1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations 264p

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FI ELD MANUAL
GUERILLAWARFARE
AND
SPECIALFORCES OPERATIONS
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COM
*
FM31-21
FI ELDMANUAL HEADQUARTERS,
DEPARTMENTOFTHEARMY
NO. 31-21 WASHI NGTON25,D.C.,29September1961
GUERRILLAWARFAREANDSPECIALFORCES
OPERATIONS
Paragraphs Page
PARTONE. I NTRODUCTI ON
CHAPTER1. FUNDAMENTALS---------------------------------- 1-3 3
2. RESI STANCEANDGUERRI LLAWAR-
FARE------------------------------------------------- 4-8 5
PARTTWO. ORGANI ZATI ONFORTHESPECI AL
FORCESEFFORT
CHAPTER3. JOI NTUNCONVENTI ONALWAR-
FARETASKFORCE(JUWTF)------------- 9-12 14
4. AI RBORNESPECI ALFORCESGROUP
Secti onI . General ----------------------------------------------13-18 18
I I . TheSpeci al Forcesoperati onal base -------19-21 26
I I I . Control ofoperati ons-----------------------------22-27 29
I V. Control ofadmi ni strati veandtrai ni ng
Acti vi ti es-----------------------------------------28-32 39
CHAPTER5. THEATERSUPPORT
Secti onI . Logi sti cs---------------------------------------------33-43 46
I I . I ntel l i gence-----------------------------------------44-46 54
I I I . Communi cati ons----------------------------------47-52 58
I V. I ni ti al contact--------------------------------------53-54 63
PARTTHREE. OPERATI ONS
CHAPTER6. I NFI LTRATI ON----------------------------------55-60 64
7. ORGANI ZATI ONANDDEVELOPMENT
OFTHEAREACOMMAND.
Secti onI . Organi zati onal concepts------------------------61-66 69
I I . Resi stanceel ements-----------------------------67-72 79
I I I . Securi ty----------------------------------------------73-80 86
I V. I ntel l i gencei nguerri l l awarfareoperati onal
area------------------------------------------------81-83 93
V. Communi cati onsi nguerri l l awarfareopera-
ti onal areas --------------------------------------84-87 93
VI . Logi sti csi nguerri l l awarfareoperati onal
areas-----------------------------------------------88-94 95
*
ThismanualsupersedesFM31-21,8May1958.
1
Paragraphs Page
CHAPTER8. COMBATEMPLOYMENT
Secti onI . I ntroducti on-------------------------------------- 95-100 103
I I . Offensi vecombatoperati ons---------------101-116 107
I I I . I nterdi cti on --------------------------------------117-126 130
I V. Defensi veoperati ons-------------------------127-131 137
V. Empl oymentofunconventi onal warfare
forcestoassi stconventi onal forces'com-
batoperati ons-------------------------------132-139 145
VI . Empl oymentofUWforcesafterl i nk-up140-147 164
CHAPTER9. PSYCHOLOGI CALOPERATI ONSI N
SUPPORTOFUNCONVENTI ONAL
WARFARE-----------------------------------148-152 169
10. DEMOBI LI ZATI ON--------------------------153-166 177
APPENDI XI . REFERENCES------------------------------------------- 183
I I . CATALOGUESUPPLYSYSTEM------------------ 188
I I I . AREASTUDYGUI DE --------------------------------- 234
I V. AREAASSESSMENT---------------------------------- 244
V. GLOSSARYOFTERMS------------------------------ 249
I NDEX---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 252
2
PARTONE
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER1
FUNDAMENTALS
1. PurposeandScope
a. Thi s manual provi des gui dance i n Speci al Forces and
unconventi onal warfareoperati onsforcommandersandstaffsatal l
l evel s.Thebasi cconceptsofunconventi onal warfarearepresentedi n
a manner desi gned to acquai nt the reader wi th Speci al Forces
organi zati on,concepts,andmethodsofoperati onstoful fi l l theArmy's
responsi bi l i tyfortheconductofunconventi onal warfare.
b. Thorough understandi ng of the i deas establ i shed wi thi n thi s
manual wi l l preparethecommanderandstaffoffi cersforsubsequent
deci si ons and staff acti ons whi ch affect speci al forces pl anni ng and
operati ons.
c. Detai l edmethodsandtechni quesofSpeci al Forcesoperati ons
aredi scussedbel ow.Cl assi fi edi nformati onpertai ni ngtoal l l evel sof
Speci al Forcesoperati onsi sfoundi nFM31-21A.
2. DefinitionofUnconventionalWarfare
Unconventi onal warfare consi sts of the i nterrel ated fi el ds of
guerri l l awarfare,evasi onandescape,andsubversi onagai nsthosti l e
states(resi stance).Unconventi onal warfareoperati onsareconducted
i nenemyorenemycontrol l edterri torybypredomi natel yi ndi genous
personnel usual l y supported and di rected i n varyi ng degrees by an
external source.
3. DelineationofResponsibilitiesforUnconventionalWarfare
a. The responsi bi l i ty for certai n of these acti vi ti es has been
del egatedtotheservi cehavi ngpri maryconcern.Guerri l l awarfarei s
theresponsi bi l i tyoftheUni tedStatesArmy.
b. Wi thi n certai n desi gnated geographi c areascal l ed guerri l l a
warfareoperati onal areastheUni tedStatesArmyi sresponsi bl efor
the conduct of al l three i nterrel ated fi el ds of acti vi ty as they affect
guerri l l awarfareoperati ons.
3
c. The mi l i tary operati ons of resi stance movements are
customari l y supported and accompani ed by pol i ti cal and economi c
acti vi ti esboth overt and cl andesti neof i ndi vi dual s and groups
i ntegrated,oracti ngi nconjuncti onwi thguerri l l as.Theseveral types
of acti vi ti es are i nterl ocki ng. The term unconventi onal warfare i s
used i n thi s manual to denote al l of the Uni ted States Army's
associ ated responsi bi l i ti es i n the conduct of guerri l l a warfare. The
term guerri l l a warfare i s used to denotethepri maryovertmi l i tary
acti vi ti esoftheguerri l l aforces.
4
CHAPTER2
RESISTANCEANDGUERRILLAWARFARE
4. Resistance
a.General. Resi stance i s the cornerstone of guerri l l a warfare.
Underground and guerri l l a warfare stem from a resi stance
movement.
b. Definition.Resi stancei sdefi nedastheactofopposi ti onofone
i ndi vi dual or group to another. A resi stance movement i s the
organi zed el ement of a di saffected popul ati on whi ch resi sts a
governmentoroccupyi ngpowerwi thmeans,varyi ngfrompassi veto
vi ol entl y acti ve. Resi stance movements begi n to form when
di ssati sfacti on occurs among strongl y moti vated i ndi vi dual s who
cannotfurtherthei rcausebypeaceful andl egal means.
c. TheNatureofResistance.
(1) Resi stance,rebel l i onorci vi l warbegi nsi nanati onwhere
pol i ti cal , soci ol ogi cal , economi c or rel i gi ous di vi si on has
occurred. Di vi si ons of thi s nature are usual l y causedbya
vi ol ati onofri ghtsorpri vi l eges,theoppressi onofonegroup
bythedomi nantoroccupyi ngforce,orthethreattothel i fe
andfreedomofthepopul ace.Resi stanceal somaydevel op
i nanati onwheretheoncewel comedl i beratorshavefai l ed
to i mprove an i ntol erabl e soci al or economi c si tuati on.
Resi stance can al so be del i beratel y i nspi red from external
sources agai nst an assumed gri evance. Resi stance can be
acti veorpassi ve.Passi veresi stancemaybei ntheformof
smol deri ng resentment whi ch needs onl y l eadershi p or a
meansofexpressi ontomaturetoacti veresi stance.
(2) Some peopl e joi n a resi stance movement because of an
i nnate desi re to survi ve. Others may joi n the resi stance
forces because of deep i deol ogi cal convi cti ons. But al l ,
regardl essofi ni ti al moti vati on,areboundtogethertofi ght
agai nstacommonenemy.Partofthepopul ati onassi ststhe
resi stancemovementasfi ghtersi ntheguerri l l aforce;some
assi staspart-ti meguerri l l asori nci vi l i ansupportagenci es
know as auxi l i ary uni ts; whi l e others are members of the
underground.
5
d. I nfluencingFactors.
(1)Environment.
(a)Terrain. The physi cal l ocati on of the resi stance
movement has a great i nfl uence upon i ts organi zati on
andtacti cs.Becausetheyprovi desui tabl eareasforthe
securi tyofoperati ons,mountai ns,swamps,l argeforests
orjungl esnurtureovertorguerri l l atyperesi stance.Fl at
pl ai ns areas and l arge towns or ci ti es are more apt to
l ead to underground resi stance acti vi ti es al though the
possi bi l i tyoforgani zi ngaguerri l l aforcei ntheseareas
shoul dnotbeoverl ooked.
(b) Cultural. A peopl es' cul tural envi ronment al so has i ts
effectsonresi stancemovements.Theurgetobeararms,
escape,andfi ghttheenemyi sdependentonthecul tural
background of the peopl e. Men from rural or peasant
envi ronment, not subjected to ti ght governmental
control , have more opportuni ty to show thei r hatred of
theenemyoccupati onbyovertandvi ol entmeanssuch
asguerri l l awarfare.Peopl efromani ndustri al i zedand
hi ghl yurbani zedcul turewi l l resi stwi thsuchacti vi ti es
assabotage,propaganda,passi veactsandespi onage.
(c)Controlofpopulation.Whenanoccupyi ngpoweri sabl e
to exerci se cl ose and stri ngent control over the
popul ati on, the resi stance movement i s conducted
pri mari l yi nsecrecy.Whenthepol i ceandmi l i taryforces
of the occupyi ng power are di verted or otherwi se
i neffectual ,theresi stancemovementmaybeconducted
wi thpri mari l yovertguerri l l aacti ons.
(2)Motivation. Besi des the geographi cal and cul tural
envi ronmenti nfl uenci ngguerri l l awarfare,thesoci ol ogi cal
cl i mate produces many moti vati ng factors whi ch have a
profound effect upon the resi stance movement. Strong
i ndi vi dual moti vati on i s essenti al to the formati on of a
resi stanceforce.Al thoughsomei ndi vi dual moti vesarenot
i deal and,i fopenl yexpressed,maydoharmtotheguerri l l a
effort,thefol l owi ngareexampl esofwhatsomeofthetrue
moti vesmaybe.
(a)I deology. I n guerri l l a uni ts some i ndi vi dual s have
devel opedstrongi deol ogi cal moti vesfortaki nguparms.
These i deol ogi es take root i n two broad areas pol i ti cs
and rel i gi on. The i ndi vi dual tends to subordi nate hi s
ownpersonal i tytothesei deol ogi esandworksconstantl y
and sol el y for the "cause." I n some resi stance fi ghters,
thi smoti vei sextremel ystrong.
6
(b)Economic.Manyi ndi vi dual sjoi nresi stancemovements
to keep from starvi ng or to keep from l osi ng thei r
l i vel i hood. An organi zed resi stance force may exert
economi c i nfl uence on i ndi vi dual s who fai l to support
thei rmovement.
(c)Personal gain. Personal gai n i s the moti vati ng force of
some vol unteers. An i ndi vi dual , so moti vated, may
changesi desi fhebel i eveshecangai nmorebyfi ghti ng
fortheopposi ngforce.
(d)Hate. Peopl e who have l ost l oved ones due to enemy
acti ons may fi ght agai nst that enemy as a resul t of
engendered hatred. Uncontrol l ed hatred can pose
probl ems for the sponsor because i t i s di ffi cul t to curb
the fanati ci sm of such i ndi vi dual s and properl y di rect
thei refforts.
(e)Security. I f the resi stance movement i s strong or gi ves
thei mpressi onofbei ngpowerful ,manyi ndi vi dual sjoi n
outofafeel i ngofpersonal safety.Usual l y,thi ssi tuati on
occurs onl y after the resi stance movement i s wel l
organi zed and the enemy has been weakened by other
acti ons.Othersjoi ni nordertoescaperecrui tmenti nto
theservi ceoftheenemy.
(f)Ego. Personal moti ves such as power, pri de, and
adventure operate to some extent i n al l i ndi vi dual s.
Dependi nguponthemoral fi berofthei ndi vi dual ,these
moti vesmaysustai nhi mi nti mesofgreatstress.
(g)Fear.Somei ndi vi dual sbecomeapartoftheresi stance
movementthroughnopersonal desi reofthei rown.They
joi n the movement out of fear of repri sal s agai nst
themsel vesorthei rfami l i es.
(3)Chance for success. I n addi ti on to moti vati on and
ci rcumstancesofenvi ronment,apopul ati onmustfeel that
therei sul ti matel yachanceforsuccessortherecanbeno
effecti ve resi stance movement devel oped. Acti ve
parti ci pati on i n any resi stance movement i s i nfl uenced by
i tschanceforsuccess.
(4)Guidance. Resi stance movements stand or fal l on the
cal i ber of the l eaders and other i ndi vi dual s i n the
organi zati on. An understandi ng of the envi ronmental and
i ndi vi dual moti vati ng factorswi l l assi stgreatl ythosewho
desi retoobtai ntheopti mumfromaguerri l l aorgani zati on.
An anal ysi s of these factors pl ays an i mportant part i n
eval uati ngpotenti al resi stanceforces.
7
5. GuerrillaWarfare
Guerri l l a warfare compri ses combat operati ons conducted i n
enemy hel d terri tory by predomi nantl y i ndi genous forces on a
mi l i tary or parami l i tary basi s to reduce the combat effecti veness,
i ndustri al capaci ty,andmoral eoftheenemy.Gueri l l aoperati onsare
conducted by rel ati vel y smal l groups empl oyi ng offensi ve tacti cs.
Guerri l l awarfaresupportsothermi l i taryoperati ons.
6. CharacteristicsofGuerrillaWarfare
a.General.Gueri l l awarfarei scharacteri zedbyoffensi veacti on.
Guerri l l asrel yuponmobi l i ty,el usi venessandsurpri se.I naddi ti onto
thesetrai ts,thereareothercharacteri sti csthatshoul dbementi oned:
ci vi l i ansupport,outsi desponsorshi p,pol i ti cal aspects,l egal aspects,
tacti cs,anddevel opmentaspects.
b.SupportFactors.
(1)Civilian support. The success of guerri l l a movements
dependsuponconti nuousmoral andmateri al supportfrom
the ci vi l i an popul ati on. The l ocal communi ty usual l y i s
under i ntense pressure from anti -guerri l l a facti ons.
Puni ti ve measures such as repri sal s, terrori sm,
deportati on, restri cti on of movement and sei zure of goods
andpropertyareconductedagai nstsupportersofguerri l l a
acti vi ty,maki ngthi ssupportdangerousanddi ffi cul t.I fthe
l ocal popul ace has a strong wi l l to resi st, enemy repri sal s
cause an i ncrease i n underground acti vi ti es. The ci vi l i an
communi ty may assi st the guerri l l a force by furni shi ng
suppl i es,recrui ts,i nformati on;bygi vi ngearl ywarni ng;by
supporti ng evasi on and escape; and other acti vi ti es. After
theguerri l l aforcehasestabl i shedi tsel fandi ssuffi ci entl y
strong,i tmayneedtoexertforceuponcertai nel ementsof
the ci vi l i an popul ati on to command thei r support, e. g.:
coerce i ndi fferent or unresponsi ve porti ons of the
popul ati on i nto supporti ng the guerri l l a movement.
Ci vi l i ans parti ci pati ng i n such support acti vi ti es, asi de
fromundergroundoperati ons,compri sewhatareknownas
theauxi l i aryforces.
(2)Outside sponsorship. Guerri l l a operati ons are more
effecti ve when outsi de sponsorshi p i s present. Duri ng a
warti me si tuati on thi s support i s pol i ti cal , psychol ogi cal
and l ogi sti cal as wel l as tacti cal . A sponsori ng power
deci des to support guerri l l a forces when i t feel s that the
guerri l l as can make a si gni fi cant contri buti on toward the
achi evementofnati onal objecti ves.
8
c. PoliticalAspects.
(1) Guerri l l a warfare has often been descri bed as bei ng more
pol i ti cal thanmi l i taryi nnature.I ti scertai nl ymi l i taryi n
the tacti cal sense, but i t i s al so pol i ti cal si nce a guerri l l a
movement general l y stems from a l ocal power struggl e.
Guerri l l as usual l y fi ght for pol i ti cal gai ns, al though i n
gai ni ng thei r own pol i ti cal objecti ves they may assi st the
sponsori ngpowertogai ni tsmi l i taryobjecti ve.
(2) The pol i ti cal domi nance i n guerri l l a warfare can be seen
from another poi nt of vi ew. Guerri l l a l eaders wi th a
commonenemy,butpol i ti cal l yopposed,maydi ssi patethei r
efforts by fi ghti ng each other. The pol i ti cal l y ori ented
guerri l l a l eader can cause troubl e by wi thhol di ng hi s
cooperati on unti l he extracts promi ses of pol i ti cal
si gni fi cance from hi s sponsor. The pol i ti cal i mpri nt on
guerri l l awarfarei sbutanotheraspectthatmustbecl osel y
studi ed.
d. Legal Aspects. Guerri l l a warfarei sboundbytherul esofthe
GenevaConventi onsasmuchasi sconventi onal warfare.Asoutl i ned
i n appropri ate i nternati onal agreements and FM 27-10, four
i mportantfactorsgi veaguerri l l al egal status:(1)becommandedbya
personresponsi bl efortheacti onsofhi ssubordi nates;(2)wearafi xed
anddi sti ncti vei nsi gni aorsi gnrecogni zabl eatadi stance;(3)conduct
operati onsi naccordancewi ththel awsandcustomsofwar;and(4)
carry arms openl y. I f these four factors i re present, the guerri l l a i s
enti tl edtothesametreatmentfromhi scaptorsastheregul arsol di er.
Duri ng Worl d War I I , General Ei senhower sent a procl amati on to
Nazi s and Frenchmen al i ke, formal l y recogni zi ng the French
Resi stanceMaqui sasmembersoftheAl l i edForces,andwarnedthe
Germans that al l guerri l l as were to be gi ven the same honorabl e
treatment as the regul ar sol di ers under hi m i n the Al l i ed
Expedi ti onaryForce.
e. Tactics.
(1)Primary considerations. Guerri l l as, because they are
i rregul arsol di ers,general l ydonotachi eveuni tyofacti on
i nthesamemannerasconventi onal uni ts.Becauseofthi s
and two other factorsthe l ogi sti cal probl em and
manpower requi rementsguerri l l as i ni ti al l y cannot hope
to meet and deci si vel y defeat a conventi onal uni t i n a
pi tchedbattl e.Guerri l l aoperati onsarefaci l i tatedbyother
mi l i tary acti vi ti es whi ch di stract potenti al enemy
rei nforcements.Ontheotherhand,i ftheenemyi sfreeof
otherconcerns,hewi l l combattheguerri l l aswi thhi sbest
troopsi nordertoprotectvi tal i nstal l ati ons.Guerri l l auni ts,
therefore, must coordi nate thei r acti vi ti es wi th other
9
fri endl y mi l i tary forces and attack the enemy at poi nts
most di sadvantageous to hi m. These attacks are normal l y
conductedduri ngperi odsofl owvi si bi l i tyandaredi rected
agai nsti sol atedoutposts,weakl ydefendedl ocati onsorthe
movi ng enemy. By recogni zi ng hi s own l i mi tati ons and
weaknesses, the guerri l l a can hope for survi val and
eventual success. I ni ti al l y, he i s usual l y i nferi or to the
enemy i n fi repower, manpower, communi cati ons,l ogi sti cs,
and organi zati on. He i s equal , and often superi or, to the
enemy i n the col l ecti on of i ntel l i gence i nformati on, cover
anddecepti on,andtheuseofti me.
(2)Offensivetactics.Thebasi sofsuccessful guerri l l acombati s
offensi veacti oncombi nedwi thsurpri se.Duri ngperi odsof
l ow vi si bi l i ty, the guerri l l a attacks, tri es to gai n a
momentaryadvantageoffi repower,executeshi smi ssi onto
captureordestroypersonnel andequi pment,andl eavesthe
scene of acti on as rapi dl y as possi bl e. Normal l y, the
guerri l l a does not consi stentl y operate i n one area but
vari es hi s operati ons so that no pattern i s evi dent. I f
possi bl e,hestri kestwoorthreetargetssi mul taneousl yto
di vi detheenemypursui tandrei nforcementeffort.
(3) Defensivetactics.Protecti vesurvei l l ancefortheguerri l l ai s
usual l yverygood;hehasci vi l i annon-combatantsprovi di ng
hi m wi th i nformati on on enemy garri sons, troop
movements,andcounter,guerri l l aacti vi ti es.Thi sadvance
warni ng gi ves the guerri l l a ti me for proper
countermeasures. I f, i n any counter guerri l l a move by a
superi orenemy,theguerri l l asarethreatenedorenci rcl ed,
theydonotmeethi monashowdownbasi s,butwi thdraw,
di sperseorattemptabreakout.
f.Development Aspects. To compl ete the pi cture of guerri l l a
warfare, a ti me-and-space frame of reference must be understood.
That i s, i t i s not suffi ci ent merel y to state certai n pri nci pl es of
guerri l l awarfare,buti ti snecessarytoqual i fystatementsregardi ng
guerri l l aacti onstofi xthemwi thregardtoti meandspace.
(1)Time element.Guerri l l ashaveprovedthemsel veseffecti ve
duri ngal l stagesofconfl i ctfromtheoutbreakofhosti l i ti es
unti l the end of fi ghti ng. However, i n the earl y stages of
guerri l l a devel opment, when the enemy i s sti l l strong,
resi stance operati ons normal l y tend to be conducted l ess
openl y. Duri ng thi s peri od, securi ty i s a pri me concern. I f
the resi stance movementi stosurvi veanddevel opwhi l e
surrounded by strong enemy forces securi ty i s a pri me
concern and precauti ons must be extensi ve and effecti ve.
