Xiemenes and Januario Maya.

92. On September 26,1999 mWtia attacked and shot at a group of villagers hiding in a forest near Wetabe 1 kin i ng Pa u lino Ca rdo so.

93. On September 26,1999 militia attacked and shot at a group of villagers h~ding In We s e ~ forest, killi ng Dom 1 ngos Ba rros.

94. On October 5, 1999 militia attacked and shot at a group of villages hiding in La keto F ores t, kU Ii ng Lo renzo Gus mao and Naza rio G ute rres.

95. On October 6,1999 mUUia attacked the villagers of t.ockeu, shooUng and kiBing F red rico Barra s.

96. 0 n Octob e r 6, 1999 mil Itla sh ot and klU ed Lui s Ro s ali ho,

DILl OlSTRtCT

om Rally· April 17. 1999

97. On April 17 , 1999 leaders of the lntegration Fighters' Force [Pasukan Pejuang Jntergrasi - PPl] organised a large pro-Indoneaian rally and ordered rnllitla members from throughout East Timor to attend.

98. During the rally I Eurico Guterresj Deputy Commander of PPI, addressed the crowd and to~d them that people who were against integraUon with Indonesia were the enemy. He told rsprasentatlves of the state, and those helping state forces, to capture anti-integrationists and shoot them if they resisted. Guterres identlfled Mario Carrascalao as a traitor and stated that the East Timorese people could not unite because of Carrascalao's existence.

99. I mme d la te 1 y foHowi ng th e ra lIy, TN Iso ld iers and m iBUa divided lnto grou ps and attacked targets arou n d the cUy. T hey destroyed property and ass aulted civBian s they believed to be independence supporters.

I

106. After the attack Cassiano Morais, HilariO Boavida, Lorenco Boavido, Jorge Mesquita da Costa Rego, Mario Belo, Thomas Befo, Tiago Kofil Vergillo Fernanda Augusto da Costa, Marito Mesquita and Alexandre Mesquita da Costa Rago were forced into trucks and taken away by mHitia. Their dead bodies were found later in Tasi Tolu, near DilL

100. In one of these attacks, milUia and TNI soldiers attacked the home of Manuei Carrascalao. the brother of Mario, where over 100 civilians were seeking refuge. TNI soldiers and militia shot. stabbed or beat 12 of these civilians a nd killed them. They were Manelito Carrascarao. Eduardo de Jesus, Alberto des Santos, Antonio ds Sliva Soares, Januario Pereira, Raul dos Santos Cancela, Joao dos Santos, Crisanto dos Santos. Rafael da Sliva, Afonso Rlberio, Cesar dos Santos and Augu s tin 0 Be n ito. TN Iso Id iers and mili ti a a I so des troye d th e Ca rrasca la 0 home.

101. Upon hearing of the attack upon his home, Manuel Carrascalao sought assistance from SURATMAN. SURATMAN laughed at his request and suggested he should get help from CNRT.

102. During April 17,1999 TNI soldiers and militla attacked civilians and destroyed property In the Benamauk. Mascarenhas, Metiaut, Colmera and Kakaolidum areas of DilL

103. In Benamaukl TN I soldiers and milltia shot and killed Manuel Pinto.

OHi 0 iaesse and Bishop B&IO'5 Reside nee - Septem ber 5 and 6j 1999

104. On September 5,1999 WtRANTO, MAKARlMJ SYAHNAKRI, DAMIRI and MUIS were present at a meeting in DilL Bishop Carlos Ximenes Felipe Belo asked that WIRANTO act to control the militias and return the situation to normal. WIRANTO re s pon d e d by a rde rin 9 MU I S to dee I with the mil i ti a sand retu rn normality.

105. Later that day TNI soldiers and militia attacked the Dili Diocese compound and the people see k in 9 refug e there. J ose Fern a nd 0 Nilto n d a Costa wa s fa ta Uy stabbed in the attack and died tater that day. Jose Martins de Sousa, Fransisco B oavld 0 and Eug en to d aCosta we re last seen a live afte r th e attack j n the presence of militia. Leonel da Silva de Olive~ra disappeared durlnq the attack and has not been seen allve since. Many other c~vUians were seriously injured ln the attack.

107. On September 6, 1999 Bishop Belo telephoned MUIS and requested TNI protection for a p proxi mately 51000 civil i a ns Bee king refug e from mil itia v~ a Ie nee in the compound of his home. He asked MUIS to help evacuate the refugees from the compound where they were in danger of imminent attack. MUIS told Bishop Befo that he could not do this because he had no vehicles avallabfe.

108. Later that day TNI soldiers and rnilltia attacked Bishop Belo's residence killing at least 1 civIlian. They assaulted civilians seeking refuge there and stole their property. TNI soldiers and m1l1Ua set fire to Bishop 8elo's home. TNI soldiers and militia ordered civil1ans to move to DW harbour to be transported toWest Timor and they threatened to kill those who tiid not comply.

15

I

110. Tim Alfa was a militia group that had been established by TNl in the 1980s, In early 1999 elements of TN I and the civU administration strengthened Tim Alfa to fight against East Timorese who were believed to be independence supporters,

111. On April 21, 1999 Tim A/fa militia and KOPASSUS officers severely beat and mutilated Evar!sto Lopes, an independence supporter. His throat was cut and he

was killed,

109. On September 6, 199,9 militia attacked the International Committee of the Red Cross compound killing at least 1 c;vilian,

LAUTEM DISTRICT

\6

112, On September 21, 1999 Tim Affa militia shot and killed Alfredo de Araujo and Kalistu Rodrigues.

Tim Alfa. itt Verukoco· September 25,1999

113. On September 2511999 Tim Alfa miUtia set up a roadblock beside the MalaHana River, near the village of Verukoco, to Intercept a vehicle carrying priests and nuns who were travelling to Baucau, The militia were armed with SKS rifles.

114. When the vehicle approached the roadblock mUitia fired thelr weapons into the vehicle. When the shootlnq stopped, some of the occupants were able to climb out of the ve h lcle, MUlti a h a eked and stabbe d them with machetes a no shot them

wah their r~nes.

115. The militia pushed the bodies and the vehicle lnto the river. A hand grenade was then thrown into the river to ensure there were no survivors. Finally, another man who had been captured by the militia was hacked to death with a machete and

thrown into the rive r.

116. I n the attack, th e militi a killed Broth e r J acl nto Xavier, Broth er Fern and a d 05 Santos, Brother Valerio da Conceicaa, slster Erminia Cazzagina, Sister Celeste de CalValho, Agus Muliawan, Cristovao Rudy Barreto, Tltl Sandora Lopes and

lzlno Freitas Amaral.

