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10th Armd Div in the CRAILSHEIM
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loth Armored Division inthe Crailshelm
Operation, 4-10 Apr 45. Arnrored School,
Student researoh .report. llay 60.
This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
fOltT LEAVENWORTH. KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO.N-2146.58 COpy NO. .1
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A RESEARCH REPORT
PrepClred at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox Kentucky
19491950

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CRAILSHEIM
OPERATION

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10thARMORED DIVISION IN THE CRAU.SHEIM OPERATION
A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED
BY
COMMITTEE 8 OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE
THE ARMORED SCHOOL
1949-1950
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CECIL HIMES, CAV.
MAJOR CHARLES T. KRM:PITZ, CAV.
MAJOR HUGO Vi. HEFFELFINGER, CAV.
MAJOR CARROLL Me FALLS, Jr. J CAV.
MAJOR MORRIS C. STOUT, FA.
MAJOR WILLIAM J. BOEHMER, CAV.
CAPTAIN STEP'1EN K. PLUI\1:E, CAV.
CAPTAIN GEORGE D. STYER, CiI.V.
CAPTAIN JhMES M. HUDDLESTONI CAV.
FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY
MAY 1950
PREFACE
Tho lOth Division orossed the RtUNE River
as part of the United States Seventh Army in Maroh 1945.
The division spearheaded the of the VI Corps to the
W?st bank of the River against feeble German nsist-
(lnCG. Arriving in front of HEILBRONN the corps vias halted
by stiffening German resistnnoe. The 10th Armored Division
was dirGcted to move to th6 north in an attempt to outflank
HEI LBRONN Elements of the division Viere successful in re-
aching CR:I.ILSHEIM, forty air miles to th(;) e!lst. Failing
to move back tOVlClrd HEILBRONN und after defending CRAILSHEIM
for tuo days the division '.-IUS forced to \Ji thdraw. This
study COVE;rs the drive for, oapture of and from
by tho 10th Armored Division during the period
4-10 1945.
Our main purposo in studying this particular action
1::QS to incrcuse our lmm71cdgc of armored operations in
three types of action: penetration, defense, and ,'Jith-
drawul. Besides increasing our lmo':!ledgG Vie ,'Jere trying
to determine udhGrence to or violation of armor cd doctrine,
any lessons to bo learnod from this particular operation,
und to make recommcnd:ltions on the future Gmployment of
armor cd uni ts.
.Ll
Tho main sources of information D.v,lilable to us ywre
llfta ;'.c tion Reports, 0. Report by Captain a member
of tho Officers Class of 1948, on this same sub-
ject, and letters and interviel"ls YIith former members of
the 10th .<:"rmorcd Division. After Action Reports formed
the basis for most of the report as they uere the only
availablc source that covered the entire period in detail.
grE:at dec.l 0 f the valuo of the rGports 1jJas lost, however,
becG.usc the such as journals, order s, stutistical
reports, etc., wGrC not c:..vaiL,blc. Th0 information in the
After .-lction Reports Was confirmed and el::l,bor'.lted on by
Ha'1lGl and other former mGIJlbers of the 10th il.rmored
Di vision.
The following members of the 10th Armored Div-
ision .'Iere helpful in our inquiries:
Col Wade C. Gatchel (Rotired)
Lt Col ;ililliom 'J'f. Beverly
Lt Col Curtis L. Ho.nkins
Lt Col 'l'homus C.
Mo.j Ar thur C. Ball
Cupt George F. H:mwl
K:J.lr,rcn
SFC Hugh S. Johnson
iii
ilerman C. Jacobs
Jrsderict:: r. Haas
Syl \fes tel' r. H sr p;6r
Carl E. Michael
I;;alcol:i1 ::liIerr itt
'IUilliam Hartline
Jcim Vi. Sheffield
Fi.ichard -\1. Ulrich
v ~ h l r hll. Tha.ckston
In addi-:ion we would like to express oru appreciation
for the work of Hrs. i{jlliam J. B06hw,r on the cover, charts
and rr.aps of this r epor t.
TABLE OF CCNTEN'IS
0' :\PTF.R
Page
1 TIJ TRODUCTI CN . .... ......... ...I ,
1
2. TJ-fE CAPTlFE OF ,CRAIl SI-TT!::IM , ." 7
Evef;1ts up to the drive on Crailsheim , 7
Combat tonmapd l\. ;, . " 12
Combat Cotntnand Bl ,e, 19
Reserve Cohmahd am 90th Cav. Ren. Sq. Mecz. 24
;. OFFENSIVE (FH.:Rcl.TIO"lS ThT CRAILSU;EIM-llSHOFEN MEA. 30
Canbat Comnand A. e 30
Reserve Corrm:md and 90th Cav. Ren. Sq. Meea .. 37
Combat Gomnand .-\. (w ith deserve Comnand under operational
Combat Corrmand (with Reserve Conmand under operational
centrol) 8 , 39
control) 9April. .. 47
90th Cavalry ReconnaisSd.'.ce Souadron, Mechanized. 51
4 ROII . ..... . 55

The fight along the MSR ,

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Air resupply operations

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5 THS FRO!" C::,.-iFS' EDi 65
Combat Con-mand A (wit); Reserve Corrmand under operational
centrol) 10 April. " 65
Combat Comnand B. .. '. . 72
90th Cavalry Reconnaissa'ce Squadron, Mechanized' . 74
6 StJ'.'l"ARY .'.' , ........... _. 77 to
Elnt'loyrrent of the lOn l-1.rmored Division. 77
Conclusions and lessons learned 79
...
I. Order of Battle a,ld. Troop List 85
II. Terrain &twy. 91
III.Liivl sion, Corps, at'.d ;1.rmy Orders 94
IV. Personalities. 111
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CHAPTE.'R 1
INTRODUCTION
Tho lOth Armored Division, under the comm:md of
M:,-j or GcnerLll Paul W. Newgo.rden, 'was ac tiVQ ted on 15 July
1942 at Fort Benning, Georgia from elements of the 3d and
11th Cavalry Regimen ts. The newly orgo.nized division
took over the area und somo of the equipment which ho.d
formerly belonged to the 2d A.rmored Division.
The 10th h.rmorcd Division perfonned the usual
l,GF training progrurn \-;hilo u.t Fort Banning, and was soon
known :.1S a "hot" outfit. Concurrently, the niclmumo of
"Tiger" W:.1S acquire,d. When the bas ic :.1nd uni t tro.ining
cycle >''D.s c0mpleted, the ~ n t i r e division spent almost
four ;uonths pl.:.rticipCtting in thE; Ten..'1esscG Maneuvers
CLnd tilen moved to C[;.mp Gordon, Georgi...:. to proc(;ss for
ovcrscCLS dut:y. ;, serious bl07! ':(,:1.3 dC:J.l t the di 'lis ion
by the unti:noly dco.th of General Hcwgarden in :.1 pl:.1ne
crLlsh nc.:o.r Chl tto.noog;' 1 TennessGe on 14 July 1944, almost
t,vo yc._crs to the day after he hetd D.ssu.rncd comrrr:tnd of tho
division. M:.1jor Genera.l W'lillin.m H. Horris, an officer
of livide experience, succeeded to comm:.;.nd of the division
~ n led it through all of its subsequent c ombclt on the
contLlcnt.
1
SJ::.arpencd by tra.ining" the division loft for Europo
from CD1l'.p Putrick Henry, Virginia. on 13 September 1944,
6YJ.tGring the continent through the port of CHERBOURG on
23 September 1944. After its arrivo.l in Europe, tl& di'l-
ision wus moved to TEURTHEVILLE and underwent a. month of
intensivo truining and comb:lt conditioning prior to enter-
ing combat.
Tho division moved to the front in the MAR LA TOUR
area. on 23 October 1944 where it first suw combat on 1 Nov-
ember in support of the XX Corps. The corps miosion o.t
this timo W:.!S to conblin c!1cmy troops in the arco.. In
mid-November" the di7ision flS a unit 1'10nt on tho offen-
sive, crossing the MOSELLE 'lnd };!fl.LLING and driving to the
SA."-R Rivc.r north of the fortress city of METZ.
As part of the., fo.mous Third J;l-rmy" the 10th Armored
Di 7isicJ:l w:.ts ffi2..king for the dr ive to the
RHINE when it recoived the urg.::;nt cl,ll to go north to
,l.ssist in stopping tbc Germun ,,:intcr offonsive in tho
XEWE1'NES. Tha division rush,)d into the gClP to stop
tho Germo.n onsla.ught on 17 December 1944, und held
defensive posi tions Bf.STOGNE, NOVILLE, Clnd BR.:iS
until tile 'i'cutonic tide ha.d receded. Liko other div-
isions 'ahich hD.d hClstily moved to tho ARDENNES, the lath
sustt:dncd considcro.ble casualtics in both men ;J.nd equip-
ment, and aftor tho action withdrew to rest o.roas.
:Ster 0. brief r0st in J::muo.ry, the division roturned
to he attack and took part in the clco.ring of the SAAR-MOS-
ELLE Triangle as part of tho Third Army, and th(;n turned
north to capture TRIER on 15 March 1945., At the end of
March, tho division part of tho Seventh Army"
crossed the RHINE River at l{,LlI..NNHEIH on 28 March 1944, and
took part in the April Offensive ago.inst the hc[,rt of GER-
IvIANY. Under VI Corps the division had the principal rolo
in the battlG of tho HEILBRONN-CR.AILSHED.1-SCHi'JABISCH HALL
the combined :llied armies drove toward the
heo.rt of GERM,ANY.
l...fter the failure of the ARDENNES Offensive, it
was incrGo.si!lg1y o.pp::.\rellt th",t it ,1ould be only 0. mo.tter
of time beforo thG once omnipotent Germ::n war mnchine
;v,')ulcJ crumble. Desie:ncd to ho.st611 the fD.ll of GERl1ANY,
the 0.11 iGd Spritlg Ofi'rons i V6 of 1945 envisi oaed o.dv::mc ing
C1.cross tho RHH;'E on n. brwd front and striking deep into
t:le hco.rt of VlC Gerrrnn n'J.tion. Stratogicdly the allied
pl:1,ns cc.llod for tllroe pb),ses. Tho first p11Cl.sc vw.s the
c:lCirclcmcnt or tht. industrial RUI-lR by '). doubl", cmvclop-
ment. The ,n0vcment was to be carried out by Field
Sir L. 1,:oCltgomery's Tvvcnty-first Army Group in the
north,. and General Omur Bradley I s T:'Jelfth Army Group in the
south. The second and third of the overall plan,
after the central armic::s made D. jUllction wi th the Russians
3
somewhere along the ELBE, called for a rapid advance on each
flc.nk. The northern armies would cut off DENMARK, and the
southern armies would drive to the southeast through GERMANY
into AUSTRIA. In summing up this plan in 0. radio message
to lVLi.RSH';'LL, Gl1eral EISENHOWER said the. following:
I propose, at thE. en.rliGst possible inoment, in
conjunction 'with the SOVIETS to divide ilIld destroy
the GERMAN foroc;s by launching my mo.in attack from
the KASSEL arc8. straight eastward tow:J.rd the heart
of Wh:,lt remains of the GERlviAN industrial power
until that thrust has attained the general area
of LEIPZIG and including that city, unless the
RUSSLiN advance meets us west of that point. The
second. main fe:ture of the battle is to bring
MONTGOMERY'S forces along on tho left and as quickly
as the above has been accomplished to turn Ninth
h.rmy to the left to flssist him in clen.niEg out
tho '17:;'010, OIGCl. from KIEL and LUBECK westward.
""ftcr the of' these two moves h:..ve
Deen mGt, I ,Jill thrust colwnns suutho!:lstw8.rd in un
attempt to join up wi th the RUSSIA.NS in the DANUBE
Valley ::l.nd prevent tho Gst,1olishmcnt of a NAZI fort-
ress in southern GEillLANY.
Natur;llly l,ly pLms flre flGxi ble c.nd I mus t ret:1in
freedom of action to meet changing Max-
i:nu:n flexibility result from of
maxLm.rril forco in the center.l
On 31 March" the lOOth Ia'o.ntry Divisio!'1 of ttL VI
Corps crossed the RHINE river near IV1ANNHEDIl. On 1 April,
the 63d Inf cutry Division and the 10th [.rmored Division
joined the corps cmc] the attQck jumpod off to the oG.st
with the proponderance of the attack on the southern flank
of corps. by elements of the 10th Armored
DivisiO!J the corps mado re.pid progress for throe days aga.11lBt
sporadic Germ<J.n resistance consisting in thE: 10.<J.in of doLlying
forces.
4
By tho 4tt of April the 63d Infantry Division, on
the north, had advanced eastward 8.S far as aiD MERGEN-
TRETIvl and WClS poised to str ike south across the JAGST Rbror.
Thi s division lnd followed Reserve Commnnd of the lOth
i;..rmored Division cmd noY. had its three inf:::cntry r6giments
sproZld along t:1. north bnnk of the JAGST River. The c om-
center of HEILBRONN apP6arod to have been out-
flanked by the swift of this flank.
the maneuver to th6 north had bean progressing,
t Command .tl. of thE; lOth Armored Division, followed by
the 100th Ini'mtry J.)ivisioll" had been attc.cking west from
HEIDELBERG townrd HEILERONN. Theso southern forc6s had
bcem meeting stiffening resistance on the 2d ;).nd 3d of
il. By the niEht of the 3d of this force was
dr::;,vJn up along th:: NEClbR before HEILBRONN and hLld c leured
OllOUgh of the. west brlnk befon, the. city to plzm :J. cros
for the follo\ving d::<y.
Comh:t Commo.nd B of the lOth ".rmorod Division on
the extreme southcrn f1,:u-:k of the corps o.lso 'Jo.s stopped
on th" Y/est h;,nk of the NECKL.R.
Tho first v,eek of the. (,dvunco from tho bridgeh6ad
of the RInNE had seen only light enomy rcsisto.nce. It was
known t'lil t VI Corps wo.s fae ing the depleted German r irs t
k:::my -,dth an cstim-t,.:;d strength of 7,500 comb(",t effectivos.
The en6:n.y made good USG of his monger forces and it Wo.s
5
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o.ppi1rO:1t th::1 t he intended to m:J.ko r:.. stand for HEILBRONN
along the JAGST and NEC&\R River lines.
Tile VI Corps had not n.nticipLl. ted :l. long dehy in
crossing these rivers. On 3 .Jl.pri1 the corps issued orders
for thG 10th "rmored vivision 2.nd the 100th Infantry Di v-