Acti vi ty i s general l y l i mi ted to i nformati ongatheri ng,
10
recrui ti ng, trai ni ng, organi zati on, and smal l -scal e
operati ons.
(2)Situation.Ontheotherhand,whenthesi tuati onchanges
to favor the guerri l l as ei ther through enemy weakness or
resi stance-created favorabl e ci rcumstances, operati ons
become more overt maki ng l arge-scal e acti ons possi bl e.
When the si tuati on permi ts, guerri l l a forces expand and
tendtoadoptconventi onal organi zati ons.
(3)Location. Guerri l l a warfare takes on di fferent aspects
accordi ng to i ts geographi c l ocati on. I n some areas of the
worl d guerri l l a warfare has preceded the entry of regul ar
troops; whi l e i n other areas, guerri l l a movements have
comei ntoexi stenceaftertheformal entryofregul artroops.
Addi ti onal l y, i n some areas the compl ex soci al structure
andeconomi corgani zati onsarecogsi navastsystemthat
i srel ati vel yeasytodi srupt.Thehi gherthedegreetowhi ch
acountryhasevol vedi ndustri al l ythemorevul nerabl ei ti s
toacti vi ti esoftheguerri l l as.I nl essi ndustri al i zedareasof
the worl d, these compl exi ti es do not exi st. The peopl e are
l ess dependent on one another for goods and servi ces;
di srupti on of one communi ty does not necessari l y cause
extremehardshi pi nanother.Thus,thei mpactofguerri l l a
warfare upon the popul ati on i s not as great and guerri l l a
fi ghti ng i s l i kel y to be more preval ent. I n judgi ng the
potenti al for,andeffectsof,guerri l l awarfarel ocati oni san
i mportantconsi derati on.
7. SpecialForcesOperations
The val ue of coordi nati ng guerri l l a acti vi ti es wi th conventi onal
mi l i taryoperati onsandtheneedforpeaceti mepl anni ngandtrai ni ng
bythepotenti al sponsorhavebeenrecogni zedbytheUni tedStates.
The uni t organi zed and trai ned to i mpl ement the Army's
responsi bi l i tyi ndi recti ngguerri l l aoperati onsi stheAi rborneSpeci al
Forces Group. Speci al forces uni ts may be cal l ed upon to operate
duri ngageneral ,l i mi tedorcol dwar.
a. General War. The doctri ne set forth i n thi s manual i s
structuredaroundageneral warsi tuati on.I nageneral war,Speci al
Forces organi ze guerri l l a forces to support conventi onal mi l i tary
operati ons under the di recti on of the theater commander. Thei r
operati ons general l y are conducted i n deni ed (enemy control l ed)
terri tory.
b. Limited War.Li mi tedwaroperati onsbySpeci al Forcescoul d
beofthegeneral typewi thi nfi l trati onofSpeci al Forcesdetachments
or of a trai ni ng nature conducted i n a nondeni ed area wi th
i nfi l trati onofi ndi genousuni tsonl y.
11
c. Cold War. Speci al forces uni ts can assi st i n trai ni ng mi l i tary
personnel i n combati ng guerri l l a and terrori st acti vi ti es and
subversi on.I naddi ti on,theymaytrai nforei gnmi l i tarypersonnel i n
the techni ques of guerri l l a warfare, thus enhanci ng the defense
capabi l i tyofthenati onconcerned.Whensoempl oyed,Speci al Forces
uni ts suppl ement the U.S. mi l i tary assi stance groups and army
mi ssi ons.
8. CapabilitiesandLimitations
a. Capabi l i ti es. Speci al forces depl oyment gi ves reach to the
theatercommander'soperati ons.I tpermi tshi mtoi nfl uenceacti vi ti es
far i n advance of the fi el d forces and beyond the range of army-
control l ed weapons systems. Speci al forces di rected guerri l l a uni ts
(cal l ed UW forces) conduct operati ons whi ch are categori zed as
fol l ows:
(1)Missionsinsupportoftheatercommander.Thesemi ssi ons
i ncl ude
(a)I nterdi cti on of l i nes of communi cati ons, key areas and
mi l i taryandi ndustri al i nstal l ati ons.
(b)Psychol ogi cal operati ons.
(c)Speci al i ntel l i gencetaskssuchastargetacqui si ti onand
damageassessment.
(d)Evasi onandescapeoperati ons.
(e)Coveranddecepti onoperati ons.
(2) Mi ssi ons to support combat operati ons of tacti cal
commanders.I naddi ti ontoani ntensi fi cati onofthetasks
l i sted i n (1)above,UWforcesexecutemi ssi onstodi rectl y
assi st conventi onal forces engaged i n combat operati ons.
Suchmi ssi onsmayi ncl ude
(a)Sei zure of key terrai n to faci l i tate ai rborne and
amphi bi ousoperati ons.
(b)Empl oymentasareconnai ssanceandsecuri tyforce.
(c)Sei zureofkeyi nstal l ati onstopreventdestructi onbythe
enemy.
(d)Di versi onary attacks agai nst enemy forces to support
coveranddecepti onpl ans.
(e)Operati ons whi ch i sol ate sel ected porti ons ofthebattl e
area,ai rborneobjecti veareaorbeachhead.
(3) Mi ssi onsconductedafterjuncturewi thfri endl yforces.I n
theeventcontrol ofguerri l l auni tsi sretai nedbytheUni ted
States,thefol l owi ngmi ssi onsmaybeassi gned:
(a)Reconnai ssanceandsecuri tymi ssi ons.
12
(b)When properl y trai ned and supported, conventi onal
combatoperati ons.
(c)Rearareasecuri tymi ssi ons.
(d)Counter-guerri l l aoperati ons.
(e)Supportofci vi l affai rsoperati ons.
b. Li mi tati ons. I t must be real i zed that there are certai n
l i mi tati onsi ntheuseofguerri l l aforces.Someofthesel i mi tati onsare
(1) Li mi ted capabi l i ti es for stati c defensi ve or hol di ng
operati ons.
(2) I ni ti al l y,l ackofformal trai ni ng,equi pment,weapons,and
suppl i esprohi bi tl arge-scal ecombatoperati ons.
(3) Dependence upon the l ocal ci vi l i an popul ati on and an
outsi desponsori ngpowerforsuppl i esandequi pment.
(4)Communi cati onsbetweentheguerri l l awarfareoperati onal
areaandhi gherheadquartersi nfri endl yterri toryareoften
tenuousandfraughtwi thtechni cal probl ems.
(5) Decentral i zati on of command and di spersi on of forces for
securi tyi mpedesreacti onti metoordersfromtheaterl evel .
(6) Restri cti ons on fri endl y supporti ng fi res i nto the
operati onal areabecauseofnecessi tyforfrequentmovesby
the guerri l l as as wel l as the necessi ty far protecti ng the
fri endl yci vi l i anpopul ati onsofaraspossi bl e.
(7) From i ni ti al contact unti l an operati on i s compl eted, the
enti re project i s dependent upon preci se, ti mel y and
accuratei ntel l i gence.
13
PARTTWO
ORGANIZATIONFORTHESPECIALFORCESEFFORT
CHAPTER3
JOINTUNCONVENTIONALWARFARETASKFORCE
(JUWTF)
9. General
a. The theater commander i s responsi bl e for the conduct of
unconventi onal warfarei nhi sareaofoperati ons.
b. Asapartofthi sresponsi bi l i tyhedesi gnatesguerri l l awarfare
operati onal areas for the conduct of guerri l l a warfare and rel ated
unconventi onal warfareacti vi ti es.
10. OrganizationoftheJointUnconventionalWarfare
TaskForce(JUWTF)
a. The theater commander has the authori ty to organi ze hi s
command for unconventi onal warfare i n the manner best sui ted to
accompl i shhi smi ssi on.
b. Thepreferredorgani zati oni sajoi ntsubordi nateheadquarters
for unconventi onal warfare on the same l evel as other servi ce
componentcommands(fi g.1).
Thi ssubordi nateheadquarters,knownasaJoi ntUnconventi onal
Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), i s composed of representati ves from
theservi cecomponentcommandsandappropri ateci vi l i anpersonnel .
c.
*
A second possi bl e organi zati on i s an unconventi onal warfare
pl ans secti on wi thi n the J3 staff di vi si on of the uni fi ed or speci fi ed
command.
d. Thei nternal stafforgani zati onoftheJUWTFi sjoi nt,wi ththe
pri nci pal staffoffi cersbei ngfromanyservi ce,andconsi sti ngofaJ1,
J2,J3,J4,J6di vi si onsandanyrequi redspeci al staffoffi cers(fi g.2).
I n the JUWTF the pl ans and pol i cy functi ons of J5 di vi si on are
normal l yaccompl i shedbytheJ3di vi si on.
e. Uni ts and i ndi vi dual s from the servi ce components are
assi gnedorattachedforoperati onal control totheJUWTF.
*
SinceanunconventionalwarfareplanssectionwithintheJSdivisionperformsessentiallythesame
functionsasaseparateJUWTF,furtherdiscussionislimitedtotheseparateJUWTF.
14
f. Theai rbornespeci al forcesgroup,thepri nci pal armyel ement
oftheJUWTF,establ i shesaspeci al forcesoperati onal base(SFOB)to
command and support operati onal detachments before and after
commi tmenti ndesi gnatedguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.
11. FunctionsoftheJointUnconventionalWarfareTaskForce
a. TheJUWTFcommanderandhi sstaffmakeoperati onal pl ans
for and di rect the conduct of unconventi onal warfare. Thepri nci pal
functi onsoftheJUWTFare
(1) Recommendgeographi cal areastobedesi gnatedguerri l l a-
warfareoperati onal areas.
(2) Procureandmai ntai ni ntel l i gencemateri al si nsupportof
unconventi onal warfare.
15
(3)Devel op operati onal , admi ni strati ve and l ogi sti cal pl ans
and requi rements for the support of unconventi onal
warfare.
(4) Coordi natewi thothertheateragenci esi npl anni ngforal l
typesofoperati ons.
(5) Devel op communi cati on procedures and requi rements to
supportunconventi onal warfarepl ans.
(6) Pl an and conduct joi nt trai ni ng of l and, sea and ai runi ts
desi gnated to parti ci pate i n or support unconventi onal
warfare.
(7) As di rected,coordi natewi thal l i edmi l i taryauthori ti esfor
the preparati on and executi on of unconventi onal warfare
pl ans.
(8) Mai ntai n l i ai son wi th other unconventi onal warfare
agenci esoruni ts.
(9) Recommendstrengthsofi ndi genousforcestobesupported
forunconventi onal warfareoperati ons.
(10) Mai ntai n l i ai son at staff and operati onal l evel wi th
appropri atei ntel l i genceagenci es;coordi naterequi rements,
col l ecti on and communi cati ons wi th other acti vi ti es i n
deni ed areas; pl an i ntel l i gence operati ons i n support of
conventi onal forces when di rected by the theater
commander.
(11) Mai ntai n l i ai son wi th theater ci vi l affai rs uni ts wi th
respect to ci vi l affai rs (CA) aspects of unconventi onal
warfare.
b. Thestaffoperati onsofaJUWTFarebasi cal l ythesameasfor
otherUSmi l i tarystaffs.
12. OperationalControlofUnconventionalWarfareForces
a. I ni ti al l y, operati onal control of US sponsored unconventi onal
warfare forces i s retai ned by the theater commander. Control i s
exerci sed through the JUWTF assi gni ng mi ssi ons to the Speci al
Forces group, whi ch i n turn di rects depl oyed operati onal
detachments.
b. Whenguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areasfal l wi thi nthearea
of i nfl uence of advanci ng tacti cal commands, operati onal control of
affectedunconventi onal warfareforcesusual l yi stransferredfromthe
uni fi edorspeci fi edcommandl evel throughtheaterarmytothefi el d
army concerned. I n conjuncti on wi th thi s transfer, el ements of the
Speci al Forces group are attached to the army headquarters to
provi deconti nui tyofsupervi si on.
16
c. The fi el d army commander i n turn may assi gn operati onal
control oftheunconventi onal warfareforcetoanyofhi ssubordi nate
tacti cal uni ts.Del egati onofcontrol general l yi snotmadel owerthan
di vi si on.Seechapter8foramoredetai l eddi scussi onofuti l i zati onof
unconventi onal warfareforcesbytacti cal commands.
17
CHAPTER4
AIRBORNESPECIALFORCESGROUP
SectionI.GENERAL
13. General
The Ai rborne Speci al Forces Group i s the Uni ted States Army's
organi zati on trai ned to conduct guerri l l a warfare and rel ated
unconventi onal warfareacti vi ti es.Speci al forcesareastrategi cforce
empl oyedunderthedi recti onoftheatercommanders.Depl oymentof
speci al , forces uni ts al l ows the theater commander to conduct
offensi veoperati onsdeepi nenemyterri tory.
14. MissionandConcept
a.Mission.Themi ssi onofspeci al forcesi stodevel op,organi ze,
equi p,trai n,anddi recti ndi genousforcesi ntheconductofguerri l l a
warfare.Speci al forcesmayal soadvi se,trai nandassi sti ndi genous
forcesi ncounter-i nsurgencyoperati ons.
b. Concept. Speci al forces are responsi bl e for the conduct of al l
unconventi onal warfare acti vi ti es wi thi n guerri l l a warfare
operati onal areas and may be cal l ed upon to perform other tasks
associ atedwi thori nsupportofguerri l l awarfare.
15. AirborneSpecialForcesGroup
a.Organization.TheAi rborneSpeci al ForcesGroupconsi stsofa
headquarters and headquarters company and four Speci al Forces
compani es(fi g.3).
b. Capabilities.Thespeci al forcesgroupi scapabl eof
(1) Depl oyi ngi tsoperati onal detachmentsbyai r,seaor l and
whenprovi dedwi thappropri atetransportati on.
(2) Organi zi ng,trai ni ng,anddi recti nganumberofvari edsi ze
guerri l l auni ts.
(3) Control l i ng,byl ong-rangecommuni cati ons,theoperati ons
of UW forces i n enemy or enemy occupi ed terri tory to
reduce hi s combat effecti veness, i ndustri al capaci ty, and
moral e.
(4) Performi ngspeci al i zedi ntel l i gencemi ssi onsasdi rectedby
hi gher commanders and when augmented by i ntel l i gence
speci al i stsasrequi red.
(5) Provi di ng trai ni ng and assi stance to fri endl y forei gn
armi esi nguerri l l aandcounterguerri l l aoperati ons.
18
(6) Establ i shi ng a Speci al Forces operati onal base when
augmentedbysupportandservi ceuni ts.
c. AdditionalConsiderations.
(1) TheSpeci al Forcesgrouprequi resaugmentati onbysupport
andservi ceuni tstoconductsustai nedoperati onsfromthe
Speci al ForcesOperati onal Base(SFOB).Fordetai l softhe
supportrequi red,seeparagraph21.
(2) The reacti on ti me of Speci al Forces detachments di ffers
from that of conventi onal i nfantry uni ts because of
communi cati ons l i mi tati ons and greater di stances to
operati onal areas.
16. HeadquartersandHeadquartersCompany(fig.4)
a.Mission.Toprovi decommuni cati ons,admi ni strati ve,trai ni ng,
i ntel l i gence, and l ogi sti cal support for assi gned Speci al Forces
el ementspri ortoandafterdepl oyment.
b. Capabilities. Headquarters and headquarters company of the
speci al forcesgrouphasthefol l owi ngcapabi l i ti es:
(1) Provi des command and staff control and pl anni ng for
Speci al Forcesel ementspri ortoandafterdepl oyment.
(2) Provi des l ogi sti cal support (except del i very) to Speci al
Forcesoperati onal el ementsonaconti nui ngbasi s.
19
20
(3) Provi desl ong-rangecommuni cati onbetweenanSFOBand
assi gnedSpeci al Forcesoperati onal el ements.
(4)Provi desuni tl evel medi cal anddental servi ce.
(5) Provi des thi rd echel on mai ntenance i n radi o and smal l
arms.
c. Organization.Fordetai l edorgani zati on,seethecurrenttabl es
oforgani zati onandequi pment.
17. SpecialForcesCompany(fig.5)
a.Organization. The speci al forces company consi sts of an
admi ni strati ve detachment, one operati onal detachment C, three
operati onal detachmentsB,and12operati onal detachmentsA.
b. Administrative Detachment. The admi ni strati ve detachment
performs the normal admi ni strati ve functi ons of a company head-
21
quarters. The detachment commander executes the di recti ves and
orders of the commandi ng offi cer of the operati onal detachment C,
who i s the commander of the Speci al Forces company. Duri ng
operati ons, the admi ni strati ve detachment reverts to the group
commander's control when i ts operati onal detachments have been
depl oyed.
c. Operational Detachment C (fi g.6).Operati onal detachmentC
i s the seni or operati onal uni t of the Speci al Forces company. I t i s
capabl eof
(1)Conducti ngoperati onswi thguerri l l aforces.
(2) Exerci si ngoperati onal control overdesi gnatedsubordi nate
detachments.
(3) Provi di ngthenucl eusofal i ai sondetachmenttofi el darmy
or other tacti cal el ements when the operati onal control of
Speci al Forces detachments i s passed to tacti cal uni t
commanders. When so empl oyed, the detachment C i s
attachedtothetacti cal uni theadquarters.
d. OperationalDetachmentB(fi g.7).Operati onal detachmentB,
l i ke the detachment C, conducts operati ons wi th guerri l l a forces.
Whenoperati ngwi thotherdetachments,theBdetachmentexerci ses
operati onal control over subordi nate detachments and/or i s
subordi natedtoaseni ordetachment.I tal socanprovi dethenucl eus
ofal i ai sondetachmentatatacti cal uni theadquarters.
e. OperationalDetachmentA(fi g.8).Theoperati onal detachment
Aconductsoperati onswi thguerri l l aforces,ei theruni l ateral l yori n
conjuncti on wi th other detachments. When operati ng wi th other
detachments,theAdetachmenti snormal l ysubordi natedtoaseni or
detachment.
18. AugmentationDetachment
a. The augmentati on detachment i s i denti cal i n composi ti on to
theoperati onal detachmentC(fi g.6).
b. Theaugmentati ondetachmenti scapabl eof:
(1) Assi sti ngthecommanderi nthecontrol ofoperati ons.
(2) Formi ng the l i ai son detachment at a tacti cal uni t
headquarters when operati onal control of Speci al Forces
detachmentsi spassedtothetacti cal uni t.
(3) Formi ng the nucl eus to establ i sh an al ternate SFOB
headquarters.
(4) Conducti ng operati ons i n guerri l l a warfare operati onal
areas.
c. For a detai l ed descri pti on of the empl oyment of the
augmentati ondetachment,seeparagraph21.
22
23
24
25
SectionII.THESPECIALFORCESOPERATIONALBASE
19. General
a. TheSpeci al Forcesoperati onal base(SFOB)i stheoperati onal
andadmi ni strati vefocal poi ntforguerri l l awarfareacti vi ti eswi thi na
U.S. theater of operati ons. I t i s l ocated i n terri tory under fri endl y
control , usual l y wi thi n the communi cati ons zone (CommZ). The
l ocati onoftheSFOBi sdesi gnatedbythetheatercommander.
b. The Speci al Forces group, supported by el ements wi thi n the
CommZ, acti vates and operates the SFOB. I deal l y, the SFOB i s
establ i shed and acti vated pri or to the commencement of hosti l i ti es.
However,si ncepreemergencyacti vati onmaynotbeauthori zed,the
base often i s establ i shed on a standby basi s to i ncl ude l ong-range
communi cati onfaci l i ti es,i ntratheaterandi ntrabasecommuni cati ons,
andemergencystockpi l esofequi pment.
c. The SFOB may be physi cal l y l ocated at one i nstal l ati on or
di spersed among a number of smal l si tes, usual l y i n the vi ci ni ty of
other i nstal l ati ons such as an ai r base or CommZ depot. Vari ous
modi fi cati onsareadoptedtosui tthel ocal si tuati on.
20. Mission
The mi ssi on of the SF'OB i s to prepare operati onal detachments
fordepl oymenti ntoguerri l l awarfareareasand,afterdepl oyment,to
di rect,admi ni ster,andsupportguerri l l aforcesi nfurtheranceofthe
theatermi ssi on.
Thefuncti onsperformedattheSFOBare
a. Pl anni nganddi recti onofoperati ons.
b. Communi cati onssupport.
c. I ntel l i gencesupport.
d. Logi sti cal support.
e. Bri efi ngandstagi ng.
f. I nfi l trati on.
g. Li ai sonandcoordi nati on.
h. Trai ni ng.
i. Admi ni strati on.
21. Organization
(fi g.9)
a.General.TheSFOBi sorgani zedal ongfuncti onal l i nesi ntotwo
majorgroups:theoperati onal el ement.,;andtheadmi ni strati veand
trai ni ngel ements.
26
b. Operational Elements.Theoperati onal el ementsoftheSFOB
consi stof
(1)Operations center. The operati ons center i s the faci l i ty
wi thi n whi ch are grouped representati ves of uni t and
speci al staff secti ons and other commands concerned wi th
currentoperati onsi nguerri l l awarfareareas.Foradetai l ed
di scussi on,seeparagraph23.
(2)Briefing center.Thebri efi ngcenteri sani sol ati onareaor
areas where Speci al Forces detachments recei ve thei r
operati onal mi ssi ons and conduct fi nal preparati on for
i nfi l trati on.Foradetai l eddi scussi on,seeparagraph24.
(3)Communications complex. The communi cati ons compl ex
consi sts of the communi cati ons faci l i ti es avai l abl e to
supporttheSFOBandguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.
I t i ncl udes the Speci al Forces group communi cati ons
pl atoon, pl us attached or supporti ng si gnal uni ts and
faci l i ti es. The group si gnal offi cer i s the staff supervi sor.
The communi cati ons pl atoon l eader i s normal l y the
operator and supervi ses the si gnal i nstal l ati ons. For a
detai l eddi scussi on,seeparagraph25.