L.~QU1CA DISTRiCT

117. On April5~ 1999 a group ofvUlagers from Uqulca encountered TNI soldiers and mUitia armed with automatic weapons. The TNI soldiers and militia started shooting at the groupf including Thomas de Jesus, who was shot and died 4

days later,

118. On AprU 5, 1999 TNl soldiers and mllltla found Herminlo dos Santos, a CNRT s up porter I seeki ng refug e at a TN I post. A TN I so Id ier cut his th ro at and sta bbed

him to death.

119. On April 5, 1999 milltia abducted Laurindo da Costa Goncalves, a CNRT su pporte r, from hiS he use. Late r that day 1 a TN I sold; e r 1 ntorrned th e rei a tive s of

Laurlndo da Costa Goncalves that he had been killed.

I

17

120. On April 5, 1999 llldlo cos Santos and his family sought refuge at the SubDistrict Military Command. Subsequently, 6 militia arrived and kUled him w~th a machete. TNI soldiers and Intelligence officers were present and did not intervene to stop the murder.

Llquica Church· April 6, 1999

121. I n the days preceding April 6, 1999 a large group of civl!ians gathered in the Liquica church compound seeking refuge from the Bes; Merah Putih militia and elements of TN I who were engaged in a campaign of violence in the district. TNI soldiers and militia, as well as police and BRIMO B officers surrounded the ch urch. Mil i ua h ara sse d and in Umid a ted the refuge es te II i ng the m tha t they wo u I d be kU1ed if they remained ~n the church. MUitla leaders instructed their members that later they would be required to attack the church and kiH persons sheltering mside as well as those who attempted to flee.

122 .. In the early afternoon of April 6, 1999 a gunshot was heard from the direction of the church. BRIMOB officers then opened fire on the church and militia phystcally attacked the people lnslde. Tear gas was thrown into the priest's residence forcing many refugees to run outside. As the refugees attempted to flee the church compound, TNI sotdters and militia fired their weapons into the crowd of men, women and children, kiHing many of them. The militia also attacked the refugees with machetes, knives, arrows and homemade nrearms.

123. In d 0 nesi a n civH and m ilita ry a utho ritl e~ 0 rd e red mil iti a to dispose of the bodi as in va rlou s locatlon s aro und L1 q u lea, Poli ce, TN I so Id iers and miUti a loaded dozens of bodies onto trucks. They threw some of the bodies into Lake Masi and buried othe rs ln loca lions a rou nd Mauba ra Vi II ag e. Not all of th e grave site s have bee n discovered and the exact number of dead is unknown.

124. On Aprll7, 1999 TNI soldiers, police and miliUa arrested Fernando da Costal a CNRT supporter, and stabbed him to death.

125. On April 9, 1999 militia abducted Carlos, a CNRT supporter. His throat was cut and he was stabbed to death.

126. On April15t 1999 TNl soldlers and mHltia attacked Henrique Borgesl Carlos dos Santos da Costa and Leo Lakon. Henrique Borges was shot and killed, and the other two men were stabbed to death.

127. On Aprll27, 1999 TNI soldiers, police and miliUa arrested Tobias Alves Correia and Ellas Ataidi whom they believed to be independence supporters. TN~ soldiers ordered the mllWa to kHi them and they were both stabbed to death.

128. On August 8, 1999 pollee and militia arrested Mariana da Casta. TNI soldiers ordered the mllitia to k1l! him in West Tlrnor.

129. On September 3, 1999 TNi soldiers and militia abducted Pedro Alves, Jaclntc dos Santos and F ra ncl seo da Silva who m th ey believed to be in de pe nd en cs supporters. The foHowing day TNI soldlers and militia shot and killed Jacinto dOB Santos] and they shot, beat, stabbed and killed Pedro Alves and- Francisco da

Silva.

I

\8

130- On September 7, 1999 militia stabbed and killed Paulo Goncalves. They also shot and kiUed Guilhermo Alves and Clementino Goncalves. TNI soldiers present

did not intervene to stop these killings-

131. On September 12, 1999 TNI soldiers shot and killed Augusto Goncalves-

QECUSSI DISTR'CT

Passabe . september 8 and 10, 1999

132. On September 8, 1999 TNl soldiers and Sakunar militia attacked the vBlages of Nibin, Kiobise~o and t'umln in the Passabe sub-district of OecussL They burned houses, kiHed livestock and attacked the inhabitants they believed to be

independence supporters.

133. l n Nibin, TNI soldiers and militia killed the village ch~ef: Armando SanL

134- tn Kiobiselo, TM soldiers and militia kiUed 6 men: vlctor Punef, Yacobus Stci, Jose Noni Maknaun, Augustino Ulan, Zacharlas Ena, Mikhael Sasl, Yacobus Ok;

and Jose Sici.

135. In Tumin. TNl sotdiers and militla killed 9 men: Marcos Sufa Afoan, FBippus Tualaka, LaurenUno Ulan Canol Augustino Neno, Naub Lape, Alberto Afoan,

Nenu Catu, C~prianus Anin and Francisco Elu.

136. On September g, 1999 TNI soldiers and mWtia returned to the vlBages. They forced villagers across the border into West Timor and ordered them to register at the sub~distrjct office in tmbate. At this government office, the young men we re se para ted fro m the re s t of the vUl a gers an d we re ti e d tog ethe r in pal rs. TN I soldiers and miHtia then marched these men across the Noe~ Passabe River back into East Timor to a place called Nifu Panief,

137. At Nifu Panief, TNl soldiers and mliWa shot hacked or stabbed 47 of the men to de a th . After ki 111 n 9 the men I TNt sold lers and mil iti a fa reed the ; n ha bita n ts 0 f Passabe village to dig graves and bury the bodies of the victims.

M a\(e la b - Octobe r 20, 1999

138, On October 20, 1999 TNl soldiers and Sakunar militia attacked and captured a large number of civHians who were hiding In the Betunes mountains. The TN I sold ~e rs and mi Uti a fo rce d the ca ptu red civHl ans to wal k to the market pla ce at Makelab. TNI soldiers and militia stood guard over the cIvilians as they were

de tai ned the re.

139. Militia took Justilioda Costa and Paulus Kelo, both ~ndependence supporters, from the market place and shot and kiUed them.

140. In the market place, milltla ordered Mateus Tone~ Domingos Kelo, Fransisco Taek and Joao Talias, who were aU independence supporters, to stand up. They

were then shot and kiBed, one by one.

141. Later that day, rrtilltla found DominQos Fone hiding in the Betunes Mountains.

The mUitia shot him and stabbed him to death.

r .. -.-------~----------------

I

19

142. The remaining villagers were forced by TN I soldiers and rnilifia to go by truck to West Timor.

BATTALION 745

143. In 1999 TN I Battalion 745 had its headquarters at Fuiloro Village in t.autem District. 1 n July 1999 the Commander of Batta~ion 745 ordered the East Timorese soloters In the battaHon to teB the civilians in their viBages to support the proIndonesian cause and not the independence cause. He told the soldiers that TNI would never leave East Timor and stated that anyone who voted for

independence would be kiUed.