ision to seize HEILBRONN and continue the attc..ck 6L1st}-
}JOTES FOR CHAPTER 1
1D-i:lir,ht D. Crusuade in Europe (G:l.rden City,
NOH York: fend Co., Inc., 1948) p 401.
2Report of Opero.tions, The Seventh United States Army,
1944-1945, Vol III, P '79.
6
CEAPTER 2
THE CAPTURE OF CRAlLS JElE
On the night of 28 March 1945, the lOth Armored Div-
ision crossed thE: R1IINE River at EANN_=::EILI, GerIrfmy. During
the period 29 March - 4 April tho diviwion was in
exploi totion operations in the area 30ut11 of the NECKAR River
bet'iJ6Cn and HEILDROliN (08.5-61.5). The division
carried out this mission, advancinG swiftly against incre-
asing resistunce with Com-bat Co:r:ur.ands A and alJreast, CCA
on the left (north). Combat Command A drove the general
(91.3-04.5), lIELHS1'l,DT (90.0.. 81.5), (98.0-77.9),
and KBCmIAUSEN (00.0.. 66.0). Combat Command 1:3 moved along
the axis HAIF(mElM, SClrvYETZ E:GLN (61.0.. 87.5), 1iVALLDORF (66.0-
78.6), STETTFILD (66.3-65.3), GROSSGARTACE (01.0-61.5), and
LA1.?l'EN (03.5-54.0). (See Fir:ure 1.) Combat Cornrr.a.nd Reserve
movE;d t;18 same general axis as t ;,s.t of eCA vii th the
mission lito e:"1gaf;e in a reconnaissa.nce in force with the 90th
Cavo.
Reconnaissance Squadron to t:!'l.E: oi ty of ROT?ErWERG
"l
(7'1.5-89.4). The Re::lerve Command moved to
(41.5-S3.e) on 4 A.pril a.nd raade contact viJ.th the 90th
Cavalry Squadron w!lich had preceded them.
Plans Yller8 [-;ade for a coordinated atta.ck st
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enemy defenses in the vicinity of (46.0-95.8).
This o.tto.ck wo.s bunched ut 1430B on 4 April 1946 from
ASShlJ[STADT with the Reserve Command on the south und the
90th Cuvo.lry on the north. STUPPACH und HACHTEL (49.0-93.0)
were to.ken despite moderate enemy Q.nd the fo.ct
reported to division he0.dqu8.rters o.t 1600B hours. Reserve
Comrn..'"lnd WfJ,S ordered :'y di vision to hold the ground ken
::::.nd block to the north n.nd northeast.
lilihile the Reserve and the 90th Cavulry
wore fig;,ting in the vicinity of ::md STUPPACJ,
COA and CCB Vlere engtlg.:od in oper:\tions in the vicinity of
HEILBRONN designed to clen.r thE; 0ner:1Y from thG west b.cmk
of the NEC:K:.aR cmd to loco.te crossings n.cross this major
bQ.rri6r. Combat Comm;.md A ','JUS oper:<ting in the KIRCH-
[TAUSE} , BI:-JsRACFI (02.5-67.2), FRiiNKENBll.CR (04.5-63.2)
J.re0. YJhilo CCB WClS deployed to the south in the o.rea
between ]EIL5RONN and LAUFFEN.
Combat Commo.nd .:. - 5 il.pril 1945
The morning of 5 1945 found Combat Commo.nd
11. deployGd C1.S follO'.Js: Comoclt COmTIl0.nd Comn,md Post nt
Bli:1ER.'.CEi Ta.sk Force Hankins a.t KIRCIIILmSEN.; Task Force
Roberts ::..t FR..NKENP'v.I.CH'1nd Task Force Riley Jot BIB:GRACH.
P1o...l1s und reconnuissc.mo6 O ;6n completed to effect a
crossing of the NEC1G.R River in the vicinity of HEILBRON1'J.
This crossing 'NelS to lu.ve bE-en made in conjunction
9
the 3d Battalion" 398th Fiegimeuto.l COl"l:lJ,t Te:l:n ot the loath
Infantry Division. These phns were never carried out, lor
f',t 1030 llOuts Combat COl;r<:1B.nd A was alerted to move north
on [l neW lJ1ission. This mission was to cross the NECK.b.R River
in the vicinity of MOSPACE (02.0-84.5) .. pass through the
established there t::e Infantry Division,
the Reserve COlTmand and t:l8 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron, and "r ec annOl '.... "er l'n f'orce
u2
"l',O t'_, e east.
At 1130B the combat command nc','cd out to accomp-
lish its new rr:ission. The order of :-;'lD.rch was Task Force
Task Force Riley, and Task rorc e berts. The
Combat Comma.nd noved north alonG the route BONrELD
(98.8-69.2) I .ILLES'r.ADT, .t,CLASTERElAU NECK-
ASSMIS'I'liDi',. o.nd at 1315B hOUl'S the Comtat Cornmai:1d Command
Post closed in ASSAHSTADT. (See 2.) E;.'T 1950B hours
Task Yorce Hankins had closed into ...tUJSEN (44.4..
91.5) and had stopped in order to carry out refueling op-
erations of all vehicles, To.sk loree Riley closed into
at approxirna te1y 2030B hou: s and Task Force
Ro'berts into an attack position in the southern outskirts of
at approxblD.'tely 2100B hOUi"S. Both task forces
immediately refueled and prepared for irmnc;diate action.
10
While CCA was conducting its movement to the vicinity
of ABSA SI'ADT" General Morris, Corrnnand Genee aI, 10th
ed Division" issued an oral field order to General Piburn.
'rIds fiGld order directed Combat Conmand A to continue the
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attack to the southeast, capture (70.5-62.5,) ,
turn to southwest and west and seize the line CRAILSEE1J.,1,
HALL (46.0-59.Q)" BACKHAHG (24.0-40.0) 3 General
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Piburn then issued verbal crders to task force conunanders )
(
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to carry out this mission. His plan ,-nas to attack with Task
Force Hankins in thE lead" followed by Task Force ley.
J
Task Force Roberts was given the initial mission of clear
(
the enemy from the sector between ASSAIMSTADT and DORZBACH
(43.0-89.0). Considerable enemy resistance had been devel-
oped at DORZBACH during the evening of 5 April by the 90th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.
Combat Command A - 6 April 1945
Having quickly refueled" r ecei ved its order s, and pre-
pared f'or the attack" Task Force passed through the
lines of tile 90th Cavalry in the northeastern outskirts of
REHGBHSI-IAUSEH and cormnenced the a ttack toward CRAILSHEIM.
The initial movement VJas extreme ly d ifficul t. This was
occasioned by the poor road net, enemy road blocks, dark-
ness, and t fact that Task Force Hankins had to remain
on the roads becau.se of the. heavy woods. This made it
12
very simple for the enemy to cons.truct effective roadblocks
by felling trees across the roads He took full advantage
of this and Task Force Hankins struggled throughout the
night to get the attack moving. Terrain was the major
enemy, as only sporadic small arms and mortar f.ire, larg-
ely' ineffective, was encountered by the column.
4
Bypasses
were used to get the extensive roadblocks but, since
the ground was very soft, vehicles continually mired and
had to be pulled Despite these difficulties Tusk Force
Hankins continued its slow movement forward. Daybreak found
them approaching HOLLENBACH (50.3- 88.4) (See Figure 3.)
. Since .TaskForce Hankins was having so much trouble
traversing the route between RENGERSiIAUSEN and HOLLENBACH
General Piburn ordered Task Force Roberts
to attack to the south toward DORZBACH and reconnoiter a
route to the west 0 f Task Force Hankins, bypass him, and
5
get the attack moving. The Task Force moved from the sou-
thern outskirts of ASSAMSTADT at 004513 hours, 6 April 1945.
They took the wrong road in the darkness and advanced into
undefended HORRENBACH (39.5-91.9)
6
Discover ing their
mistak;e they turned east and advanced to LAIBACH (41.9-
90.8); thence to DORZBACH. Here they encountered det-
erLlined enemy resistance in the form of roadblocks and
heavy small arms, antitank, and artillery fire. The tusk
force spent the remainder of the nifht attempting to find
13
a bypass around DORZWiCH but was unsuccessful.. They
attacked after daylight andj after a severe
.' ,
fire fight, took the toWn that evenirlgt
Arter of the town, itwas discovered
that the main road from DORZBhCH to HOLLENBACH, via
HOHEBACH (45.0-86.7) and AILRINGEN (46.2-87.8), was
blocked by a destroyed bridge across a small stream
which ran through the town-. They were unable to find
a bypass and this fact was inunediately reported to Combat
Command A. Task Force Roberts was then ordered to move
back to its original assembly area inASSiiMSTADT. This
move was accomplished without incident. (See Figure 3J
Task ForC6 Hankins was attacking toward
n.nd Task Force Roberts was engaged ilt DOR-
ZBACH, Task Force Riley had remained in liSSAMSTADT
with Combat A Heudquarters. They were prepared
to follow eith6r Task Ii orce Hankins or Task For ce
Roberts, depending upon tusk force found a suitable
route and bogan to move 'with the speed \vi thwhich an
7
ar.morcd task force is cffpable of moving. This opport-
unity did not present itself during the night of 5-6
April because of th6 conditions already stated.
,L'it approximately 0900B hours, 6 April 1945, while
Task }< orce Roberts was attacking DORZBAeH and Task Force
Riley was waiting expectantly in Task Force
Hankins captured and cleared HOLLENruiCH. The attackwas
15
imrtwdid.tGly continuE;d toward GUTBACH (56.8-87'&2)-_ Two
roa.db1ocksdcfended by sttulli etiemy gkooupa d.rilibd with
smull arms and panzerfausts were 6TJ.countered between
HOLLENBACH and GUTBACH, but were swiftly oleared through
the coordinated of the leading teams. GuTB8.CH
fell at 1245B hours and the attack began to pick up
speed. RIEDBACH (58.2-85.7) was captured at
against slight resistance and it became apparent that
Task Force Hankins had a brer:'kthrough. The ruce was
The column vV ith little or no int6rference from the enemy
pushed swiftly through DLAUFELDEN (62.5-80..0), 1443B
hours; BRETTENFELD (65.8-76.0), l515B hours; ROT AM SEE
( 66.6-74.7), 1550B hours; w-ALLHAUSEN (69.6-70.6), 1634B
hours; GRONINGEN (69.6-68.. 3), 1650B hours; SATT11iiEILER
(70.6-66.7), 1710B hours; SATTELDORF l730B
hours; and NEIDENFELS BURLESTIAGEN (69.866.8) at 1745B
8
hours. The main column of Task Force Hankins dashed
into at the same time that elements of the
task force were clearing surprised, bewildered enemy out
of NEIDENFELS BURLESViAGEN. Ene!'.1Y resistance in CRAILSHEIM
was light and disorganized, and it was apparent that com-
plete surprise had been acheived. The town was hastily
searched, since darkness was fast approaohing, and by
2100B hours Task Force Hankins Was disposed in CRAIL-
SHEIM for defense.
16
Tc.sk Force Riley, had remained in ASSAM-
ST.d.DT C\.vJaiting the opportunity to exploit any success,
received the ttgo" signal fl'om Combat Contrna.nd 11 Head.-
qJarters at iSOOB hours. It was apparent
from reports from Task }i'orce Hankins that a breakthrough
was in the ffi.::..king, and General Pi burn wanted Task .r orC6
Ri ley to as s i st in the exp loi to. tion.. Task It orce hi ley
moved out at 1510B hour s.9 It was immediate ly apparent
that move was to be no mere "motor march". Th6
enemy had inf il trated behind Task For ce :tankins and
harrassed Task r'orce .hiley with small arms fire While
the task force was negotiating the stretch of bad road
through the woods northeast of RENGERSHAUSEN. The
task force continued a steady advance following
the same route taken by Task }i'orce H:.lnkins. After
the stretch of bad road the task force began
to roll, and at 2058B hours lead elements of Task Force
Ri ley entered CRAILSHEIM and made contact with Task Force
Hankins. Since radio communication between both task
forces and Combat Command A lieadquarters had been lost,
because of the distance involved, the commanders of
Task Force l1f.lnkins and Task :B' orce Riley conferred and
agreed upon a plan for the defense of the CRilILSHEIM
area. They decided to reinforce Task Force Hankins in
17
CRll.ILSHEIM VJi th one team from Task Force Riley and to pI ace
the remaining two teams of Task Force Riley in S..;'TTIL-
and SATTELDORF. These dec isions were quickly carria:l
into abtion and by midi-iight th(3 area firmly
in the hands of the assault task forces of Combat.
Command
preparations for the defense of the CRAIL-
SHEIM area were be ing carri ed out, Combat Command A Head-
quarters, which was still located in .. received
orders from division to continue on its mission; .at the
same time holding CRAILSHEIM until relieved by the Reserve
Cornnand. General Piburn decided to follow his original
pI an of having Task l' orce block at CRAILSHEIM While
Task }i'orce b.iley passed thr ough and attacked toward SCH-
Vll.BISCH These orders, hov.Jever, never
reached the troops in the CR;-I.ILSHED!I area due to the fact
that radio communication with them had been lost and, des-
pi te repeated attempts involving the use of relay stations.
could not be reestablished.
IO
Consequently, the troops in
did not move to accomplish this mission during
the night of 6-7 April .
It became apparent during the night that the enemy
had been completely surprised by the capture of CRAILSHEIM.
It "vas furthEr apparent that enemy forces in the area. were,
18
in most cases, unaware that CRAILSHEIMwas in American handSJ
This VJas proven by the faet that several command vehicles
and their occupants were by of Task
Force Hankins during the night . These vehicles had been
tr3.veling toward CRAILSHEIM and their occupants were ast-
ounded to find CRi.ILSHEIM in American hands. At SATTiL-
DORF a German army bus passed unmolested through the outpoots
of Task Force Riley and Was stopped in front of the command
post by the task force S-4. The occupants of the bus stated
they been sent to pick up laundry.ll They never accomp-
lished their 17lissionl
Com bo. t Cormn nn d B - 4, 5 and 6 Apr i 1 1945
On 4 April 1945 B was probing the
WGst b3.nk of the NECKA.R River seeking like ly bridgeheads
across tllO barrier.
12
On the preceding day VI Corps had
or der-e d the 10th iirmor ed Divi s ion and th e lOOth rnf antry
Di vis), on to S6 ize I-{EILBRONN and to continue the attack east
into the heart of GERMANy.
13
. The command post of Comba t
Command B Was located in the vicini ty of FRANKENBACH.
Elements of the combat command reconnoitered for bridges
in the (04.5-58.4) area.
Enemy resistance stiffened along the entire river line
as he sought fran ticnlly to guard his internal commun-
ication and supply line s. Air and ground reconnaissance
19
shovved that all bridges; with the exception of the ee,st
bridge at HORKHEIM and the bridge at LA.UF'FENj were des.
troyed.
14:
the lattet Were intndt but heavily defended.
Befote daylight on 4 April, in the northern sector of
HEILBROHN, the 398th Infantry Re giment of the lOOth Inf-
antry Division had succeeded in establishing a limited
bridgehead on the far bank of the NBCKAR River. The
infantry, unable to expand its bridgehead, held tenaciously
to who..t Ii ttle they had against fanatical enemy counterattacks.
Upon expansion of the lodgement by friendly i n ~ n t r y VI
Corps planned to erect a treadway bridge across the NECKAR
16
River for the crossing of supporting armor. Elements of
the FRZlTCT{ First Army were attempting to force crossings
of the NECKAR south of LAUFf'EN on the right flank of Combat
Command B.
CombJt Command B, consisting of the 56th Armored
Infantry Battalion and the 11th Tanle Battalion wi th the
normal attachoonts of engineers, artillery, medics, ord-
nance and tank destroyers, was organized into two reinforced
battcllions: Task Force Chamberlain :tnd Task F'orce Richard-
son.
Oper:J.tions Order No. 19, issw:;d by the Commanding
General 10th Armored Division, was received at 2400B,
4 hpril 1945 by Combat Command B. The combat command was
20