(4) TheAugmentationdetachment.
(a)Whenacti vated,theaugmentati ondetachmentprovi des
addi ti onal fl exi bi l i ty to the Speci al Forces group
commander.
27
(b)The augmentati on detachment may be empl oyed to
assi stthecommanderi nthecontrol ofoperati ons.When
so empl oyed the detachment commander becomes a
deputy for operati ons and supervi ses the operati onal
el ementsoftheSFOB.Otherdetachmentpersonnel are
assi gned duti es to operate the bri efi ng center and
suppl ementstaffel ementsofthebase.
(c)The detachment may form the Speci al Forces l i ai son
detachmentwi thafi el darmyorothertacti cal command.
I n thi s si tuati on the detachment i s attached to the
tacti cal command and exerci ses operati onal control for
the tacti cal commander over desi gnated guerri l l a
warfareoperati onareas(ch.8).
(d)The detachment can establ i sh an al ternate SFOB
headquarters. I n thi s rol e addi ti onal personnel and
equi pment are provi ded from headquarters and
headquarterscompanyandothersourcesasrequi red.
(e)The detachment can be empl oyed operati onal l y to
accompl i shtasksappropri ateforaCdetachment.
(f)More than one augmentati on detachment may be
acti vatedforempl oymentattheSFOB.
c. Administrative and Training Elements. The admi ni strati ve
andtrai ni ngel ementsoftheSFOBconsi stof
(1)Administrative center. The admi ni strati ve center i s the
faci l i ty wi thi n whi ch are grouped representati ves of uni t
and speci al staff secti ons and other commands concerned
wi th current admi ni strati ve support operati ons, base
securi ty,andareadamagecontrol .Forfurtherdi scussi ons,
seeparagraph29.
(2)Logistics support element. Thi s i s a non-TOE groupi ng of
Speci al Forcesandsupporti ngtechni cal servi ceuni tsfrom
CommZformedtosupporttheSFOBandguerri l l awarfare
operati onal areas. The group S4 supervi ses operati ons of
thel ogi sti cssupportel ementwhi chi ncl udes
(a)Organi c el ements of the Speci al Forces group: Suppl y
Secti on,MotorSecti on,ParachuteRi ggi ngPl atoon,and
theMedi cal Secti on.
(b)Supporti ngel ementsasrequi red:Transportati onuni ts,
Engi neer Uti l i ty Personnel , Ordnance 3d Echel on
Support, Ci vi l i an Labor, QM Aeri al Suppl y Uni ts,
Medi cal Uni ts,andaLi ai sonSecti onfromCommZ.
28
(3)Other supporting units.Al thoughthegrouphaspersonnel
to establ i sh the SFOB, depl oy detachments and provi de
l i mi ted l ogi sti cal support, i t requi res augmentati on to
conduct support acti vi ti es on a sustai ned basi s. CI C, base
securi ty and l ogi sti cal support el ements are requi red to
support i ni ti al operati ons. As the number of operati onal
areas i ncreases wi th the subsequent bui l dup i n guerri l l a
forces, the admi ni strati ve support operati ons expand
correspondi ngl y.Uni ts,suchasthoseoutl i nedi nparagraph
(2) above, are requi red to augment the SFOB. Mi l i tary
pol i ce securi ty uni ts and counteri ntel l i gence corps teams
are i ncl uded and operate under the headquarters
commandant and S2, respecti vel y. An army avi ati on
detachmentmaybeattachedtotheSFOBtoprovi dearmy
avi ati on support. An Army Securi ty Agency uni t may
moni tor communi cati ons for securi ty. I n some i nstances
techni cal servi ceuni tsori nstal l ati onsarenotl ocatedatthe
SFOB but provi de general or di rect support as a part of
thei r mi ssi on. I n thi s si tuati on, the SFOB exerci ses no
operati onal control overtheuni tsconcernedbuti sservi ced
as a "customer" of the supporti ng uni t or i nstal l ati on. An
exampl ei shi gher-echel onordnanceandengi neersupport.
(4) Headquarters and headquarters company. The
headquarters and headquarters company, augmented by
techni cal servi ceandsecuri tyuni tsfromCommZ,handl es
housekeepi ng acti vi ti es at the SFOB. The company
commanderi stheheadquarterscommandant.
(5)Special forces companies (uncommitted units). The
uncommi tted compani es and detachments conti nue uni t
preparati on and trai ni ng. These detachments are bri efed
frequentl y on the si tuati on i n thei r projected operati onal
areas.
SectionIII.CONTROLOFOPERATIONS
22. General
The Speci al Forces group organi zes functi onal l y to control
operati onsi nguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.Theel ementsused
i nthecontrol ofoperati onsare
(1)Operati oncenter.
(2) Bri efi ngcenter.
(3) Communi cati onscompl ex.
29
23. OperationsCenter
a.General.Theoperati onscenteri safuncti onal groupi ngofTOE
personnel whocoordi nateandcontrol operati onsforthecommander
oftheSFOB.
b. Functions.
(1) Detai l ed pl anni ng for guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas,
to i ncl ude preparati on of the operati on pl an for each
operati onal detachment. Thi s pl anni ng i s based upon the
UWpl ansofthetheatercommander.
(2) Conducti ngbri efi ngsandsupervi si ngotherpreparati on by
detachmentsassi gnedtothebri efi ngcenter.
(3)Coordi nati ngwi thotherservi cesandagenci esasnecessary.
(4) Exerci si ng operati onal supervi si on over guerri l l a war fare
operati onal areas.
(5)Maki ng recommendati ons concerni ng empl oyment of
guerri l l a forces i n support of mi l i tary operati ons. Thi s
i ncl udesreorgani zati onasnecessary.
(6) Acti ngasthecontrol andcoordi nati ngcenterforguerri l l a
warfareoperati onal areas.
c. Composition(fi g.10).
(1) S3. The S3 exerci ses pri mary staff responsi bi l i ty for
operati onscenterandi sthedi rector.
(2)Plans element. The operati ons center pl ans el ement
conductspl anni ngforfutureoperati ons.Thepl ansel ement
consi sts oftheassi stantS2andassi stantS3pl usenl i sted
augmentati on. The assi stant S3 i s the offi cer-i n-charge of
pl ans el ement. Once pl ans are approved they are
i mpl ementedbytheappropri ateareaspeci al i stteam.
(3)S2operationselement.TheS2operati onsel ementconsi sts
of the S2, i ntel l i gence sergeant, i ntel l i gence edi tors,
anal ysts,andorder-of-battl especi al i sts.Theyassembl eand
eval uate i ntel l i gence i nformati on recei ved from the
operati onal areas; prepare and di ssemi nate i ntel l i gence
reports based on eval uated i nformati on and i ntel l i gence
reports from other headquarters; and conduct i ntel l i gence
bri efi ngs and debri efi ngs. For a detai l ed di scussi on, see
paragraph27.
(4)Assistant S4 (plans). The Assi stant .S4 (Pl ans) i s the
l ogi sti cal coordi nator for the Operati ons Center. He
processes l ogi sti cal requi rements from the area speci al i st
teams and i s responsi bl e for l ogi sti cal acti vi ti es i n the
30
bri efi ng center. He prepares the admi ni strati ve annex to
theguerri l l awarfareareaoperati onpl ans.
(5)Signalofficer.Thesi gnal offi ceri ssi gnal coordi natorforthe
operati onscenter.Hecoordi natessi gnal requi rementsfrom
area speci al i st teams and i s responsi bl e for operati onal
si gnal matters. He prepares the si gnal operati ng
i nstructi ons and si gnal annex for guerri l l a warfare area
operati onpl ans.
(6) Areaspecialistteams(ASTs).TheASTsarethefocal poi nt
of the operati ons center. They assi st i n precommi tment
pl anni ng, coordi nate acti vi ti es of thei r assi gned
detachmentsi nthebri efi ngcenter,andactastheparents
ofthecommi tteddetachments.TheASTconsi stsofthearea
31
speci al i st offi cer (assi stant S3) and an area supervi sor
(seni orNCO).Thi steammustbecomeexpertonthespeci fi c
area or country i t wi l l supervi se duri ng operati ons. The
ASTactsasthecommi tteddetachment'srearheadquarters,
andi sresponsi bl eforfol l owi ngthroughonal l di recti vesto
and messages from commi tted detachments. Duri ng
prei nfi l trati on bri efi ngs, a cl ose rapport i s establ i shed
betweenthedetachmentandtheAST.TheASTkeepsthe
commanderandstaffi nformedontheoperati onal si tuati on.
(7)Communication center. The communi cati ons center,
operated by the command operati ons center team of the
communi cati ons pl atoon, i s l ocated i n the vi ci ni ty of the
operati ons center si nce i t provi des the communi cati ons
centersupportfortheoperati onscenterandotherel ements
oftheSFOB.
(8)Liaison officers. Al though not an i ntegral part of the
operati ons center, the l i ai son offi cers from the vari ous
servi ces,fi el darmi es,andal l i edcountri esarel ocatedthere.
They coordi nate matters of common i nterest wi th thei r
servi ces and nati ons and arrange support when requi red.
They keep the Speci al Forces group commander and staff
abreastofthesi tuati onofthei rrespecti veorgani zati onsas
these organi zati ons i nfl uence guerri l l a warfare areas of
i nterest.
24. BriefingCenter
a.General.Thebri efi ngcenterprovi desforthefol l owi ng:
(1)Housi ng.
(2)Messi ng.
(3)Bri efi nganddebri efi ng.
(4)Detachmentstudy.
(5)Di spensaryservi ce.
(6)Speci al trai ni ng.
(7)Storageandpackagi ngofaccompanyi ngsuppl i es.
(8)Li mi tedmoral eservi ces.
(9) Stagi ngofdetachmentstodeparturesi tes.
b. Operation.Theenti rearea(areas)i samaxi mum-securi tysi te
accessi bl e onl y to those personnel who have a requi rement to be
there. The operati ons of the center are supervi sed by the S3. The
headquarters commandant i s responsi bl e for the admi ni strati ve
functi oni ng and securi ty of the area. Personnel from the
32
augmentati on detachment and Speci al Forces company
admi ni strati vedetachmentoperatethebri efi ngcenter.
c. Functioning.
(1) The di rector of the operati ons center (S3) coordi nates the
bri efi ng and stagi ng acti vi ti es of the center. He schedul es
bri efi ngsandarrangesforthestagi ngofthedetachmentsto
thedeparturei nstal l ati on.Bri efi ngpersonnel arethearea
speci al i stoffi cersandthestaffoffi cersfromtheoperati ons
center,augmented,whenrequi red,byothermembersofthe
group staff and appropri ate l i ai son offi cers. Often,
speci al i sts from other headquarters, servi ces and al l i ed
governmentsparti ci pate.
(2) Detachments prepare thei r own pl ans based upon the
operati onpl anfortheguerri l l awarfarearea.Detachments
packagethei rownequi pment.Parachuteri ggi ngsupporti s
provi dedasnecessary.Detachmentsareaffordedmaxi mum
ti metostudythemateri al recei vedatbri efi ngs.Si ncemuch
ofthi si nformati oni scl assi fi ed,i ti scommi ttedtomemory.
Essenti al s whi ch do not l end themsel ves to memori zati on
aremi ni aturi zed.
(3) Debri efi ngsareconductedi nthesamemannerasbri efi ngs,
wi th recovered detachments remai ni ng i n i sol ati on i n the
bri efi ngcenterunti l thedebri efi ngi scompl ete.
(4) Detachmenttrai ni ngconductedwhi l ei nthebri efi ngcenter
i sl i mi tedtothatessenti al fortheoperati onwhi chcoul dnot
be conducted el sewhere. New i tems of equi pment or
weapons i ssued at the l ast mi nute requi re fami l i ari zati on
or test fi ri ng. Speci fi c techni ques rel ati ng to i nfi l trati on
may have to be taught. I denti fi cati on and recogni ti on of
new or speci fi c i tems of enemy equi pment may be a
requi rement.I fdetachmentsarei sol atedforrel ati vel yl ong
peri ods of ti me, trai ni ng programs are expanded to
mai ntai nbasi cski l l sandphysi cal fi tness.
(5) Hospi tal i zati onofsi ckori njuredmembersofdetachments
prepari ngforcommi tmenti sdonesofaraspossi bl ewi thi n
the bri efi ng center. A smal l di spensary faci l i ty i s
establ i shedtocareforthosepersonnel whosei l l nessi snot
seri ous enough to precl ude parti ci pati on i n thei r
detachment's operati onal mi ssi on. The seri ousl y si ck or
i njured are evacuated to CommZ medi cal i nstal l ati ons.
33
Arrangementsaremadetoi sol atesensi ti vepersonnel who
arehospi tal i zedoutsi dethebri efi ngcenter.
(6) Thestagi ngofdetachmentsi nthedeparturei nstal l ati oni s
arrangedbytheS3.TheASTsaredi rectl yresponsi bl efor
the operati on and accompany thei r detachments from the
bri efi ng center to the departure i nstal l ati on. The
requi rementsofthedel i veryagencypertai ni ngtoprefl i ght
or embarkati on bri efi ngs are coordi nated i n advance. I f
necessary, arrangements are made for secure housi ng at
thedeparturei nstal l ati on.
25. SFOBCommunicationsComplex
a.OrganizationoftheCommunicationsPlatoon(fi gs.11and12).
(1) The communi cati ons pl atoon headquarters provi des the
groupsi gnal offi cerwi ththenecessaryadmi ni strati veand
suppl ypersonnel fortheoperati onsofthepl atoon.
(2) The command operati ons center team operates the
communi cati ons center servi ng the SFOB. The forward
operati onscenterteamprovi desacommandandcontrol
34
35
faci l i ty for the recei ver and transmi tter si tes. The forward
recei vi ng center and the forward transmi tti ng center teams
operatetherecei verandtransmi ttersi tes,respecti vel y.
b. Capabilities.
(1) Operate tel ephone servi ce wi thi n the SFOB. The pl atoon
i nstal l s the tel ephones to be used wi thi n the SFOB and
operatesatel ephoneswi tchboard.
(2) Termi nate l i nes from other headquarters. The pri mary
means of communi cati on to JUWTF and other theater
agenci eswi thi nfri endl yterri toryi stel ephoneandtel etype.
Theater army si gnal troops i nstal l these l ong wi re l i nes.
The communi cati ons pl atoon termi nates these l i nes i n
tel etype,on-l i necrypto,crypto,cryptospeechequi pment,or
tel ephone.
(3) Operate base recei ver and transmi tter si tes. The SFOB
recei ver and transmi tter si tes may be separated from the
base by a consi derabl e di stance. The base proper i s
connectedtotherecei verandtransmi ttersi tesbyl andl i ne,
tel ephoneandtel etype.Suchl i nesareprovi dedbytheater
si gnal agenci es.
(4) Provi de radi o tel etype back-up. The communi cati ons
pl atoon provi des radi o tel etype back-up to the l and l i nes
betweentheSFOBandtherecei verandtransmi ttersi tes.
(5) Operate the communi cati ons center. The communi cati ons
pl atoon, encrypts and decrypts messages and acts as a
central andcl eari ngcenterfortheremotetransmi tterand
recei versi tes.
c. Responsibilitiesofthesignalofficer.Thegroupsi gnal offi ceri s
responsi bl efor
(1)Determi ni ng operati ng frequenci es and communi cati on
securi ty measures necessary to i nsure rel i abl e radi o
communi cati onswi thoperati onal detachments.
(2) Obtai ni ng frequenci es as necessary and coordi nati ng the
useofal l frequenci eswi ththesupporti ngsi gnal offi cer.
(3)Si gnal pl anni ngandpubl i shi ngnecessarySOI sandSSI s.
(4) Pl anni ng, requesti ng and coordi nati ng the engi neeri ng
assi stance necessary for the desi gn of antenna farms and
keyi ngl i nes.
(5) Requesti ng materi al necessary to i nstal l these antenna
farmsandkeyi ngl i nes.
36
(6) Requesti ng si gnal support necessary to i nstal l l ong and
l ocal wi re l i nes, e.g., SFOB to i nstal l ati ons of the
communi cati oncompl ex.
(7) Requesti ng the tel ephone and tel etype trunks necessary
fortheoperati onoftheSFOB.
(8) Advi si ngthegroupS4onsi gnal suppl ymatters.
(9) Supervi si ng trai ni ng of the group communi cati ons secti on
andwhendi rectedtrai ni ngofal l communi cati onpersonnel
i nthegroup.
d. SignalPlanning.
(1) Advance pl anni ng i s necessary to provi de rel i abl e
communi cati ons between the SFOB and guerri l l a warfare
operati onal areas. The di stances between the SFOB and
detachments, the communi cati on securi ty probl ems
presented by operati ng from wi thi n enemy terri tory, and
the l ow-power communi cati on equi pment used by the
detachments al l present techni cal probl ems. Proper
frequenci es must be chosen ari d the use of these
frequenci es coordi nated wi th the theater si gnal offi cer i f
communi cati onsaretoberel i abl e.Forfurtherdi scussi onof
communi cati onsconsi derati ons,seechapters5and7.
(2) The group si gnal offi cer i nsures that the JUWTF si gnal
offi ceri sawareofal l aspectsofhi sprobl emtoi ncl udethe
extentofsi gnal supportrequi red.
(3) The pl anni ng mustbe doneasfari nadvanceaspossi bl e;
the rel i abi l i ty of the communi cati ons wi l l be di rectl y
proporti onal topri orpl anni ngandsupervi si on.
26. Plans
Pl anni ng, parti cul arl y pri or to commi tment of operati onal
detachments,i soneofthemajorfuncti onsofthespeci al forcesgroup.
TheS3pl ansgroupi sthefocal poi ntofpl anni ngfuncti ons.TheASTs,
supervi sed by the assi stant .S3 (pl ans) and assi sted by other staff
offi cers, accompl i sh operati onal pl anni ng. Consi deri ng the l ocati on,
the mi ssi on and the ul ti mate devel opmental objecti ves, the ASTs
prepare the operati on pl ans for the guerri l l a warfare operati onal
areas.Pl anni ngi sconti nuousandpl ansarerevi sedasrequi red.Wi de
l ati tude for the operati onal detachment i s the rul e for guerri l l a
warfare operati on pl ans. The sel ecti on of a detachment for a
parti cul ar mi ssi on i s based on several factors, chi ef of whi ch are:
trai ni ng status of the detachment andtheabi l i tyandexperi enceof
the detachment commander. For securi ty reasons, detachments do
not have access to operati on pl ans unti l assi gned to the bri efi ng
center. However, to faci l i tate area studi es, geographi cal regi ons
37
(whi chi ncl udethedetachments'speci fi cguerri l l awarfareoperati onal
areas)areassi gnedi nadvance.
27. IntelligenceSection
a.General.Thei ntel l i gencesecti onofthespeci al forcesgroupi s
responsi bl eforthefol l owi ng:
(1)I ntel l i gencetrai ni ng.
(2) Furni shi ngi ntel l i gencetodetachmentspri ortoandafter
commi tment.
(3)Conducti ngi ntel l i gencebri efi ngsanddebri efi ngs.
(4) Fi el deval uati onofi ntel l i gencei nformati onrecei ved from
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.
(5)Counteri ntel l i gence.
(6) Supervi soryresponsi bi l i ti esi ncoordi nati onwi ththeS1for
the exteri or and i nteri or securi ty of the operati onal base
andi mpl ementati onofasecuri ty-educati onprogram.
b. OrganizationandFunctions.
(1)S2. The S2 supervi ses the acti vi ti es of the i ntel l i gence
secti on, keeps the commander and staff i nformed of the
i ntel l i gence si tuati on, and coordi nates wi th other staff
secti onsandagenci es.
(2)Administration and training. I ntel l i gence admi ni strati on
andtrai ni ngi sunderthesupervi si onofthetrai ni ngoffi cer.
Hepl ansandsupervi sesi ntel l i gencetrai ni ngandconducts
routi ne admi ni strati on forthesecti onsuchasprocessi ng
securi ty cl earances, handl i ng cl assi fi ed documents, and
di stri buti onofi ntel l i gencemateri al wi thi ntheSFOB.
(3)I ntelligence planning. The assi stant S2 i s the pri nci pal
i ntel l i gence pl anner at the SFOB. He represents the S2
secti oni nthetacti cal operati onscenterpl ansel ement.He
conducts i ntel l i gence pl anni ng, prepares the i ntel l i gence
annexesfortheoperati onpl ans,andcoordi nateswi thother
personnel ofthei ntel l i gencesecti onforspeci fi ci ntel l i gence
supportrequi red.
(4)I ntelligenceoperations.TheS2di rectstheacti vi ti esofthe
i ntel l i gencesergeants,i ntel l i genceedi torandanal ystsand
the order of battl e speci al i sts to provi de the i ntel l i gence
support to guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas and other
headquarters. These personnel prepare esti mates, pl ans,
and summari es, routi ne and speci al i ntel l i gence reports,
processi nformati onrecei vedfromandfurni shi ntel l i gence
to commi tteddetachments,prepareandmai ntai norderof
battl efi l es,coordi natei ntel l i gencematterswi thotheruni ts
38
and headquarters, and prepare and conduct bri efi ngs and
debri efi ngs.
c. Attached or Supporting I ntelligence Elements. The speci al
forces group operati ng from an SFOB requi res addi ti onal mi l i tary
i ntel l i gence support than that whi ch i s organi cal l y avai l abl e. The
group has no counteri ntel l i gence capabi l i ty and requi res CI C
augmentati on. Addi ti onal mi l i tary i ntel l i gence speci al i sts may be
attachedtoassi sti nbri efi ngdetachments.
SectionIV.CONTROLOFADMINISTRATIVEAND
TRAININGACTIVITIES
28. General
a. The speci al forces group establ i shes anadmi ni strati vecenter
attheSFOBtocontrol admi ni strati veandtrai ni ngacti vi ti es.
b. The speci al forces group executi ve offi cer supervi ses the
admi ni strati ve center and other el ements l ocated at the SFOB that
areengagedi nadmi ni strati veandtrai ni ngacti vi ti es.