144. A few days before the result of the popular consultation was announced, a TNI platoon commander addressed sotdlers from Battalion 745 and told them that if pro-~ndependence won, Battalion 745 would destroy livestock, houses, CNRT members a nd other in depend en ce sup po rters.

145. On September 8, 1999 Battalion 745 soldlers shot and killed Antonlo da Costa.

His dead body was found later in a grave close to the Battalion 745

he adq uarters.

146. On september 9, 1999 Battanon 745 soidlers arrested Ambrosio Bernadino Alves, an 1 n de pen d en ce supporter. He was lnte rrog ate d and be ate n by the soldiers. His dead body was found later In a grave close to the BattaHon 745

headquarters.

147. On september 9,1999 Battalion 745 eoldters attacked Julio de Jesus at Baucau airport and took him away. His dead body was found later at the back of the Ba ttaUon 745 base ln Fa tum aca vW ag e, Ba ucau d lst net,

148. On September 10, 1999 Battalion 745 soldiers killed F~orencio Monteiro and Florentino Monteiro.

149. On september 11, 1999 Tim Alta mUWa took Alexio Oliveira to the Battalion 745 headquarters in Fuiloro village. Later that day he was stabbed to death by a TNI

soldier.

150. On September 13, 1999 Battallon 745 soldiers arrested Martinho Branco.

Marcelio Branco, Juiiao de Assis and Elder de Assls, They were led away by the soldiers in the dlrecUon of the sub-village of Horo. AU 4 men ware independence supporters. The dead bodies of the 4 men were found later in the suo-village of

Hero,

151. On September 20,1999 part of Battanan 745 began to move by road ln a convoy towards OUi, on their way to West Timor. There were approximately 60 trucks and motorbikes in the convoy led by the battation commander. Approximately 120 sotdlers and their famiUes rode In these vehicles. As Battalion 745 moved a~ong the coast road toward Dili. soldiers from the convoy kllled civilians.

152. On September 20, 1999 TNI soldtars including members of Battalion 745 beat, shot and kiUed Amilcar Barras, Joao Gomes and Agusto Venacto Soares In

Lautem viltage.

153. On September 21, 1999 Battalion 745 soldiers shot and kUled Abreu da Costa and Egas da SUva who were trying to run away from the convoy near the village of Buile.

154. As they approached the village of Buruma, on the outskirts of Baucau I Battalion 745 soldiers shot and killed Luclnda da Silva and Elizete da Silva who were trying to hide from the convoy,

155. In the village of Caibada, near Baucau. Battalion 745 soldiers shot and killed Carlos da Costa Reberi 0 and Vi ctor Belo.

156. In the village of Becora, near Dili I Battalion 745 soldiers shot and killed Manuel Andreas as he was walking alongside the road.

157. Also in Becora, Battalion 745 soldiers shot and killed Dutch journalist Sander Robert Thoenes as he was riding on a motorbike away from the convoy.

158. When the convoy arrived at the Sub-Reqlonal Military Command 164 in DW, M U I Sad d re s s ed the sol d iers of Batta Ii 0 n 745 a nd in structed th em neve r to teB anyone about what they had done on their way to Dilil not even their wives,

20

DEPORTATlO NOR FORe I B LE TRAN SFER

159. Between the announcement of the result of the popular consultation on September 4, 1999 and October 25, 1999 TNI soldiers and militia forcibly transferred approximately 200,000 civilians to West Timor. The forcible transfers we re pa rt 0 f the wldesprea d 0 r sys tema tic a tta ck directed a ga j n s t th e c ivai a n population of East Timor.

160. As part of the torelble transfers TNI soldiers a nd militia intentionally created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through threats of force, the use of force and acts of violence- Both TNl soldiers and militia told the civilian population that they would be killed if the.y did not reave their homes and go to West Timor. TNI soldiers and militia physically attacked ctviHans who expressed a reluctance to leave the i r ho mas. j n man y p la cas, th e th re ats we re accom pan i ed by a ca m pa ign to destroy prop e rty, in clu d in 9 hom e S I fa rms, lives tack, business e s , cultural monuments and rellqlous sites. As a result of these actions, villages, towns and entlre regions were made dangerous and uninhabitable.

161. As a part of the forcible transfers TNI used its facilities as collection points to gather and register civilians before transfer to West Timor. TNl used its own and civil ian veh i cles to tra n s port large n umbers of the po pu la tion withi n East Tim 0 r and to West Timor. They also used Indonesian Navy ships to transfer civilians from the seaports of Com, Laga, DiU, Liquic8, BeBcu and Betano to West Timor a nd to 0 th er pa rts of In d onssla. TN I used m IUta ry aircraft an d cha rte red co m merelal ai rcraft to take cfvU!a n s fro m th a a j rports at Co m oro and Sa u ca u. In addltlon, many civilians were forced to cross the bordarto West Timoron foot or in p rlvate va h [des.

162. The means by which civilians were forcibly transterreo to West Timor varied between the districts of East TImor, However in every district the forcrbJe transfer wa s bro ug ht abou t by the coop e ration ofT N I and mil i t i a. Th e fo II owing a ceo u n t represents some of the events which occurred in each of the districts and th rou 9 h 0 ut East Tim 0 r:

AIL.EU DISTRICT

163. F allowing the announcement on September 4,1999 TN I soldiers and members of the Aku Hldup untuk Integras; mltltia began a campaign of violence and commenced a forced transfer of the people in the district.

164. The Dfstrjct Administrator started the campaign on September 4, 1999 at a meeting in front of the government building in Aileu town. He was dressed in TN[ uniform and discharged his rifle as a signal for the carnpalqn to commence.

AINARO DISTRICT

165. FoHowlng the announcement on September 4, 1999 the commander of the Mahidl m Hit1 a ad d resse d a 9 ro u p of mili ti a at the fa atb a II field in the vin a ge of Caesa. He sta ted tha the wo u Id kill anyo ne wh 0 ra n away fro m th e vi Uage and o rde re d the vi II agers to b r~ng a If 1 he ir belon gi ngs to the ro ad side and p repa re to go to West Timor.

21

166. Most of the villagers travelled by their own means, however, there were 5 trucks used by the rnllnla tortransportatlon. The militia commander stated that anyone who stayed in Cassa would be killed, Armed militia escorted each vehicle ca rry! n 9 pe 0 pi e to We s t Tim or. The depu ty co m m ander of the mil i tia gave ord e rs to burn houses and to secure the villages to prevent people running away.