ordered to continue its present mission of probing the river
line for crossings, and to be prepared oh division drder
to cross bridge No, 3 at bridge north of
HEILBRONN_ br bridge No.1 in the vicinity of NECKARELZ,
a.nd a.ttack to the east. The combat oommand objective,
regardless of "Nhere the crossing of tho NECKAR occurred
(S6C annex for division order), WQS to seize the line
Hil.LL-C.RJiILSHEIM. It Vlio.S apparent from thi s
ordor t VI Corps had all but givon up hope of success-
fully eliminating the resist:lnce at HEILBRONN and foro-
ing tho a.rmor cd support through in that en.. Instf.1ad the
pIon one of flD.nking the sali Gnt to the north and
the corps objective from the reur.
The combat command, on 5 April, continued its mis-
sion in the same :J.roCl.. Task Force Richa.rdson was engaged
wi th tllC enemy in the gener:.:.l vicini ty of LAUFFEN. Tnsk
Force Cho...rnberlain was enga.ged in tho vicinity of KLINGEN-
BERG (03.6-58.8) and south to LAUFF'EN. The e'.lrly morning
hours werG m:,rked by slow progress and general confusion
in the comb:::..t command's sector. This was brought about
by the intermingling of French and Aoericun units using
the srune route for identical missions.
16
During the
hours of poor visibility this condition became aggravated
by stiffening German resist:::..nce and sever e anti-tank and
artillery fire delivered from enemy posi tions on both sides
21
of the river. The task forces suffored casunlties in
mell and vehicles from the heavy artillery fire delivered
from positions east of the River which could not
I
be silenoed by our
In nt least one
ions of Task Force Chamborlain were forced to withdrClW
to locations of safety.
Shortly before noon Combat Command B was directed
to support of the 397th Inf :mtry Regiment, which
Were to pass through the comoot cOlTIl7lnnd a.nd attempt 0. cros-
sing of the NECKAR at BOCKINGEN (05.5-60.5). In the
afternoon one battulion of thG 397th Infantry succeeded in
crossing the NECKAR River, supportGd by their own division
fires a.nd those of Cor:1bat COmrrlr"..nd B, a.nd esta.blished a.
bridgehead on the southern edgo of n
E
ILBRONN.
18
Combat B passed to VI Corps control with
no chnnge in mission at 1700B, 5 45. Other elements
of the lOth Armored Division WerG given the mission of
reconnoitering in force to the line SCR,-ABISCH
HALL-CRAILSHEIM (see annex for Corps order). Comba t
Command B cOiltinued operations in the same general area
dur ing the rGmaindor of 5 April. Efforts to cross the
riv('r ceased gu ins were consolidated. Elements of
the FRENCH First Army had fought into NORDHEIM (01.5-57.5)
and only to bo forcd back by tho he nvy resistance
of Ss troops in NORDHEIM. Another attack by the FRENCH
22
First Army 1315B sccured both of those towns.
I "
Combut Command B reverted to division control at
1600Bi 6 nnd waS o.lertGd to crcHH3 the NECKAR
Ri \fer to tho north in the vicinity of NECKARELZ. After
crossing the River, Combat B ordered
to move into an Q.sscr.1b1y in the vicini ty of ASSAMSTADT
and to be prepurcd for on one hour notice.
Confusion arose as to the exact time the bridge would
bo available. Division contacted and the division
G-3 notified Combat Cor.unund B that they wculd move across
19
tho.t night.. Comb'1t Com."nllnd B informed division that
they would move out nt 2118B with un ostimat6d of
at the crossing of 2318B. The post of
Combat Command B cltared FRl!..NKENBACH at 2200B. The order
of march to the crossing site Was Task Force Richardson,
93rd Field Artillery Battalion, Headquarters Combat
Conmand B, Task Force Chamberlain, 423d Armored Field Art-
i11cry Buttalion, 141st '>I.rmorcd Field ;;\rti11ery Battalion,
20
and Battery B, 976th Field Artillery Battalion. The
route followed to the bridge site was KIRCHAUSEN, BON-
FELD, (99.5-72 .2) ViOLLENBERG
(94.5-77 .5). BARGEN (93.5-f9.4)., BEI.MSTADT"
AGLi.l.STER HAUSEN.
21
f:tgure2.) Progress of the crossing
slow due to poor visibility and road oonditions. The
lead elements of Combat Command B arrived at the crossing about
23
0525Bj 7 ll.ptil -i5 and started cro ssing the NECK.\R Ri vcr.
The movG!1ent to the crossing had been executed under con-
trol of VI Corps, and the 10th Division provided
guides to lC:1d the elements of COl"JOO t COD."':lund J.j to their
Ilssembly area o.t l1.SSlt.l"lSTADT.. The actual crossing of the
river was slQl.v, and it Wo.s not until ll15B tha.t the last
element oleared the br.idge. At this time the cOI!lnand post
of Co::tbat CorJraand B was at ijjINDISCI-IBUCH (36.7-94.7) . Task
Force Richllrdson, which was the leading element of the
conbat cor.ll-:Iund, rea.ched the assenbly area ut ASSAMSTADT at
l020B.. and discovered that the area. Clssigned was too STI'lllll
and the surrounding fields were too soft fron recent rains
to support the weight of heavy vehicles. The remainder
of the COl-:lba.t continued to close in the ASS:i.M-
STADT assembly are a.. (See Figure 4..)
Reserve Cor:rrnand and 90th Cnvo..lry Reconnaissance
Squa.dron, 6 April 1945
The Reserve Command and the 90th Cavalry had not
been idle while Combat Command was engaged in the capture
of' CRAILSHEIM. As previously stated they had captured a
line east of running generally tnrough STUP-
PACH,. HA.CHTiliL, and RENGERSHI1.USEN They. held this line
24.
during the night of 5-6 April despite small groups of
ene8Y SS troops who attacked from the direction of BAD
MDRGENTHEn,l (47.5-01.0) and ROTHENBERG, The Reserve
COTrlr:'land wus pla.ced on a bvo hour alert prepared' to move
south following Combat Con:na.hd A.22 The German continued
his pressure against the line held by the Reserve Comnand
and the 90th Cava.lry. Forces of tho Reserve Command which
hud taken ROTH (50.6-91.3) against no opposition were
counterattacked by the enemy during the night. The enemy
VJus dr ivcn off with heuvy casualtie s, after an intense
fight which was conducted wi thin the to'Nn itself:. Shortly
beforo duylight on 6 April 1945, n force, estimated one
hundred fifty strong', of SS troops infiltrated back
in drove out the defender s composed of both
Reserve Cor.UJund and 90th Cavalry troops, and set up n.
defense of the town. Some .ii.r:lcrican troops vvere cut off
and captured during this !J.ction. An attack, consisting of
elements of the Heserve Coml:Hlnd und Troop B (Reinforced),
90th Cuvc.lry, was launched against STUFPACH dur ing the
morning a.nd fighting continued the day'. As
a result of this action, the Reserve Command was relieved
from the two hour alert and ordered to hold their pos-
i tion until they could be relieved by other units. As
soon as this raIief could be accomplished.. the Reserve
COl:nond Wa.s to proceed to CRAILSHEDh: and relieve Comba.t
26
CO!:1lTl'J.nd A.
2
3 As c.. result of the coordinated attack of
elcncnts of the Reserve COmrrll..'.Tlcl :lnd c lcrnents of the 90th
Cavalry) STUPPACH Was recn.pturcd by 1730B hours' Thirty-
five priSr)ncts t"-lcre taken UriC: seventy-five Germ:-.n dcad
counted'
2/,1
The Reserve and the 90th Cavalry held
their blocking positions throughout the night of 6-7 rtpril.
Small cnany patrols continually probed the outpost system
throughout the night, but no major att:l.ck developed. (See Fig
ure
3.)
The night of 6-7 Apri 1 found the 10th .tl.rnored Div-
ision v.Jell along toward the occomplishr.lCnt of the mis sian
':I' )
:J.ssigl1od to thGr.l by VI
C
orps. l.gurc 4- The division
had, in approxinutely 40 hours, disongaged from the enemy in
tho vicinity of liEILBRO}Jl'T , mnd"; a 90 change in direction,
and acccmplished Ll m2rch of approxinntely 59 miles from
the vicinity of BEILBRONN to ASSAMST.'l.DT. :lore they S'lIliftly
prepared for combQ.t, l:lunched a.r... ;.ttn.ck during hours of
darkness, turnbd 180
0
from the tlircction followed during
the raa.rch from r:EILBRONN, Oond drove to ClliI.ILSIf.8IM, approxima-
tely 31 miles behind the Gcr rn."1n lines and approxim,J.tcly 40
air milos from the major ele:nents of VI Corps fighting in
the vicinity of HEILBRONN. They had ca.ptured more than
300 prisoners
25
during this period, and had killed and wou-
nded r.lD.ny nore
l
as well as capturinf; und destroying a large
of enGmy materiel - which he could ill
ufford to lose at this stage of the Vi'or.
27
In addition to the muteriel succoss of the division,
trw cnptux<e of CRAILSHEIM plncod American troops, personi-
ficd by major element of the division, in control of 0.
important loeality, CRAILSIIEn.1: was D. cormnuni-
cntions centor of major QS it controlled the
mc..in highways between EEILBRONN and N1JRNBERG, o.nd between
STUTTG.ART ::lnG NURNBERG. It also controlled the rnnjor ra.il-
road and the most direct
railroad STUTTGART and NURNBERG
1
vio. lu\LEN (73.0-
29.3), (75.5-43.3), CRAILS]EDvI. It was of vito.l
importance to the 0erman if he was to hold his line along
tho RIVER betw.een HEILBR01'1N ond STUTTGAllT. Just how
the German considerec CRAILSHEIM shall be seen in
his a.ctions in that area described in succeeding cbapters.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2
for Unit Citation, 24 AUf;ust 1945, Head-
quarters 10th Division, p 1. (Inclosure #5)
2Aftor HGport, Conbat Com.rnand J.';., lOth Arnored Div-
ision, entry for 5 April 45.
4Cc.ptain GeorgE; F. Hamel, The Crailsheim Opera tion of the
lOth Armor6d Di vi sion, (Richr:1ond: Armored Cavalry Journal,
fl1rch-April 1949) p 37.
BAfter Report, 54th Armored Infantry Battalion, Combat
Cm-.imand A, 10th Armored Division
l
entry for B April 1945.
28
70p cit, The Crn.ilshiem Operation of the lqtr Pivision,
p 37.
8Aft6r Action Report, 51st Armored Infnntry Battalion, Conbat
COI:una.nd A, 10th Armored Di vi sion, entry for 6 April 45.
goP cit, AJ'ter Report, Combat Con."land A, entry for
6 .April 45.
lOOp cit, The Crailsheim Operation 10th .ii.rmored Division,
pp 37-38.
llIbid, P 38.
l2Aft6r Action Report, B, 10th Armored Division,
entry for 4 April 45.
l3Report of Operations, The Seventh United Stat6s Army, France
and 1944-1945, p 779.
l4.Aftcr Acti'Jn Report, 11th Tank Bo.ttD.lion, 10th Armored Div-
ision, entry for 4 April 45.
l50p cit,keport of Operations, The Seventh United States Army,
'P78O-;
16
Qp
ci t, After Action Report, 11th Tank Ba.ttalion, entry for
5 April 45.
l7Ibid, entry for 5 April 45.
l80p cit, Report of Operations, The Seventh United States
p 782.
19G_
3
Journal, lOth Division, entry for 6 .April 45.
20.After Action Report, 405th Field Artillery Group I April 45.
210p Cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry
for 6 l1.pr i1 45.
Report, 3d Tank Battalion" 10th Armored Uivi-
sion, entry for 6 April 45.
230perations Instructions No. 21, Headquarters, lOth Armored
Division, 6 45, par 3.
24G_ 2 Periodic R(;port, 10th Armored Division, 6-7 April 45.
250p cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th ArmorGd Div-
.- '
ision, p 38.
29
CHAPTER 3
OFFENSVE OPERATIONS IN THE CRAIlSHEIM-ILSHOFEN
AltEA,
Combat Command A - 7 April 1945
The morning of 7 April 1945 found bo th Task Foroe
Hankins and Task Force Riley in CRAILSHEIM. They were
reluctant to move out to continue the mission which, the
reader will remember, was to "seize the line CRAILSHEIM,
HALL, BACKNANG." Their reluctance was occas-
ioned by the fact that they had been out of conmunicat-
ion with Combat Command A Headquarters in ASSAMSTADT
since the night before,and both commanders were fearful
of becoming strung out and possibly defeated in detail
by the enemy.l An additional factor was the shortage of
fuel and ammunition. lA considerable amount of fuel had
been used during the march from HEILBRONN to ASruu!STADT
and refueling operations in ASSAMSTADT had used up most
of the fuel carried in the trains. , Operations during the
6th of April had practically depleted the fuel carried
in the unit trains and they had been sent to the rear
for resupply. They had not rejoined the task forces on
the morning of the 7th. Consequently both task forces
redistributed their supplies equally among themselves but
neither had enough for more than a few hours of offensive
action.
Since General Piburn was out of communication with
elements of his cormnand in CRAILSHEIM, he flew in an art-
illery liaison plane to join thGID during the morning of
tho 7tH. Prib.r to ieaving his command post he ordered
Task Force Roberts, which had remained in ASSAMSTADT
s inca returning from the ir fight u t DORZ BA.CS, and the
command post to move to CRAILSHEIM. He arrived at
CRAILSHEIM during tho morning, was informed of the sit-
uation, and relayed the information by a.rtillery liaison
plane baok to the division headquarters.
Meanwhile both task forces in CRAILSHEIM had
begun to improve their positions by clearing out t ~ v s
in the vicinity. No effort was made to continue the
attack toward SCHflABISCH HALL. Team Hill of Task Force
Hankins cleared INGERSHEIM (71.0-60.7) at 1035B and
returned to CRA.ILSHEIM. Team Havlovi tz of Task For ce
Hankins attacked the a.irfield areo. (69.0-62.5) west of
CRL.ILSHEllvl and secured it by 1135B. In the process a
dual purpose 88-mm gun was knocked out and fourteen
2
enemy planes captured and destroyed. Terun. Holland of
Task Force Hankins cleared ALTENMUNSTER (69.3-61.3)
and remained there all day in a blocking posi tion.
While Task Force Hankins was engaged in these operations,
Task Force Riley was preparing to attack toward SCH-
Wi.. BISCH HfiLL.
31
\.
)
\
After being briefed on the s i tuo.tion, General
Pi burn ordered Task Fl orce Riley to attack SCH'.l1JABISCH
whi 10 Task Force Hankins continued its blocking ro Ie
in und around CRAILSHEIM. General Piburn established
his personal command post with the command post of Task
Foroe Hankins the arrival of his command post
personnel from ASS.l).MSTADT.
Task Force Riley commenoed its attack toward
HALL shortly before noon and by l230B the
ing team, Team Felice, had reached ROSSFELD (67 -62.5).
Shor tly befor e the ca.pture of ROSSFELD Team Fe lice sighted
a railroad train approaching CRAILSHEIM from the west. They
allowed the train to reach an advantageous position and then
stopped it with tank cannon fire. They then proceeded to
shoot up the entire train.
3
Team Graham passed through
Team Felice at ROSSFELD and continued the attack through
M:AULACH (65.0-62.8) which fell at l400B. Enemy resistance
was light,consisting mainly of small arms fire from both
sides of the road and from the woods west of lVJAULACH.
Team Felice passed through Team Graham near and adv-
anced thr ough ILSHOFEN (59.3-65.6), scene of a hasty with-
drawal by the headquarter s of a German corps. Task For ce
Riley was strafed and bombed by a small group of ME 109
fighter-bomber s in the vicinity of ILSHOFEN; this del ayed
but did not stop their Team Felioe continued
32
the attack and captured (53.7-65.2). While
the task force was in II liaison plat;ie repor t-
ed that a bridge across the KOCHER River at CROFFELBACH
(52.1-64.3) was intact. Lt Col Riley immediately dispatched
a team (apparently Felice) to take the bridge. This bridge
Vias loco. ted in a defile and was blown up by the enemy jus t
as the l6ad tank of the team reached it. Intense resistance
quickly developed. Enemy mortar fire began to fall around
the approaches to the bridge# and small arms and panzerfaust
fire was deliver ed on the colunm from the hi ground on both
sides of the road near the bridge. I:)ince they Were tra.pped
in a defile, the team could not maneuver to attack the enemy
and were forced to withdraw. This they accomplished wi th
considerable difficulty since it was necessary to back
tanks out# trlere being insufficient room in which to turn
them around. One tank was destroyed by panzerfaust fire
from the high ground when a round penetrated its engine
comf;urtment.
5
The team withdrew to WOLPERTSHAUSEN and re-
ar ganized.
Thi s conc I uded the offensive oper at ions of Task r arc e
Riley for the dQy. As night was fast QPproaching, Lt Col
Riley decided to hold wrat he had gained. Consequently he
ordered Team Felice to or ganize t re defense of WOLPERTSHAUSEN
while the remainder of the task force defended I LSHOfEN
The task force command post was located in and
33
the 4l9th Armored }ield Artillery the direct
support artillery battalion for the task force, Was in
position in the vicinity of ILSHOFEN. Task Force Riley
was reinforced at ni ghtfClll in the
area. by the Reserve Comnand. These positions were held
without incident by Task Force Riley_ reinforced, throughout
the night.
Task F' orce Hankins improved their bloc king posi tions
around CRAILSHEIM during the day but made no major
due to a shortfl.ge of supplies and the nature of their mission.
Ie Task Force Ri ley was' bear ing the brunt of the
fighting insofar as the division and Combnt Cormnand A were
concornod, Task Fores Roberts and the commClnd post of
t Command A were moving south toward CRAILSHEIM. The
column departed from ASSAMSTADT at l045B on tLe 7th
April, following the route taken by Task Forces Hankins
and Riley. It was to make this route the main
supply route although it actually became the MSR in name
only. As future events will sho;,;, enemy infiltration and
action along this routes Vias to prevent its ever becoming the
MSR in practice.
Task }orce Aoberts, accompanied by the Headquarters,
Combc.t Command A, moved from ASSAMSTADT to HOLLENBACH with-
out incident. Near HOLLENBACH they ran into the tail of
the Re serve Command which had precded them from ASSAMSTADT
and had been stopped by intense enemy fire in the woods
34
northeast of HOLLENBACH. At l3l5D ti1ey bypassed the Reserve
Cbmn:lnd, which was engaged in clearing a roure through the
WbodSj and pushed on toward HARTENSTEIN As
the column. was moving through the woods northwest of
BARTENSTEIN at approximately l530B, they were strafed by
6 ME 109 aircraft and two jet aircraft and halted.
6
They resumed their :ldvance and reached n. point in the woods
at (56.0-87.3). Here they began to receive heavy small anns,
antitank and flak fire from both sides of the road. Sevbral
personnel cn.sU!llties were sustained and one light tank, one
half-track, and one i ton truck iNere destroyed. The enemy
was engnged vi th tank, tank destroyer I ar.d ma.chine gun
firo, and the enemy fire was silencE:.d. The column then
continued its advance and moved swiftly tovJD.rd CRAILSHEIM
which they entered at approximately 1800B. (See Figtre 5J
Upon arrival in CRAILSHEIM Task :r orce Roberts was
ordered by lcenerfll Piburn to attack and seize KIRCHBERG
(63.7-69.5). The task force moved out at 1830 B. Team
Reilly and the command post moved to and remained at
whi Ie Team Mc Intosh pus hed on toward KIR-
CHBERG. This team took HORNBERG (64.7-70.1), but did not
continue the advance they could not find a route
7
from HORNBERG to KIRCHBERG. Team McIntosh therefore rem-
ained at HORNBERG throughout the ni ght.
35
Raserve COrron'lnd and 90th Cavalry
S9\lag,9!:. 7 April 1945,
The Reserve Command was ordered to disengage from
the enemy on the morning of 7 April and proceed to CRAIL-
8
SHEIM. Their neW mission was to relieve Task Force Hankins
to block enemy approaches into CRAILSREilvI from the south
and southeast. The 90th CavC'clry wns order6d to extend their
blocking positions to take over the positions occupied by
the ReservE: Comm:::md. Elements of the Reserve Commn.nd exp-
erienced grc:1t difficulty in withdra.wing from ROTH becnuse
of o.n Gnemy countoro.ttack. The disengc.gement wns finally
accomplis hod by deli berately setting fire to 0. por tion of
ROTH 1l.."1Cler co vcr of the c omlT1nnd withdrew.
9
(See Fig 5.)
The 90th Cavalry completGd their relief by 0630B,
::1"t which time the squadron was disposed as follows:
nquo.dron headquarters, A, attached to Combat
Command i .. in CRAILSHEIMi Troop B, HL.CHTELJ Troop ROTH;
Troop D, HGD.dq sand Servi ce Troop, SCH-
WABHhUSEN (35.2-96.8). The light tc.nk plo.toons and assault
gun (75-nun HOW) platoons of Troops E and .t, were !J.ttached to
Troops B, C, and D. the h6adqu::'.rters of these attached troops
remained with squadron headquarters in H1CHTEL. The squo.d-
ron held these blocking positions all day with little dif-
ficu1 ty, the only [lct ion being from small groups of Germans
who made no determined attacks. (See Figure 5.)
J7
After b(;ing relieved by the '::JOth Cavnlry, the Reserve
Commnnd moved out along the route followed by Combat Command
A, The column ran into intense enemy resistance in the woods
northeast of As a result of this enemy res-
istanc6, which included smull arms, 88-mm antitank, and aut-
ornntic vleapons fire, the column Wi.lS split. The woods were
finally cleared with the loss of two light tanks, and the
column resumed its advance. After moving through the woods
into more open cOWltry, the column vms unable to pick up
the des ired speed of road blocks and intense enemy
air action. This nir action, in the form of bombing 'lnd
strafing, continued throughout the Despite this enemy
air f'..nd ground action, the ReservG Command continued to
move and late in the afternoon re nchud CRAILSHEnv.r." Upon
arrival they were unable to accomplish their mission of
relieving Combat Command a, due to the fact that the all-day
fight along the route to CRAILSHEIM hnd caused a severe
shortage of supplies, especially ummunition and fuel.
Accordingly they were placed under opera ti ona 1 centro1 of
. 10
Combat
C
ornmand he,
Team Connolly of Task Force Thackston".
the only tusk force in the Reserve Comnand, was sent to
and set up blocking positions, in conjunction
with Team Felice of Task Force Riley, to the south'lnd
west., Griswold proceeded to the vicinity of MAULACH
and cut the main east-west railroad leading into CRAILSHEIM.
'38
main body of this team moved into ILSHOFEN, where they
strengthened the defense organized by Task Force Riley_
H6Qdquarters, Reserve Command was set up in CRAILSHEIM.
Meanwhile, the 90th Cavalry continued on their block-
ing mission throughout the day. They were ordered to assemble
soon as relieved and move to CRAILSHEIM to take over the
line HALL" as soon as that line had
11
beGn secured by Combat Command ii. At the conclusion of
tho day's'operation in the arsa, it was becoming
apparent that the enemy was recovering from his initial
surprise nt the capture of Increasing enemy
resistance to the forces operating in the area,
togcth8r -,';i th repented attempts by the ene:ny to cut the
main supply route betV!een ASSAMSTADT and CRAILSHEIM. were
only indicrtions of future violent enemy action to re-
capture this vital area.
Combat Command A (with Reserve Command under operational
control) - 8 April 1945
Eo..rly on the morning of 8 at approximately
0530 B-, the 1. i rst 1 :.x ge SCQ Ie enemy attack agains t thE:.
CRAILSHEIM area was launched.. It cOInnenced wi th an intense
rocket o..nd mortar preparation, under Iii hose cover simultaneous
were delivered from the east, southeast, north-
(S66 Figure 6 ... ) This enBmy attack was conducted
by :m estimated 400-700 SS engineer troops.. The northeastern
39
column VlO.S repulsed tely. The Gnemy was a.pparent ly
of tho true dispositions of Task Force Hankins in this
o.rc:\ . ., for he moved into th 6 attn ck in o.n undeployed forntl. tion
The entire attacldng formation Was ldlled., wounded, capt-
urcdj or di sper sed.
The attacks from the east and southeast proved a
different story from the northeastern attack, for the enemy
pressed his assault skillfully 'lnd determinedly. He over-
ran the outposts penetrated into the outskirts of CRAILSH-
ElM. fighting developed and continued throughout the
morning. Shortly before noon Task Il orce Hankins gained the
upper hund and forced the enemy The enemy suffered
severe casual tics in this nct ion. Team Holl::.nd followed the
withdrawing German troops, mr.:tintr-.ining constant pressure on
them. The team cle1.red .i\.LTEm.!f1JNSTER for thtJ sec ond time and
established 0. bloc position in thn.t tovm. (They held
this position throughout the day and moved back to CRAlLSHEDJ.
as night fell.) CRhlLSHElM wa.s o.go.in sGJ.rched to insure
tho.t no enemy hLld infiltrn.t6d into the town. nt tl1G same
time T6:1111 Hi 11 again searched INGERSHElM and Team Havlovi tz
the J.irfield areCl. e. By noon 0.11 German attacks on CRhILSHEIM
had been defeated and the task force was again in its
blocking positions.
General Piburn's plan to carry out the division
mission, tho capture of the line SCHVITABISCH HALL-BACKNANG,
WQS to the Reserve Command (Task Force Thackston) rel-
ieve Task Force Hankins in CRAILSHEIM. Force Riley waS
to continue the attack in the vicinity of SCHJlTABISCH HALL,12
Due to enemy pressure this plan could not be accomplished.
At 0900B.. Gener:ll Piburn received orders from div-
ision headquQrters, which had moved to ASSll.IvISTL.DT late in
the afternoon of thE 7th of .April. These orders directed
Combat Conrmand i'.. to continuG the tl ttnck from
HALL and continue to the west to conto.ct the lOOth Inf:.ntry
13
Division moving east from HEILBRONN. In order to carry
out this mission Goneral Piburn ordered To.sk Force Riley
to continue the attack to the west. They 'Noro to be followed
by Task Hankins when relieved. It soon became apparent
that Task force Hcmkins could not be relieved by the Reserve
Comr.1D.nd unless that command was rGinforced. The Reserve
Command had beGn given the mission of keeping the road open
between and CR11.ILSHEIM. This proved to be
D. difficult task, since the enemy infiltrated
behinc. elements of the cOTIUnJ.nd 80S they cle'1red the road,
necessitating t:1at the clearance be continually repeated.
Nevertheless Task Force Riley undertook the mission.
Task}orce rtiley attack6d from toward
CROFFELBACH, but was soon stopped by heavy small arms und
bazooka fire. 'l'he terrain in this area was not suitable
for tank employment because of numerous defiles. The tlnks
42
were practically Since the task force only
one company of o.rmored infantryI it was not pos sible to launch
a.n inf2ntry o..ttack in suffieistlt strength to ole at the area.
For 'the foregoing reasons, and the fact that reports from
civilians and PW's indic:lted n strong buildup of enemy forces
:'.nd probable a.ttacks in the CRAILSHEIM Task Force
Riley Was ordered to break off its and establish a.
perimeter defense in the vic inity of ViOLPERTS:a;'U:;>EN. Ie
engo..ged in prepr.ration for 0. perimeter defense" Task Force
Riley VIets ordered to send one teom to GEISLINGEN (49.6-65.3)
to seize bridge across the KOCHER River reported int'1ct by
0. liaison Team Gr::..hum moved out to accomplish this
mission. lhey encountered sroll ::lrms and panzerfaust fire at
the edge of GEISLINGEN. Resist'lnce was overcome and they
Were ',rv ithin sight of the bridge v>then it was blown.
14
The team
then returned to This proved to be the far-
thest penet:1tion to the west of any element of the 10th
....rmor6d Division during offensive oporn.tions in the CRii.ILSHEIM
(See Figure 7.)
Task Force Roberts, which had spent the night of 7-8
I.. pril in tho vv.LiLLfL'\.USEN... HORNBERG area" cormnencod offensive
opero.tions ut 0730B on the 8th. Te:,J!l.s McIntosh and Reilly
occupied KIRCH1)ERG n.t 1100B. No onemy resist:.::.nce VJUS en....
countered. The task force was ordered to hold the line
during the afternoon. This was in accord..
anC6 wi th the combat C01TDJlf..lnd pla.n to temporarily assume the
43
defensive in anticipation of enemy J..ttacks. The task force
was accordingly disposed to defend against possible enemy
attncks from the northwest. Task Force Roberts spent the
remainder of the afternoon qui6tly, awaiting enemy- attacks
which never came.
;l.fter defea t of the enemy attacks on CRAILSHEIM
proper and restoration of their blocking positions, Task
Force {-bnkins was ordered to locld all prisoners of war
on all Class I and V supply vehicles and evacuate
them to 11.SS.:...MST.L\.DT" This procedure had been ordered by
VI Corpse Since the MSR was not open and
CRAILSH.l1iIM" Combat Command .0 being engaged in attempting to
open it, it Was considered very unlikely thut the convoy could
reach nm'1ever, the supply trucks and pri soner s.,
numbering approximately 550, 'Were assemblGd in CRAILSHEIM
and the prisoners loaded. Combat Commnnd A ordered Troop
A, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron to escrot the convoy..
It was :..nticip:l ted th:.lt the convoy could fight its W0..Y thr ough
to Comh:.lt Command B ... The convoy proceeded to the vicinity
of BL.i1.UFELDEN where i t was ambushed by the enemy. Several
supply vehicles were destroyed and several personnel cas-
ualties were suffered. During the fight most of the prisoners
war e killed or escaped. The convoy could not breD. k through"
returned to CRAILSHEIM with the rennining vehicles and
prisoners. The mQin supply route was still cut and supplies
were fas t running out ..
4.5
To allevi:tte the ori fical supply si tion, General
Piburn requested that the troops in the CRi"l.ILSPEIM area be
resupplied by air. Engineers were sent to the airfield to
Gnl8Xge the strip. The request for air resupply was approv-
ed, but the operation could not be mounted on the 8th.
Meanwhile enemy activity and reports from civilians
and prisoners had indicated an all-out attack was being plan-
ned to CRAILSHEIM. Accordingly General Piburn had
ordered all forces, as previously discussed, to assume
the defensive in anticipation of the attac'k. Orders were
received from di vision at 1545B to Itpush Task F'orce ROBERTS
15
to tr.c northvvGst between K9CHER and JAGST Rivers". Ta.sk
Force Roberts WQS ordered to abandon its defensive positions
and carry out this mission. General Pi burn reported to div-
ision tho.t supplies would support an attack of
only hours He also requested night fighter
16
but it Was not received.
Task Force Roberts assembled in KIRCHBERG at 1900B
ctnd moved via ALL1I[ERSPl1.N (61.0-66.0) to I LSHOFEN Here
the t2sk force received fuel and sane ummunition from
the 419th Armored J:t'ield Artillery Battalion. Supplies were
redistributed among all vehicles in the task force in order
to make an attack. Battery C of the 419th .L1.rmored Field
Arti llery joined the task force to provide close
46
artillery support. By 2400B hours Task Force Roberts Was
reo.uy to begin its assigned mission, (See Figure
IvIe:::L1'.vhile Task Force Hankins had been reinforced in
CRJiILSHEIM. During tIle night I enemy patro Is continua lly
probed the defenses of These patrols set off
fllrlny of the fl Dr6S c.nd booby traps and Were engaged by fire
on num6rous occasions. They did not infiltrate through the
defenses.
CombQt Command A (with Reserve Command under operat-
ional control) - 9 April 1945
The suspected enemy attack on CIlliILSIfEIM during the
night of 8-9 .April did not take plo..ce. Just prior to da.wn,
however I intense enemy rocket o.nd artilJe ry fire was deliv-
ered on Clli\ILSHEIM, ILSHOFEN, and WOLPERTSBAUSEN. The cOITll'Tk'1nd
post of Combat COIn...'Tlnnd .n. received direct hits nnd was forced
to move to the northern part of CRAILSHEIM. CRAILSHEIM received
a bombing und stro.fing attack from ME 109 and jet aircraft
at 0635B.
17
.At daylight Task 110rc6 searched the
nref:< surrounding CRAILSHEIM for enemy, n.nd Team Hollund
was dispatched to They cle.';.red this
town for the third time_.to..king some prisoners. The tea.m
o.gc'tin remained in ALTENMUNSTER throughout the day, returning
to at nightfall. The rernn.indel of Task Force
Hankins remained in their blocking positions during the 9th
of .a.pril without serious interference from the enemy. Friendly
47
aircraft bor.lbed and strafed roads (74-64) east of CRAIL-
SI-:EIM and it was believed that this action disor ganized
18
enemy forming for an attack.
Hhile Task Force Hankins was engaged with enemy
patrols, awaiting the suspected Gnemy night attack, Task
ForcG Roberts Was atto.cking to the northwest from ILSHOFEN.
As the to.sk force was moving out, they received word that
Comb:--.t COJTI:1:J.nd B hod finally brokt>n through to CRAILSHEIM
with supplies .The task force was halted and all of its
vehicles resupplied. lifter being resupplied the task force
attr.cked RUPPERTSHOF'EN (58.5-68.2) nnd encountered small
arms and fire. The task force wi thdrew to allow
an :"rti11ery prepnrD. tion to be fired on the toYW'"n. They
o.g,'lin illlder cover of the o.rtillery fir e rmd ent ered
the tmm without opposition. (See Figure 7.)
TO,sk Force Riley ho.d been ordered by Gener'll Pi burn
to wi thdraw from positions around VlOLPERTSHl\.USE}! and to
fcll)v: Tusk Force Roberts. This .....JClS in accordo.nce v.rl. th
instructions issued by division for Force
Riley to assist Tusk Force 1\oberts.
19
The task force with-
dreVl, ;'J.ssembled in ILS30FEN, \Vas r(:3supplied, and joined the
t<li I of Ta sk :F' or ce Robe rts near RUPPERTSHOFEN (See Figure 7.)
To.sk Force lio ber ts, followed by Task F arc e H.i ley
,
c olltinued the fron RUPPERTSHOF'EN to the vicini ty of
DUNSBACH (56.5-70.q). Here" at 0700B.I the combined colunm
48
was bombGd and strafed by approximo. te ly t'JlJenty-fi ve (25) enemy
planes. J-.. considerable number of ties in both men
;""lnd materiel Vlo.S suffred by Task Force RQberts. Immedia-
tely ufter the uttuck the leading eiements of the col-
were subjected to hGQvy artillery mortar and
b0CD.mC involved in Q. seriE:S of sm[lll fire fights. During
the confusion occasioned by the air and ground attack, the
re::'..r cler:lcnts of Task Force Rob6rts took thG wrong roa.d and
advnnced towc..rd LEOFELS (59.0-69.9), while lead clements of
the colu.mn proceeded trl1"ough DUNSBACH in the direction of
NESSELE.tl.CH (53.8-71.8). As the rear elements of the column
reached ,:1 posi tion :lpproximately 300 yards from LEOFELS,
c.utorrl.C4tic 'weapons':tnd riflefire was received. The
column Was momentarily thrown into confusion as, believing
tho.t they V'Jere following ths lead elements of the task force,
tl1e fire \,1.).S unexpected. Lt Col Roberts, who had been uccomp-
nnying the roar colurnn., ordered thE. colunm reversed and exp-
osed himself ,r..h ile personally reorg:tnizing his troops. He
20
V1('1S kiJ.led. by u sniper. The colurnn mn.no.ged to turn around
o.nd proceeded" under fire, bGck to RUPPERTSHOFEN. Here the
senior officer of the task furce, Co.ptain Ulrich,. the 8-3,
W[lS notified of what had transpired. C:lptCl.in Ulrich was
-"'1. th the leading elments of Task Force Roberts 'uhich had
captured NESSELBL.CH. He outposted the town and returned to
RUPPERTSJOFEN where he leurned the situation and requested
49
orders from Comret Cono.mand A. He vvus ordered to assume
cormn;:..nd of the task force D.nd continue on his
NOTE: Eerenfter Task Force Roberts vd 11 be referred to as
Task ForcG Roberts (Uirich). Captain Ulrich then ordered an
attack of LOEFELS. This attack, led by light tanks, vms
successful and the task force was assemblod in NESSELBACH.
They resumed the advance and pushed through LASSEACH
(50.9-76.0) to BUTTELBRONN (47.5-80.3).
T:-.sk Force Riley had follo'wed Task Force Roberts
(Ulrich) to tIE vicini ty of DUNSBACH. Here they moved out on
a parallel route to the west (left) of Roberts (Ulrich).
By 1500B they had re!.lched (54.5-66.8). They
continued to udv8.nce p8.rallel to the route t .ken by Task
ForcG Koberts (Ulrich). (See Figure 7.)
passing tnrough BUTTELBRONN, Task Force Rob-
er ts.. (Ulric h) I ::l t 'lpproximnt61y 1530BI enc ounter ed a wash-
out on the rCIc.d towo.rd EERMUTHAUSEN (45.0-81.1). They
received eneI'!1.Y s!n::..ll D.rns fire which 71::1S quickly eliminated.
The column attempted to advr:.nce 8.round the. w:J.shout on a new
route" but recei VE:G. iHortu.r fire which WD.S identified as
friendly.. It was believed th:-::.t this fire vns from elements
of' the 63d Infantry Division driving dovIn townrd
from the northwest .. Since contact vvi th the 63d Division
wus now imrnin6nt, CCtpt Ulrieh decided to stop his adva.nce.
The task force moved into position on the high ground sur-
rounding BERNDSHhUSEN (48.-0-78.8) and WOLFSOLDEN (48.2-79.8)
50
to block the retr6o..t of any en6my forces from in front of
21
the 63d Infantry Division.
Throughout the day Task Force Thackston was engaged
in keeping the supply routes Cfu\ILSHEIM and Task
Forces Riley and Roberts (Ulrich) open and in protecting
"t:1C ",ir' icld near CRJ\ILS!1EIM. Team Griswold, 'which had
been assisting Task Force Hankins in the defense of CRhIL-
SHEIM during the night of 8..;9 April,. moved to the airfield
during the morning. The ir mis s ion VIas to secure the air f ie ld
so thnt o.ir re supply operations could be carri ed out. They
continued on this mission throughout the day. MeanWhile
Teo.m Connolly VJO,S engaged in pf.l.trolling the roads between
CRAILSHEIE D.nd ILSeOFEN, ::.nd between ILSHOFEN and Task
Forcos RilGY und hoberts (Ulrich). Elements of Task Force
Thackston renJ.in6d in ILSHOI'EN, defending thr1.t from
Gner;lY throats from the south und west .
Reoonnnissnnoe Squadron - 9 April 1945
The 90th Cavalry Reconnuissunce Squadron, which had
entered CRiI.ILSHElIvI during the night 8-9 April, reinforced
the tr oop s in the CRil.ILS ;EIM arGo.. Troop D (r einf orced)
joined Troop A, which was :.1lrec.. dy o.ttuched to Combat CorYml':lnd
A,. in trolling roads in the immedif.l. te vicinity of CRAILSHEIM.
Squo.dron headqu:.rters 'was established in W"OLLMERSHAUSEN (67.5-
66.4).- Troop B (reinforced) and the of Troops
E und F wore 0.1 so Ioca td in Troop C
51
(reinforced) was based in ILSHOFEN, c.nd Q.ssisted Tc..sk Force
Thackston throughout the day in patrolling the roads between
o.nd the advancing locntionS of Task :boreas Riley
and Roberts,' (Ulrich)' All ttoops met continuous li ght
resistance the day, but the enemy did not seriously
22
intorfere with the o.ccomplishment of the squadron mission.
The night of the 9th of April concluded the offensive
of the 10th lirmored Division in the CRAILSHEIM area.
These operations were actually concluded when Task Forces
Riley and L\.oberts (Ulrich) halted for the night in the BERN-
DSF..AUSEN area.. (See Fi gure 7. ). Tho d i vis ion had co. ptur ed
but all efforts to continuG the o.ttack to capture
the line SCHv1f1.BISCH HALL-B..'lCKNANG had been unsucce ssful due
to sco.rcity of supplies, lack of o.dequn.tG troops;, and enemy
The enemy continued to build up his strength in
the arE-a. Prisoners of WQr nnd civilians reported
lcrge num.b3rs of enemy troops concentro.ting in the BEUERLBACH (71.7-
64.7) area. This concentration vms estimated as bEdng
23
3000 strong. These reports were a factor 'which prevented
the use of Tnsk } orce Rich'U'dson in offensi v operations
upon the. ir arr iva 1 in CR[\.ILSHEIM. As sOOl1 be seen, this
ener!1Y thren.t and other concurrent enemy action was to
prevent the 10th .d.rmored Division;and therefore VI Corps,
from exploiting th6 price16ss tacticnl advantage gained
wi th the c aptur 6 of ILSHEIM
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
lCo.ptn.in GGorge F. Bamel" The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th
Armored Division, (Richmond: Armored Cavalry Journal,
March-April 1949) p 38.
2After Action Report, 61st Armored Infantry Battalion, lOth
Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.
30p__ The Crailsheim the lOth Armored Division,
p 39.
4
39.
5Ibid, P 39.
6After Action Report, Combat Cownand A" 10th Armored Division,
entry for 7 .t1pril 45.
7 After Action Report, 54th Armored [nfantry Battalion, lOth
Armored Division, entry for 7 April 45.
8After Action Report, Reserve Command, lOth Armored Division,
entry for 7 April 45.
9
Op cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10thArmored lJivi-
sion, p 39.-
lOOperations Instructions No. 23, Headquarters, lOth
Armored Division, 8 April 45, par 3.
110perations Instructions No. 22, Headquarters, 10th
Armored Division, 7 April 45, par 4.
12After Action Report, Combat Command A, 10th Armored
Division, entry far 8 April 45.
l30p cit, Operations Instructions No. 22, par 1.
140p cit, The Crailsheim Operation of the 10th Armored
Divisior}., p 40.
15
0p cit, Operations Instructions 1'10.23, par 1.
-.;;.,--
160p cit, After Action Report, Combat Command A, entry for
8 April 45.
17Ibid, entry for 9 April 45.
53
180p cit, After Action Report, 61st Armored Infantry BattalicriJ
entry for 9 April 45.
190p cit, Operations Instructions No. 23, par 1.
20Letter Interview, Major RichardW. Ulrich, 3 Febl'"Uary 50.
2l0p cit, After Action Report, 54th Armored Infantry Battalion,
eutry for 9 April 45.
22After Action Report, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
lOth Armored Division, entry for 9 April 45.
23
Op cit, After Action Report, Comuat Comnand A, entry for
9 April 45.
54
CHAPTER 4-
'!HE ROLLa;BAHN