29. AdministrativeCenter
(fi g. 13)
a.Composition.Theadmi ni strati vecenterconsi stsof
(1)Theexecuti veoffi cerwhoi sthedi rector.
(2)GroupS1.
(3)GroupS4.
(4) Trai ni ngoffi cer,S2Secti on.
(5) Trai ni ngoffi cer,S3Secti on.
(6)Enl i stedspeci al i stsasrequi red.
b. Functioning. The admi ni strati ve center pl ans and control s
admi ni strati ve and trai ni ng acti vi ty at the base and di rects the
vari ous secti ons, uni ts ari d attached el ements i n executi on of thei r
support tasks. Through coordi nated pl anni ng the admi ni strati ve
centeri nsuresthatguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areasandtheSFOB
recei ve the admi ni strati ve support they requi re and that
uncommi ttedoperati onal detachmentsaretrai nedforthei rmi ssi ons.
30. Training
Trai ni ngattheSFOBi saccompl i shedundertwocondi ti onsthat
conductedpri ortoi sol ati oni nthebri efi ngcenterandthatconducted
i n the bri efi ng center. Trai ni ng pri or to recei pt of an operati onal
mi ssi oni si ntendedtokeepthedetachmentati tspeak,toteach
39
speci fi c techni ques appl i cabl e to projected operati ons and to
fami l i ari zepersonnel wi thnewequi pment.Trai ni ngconductedafter
assi gnment to the bri efi ng center may i ncl ude any or al l of these,
ti mepermi tti ng.Trai ni ngareasi ncl uderangefaci l i ti esfortest-fi ri ng
andzeroi ngweaponsandtrai ni ngwi thnewequi pment.I naddi ti on,
pl ans are prepared to trai n repl acements and/or repl acement
detachments. Trai ni ng supervi si on i s accompl i shed through the
normal chai n of command. The S3 trai ni ng offi cer exerci ses staff
supervi si onoftrai ni ng.
40
31. Administration
a. S1.Thefuncti onsofanyuni tS1areappl i cabl etothespeci al
forcesgroupS1;however,theymustbemodi fi edtomeetthesi tuati on
whi chexi stsafterdepl oymentofoperati onal detachments.Obvi ousl y
theacti onswhi charenormal i nothermi l i taryuni tsaredi ffi cul tor
i mpossi bl etoaccompl i shwhendeal i ngwi thcommi ttedspeci al forces
personnel .TheS1preparesSOP'stocoverforeseeabl econti ngenci es
and takes steps to accompl i sh routi ne personnel matters pri or to
commi tment.Personnel acti onsrequi ri ngasol di er'sapproval afterhe
i s i n the operati onal area shoul d be prepared i n brevi ty codes to
reduce radi o transmi ssi ons. The S1 conducts porti ons of the
predepl oymentbri efi ngi nthebri efi ngcenter.Certai nfuncti onsofthe
speci al forces group S1 are di scussed wherei n they are pecul i ar to
depl oyedpersonnel .
(1)Strengths. Status of personnel i s reported onl y when a
change takes pl ace, i .e. wounded, mi ssi ng, captured, or
ki l l ed.
(2)Replacements. The provi si ons of repl acements depends
uponthecapabi l i tyoftheoperati onal detachmenttorecei ve
them and theater servi ce components to del i ver them.
Repl acementsareprovi dedonani ndi vi dual ordetachment
basi s.
(3)Discipline, law and order. Commanders of commi tted
detachments are gi ven a cl ear statement of thei r
di sci pl i nary authori ty as del egated by the hi gher
commander.
(4)POWs. The handl i ng of pri soners wi l l depend upon the
exi genci esofthesi tuati onandi sgovernedbythefactthat
theU.S.i sfi rml ycommi ttedtohumanetreatmentandcare
ofPOWs.
(5)Burials and graves registration. Theater army pre scri bes
gui dance for reporti ng and/or marki ng graves wi thi n
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.
(6)Morale and personnel services. Detachment commanders'
recommendati ons for awards are processed promptl y or
authori ty to award certai n decorati ons i s gi ven the
detachment commanders. Mai l i s handl ed by a
preestabl i shed system; automati c answers are di spatched
when desi red by i ndi vi dual s; peri odi c del i very may be
possi bl e wi th resuppl y drops i f securi ty consi derati ons
permi t. Personal necessi ti es are provi ded automati cal l y
wi th resuppl y. These normal l y are procured from
i ndi genous sources or speci al l y packaged to preserve
41
securi tyandareprovi dedforbothdetachmentandguerri l l a
personnel .
(7)Personnel procedures. Promoti on recommendati ons are
preparedi nadvancetobei mpl ementedwhenrecommended
by the detachment commander. Demoti on authori ty
del egated to detachment commanders i s outl i ned by the
theaterarmycommander.
(8)Miscellaneous. Pol i ci es coveri ng pay or recogni ti on for
i ndi genoustroopsareoutl i nedbythetheatercommander.
When requi red, confi denti al funds are i ssued to the
detachment commander. Barter i tems, such as medi ci ne,
gol d,orotherscarcei tems,arei ssuedorhel dfordel i very
on order. Credi t systems for servi ces rendered may be
establ i shed.TheS1i nsuresthat,pri ortothedepartureof
detachments for guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas, each
mani sgi venacompl etepersonnel processi ngi naccordance
wi ththeSOP.
b. Distribution center. The S1 establ i shes and supervi ses a
di stri buti on center for the orderl y handl i ng of correspondence i nto,
wi thi nandoutoftheheadquarters.Thi scentercontrol sal l messages
except those ori gi nati ng. from commi tted detachments or TOC. The
communi cati on center operated by the communi cati ons pl atoon
control smessagestoandfromcommi tteddetachments.
32. Logistics
a.General. The l ogi sti cal responsi bi l i ti es of the SFOB are
twofol d: fi rst, support of the guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas;
second, support of the SFOB and other unconventi onal warfare
el ements as desi gnated. To thi s end, the speci al forces group
organi zesal ogi sti cal supportel ement.
The l ogi sti cal support el ement i ncl udes organi c speci al forces
group l ogi sti cs secti ons pl us any attached or supporti ng l ogi sti cal
uni ts from other headquarters and/or CommZ. The speci al forces
group S4 normal l y control s the operati ons of the l ogi sti cal support
el ement. When the l ogi sti cal support of the SFOB reaches such
magni tude that numerous attached or supporti ng servi ce el ements
are requi red, then a separate commander of the l ogi sti cal support
el ementi sappoi ntedfromCommZsourcestoassi stthespeci al forces
groupS4.
b. Organization. For a typi cal l ogi sti cal organi zati on i n the
SFOB,seefi gure14.
c. Planning.Theassi stantS4functi onsasthel ogi sti cal pl anner
for the S4 secti on. The assi stant S4 prepares the admi ni strati ve
annexes for the guerri l l a warfare areas operati on pl ans. He
42
coordi nates wi th S3 pl ans group i n the preparati on of these
admi ni strati veannexes.Theassi stantS4i stheS4representati vei n
TOC.
d. Logistical Operations at the SFOB. The l ogi sti cal support
el ementcoordi natesl ogi sti cal supportforal l el ementsofthebaseand
the guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas. The fol l owi ng are provi ded
for:
(1)Requirements. A conti nui ng revi ew of requi rements and
submi ssi onoftheserequi rementstotheappropri atesuppl y
agency.
(2)Limited storage. The SFOB i s prepared to provi de short
term storage for suppl i es. Thi s storage i s onl y temporary
unti l suppl i es are packaged and shi pped to the del i very
43
agency. Large stocks of suppl i es are not desi rabl e at the
SFOB ; however, nonstandard or speci al i tems are stored
thereforl ongerperi odsofti me.
(3) Preparation of supplies. Normal l y, suppl i es are speci al l y
packaged for aeri al del i very. Packagi ng i s i ni ti al l y
accompl i shed under the supervi si on of the parachute-
ri ggi ng pl atoon assi sted by uncommi tted detachments. As
soon as possi bl e, QM aeri al suppl y uni ts assume
responsi bi l i ty for packagi ng, taki ng advantage of depot
capabi l i ti es. Ci vi l i an l abor may be empl oyed i n thi s
operati on. Packagi ng may expand to a si zeabl e operati on
andi saccompl i shedi nanareaneartheSFOBoradjacent
to the departure i nstal l ati on. When ai r superi ori ty i s
achi evedandregul arsuppl yschedul esforbul ksuppl i esare
establ i shed, the emphasi s shi fts from smal l , man-portabl e
bundl estol argepackageswhi chareheavy-droppedorai r-
l anded. When the packagi ng capabi l i ty exi sts i n CommZ
depots,theSFOBdoesnotrequi reanextensi vepackagi ng
acti vi ty.
(4)Coordination. A l i ai son secti on attached to l ogi sti cal
support el ement coordi nates wi th theater l ogi sti cal
agenci es. Thi s secti on, composed of CommZ and other
servi ces' l ogi sti cal representati ves, expedi tes l ogi sti cal
mattersfortheSFOB.
(5)Supportofotherunconventionalwarfareunitsandattached
supportingunits.TheSFOBsupportsaddi ti onal uni tsand
el ements desi gnated i n pl ans. Thi s may i ncl ude techni cal
servi ce and support el ements at the base pl us other
unconventi onal warfareuni tssuchastheJUWTF.
(6)Shipment of supplies to the delivery agency. Thi s i s
normal l y the responsi bi l i ty of the SFOB. Because of the
packagi ng requi red, i t usual l y i s not feasi bl e to shi p
suppl i esdi rectl yfromdepotstodeparturei nstal l ati ons.I fa
packagi ng faci l i ty i s l ocated at the departure poi nt, then
suppl i es may be del i vered di rect from depot to departure
i nstal l ati on by CommZ. I f packagi ng can be accompl i shed
at the depots, the fl ow of suppl i es to the departure
i nstal l ati onbypassestheSFOB.
44
45
CHAPTER5
THEATERSUPPORT
SectionI.LOGISTICS
33. General
a.Support Aspects. Wi thi n a theater of operati ons one or more
speci al forces groups may be avai l abl e to support the theater
commander's mi ssi on. Asi de from the organi zati on precepts whi ch
weresetforthi nchapters3and4,therearecertai nsupportaspects
whi charedi scussedfromthepoi ntofvi ewofthetheaterandSFOB
pl anners. These support concepts are di scussed under the general
headi ngs of l ogi sti cs, i ntel l i gence, communi cati ons, and i ni ti al
contact.
b. Logistics.Oneofthepri marymeansusedbyanoutsi depower
to assi st a guerri l l a movement i s l ogi sti cal support. Whi l e guerri l l a
forces are expected to be abl e to provi de a major porti on of thei r
l ogi sti cal requi rements from l ocal sources, certai n speci al i zed
equi pment must be obtai ned from the sponsor. Numerous probl ems
maybeencounteredi nprovi di ngadequatesupporttoguerri l l auni ts
whi ch usual l y are l ocated great di stances from fri endl y support
i nstal l ati ons. The physi cal probl ems of transporti ng and del i veri ng
undetected, rel ati vel y l arge quanti ti es of suppl i es i ncrease i n
proporti ontothedi stancei ntoenemy-domi natedterri tory.However,
guerri l l a l ogi sti cal requi rements are smal l er i n quanti ty and l ess
compl exthanthosefoundi naconventi onal forceofcomparabl esi ze.
Thi stendstooffsetsomeofthedi sadvantages.
34. JUWTF
The JUWTF i s responsi bl e to the theater commander for the
conduct of unconventi onal warfare, but each component servi ce i s
responsi bl e for the l ogi sti cal support of i ts own forces assi gned to
JUWTF. The JUWTF prepares, or assi sts i n prepari ng, the
unconventi onal warfare annex to theater war pl ans, and pl ans and
coordi nates al l l ogi sti cal support for unconventi onal warfare
operati onsi nthetheater.Servi cecomponentcommandersunderthe
JUWTFaredesi gnatedbutarenoti nthechai nofcommandunti l the
JUWTF becomes operati onal . For thi s reason, JUWTF has to work
di rectl y wi th the l ogi sti cal headquarters of each theater servi ce
componentandi nsurethesupportofArmy,Navy,orAi rForceuni ts
that may be attached to JUWTF. The speci al forces group
commandi ngoffi cer,ascommanderoftheSFOB,i susual l ytheArmy
46
componentcommander.JUWTFheadquartersprovi destheaterarmy
communi cati ons zone (CommZ) wi th l ogi sti cal esti matesforsupport
of the SFOB, the commi tted speci al forces detachments and the
guerri l l a forces to be generated. Thi s type of pl anni ng entai l s a
myri ad of detai l and i s made more compl ex by the many di fferent
requi rements resul ti ng from the vari ed geographi c l ocati ons of
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areasandthevaryi ngsi zesofpotenti al
guerri l l aforces.
35. J4
Si nce JUWTF has no subordi nate headquarters, troops, or
l ogi sti cal support capabi l i ty unti l operati ons start, the JUWTF J4
usual l ydoesnotsupervi sethephysi cal functi onsofl ogi sti cal support,
buthei sthepri marystaffpl annerandcoordi natorwhoi nsurethat
adequatemeansareprovi ded.Therecommendati onsandrequestsof
JUWTF are i ncorporated i nto theater headquarters' pl ans or
di recti ves. Thi s starts the physi cal process of provi di ng the needed
l ogi sti cal support.
36. TheaterArmy
The commander of the theater army CommZ i s responsi bl e for
provi di ngadmi ni strati veandl ogi sti cal supporttospeci al forcesuni ts
l ocated i n the theater and to other theater unconventi onal warfare
forces as di rected. The actual mechani cs of procurement, recei pt,
storage, mai ntenance, di stri buti on of suppl i es and equi pment, and
theprovi di ngofservi cesandfaci l i ti esthatareneededtosupportthe
Army porti on of unconventi onal warfare operati ons, di ffer l i ttl e, i f
any,fromthemechani csofconventi onal uni tl ogi sti cal support.Any
necessary devi ati ons are determi ned by di rect pl anni ng and
coordi nati onbetweenCommZandJUWTForthespeci al forcesgroup.
37. SpecialForcesGroup
a. The speci al forces group or groups assi gned to a theater are
responsi bl e for pl anni ng l ogi sti cal support for the commi tment of
operati onal detachmentsandforassi sti ngJUWTFi npl anni ngforthe
establ i shment of the SFOB. Before i ts attachment to JUWTF, the
groupi sresponsi bl eforrecommendi ngthatspeci al andnon-standard
suppl i esandequi pmentbei ncl udedi nunconventi onal warfarepl ans.
b. Thecl osestpossi bl el i ai sonbetweenJUWTFandspeci al forces
groupi smandatoryi nthefol l owi ngareas:
(1)Operati onal requi rementsfor:
(a) Quanti ti esofsuppl i esandequi pment.
(b)Medi cal support.
(c) Uni tsandfaci l i ti esforSFOB.
47
(2)Submi ssi onofcross-servi ci ngrequi rementstoJUWTF.
(3) Coordi nati on of pl ans for del i very of the suppl i es and
equi pmenti ntooperati onal areas.
38. LogisticalDoctrineandPolicies
a.General.Theappl i cati onofl ogi sti cal operati onsi nsupportof
unconventi onal warfare di ffers from that normal l y consi dered i n
supportof,othertheaterforces.
b. Application.
(1) Thefi veoperati onsofl ogi sti csare
(a)Transportati on.
(b)Evacuati onandhospi tal i zati on.
(c)Suppl y.
(d)Servi ce.
(e)Management.
(f)Thei r speci al appl i cati on to the unconventi onal warfare
si tuati oni sdescri bedi nthefol l owi ngparagraphs.
39. Transportation
Unconventi onal warfareoperati onscanbesupportedbyl and,sea
or ai r transportati on means. As a practi cal matter, however, the
majori tyofoperati onsandsi tuati onsrequi resupportbyai r.Because
of the depth of penetrati on, the cargo wei ght to be carri ed and the
speedwi thwhi chtheoperati oni stobeexecuted,theAi rForcehas
the greatest capabi l i ty for thi s support. I n certai n si tuati ons, the
Navy may possess a more appropri ate capabi l i ty for a parti cul ar
operati on, especi al l y wi th carri er-based ai rcraft. Thi s capabi l i ty i s
uti l i zedbythetheatercommanderal l ocati ngtheneedednaval forces
to provi de support requested. Successful sorti es wi th speci al forces
detachmentsorcargoesrequi reni ghtfl i ghtsofl ong-rangeandatl ow
al ti tudes (50-400 feet) i n order to escape el ectroni c detecti on.
Trai ni ng of ai rcrews i n l ow-l evel fl yi ng and navi gati on techni ques
joi ntl ywi thspeci al forcesuni tsi smandatory.
40. Evacuation
Evacuati onformedi cal attenti onorotherreasonsfromaguerri l l a
warfareoperati onal areai sconsi deredonl yforkeypersonnel .Even
forthi sl i mi tednumberthedi ffi cul ti esi nvol vedmakesuchpl anni ng
tenuous.Theabi l i tyofthetheatertoprovi detransportati onandthe
capabi l i tyofguerri l l astotemporari l ysecureevacuati onsi tesarethe
governi ngfactors.
41. Supply
48
a.Determination of Requirements. Proper preparati on for
unconventi onal warfare operati ons pl aces a responsi bi l i ty on al l
headquarters from speci al forces group l evel up. I ni ti ati ve to
commencel ogi sti cal pl anni ngmustbeexerci sedateveryl evel .Afree
fl ow of recommendati ons and pl anni ng gui dance between al l
i nterested commands and agenci es must take pl ace. The process of
determi ni ngrequi rementswi l l begi nwhentwofundamental deci si ons
aremadebytheater:(1)Thedesi gnati onofgeographi cal l ocati onsof
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas,and(2)thesi zeoftheguerri l l a
force to be sponsored. Detai l ed requi rements are based on the
operati onal war pl ans, current l ogi sti cal pl anni ng factors and
mi scel l aneous factors such as cul tural , seasonal and cl i mati c
condi ti ons, and l ogi sti cal support that may exi st wi thi n guerri l l a
warfareoperati onal areas.Thespeci al forcesdetachmentcommander,
groupstaffoffi cers,andJUWTFstaffoffi cersi n.parti cul armustbe
al erttodetermi nethosei temsofstandardor,non-standardsuppl i es
or equi pment needed to support operati onal mi ssi ons. Once
requi rements have been determi ned and pri ori ti es establ i shed,
requestsareprocessedi nthenormal mannerthrougharmyl ogi sti cal
channel s.Local purchaseprocedurescanhastentheprocurementof
non-standardorsubsti tutei tems.Thedetermi nati onofrequi rements
andthei ri ncl usi oni nappropri atewarpl ansi samajorsteptoward
i nsuri ngadequatel ogi sti cal support.
b.Stockpiling.
(1) Stockpi l i ng i s the accumul ati on of mobi l i zati on reserve
stocks i n support of strategi c pl ans and contempl ated
speci al forces operati ons i n guerri l l a warfare operati onal
areas. Except i n unusual ci rcumstances, i tems stockpi l ed
forunconventi onal warfareusearestoredbytheaterarmy
forneedsexpectedduri ngthefi rstsi xtydaysofoperati ons.
Accessi bl e stockpi l es i n adequate amounts, content, and
conveni ent l ocati on resul t from thorough and detai l ed
pl anni ng commenci ng wi th the cl ear determi nati on of
requi rements,i ncl usi onoftheserequi rementsi napproved
war pl ans, and the avai l abi l i ty of funds. The creati on of
stockpi l es for unconventi onal warfare operati ons i s
accompl i shed through the same l ogi sti cal process as for
other army materi el requi rements. Li mi ted stockpi l i ng of
obsol etesuppl i esandequi pmenti sconsi deredappropri ate
for the support of unconventi onal warfare. Such i tems
'shoul d recei ve mi ni mum mai ntenance wi th the ri sk that
onl y a smal l percentage of the materi el wi l l not be
servi ceabl e when needed. ZI stocks of obsol ete equi pment
shoul d be kept on the same basi s. Parts resuppl y wi l l be
dependentuponstockpi l i ng.
49
(2) I n general , unconventi onal warfare stockpi l es are not
segregated, but the i tems are earmarked and stored i n
depotsal ongwi thal l othersi mi l ari temsfortheaterarmy.
Defi ni tepri ori ti esareestabl i shedbytheaterJ4fordel i very
of materi el . The probl ems of i n-storage mai ntenance and
i nspecti on,aswel l asthatofdetermi ni ngthebestl ocati on
forseparatestoragesi tes,makei tabetterpracti cetokeep
unconventi onal warfare stockpi l es i n CommZ depots.
Logi sti cal pl ans i ncl ude the del i very schedul e to speci fi c
l ocati ons.Forexcepti onstostockpi l i ngsuppl i esi nCommZ
depots,seeparagraphebel ow.