167. On September 23, 1999 approximately 60 members of the militia attacked the residents of the vHlage of Maununo, The militia were armed with rifles and dressed ln TNI uniform and red and white bandanas,

168. The attack resulted in the deaths of 11 people, in~ury to 6 and the forcible transfer of approximately 75 people, The deputy commanderof the militia led the attack during which he shouted that everyone had to report to the village office in order to be transported to West Timor. He said that those who refused would be shot.

BAUCAU DISTRICT·

169. Following the announcement on September 4, 1999 the Baucau District Military Commander and the District Adminlstrator told the people of Baucau to go to West Timor.

170, Civilians were forced to travel to the town of Laga were they waited on the beach for ships to take them to West Timor. At the port of Laga there was a permanent TNI facility which was used as a base from which to coordinate the transfer of civilians,

171. On September 81 1999 a convoy of TNI trucks, civilian buses, cars and motorcycles arrived In Laga. The vehicles carried TNI soldiers and police officers in uniform, militia and civilians. Individuals on the convoy were firing weapons into the air. TN! soldiers and mlll~a told clvilfans in Laga that they must go to

West Timor. '

172. On September 10, 1999 an Indonesian Navy ship arrived at the port. Civilians were threatened, beaten and forced to board the Navy ship. TNI soldters walked th ro ug h Laga check! ng house s fa r civi Ii a n s who were stU! i nsi de.

17.3. On September 101 1999 TNI trucks arrived at Laga to take civilians to Baucau airport for flights to Wast Timor. Those who refused to board the trucks were beaten by TNI soldiers. The TNI used military aircraft as well as commercial aircraft chartered from the state-owned alrline, Garuda Indonesia, to transport the people.

BOBONARO DISTRICT

174, On September 21 199930 police offrcers went to the village of Holsa In Maliana sub-dlstrlct. They told the people to move to Maliana Police stenon and that no responsibility for them would be taken if they did not go. As the viUagers g8 th e re d thai r bela ngi ng s to leave, militia arrive d. So me we re wean n 9 TN I uniforms and some carried machetes or rifles, The milItia burnt houses in the village and forced the vlllagers to go to the police station, where about 1000

people had gathered. .

22

175. Following the announcement on September 4, 1999 more civilians took refuge in the police station and District Military Command in Maliana. Civilians a Iso took refuge in a building called BP7. The commander of Deaurus Merah Pllfill militia came to the building together with two TNI soldiers who were tn civilian clothes. The militla commander shouted at the civilians saying that those who did not go to West Timor would have their houses burnt and they would be killed- As a result of the threats made by the militia, the civlllanstravened by road to West Timor.

176. After the attack on the Maliana Police Station [described in paragraphs 51 to 58 of this indictment] TNI organised trucks to transport civilians to West Timor. The civilians put their names on lists compiled by TNI soldiers from which persons who were to be transferred to West Timor were identified,

COVA 1..1 MA DISTRICT

177 .. About one month before the popular consultation members of Laksaur militia we re des cri bing thai r plan to fo rce people to go to Wes t Tim 0 r if auto nomy lost at the ballot. Militia sald that this would cast doubt over the legitimacy of the ballot,

178. Following the attack an Suai church [descrlbed in paragraph 74 to 78 of thls indictment} the District Administrator instructed aU women and children to go to the S uai Di strict M ilita ry Co mm and. T hey were he I d the re for abo u t 8 days guarded by TNI soldiers before being transferred to West Timor.

179, On both September 6 and 7, 1999 the commander of the militia drove around Su a i town an nounci ng 0 n a loud spea ker th at if the v i II agers were etl II there 0 n September 9,1999 they would die. The viUagers prepared their belongings and put them by the roa d side awa itlng tra n spo rt. About 30 tru cks we re u sed to transport people out of Suai town.

180. On September 61 1999 militia arrived in Kunain vrllage in two trucks led by a uniformed TNI soldier, carrying an M-16 rifle. He ordered the villagers to pack up their belongings. Shortly after, the militia burnt down the civilian's houses.

181. MiI~tla went to the village of ManekHk to prepare a register of people to be transferred to West Timor. Militia assaulted the villagers and instructed them to prepare to move to West Timor. As a result some villagers fied to Atambua, West Timor.

182. On September 9, 1999 TNI soldiers transported civUians to the Suai Sub-District Mill tary Command. Once therej a TN I Ii e uten a nt gave orders for the ci vlllan s to be taken to West Timor.

mu OISTRJCT

183, Between September 5 and 9j 1999 thousands of clviHan refugees were forcibly transferred from Dlli to West Timor. TN! soldiers, police and Aitersk militia all active 1 y pa rtl cl pated in the movement of the civi I ia n po p ul atio n .

23

184. Refugees were trans f~rred from various locations around DiB, including the Oili Diocese, Bishop Belo's residence, the Ca nossian Convent and the 1 nternatlonal Committee of the Red Cross compound, to TNI, police and mihtia posts. At the po s ts th ey were re gi s tered and eve ntu a II y tra n sp 0 rte d to West Tim 0 r.

185. On September 6, 1999 BtShop Belo's residence was attacked. Following the inUiaf attack. the civilians seeking refuge were forced into a park Just outside. A few hours later TNI, BRlMOB, police and miBtia ordered the refugees to move from the park to the beach front. later that afternoon, the civilians were ordered to move towa rd s D iB h a rb 0 ur an d the mi litia iss ued thre a ts of dea th to a nyo ne who did not comply. Under guard, the civilians were marched towards the harbour and many were forced to register with TN I at the DiU District Military Command.

24

186. Many civilians were forcib~y transferred directly from the East Timor Police headquarters to West Timor by mBitary trucks and other vehicles. Others were taken to Comero airport and were forcibly transferred to West Timor by lndonesian mllitary planes. Others were forcibly transferred by boat from Di1i hsrbourwhich was controlled by TN!.

1B7. FoUowing the announcement on September 41 1999 TNI soldiers and militia forced villagers throughout Lautem District to go to the seaport of Com for transfer to West Timor. TNI supplied minibuses and trucks to transport the people.

1 BB. Many civilian houses were burnt by TNt soldiers and militia when they went to villages to force the civilians to leave. They made threats tnat TNI or militia would return to the viUages and k1l1 the people if they did not comply.

189. Many civilians were taken to the KOPASSUS and Battalion 745 headquarters in Los Palos and Fuiloro. They were registered and transported to Com to await ships to West Timor.

190. By August 1999 there was a plan in Uqulca to forcibly transfer the populauon to West Timor and the District Admlnlstrator had given instructions for vehicles to be hired to transport civilians.

191. Following the announcement on September 4, 1999 civilians were threatened by miUtia and instructed to go by road to West Timor or to go to Llqulca tawn from where they would be transported to West T~mor.