hs units ot Task F'oi"ce .h.ichardson were closing in
the ASS.i\IvlST..\DT assembly area, Combat Corrmand B was ordered
by the lOth Armored uivision to move from their present
location with its leading task force to CRAILSHEIM. There,
contact was to be made with elements of Combat Command A or
the Reserve Command. Task Force Richardson was instructed by
Combat Command D at l120B to move out immediately to
SHEIM, via STUPPACH , (49.0-95.6), and HERBSTHAUSEN
1
( 51 .8-91 .7).
Combat Command B was issued further fragmentary orders
at 1340B which Ie. ter were confirmed by Operation Instruction
No. 22" 072200B April 45 (see annex No.. IIl),. The combat
command was assigned the mission of securing and holding
open the highway from CRAILSHEIM to BI1.D MERGENTHEIM. This
was to be used as the division main supply route, support-
ing elements of Combat Connnand A by a swift move had
piercGe;. the enemy defenses and entered This
action cut the German lines of communication to HEILBRONN
from the east. 00ntact was to be maintained with elements of
the 4th Infantry Divi si on on the nor th and VJi t h Reserve
Command, lOth Armored Division on thG south. Meanwhile
Task Force Chrunberln.in closed in ASSAMSTADT and continued to
follmv the route of Task Force Richardson, Which was reported
b'.f division
55
at this time to be between LUSTERONN (44.2-96.1) O-nd
2
STUPPACH. Combat Command B, on division orders, sent
Task l!'orce hichardson on to CRl1..ILSHEDJI, where contact was
to be made 'wi th either the Reserve Command or Task Force
Roberts of Combat Connnand A. Task}.i orce Chamberlain was
orderod to move in U10 columns and secure the road net in
tho vicinity of BAD MERGENTHEIM and STUPPACH.. maintaining
contact with clements of the 4th InfDntry Division at BAD
3
MERGENTHEIM and the 90th Cavalry at STUPPACH. (See Figure 5)
In oral orders the 10th Armored Division G-3 stated
that he 1vanted a continuous "chain of armor" down the road
4
from Bi1.D MERGENTHEIM to CRAILSHEIM. Since thi s "chain of
armor" was to extend some thirty miles" Combat Command B"
at 1845B, requested clorii'ico.tion and interpretation of this
term" as the combat had insufficient vehicles to
form the continuous line of armor which was desired. The
pr 0 blem appGared to offer two alternJ.tive s: either string
the vehicles out at wide the road, Or Gstab-
lish a series of strong points in critical areas. Feeling
that extending the vehicles would be inviting enemy infiltra-
tions" division suggested setting up strong points at every
likely ave nue of approa.ch and filling the gap between strong
points with light mobile patrols. This began a phase of
action between BAD MERGENTHEIM and which centered
around the effort of keeping the main supply route open
and free of enemy.
Thi s phase of action, to mai:ltlJ.in the main supply
route BAD MERGENTHEIM and CRAILSHEIM, became known
to the Germuns in succeeding days as the nRollenbahn." The
GermClns aptly applied this de scr iptive phrase, which me!3.ns
Bowling Alley. (See Figure 8.)
Task Force moved from STUPPACH to
aguinst very light enemy resistance. The route, however,
from Wl.. CIfBil.CH south to HERBSTHtl.USEN was characterized by
increQsing enomy It must be remembered that