(3) Whi l etheformati onofsuchreservesi stheresponsi bi l i tyof
thetheatercommander,thecontentofstockpi l esfromthe
standpoi nts of qual i ty and sui tabi l i ty must be determi ned
by personnel i n the speci al forces group. Smal l stockpi l es
contai ni ng onl y the materi el whi ch wi l l accompany
detachments on i nfi l trati on, or be i ncl uded i n the i ni ti al
resuppl y, are mai ntai ned separatel y and are avai l abl e for
emergencyuse.
c. Prepackaging. Prepackagi ng for unconventi onal warfare
operati ons means that suppl i es and equi pment desti ned for both
i ni ti al andsubsequentresuppl yl oadsarestockpi l edi npackagesfor
fi nal di stri buti on. Al l of the standard suppl i es and equi pment
del i vered to the operati onal areaare packaged i none-man-portabl e
l oadsoffi ftypounds.Eachpackageshoul dcontai nbal ancedi tems,be
compl eteki tsfori mmedi ateuse(weaponwi thammuni ti on,etc.),be
safefromhazardsofweather,handl i ng,anddeteri orati on,andhavea
packboardorcarryi ngstraps.Ski l l ful useofi tems,suchascl othi ng,
for i nternal packagi ng materi al wi l l produce savi ngs i n wei ght and
bul k.Thegoal i stohavepackagesreadyfordel i very.Asapracti cal
matter,however,thegreatertheti mebetweenpackagi ngandactual
use, the more uncertai n i t i s that the contents wi l l be servi ceabl e
whenopened.
d. Preemergency Caches. The pl acement, ti mi ng, and l ocati on of
preemergency caches of essenti al suppl i es to support projected
operati ons are pl anned by the theater commander based upon the
recommendati onsoftheJUWTF.Thesecachesareestabl i shedwhen
aparti cul arneedexi sts,adequatesecuri tycanbe,provi ded,andthe
packagi ngprovi desend-useservi ceabi l i tyofareasonabl epercentage
of the suppl i es. The many vari abl es, such as ti me of use, l ocati on,
securi ty, deteri orati on, and the i ni ti al expense, make the
establ i shmentofeachcacheamatterofi ndi vi dual consi derati on.
e. AccompanyingSupplyLoads.Accompanyi ngsuppl yandi ni ti al
resuppl y l oads to 'support unconventi onal warfare operati ons are
pl anned on a basi s of austeri ty. The l oads consi st of i tems i n
50
quanti ti es essenti al for combat operati ons and detachment survi val
forthi rtydays.Speci fi cquanti ti esofdemol i ti onmateri al s,weapons,
ammuni ti on, and medi cal suppl i es are determi ned by speci al forces
grouppl annersfromanexami nati onofthestatedmi ssi oncontai ned
i napprovedwarpl ans.Oncetheaccompanyi ngandi ni ti al resuppl y
equi pment has been procured, i t i s packaged and prepared for
del i very.Suchmateri el shoul dnotbemai ntai nedasgeneral stocki n
exi sti ng CommZ depots, but l ocated i n the vi ci ni ty of departure
i nstal l ati ons.
f.Accountability. Formal accountabi l i ty for suppl i es and
equi pmentaccompani esthemateri el tothedeparturei nstal l ati on.Al l
suppl i es and equi pment l eavi ng the departure i nstal l ati on for
operati onal useareconsi deredtobeexpended.Nosal vageorrecovery
operati ons are consi dered i n l ogi sti cal pl anni ng. Al though al l
commanders concerned are responsi bl e for the securi ty and proper
useofthemateri el ,theheavi estresponsi bi l i tyrestsuponthespeci al
forces detachment commanders. SFOB wi l l keep i nformal
accountabi l i ty for al l materi el i n order to report the amounts of
cri ti cal i tems, such as weapons, commi tted to a guerri l l a warfare
operati onal area. Suppl y and di stri buti on of cri ti cal i tems are
control l ed to assi st an orderl y post-war transi ti on to peaceti me
pursui ts.
g.ResupplyTechniques.Toreducethei mpactofequi pmentl osses
whi ch may occur duri ng i nfi l trati on and subsequentoperati ons,the
SFOBschedul esbothautomati cresuppl yandemergencyresuppl y.
(1) Automati c resuppl y. Automati c resuppl y i s schedul ed for
del i veryshortl yafterthedetachmenthasbeencommi tted.
I ti sprearrangedastoti me,del i verysi te,andcomposi ti on
ofl oad.Thi sresuppl yi sdel i veredautomati cal l yunl essthe
detachment cancel s or modi fi es the ori gi nal pl an.
Automati c resuppl y i s pl anned to repl ace l ost ordamaged
i tems of equi pment or to augment the detachment wi th
equi pmentwhi chcoul dnotbecarri edi nonthei nfi l trati on.
(2) Emergencyresuppl y.Emergencyresuppl yi sschedul edfor
del i very after the detachment has been commi tted and
prearranged as to ti me and composi ti on of l oad. The
del i very si te i s sel ected and reported by the detachment
after i nfi l trati on. The del i very of emergency resuppl y i s
conti ngent upon and i ni ti ated when communi cati ons from
the operati onal detachment are i nterrupted for a
predetermi ned peri od of ti me. The content of emergency
resuppl y i s normal l y communi cati ons and survi val
equi pment to restore the detachment operati onal
capabi l i ty.
51
(3) Frequency rate of resuppl y. The number of resuppl y
mi ssi ons i s l i mi ted unti l i t can be determi ned that the
detachment wi l l not be compromi sed by fl i ghts over the
guerri l l a warfare operati onal area, and/or unti l ai r
superi ori ty can be establ i shed at a presel ected ti me and
pl ace.Ami ni mumofoneresuppl ymi ssi onperthi rtydays
per commi tted detachment i s pl anned duri ng thi s i ni ti al
peri od.Thefrequencyofmi ssi onsi ncreaseswi ththedegree
of ai r superi ori ty establ i shed by fri endl y forces, unti l
resuppl ymi ssi onsarefl ownasrequi red.
(4) Catal ogue suppl y system (app. I I ). I n order to expedi te
requests, i nsure accuracy i n i denti fi cati on of types and
amounts of suppl i es and equi pment, and to faci l i tate
communi cati onstransmi ssi onsecuri ty,speci al forcesuni ts
empl oyabrevi tycodesystemforrequesti ngsuppl i es.Thi s
brevi tycodei sknownasacatal oguesuppl ysystem(CSS)
and i ts preparati on i s the responsi bi l i ty of the C0, SFOB.
The CSS i s appl i cabl e to al l speci al forces and guerri l l a
uni ts.TheCSSi susedforthreecategori esofsuppl i es:
(a)Those cri ti cal i tems of suppl y essenti al to combat
operati ons,e.g.,arms,ammuni ti on,anddemol i ti ons;
(b)Those cri ti cal i tems of suppl y essenti al for i ndi vi dual
survi val ,e.g.,rati ons,medi ci neandcl othi ng;
(5) I ncreased amounts of the cri ti cal i tems contai ned i n
categori es (a) and (b), but packaged i n bul k for use i n a
rapi dbui l dupphaseofguerri l l aforcedevel opment.
(a)Suppl y bundl es for categori es (a) and (b) are del i vered
pri mari l yduri ngthei ni ti al phaseofoperati onswhereas
category (c) bundl es are del i vered when the growi ng
resi stance force or tempo of combat requi res i ncreased
amountsofessenti al combatsuppl i es.
(b)Characteri sti cs of an effi ci ent catal ogue suppl y system
are cri ti cal i tems of suppl y packed i n packages of fi fty
pounds or l ess; packages whi ch are man-portabl e and
protectedfromhandl i ngandweatherdamage;packages
the composi ti on of whi ch i s such that i n storage
handl i ngandmai ntenancearesi mpl e;ani denti fi cati on
code desi gned for accuracy i n transmi ssi on when
encrypted.
42. Services
Theater army emergency and war pl ans cl earl y defi ne the
responsi bi l i ti es of speci fi c CommZ servi ce and support uni ts i n
assi sti ng the speci al forces group to establ i sh the SFOB. These
52
desi gnateduni tsmaybeattacheddi rectl ytotheSFOBorbeassi gned
mi ssi onsi ndi rectsupportoftheSFOB.Exampl esofservi cesupport
thatmayberequi redbytheSFOBare
a. Engi neer(i nstal l ati onsupport).
b. Ordnance(3dechel on).
c. Medi cal (abovedi spensaryl evel ).
d. Si gnal (3dechel onandi nstal l ati onsupport).
e. Transportati on.
f. Armyavi ati on.
g. Counteri ntel l i gencecorps.
h. Mi l i taryPol i ce(securi ty).
i. ArmySecuri tyAgency.
j. Ci vi l i anl abor.
k. QMaeri al suppl i es.
43. Management
Thefuncti onsofl ogi sti csmanagementareperformedi ngeneral l y
the same manner at SFOB as i n other mi l i tary uni ts.Management
i ncl udes
a. Supervi si onofthel ogi sti cal operati on.
b. Logi sti cal esti matesandpl ans.
c. Admi ni strati veannexestoorders.
d. Logi sti cal recordsandreports.
e. Coordi nati onwi ththeaterl ogi sti cal agenci es.
SectionII.INTELLIGENCE
44. General
a. A thorough knowl edge of the enemy, terrai n and resi stance
potenti al ,coupl edwi thani nti mateunderstandi ngofthei ndi genous
popul ati on wi thi n operati onal areas, i s essenti al to the success of
unconventi onal warfare operati ons. Pri or to depl oyment, speci al
forces operati onal detachments compl ete detai l ed area studi es and
recei ve comprehensi ve i ntel l i gence bri efi ngs at the SFOB. After
depl oyment, the detachment conti nues to add to i ts background
knowl edge by a thorough and conti nui ng assessment of the area,
usi ng i ntel l i gence devel oped wi thi n the area. Thus, armed wi th
i ntel l i genceacqui redbeforeandafteri nfi l trati on,thedetachmenti s
betterabl etowel del ementsoftheareacommandi ntoacoordi nated
andeffecti veforcecapabl eofsupporti ngtheatermi l i taryoperati ons.
53
b. Paragraphs 45 and 46 provi de commanders wi th an
understandi ng of the speci al forces i ntel l i gence requi rements for
unconventi onal warfare operati ons i n general and guerri l l a warfare
i nparti cul ar.
c. Detai l s of procedures and techni ques rel ated to combat
i ntel l i gence whi ch are contai ned i n the 30-seri es and basi c branch
manual sareomi ttedfromthi smanual .
45. Requirements
a.General.
(1) I ntel l i gencerequi rementsatal l commandl evel sconcerned
wi th the conduct of unconventi onal warfare operati ons
encompass the enti re spectrum of i ntel l i gence. Pri or to
operati ons, the JUWTF and the speci al forces group both
dependonstrategi ci ntel l i gence.Asoperati onsarei ni ti ated
and speci al forces detachments are depl oyed i nto enemy
occupi ed terri tory, combat i ntel l i gence suppl ements
strategi ci ntel l i gence.Al thoughtheareacommandi smore
often the user of combat i ntel l i gence, the SFOB and the
JUWTF both use combat i ntel l i gence appl i cabl e to thei r
l evel .
(2) I n order to i mprove the chances for success i n combat
operati ons,thespeci al forcesdetachmentrequi resagreater
degree of preparati on i n predepl oyment i ntel l i gence than
army uni ts of battl e group or comparabl e si ze. I t i s
desi rabl e for the detachment to acqui re thi s i ntel l i gence
backgroundwel l i nadvanceofoperati onsbyi ntensi vearea
studyofpredesi gnatedregi onsoftheworl d.
(3) Coordi nati on for i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence
acti vi ti esi nsupportofprojectedspeci al forcesoperati onsi s
accompl i shedi npeaceti mebythetheaterarmycommander
i n accordance wi th joi nt unconventi onal warfare pl ans.
Duri ng hosti l i ti es coordi nati on for i ntel l i gence and
counteri ntel l i gence acti vi ti es i n support of guerri l l a forces
i saccompl i shedthroughtheJUWTF.
b. Pre-I nfiltrationRequirements.
(1)Operational detachments. Speci al forces detachments
requi re a thorough background knowl edge of thei r
operati onal area pri or to depl oyment. Thi s background
knowl edge, accompl i shed through the medi um of ari a
studi es,i sdi vi dedi ntotwophases
(a)General area study. Thi s i s the broad background
knowl edge of an area, regi on or country. See appendi x
I I I foratypegeneral areastudyformat.
54
(b)Operational Area I ntelligence. Thi s i s the detai l ed
i ntel l i genceofadesi gnatedgueri l l awarfareoperati onal
area i ncl udi ng that i nformati on necessary for the
detachmentto
1. I nfi l tratetheoperati onal area.
2.Contactresi stanceel ements.
3. I ni ti ate operati ons. See appendi x I I I for an
operati onal areai ntel l i genceformat.
(2)Special forces group. The speci al forces group requi res
current i ntel l i gence of i ts assi gned guerri l l a warfare
operati onal areas i n order to conduct preemergency
pl anni ng for the empl oyment of the operati onal
detachments. Al though area studi es are prepared and
provi ded by speci al research agenci es, the detachment
studi esarereorgani zedi ntoamoreappropri ateformatfor
operati onal use. The S2 secti on procures the necessary
i ntel l i gencedocumentsfromwhi chdetachmentareastudi es
areprepared.Coordi nati onthroughprescri bedchannel si s
effected wi th al l appropri ate theater i ntel l i gence agenci es
for. the conti nuous procurement of ti mel y area and
operati onal i ntel l i gence. Several methods of area study
preparati onarefeasi bl e.
(a)Thedetachmentspreparethegeneral areastudyandas
much of the operati onal area i ntel l i gence as i s
compati bl e wi th securi ty. From the poi nt of vi ew of
detachment knowl edge, thi s method i s the most
advantageous. Di sadvantages are ti me, securi ty, and
l ackofstabi l i tyi npersonnel assi gnments.
(b)The group S2 secti on prepares the general area study
andoperati onal areai ntel l i gence.
(c)Area speci al i st teams (ASTs) prepare the general area
studyandoperati onal areai ntel l i gence.
(d)Vari ous combi nati ons of the above methods. The S2
secti on constantl y revi ses area studi es based upon the
l atest i ntel l i gence. I n parti cul ar, the S2 mai ntai ns
operati onal areai ntel l i genceasaccuratel yandcurrentl y
aspossi bl e.
(3)J ointunconventionalwarfaretaskforce.
(a)TheJUWTFrequi resareastudi esoftheenti retheater
area of operati ons. Materi al for these area studi es i s
provi ded by the theater commander. Thi s i ntel l i gence
provi des the JUWTF commander wi th a basi s for
recommendati onsastothesel ecti onofguerri l l awarfare
55
operati onal areas that best support theater war pl ans.
Once these areas have been approved by the theater
commander, the JUWTF assi gns certai n areas, based
uponpri ori ti es,tothespeci al forcesgroup.
(b) The JUWTF coordi nates procurement of i ntel l i gence
materi al needed by the speci al forces group to
accompl i shi tsoperati onmi ssi ons.I trequestsfromother
theater component forces i ntel l i gence materi al and
i nsuresthatrequi rementsofthespeci al forcesgroupare
sati sfi ed.
c. Post-I nfiltrationRequirements.
(1)Specialforcesoperationalbase.
(a)The SFOB i s pri mari l y concerned wi th i ntel l i gence
whi ch
1. Supportstheexpansi onofoperati onswi thi nacti ve
orpotenti al operati onal areas.
2. Ai ds i n determi ni ng current pol i ti cal trends i n
operati onal areas.
3. Ai dsi ndetermi ni ngmajorenemyacti vi ti eswhi ch
i nfl uenceoperati onswi thi ntheareaconcernedand
i notherporti onsofthetheater.
4. Ai ds i n determi ni ng weather condi ti ons i n or en
routetotheareawhi chaffectsexternal support.
5. Supports guerri l l a warfare area psychol ogi cal
warfareoperati ons.
6. Ai ds i n determi ni ng enemy capabi l i ti es whi ch
coul di nterferewi ththeoperati onsoftheSFOB.
7. Supportcoveranddecepti on.
(b)The SFOB has a requi rement for combat i ntel l i gence,
whi ch i t rei nterprets and reeval uates i n l i ght of
projectedtheateroperati ons.
(c)After depl oyment of speci al forces detachments i nto
operati onal areas, the SFOB becomes an i ntel l i gence
i nformati on col l ecti on agency avai l abl e to al l servi ces
andagenci eswi thi nthetheater.
(d)The SFOB furni shes i ntel l i gence to commi tted
detachments as requi red. Much of thi s i ntel l i gence i s
provi dedfromothertheaterforces.
(2)J ointunconventionalwarfaretaskforce.
(a)I ntel l i gence requi rements of the JUWTF stem from
pl anni ng and coordi nati ng unconventi onal warfare
acti vi ti eswi thi nthetheater.Suchrequi rementscl osel y
56
resembl ethoseofthetheatercommanderbybei ngbroad
i nscopeandhavi ngl ong-rangeappl i cati on.
(b)Muchofthei ntel l i genceusedbytheJUWTFi sprovi ded
by other forces of the theater. JUWTF, through i ts
subordi nate uni ts, i s a major col l ecti on agency of
strategi c i ntel l i gence for the theater. I t coordi nates
cl osel y wi th the theater i ntel l i gence di vi si on and
appropri ate i ntel l i gence agenci es of other servi ce
components for an i ntegrated col l ecti on effort wi thi n
enemyrearareas.
46. Intelligence Activities Within Guerrilla Warfare Operational
Area
The depl oyed speci al forces detachment i s i deal l y si tuated to
contri bute to the theater i ntel l i gence pl an. Uti l i zi ng i ndi genous
agenci esandsourcessubordi natetotheareacommand,i tcangather
andrel aytotheSFOEi ntel l i gencei nformati onofval uetothetheater
and component force commanders. However, certai n practi cal
l i mi tati ons exi st as to the vol ume of transmi ssi on from wi thi n
guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas to hi gher headquarters. The
securi ty of the speci al forces detachment and the resi stance effort
restri cts radi o traffi c and consequentl y the amount of i ntel l i gence
i nformati on whi ch can be expected. Hi gher commanders prescri be
thoseel ementsofi nformati onrequi redofspeci al forcesdetachments
and provi de the necessary code systems to reduce the l ength of
i ntel l i gence reports transmi tted by radi o. EEI assi gned to speci al
forcesdetachmentsarekepttothemi ni mum.
SectionIII.COMMUNICATIONS
47. General
The communi cati ons system establ i shed for the support of
unconventi onal warfare wi thi n a theater i s desi gned to provi de the
theatercommanderwi thmeanstocontrol wi despreadunconventi onal
warfareforcesl ocatedi ndeni edareas.Thesystemmustal sosupport
the acti vi ti es of the base el ements of unconventi onal warfare uni ts
l ocatedi nfri endl yterri tory.TheJUWTFi sresponsi bl eforpl anni ng
andcoordi nati ngthetheaterunconventi onal warfarecommuni cati ons
system. The speci al forces communi cati ons system, wi th i ts hub
l ocated at the SFOB, provi des communi cati ons for speci al forces
el ementsofthetheaterunconventi onal warfareeffort.
48. TypeSystems
a. SFOB:TheaterSystem.
57
(1) The purpose of thi s system i s to provi de communi cati ons
betweentheSFOBandothertheateragenci es,andbetween
el ementsoftheSFOB.Si ncethebasei sl ocatedi nfri endl y
terri tory, thi s communi cati on system i s comparabl e tothe
communi cati onsystemofanyconventi onal headquarters.A
tel ephone,andtel etypeswi tchboardi sprovi dedatthebase.
Thi sswi tchboardi sconnectedtotheareasi gnal centerand
through the faci l i ti es of area si gnal system to al l other
theater and army headquarters. The speci al forces group
has the faci l i ti es to termi nate these communi cati on l i nes
wi thbothtel ephoneortel etype,ei therpl ai norencrypted.
(2) For both techni cal and operati onal reasons, the radi o
transmi tter and recei ver si tes servi ng the base may be
l ocated at consi derabl e di stances from the base proper.
Communi cati ons are provi ded between the operati ons
center and the radi o transmi tters and recei vers. The
faci l i ti esoftheareasi gnal systemmaybeusedforthi s.
(3) Tel ephoneservi cewi thi nthebaseproperi sprovi dedbythe
communi cati ons pl atoon of headquarters company, speci al
forcesgroup,butthepl atoonhasnei therthepersonnel nor
faci l i ti estoprovi del ongdi stancewi recommuni cati ons.The
l ong-l i ne wi re communi cati ons are provi ded by the area
si gnal center.Thecommuni cati onspl atoondoeshaveradi o
andradi o-tel etypeequi pmenttobackupthel ong-l i newi re
communi cati onsprovi dedbytheareasi gnal system.
b. BaseCommandSystem.Thi ssystemfurni shescommuni cati on
between the base and a detachment i n an operati onal area. Thi s i s
the communi cati ons system through whi ch the commander
coordi natesandcontrol stheguerri l l aeffort.I ti s,normal l y,theonl y
l i nk between a commi tted detachment and a regul ar mi l i tary force.
Si ncethecommi tteddetachmentsmaybeupto2,500mi l esfromthe
base,thi ssystemmustdependonradi o.Theradi oattheSFOBcan
be as el aborate and as powerful as necessary. The commi tted
detachments,however,haveri gi drestri cti onsonthesi zeandwei ght
of thei r radi os. Because of thi s, and because of the extended
di stances,successful communi cati onsrequi remoredetai l edpl anni ng
andahi gherstandardofoperatortrai ni ngthani susual l ythecase.
Si nce the detachment i s l ocated wi thi n a deni ed area, greater
emphasi sthannormal i spl acedoncommuni cati onssecuri ty.
c. Area I nternal System. Thi s system provi des the area
commanderwi thcommuni cati onstosubordi nateel ementswhen(1)a
si ngl e speci al forces detachment i s l ocated i n a guerri l l a warfare
operati onal area,and(2)thespeci al forcesdetachmenti nvol vedi sa
sector command subordi nate to an area command. Communi cati ons
i nthi ssystemwi l l i ni ti al l ydependonnontechni cal techni queswi th
58
el ectroni c means used onl y i n an emergency: As the area becomes
more secure, the use of el ectroni c means of communi cati ng may be
i ncreased.
d. Area Command System. Thi s system i s establ i shed between
theareacommandandsubordi natesectorcommands.Whenthearea
and sector commands are separated so as to make the use of non-
techni cal techni ques i mpracti cal , radi o i s used. Thi s system can be
organi zedi nanyofthefol l owi ngways:
(1) The sector command communi cates onl y wi th the area
command.Theareacommandthencommuni cateswi ththe
base(1,fi g.16).Emergencycommuni cati onwi ththebasei s
sti l l avai l abl etothesectorcommand.
(2) The area and sector commands have no di rect
communi cati onsbetweenthem.Bothtransmi ttothebase.
The base rel ays to the fi el d al l i nformati on necessary to
effectcoordi nati on(2,fi g.16).