192. On September 5t 1999 a TNI officer gave orders to m~Htla to instruct the residents of Betagou to go to Bazartete on foot, threatening them with guns as they went.

193. In Bazartete the villagers were held at the school for 9 days. WhBst at Bazartete the villagers were threatened that if they d~d not IS6Ive fer West Tlmor they would

be arrested. '

... -I

25

194, On September 13 and.14, 1999 militia took to the streets of l.iquica, shouting at civilians that they must leave East Timor. Villagers gathered near to and inside the Liquica District MHitary Command, at the police station and at the Sub-District Military Command. TN I soldiers and militia were armed and standing around the streets where the vIllagers were,

195, Civilian families were required to pay 1 million rupiah for transport to Atambua, West Timor. TNI soldiers and police, including their families, did not pay for transport. TN! trucks were used to transport the people to West Timor,

MANATUTO DISTRICT

196. Following the announcement on September 4, 1999 the District Administrator ordered the Mahodomi mUitia to burn the houses and public buildings in Manatuto. Following these orders, the section commanders of the militia led the militia in the forcible transfer of civilians to Manatuto and then to West Timor.

197, The District Administrator arranged for trucks to transfer the civilian population to West Timor. Some of those trucks belonged to TN!. Some of the civilians were forced to pay for their transportation to West Timor.

MANUFAHI DISTRICT

198. On September 31 1999 a meeting was called by a TNI lieutenant at the SubDistrict MUitary Command, He described orders he had received from the Manufahi District Military Commander In the event that autonomy lost at the popular consultation. He said all the people were to be gathered at Betano, where ships and vehicles would take them to West Timor. The lieutenant said there would be a war between TNI and the Armed Forces for the Natlonat Liberation of East Timor rFDrcas Armadas de Llberlacao NacionaJ de Timor Leste - FALlNTlL] and that all people must be deported and those who refused must be taught a lesson.

199, Following the announcement on September" 4, 1999 the commanders of Ablal militia comma nced ope rati ens to forci bly tra ns fe r the pop ul atlon to West Timor. The miUtia burnt houses in the villages and arranged for trucks to transport the villagers. They threatened to kill villagers if they did not go.

200." Civilians went first by truck to the District Military Command, escorted by TNf soldiers who discharged their firearms into the air to scare the people. Civilians were then taken by truck to Betano, where they waited for one week before b ei ng tra n s po rted to West Timor. Some vi Iia ge rs we re t ra n sp a rte d to A tam b ua by road, others were transported to Kupang by Indonesian Navy ships from the port of Beta no.

OECUSSI DISTRICT

201. Following the announcement on September 4, 1999 thousands of civUians were torclbly transferred from different parts of Oecussi district to West Timor" TN I soldiers and Sakunar mflitia cooperated in the transfer of the civHian population.

202. On September 9, 199.9 TNI sergeants led soldiers and mUitia to the viUages of Nib in, Kiobl se lo and' Tum in. Fro m the villages th ey terce d c ivi Ha n s to wa Ik to

West Timor-

203. On October 20, 1999 after the attack in Makelab market place by TNI soldiers and militia (described in paragraphs 138 to 142 of this indictment], trucks were

used to force the civBians to go to West Timor.

VIQUEQUE O'STRICT

204. Following the announcement on September 4, 1999 TNI soldiers in Viqueque distrlct began to raqlster people who wished to travel to West Timor.

205- The people were required to go to the vlqueoue District MUitary Command to register their names and the number of family members wishing to travel. If the p e 0 p Ie did not regi ster, they were vistted by TN I soldie rs arm i I itia and th re a tened. After re 9 ~s tranon, the ciVitians we re in fa rm ed by TN I so ld i e rs to

, return to their homes, to be collected later .

. 206. On September 10, 1999 the forcible transfer of the population began in Viqueque district. Many travelled by civilian or military vehicles to Beacu from wh e re th ey we re tra ns ported to We st Ti m 0 r by I nd 0 nesi anN avy sh lp.

PERSECUTION

207. During 1999 as a part of the widespread or systematic attack TNI soldiers and mBiti ape rsecuted th e civil i an popu lat; 0 n of E as t Timor. The persecutlo n viol ated the fundamental rights of civlUans, by discrlminatory acts against those who were believed to be su p porte rs of 1 n depen dence, Th e persecu ti a n in cl uded the

following acts:

a. Murders, as described in paragraphs 41 to 158 of thls indictment;

b. Fihyslcal assaults and threats of physical assaults;

c. Un I awful detention s. T has e detentions often occu rred at TN I and m i litis posts a nd we re freq U 6 ntly accompa nied by In timldation a nd beating S I and in some instances ended ln the m u rde r of th e deta In sa;

d. Destructio n of person a I pro party I whi ch re s ul ted in the d as tru ct 10 n of approximately 70% of the buildIngs in East Timor, including 40% of all dwe Ui n 9 hou ses. Most of th ese structu res we re destroyed byars on:

e. Des tru ctl on of gave rn m e nt bu ildtn gs and oth e r in fras tru ctu re essential for the functioning of government and commerce; and

f. Des tru ctl on of rell 9 ton s site sand mon u m e nts.

26

I

27

V. RESPONSIBILITY·AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED

WIRANTO

208. At aU material times covered by this ind~ctment. WI RANTO held the rank of General and was the lndonesian Min~ster of Defence and Security [Menterj Penahenan dan Keamanan, Menhankam) and the Commander of the Armed Forces of Indonesia [Panglima Angkatan Berselljata Rep~/brik Indonesia and, as of Aprll1, 1999 Panglima Tentere Nesionallndonesiaj.

209. As Indonesian Minister of Defence and Security and Commander of the Armed Forces of I n don e s i a, WI RAN TO poss ess ed co mmand authority ove r a II branches and pe rs 0 n ne I 0 f the Armed Forces of I no on esl a, i ncl ud In 9 th e accu sed MAKARIM, SYAHNAKRI, DAMIRI1 SURATMAN, MUIS and SUDRAJAT.

210. By the nature of the relationship which existed between TNI and the militia groups operating in East Timor during 1999, whether in person or through his subordinates, WIRANTO had effective control over the members of the rnllltia groups ..

211. During 1998 and 1999 WIRANTO made frequent visits to East Timor. During th a se vis I ts he met with East Ti m orese com m un ity te ade rs, me m b e rs of the press and officials representing the jnternationa~ community, including Military Uaison Officers and other officials from the United Nations Mission in East Timor [UNAMET]. .

212. At these meetings he was repeatedly informed of acts of violence and other crimes being perpetrated by TNI and mHitia groups in East Timor. In these meetings requests were made that he control the TNI and mUlUa groups that we re comm ittl ng these cri m es.