this Bnme rond had been passed over by other elements of
loth il.rmored Division on their drive into CH.L\.ILSBEIM.
In many inst:"'lnces, s:nnll groups of Germons would strike
out, harass the colUL'1ll1, thon melt back into the darkness,
unly to reappEar ilgain at some other pl<lce along the column
of Combat Command B.6 Task Force Chamberlain followed Task
Forc:; Richardson.. maintaining cont:J.ct whenever possible.
Th':'.t nigh t physiC'll contact was maintained between til e two
task for ees in the town of WACHBACH.
6
Task Force Chamberlain was ordered to continue south
on the 8th of April :It 0730B, following Task Force Richardson,
the mission of outposting the road to CRAILSHEIM
with patrols and strong points. One team, Team Maher, was
ordered to four strong points on the northern
sector of thG road. Team OtGrndy was to outpost the southern
Section of the road.
7
To.sk Force Richardson to continue
57
o __-"__~ 1 C - - C - ~ __-l'___'"--J!__-'.c--"'__-,.
MllE.5
south as rapidly as possible in order to get the supply
vehicles, which had been intermingled in his column, to
the troops of Combat Command J.l. in CRAILSHEIM.
Ec.rly the morning after Task Force Ricb.o.rdson passed, the
enemy succeeded in cutting the ma.in supply route where it
passed through the woods, about four miles north of B.n.R-
TENSTEIN 4 Fighting the-ir way to the south, Task Force
Richardson's entire column was held up by intense small
8
arms fire L"'..nd morto.r fire at 1350B. Friendly air strikes
and column cover flown in the afternoon materially assisted
in keeping the revi tJ.lized Lufuvaffe from D.ttacking the
troops using the road. SevcrQl times during the use of the
mQin route the Luftwaffe bombed and strafed the road.
Task Force Ch;J.mterlain, me8.nwhi le, W:J.S c Ie rUling up
isolated, stubborn pockets of enemy which had
been bypassed by task Force Richardson. An estinnted 200-400
0nemy infantry had duZ; in clnd occupied the woods bordering
the main supply route north of BartGnstein in the vioinity
of (53.0-89.0). These troops were stubbornly contesting
the usc of the MSR. Heavy J.rtillery fire from the northeast
Was falling on the main road junct ion at (52.5-89.9). Team
Maher of Task Force Chamberlain was ordered to clear the se
woods of the enemy, while Team O'Grady continued south in
contact wi th the rear elements of Task II'orce Richardson
which 'Were moving s 10"Nly south ugD.inst dogged resist3.nce.
59
Team Maher completed the clearing of these vIooas by
14l5B and continued 9,
The enemy had succeeded in infiltrating behind the
head of the Command B column south of
This, cou.pled with the appearance of the Luftwaffe, mat-
erio.lly slowed down the colwnn. In o.ddition to the fire
of artillery, mortars, and small arms, the Germans had
constructed abutis across the road. 'In one case about
100 yards of abs.tis had to be cleQred before the columns
could continue. German artillery, occupying high ground
be uveen HERRENZ INlNIERN (54.4-94.3) and NEIDERSTETTEN (58.2-
91.5), comrrl.::lnded Q. long stretch of the rond wi th their
f
, II
oxt rem6 1y accurnt e At 1700B one of our o.ir OPs
reported twelve enemy tmks moving tovJard the hG<J.d of Task
Forco Richo.rdson from the vicini ty of BLi-UFELDEN und
SCHROZDI:;RG (63.0-85.4). Fortunately this report wo.s in
error and no hostile armor appeared.
During the night, ele:rwnts of Task Force Chamberlain
completGd setting up strong points Qnd continued patrolling
their sector of the MSR . Enemy resistance was sporadic and
light. The Gcrmuns appeared to have lost some of the aggres-
eiveness which had previously characterized their actions
along the MSR.
Task :B orce Richardson app0.rently had crashed thr ough
the crust of the enemy defensive line and was advancing
rapidly towo.rd CRAILSHEIM. After clc::\ring a fev! roadblociks
and brushing aside iight resistance, Tdsk :B orce rt:lohardson
11
entGI'ed before daylight of 9 Apr.il.
Having delivered the supply vheiclos, Task Force
Richo.rdson was <iirected to set up 0. series of strong points
from north to Bu\UFELDEN. During the day all
of Combat Conmand B continued on the mission of
outposting and patrolling the MSR. Enemy infiltrations had
been largoly eliminated, but determined harassing fires,
especially in the northern still denied our force
frGedom of movement along the MSR. Friendlyinfantry uni ts
"\Nere beginning to move from the north and assumed respon-
sibilityfor most of thG northern part of the route
.-(
Early in a flight of thirty-six enemy
o..ppe:J.red over Team 0'Grady but failed to do any damage
12
on air strafing runs. At 1300B, alemants of the 90th
Cavalry Squadron" which had been relieved
on the 8th by tre 117th Cavcl1ry iteconn::tissance Squadron
in the vicinity of STUPPACH" passod through Combat lionmand
B and. continued ro uth tovIctrd CRAILSHEIM, arriving there
the night of 8-9 Combat Command b"
in an urgent message .. w:.lrned all elements of the command that
air supply of CRAILSHEIM -would be effected between 1545B 'lnd
164SB. and ordered no firing at low flying aircraft unless
they showed deliberate signs of o.ttacking.
14
-61
The hours of darkness remained generally quiet with
only oocasional outbursts of fighting along the MSR. Friendly
infantry continued occupying the northern sector as far
south as the towns of BARTENSTEIN and ADOLZHAUSEN (54,1-91.4).
Friendly supply were repotted moving southward with
very little difficulty.15 the stillness and luck or
resistance along the main supply route it appeared that the
struggle to open and maintain the route had terminated.
Air Supply during the CRAILSHEIM Operation -
No narrative of the 11th Armored Division's action in
the CRAILSHEIM-ILSH FEN area would be complete without ment-
ion of the part played by the air supply to the forces of
Combat Command A within CRAILSHEIM.
The breakthrough of Combat Conrnand A in the Crail-
she im are:3. momentar ily tr.rew the Germans off balance. : The
enemy reaction to this swift advance was to seal off the
land corridor leading into CRAILSHEIM from the north, thus
effectively isolating the troops in from the
remainder of the division and supplies, there is no doubt
that the tactical advantage which had been gained by Com-
bat Corrunand A's bold act ion had been dulled by the almost
impossible task of maintaining an adequate supply route
against the pressure of the enemy. It must also be remem-
bered th at the bridges over the NECKAR and JAGST Rivers
had been blown by the enemYI and the temporary bridges
62
which had been erected were under hostile fire6
FortunateiYJ just to the east of CRAILSHEIM was
located a good airfield. During the period 9.10 April
fifty C... 47 transports of the 9th Troop Carrier Corrunand,
escorted by P-47',s, flew in fuel, food, and ammunition.,
16
:And ovacuated the 'IN ounded. In the two-day period of air
supply 20,000 gallons of 7,000 rations, 1,000
rounds of l05mm. and 100,000 rounds of small arms wnmunition
. 17
were f1own In. This operation was successfully and skill-
fully Although the airfield was under constant
enemy artillery and small arms fir.e" the operation terminated
with the loss of only one aircraft which was destroyed on
the ground by hostile artil1ery fir.e.
'NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4
lAfter Action Report, Combat Command B, 10thArmored Division,
entry for 7 April 1945.
2G- 3 Journal, lOth Armored entry for 7 April 1945.
3 b
After Action Report, 11th Tank attalion, 10th Armored
Division, entry for 7 1945.
4
up cit, G-3 Journal, entry for 7 April.
50p cit, After Action Report, Combat Command B, entry for 7
Aprl.I.
60p cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for
'1 April.
7up 'cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for
8 Apri-l.
Sup Cit, After Action Report, Combat Command B, entry for e April.
90p cit, After Report,. 11th Tank Battalion; entry fot
8 April'
lOup pit, After Action Rt3pcr t, 11th Tank Battalion, entry for
8 April
110p cit, After Action Report, Com('at command B, entry for
9 April...'
12up cit,.After Action 11th Tank Battalion, entry
for 9 i1.pr11.
13After Report, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,
Mechanized,. 10th Armored Division, entry for 9 April 1945.
14
Op cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank Battalion, entry
for 9 April.
15
Op cit, After Action Report, 11th Tank ButtQlion, entry
for 9
16
Be.;ichhead News, 11 April 1945.
17Report of Operations, The Seventh United States Army,. 1944-
1945, Volume III p 784.
CH!'i.PTER 5
Combat A (with ReSErve Command under
__._,_, ____ ___...... ........r-..__ _ - .. _ ..... , ___
As has been recounted, the continually probed
defenses of CllfiILS:-::EUl with patrols tllr the ni ght
-10 l..pr il. These pa trols were appar see information
o thE- n;l.ture of the defenses, for at approximately 0430B
on of 10 April the enemy launched a coordinated
attack a t the CRb.ILSHEIM area, attack developed from
the 30u.tl1, east, and northeast, and contained an estimated 6eO
soldicrs.
l
(See Figure 9.) Task Force Hankins bore
t11e brunt of' the attack sine e Were still occupying their
Cl ensive positions in CR,,\ILS'JBIIl. The te:.sk force was disposed
wit.l Team T:ill defendin:: soutl1ern sector of CRAILS'(lETII,
1
l
carn t
l
l6 ea::3tcrn and northCl.lstern sector" and Team
in res 8r '1{6 ( Se e Ii' 9. ) "
'1'>.6 attack on 'I'c\m Havlovitz was pressed determinedly
the German forces. They were !CGn under fire by all team
we:::.-[;Wl1S and by tj-1(: p;uns of the 420th li.rlil0red It'ield Artillery
Battalion. The artillery fire was extremely effective and tIE
attack was repul sed after small numbers of the enemy had s uc-
cecded in breaking throuGh the main line of resistance. They
2
were taken care 01 by the tea:rr.. reserve.
The thrust against Teum Hill in the south was much
more serious than the attack against Team :--Iavldvi tit. The
I ,
enGmy btoke thr ough thE.. outposts and penetrated the main
t
line of esistance. Hard fighting at extremely close range
developed within Team Hill's posi ti.on and ragvd thr oughout
the streets in the area. To overcome this en6lTlY penetration,
which threatened to disrupt the entire defensive system of
the task force ... Major Hankins conuni tted a pIa toon from his
reserve team, Team Holland, to support Team Hill. This
pI atoon,. together wi th the reserve from Team Havlovi tz.t attac-
ked the enemy penetration. The enemy was prevented from
reinforcinE his engaged troops by artillery concentrations
'INhich nere fired on his avenue s of appr oach to CRAILSHEIM
from the south. Supported by fire from the elements of
Teom l{ill in contact with enemy,. the reserve force proceeded
to clear out the a r e ~ They advanced through the contested
area and reached the outpost line., destroying or capturing
all enemy forces in their Zone. The lines were reestab-
lished. Team Holland attncked and cleared ALTEN'MUNSTER
for the fourth time .. By noon all positions in the CRAIL-
SHED.l area had been restored. The enemy attack had been
repulsed and he had suffered severe casualties.
In coordination with the assault on CRAILSHEIM,
German troops attacked Task 1< orce Thackston in ILSHOFEN.
This attack began at approximately 0630B and came from
67
the nort!1. and northwest. (See Figure 10.) It consisted of
approximately 200 German infnntry supported by at ieast ohe
gun.:3 The enemy was engaged by ail elements of the
task force and by tite the hr,mored Field Artil-
Battalion. The enemy attack was pressed with vigor and
determina tron, but VJo.s f ina lly repuls ed at 0900B. Enenw
,losses were very heavy, consisting of fifty killed, seven-
teen wounded, sixty-five captur cd, inc luding the com-
4
mc.. nder of the attn..king forces. One hostile assault gun
w:::\.s destroyed. After the termination of the attack, Task
Force Thackston improved its positions and awaited devel-
opments.
lOth Armcired Division troops were defeating
the German attempts to recapture CRAILSI1EIM, Task Forces
Riley and Roberts (Ulrich) were occupying their defensive
positions in the area. At 0845B Task Force
Roberts (Ulrich) made conto.ct with Company I, 254th Inf-
antry Rogiment, 63d Infantry Division in the vicinity of
\IOLFSOLDEN. Elements of this division ha.d been given the
5
mission of D.tto.cking toward CRAILSHEIM from the northwest.
An air resupply mission had been scheduled for
Comb:}.. t Corrmand A during the morning of 10 Apr il. .tiS a
result of the enemy attacks, during w mch the airfield
Was subjected to heavy artillery fire, division was
notified at 0600B that the supply planes could not be
68
r6ceived i111til the attack had been defeated. This message
Was not reeeived in time, at 0630B the planes began
l:--nding. Tec.lm Griswold of Task Force Thackston was holding
the airfield, despite the intense artillery fire the
6
pI Dnes VJerG u..'1.1oaded.
After defGating the enemy assault on CRAILSHEIM,
General Piburn requested th'1t infL';.ntry reinforcements be
sent to assist Combat COmm':tnd I. if the 'J.reD. was to be
retained. The g6neral was becoming alarmed at the increasing
enemy reQction. This, coupled with the facts that his troops
had suffered serious losses" hld bcen fighting continuously
for several days, Qnd could not be properly supplied, made
it 'nhether the area could be held against
. G t . 7 1
the grovnng ermo.n concen rat10ns. Pi burn made
it cleo.r th'lt VI Corps would hn. ve tb cormni t sizeable forces
to destroy the enemy concentrations in the
Since VI Corps had insufficient troops to accomplish
the mission of cle:lring the enemy forces from tre CRAILSHEIM
area, it ordered the 10th .il.rmored Division to withdraw
are:lS northwest of general li':1e STEINKIRCHEN (48,2-
72.5) LANGENBURG (54.0-75.0) BLcl.UFELDEN." 8 These orders
wero transm.itted to Comb:::.t Commclnd A and plnns were made to
execute the order. The plan was to assemble in the vicini ty
of DORZBlI.CH. To.sk Force ThaCkston was to withdraw from
ILS,]OFEN, follovJed by Task Force Honkins. Both task
forces v.,rere to follow the route taken by Task Force
70
Roberts (Ulrich). Combn.t L.ommand B and the 90th Cavalry
Reconnu is sance Squadr on wer e to cover the wi thdrawal and
fo 110"1;; Combu. t Cornmc..'..nd A to the assembly area.
Task Force Tho.ckston received the or ders to
wi thdraw, it Wo.s eng.'lged VV i th the enemy in tho vicini ty
of ILSHOFEN. Team Connolly wn.s nn enemy force
in the woods north of ILSHOFEN o.t (58.0-65.5). The team
stopped its upon receipt of the withdrawal orders
and returned to ILSHJFEN. The task force moved out at
upproxim.:J.tely 1900B ::md was harassed by enemy artillery fire.
Tho.ckston's task force procoeded along the followed
by Task Force Roberts. Although the enemy had continuously
infil trated the route between BERNDSHil.USEN and ILSHOFEN
during the duy, no enemy interference was met. The task
force closed into an assembly area in the vicinity of
HOHEB.!.. CH at OIOOB on the 11th of April. This brought to
0. close their opern.tions in the CRaILSHEIM area during
which the tr..sk force had suffered serious personnel losses
which inc luded sevente6n killed, seventy-seven wounded, :lnd
thirteen missing in action. The to.sk force had accomplished
a very difficult job, and had inflicted severe cusuo.l ties
on the enemy.
M8o.nwhile Task Force Hn.nkins hn.d receiVed orders
to thdrllVJ in accordance wi th the combat command plan.
At 2000B troops of the task force began disengaging
71
and moved out along the route taken by Task Force Thackston.
I
The task force closed int? an assembly area in the vicinity of
at 0810B on the 11th of April. Sin6e Task Force
Ha.nkins had borne the brunt of the German assaults in the
CRAILSHEIM area g,nd had also been the spearhead of the lOth
Armored Division dri ve to capture CRAILSHEIM, it had suffered
heavy losses. These losses were approxi:mo.tely twenty-six
killed 8.nd one hWldred wounded.
TQsk Force Roberts (Ulrich) was attached to Task
Force Riley for control purposes during the withdrawal.
Task 10rce Riley, with Roberts (Ulrich) attached, was
detCl.chGd from Combat Command A and placed under direct
control of the Com.'1lc..nding General, 10th Armored Division
9
at 1740B. The combined task forces moved to an assembly
arca in the vicinity of DORRENZ (40.5-83.5), closing
thero at 1945B. They 'Were assigned the mission
of reconnoitering crossings over the KOCHER River in the
vicinity of ,;EISSBACH (35.0-79.3). This was in accord-
10
ance with the new pIJIlS of VI Corps to hn.ve the 10th
ArmorE,d Division (ltt:J.ck toward HEILBRONN. At the close of
the period, Task Force Riley hc..d commenced this new mission.
Combat Command B- 10 April 1945
The morning of 10 April found Combat Command B
disposed as follows: Tflsk Force Chamberlain patrolling the
"RollenbSl.hn" between and BLAUFELDENj Task Force
72
Ric on in the (65.4-71.3) area,
blocking to the northeast with Team Lordwood alerted to
move to CRl.l.ILSFlEIM on order to assist Combat COnInand A;
and the Combat Command Headquarters at ROT am SEE.
At 0730B Colonel Thayer ordered Task Force
Chamber lo.in to as semble at BLAUFELDEN and move to Q.n
assombly area in the vincinity of KIRCBBERG. The task
force o..ssembled '":'..nd J7loved out, and CLt l030B Were on the WFly
to KIRCITBERG. As they neared this locality, the column was
bombed and strafed by cnc:;w The task force
closed in.to this new assembly area without further enemy
interference . At 1500B the task force was ordered to
prepCLre, in conjunction with the remc..inder of Combat
Command b, to cover the vJi thdro.w:.."'..1 of Combat Command A
from CRAILSHEIM. Upon completion of this mission Task
Force Clk'.mber lain was to move to a new di vision assembly
area. The task force moved out at 2100B Qnd closed into
an asserrloly near Bll.RTENSTEIN aftor an all-night march
during which it was continually h<1rD.ssed by the enemy.
Lordwood of For co Richardson was al erted
L'.t 0630B to to CRAILSHEIM to assist Combat Comnand A
which was under severe enemy att:::.ck. The te.:"lm 'was never
ordered to m:tke the move since,.as ho..s been previously
related, To..sk Force Hankins defeated the enemy assault.
Lieutenant Colonel was ordered to report to the
73
c-.)mb8.t comrna.nd p.'s t [).t ROT :lm SEE to receive inst-
ructions incident to the of COmbD.t Cmmnnnd B
frem the CR'i.ILSHEIM o.rerJ.. il.t 1345B he left the task force
comn:lnd post which was located Q t ",d1.LLHAUSEN and proceeded
to Combat COmm'.lnd B comrrL'.. nd post. There hE: received orders
from ColonE.l Thayer to COV6r th wi of Comb..l t
Comrr.o..nd A from CR.l.ILSHEHiI and then to wi thdravv his tesk
force tu o..n assembly in thE: vicinity of MULF INGEN
(19. 8-84.5). The tQsk force accomplished this mission
without incid6nt .. and after an nIl-night march closed into
tho new ,J.ssembly at 0840B on thE: 11th of April.
90th Reconnaissance Squadron - 10 April 1945
The 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squudron was engaged
in the execution of a dual mission on the morning of 10
April. Troops A emu D (reinforced) wore in CRAILSHEIM
nssi sting Task For ce Hankins in the defens e of that town.
Troop C (reinforced) WQS patrolling the road between
CRi;.ILSHEIM and ILSHOFEN and The squadron
hoadquc..rtGrs f'.nd the headquarters of Troops E and F
rem'1ined in Troop B, in reserve, Was
guarding the bridge I:?cross the JAGST ri ver at KIRCHBERG.
This troop ViaS movGd t'O ROSSFELD at approximately l800B
mld was given the mission of patrolling the gU1eral line
ROSSFELD-Yl.AULJ-\. eH.
74
Troops A, C, and D continued their missions through-
out the day. Troop C encountered continuous sniper and
fire while nttempting to keep the rond between
and ILSHOFEN opon. The rond was Q.ctunlly open
only when armored units were moving over it, as the enemy
continually infiltrated behind elements clearing the road.
This necessitated a continuous back and forth movement
between CRAILSHEIM and ILSHOFEN. (See Figures 7 and 10.)
On the afternoon of 10 April, the 90th
in conjunction VJi th Combat COlTlITlD.nd B, received orders to
cover the withdrawal of Combat Command A from CRAILSHEIM.
The squadron carried out this mission during the night of
10-11 April. Although small groups of Germans harassed
elements of thE; 90th Co.V<llry, no serious opposition to
tho withdrawalwas encountered. The squadron completed its
movement to the division assembly areo. by 1700B, 11 April.
The withdrawal of the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance
brought to end the operation of the 10th Arm-
ored Di visiun in the CRAILSBEIM area. This operntion,
'which had enjoyed brillinnt initi:tl success, concluded
on a note of fo.ilure. D6 spi te thE.. heroic efforts of
troops of the 10 Armored Vi vision, the area
vms again in Germ:::m hands.
75
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5
lAfter Action Report" 6lst Armored Infsntry Battalion,
lOth Armored Division, entryfor 10 April 45.
2

3'fter ,,1.C 'tlon R.. eport , 3d Tank Ba ttU1 l.on, 10th Armored J.i.
Division,_ entry for 10 April 45.
4
Ibid