(3) The area and sector commands have a di rect
communi cati onsl i nkonoperati onal matters.Theareaand
sector command both communi cate di rectl y wi th the base
onadmi ni strati vematters(3,fi g.16).
e. Air-Ground System. The pri mary means of communi cati on
betweenanoperati onal detachmentandsupporti ngai rcrafti svi sual .
Usual l yi ti sbymeansofaprearrangedsystemofmarki ngtheDZ.
Thi s vi sual system may be suppl emented, however, by el ectroni c
and/orothermeans.
f.Special-Purpose Systems. A speci al -purpose system i s any
systemofcommuni cati onsestabl i shedtosati sfyaparti cul arneedfor
adefi ni teperi odofti me.Anexampl eofthi smi ghtbetheradi onet
establ i shedbetweenacommi tteddetachmentandafri endl ytacti cal
uni tpri ortojuncture.
49. MeansAvailable
a. Wi thi n the theater of operati ons the communi cati on means
avai l abl etospeci al forcesarethoseavai l abl etoothermi l i taryuni ts.
b. Between the SFOB and commi tted operati onal detachments
thepri marymeansi stheradi o.Othermeansavai l abl emi ghti ncl ude
messengers, ai r drop of messages or a combi nati on of messengers,
and communi cati ons faci l i ti es l ocal l y avai l abl e to the area of
operati ons.
50. FactorsAffectingCommunications
The communi cati ons systems establ i shed tosati sfyspeci al forces
requi rementsmustbefl exi bl e.Speci al forcesrequi rementscannever
besati sfi edbyari gi dl yfi xedsystem.Astheoperati onal detachments
59
arecommi ttedandasthesedetachmentsprogressi nthei racti vi ti es,
the extent and type of communi cati ons necessari l y wi l l change.
Factorswhi chmustbeconsi deredare
a. Thenatureandextentoftheresi stancemovement.
b. Organi zati onoftheguerri l l auni ts.
c. Thel ocati onoftheguerri l l auni ts.
d. Speci al forcesorgani zati onoftheguerri l l awarfareoperati onal
area.
e. Theneedforcommuni cati onsecuri ty.
f. Secondarymi ssi onsofthespeci al forcesdetachment.
51. CommunicationSecurity
a. Commanders must l earn and accept a concept of
communi cati ons based on securi ty and dependabi l i ty, rather than
speed and ease of communi cati on. A detachment normal l y operates
underamaxi mum-securi tytypeSOLThi sSOI doesnotprovi defor
ful l -ti metwo-waycommuni cati onsbetweenthedetachmentsandthe
FOB. The SOI provi des for peri odi c, schedul ed contacts and bl i nd
transmi ssi onbroadcasts(BTBs)fromtheSFOBtodetachments,and
emergency contacts wi th the SFOB at any ti me. The enemy can be
expected to make every effort to i ntercept and anal yze detachment
communi cati ons. The detachment must spend a mi ni mum ti me on
theai r.TheSOI i sdesi gnedtoconfuseenemyi nterceptoperatorsand
makehi si ntercepttaskasdi ffi cul taspossi bl e.
52. RadioOperatorTraining
Theprobl emsfacedbytheradi ooperatorassi gnedtospeci al forces
are somewhat di fferent than those faced by most mi l i tary radi o
operators.Acommi tteddetachmentmustsendmessagesfromenemy-
occupi ed terri tory. These messages travel l ong di stances wi th onl y
l ow-powered equi pment avai l abl e to the detachment. I f successful
communi cati ons are to be establ i shed and mai ntai ned, the radi o
operatormustbewel l trai ned.Forasol di erwi thnoprevi oustrai ni ng
as a radi o operator, thi s trai ni ng requi res a l ong peri od of formal
school i ng.Radi ooperatorsshoul dhavethefol l owi ngcapabi l i ti es:
a. A thorough knowl edge of radi o-tel egraph procedures and the
morecommonl yusedoperati ngsi gnal s.
b. Athoroughknowl edgeoftheoperati ngprocedurespecul i arto
speci al forces operati ons. Furthermore, he must understand how to
prepareaspeci al forcesSOI andhowthi sSOI di ffersfromothers.
c. Be capabl e of sendi ng Morse Code at ei ghteen words per
mi nute and recei vi ng at twenty words per mi nute, usi ng speci al
forcesoperati ngprocedures.
60
61
d. Understand the pri nci pl es of cryptography and be capabl e of
devi si ng a rel ati vel y secure system for guerri l l a use. He must be
profi ci ent i n the use of the pri mary and al ternate cryptographi c
systemsusedbyspeci al forces.
e. Haveabasi cunderstandi ngofthetheoryofradi otransmi tters
andrecei versandbecapabl eofmaki ngorgani zati onal mai ntenance
typerepai rs.
f. Understandthepri nci pl esofradi otransmi ssi oni ntheHI Pand
UHFband.
g. Understand the constructi on and pri nci pl es of operati on of
fi el dradi oantennas.
h. Understand the need for communi cati on securi ty. Know the
pri nci pl es of radi o di recti on-fi ndi ng traffi c anal ysi s and crypto
anal ysi s.
i. Have a suffi ci ent understandi ng of other means of
communi cati on to be abl e to advi se the detachment commander i n
thei rempl oyment.
SectionIV.INITIALCONTACT
53. ContactPriortoInfiltration
a. Pri or to i nfi l trati on, contact shoul d be made wi th the
resi stance movement. I t consi sts of the fi rst contacts between the
sponsori ngpowerandtheresi stanceforces.I ni ti al contactmaytake
pl ace at any poi nt i n the devel opment of the resi stance force.
However,tobemosteffecti ve,i nfi l trati onshoul dtakepl aceassoon
aspossi bl eaftertheguerri l l anucl eusi sformedi norderthatspeci al
forcespersonnel mi ghtexertanearl yi nfl uenceoverthedevel opment
oftheorgani zati on.
b. The major purpose of i ni ti al contact i s to arrange for
i nfi l trati on of speci al forces detachments and for cooperati on of the
resi stance forces wi th the sponsor. I t permi ts arrangements to be
madeforsuchthi ngsasmarki ngdropzonesorcoastal l andi ngsi tes.
54. ContactCoincidentwithInfiltration
Whennocontactcanbemadei nadvanceofi nfi l trati onbutwhere
therei sevi denceofguerri l l aacti vi tyi nanarea,i tmaybenecessary
tosendadetachmenti n"bl i nd."I nsuchcases,therei snorecepti on
partyonthedropzoneandthedetachmentmayhaveonl ythemost
general i deaofwheretofi ndtheguerri l l as.Thi smethodi sthel east
desi rabl eandi sonl yusedwherenootheral ternati veexi sts.
62
PARTTHREE
OPERATIONS
CHAPTER6
INFILTRATION
55. General
a. The acti ve rol e of speci al forces i n the devel opment of a
guerri l l a organi zati on begi ns wi th i nfi l trati on. I nfi l trati on i s the
entrance of personnel and suppl i es i nto a deni ed area maki ng
maxi mum use of decepti on to avoi d detecti on. Duri ng thi s stage,
speci al forces detachments l eave the SFOB and are transported or
movedi ntotheguerri l l awarfareoperati onal area.I nfi l trati oni snot
compl ete unti l the speci al forces detachment establ i shes
communi cati ons wi th the SFOB from wi thi n the guerri l l a warfare
operati onal area.
b. Thefourmeansofi nfi l trati onforspeci al forcesare
(1)Ai r.
(2)Water.
(3)Land.
(4)Stay-behi nd.
I nfi l trati onoperati onsmayi ncl udecombi nati onsofthesemeans.
56. Air
a. Ai r i s usual l y the most practi cal and rapi d means of
i nfi l trati on. Personnel and suppl i es can be ai rl i fted to vi rtual l y any
pl acei ntheworl d.
b. The ai r force hasthepri maryresponsi bi l i tyforprovi di ngai r
del i very. I n most cases standard troop carri er ai rcraft are used.
Assaul t type ai rcraft, as wel l as amphi bi ous types normal l y
associ atedwi thai r-searescueoperati ons,maybeavai l abl eandhave
thecapabi l i tyofusi ngrel ati vel yshort,unpreparedai rstri ps.Under
certai nci rcumstances,l ong-rangebomberai rcrafti sused.
c. The army can provi de both rotary and fi xed-wi ng ai rcraft;
however,thei roperati ngrangesaswel l asl oadcapaci ti esarel i mi ted.
63
d. AdvantagesofAir.
(1)Fl exi bi l i ty
(2)Speedofdel i very.
(3)Accuracyofdel i very.
(4) Rel ati vel yshortexposuretoenemyacti on.
(5)Abi l i tytoperformconcurrentmi ssi ons.
e. DisadvantagesofAir.
(1)Navi gati onpreci si on.
(2)Vul nerabi l i tytoenemyai rdefenses.
(3) Dependenceuponfavorabl eweathercondi ti ons.
(4) Possi bl ei njurytopersonnel andbreakageofequi pment.
(5) Possi bl ecompromi seofDZthroughobservati onofdrop or
el ectroni cdetecti on.
f. Desirable Capabilities of Aircraft. Al though speci al forces
personnel must be prepared to uti l i ze any type of ai rcraft, the
fol l owi ngcharacteri sti csandcapabi l i ti esaredesi red
(1) Para-dropami ni mumoffi fteenpersonsand5,000pounds
ofcargosi mul taneousl y.
(2) Operate at varyi ng al ti tudes duri ng darkness or adverse
weathercondi ti ons.
(3) Possess the requi red navi gati onal ai ds to i nsure l ocati ng
thedropsi tewi thami ni mumofdi ffi cul ty.
(4)Suffi ci entcombatradi ustoreachtheoperati onal area.
(5) Landandtakeofffromunpreparedai rstri pswi thmi ni mum
useabl erunwaysof1,000feet.
(6)I ncertai nsi tuati ons,l andandtakeofffromwater.
57. Water
a. General .I nfi l trati onbywateri ncl udestheuseofsurfaceand
underwater craft. I t i s consi dered the most secure and economi cal
meansuptothepoi ntofdebarkati onfromtheparentcraft.
b.AdvantagesofWater.
(1) Long-rangeofoperati ons.
(2) Weather has l i ttl e or no effect up to poi nt of debarkati on
fromparentcraft.
(3) Evacuati oni spossi bl ewi theachmi ssi on.
(4)Operati onal bri efi ngscanconti nuewhi l eenroute.
(5) Concentrati onandcontrol ofpersonnel andsuppl i es.
(6) Largequanti ti esofsuppl i escanbedel i vered.
64
c. DisadvantagesofWater.
(1) Transshi pment and offshore unl oadi ng are frequentl y
requi red.
(2) Possi bi l i tyofthel ossofpersonnel andsuppl i esduri ngshi p
toshoremovement.
(3) Movementofsuppl i esfroml andi ngsi tetofi nal desti nati on
i ssubjecttol i mi tati onsofl andi nfi l trati on.
(4) Addi ti onal packagi ng precauti ons are requi red to protect
equi pmentfromsal twatercorrosi on.
(5)Speci al trai ni ngi snecessary.
(6) Vul nerabi l i ty to enemy shore defenses duri ng l andi ng
operati ons.
58. Land
a.General. Land i s general l y the l east desi rabl e means of
i nfi l trati onandi susual l yl i mi tedtoshortmovementsbyi ndi vi dual s
or smal l detachments. Land i nfi l trati on i s best accompl i shed under
condi ti onsofl i mi tedvi si bi l i tyoverdi ffi cul tterrai n.Landi nfi l trati on
has i ts greatest chance of success when the enemy's l i nes areover-
extended,thecombatzonefl ui d,orporti onsofhi scountry'sborders
arei nadequatel ysecured.Ontheotherhand,awel l organi zed,stabl e
andcl osel y-kni tdefensei ndepthmayprohi bi tl andi nfi l trati on.
b.AdvantagesofLand.
(1)Requi resmi ni mumofi nter-servi cesupport.
(2) Provi des an opportuni ty for concurrent gatheri ng of
i ntel l i gencei nformati on.
(3) Provi destheabi l i tytochangeroutesfrequentl y,consi stent
wi ththel ocal si tuati on.
c. DisadvantagesofLand.
(1)Sl ownesswi thwhi chi nfi l trati oni saccompl i shed.
(2) Long exposure to enemy and greater , probabi l i ty of
capture.
(3) Li mi tati ononamountofsuppl i esandequi pmentthat can
becarri ed.
59. Stay-Behind
a.General. Stay-behi nd i nfi l trati on i nvol ves pre-posi ti oni ng
speci al forces operati onal detachments wi thi n thei r proposed
operati onal areas and remai ni ng hi dden whi l e the enemy advances
throughand/oroccupi estheseareas.Stay-behi ndoperati onsmaybe
consi deredwhentheenemyhasthecapabi l i tyofoverrunni ngfri endl y
65
areas and the atti tude of the ci vi l popul ace wi l l support such
operati ons.
b.AdvantagesofStay-BehindOperations.
(1)Noi nfi l trati onsupportrequi red.
(2)Maxi mumsecuri tyi sobtai ned.
(3)Ci vi l i ancontactsareal readyestabl i shed.
(4)Cachesofsuppl i esandequi pmentarepre-pl aced.
(5)Personnel arefami l i arwi thoperati onal area.
c. DisadvantagesofStay-BehindOperations.
(1) Proxi mi ty to enemy combat troops duri ng thei r i ni ti al
occupati onoftheoperati onal area.
(2) Freedom of movement and communi cati ons are i ni ti al l y
restri cted.
60. FactorsInfluencingChoiceofMeans
a.Mission.Themi ssi oni sthefi rstconsi derati oni nthesel ecti on
of i nfi l trati on means. Arequi rementfori mmedi atei nterdi cti onwi l l
emphasi zetheneedforspeed.Ontheotherhand,i fasl ower,bui l dup
typemi ssi oni sordered,amoredel i beratemeansofi nfi l trati onmay
beacceptabl e.
b. EnemySituation.Theenemysi tuati onaffectsthemeansused
for i nfi l trati on. For exampl e, a heavi l y-guarded border may nul l i fy
l and i nfi l trati on. Si mi l arl y, a strongl y-defended and patrol l ed
coastl i nemayel i mi natewaterasapossi bl echoi ce.
c. Weather. Adverse weather condi ti ons seri ousl y affect ai r and
certai n phases of water operati ons. Conversel y, bad weather may
favorl andi nfi l trati on.
d. Topography.Landformati onsmustbeconsi deredi ndeci di ng
onthemeansofi nfi l trati ontobeused.Landi nfi l trati onwi l l havea
better chance for success i f the chosen routes pass through
mountai nousorheavi l y-forestedareas;ontheotherhand,thesesame
mountai nscoul dforceai rcrafttofl yathi gheral ti tudesresul ti ngi n
greaterexposuretoenemydetecti onandai r-defensesystems.
e. Hydrography. Hydrographi c factorsti de data, depth of
offshorewater,andthel ocati onofreefsandsandbarsi nfl uencethe
sel ecti onofwaterasameansofi nfi l trati on.
f. Personnel. The number of personnel to i nfi l trate may be a
l i mi ti ng factor. The type trai ni ng possessed by speci al forces
personnel i safurtherconsi derati on.I naddi ti on,i fotheri ndi vi dual s
are to accompany the operati onal detachment,speci al trai ni ngr-for
thesepersonnel maybenecessarypri ortoi nfi l trati on.
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g. Distance. The di stance to be covered duri ng i nfi l trati on may,
el i mi nateconsi derati onofcertai nmeansavai l abl e.
h. Equipment Available. The operati onal capabi l i ti es of ai r and
water craft avai l abl e for i nfi l trati on and the amount and types of
speci al equi pmentwaterproofi ng ki ts, aeri al del i very contai ners,
etc.aremajorfactorstobeconsi dered.Li mi tedavai l abi l i tyi ntypes
of ai r orwatercraftwi l l l i mi tthenumberofpersonnel thatcanbe
i nfi l trated.
67
CHAPTER7
ORGANIZATIONANDDEVELOPMENTOFTHEAREA
COMMAND
Section1.ORGANIZATIONALCONCEPTS
61. General
Theorgani zati onofaguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areai nvol ves
i ni ti al organi zati onoftheareaandbui l dupoftheresi stanceforces.
I ni ti al organi zati oni ncl udesestabl i shi ngtherequi redcommandand
admi ni strati ve structure, taki ng necessary securi ty precauti ons and
trai ni nganucl eusofguerri l l apersonnel .Bui l dupi stheexpansi onof
theori gi nal nucl eusi ntoanoperati onal uni tcapabl eofaccompl i shi ng
the assi gned mi ssi on. Speci al forces detachments may i nfi l trate the
operati onal areaei therbeforeorafter-i ni ti al organi zati onhastaken
pl ace.
62. AreasofResponsibility
a. GuerrillaWarfareOperationalArea.
(1)Designation. The pl ans for organi zati on are started when
the theater commander desi gnates certai n areas wi thi n
deni edterri toryasguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.The
guerri l l a warfare operati onal area i s the name gi ven to a
geographi careai nwhi chthearmy,throughSpeci al Forces,
i sresponsi bl efortheconductofguerri l l awarfareandother
unconventi onal warfareacti vi ti es.
(2)I nfiltration. Any type of detachment A, B, or C may be
i nfi l trated fi rst. I ni ti al l y, one detachment i s gi ven
responsi bi l i ty for the enti re guerri l l a warfare operati onal
area.
b. GuerrillaWarfareOperationalSector.Wi ththedevel opmentof
theareaandani ncreasei ndetachments,subdi vi si oni ntosectorsi s
necessary.Thesectorhasthesamecharacteri sti csasanoperati onal
area but remai ns a subdi vi si on of the area. An operati onal
detachmentbecomesresponsi bl eforeachsector.
63. OrganizationandBuildup
a.OrganizationalObjectives..Afteri nfi l trati on,themajortaski s
to devel op resi stance el ements i nto an effecti ve force. To faci l i tate
thi sdevel opment,several tasksmustbeperformedi ncl udi ng:
68
(1) Establ i shmentofaworki ngcommandrel ati onshi pbetween

the vari ous resi stance el ements and Speci al Forces
personnel .
(2) Establ i shment of securi ty, i ntel l i gence col l ecti on and
communi cati onssystems.
(3)Organi zati onofal ogi sti cal system.
(4)Provi si onforotheradmi ni strati veservi ces.
(5)Establ i shmentofatrai ni ngprogram.
(6)Pl anni ng and executi on of tacti cal operati ons
commensuratewi ththestateoftrai ni ngofguerri l l auni ts.
(7) Expansi on of forces so they are abl e to support theater
objecti ves.
(8)Ci vi l i ansupport.
b. Area Assessment. The Speci al Forces detachment commander
commencesanareaassessmenti mmedi atel yonreachi nghi sarea.I n
veri fyi ng i nformati on acqui red through previ ous area study and
bri efi ngs, he revi ses hi s pl ans as necessary to refl ect the l ocal
si tuati on.Theareaassessmentservesasthecommander'sesti mateof
the si tuati on and i s the basi s for pl ans to carry out hi s mi ssi on. I t
consi ders al l the major factors i nvol ved, i ncl udi ng the enemy
si tuati on and securi ty measures, the pol i ti cal background of the
resi stance movement, and the atti tude of the ci vi l i an popul ati on.
There are no ri gi d formul ae for maki ng area assessments; each
commander has to deci de for hi msel f what shoul d be i ncl uded and
whatconcl usi onsmaybedrawnfromthei nformati onhecol l ects.The
assessmenti sshapedbymanyvari abl esi ncl udi ngthedetachment's
mi ssi on, the commander's personal i ty, and the thoroughness of the
pre-i nfi l trati on study. For some detai l ed consi derati ons of an area
assessment,seeappendi xI V.
64. CommandandControl
a. OrganizationandControl.
(1) The Speci al Forces detachment's pri mary concern i s the
devel opmentandcontrol oftheguerri l l aforcesi nanarea.
Because the guerri l l a uni t i s onl y one part of the forces
generatedbyaresi stancemovementand,si ncethemi ssi on
ofSpeci al Forcesi ncl udesconductofotherunconventi onal
warfare acti vi ti es, other resi stance forcesauxi l i ary and
undergroundmust be consi dered. However, the
organi zati on and control of a guerri l l a force are the
essenti al matters for Speci al Forces. The other aspects of
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thetotal resi stancemovementarebroughti nonl yasthey
bearupontheSpeci al Forcesmi ssi on.
(2) I n i ts earl y stages, a guerri l l a movement often i s hi ghl y
unorgani zed. General l y, the peopl e who become guerri l l as
have suffered a reducti on of thei r l i vi ng standards. The
mai n concern i s groupi ng together for food, shel ter, and
mutual protecti on. Oftenti mes several groups begi n
i ndependent operati ons wi th very l i ttl e concern for
coordi nati on among them. Speci al forces may fi nd that
guerri l l asarenotcooperati ngandmayevenbeworki ngat
crosspurposes.TheSpeci al Forcesdetachmentmustobtai n
control oftheguerri l l agroupsandcoordi natethei racti ons
toi nsurethatmi ssi onsassi gnedbythetheatercommander
areaccompl i shed.Thedegreeofcontrol vari esi ndi fferent
parts of the worl d and wi th the speci fi c personal i ti es
i nvol ved. As the scope of operati ons i ncreases, cl oser
coordi nati onbetweenguerri l l auni tsi srequi red.
b. ProblemsofControl.
(1) Al though the mi l i tary advantages of cl ose cooperati on
between guerri l l a uni ts are obvi ous, a Speci al Forces
commander may fi nd that guerri l l as resi st hi s efforts to
uni fy them. Thi s opposi ti on may be based on personal
antagoni smsorpol i ti cal orethni cdi fferences.
(2) A means avai l abl e to the Speci al Forces commander to
persuade guerri l l as to form a uni ted force i s control of
suppl i es. A detachment commander can use the sponsor
provi ded suppl i es as a l ever i n convi nci ng guerri l l as to
cooperate. The commander shoul d not openl y threaten to
use thi s power, except as a l ast resort; but, si nce the
guerri l l a commanders are aware of i ts exi stence, i t can
rei nforcehi ssuggesti onsforuni ty.