213. During 1999 WIRANTO failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crimes being committed by his suoordlnates and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators of those crimes-

214. By reason of the above WIRANTO is crlminally responsible for the acts of his subord i n ales pursuan t to secti on 16 U NT A ET Reg u I atl 0 n 2000/1 5.

215. On November 5,1999 WIRANTO ceased to be Minister of Defence and Security and wa s appo inted the Coo rdj n ating Min i s te r for Poll Uca I and Secu rUy Affai rs {Ment8(/ Koardinasi Bideng Politik dan Keamananj Menko Polkam] from November 5, 1999untii May 17,2000. He is now retired from the Armed Forces of Indonesia

ZACKY ANWAR MAKARIM .

216. At all material times covered by this indictment, MAKARIM hetd the rank of Major General. In 1999 he held various rnllltary positions and was a member of several special teams. I n January 1999 he was a Senior Officer at the headquarters of the Armed Forces of Indonesia [PaN Mabes ABR~_ From May 1999 until September 1999 he was a member of the Task Force to Oversee the Popular Consultation in East Timor [Tim Pengamanan Pensuksesan Penentuan Pandapaf Otonomi Khusus Timor Timur- TP4 OKTT1. As of July 1999 he was Head of the Special Team/Adjutant General's Task Force [Kstua Tim K1lUsvslSatg8s AJU]. In one or more of these capacities, MAKARIM served 85 a Li a ison Offi ce r be tween ttl e Arm e d Forces of In d 0 nesia and UNA MET.

217, During 1999 MAKARIM actively participated in the establishment and formation of violent militia groups. As a result of his conduct those militia groups subsequently committed crimes throughout East Timor, including those referred .to In this indictment.

218. By the nature of the relationship which existed between TNI and the militia 9 ro ups 0 P 9 rati ng in Ea 5 t Tim 0 r d u ri ng 1999. whether 1 n person 0 r th ro ugh his subordinates, MAKARIM had effective control over the members of the militia groups.

219. During 1999, MAKARIM spent conslderable periods of time ~n East Timor.

During those periods he met regularly with East Tlmorese cornmumty leaders, members of the press and officials representing the international community, j n cl ud i ng Mil ita ry Li a I son Off] ce rs an doth e r offici als fro m U NAM ET .

220. At these meetings he was repeatedly informed of "acts of violence and other crimes being perpetrated by TNI and militia groups in East Timor. In these meetings requests were made that he control the TNi and mllitia groups who were co m m i ttin 9 these crtmes.

221. 0 u ring 1999 MAKARJ M failed to take ne cessa ry and reason a b le measures to prevent th e erl m es bei ng comm itted by t1 is s uoord ina tes and he fai led to ta ke necessary and reasonable measures to punlsn the perpetrators of those crimes.

222. By reason of the above MAKARIM is criminally responsible for his conduct as an individual pursuant to section 14 UNTAET Regulatlon 2000/15 and for the acts of h ls s ubordl nate 5 pu rsu a nt to section 16 U NT AET Reg u I a ti on 2000/15,

223. After the popular consultation In East Timor, MAKARIM served as a Senior Offtcer at the headquarters of the Armed Forces of Indonesia.

28

KIKI S YAHNAKRI

224. At all material times covered by this indictment, SYAHNAKRI held the rank of Major General and served as Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of Staff IAsisten Operas! KSAD] from May 1998 to November 1999. He also served as the Commander of the Martia~ Law Operations Command In East Timor [PBngUma, Komendo Operas! Penguasa Darurat Mimerl in September 1999.

225. During 1999 SYAHNAKRI actively participated in the establishment and forrnatlon of violent militia groups. As a result of his conduct those mHitia groups subsequently committed crimes throughout East Timor. including those referred

to in this indictment

226. From the imposition of martial law in East Timor in September 1999, SYAHNAKRI had command authority over all TNI personnel in East Timor,

227, .By the nature of the relationship which existed between TN ~ and the militia groups ope ra ti ng 1 n East Timor during 1999, wh ethe r in pe rson or t hro ug h his subordinates, SYAHNAKRI had effective control over the members otthe militia

groups,

228. During 1999, and particularly during September t 1999, SYAHNAKRI spent considerable periods of time In East Timor. During those perlods he met regularly with East Tirnorese community leaders, members of the press and officials representtng the Intemational communfty, including Military Liaison Off! cern and other effiel a Is from U NAM ET,

229. At these meetings he was repeatedly informed of acts of violence and other crimes being perpetrated by TNI and rnilltla groups in East Timor, In these meetings requests were made that he control the TNI and militia groups that we re com m ittl ng th e 5 e cri me s.

230. During 1999 SYAHNAKRI failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to preve nt the c ri mes being comm Itted by hi s sub 0 rd In ates a nd he failed to ta ke n ecess a ry a nd rea so nab! e measu res to pun; s h the perpetra tors of thos e cri rnes.

231, By reason of the above SYAHNAKRI is criminally responsible for his conduct as an ind ivl d u a I pu rsuant to se ctlon 14 U NT AET Regulation 2000/1 5 and for the acts of hls subordinates pursuant to secnon 16 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15.

232. SYAHNAKRl served as the Commander of the Regional Military Command ~XlU d ay ana [Pa ngdam IXlUda yan a 1 from December 1999 u ntll Nove m be r 2000 and th e n se rved as t he De p uty Army Ch let Q f Sta ff [Wak'il KSAD] from Nave m bar 2000 to May 2002, He is now reti re d from th e Arm ad Forces of I nd 0 n e sl a.

29

.------~

30

ADAM RAe HMAT DAMIRi , .

233- At all material times covered by the indictment, DAMIRI held the rank of Major General and served as the Commander of Regional Military Command IX/Udayana [Pangdam IX/Udayana], covering Bali, East and West Nusa T enggara and East Timor, from June 1998 to November 1999.

234_ Durlng 1998 and 1999 DAMI RI actively participated in the establishment and formatlon of violent militia groups, As a result of his conduct those mi1iba groups subsequently committed crimes throughout East Timor, Including those referred to in this indlctment

235. As Commander of Regional Military Command IX, DAMIRI possessed command authority over all TNl personnel withIn Regional Military Command IX, including the accused SURATMAN, MULS and SUDRAJAT.

236, By the nature of the relationship whlch existed between TNI and the militia "groups operating in East Timor during 1999, whether in person or through his su bord i na te s ~ DAM I R I had e ffe ctive co ntro lover the me m b e rs of the miHti a groups.

237, During 1998 and 1999 DAMIRI'a headquarters were located in Denpasar, 8aji, He spent considerable periods of time In East Timor, During those periods he met regularly wlth East Timorese community leaders, members of the press and officials representing the internatlonai community, including Mllitary Liaison Officers and other officials from UNAMET.