50perations Instructions No. 74, Headquarters, VI Corps,

10 April 45, por 2.
6
CD.ptain George F. H8Jn61, The Crailsheim Operation of the
lOth lirmcred Division, (Richmond: Armored Cavalry Journal,
March-April P <b3.
BOp cit, Operations Instructions No. 74, VI Corps.... par 1.
9
After i"l.ction ROt-\.)rt, 21st Tank BCltt .,lion, lOth Armored
Di'vision, Gntry for 10 April 45.
10 Op cit, Instructions No. 74, VI Corps,
pur 1.
76
CHAPTER 6
SUMMJ1.RY
Employment of the 10th Armored Division
The VI Corps,' spenrhended by the 10th Armored
Di'<rision, hud experienced rapid successes in its drive fror.l
the RHINE River southeast toward MUNICH and th e hC:lrt of
Germany.' VI Corps ovident1y expected thG crossing
of the NECKAR Ri vcr and the capture of BEILIJRvNN vIOuld be
an easy task, agaLl1st we(:l.k However, on the 3d
of April, the advance of the 10th normored Division and VI
Corps wns stopped at riEILBRJNN by doturmined resistance
of the enemy. Combat commands of the civision Were
spread over a wide area along the NECKAR River; Reserve
Comnand on the left, Corabn t Corm-nand no in tho center nnd
Combc,t Command B on the right. The stubborn and skillful
defense 1::y the Gernwns prevented Corps from estublishing
an adequate bridghend at dEILBR0NN and dictated a chang e
of corps plans for employment of the 10th Armored Division.
On 5 11.pri1, the 10th .il.rmored lJivision less Com'08.t
CO!T'Jf:and B WetS ordered to exploit gains in the northern
sector Where Reserve Command D..l1d tl1.6 90th Cavalry Reconnais-
sance Squadron had cros SGd the NECI-\L1.R River anG. WGre in
the vicinity of ItERGENTHEIM. The division was to
reconnoi ter in force to CRi1.ILSHEIM nnd to approach
77
HElL.BRONN from the east. Since the Reserve Cormnand and
the 90th Cavalry were engaged in the vicinity of DORZBACH
a.1J.d STUPPACH, the division had only Comcat Corrrrnand A
avai 1abl e for imnediate employmen t in an attack toward
CRAILSHEIM. lr;titially the bold movement eastward of Combat
Comm:J..nd A caught the German forces off bal'mce. The ITlljor
port ion of the corrnnand, after piercing the German
defensive shell in the vicinity of was able
to enter CBL.ILSHEIM by l700B, 6 against only dis-
organized resistance. On the 7th 8th of April, elements
of Combat Comnand ,,1. probed to thG west to ILSIIOFEN and
KIRCHBERG.
en 7 April, Reserve Command in the north was
ordered to relieve Combat Comnand A at to enable
tho 1 cltter to push to the west. Combat Corrmand B was
released by corps to rejoin the division and on 8 April
was given the mission of reopening the main supply route to
CombQt Corrmand ,d. at After considerable action
with minor enemy forces along the route, elements of
Combat Comnand Breached CRAILSHEIM on the morning of the
9th of April wi th 0. convoy of much needed supplies.
Supplies were also flown by our Air Force to the air-
field just west of CRAILSHEIM on the 9th and again on the
10th of Apri 1. .By.10 Apri I" alar ge porti on of the supply
route extending soutt to BLAUFELDEN had been secured by an
attached regimental combat team from t:re 44th Infantry Division.-
78
During the period 6 to 10 April elements of Comtat
Cor.mw.nd il.j reinforced oh 7 April by elements of Reserve
the 90th Cavalry, had resisted strong enemy
counterattacks in the CRi!.ILSHEIM area. By the 10th of
April, the situationwas greatly relieved and the principal
efforts of the Gernans to pinch off this salient had been
overcome. Just as success in this operation seemed within
the division's grasp, division was ordered to assemble
in the vicini ty of to prepnre for a coordinated
corps attack to southwest.
In the study of this action of the 10th Armored
Division.. the commi ttee attempted to deduce.. objectivelyJ
logical conclusions from limited source Mtterial avail-
able to it. -lihile these conclusions are retrospective in
nClturo, 0.. close inspection of the available reports will
substo.ntiutG the conclusions drawn.
Conclusions and lessons
1. VI Corps committed the 10th Divisicn
to opera. piecemeal .. by combat comnand
r-ther thc;.n as a unit. This reduced the possibility of
employing the division as Q unit in a coordinated action.
Reserve COL1;.1and WD..S eng:-.tged east of the NECKAR in the vicinity
of B..;".. D MERGENTH EIlJI when corps gave eli visian the mission of
rcconnoi tGring in forcG to the 1ine cn
H..I.LL-B:.. CKNll.NG... while retaining Combut Command Bwest of the
NECICl.R River under corps control. This gave the division
79
commander but one combat commund fot the initial 1h
the CRh.ILSHEIM a.reG.. unit should bG employed with suf-
ficient forces to ensure a reasonable chance for success.
2. The cross country mobility of uni ts was greatly
reduced by the seD.sonD,l rains which creQted quagmires of
thG country side. Vehicles became roadbound with the cor-
responding loss of freedom of maneuver. In the assignment
of missions to armored units due considerr'.tiun must be
given to tile effect of weather ilnd terrain on operations
3. Instructions from highGr headqut:..rters to sub-
ordinn.tc "Lillits were not always clcctr or specific. Examples
of this were the corps oreer to division to "reconnoiter
in forcG to the line IL'\.LL-BA.CKNANGn
the instruction of the division directing Combat
Corrnnand B to "establish 3. continuous of n.rmor along
the Both of these orders doubt and confusion
in the minds of' unit coITmllnders n.s to exactly whc..t was
desired of their units. Orders to subordino.tGs must have
sufficient clarity and be specific in nn.ture" in order
thClt positive Q.nd correct :J.ctionVlill te t:lken by the recipient
.;1. There v.,rere f:.:tilures in cormnunicQ.tions betv:ecn
comr)o.t commands and task forces. On 6 ApriI, Task Force
and Task Force Riley had no communicati.:>ns with
their ccmba.t cOl11znr:;.nd commander. a result they both re-
mained in the vincinity of instead of Task Force
Riley pushing west as ordered by the combat commander.
80
Combat Command B lost contact wlth its leading element,
Task Force Richardson; on the 7th of April when rejoining
the division. The combat command indirectly learned of the
location of its unit from the 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron vlhich had informed division. It is believed the
command group of Combat COlTh118.nd B should have remained nearer
its leading elements and placed greater emphasis upon main-
tenance of communications. The combat command then would
have been more cognizant of the situation of its leading
eleme:lts and mfi)ra able to direct their efforts to accomp-
lish assigned missions.- In a fast moving situation corrnnuni-
cations are all the more important and every effort should
be made to maintain them.
5. Units did not capitalize on their initial gains.
Elements of Combat l,.,ommand entered CRAILSHEIM with little
opposition after the initial breakthrough. Even though
previously instructed to press onin tiEvastfrom CRAILSHEIM,
Task F'orce Riley remained in and did not begin
its attack to the west until the follovling day. 'Higher
headquarters also failed to exploit Combat Command A's
initial successes with an immediate follow-up by other
troops. If other elements of the division and tLe corps
had been immedia-tely pushed into CRAILSHEIM and to the west,
the impact upon German troops in the area would have been
considerable and the German defenses to the west would have
been enveloped from the rear. coromi tting troops to
81
an action which may result in a penetration or envelopment.
forces must be and prepared to exploit those
successes.
6, Staff planning was notihorough. Ccmbat
Command B was ordered into an assembly m'ea in the
of ASSAMSTADT when the assembly area could not accomodate
even one of the combat command's task forces. Staff action
must be complete tlefore orders are transmitted to subordinate
units. The issuance of faulty instructions only destroys the
confidence of subordinate commanders in all instructions
originating from the same headquarters.
7. The Commanding General of Combat A did
not arrive in CRAILSHEIM until the 7th of April, about six-
teen hours after the arrival of his comhJ.t elements. If he
had bcen with his combat elements :..1.nd arrived the evening
beforE- .. he could hD. ve pus hed the 3. ttack to the V!GS t as he
had previously instructed. There is no indication that the
division commander or the corps commander ever visited
CRAILS .ED/.[ during this cri tical period.. It was not until
10 April thr).t the COmrn:lnding General of the 10th Armored
Di vi s ion arrived at CRAILSHEIM .J.nd ordered the VIIi thdrawal.
A should not expose himself unnecessarily but he
must rem;J.in far enough forward to influence his combat
elements in crucial action.
82
8" The division f'J.iler1 tn ann,..., its
main suprly route into Ch.iiILS JEH!I. .L}ds d CV'J..Ld G .......?
result in the eventual failure of' t ro foroes enga.ged in
vicini ty' 0;" CRAILsEEIM bGCilUse of the laok of adequate
support. Most of the 6nemy against
tho main supply t"oute oentered around HOLLENBACH and
.-:..B.tENSTEIN, If these enemy troops had been cleared out
immediately, as was later done by the infantry
during the 1'inal phase of the operation" the 8).CC(;SSCS in
CRAILELillIM could have been L,).ploi ted to the fullest, a.nd
troops would not lLtve be(;D withdr-tvvn by corps at a time
when complete success seemed at The supply routes
of D. lIDi t must be clG:l.rod,secured" ITID.. int::.ined.
9. Small units instinctively took the proper
action without instructions from higher headquarters and
ret:1.ined the initiative. An outstr':lding of this W:1S
the c,Jordin:'.. tioD beuvoen Task ForCG ::Iankins 8.nd Task Force
Riley ill the consolici::'.tion of positions and redistribution
of limited supplies in CRAILS]EI1VI.
10. The defense, of __ EIMI ROTH" and ILSHOFEN
ug:.:.inst Successive countorattClcks by the Germ:.:..ns displayed
an aggressive spirit and a sound tuctic:ll "knov'i how" in
tho defense of a built-up urea.
1,1. BQdly needed CIass I II V suppliGS were
successfully flown into the CRAILS-1EIM are'). with the loss
of only onG pl:me. This WO,s accomplished despi.te continuous
83
on the
et:. )ivi O'L1 f:;.... OIC J ..;J 10
I
I.
ITne iivisio:1.
'I
j.-:--,,-;t rt'''cce''rtl'':'''llTT
- v'"" - J .) c_ .. -< - L ,.-.- v ___-- u -- f - -'''1- '.. .;
:........ cr....)3L..;..tio..l 0':: t:1e t""'-J6 1111cSio"t'lse
_ _ L- ..... I '
GJ.tiO:l ai.1 sep .:.:xis 0: lJ.'i:o-cec-cio..1
II
livi Di sector,
o en. , Q, 'L1c1
I
I
i
J.'hese 8i
C3, S1..-1 .3,.JJ t1e s
I
I
24
A F FEN r I X I
TROOP LIST
3d Tank Bn
11th Bn
21st Tank En
20th Armored Infantry Bn
Armored Infantry Bn
61st Armored Infantry Bn
55th Armored neer En
80th Armored Medical
90th Cavalry Rcn En
132d Armored Ordnance
150th Armored Co
419th .t'''rmored 1: ieId Arty Bn
420th il.rmor d Field Arty En
423d Armored Fiel3. Arty tin
Unit
9th V.G. Livision
57th Ini'antry He t
Infantry Regiment
Sth Fusilier Battalion
212th V.G. Division
423d Infantry Re
K.G. Sachs
Gr. Ers. battalion 42,
Marsch Company, :Nebel
59th Armored }i Id Arty Bn
93d d ield Arty Bn
405thFi cld il.riillery Group
634th Field n.rty Bn
141st ield Arty Bn
939th Field Arty bn
Btry B, 976th Field Arty Bn
324th Infantry Regiment
609th Tsnk Lestroyer Bn
796th AAA AR Bn (Sp)
59th AAA AN Bn (Sp)
31st Engineer Combat Bn (-)
until 6 April 1945
2827th Engineer Combat En (-)
from 6 April 1945
442d ltuartermaster k Co
448th Truck Co
I FiTI[ Team Yo. 13

Strength
Reported Estimated
850 -- 400
500 200
250
150
100
50
220J
194:0
_. 420
320
600
500
EAYREUTH 600
450
Tr. 68 100
90
dsrier Ers u Ansb battalion 8 220
180
212th usilier Dattalion 160
100
.t..ntitank
100
?j..C)
300
5CO
350
2d C ompa'ly
1121st Grenadier battalion 2 bv
60
250
?
150
2d C
553d V.C'.
1119th
----
Unit
JaGg;er Fee "Alpen 2"
I Battalion (5 Companies)
II Dattalion (5 Companies)
AT Compa.ny
3d Llatt'.,ry" Heavy Arty_ Bn., Alpen
646th nridfe Construction Battalion
ICG. Duernagc:;1
I b8.tt,C).lion
II Lattalion
sclU].-C Company
283d Stomach Dsttalion
(2 Companies identified)
Kurfurst 30
V.S.
K. G. Jiubner
Gr Ansb u Ers Bn 5)
K.G t Lucker
.Kemnant.3 73d Inf3.ntry Eeg,irnent
260th Gr Lrs battalion
pz hgte Rosenheirr
(4th and 5th Companies identi:Lied)
Artillerv 3chramm
J
Schutzen' Battalion, }t urth It
Flieger Horst Company
19th li.ll. R6 r.rim6nt" 2d Battery
(Comrni as Infantry)
TOTAL
stren@:th
Reported Estinated
1734
7'50
7'50
114
120
650
2500
500
500
90
600
300
400
500
265
300
440
400
480
120
90
11,184
1180
500
500
100
80
400
1800
375
375
75
450
200
250
350
150
250
375
400
150
80
85
8,06e
86
CRAILSHIM OPf.RAT'ON
t'
CCR
405 FA 6rotJp
"';;:A 93 AFA Bn. (33 FA 8n .)
59 1'1"'=4 "n (33 F/1 13r ilJ 141 FA t3n. (405 r';4 G Y)
8n.(4l:J4r,Q!?p) 423AFAan. (/OAiJj;o
f:J39 ':I'f 8n. (1'.10:; F ... Gp)
8 Blry 976F,q
:32 Ord l3n C-)
&J r?ect 8n.(.)
5.5 Eng (3n (0)
90 RCN Bn (.)
1505'.9 CO.
32'4 Inf. R9t
609 T) BI7 ( )
79G:> AAA A 10/ .sp 8n t-J
3.' nq (c) all() ur:!! bA ..... r)
Enj. (c) Bn () f'mm I;A.'?r/
'5"S AAJI A W S D an
Trl< CO
448 QM Tr'r, Co
,;, AftJ (-CoA)
CoA 3rr/ TK Bn
I PliTt Coa (CL)970BrJ
I sI Plat, Cot4 .55 A Bn
(RAILSHEJM OPE.RATiON (4-10 Apr. 45)
CCA lOAD
TASK }:"'ORCE
RILY
ciS! TK On [GJI3)
CoA 6/ AIJ3
/ Plat rOBn
2ndPldtCoA 5.54E8
tASK FORCE.
ROBE.R.TS
54 -'1, A!8 (- Cos A
u, 21st TK Bn
I Plat, wBG09rD
.31'1:::/ Plat wAS5AEB
TrA.90 CdV R<:.n 8n
CoA5'sAE8n(-)
CoBW9TDl3n()
CoA80MedBn
419 Bn
CD/S7r tGkl'lJ
420Af'A 8r '"
(o/s TFha/."(li1;::,-:J
FA an
C&/s CCA; /4,.'3-rn::/
alcfJtl4/.9AFA
20AI8 (-Co( 3/.4)
(0(; ilH,TJ( 8n
.3 Plat C..oA / jill TK 13n
.3PlilfCo8 55 AE8
3PlciJtCoA b0910 8n
CRAJLSHEJM
TASK FORC
CHAM8ERLAfN
TA.5K FORCE.
RKHARDSON
/1 11< :>n. (. Cae, -1"4; !U)
CaC ZO+hAIB
3 PLAT CocA 20rhAIB
! Pliif CoB 55AEB
I PIJt CoA '09 TO Bn
OPERATION
(4-10 Apr. ~ 5 )
H
Y
f H9 Co CCB
eoA fo097D 8n{-)
CoB S5 A8 (-)
Is"! Plol GOD IITK8n
/ Pw TEAM -#/1.3
CoC .31 119 (C) BI1
CoA 3/ Eng (,)Bn(!"f'/t!;w)
(.08 2287 ) 8 n (rpIAfi
2 PI.tCoA 90Rcn 8n
423 AFA 8n
Co l3 80 M Ell Bn
wA 1320r4Bn
405 rA {;-p
93 AFA Bn
/41 FA Bn
8 Bfry.976FA
QpRATfON C4-IOApr 45)
-
.3rd Til( Bn.{- (0.4:-2pl.,f DCa) 5!1 f-;.q an. CO/.s)
CoA.54AlB
Cae S4AI8
2ndpl.:rl-Co c (009.'1)&.
3rdp1a+ Co c.5.5 AB
90
A P P E D I Z II
TEH.RA 1fT STUDY
The HElLBRONN-ASSA1,ISTADT-CRAILSHEIM area lie s in
the state of WURTTEM:J3URG 'which is in the southeast corner
of GERMANY. This east central portion comprises approxim-
ately one fifth of the state.
r;URTTEVIBURG, a hillyI agricultural pr ovince, is a
part of the South Germany r::'ableland. About fifty-seven
percent of the state is drained the YEGKAR River and its
main tributaries- the KOCHER.. the JAC the and the
RC1"S Rivers with their nwnerous tributaries. Sixty-four
percent of thG area is under this mostly
grains, vllith a scattering of orchards [dIU vineyards. Thirty-
one percent of the state is in forest land. To the west,
betr:een the IEIHTE and the sand and
I<ARLSRUdE.. lies the black rorest. Small stands of this
dense forest spread to the east of th,e l
li
ECKAR. road
net, in some instances dating back to the time of the
RQr.r:.,l\YiS, is fairly good. roads are of tr..e hard surface
bJa ck-top variety, averaging about five to six meter s in
width.
l
The T-JE ILBROliN-ASSN TSTADT-CRAILS:'-IEIJlii area is traversed
by three rivers: the l'TECKAR River fl0DS north through
91
HEILBROlTN to EBERBu.CH where it turns west through HEIDELBERG
and empties into thE, RHINE River; KOCHER River flows
north through SCEtW:l.BISCf-I ELIoLL.:; approximately forty-six
kilometers east of the NECKAR River .. e;r::\dually swings in
a gentle curve to the west and GS into the NECKt'..R River
seven kilometers north of the J:.. GST River flows
north through Cfu.. ILSHEIE"
ki lome ters to the
east of the KOCHER River .. and curves westward" roughly
the KOCEER.. and s into the NECKAR River
eleven kilometers north of HEILBRONN. These rivers .. which
are unfordable require hr I and th e ridge line s
betvveen them divide the of operations into numerous
complex compartments. In addition, the aphica lly old
terrain is deeply locerated the stre'J.m nevNork formed by
numerous small streams, resulting in stream beds with
soft banks and steep slopes. 'rhis condit ion renders even
tIle narro1';est of stre[lmS unfordable. The ro ,
moder'1tely open terrO-in provides observation and fields
of fire. HOYleVer, continuou.s cultivation for centuries
has c'1used the soil to pI' esent c. mu.ddy morass dur the
ing season, reducing the trafiica
1
)il of vehicles for
2
cross-country operation.
During a dry season t'' terro.in "jQuld favored
the employment of armor. However 10th Armored Division
was 'lampGrGd by tL6 lack of tr''1.fficability for
its vehirles. The mire-like condition oi the soil, resulting
from t:1G annual spring rains and confined the activity
of t:,6 vebicles to the roads, w!lich ciisintergra.ted rapidly
under the constant U8e by heavy armored vehicles. The 1Nater
barriers presented by the NECKAR River and its tributaries,
the and K0CHlli Ri vers, further canalized the movements
of tIle division into narrow and greatly aided
the German defense of the area.
------_._--------,---_._--_.._. -------
FOR APPEFDIX II
lLetter, The Americana Institute, He'
i
:: York IS, l:evl York, 24
Fe:)ruary 1950.
2I,Laps: 1:100,000, Sh('3ets U-4; ELL';'AlTGLN"
iJ-3; -3. 1:25,000,
Geographical Section, General St,:Lff 1'0. 4414, Britis>J..
93
AP P E. D I X III
OPERATIOES ORDERS AnD OPERA1'IO"lS rirSTRUCTlot"s
94
lOth Armd Div
A?O 260
0424CIOB Apr 45
Copy Ho.
OPERATIors INSTRUCTIONS NO. 19
(Co'lfirming Oral and Yrag:cn0ntClry Orders)
MAPS: GSCS 4<b16, CEYJTRAL EUROPE, Scale 1:100,000 3heets
U2, V2 & U3.
1. 90th Cav Ren Sq (Mecz) (-):
a-:---1Tove at once to Rcn "hi force to line ROTHENBURG (7789)
CRAILS.LEnF (7062).
b. Establish Ln with 63d Ini Div and coordinate passage
thru their lines.
c. Coordinate all movements with nes Comd.
2. Res Comd:
a. Atk at once to seize line ROTllirmJRG (7789) -
(7676).
b. Establish Ln with G3d lnf Div and coordinate passage
tilru lines.
c. Coordinate all I;lOVGm8nts \"Iitb 90th Cav Rcn Sq (rvlecz).
3. CCA:
Cont present
b. Prepared on Div to:
(1) Cross Dr No.2 and Atk to E.
(2) Cross Dr No.1 anG. Atk to E.
(3) Cr0 S s Dr 1\)o. 3 and Atk to L.
c. Obj will be to seize line CRAILSilliIi\l (7062) -
YJE'lTRIT'.TGElJ (7676) recardless of W>lere crossin,r: is made.
'-' <......
d. EstJ.blish Ln '.\Iith illlit in whose i... crossing is
made to coordinate of
4. CC B:
a;--Cont present mission.
b. Prepared on Div to:
(1) Cross Br No. 3 and Atk to E.
(2) Cross Dr No.2 and Atk to E.
(3) Cross Br No. 1 and Atk to E.
c. Obj VI/ill be to seize line 3CE'-:A:JISH HALL (4659) -
CHAILST1EI!': (7062) regardless of IN ,ere crossing is made.
d. Establish Ln v.J1. th friendly lUlit in whose Z crossing is
made to coordinate passage of lines.
95
5 C:':;lJERAL:
cs vIill not be blocked (Jlms. If he8.cl is
Itcd f or any rSL,Son" 11 curl v"d and clear
both approC\.ch s to Dr.
b. is esttnatcd !3r 2 will be completed 5 lipr.
c. ProT11pt and reports 0
'
1 prog;ress of Clms
is mandator;),',
MO:RHIS
Maj Gen
ICIAl:
S'IEf'rIELD
Actp; G-3
"X" plus 3-VI Corps
I-2d Fr Corps
l-locth Ini' Div
1-63d In:!. Di v
I-44th Inf Div
96
lOth Armd Di v
APO 260
061600e Apr 45
Copy l'Jo.
o::':rt.Al' I S r STRrerrI ,;,3
(Coniirr;li'1[:: verbal..,; Orders)
EUROFE, Scale 1:100,000, Sheets
TJ( & '14.
I,J.. F3: C3
r
:-3 -1416,
1. :
a:--B"d 4betvleen VI and XXI Corps chan-;ed effective 06000lB
Afr 45.
operates on uivision left. b. 4th Div and 101st
c. Division co inues to in Z 63d and 100th Inf
Division.
d. VI Corps COlltiuues Atkl c:-lan direction to SEe
e. Division limit of Ren changed (overlay). Atks to
SE at once to seize line BACK:Al\jG (2440) SCFlrliABISCH
ilALL (4660) (7063)
2. CC ii:
attack t SEt
b. Turn to and d on re6ehin" Vic CHAILS":1EnE to seize
line BACKl:'AHG (2440) .. Bisc qft..LL (4660) both
inclusi VB.
3" PES COT:D:
a.-}'ollorJ CC A initial
b. La soon as possible 3 to S and seize line
SC? I'.. BISCll (4660) (exclusive) GROS ALTDORF
(5860) (exclusive).
4. 90TH OF-V HeN sQ (J;JlCZ) (-):
a-;----rolloVJ Res Comd ini tinl t
b. [ail;.tain physical contact ith i.riel1c>ly 11ms on left
keeping iniorr;.ed of Oll!' positions.
c. As soon as possible sides to SE and S to Rcn in
force to line GROS ALTDORF 5860) (inclusive)
CRAILSliliIM (7063) (incl us i VG )
5. ALL IN COnTACT:
..
a. Prepared for flrrthGr offensive action to Sand SE on
Div o.
b. Resistance and towns will be bypassed wt.ere pOssil)le
in order to reach Obj line as qlJ. icl-::ly as possibIe.
llIOREIS
J"/aj Gen
ICIAL:
IELD
Actg G-3
"Xii plus 3-VI Corps
l-IOlst Cay Gp
I-4th InI' Div
l-lOOth Inf Di v
1-63d Ini' Div
98
Eq 10th Armd Div
APO 260
062200B Apr 45
Copy '0.
OI--ERJ._TI'Ji:'S L,TSmUCTIO:JS NO. 21
(Confirminp; Oral 0: }'ragmentary Orders)
EAPS: GSGS 4416, CElfTPJiL EUROFE, Scale 1:100,000.. Sheets U4
&, V4.
1. CC A:
a;--No change in mission.
b. Bxploit to rnaximum breaktj,1ru 01 TF TIankins.
c. Protect left (:8) flank of oym advance.
d. shoulder at (7062) until Rlvd by Res
Comd.
2. CC
a. Reverted to Div control as of 061645B Apr 45.
b. Ordered by VI Corps to move so as to re8.ch Er
(800834) by 062300B.
c. (':0'1e from Br by Rt indicated to Assy Are:) Vic
(4193) (overlay).
d. Prspared upon arr)..-:1.1 for cOITll:1itrnent on 1 FIr notice.
3. RZS COl D:
in present mission.
b. Assi3t 90th Cay Rcn Sq (Mecz) in HE Div Z initially.
c. Rlv Elms CC A at CRAILSHEnI (7062) as soon as possible.
d, nold shoulder at CRAILSi3EHC (7062) until [Uvd by 90th
Cay fLcn Sq C:ecz).
4. 90th Cay Rcn Sq (Mecz):
a. NE shoulder Di v Z until Rlvd.
b. Proceed on mission assigned or NO. 20 on Div O.
MORRIS
Maj Gen
OIT IeIAL:

Actg G-3.
DISTRIBUT101: "x" plus 3 - VI Corps
1 - 101st Cav G:.)
1 - 4t'l vi v
I - IOOth lui Div
1 - 63d Ini' Div
99
lOth Armd Div
APO 260
072200B April 1945
Copy No
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 22
(Confirming Oral and Fragmentary Orders)
rvIAI.PS: GSCS 4416.. CENTRAL EUROPE, Scale 1:100..000.. Sheets U4
V4.
1. CC A:
a:---iTo change in mission.
b. Send minimum of one light Task Force from SCHvVABISH
HALL (84659) toward HEILBROFJ; (S086l) to contact Elms
100th Inf Di v movtng E from that point.
2. CC B:
a:--Becure and hold open (S7062) - BAD
(S470l) (both exclusive) for Div MSR.
lJ. I'Jlaintain contact with Elms 4th Inf Div to N and Res
Comd on S.
3. COlIn:
a. Mission Asgd 01 No. 20 cancelled.
b. Block and protect CRATLSHEHI Rd center.
c. Maint8.in contact with 90th Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz) on
It and CC B on L.
4<'1 90th CAV RCN SQ UfECZ):
a-.. Asgd or No. 20 cancelled.
h. Take over and hold Obj Line (S7062) -
SCEVLADISCH EALL (both exclusivo).
c. contact with Rss Comd at CRAIL3HEIM and
CC A at 8CHNABISCH HALL
MORR.IS
Maj gen
OFFICIAL:
SHEFFIELD
Acte; G-3
DI8TRIBUTIOF: "X" plus 3 - VI Corps
1 - 101st Cav Sq
1 - 4th Inf Div
1 - 63d Inf Div
1 - 100th Inf Div
100
10th Armd Div
AFO 260
082400B Apr 45
Copy
Ol:;ERr.. Tlors I:JSTRUCTIONS NO. 23
(ConI' Oral and Fragmentary Crders).
GSGS CENTRAL EUROPE, S081e 1:100,000 Sheets
U4 and V4.
TF Roberts to between KOC:illR and JAGST Rivers.
b. Seize any intact Brs over KOCHER R.
c. Gain contact with 63d Inf Div Atking from
d. ize that portion of Rd from ':.rOHEBACH (4586) to
se H HALL (S4659) in Z.
eo If unable to cross KOCHER R at present locatim,
he is to follow Rt of TF' Roberts prepared to ad-
of any intact Er 0 '.Jr KeC dER R. Cross to
Y'f as soon as possi'Jle and Cont Atk tm':ard BEIL13RONN
(30861) to contact lOOth Inf Div.
'. 0 Chffi1[e in remainder of present mission.
go CG CC A has operational of Res Comd until
further notice.
2Q CC 13:
a;--C-cmt on prese:1t mission initially.
b. On be relieved in sectors 8525898) to
(36279) (Incl) hold line BLJ.. (S6279)- CRAIL-
e (S7062) (both exclusive) keeping balance of
CC in mobile :t{es Vic KIRCE=BEEG (36369).
c. W':aintb.in contact v,;ith CC A on Sand 324th RCT on V"
d. Close coordination bet1Neen Tf: Chamberlain and leading
En 324th RCT is maDdatory.
e. Team l,faher to Cont rr.ission on between (4800)
and (S525898) until further notice.
3. RES COJ:D: (Temporarily under Oper3.tional Control of CC A.)
4. 90th C!.v Rcn Sq (Mecz) (-):
a. change in mission.
b. Move as rapidly as possible to
mission"
bypassing and p1 ssing thru fri where
possible. .
101
5. 324th ReT:
a. Itchd Div Eff 08lBOOB Apr 45.
b. Assemble in designated area (overlay).
c. as soon as posiJible after 9 Apr
Atk S to secure MSR in Z.
d. CoopEJrate closely Y.:ith 1'F C:iamberlain of CC B who
now has responsibility of Z to be d by RCT.
6. 59th Armd FA Bn:
a:--Atchd Di v l'.:ff 08l200B Apr 45.
b. Comd Rpt Co Di v Arty for orCters.
MORRIS
Maj Gen
OFFICIAL:
SHEFFIELD
Actg G-3
DISTRIBUTION: "X" plus 3 - VI Corps
1 - lOlst Cav Gp
1 - 4th Ini Div
1 - lOOth Inf Div
1 - 63d Inf Div
1 h. 324th RCT
102
10th Di v
APO 260
092400B Apr 45
Copy No.
INSTHUCTIO:bIS j\IO. 2.:1
(I:"'onfirming; Or'.11 and Iragmentary Orders)
GSGS 4416
1
EUnOPE, So:c:.le 1:100,000.. ets
U4 :::tne! V4.
Ron iramecli
cont3.C "i<lith G3d Inf Div, initi'3.te
for crossi:l;' over KOCEER rt..
b. Push 54th I.\.rred Bn (-) (Reinf) and 21st Tk (-)
(Reinf) across R 3.S rapidly as possible.
o. Cant ;.\.tk toward H.b:ILbRONi'I.
d. M:aintmn close Ln with Elms 63d Div during crossinf;
p:Bse to ooordinate passage t ru their troops.
e. ITo Oh8.nr;8 in mission Vic
2. CO No 0
3. Res Comd: No cl:ange
4. 90th Cay Ron Sq (Meoz): In addi tion to present mission
Ron- to Nand 8 of SC I,':::':'.\.LL for Brs and fords over
KOC . IE], R.
J\,:1GRTUS
j Gen
OFfICL;.L:
SJ:-CfFIELi)
G-3
DISTRILUTIO: "Xn plus 3
1
1
1
1
- VI Corpa
- 63d Inf Div
- 4th Inf Div
- lOOth Inf Div
- 324 RC1J.
1
103
Irq 10th Armd Div
AFO 260
l01300B Apr 45
Copy No.
OFERATIO;J8 LI3T:RU(;T10; S NO. 25
(Confirmin;c Verbal (J. 1'1ragmentary Orders)
LIAFS: GSCS 4416, CElTTRAL EUI{OPE, Scale 1:100,000, 5heets
U4 aYld V4.
1 GE}TLRAL :
a. Divwithdraws irrunediately fro!:1 CEAILST-l:G;IM Area to
Assy Area (ov;:;rlay)
b. Prepared on arrival to Cont Atk to toward HEIL13ROHN
wrwn crossinp:s over KOCT-ffiR R are available.
2. CC A:
a:-Initiatewithdrawal at once to designated Assy Area.
b. Use Red &Blue Hts as required.
c. On closing Assy Area prepared to Cont Atk to Won orderc
d. R8s Comd remains under your oY:Jer3.tional control until
closed in Assy Area.
e. Tr A, 90th Cay Rcn Sq (Mecz) reverts Sq control.
3. 90th Cuv Rcn Sq (Mecz):
-a-;--C'-C"VervJithcrr:-avJaflS'c A fram CTc..A.ILSlH.f Area.
b. Co-,ler withdrawal CC B from KIRCIIBBE.G Area.
c Fall back to ,9,; hold generally along E-\[ 80 Grid Line
from BLAUfELDE1'; to BUCEE}TBACK until Rlvd by 117th
Cav Sq.
4. CC B:
a.-Hold present pasitions &: cover vdtr.dra"li'al CCA.
b. After CC A has cleared" move to desi[nated .Assy Area
Via Route Red or any Ii.outes to North E of
JACST R.
MORRIS
Maj Gen
OFFICIAL:
SHI;FFIELD
Actg G-3
DISTRIBUTIOlJL "X" plus 3 - VI Corps
1 - d Inf Di v
1 - 4th Inf Div
1 - lOOth Inf Div
1 - 324th RCT
104
E-l.-T-R-A-C-T
S SEVENTH AlnlY
APO No. 758 0 S. Army
4 April 1845
OPERATIons
122
1. a. First Brench Army on the right secures the line
KARLSRUHE--HEILBRONl1 and reconnoiters to the line
LICHTElJAU R2014)--LUDiJIG-SJURG (80734).
0.., Third Army 0:2 the left continues the advance
tow3.rd LEIPZ
2. Boundaries:
a. Present boundary Seventh Army and Third
Army is extended as follows: livest of FULDA
(H3819) no ehange--FULDA (to Seventh Army)--
IlIEEJINGEN (H9022)--COBlTRG (03089)--BATttEUTH
(907556) (all to d
b" Boundary between Seventh Army and First Freneh
effGctive i:mr:lediately: BITccffi (Q7750)--
EDENKOBEIT (R2876)--SPEYER (R5180)....-all to First
French Army--HICHELFELD (R7670)--HILSBAC3 (R8267)
--LAUFT'EN (80454) (all to Seventh --thence
NECKAR to STUTTGi..RT (to First French
(see Overlay). use of the
main railroad from '-est of the running
thr IIAGUElTAU and LAEDAL to Seventh Army.
Unrestricted r ri s on the r PdALSBOURG
_-Sh'lER!:TE-- TR--FACUEITAU- ..NvISSE1,1BOURG--
LANDAU.. -EDENKOBEr to Seventh Army.
Co Joui1dary bebc'een Cor erective OOOIE 6 April 1945:
(1) Between XV Corps Clnd Corps; oV"erlay.
(2) Be-bueen XXI Corps and VI Corps: Bee overlay.
Corps:
(1) advance und secure objective shown
on overlay.
105
(2) Maintain close liaison with First French ;).rmy.
E-Z-T-R-L.-C-T
OPDR.:.. TIOiTS INSTRUCTIONS 7 April 1945
:r:ruTlBER 126
Division: 1. 44th
Eave the 324th RCT (Reinf) to VI Corps Zone. Effect-
ive upon arrival in VI Corps zone, 324th ReT (reinf)
is attached to VI Corps .for Operations.
---
10 Apri1 1945
128
1. Confirming VOCG Sellenth Army, thE, following is IT..1.de
of record:
a. Effective 1500J
J
10 April 324th ReT (reinf)
is relieved from attL-1.c11ment to 'iI Corps and is
attac:16d to XXI Corps.
c. jor elements VI s in advance at general
1ine: KUFF3hZ.,-=;L (84271)--LAIIG.t;}- a.RG (35475)--DLl..-
UFELDEN (86280) 'will }:ie withdrawn.
E-X-T-R-l.. -C -T
106
HEADQUARTEllS V I COR1-; 8
APO 46 U.. S.
051700B Apr 45
OP:JliA INSTRUCTION)
71)
Ie lOOth Inf Div:
a. Continue Atk to seize BEIL13RO-cJlf (S0862) - EITZFELD
(S2467) - (S2056) area. (Overlay)
b. Protect Corps R (S) flank. _
c. Maintain physical contact II Fr Cor}S on.8..
d. 163d Cml SG Co Atchd effective 050200B Apr 45.
2. 63d Ini Djv:
a. Continue Atk to seize OURINGEn (82968) - HO:JEBACK
(B4586) - NITZENHAUSEN (85078) area. (Overlay).
b. Protect Corps L (n) flank.
c. MaL1.tain physical contact ZYI Corps on L"
3. 10th Armd Jiv (-):
a. }-.-lSS C'C B to Corps control in present area. Co CC B
establish Ln ':Iith CG VI Corps immediately.
b. Reconnoiter in force to line ,JACIGTAtTG (82440) - S\"TABI8CE
(34660) - (87063). (Overlay).
4. New prl:!:"'ies effective 06000113 Apr 45.
50 Hq & Hq Btry 46th FA Gp ReId AtchElent VI Corps Arty
effective 030800B Apr 45 and vlill operate as "T" Force
VI Corps under instructions to be issued thru G.. 2 VI
Corps.
6. Other uni ts" no chCl_nge.
BROOKS
Maj Gen
-OFFICIAL:
/s/ Davison
ItI DAVI80N
1 Incls - Overhy
DISTRIB1JTION:
Special
107
HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46 U. 8. Army
07l500b Apr 45
OPERATIOlJS INSTRUCTION)
NUMbER 72)
1. lath Armd Div:
CC B reverts control 10th Armd Div effective
061700B Apr 45.
2 63d Inf Div;
Maintain 2d En 254th Inf alerted for movement by motor
on Corps order on two hours notice.
3. lOOt)1 T:--lf .:.\i.v:
C)l Atchd effective 062200B Apr 45.
4. 35th AAA Brig:
216th AAA Gun En reld Atcrunent VI Corps and 35th
Brig.1 reverts control Seventh Army effecti ve
0300015 Apr 45. cO 216th AAA Gun Bn report CG 44th
AhA Brig for further instructions.
b. B 353d AAA 8L Bn (-1st Flat) Atchd effective
or(-L200B Apr 45.
Other lnits, no change.
BROOKS
Maj Gen
OFFIeIAL:
IS/Davison
It/DAVISON
DISTRIBUTION:
Special
HEAf,QUARTBRS VI CORPS
APO 46
OPERATIOJ..TS HJSTRUCTION)
rUHBER 73)
1. 10th Armd Div:
324th RCT (44th Inf Div) Atchd effective 081800B Apr
45,
2. 100th Inf Div:
Co 'B 83-CI-Cml Bn Atchd effecti ve 191000B Apr 450
3 63d :;:,,: Dj y
-2r'-'ZS
c
lth Inf released from alert status (Par 2"
72; Hq VI Corps, 071500B Apr 45) effective
072330B Apr 45.
4. 35th j."AA. Fr3. e::
;::-Sn Atchd efiective 191200B Apr 45.
b. 2-iSth hAA Gun En Atchd effective on arrival.
5. VI Corps Arty:
FA Bn (240mm How) without delay to Vic
(R6990)o Adv Det report to CO 421st FA Gp
at On arrival destination, unit ReId Atch-
ment VI Corps and VI Corps Arty, reverts control Seventh
Army.
6. Coordina te vehicular movements thru M-PACS VI Corps
(Redwood 50). Comply with Opns Memo "[ITO 1" Hq VI Corps,
12 45, "Signal Security Measures".
7. Other units, no chan[e.
BROOKS
Maj Gen
OFFICIAL:
IS/Davison
.It/DAVISON
Asst G-3
DISTRIBUTION:
Special
109
VI CORPS
APO 46 U. S. Army
l01800B .Apr 45
OFERATIONS IPSTRUCTION)
74)
1. lOth Armd Div:
a I 324th RCT (44th Inf Di ,,-) reId atchment 10th Armd 1:i y
and IV Corps, and atchd XXI Corps in present position
effective 101500B Apr 45.
b. vHthdraw elements in (S7062) - ILSEOFEN
(S5965) - KIEC,.1BERG (36369) area to areas NWof
g('!1'3raL line .3TEIUKIHC'lEN (S 4872) - LANC'ENBURG (S5475)
.- (s 6280).
c. C O'Jf, it using all availacle crossincs and atk
i'l 'lir-:;,:tion (S1671) and (S08S1)
'wi-L 1: delay.
Mai>rcain contact ele,nents },AI Corps at n.J (3602789)
_'eld by elemeL1ts 63d In.t Div alon? general line
':'>:;:IHn.J.l(:",-IEN - LAi\;GE1'.JBFRG - (Par 2a).
e. CC2rdinnce 'with CG 63d Divo
f 5ee 2b.
2. _f Di7
,'on-cc.Jntact, 'Ie ele:n.6nts 10th Armd J..iiv along
line - .
(S4575) - (36280), t:lereafter maint:l.in
contact elements iXI Corps at rtJ (3602789).
bo 59th Arrr.d lA bn reld atchd 10th Armd
Div effective 081200B Apr 45.
3. OthGr units, no chang.e.
bROOKS
Maj Gen
OJ J ICTAL:
/s!Daviscn
/ t/Dl'.VISeN
Asst G-3
110
A P PEN D I X IV
PbRSOFALITIES
1. 1\'lajor Goneral d. H. H. l
v
iORRIS .. Jr.
2. Brigadier General ED FIBURH
3. BASIL Go TlIAYER
4. C0101.181 tJADE C. GATCHELL
5. Colonel n:crUJARD F. LUE:CBERMAlT (deceased)
7. Lie'.'.: .-
, C01U!ELIUS Ao LIC:IIRIE
8. Lis ut ':;" C' oJono1 elmTIS L.
}U\_lEcr[,is
9. Lieutcel..nt olonel 1l1JILLIAM T.S0 (deceased)