(3) I n hi s conferences wi th the resi stance l eadershi p, a
detachmentcommanderi scareful nottobecomei nvol vedi n
thei rpol i ti cal di fferences.Therei snosurerwaytol osethe
respectandcooperati onoftheguerri l l asthantotakesi des
i nthei ri nternal di sputes.
(4) Once guerri l l as have been convi nced of the advantagesof
cl ose cooperati on, the Speci al Forces commander must
deci de on a command structure. Whi l e he must adapt to
l ocal condi ti ons, there are certai n factors whi ch he
consi dersi nanysi tuati on.Hemusthavesuffi ci entcontrol
over the guerri l l as to i nsure that they carry out assi gned
mi ssi ons. At the same ti me, the nature of guerri l l a
70
operati ons requi res that i ndi vi dual uni ts be gi ven a l arge
measureoffreedomi ncarryi ngoutthei rmi ssi ons.
(5) Perhaps the most del i cate part of a detachment
commander'sjobi si nsuri ngthatcompetentl eadersoccupy
commandposi ti ons.I fl eadersoftheori gi nal groupsarenot
capabl e of fi l l i ng the posi ti ons they hol d, the detachment
commander shoul d arrange for thei r removal wi thout
creati ngdi ssensi onwhi chcoul dendangerthesuccessofhi s
mi ssi on.
65. AreaCommand
a.General. The area command i s the formal organi zati on
i ntegrati ng the Speci al Forces detachment(s) and the resi stance
forceswi thi naguerri l l awarfareoperati onal area.I ti sestabl i shedas
soonasthedevel opmentprocessrequi ressuchastep.Therecanbe
no ri gi d pattern for the organi zati on of an area command. I t must
carry out the basi c functi ons for whi ch i t i s responsi bl e, tai l ored i n
strength and composi ti on to fi t the si tuati on and mi ssi on. When a
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areai ssubdi vi ded,thesubdi vi si onsare
cal l edsectorcommands.
b. Composition. The area command basi cal l y i s composed of a
command group and three types of resi stance forces-guerri l l as,
auxi l i ari es,andunderground.
(1)Command group. The command group i s made up of the
Speci al Forcesdetachment,thel ocal resi stancel eaderand
representati ves from the resi stance forces i n the area. I t
organi zes a staff as necessary. Normal l y, the command
groupi sl ocatedwi ththeguerri l l aforce.I ti sl ocatedwhere
i t can best control the resi stance movement. See FM 31-
21A.
(2)ResistanceForces.Thethreeorgani zati onal di vi si onsofan
area command are the guerri l l a force, auxi l i ary and
underground. Al l three types may not be establ i shed i n a
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal area.Theguerri l l aforcei sthe
el ementwi thwhi chSpeci al Forceshaspri maryconcern.
c. Concept.
(1)General. Speci al forces detachments may i nfi l trate a
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areai ndi fferentsequenceto
establ i sh anareacommand.Theorderandcomposi ti onof
detachmenti nfi l trati ondependuponmanyfactors,someof
the more i mportant of whi ch arecharacteri sti cs of the
resi stance movement, capabi l i ti es of Speci al Forces and
needsofthetheatercommander.Li stedbel owaresomeof
71
the patterns that mi ght be fol l owed i n establ i shi ng type
areacommands.
(2)I nitialinfiltration.
(a)One detachment. One detachment-A, B, or C-may be
i nfi l trated when the si tuati on i s not wel l known, the
guerri l l a movement i s not extensi ve, or the guerri l l a
forcei ssowel l organi zedthatmi ni mumcoordi nati oni s
needed.
(b) Multiple detachments. Another possi bl e sol uti on i s for
twoormoredetachmentstoi nfi l trateconcurrentl y,each
setti ng up a separate sector command. Thi s sol uti on i s
adopted when topography, the enemy si tuati on or
probl emspecul i artotheresi stancemovement,prohi bi t
the i ni ti al establ i shment of an effecti ve area command
(fi g.17).
(3)Subsequentinfiltration.
(a) Expansionfromonedetachment.Afteranareacommand
has been establ i shed, other detachments can be
i nfi l trated to set up sector commands wi thi n the area
(fi g.18).Ei theraBorCdetachmenti si nfi l tratedorthe
i ni ti al A detachment i s redesi gnated a B detachment.
Wi th a B or C detachment i ni ti al l y i n the area, A
detachments may be i nfi l trated to establ i sh the sector
commands.Subsequenti nfi l trati onofotheroperati onal
detachments takes pl ace wi th the expansi on of the
guerri l l a forces, i ncrease i n operati ons or for pol i ti cal
reasons.
(b) Expansion from several detachments. After separate
commandshavebeenestabl i shed,adetachmentBorC
maybei nfi l tratedtoestabl i shanareacommandforthe
samereasonsas(a)above(fi g.19).
d. ControlCriteria.Becauseofthenatureofoperati onsandthe
di stances i nvol ved, control measures are not as effecti ve wi thi n an
area command as they are i n a conventi onal mi l i tary organi zati on.
Thus,certai ncri teri aareestabl i shedtoi ncreaseeffecti vecontrol .
(1)Operationorder.Suffi ci entgui dancetosubordi nateuni tsi s
outl i nedi ntheoperati onordertocoverextendedperi odsof
ti me. Thi s i s especi al l y true when operati ons precl ude
frequent and regul ar contact. Operati on orders i ncl ude
l ong-term gui dance on such matters as psychol ogi cal
operati ons,i ntel l i gence,targetattack,ai rsupport,external
72
73
74
75
l ogi sti cal support, evasi on and escape, and pol i ti cal and
mi l i taryrel ati onshi psvi s-a-vi stheresi stance.
(2)SOP's. Another techni que used to mai ntai n control i s the
use of Standi ng Operati ng Procedures. SOP's standardi ze
recurri ngproceduresandal l owthedetachmentandSFOB
toanti ci pateprescri bedacti onswhencommuni cati onshave
beeni nterrupted.
66. OrganizationontheGround
a.General.Thephysi cal organi zati onofthearea,togetherwi th
the command structure, i s a pri ori ty task of the speci al forces
commanderafteri nfi l trati on.I nsomesi tuati onstheorgani zati onof
theareai swel l establ i shed,buti nothers,organi zati oni sl acki ngor
i ncompl ete.I nal l cases,however,somei mprovementi nthephysi cal
di sposi ti ons probabl y are necessary. Organi zati on i s di ctated by a
numberofrequi rementsanddependsmoreonl ocal condi ti onsthan
uponanyfi xedsetofrul es.Amongthefactorsconsi deredaredegree
ofguerri l l auni torgani zati on;extentofcooperati onamongresi stance
forces,amountofci vi l i ansupport,enemyacti vi ty,andtopography.I n
practi ce, the detachment commander can expect to make
compromi sesi norgani zati onbecausei ti sdi ffi cul ttobri ngtogetheri n
oneareaani deal setofci rcumstances.
b. Guerrilla Base (fi g. 20). The basi c establ i shment wi thi n the
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areai stheguerri l l abase.
(1)Definition. A guerri l l a base i s a temporary si te where
i nstal l ati ons,headquarters,anduni tsarel ocated.Therei s
usual l y more than one guerri l l a base wi thi n an area
compl ex.
(2)Characteristics. From a base, l i nes of communi cati on
stretchoutconnecti ngotherbasesandvari ousel ementsof
the area compl ex. I nstal l ati ons normal l y found at a
guerri l l a base arecommand posts, trai ni ng and bi vouac
areas, suppl y caches, communi cati ons and medi cal
faci l i ti es. I n spi te of the i mpressi on of permanence of the
i nstal l ati ons,aguerri l l abasei sconsi deredtemporaryand
tenantguerri l l auni tsmustbeabl etorapi dl yabandonthe
basewhenrequi red.
c. AreaComplex.
(1) Defi ni ti on.Anareacompl exconsi stsofguerri l l abasesand
vari ous supporti ng faci l i ti es and el ements. The acti vi ti es
normal l y i ncl uded i n the area compl ex aresecuri ty and
i ntel l i gence systems; communi cati ons systems; mi ssi on
supportsi tes;recepti onsi tes;suppl yi nstal l ati ons;trai ni ng
areas;andothersupporti ngfaci l i ti es.
76
77
(2)Characteristics.Thecompl exi snotaconti nuouspatternof
tangi bl ei nstal l ati ons,butmaybevi sual i zedasaseri esof
i ntangi bl e l i nes of communi cati ons, emanati ng from
guerri l l abasesandconnecti ngal l resi stanceel ements.The
mai n guerri l l a base i s the hub of the spi der web-l i ke
compl ex. The compl ex i s not stati c but i s a constantl y
changi ngapparatuswi thi ntheoperati onal area.
(3) Location. By vi rtue of thei r knowl edge of the terrai n,
guerri l l as shoul d be abl etorecommendthebestareasfor
l ocati ng i nstal l ati ons. Whereas i naccessi bl e areas are best
forthephysi cal l ocati onofguerri l l acamps,thel ackofthese
remote areas does not precl ude guerri l l a operati ons. For
i nstance, there may be ti mes when guerri l l as are abl e to
fi ghteffecti vel yi ntownsandonthepl ai ns.Approachesto
the base are wel l guarded and conceal ed.Thel ocati onsof
guerri l l ai nstal l ati onsaredi ssemi natedonaneed-to-know
basi s. Si nce guerri l l a forces sel dom defend fi xed posi ti ons
forextendedperi odsofti me,al ternateareasareestabl i shed
to whi ch the guerri l l as wi thdraw i f thei r pri mary area i s
threatenedoroccupi edbytheenemy.
SectionII.RESISTANCEELEMENTS
67. GuerrillaForce
a.General. Paragraph 65 refers to the three mai n resi stance
el ementsguerri l l aforce,auxi l i ary,andundergroundthataspeci al
forces detachment wi l l l i kel y encounter or organi ze i n a guerri l l a.
warfareoperati onal area.Thepri maryconcerni stheguerri l l aforce.
Theauxi l i aryandundergroundorgani zati ons,fromthepoi ntofvi ew
oftheguerri l l aorgani zati on,aresupportel ements.Fromthepoi ntof
vi ew of the total resi stance movement, however, the guerri l l a force
maybesupporti ngtheunderground.Forthepurposeofthi smanual ,
theguerri l l aforcei sconsi deredthesupportedel ement.
b. Organizational Goal. The ul ti mate organi zati onal goal i s to
i ntegratetheguerri l l a.uni tandthedetachmenti ntoauni fi edforce.
The degree of uni fi cati on depends upon many factors. The
organi zati on whi ch combi nes the speci al forcesdetachmentand the
guerri l l auni t,regardl essofthedegreeofcohesi on,i scal l edthearea
orsectorcommand,hereafterreferredtoasareacommand.
c. Definition.Theguerri l l aforcei stheovert,mi l i tari l yorgani zed
el ementoftheareacommand.
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79
d. Establishment. The guerri l l a force i s establ i shed when the
guerri l l a commander agrees to accept Uni ted States sponsorshi p.
Oncetheguerri l l aforcei soffi ci al l yrecogni zed,i ti sthedetachment
commander'sresponsi bi l i tytouni teandcontrol i ttothebestofhi s
abi l i ty.
68. AuxiliaryFortes
(1) Acti ve support from some of the ci vi l i an popul ati on and
passi vesupportfrommostoftheremai nderi sessenti al to
extended guerri l l a operati ons. To i nsure that both acti ve
and passi ve support i s responsi ve to the area command,
someformoforgani zati onandcontrol i srequi red.Control
of ci vi l i an support i s accompl i shed pri mari l y through the
auxi l i ari es. Auxi l i ary forces compose that el ement of the
area command establ i shed to provi de for and organi ze
ci vi l i ansupportoftheresi stancemovement.
(2) "Auxi l i ary" i s a term used to denote peopl e engaged i n a
vari ety of acti vi ti es. I t i s appl i ed to those peopl e who are
not members of other resi stance el ements, but who
knowi ngl y and wi l l i ngl y support the common cause. I t
i ncl udestheoccasi onal supporteraswel l asthehardcore
l eadershi p. I ndi vi dual s or groups who furni sh support,
ei therunwi tti ngl yoragai nstthei rwi l l ,arenotconsi dered
auxi l i ari es. Auxi l i ari es may be organi zed i n. groups or
operateasi ndi vi dual s.
69. CharacteristicsofAuxiliaries
Auxi l i ary forces are characteri zed by l ocati on, organi zati on and
methodofoperati on.
a.Location. Auxi l i ary uni ts are composed of l ocal ci vi l i ans
normal l yl i vi ngi nthesmal l ertowns,vi l l ages,andrural areas.Unl i ke
guerri l l auni ts,theauxi l i ari esarenotexpectedtomovefrompl aceto
pl ace to conduct operati ons. The fact that the auxi l i ary forces are
l ocal andstati ci shi ghl ydesi rabl efromtheareacommandvi ewpoi nt
i nthati tprovi dessupportforthemobi l eguerri l l a,forcesthroughout
mostoftheoperati onal area.
b.Organization.
(1) Auxi l i ary forces normal l y organi ze to coi nci de wi th or
paral l el theexi sti ngpol i ti cal admi ni strati vedi vi si onsofthe
country. Thi s method of organi zati on i nsures that each
communi ty and the surroundi ng countrysi de i s the
responsi bi l i tyofanauxi l i aryuni t.I ti srel ati vel ysi mpl eto
i ni ti ate si nce auxi l i ary commands may be establ i shed at
80
each admi ni strati ve l evel , for exampl eregi onal , county,
di stri ct or l ocal (communi ti es and vi l l ages). Thi s
organi zati on vari es from country to country dependi ng
upon the exi sti ng pol i ti cal structure. Organi zati on of
auxi l i ary uni ts can commence at any l evel or at several
l evel s si mul taneousl y and i s ei ther central i zed (fi g. 21) or
decentral i zed(fi g.22).
(2) The basi c organi zati on at each l evel i s the command
commi ttee. Thi s commi ttee control s and coordi nates
auxi l i aryacti vi ti eswi thi ni tsareaofresponsi bi l i ty.I nthi s
respect i t resembl es the command group and staff of a
mi l i tary uni t. Members of the command commi ttee are
assi gned speci fi c duti es such assuppl y, recrui ti ng,
transportati on,communi cati ons,securi ty,i ntel l i gence,and
operati ons(fi g.23).Atthel owestl evel ,onei ndi vi dual may
performtwoorthreeoftheseduti es.
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(3) The command commi ttee may organi ze ci vi l i an
sympathi zers i nto subordi nate el ements or empl oy them
i ndi vi dual l y. When possi bl e, these subordi nate el ements
areorgani zedfuncti onal l yi ntoacompartmentedstructure.
However, because of a shortage of l oyal personnel , i t i s
often necessary for each subordi nate auxi l i ary el ement to
performseveral functi ons.
(4) The home guard i s the parami l i tary arm of the auxi l i ary
force.Homeguardsarecontrol l edbythevari ouscommand
commi ttees. Al l auxi l i ary el ements do not necessari l y
organi ze home guards. Home guards perform many
mi ssi ons for the l ocal auxi l i ary force, such astacti cal
mi ssi ons,guardi ngofcaches,andtrai ni ngofrecrui ts.Thei r
degree of organi zati on and trai ni ng depends upon the
extentofeffecti veenemycontrol i nthearea.
c. MethodofOperation.
(1) Auxi l i ary uni ts deri ve thei r protecti on i n two pri nci pal
waysa compartmented structure and operati ng under
cover. Whi l e enemy counter guerri l l a acti vi ti es oftenforce
theguerri l l astomovetemporari l yawayfromgi venareas,
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the auxi l i ari es survi ve by remai ni ng i n pl ace and

conducti ng thei r acti vi ti es so as to avoi d detecti on.
I ndi vi dual auxi l i ary members carry on thei r normal , day-
to-dayrouti ne,whi l esecretl ycarryi ngoutthemanyfacets
of,resi stanceacti on.
(2) Auxi l i ary uni ts frequentl y uti l i ze the passi ve or neutral
el ementsofthepopul ati ontoprovi deacti vesupporttothe
common cause. Usual l y thi s i s done on a one-ti me basi s
because of the securi ty ri sks i nvol ved i n repeated use of
such peopl e. The abi l i ty of auxi l i ary forces to mani pul ate
l arge segments of the neutral popul ati on i s further
enhancedbythedemonstratedsuccessoffri endl yforces.
70. SupportMissionsofAuxiliaries
The support mi ssi ons di scussed herei n are the pri nci pal ones
performedbyauxi l i aryforcestosupporttheareacommand.Someof
thesetasksarecoordi nateddi rectl ywi thguerri l l auni tswhi l eothers
arecontrol l edbythei rownhi gherheadquarters.Normal l y,auxi l i ary
uni tsareassi gneddi rectsupportmi ssi onsfoxguerri l l auni tsi nthei r
areas.
a. Security and Warning. Auxi l i ary uni ts provi de a physi cal
securi ty and warni ng system for guerri l l a forces. They organi ze
extensi ve systems of ci vi l i an sympathi zers who keep enemy forces
under survei l l ance and who warn the guerri l l as of enemy moves.
Theseci vi l i ansaresel ectedaspartofthesecuri tysystembecauseof
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thei r advantageous l ocati on whi ch permi ts them to moni tor enemy
movementtowardsguerri l l abases.
b. I ntelligence. Auxi l i ary uni ts col l ect i nformati on to support
thei rownoperati onsandthoseoftheareacommand.Theauxi l i ary
forceprovi desdi recti ntel l i gencesupporttoguerri l l auni tsoperati ng
wi thi nthei rareaofresponsi bi l i ty.
c. Counterintelligence. The auxi l i ary uni t assi sts the area
command counteri ntel l i gence effort by mai ntai ni ng watch over
transi toryci vi l i ans,byscreeni ngrecrui tsforguerri l l auni ts,andby
moni tori ngrefugeesandothernon-i nhabi tantsofthearea.Because
ofthei ri nti mateknowl edgeofl ocal peopl e,auxi l i ari esshoul dbeabl e
toreportattemptsbyenemyagentstoi nfi l tratethearea,Theycan
al sonamethosei nhabi tantswhosel oyal tytotheresi stancemi ghtbe
suspect.
d. Logistics.Theauxi l i aryuni tsupportsguerri l l asi nal l phases
ofl ogi sti cal operati ons.Theyprovi detransportati onand/orportersfor
the movementof suppl i es andequi pment.Auxi l i ari esoftencarefor
si ck and wounded guerri l l as, provi de medi cal suppl i es and arrange
for doctors and other medi cal personnel . They establ i sh and secure
caches. They col l ect food, cl othi ng, and other suppl i es for guerri l l a
uni ts through a control l ed system of l evy, barter, ox contri buti on.
Someti mes auxi l i ari es provi de essenti al servi ces to guerri l l as such
asrepai rofcl othi ng,shoes,andcertai ni temsofequi pment.Auxi l i ary
uni ts furni sh personnel to assi st at drop and l andi ng zones. They
di stri bute suppl i es throughout the area. The extent of l ogi sti cal
supportfurni shedbytheauxi l i aryforcedependsupontheresources
of the area, the degree of i nfl uence the auxi l i ari es exert on the
popul ati on,andenemyacti vi ti es.Forafurtherdi scussi onofl ogi sti cs,
seesecti onVI .
e. Recruiting. The guerri l l a uni ts depend upon the l ocal
popul ati on for recrui ts to repl ace operati onal l osses and to expand
thei rforces.Auxi l i ari esspot,screen,andrecrui tpersonnel foracti ve
guerri l l a uni ts. I f recrui ts are provi ded through rel i abl e auxi l i ary
el ements, the enemy's chances. for pl aci ng agents i n the guerri l l a
forcearegreatl yreduced.I nsomei nstances,auxi l i aryuni tsprovi de
rudi mentarytrai ni ngforguerri l l arecrui ts.
f.Psychological Warfare. A very i mportant mi ssi on i n whi ch
auxi l i ary uni ts assi st i s psychol ogi cal warfare. The spreadi ng of
rumors,l eafl ets,andpostersi sti medwi thguerri l l atacti cal mi ssi ons
todecei vetheenemy.Leafl etscanmi sl eadtheenemyastoguerri l l a
i ntenti ons, capabi l i ti es, and l ocati on. The spreadi ng of thi s
propaganda usual l y i nvol ves l i ttl e ri sk to the di ssemi nator and i s
verydi ffi cul tfortheenemytocontrol .
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g.CivilianControl.Tocontrol thepopul ati onandgi vetheenemy

an i mpressi on of guerri l l a power, the auxi l i ary uni ts establ i sh a
rudi mentary l egal control system. Thi s system can control bl ack-
marketi ng and profi teeri ng for the benefi t of the guerri l l a force.
Col l aborators may be terrori zed orel i mi natedbytheauxi l i ari es.I n
addi ti on,control ofl argenumbersofrefugeesi ntheareai sassumed
fortheguerri l l aforcebytheauxi l i aryuni ts.
h. EvasionandEscape.Auxi l i aryuni tsarei deal l ysui tedforthe
support of evasi on and escape mechani sms. Thei r contact wi th and
control over segments of the ci vi l i an popul ati on provi de the area
commanderwi thameansofassi sti ngevader.
i. Other Missions. Auxi l i ary uni ts may be cal l ed upon to per=
formanumberofothermi ssi onstosupportguerri l l aoperati on.Some
oftheseare
(1) Acti vi ty i n conjuncti on wi th the guerri l l as agai nst other
targets. Cutti ng of tel ephone l i nes between an enemy
i nstal l ati onandi tsreserveforcepri ortoagueri l l aattacki s
anexampl eofsuchsupport.
(2) Operati onofdroporl andi ngzones.
(3) Operati on of couri er systems between wi del y di spersed
guerri l l auni ts.
(4)Furni shi nggui destoguerri l l auni ts.
(5) Under some ci rcumstances, they conduct acti ve guerri l l a
operati ons i n thei r areas of responsi bi l i ty on a part-ti me
basi s.