238, At these meetings he was repeatedly informed of acts of violence and other crimes being perpetrated by TNl and militia groups in East Timor. In these meetings requests were made that he control the TNI and militia groups that we re com m itti ng these crlrn es.

239, During 1999 DAMIR1 failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crimes being committed by his subordinates and he failed to take necessa ry and re aso nable mea s u res to p u nis h the perpetrators of those crimes,

240. By reason of the above DAMIRl is criminally responsible for his conduct as an ind ivl d u a I pu rsu a nt to seetin n 14 U NT AET Reg u ta tion 2000/1 5 a nd for th e a cts of his s ubord i nates pursua nt to sec~ 0 n 16 UN T A ET Regul ation 2000/1 5.

241. In November 1999 DAMIR] was appointed Assistant for Operations to the Chief of the General Staff (Asisten Operasi KepaJa Staf Umum TNn,

S U HARTONO SU RATMAN '

242. At all material times covered by this indictment up until August 13, 1999, SURATMAN held the rank of Colonel and between June 1998 and Aug ust 13, 1999 was the Commander of the Sub-Regional Military Command 164/Wira Dharma (Komandan Korem 164!Wlra Dljarma]. East Timor.

243. During 1998 and 1999 :s URATMAN actively participated in the establishment and formation of violent militia groups. As a result of his conduct those militia groups subsequently committed crimes throughout East Timor, including those referred to in this indictment

244. As Commander of Sub-Regional Mititary Command 164, SURATMAN po s sessed com m a nd au thority over a II TN I pe rson n e I with inS u b-R eg ion a I Military Command 164, including the accused SUORAJAT.

245. By the nature of the relationship which existed between TNI and the militia groups operating in Ea st Timor du ri ng 1 999, whet her 'n person 0 r th ro ugh his subordinates, SURATMAN had effective control over the members of the militia groups.

246. From August 13, 1999 SURATMAN ceased to have command authority overTNI p ersonn el in East Ti m or an d the m em be rs of th e mHitia groups.

247. During 1998 and 1999 SURATMAN's headquarters were located in Dill, East Ti m 0 r. Duri n 9 thl s pe dod hemet re gular] y wi th East Tl m 0 rase co m m uni ty leaders I members of the press and offi cia Is re presen ti ng th e i nte rn atl 0 n a I comm u n tty, in clud i ng Mill tary Ll a i so n Officers an doth e r 0 ffi cia I s fro m UN AM ET .

248. At these meeUngs he was repeatedly informed of acts of violence and other cri mes bei ng perpetrate d by TN I and mi litia 9 ro ups In East Ti m or. I n these meet~ngs requests were made that he control the TNI and militia groups that were co mm itti ng th e s e cri m e s.

249. During 1999 SURATMAN failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crimes bsrng committed by his subordinates and he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators ottnose crimes.

250. By reason of the above SURATMAN is criminally responsible for his conduct as an individual pursuant to sectlon 14 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 and for the a ots of h rs s ubord I nates pursua nt to section 16 U NT AE T Regulation 2000/15.

251. In August 1999 SURATMAN was posted as the Deputy Head of the Armed Forces of Indonesia Information Center (Wakil KepaJa Puspen TN~ and was promoted to the rank of Br[gadier General,

31

MOHAMMAD NOER MUIS .

252_ At all material times covered by this indictment after August 13, 1999, MUIS held the rank of Colonel and served as the Commander of Sub~Regional Mllitary Command 164IWira Dharma [Koman dan «orem 1641lNira Dharma]. East Timor from August 13, 1999 until March 3, 2000

253. As Commander of Sub-Regional Military Command 164, MUIS possessed command authority over all TNI personnel within Sub-Regronal MUltary Command 164, including the accused SUDRAJAT,

254. By the nature of the relationship which existed between TNI and the mhltla groups operating in East Timor during 1999, whether in person or through his subordinates, MUIS had effective control over the members of the mim~a groups,

255, During 1999 MU1S' headquarters were located in Dili, East Timor. During this period he met regularlywitt1 East Timorese community leaders, members of the press and officials representing the international community, including Military Liaison Officers and other offlclals from UNAMET.

256. At these meetings he was repeatedly informed of acts of vrotence and other cri mes bei ng psrp etra ted by TN I and mi lilia groups in Ea st Ti m 0 r. I n these meeti ngs req u ests we re mad e th at he can trol the TN I and m liltla 9 ro u ps tha t were commiWng these crimes.

257. During 1999 MUiS failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crimes being committed by his subordinates and he failed to take necessary an d re as 0 n a bl e measu res to pun ish the pe rp etrators of those crimes.

258, By reason of the above MUIS is criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates pursuant to section 16 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15,

259. In J u n e 2001 MU I S wa s poste d a s the De puW Gave rn 0 r of th e Military Academy [WakiJ Gubemur Akadami MilUerj and was promoted to the rank of Brigadier

General.

-_·--··-1

32

._ .. _ ... _---)

YAYAT SUDRAJAT

260. At all material times covered by this indictment, SUDRAJAT held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, In 1999 he held multiple positions. He was the Commander of Tribuana VIII Task Force [KomandanJ setuen Tagas Ttibuene VIII] and the Commander of the lntelligence Task Force, Sub-Regional Military Command 164/Wira Dharma /Komandan Saruan Tuqu« Inte/lj'en, Korem 164!Wira Dharma], East Timor. Tribuana VIII Task Force was the operations name for a contingent of Special Forces Command [Komando Pasukan Khusus} personnel deployed in East Timor. Triouana VBI personnel were assigned to the Intelligence Task Force.

261. During 1998 and 1999 SUDRAJAT actively participated in the establishment and formation of vjolent mJlitia groups. As a result of his conduct those mHitia groups su bse q ue ntly com m itted cr i mes th ro ug h 0 ut E as tTl mer. incl ud i n9 those referred to in this indictment.

262. As CommanderofTrlbuana VIII Task Force and Commander of the Intelligence Task Force I Sub-Regional Military Command 164, SUDRAJAT possessed command authority over all Tribuana VIII Task Force •. Sub~Regjonal Military Co m mand 164 and Intelligence Task Force person ne I.

263- By the nature of the retatlonshlp which existed between TNI and the militia grou ps operating in East Timor during 1999J whether in person or through his subordinates, SUDRAJAT had effective control over the members of the militia groups.

264. During 199B and 1999 SUDRAJA Ps office was located in Dili, East Timor, During th i s period he mat reg u la r1y with Ea st Tim ore se comm u n i ty lead ers, members of th e press and effic I a Is re prase nti n 9 the in te rn a ti a n aj co mm unity, in cl ud i ng Mil ita ry liai son Otnce rs an doth e r offici a Is fro m UN AM ET .