10. Lie'L-;.t1.;1.1 a:rt C'cloYlel JO ,.1': R. EIL:,.=-:{
11. LioutrnJ.nt Colonel JACK J. RICEAEDSmr (deceased)
13\1 Llajo::. \VHEELEH TdACKSTOl\T
14.. j0.ajor HIC 'J. ULRICH
111
l'laj or Gensr 301 r,!IorI' is wa s born at Ocean Gr ove" r. J"" 22
March 1890. After graduating from tlle [jni ted States Military
Academy in June 1911, he was appoint8d second lieutenant of Inf8ntr;
Following assi:,nments 'J:ith the 9th Inf':\.n-cry in the Phillipine Islml(
and the 15th Infa...Yltry at Tientsin., ChLJ.a. he sailed to rrance in
Jillle 1918 as a battalion commander in the 360th Inf antry Reg-
iment oJ:' the 90th Infantry Division. !.Iis battalion participated
in the MEUSE-ARGOl,nJE Campaign.. and he attained the temporary grade
of lieutenunt colonel.
During the period dorld Hars I and II he served as
PMS 8: T of Buclme 11 Universi ty (Penn) and Texas A & }:j a member of
Irq VIII Corps at Fort Sam Houston" Texas; an instructor at the Army
College; a member of t"le Inl. ccntry Board at Fort Benning; and
Chief of Planning of tli.e Personnel Division, Ir:ar DepCtrt-.
ment C:eDeral Staff. His militD.ry throue;hout this period
included t Commo.nd and Gener ,:-;.1 St;::tff ::3c'lo01 (1925)" the Army
YJar College (1930) I and the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill.
In May 1942.. Major General is was appointed COm'nanding
General of the 6th Armored Division at Calnp Chaffee" Ark. After
in tLe Louisiana and lJesert he was given
of II Armored Corps at San Jose., Calif. In September
1943 be performed as Army Ground }'orces ObservGr at the Battle of
Salerno" It-:ly, and in October 1943 was assicned as Commandinr
Ge:'ier,l oS the XVIII Corps at Camp Bovvie, Texas.
Major General Morris assumed comrru.1.nd of the 10th Armored I
Division in July 1944 and sailed with it to FrJ.nce. Under his
capable cormnand t'ile Armored DiviGion performed admira'bly in
tJ1e SAAR-VOSELLE Tr iangle.. the Battl e of tne Bul ge, the Br eak-
tirr ough to the RHINl:!i, and the captur eo,: BEIDELBURG and ULM.
During his distinguished oareer l\'i:.:..jor General lvlorris :nas
been awarded tie Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished ServicG
Medal" Leg'ion of 1"'eri t, Silver Stur" Bronze Star He do. 1" Purple HearJ
Commendation Ribbon, French LevioD of Lionor" Croix de Guerre v.'ith
palrn,,, Belgium Croix de Guerre, and t: ;3ro.zilian Order of Hilitary
Herit with g;racle of
'31' i ___ __
Bricadier General P:i.burn Vias born in Kansas, 9 July 1895.
After o.tt(mdil1g the Univ6rsity of Io'po. he joined the Oklahoma
National Guard" and was commissioned second lieutenant of Infantry
(one) 15 AUGust 1917. In November 1917, he was appointed seoond
lieutenant 01 Infantry in the Eegu13l" Army.
During War I Brigadier GG(Lera1 Piburn served with th:
1st and Infantry Divisions. He from the Infantry
School a. t For t Benninf'1 Go..
J
and the Ta::'1k School at Fort Meade
l
Maryl3.lld in the decade fo llowinf! Wor Id I.
113
In February 1.941, Br iCCldier Gellerc!.l Fiburn was tr[Ulsferr(d
from t LC, 2nd Armored Divis ion ancL'lssi as observer with the
Br itish Army in Egyptl with the:; 8.dditional duty of Defense
Aid Representative and Lend-LGase Administrator to the Middle-East
Countries. je was assigned to tIle Section of \[ar Departnent
Goneral StQff in April of 1942.
VIllen the 10th Armored Division was activated he asswnecl
0.. t.'.e 3rd Tank Regiment. Thereafter he served vvitll the
lLltb D..nd 9 th Armored Di vi s ions, returning tot h e 10th Ar nwr ed
Division in November 1944. Brigadier General Piburn c ornrnanded
Conlbu,t Command A, which spe::lrhsG.ded tile division's advance into
0
In recogni tiOD of his eminent services Br igo.dier General
Piburn beon awarded t}le Silver Star" Legion of with oak
leaf' clus-cer, Bronz,e St8.r 1-:Iedal v'ith oo.k laf cluster, Purple l:Ieart,
Colonel BAS II. Go T"'AYZn.
Colonel Thayer was 16 July 1898 in tile state of
IIEssouri. He graduated from the United states Militill'Y Academy
1 July 1920, o..nd. was appointed second lieutenant of Infantry.
He tral1.sferr,':)d to the Cavalry 10 September 1920. Further professioL'
schooling includes the COInrrlLlnd and Gen.erJ.l Staff School (1940),
Advanced Equitation Cour 36 (1932), aTIc: the School Basic
Course (1920).
114
During tne CRAILSHEIM Opero.tion CoI1bat Cormnand B,
10th Armored Division" 1..'ndcr the 'Jf Colonel Thayer ..
was primarily responsi ble for tIll; of division
supply route into CRJ-iJLST{EIM.
For his exemplary service 8010;1.61 Thayer has been
aV-farded 'Ci1E: Silver Star, Ler;ion of l'.ierit, Bronze star }iledal
with oak leaf cluster, and the Purple
Colonel ThaY6r is r ,'""'1 serving at Fort Knox" Kentucky
as G-3 .. Tne Armored Center.
Col one 1 C. GA TC
Colonel Gatchell was born at Saxtons Rivers, Vt., onl0
f,IIay 1895. He attended Norwich University: and in May J917
entered the Fj.rst Training Camp at PI attsburgl N. Y. Upon
gradl
1
:)tion he was appointed second lieutenant of Cav1.1ry
(ORC) and on 12 November 1917 was conmlissioned in trie ReGular
Army ..
During the period betvve6n wars Colo:lel Gatchell served
as an R. O. T. C 0 Instructor in CllicJ.fO Tligh Schools and w:ts
assigned to the Civilian Conservation Corps in L.entucky. His
military education includes the CavaJry School Troop Officers
Course (1926) and the Command and Gen6ral Staff College (1941),
Colo!:lel Gatchell W8.' assigned to the Armored Force
Replacement Center at rort Knox in 1940, and in 1942 joined
the 5th Armored Division as trains connnander. He was later
assigned to the 13th Armored Division as Acting Chief of Staffo
115
In September 1944.J he r to t 10th Armored Division
and was assigned as executi ve officer of Combat CorrJl1.and B.
He vv'as htcr 'i7en command of the Reserve Coinrnand and led it
the CHAI1SEEIM
Decoratior:s received COI0Tl.cl Gatchell for l1is not8.1:Jle
achievements include the 1e on of 1I,':E.rit, Bronze Star 1[edo.l
wi.th oak leaf cluster" the Croix de Guerre with palm.
Colonel Gatchell was retired on permo.nsnt diso.hility
in October 1946, 8.nd is presently Ii at 1635 48th
San Die[o 2, California.
Colonel Luebberman vv8.S i,:JOrn i:1 lEoi..lna on 19 December
1902 tIe vvu.s ed to the United States Hilit:J.ry Academy
from Ohio and g:raduated 12 June 1924 as a second lieutenant
of Ii' i e 1 d AI' t i
he attended e Field Artillery School in served
"\l'Jith the 2nd Armor Division as c. commander in 1941,
and joined the 10th Armored Divi:]ion at Camp Gordon" Gear in
V'las t."Gn assigned as division 0.1' commander.

On 8 April 1945 Colonel who was held in
esteem hy his fellow officers, was mol' 1younded by
D. l' when proceedinr" to-ward
DecoratiolJ.s o..nd awards Co10[J.6 1
for is ve.1iant service include t
1
1e ion of Esrit, 2ronze
star :Medo.l and Pur p1e Heo.r t.
116
Lieutenant Colonel JOHN W. SHEFFlELL
Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield was born in Americus,
Georgia on 11 April 1906. He entered Virginia Military
lnsti tute in 1923, and graduated from that institution with
the class of 1926. He was commissioned second lieutenant
of Cavalry (ORC) in May 1927.
Called to active duty on 10 February 1941, Lieutenant
Colonel Sheffield was assigned to Eq l; I-:1:q Ce, 68th Armored
Regiment (L) of the 2nd Armored iJivision at Fort BenninG, Georgia.
Subsequent assignments were liaison officer, assistant S- 3, and
8-3 of GGA, 2nd Armored Division.
Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield joined tile. newly-formed 10th
Arlliored Division in July 1942, and performed as aide to the
division comnander. He later served as assistant G-3 and G-3
of the division. During the CRAILS]EPff Operation Lieutenant
Colonel Sheffield executed his tasks, as G-3 of lOth Armoted
Division, in a very creditable manner.
Service schools attended by Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield
include The Armored School, Communications Course (1941) and
Advanced Course and the Corrmand and General Staff College
(1944).
Lieutenant Colonel Sheffield reverted to an inactive
status 14 November 1945. He is residing in Americus,
Geor gia.
117
-
Lieutenant Colonel COR&ELIIS Ao LIC{IRIE
--- ,------ -.._- - -
BorL in New York 26 September 1906 and appointed to
the Dnited States Mili tary .rl.cademy from that state,Lieutenant
Colonel Lichirie graduated with the class of 1931 and was
comrnissioYled second lieutenant oJ Cavalry 11 June 1931. He
graduated from the Cavalry School Hegular Course in 1935 and the
Command and General Staff College in 1944,.
Lieutenant Colonel Lichirie cornmal1ded tLe 90th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron of the 10th Armored Division during
operations in the CnAILS "'EDf area. u...Y1it did particulary
outstandil1g -work W,_"en the division executed its 1,,.d.thdra
w
al to
t !'.e northv,lest.
Decorations and 8.1f1al ds received by Lieutenant Colonel
Lichirie include the Silver star l,;ith oak leaf cluster.. Legion
of Merit.. Bronze Star Medal" and Purple Heart oak
1eaf c1uster
Lieutenant Colonel CURTIS L0 ,HANKI'PS
------ . -- --------
Lieutenant Colonel Hankins was born in Arkansas 2
February 1917. .de graduated from tJ-:ce University of Arkansas
in 1940.. and 1Nas appointed second lieutenant of Infantry (ORC)
30 May lS40.
The 61st .rl.rmored Infantry Battalion" reinforced, com-
mandej by Lieutenant Colonel (then Ma jar) Hankins.. led lOth
Armored lJivision's drive to CRAILSHSIH and performed with gre3.t
distinction throughout the operations in that area.
118
Lieutenant Colonel Hankins' aFlards for his outstand
of
professional include the Silver Star vith oak
leaf' olus ter, Br onz e Star Medal with oak 1 eaf cluster J and
the jear t wit h oak leaf cluster.
Integrated into the ... egular Army as first lieutenant
16 July 1946, Lieutenant Colonel Hankins is presently
ser with arters 2nd ConstarJulary Brigade, APO 407-A,
c/o Postmaster New York" N. Y.
Lieutenant Colonel T. So ROBERTS (deceased)
Lieutenant Colonel Roberts iT-las born 12 ember 1899
in t:.1e rict of Columbia. 3:e graduat6d from Vir a
Mi Institute in 1920 and vIas c omnissioned second lieutenant
in the Refular Army 4 August 1921. qis military
education included the Tank School (1923) and The Infantry
School Company Officers' Course (1932).
Ie Ie ading: the 54th Battalion,
r einf or of Combat Cormnand A, 10th Armored Division on its
drive northwest from CRAILSTEn: Lisutenant Colonel
Roberts made the supreme near LOEFELS .. Germany 9 April
1945.
Lieutenant Colonel JO R. RILEY
Lieutenant Colonel Riley was born at
lle, Virginia
on 29
il 1909. He was appointed second lieutenant, Infantry
( 2 April 19?i6 and promoted to first lieutenant on 6 November
1940 II He came on active duty in February 1941 and assumed
119
of
Ii
command of Company D, 191st Tank on. He subsequently
served as and 8-3 of the 1st on, 37th Armored Regi-
ment.
On 1 July 1942 LieutGnant Colonel rli joined the loth
Armored Division and was assigned as Gom..Jlanding Officer of the
3rd Battalion) 3rd Armored
After the lOth rtrmored

Division was reorganized, he was given cOIThIl3.nd of the 21st
Tank Battalion. ae retained command of this unit until the
end of \I'iorld II, and his task ce fought with distinction
the CRhILSFiliIM Operation.
Lieutenant Colonel rtiley was integrated into the Regular
Army on 29 August 1946 as a captain of Inf' a',1 try In acknow-
ledgement of his praiseworthy acccmplisbments he has been
a,1varded the Silver Star, Legion of MGrit, bronze Star Medal
wi th oak leaf 01uster, Cr oix de GUGrre cf Luxembour g, and the
french Croix de Guerre.
Lieutenant ('olonel Riley is of the current clas s
at tL,8 Command and General Staff
Lieutenant Colonel JACK J 0 (deceased)
Lieutenant Colonel was born 9 January 1912
in Texas and received his ar!"'ointment to United 5tates
Military Academy fr om that state. Upon raduation from the
Academy in 1935 he was appointed sGcond lieutenant of Infantry.
Furtl'ler professional schooling was received when he attended the
120
Course (1939) and the Tank CoursG (1940) ai' The Infa{ltry
School at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Th0 20th Armored Infantry Battdlion, reinforced, which
played a proIEinent role in securine: tLC main supply route to
CAAILSHEDil, Y";3.S ably led by Lieutel1i..Elt Colonel hichardson durinG
the operation of lOth Armored Division in that area. 1e was
killed in action soon thereafter in vicinity KIRcr'IEF,
Germany on 22 April 1945.
In recogni tion of his renowned leadership Lieuten:J.nt
Colonel has been aV'larded -t'n SilVer Star Jith two
oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Purple rieart
'with one oak leaf cluster. RICHAHDSQi\, located in the
Armored School ar63. of Fort !(nox
1
Kentuoky, was namE.d in his
honor.
Lieutenant Colonel THOII'AS C. CTIAMBERLAIN
Lieutenant Golofwl Ohamb6rlain 'V'J8.S born at Ficrce City,
Missouri on 13 January 1917 e He o.ttended Ohio State University
during the period 1935-1936 and was apL'ointed to the Uni t6d
states Military Academy from Ohio. Upon graduation in Juno of
1940 he was commissioned second lieutenant of Cavalry.
His first assignment was the 11th Cavalry, and he servcd
as platoon lecJ.der and troop c)HLrnander with trlat unit until
July 1942. He then joined the lOth Aroorcd Division and served
as battalion commandGr of the 1st 11th Armored Regi-
mente VVhen the division was Lieuten&nt Colonel
121
retained cormnand of this unit until S5ptGmber 1945, and very
competently directed its employment during the CRAILS --mUff
Operation.
Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain is a gradua tE.) of the
Conl:n2.. nd and General Staff College (c lass of at For t Leav-
en'Nor th" Kansas.
A Silver star 'With two oak leaf clusters, Legion of
Ivkri t, Bronze 3tar Medal, and Purple:: :lGart arE.) among the uwards
conferred Lieutenant Colonel Chamberl-1in for his display of
excellent combat leadership.
At the present time Lieutenant Colonel ChambGrlain is
assif,';ned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of' Staff G-4,
GenGr ,':'1.1 Staff" Fni ted Statcs Arrrp;l.
Maj or WHEELER
Major Thackstcn's birthplace is Greenville, South
Carolina; the event occurcd 14 March He graduated from
Clemson College in 1935 and received :..1 reserve commission in
t:1e Army. ThE; iollm"ing yr::;ar he:: pursued a post graduate course
at Cornell UniVersity.
In February, 1942 Thackston reported to lor t
Knox, Kentucky to begin his acti ve duty tour. 1< rom June to
August, 1942, he served with the 4th Armored Division at Fine
Camp, New York. de 'Nas then assigned to the 10th Armored
Division at Fort Benning .. Georgia, ar:d remained ','lith thtit unit
until his relief from active duty ih December 1945,
M.ajor Thackston skillfully commanded the 3d Tank Bat-
talion.. reinforced,.. of the Reserve COITmand" 10th Armored Di v-
ision during the operations in the CRAILST1EIM area . "{is unit
played an important part in tl1G successful defensi vs ba.ttle
waged by the division following the seizure of CRAILSHEIM.
Awards presented Major Thackston include t"16 Silver
star, Bronze Star Medal with oak 163.f clust6r, Purple "'.:feart,
and the Pistinguisbed Unit Badge.
lYIajor Thackston IS present addrsss is .Koute 3,. Green-
ville,. South Carolina. de is now servir:g with the 3139th
Medium Tank Battaion (ORC).
Major RICHARC WI ULRICH
Major Ulrich was born 22 August 1918 at Albany.. New
York.. He graduated from the Citadel at Charleston
J
3. C ...
in 1941.. and was then assigned to the 51st Armored Infantry
Regiment, 4th ArrnorE.d lJivision at Pins Camp, :\T. Y. In July
joined the 10th Armored Division which then being
activated at Fort Denning.. or
Major (then Captain) Ulrich served as executive officer
and S-3 of the 54th I!.rmored Infantry Batt.llion.l' reinforced,
during the initial e of opers.tions in the CFAILS:r:Epf area. .
When the battal ion commander 'Vvas fatlllly wounded in tho vic ini ty
Division at Fort Benning, Georgia.. and rGmained vrith that unit
until his relief active duty ih December 1945.
Mb.jor Thackston skillfully commanded the 3d Tank Bat-
tJ.lioll.,t r eini'oreed,. of the Reserve Command, loth Armored Di v-
ision during the operations in the CRAILS:-illIM area . T-{is unit
playc d an important part in suee essful defensi ve battl e
waR';cd by the division following the seizure of CRAILSHEIM.
Awards presented Major Thackston include Silver
star .. Bronze Star Medal with oak h;af clustcr, Purple T{eart,
and thE. Distinguiscled Unit Badge.
Major Thackston's present addr6ss is .houte 3,. Green-
vi lle, South Carolina. de is now serving with the 3139th
Medium Tank Battaion (ORC).
Major Ulrich was born 22 August 1918 at Albany, New
Yor k .. He gr ad un ted fr om the Cit adel at C hn r 1 G S t on J 3. C.,
in 1941, and was then assigned to thG 51st Armored Infantry
Regiment, 4th Armored liivision at Pine Camp, 'i\T. Y. In July
jOined the 10th Armored Division which then being
activatsd at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Major (then Captain) Ulrich served as executive officer
and S-3 of the 54th Armored Infantry Bo. ttJ.l ion,. re inforeed,
Q'.J.ring the initial phase of operations in the CFAIlSFEr' area .
WhGn the bo.. ttal ion commander was fa tally 'Nounded in tho vic ini ty
of Germany on 9 bajor (then Captain)
Ulrich assumed command of the unit 8.nd ably directed its
r3..fic1 ::tdv',.i.lc(3 to contact doughboys of t:16 63d Infantry
Division nrsar Germany on 10 April 1945.
At the present time Major Ulrich is living :it 700
Kensington Road, Avondale Estates" Georgi:l and, as executive
officer of the 1st Battalion, 122nd Infantry of the Georgia
National Guard, continues to play an active role in the national
defense 3.ctivi ties of' this