265. At these meetings he was repeatedly infonned of acts of violence and other crimes being perpetrated by TNI and mUitia groups in East Timor. In these meetings requests were made that he control the TNI and mUitia groups that were committing these crimes,

266.- During 1999 SUDRAJAT faHed to take necessary and reasonable measures to preve nt the en mas be ing comm Itted by hls s ubo rd in ate sand he failed to ta ke necessary and reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators ofthose crimes.

257, By reason of the above SUDRAJAT is criminally responsible for his conduct as an individual pursuant to section 14 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 and for the acts of his subordinates pursuant to section 16 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15.

33

ABtLi a JOSE OSORIO SOARES

268. At all material times covered by this indictment, SOARES was the Governor of East Timor.

269. During 1998 and 1999 SOARE.S actively particlpated in the establishment and formation of violent militia groups. As a result of nts conduct those militia groups subsequently committed crimes throughout East Timor, including those referred to in this indictment.

270, By reason of the above SOARES is criminally responslbte for his conduct as an individual pursuant to section 14 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15.

VI. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

CR~MES AGAINST HU MANITY

For each count charging Crimes Against Humanity under Section 5 UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, the acts or omissions by the accused persons described in this indictment were undertaken as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civiiian population, with knowledge of the attack and especially targeting those who were believed to be supporters of independence for East T~mor,

INC IVIDUAL CRI MINAL RESPONSIBI LlTY

MAKARIM, SYAHNAKRI, DAMIRI1 SURATMAN, SUORAJAT and SOARES are cri ml n a lIy resp 0 n 6 ~ble as in d lv id u a Is fa r the crimes a lIeged in this i nd ictment pu rsu an t to Section 14 of UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. Sectron 14.3 states that:

~". a person shall be criminally responsible arid Hable for punIshment for a crime wifhin the jurisdiction of the pansls if that person:

(a) commifs such a crime, whether as an {ndivldua/j jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person te criminally responsibls;

(b) orders, solicjfs or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;

(c) for the purpose of fa CiJitBtin g the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or irs attempted commnsio», including providing the m sans for tts commiss;on;

34

..

I

35

(d) in any other way comttoutes to tile comm;sSion or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting wUh a common purpose. Suel} contribution S/lBIl be intentional and shall either:

(i) be made with (he aim of furthering tne criminaf activity or criminal purpose of the grottp. where such actMty or purpose involves the commission of a crime witlJin the jurisdiction of the panels; or

. .

(Ii) be made in the Imow/edge of the intention of UJe group to commit the crime ... ~

RESPONS1 BILITY OF COMMANDERS AND OTH ER S U PERJORS

WIRANTO, MAKARIM I SYAHNAKRJ, DAMIRI, S URATMAN. MUtS and SUDRAJAT are criminally responsible for the crimes of their subordinates alleged in this indictment pursuant to Section 16 of UNTAET Regulation 2000/15. Section 16 states that, a superior is responsible far the criminal acts of his subordinates if he:

~ ... knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrator thereof. JO

36

VII. CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED

Pursuant to the above, the Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes charges:

COUNT 1: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY - MURDER

By their acts or omisslons in relation to the events described in paraqraphs 41 to 158 of this indictment WiRANTO (1), Zacky Anwar MAKARIM (2), Kiki SYAHNAKR' (3), Adam Rachmat DAMtRi (4), Suhartono SURATMAN (5), Yayat SUDRAJAT (7) and Ab;Uo Jose Osorio SOARES (8) are responsible as individuals and/or as superiors for the murder of hundreds of East Timorese civUlans as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack, and thereby commUted a CRIME AGA! NST HUMANITY - MURDER, a crime stipulated under Section 5.1[a] UNTAET Regulation 2000/15.

COUNT 2: CR'MES AGAINST HUMANITY - MURDER

By his acts or omissions in relation to the events described in paragraphs 41 to 158 of this Indictment whlch occurred after August 13, 1999 Mohammad Noar MU1S (6) is responsible as a superior for the murder of hundreds of East Timorese civilians as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civillan population with know~edge of the attackf and thereby committed a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY - MURDER, a crlme stipulated under Section 5.1 [a) UNTAET Regulation 2000/15.

COUNT 3: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANJTY - DEPORTATiON OR FORCIBLE TRANSFER OF POPULATION

By their acts or omissions ln relation to the events described in paragraphs 159 to 206 of th~s lndlctrnsnt W1RANTO (1)1 Zacky Anwar MAKARIM (2), Kik~ SYAHNAKRI (3), Adam Rachmat DAMIR1 (4), Suhartono SURATMAN (5), Mohammad Noar MUIS (6), Yayat SUDRAJAT (7) and AblUo Jose Osorio SOARES (8) are responsjble as In~ividuals and/or as superiors for the deportation or forcible transfer of the population of East Tlmor as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a clvlllan population with knowledge of the attack, and thereby committed a CRIME AGAI NST HUMAN~TY - DEPORTATION OR FORCIBLE TRANSFER OF POPULATION, a crime stipulated under Section 5.1 [d] of UNTAET Regu~ation 2000/15.

I

37

c aUNT 4; CRiM ES AGAI N ST HUMAN lTV - PERS EC UTI ON

By their acts or omissions In relation to the events described in paragraph 207 of this indictment WIRANTO (1). Zacky Anwar MAKARIM {2), Kiki SYAH NAKRI {3l, Adam Rachmat DAMI RI {4}t Suhartono SURATMAN (5), Yayat SUDRAJAT (7) and AbHio Jose Osorio SOARES (8) a re responsible as individuals and/or as superiors for the persecution of an identifiable group within East Timor as pan of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population with knowledge of the attack, and thereby committed a CRl ME AGAI NST HUMAN ITY - PERSEC UTIO N, a crime stipulated under Section 5.1 [h] of UNTAET Regulatton 2000/15,

COUNT 5: GRIM ES AGAINST HUMANITY - PERSECUTION

- -

By his acts or omissions in relation to the events described in paragraph 207 of this In d ictm ,9 n t wh ic h OCCU rred afte r Aug u st 13, 1 999 Mo ham ma d N oar M U I S (6} is responsible as a superior far the persecution of an identifiable group within East Tlrnor as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a clvillan population with knowledge of the attack, and thereby committed a CRIME AGAINST HUMAN~TY - PERSECUTION, 8 crime stipulated under Section 5.1[h] of UNTAET Regulation 2000/15.

VIII. LIST OF VICTIMS

The list of victims which forms a part of this indictment is attached and marked "ANNEX A~.

IX. REQUEST FOR TRIAL

The Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes hereby requests that the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the District Court of Dili try this matter expeditiously.

February 22, 2003

~ ~. . .

srRI FRIGAARD

DEPUTY GENERAL PROSECUTOR FOR SERIOUS CRIMES