71. TheUnderground
a. Enemy securi ty measures and/or the anti pathy of certai n
segments of the popul ati on often deny sel ected porti ons of an
operati onal areatotheguerri l l aforceortheauxi l i ari es.Si ncethese
areas are usual l y essenti al to the support of enemy operati ons, the
resi stance force attempts to extend i ts i nfl uence i nto them. The
el ementusedtoconductoperati onsi nsuchareasi stheunderground.
The underground, then, i s that el ement of the resi stance force
establ i shed to reach targets not vul nerabl e to other el ements. The
undergroundi sempl oyedtoachi eveobjecti veswhi chwoul dotherwi se
beunattai nabl e.
b. I n many respects the underground cl osel y resembl es the
auxi l i ary force. They conduct operati ons i n a si mi l ar manner and
performmanyofthesamefuncti ons.Themajordi fferences,then,are
twofol d
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(1) Theundergroundi stai l oredtoconductoperati onsi nareas
whi ch are normal l y deni ed to the auxi l i ary force and
guerri l l as.
(2) The underground i s not as dependent upon control or
i nfl uence over the ci vi l i an popul ati on for i ts success. The
degreetowhi chtheundergroundachi evesthi sobjecti vei s
abyproductofotheroperati ons.Control ofthepopul ati oni s
notthepri maryundergroundobjecti ve.
c. For a detai l ed di scussi on of the characteri sti cs, organi zati on
andmi ssi onsoftheunderground,seeFM31-21A.
72. CommandGroup
a. The command group provi des a means to control and
coordi nateal l resi stanceacti vi ti esi naguerri l l awarfareoperati onal
area.Thegroupnormal l yi sl ocatedwi ththeguerri l l aforce.I nsome
i nstancesthecommandgroupmaybel ocatedwi ththeauxi l i ari esor
theunderground.Forexampl esofthetypecommandgroups,seeFM
31-21A.
SectionIII.SECURITY
73. General
Coi nci dent wi th establ i shi ng a command organi zati on i n the
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areai stheorgani zati onofanadequate
securi ty system. Securi ty of al l el ements of the area command i s
based upon the pri nci pl e of preventi ng the enemy from ei ther
knowi ng of the exi stence of resi stanceforcesorbei ngabl etol ocate
theseforceswhenthei rexi stencei sknown.Securi tyi sachi evedbya
combi nati onofacti veandpassi vemeanstoi ncl ude
a. Thephysi cal securi tywarni ngsystem.
b. Di spersi on.
c. Mobi l i tyofuni tsandi nstal l ati ons.
d. Camoufl agedi sci pl i ne.
e. Marchsecuri ty.
f. Communi cati onsecuri ty.
g. Counteri ntel l i genceacti vi ti es.
h. Recordssecuri ty.
i. Coveranddecepti on.
Si nce the underground and auxi l i ary forces achi eve securi ty by
remai ni ngundetectedandthroughthei rbasi ccel l ul arstructure,thi s
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secti on deal s onl y wi th the securi ty measures appl i cabl e to the

guerri l l aforce.
74. Bi-ZonalSecuritySystem
a.General.Guerri l l auni tynormal l yempl oyabi -zonal (i nnerand
outerzones)securi tysystem(fi g.24).Therei snecessari l yanoverl ap
wheresecuri tyresponsi bi l i tydevol vestotwoormoreel ements.
b. I nnerSecurityZone.Thi szonei stheresponsi bi l i tyofguerri l l a
uni ts. I n thi s zone, the securi ty system depends upon standard
mi l i tarytechni quessuchas
(1) Patrol s.
(2)Outguardsandoutposts.
(3)Asenti nel system.
(4) Warni ngdevi ces.
(5) Coveranddecepti on.
c. Outer Security Zone. I n thi s zone the auxi l i ary force and the
undergroundprovi desecuri tyfortheguerri l l asbyfurni shi ngti mel y
i nformati onofenemyacti vi ty.
75. PrinciplesofSecurity
a. Dispersion.
(1) Guerri l l a forces avoi d l arge concentrati ons of troops i n
campsorbi vouacs.Eventhoughthel ogi sti cal si tuati onmay
permi t si zeabl e troop concentrati ons, commands are
general l y organi zed i nto smal l er uni ts and di spersed.
Di spersi on faci l i tates conceal ment, mobi l i ty, and secrecy.
Large forces may be concentrated to perform a speci fi c
operati on but, upon compl eti on of the operati on, they
qui ckl ydi sperse.
(2) Thepri nci pl eofdi spersi oni sappl i edtobothcommandand
support i nstal l ati ons. A l arge guerri l l a headquarters, for
exampl e,i sdi vi dedi ntoseveral echel onsanddepl oyedover
al argearea.
(3) I n the event of wel l -conducted, l arge scal e enemy
operati onsagai nsttheguerri l l aforce,theareacommander
may di vi de uni ts i nto even smal l er groups to achi eve
greaterdi spersi onandfaci l i tateescapefromenci rcl ement.
Spl i tti ngtheguerri l l aforcei ntosmal l groupsi susedonl y
when al l other means of evasi ve acti on are exhausted.
Extremedi spersi onreducestheeffecti venessoftheforcefor
a consi derabl e peri od of ti me. Thi s acti on al so l owers the
moral eoftheguerri l l as,andweakensthewi l l ofthe
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88
89
ci vi l i ans to resi st. To i ncrease the probabi l i ty of successful
reassembl yofdi sperseduni ts,pl ansi ncl udeal ternateassembl y
areas.
b.Mobility.
(1) Guerri l l ai nstal l ati onsandforcesmai ntai nahi ghdegreeof
mobi l i ty. Evacuati on pl ans for i nstal l ati ons and forces
i ncl udeel i mi nati onofal l tracesofguerri l l aacti vi typri orto
abandonmentofthearea.
(2) Mobi l i tyforevacuati oni sachi evedbyprepari ngequi pment
to be moved i n one-man l oads, by cachi ng l ess mobi l e
equi pment,bydestroyi ngorhi di ngmateri al ofi ntel l i gence
val uetotheenemy,bypol i ci ngthearea,andbyel i mi nati ng
si gnsoftherouteofwi thdrawal .
c. CoverandDeceptionOperations.Anotherpri nci pl eofprovi di ng
securi ty i s the use of decepti on operati ons. These operati ons are
pl annedtodecei vetheenemyastol ocati on,i ntentorstrengthofthe
guerri l l a force. They are conducted i n conjuncti on wi th other
resi stance operati ons i n the area or wi th conventi onal force
operati ons.
76. SecurityDiscipline
a.SafeguardingPlansandRecords.
(1)I nformati on concerni ng guerri l l a operati ons i s
di ssemi natedonaneed-to-knowbasi s.Mi ni mumnecessary
copi esofdocumentsaremadeormai ntai ned.Eachperson
i s gi ven onl y that i nformati on he needs to accompl i sh hi s
tasks. Speci al efforts are made to restri ct the amount of
i nformati on gi ven to i ndi vi dual s who are exposed to
capture.
(2) Admi ni strati verecordsarekepttoami ni mumandcached
so that the l ocati on i s known onl y by a requi red few.
Usual l yessenti al recordsarephotographed.
(3) Wheneverpossi bl e,referencetonamesandpl acesarecoded
andthekeytothecodei sgi venonaneed-to-knowbasi s.
(4)Recordswhi chareofnofurtherval uearedestroyed.
(5) Theguerri l l arel i esonhi s,memorytoafargreaterextent
than the regul ar sol di er. I nstal l ati ons are not marked on
mapsorpaperswhi charetakenoutofthebase.Guerri l l as
habi tual l ymemori zethel ocati onofi nstal l ati onsandareas
towhi chtheyhaveaccess.
b.SecurityMeasures.
(1)Stri ctsecuri tymeasuresareenforced.Thesei ncl ude
(a)Camoufl agedi sci pl i ne.
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(b)I sol ati onofuni tsfromeachother.
(c)Propersel ecti onandri gi dsupervi si onofcouri erroutes
betweenheadquartersanduni ts.
(d)Pol i ceofcampsi tesandi nstal l ati ons.
(e)Movementcontrol wi thi nandbetweenguerri l l abases.
(f)I sol ati onofguerri l l a.uni tsfromtheci vi l i anpopul ati on
at l arge. Any necessary contact wi th ci vi l i ans i s
accompl i shedthroughauxi l i aryel ements.
(g) Thorough i ndoctri nati on of al l uni ts i n resi stance to
i nterrogati on.
(2) Securi ty consci ousness i si mpresseduponguerri l l a.troops
from the i ncepti on of the force and conti nues throughout
operati ons. Commanders at al l l evel s constantl y stri ve to
i mprovesecuri tymeasures.Parti cul arattenti oni sdevoted
to those uni ts and el ements that have recentl y been
i nacti veorarel ocatedi nrel ati vel ysafeareas.
77. MarchSecurity
a. Securi tyonthemarchi sbaseduponaccurateknowl edgeofhe
enemy's l ocati on and strength. The i ntel l i gence secti on of the area
commandprovi desthi svi tal i nformati onforsecuri tyofmovement.
b. Once routes have been sel ected, uni ts are bri efed on enemy
acti vi ty, pri mary and al ternate routes, di spersal and reassembl y
areasal ongtheway,andsecuri tymeasurestobeobservedenroute.
Auxi l i ary uni ts i n the route area assi st by provi di ng securi ty
el ementsfortheguerri l l as.
c. Whi l eonthemove,theguerri l l aforcesempl oymarchsecuri ty
techni ques such as advance, rear and fl ank guards. Pre-sel ected
bi vouacsarethoroughl yscreenedbypatrol spri ortothei roccupati on
by guerri l l a uni ts. Contact i s establ i shed wi th l ocal auxi l i ary uni ts
desi gnated to support the guerri l l a movement. The auxi l i ari es are
thus abl e to furni sh the l atest enemy i nformati on to guerri l l a
commanders.
78. Counterintelligence
a. Securi tymeasuresusedbyguerri l l astosafeguardi nformati on,
i nstal l ati ons and communi cati ons, are suppl emented by an acti ve
counteri ntel l i gence program to neutral i ze the enemy's i ntel l i gence
system and to prevent the penetrati on of guerri l l a forces by enemy
agents.
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b. Counteri ntel l i gence i s a command responsi bi l i ty under the
staff supervi si on of the i ntel l i gence secti on of the area command.
Sel ectedpersonnel ,speci al l ytrai nedi ncounteri ntel l i gence,careful l y
screen al l members of the guerri l l a organi zati on as a protecti ve
measureagai nstenemyi nfi l trati on.Theyal sopl anandsupervi sean
acti vecampai gnofdecepti on.
(1) Counteri ntel l i gencepersonnel throughtheauxi l i aryforces
keepaconstantcheckontheci vi l i anpopul ati onofthearea
toi nsureagai nstthepresenceofenemyagentswi thi nthei r
mi dst. Ci vi l i ansupon whomtheguerri l l asdependheavi l y
forsupportmaycompromi setheguerri l l awarfareeffortas
easi l yasadi sl oyal guerri l l a.
(2) Fal se rumors and fal se i nformati on concerni ng guerri l l a
strength,l ocati on,operati ons,trai ni ngandequi pmentcan
bedi ssemi natedbycounteri ntel l i gencepersonnel .Factsare
di stortedi ntenti onal l ytomi ni mi zeorexaggerateguerri l l a
capabi l i ti esatanygi venti me.
(3) Acti vemeasuresaretakentodetermi neenemyi ntenti ons,
methods of operati on, EEI , and to i denti fy enemy
i ntel l i gencepersonnel orl ocal i nhabi tantswhomaybeused
as enemy agents. These acti ve measures i ncl ude
penetrati on of enemy i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence
organi zati onsbysel ectedpersonnel ,andthemani pul ati on
ofdefectorsanddoubl eagents.
79. SecurityRoleoftheAuxiliaryandUnderground
Both the auxi l i ary forces and the underground contri bute to the
securi tyoftheguerri l l aforce.I nci dental tothei reverydayoperati ons,
they uncover enemy acti vi ty or i ndi cati ons whi ch, when eval uated,
di scl osepotenti al dangertotheguerri l l aforce.Theyestabl i shspeci fi c
systemsdesi gnedtoprovi dewarni ngoftheapproachofenemyuni ts.
They i nti mi date any col l aborators and attempt to el i ci t i nformati on
fromenemypersonnel ,l ocal offi ci al sandthepol i ce.Theyoperatei n
whati stotheguerri l l astheoutersecuri tyzone.
80. ReactiontoEnemyOperations
Premature or unnecessary movement caused by the presence of
the enemy may expose guerri l l as to greater ri sks than remai ni ng
conceal ed.Suchmovesdi sruptoperati onsandtendtoreducesecuri ty
by exposi ng guerri l l as to enemy agents, i nformants, and
col l aborators. The deci si on by the guerri l l a commander to move i s
madeonl yafteracareful esti mateofthesi tuati on.
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SectionIV.INTELLIGENCEINGUERRILLAWARFARE
OPERATIONALAREAS
81. General
The l ocati on of the area command i n enemy-control l ed terri tory
makes avai l abl e to the theater commander an addi ti onal means of
devel opi ngi ntel l i gence.Theareacommandi sabl etoexpl oi tsources
general l y unavai l abl e to other theater forces. However, the area
commandi snotpri mari l yani ntel l i genceagencybutami l i taryforce
responsi ve to theater control . As such, they provi de i ntel l i gence
i nformati ongatheredi nci dental tothei r.pri marymi ssi on.
82. AgenciesandSources
a. The area command has avai l abl e three pri nci pal agenci es to
assi st i n gatheri ng i ntel l i gence i nformati on. They are the guerri l l a
force,theauxi l i aryforceandtheunderground.
b. For speci al i ntel l i gence col l ecti on mi ssi ons, the speci al forces
detachmentmaybeaugmentedbytrai nedi ntel l i gencespeci al i sts.
83. Capabilities
Theareacommandhasthefol l owi ngi ntel l i gencecapabi l i ti es:
a. I ntelligencetoSupportTheirOwnOperations.Thei ntel l i gence
system of the operati onal area i s pri mari l y geared to support the
command. I t produces i ntel l i gence for the use of the guerri l l as, the
underground,andtheauxi l i ari es.
b. I ntelligence Data to Support Theater Operations. The area
command i n the course of operati ons acqui res i ntel l i gence data of
val uetoothertheaterforces.Someexampl esare
(1)Order-of-battl ei ntel l i gencedata.
(2) I nformati ontosupportpsychol ogi cal warfareacti vi ti es.
(3) Targeti nformati onfortacti cal andstrategi cai rforcespl us
post-stri kei nformati on.
(4) I nformati on of pol i ti cal , soci ol ogi cal , and economi c
i ntel l i genceval ue.
(5) I ntel l i gence data to support speci fi c tacti cal operati ons
suchasai rborne,amphi bi ous,orarmoredoperati ons.
SectionV.COMMUNICATIONSINGUERRILLAWARFARE
OPERATIONALAREAS
84. General
Communi cati onswi thi nanareaorsectorfurni shthecommander
themeanstocontrol hi sorgani zati on.Becausei ti sl ocatedi nenemy
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terri tory, the communi cati on system wi l l besl ower.Whenapl ani s
formul ated,moreti memustbeal l owedfortransmi tti ngordersthan
i nconventi onal mi l i taryuni ts.
85. MeansAvailable
Communi cati ons wi thi n a sector or between the area and sector
commandsusenonel ectroni ctechni queswhereverpracti cal .Unti l the
areai srel ati vel ysecure,el ectroni cmeansshoul dbeusedonl ywhen
absol utel y necessary. Si nce the area command i s an i ntegrated
organi zati on consi sti ng of the speci al forces detachment and the
resi stance forces, the same communi cati ons must sati sfy the
requi rements of both. Speci al forces communi cati ons at the
detachmentl evel cannotbedi vorcedfromguerri l l acommuni cati ons.
86. CommunicationSecurity
a. Communi cati ons are al ways vul nerabl e to i ntercepti on.
Absol utesecuri tydoesnotexi st.I ntercepti onofcommuni cati onsi san
excel l entmeansofgatheri ngi ntel l i gencei nformati on.Speci al forces
radi o operators normal l y operate wi th a maxi mum-securi ty SOI ,
desi gnedtomakei ntercepti onofel ectroni ccommuni cati onsdi ffi cul t.
I f guerri l l a radi os are operated from the same general area as the
speci al forcesradi o,theyoperateusi ngthesameprecauti ons.
b. Duri ngtheearl yphasesofguerri l l adevel opment,messengers
are the chi ef means of communi cati on. Securi ty i s enhanced by
cel l ul ar structure of the messenger organi zati on, use of secure
cryptographi csystemsandproperauthenti cati on.
87. FactorsAffectingCommunications
Radi o used between the area and sector commands i s the radi o
operatedbytrai nedspeci al forcesoperators.Communi cati onswi thi n
anareaorasectordependontheoperati onal si tuati on,thephysi cal
l ocati on of the area and sector commands, terrai n barri ers, the
trai ni ng of the resi stance force, the enemy capabi l i ty i n el ectroni c
i ntercepti on, the securi ty of the area and the communi cati on
equi pmentavai l abl e.Therangeofradi os,whi choperatei nthehi gh
frequency band, i s extremel y di ffi cul t to predi ct. Under certai n
condi ti ons these transmi ssi ons can be i ntercepted over great
di stances. The range of l ow-powered radi os, operati ng i n the VHF
band,rarel yexceedsl i neofsi ght.Unti l theareai ssecure,theuseof
radi os i s restri cted to those operati onal mi ssi ons from whi ch l i ttl e
i ntel l i gencedatawi l l accruetoenemyi nterceptors.Enemycapabi l i ty
to i ntercept ei ther el ectroni c or nonel ectroni c communi cati ons and
theoperati onal si tuati onarethetwopri maryfactorstobeconsi dered
whenpl anni ngcommuni cati onswi thi nanoperati onal area.
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SectionVI.LOGISTICSINGUERRILLAWARFAREOPERATIONAL
AREAS
88. General
a. Thel ogi sti cal supportforguerri l l aforcesi sderi vedfromtwo
pri mary sources; the sponsor and the operati onal area. Logi sti cal
pl anni ngoftheareacommandi sbaseduponresourcesavai l abl efrom
bothofthesesources.
b. Theoperati onal areai snormal l yexpectedtoprovi dethebul k
ofthel ogi sti cal supportrequi redbytheareacommand.Thi ssupport
i ncl udesl ocal transportati on,careofthesi ckandwounded,vari ous
servi ces,andthosei temsofsuppl ynecessaryforday-to-dayexi stence
suchasfood,cl othi ng,andshel ter.Duri ngthecourseofoperati ons,
the area may be abl e to provi de a certai n porti on of arms and
equi pment. Thi s materi el i s usual l y procured as a resul t of combat
acti on agai nst the enemy or securi ty and pol i ce forces. I n hi ghl y
devel opedareasoftheworl d,certai namountsoftechni cal equi pment,
suchasradi os,canbel ocal l yobtai ned.
c. The sponsor provi des those essenti al l ogi sti cal servi ces whi ch
are not readi l y avai l abl e wi thi n the operati onal area. Usual l y thi s
consi sts of arms, ammuni ti on, demol i ti ons, and communi cati ons
equi pmentthe essenti al s to support combat operati ons. Under
certai n condi ti ons, sponsor l ogi sti cal support i s expanded. I t then
i ncl udesevacuati onofthesi ckandwounded,food,cl othi ng,andother
essenti al survi val i temsunavai l abl ei nthearea.
89. LogisticalRequirements
Logi sti cal requi rementsoftheareacommandarerudi mentaryand
si mpl ewhencomparedtoaconventi onal forceofsi mi l arsi ze.These
requi rements,i ngeneral ,consi stof
a. Necessi ti es to enabl e guerri l l as to l i ve;suchasfood,cl othi ng
andshoes,shel ter,andmedi cal equi pment.
b. Combat equi pment for the conduct of operati ons. Major
categori es arearms and ammuni ti on, demol i ti ons and
communi cati onsequi pment.
c. Suffi ci enttransportati ontoenabl eguerri l l auni tstodi stri bute
suppl i es.
d. Amedi cal systemtocareforsi ckandwounded.
e. Essenti al servi ces, for exampl ethe repai r of shoes and
cl othi ng.
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90. LogisticalOrganization
a.Area Command. The area command organi zes for l ogi sti cal
supportbyassi gni ngtaskstoi tssubordi nateel ements.
b. TheGuerrillaForce.Eachguerri l l auni ti sassi gnedaporti on
oftheoperati onal areaforl ogi sti cal support.Usual l yguerri l l auni ts
are satel l i ted on an auxi l i ary regi on and recei ve di rect l ogi sti cal
supportfromtheauxi l i aryuni tswi thi nthei rassi gnedporti onofthe
operati onal area.I naddi ti ontothesupportfroml ocal auxi l i ari es,the
guerri l l auni tdependsuponi tsownavertacti ontosati sfyl ogi sti cal
requi rements.
c. The Auxiliary Force. One of the pri mary rol es assi gned to
auxi l i ary uni ts i s l ogi sti cal support of guerri l l a uni ts. Si nce the
auxi l i ari esthemsel vesarel argel ysel f-suffi ci entbecausetheyl i veat
home, they establ i sh l ocal l ogi sti cal systems desi gned to support
guerri l l auni ts.
d. TheUnderground.
(1) The underground l ogi sti cal rol e i s l argel y one of sel f-
mai ntenance for i ts own members. Thi s usual l y takes the
formofrati oncards,documents,money,l i vi ngquartersand
speci al equi pment. I n the l atter case, the area command
oftensuppl i esspeci al equi pmentrecei vedfromthesponsor.
(2) I n some si tuati ons, the underground provi des sel ected
i temsofsuppl y,whi chwoul dotherwi sebeunobtai nabl e,to
the area command. Exampl es aredrugs and other
medi ci nes, radi os, raw materi al s for expl osi ves,
photographi cmateri al s,etc.
91. Supply
a.ExternalSupply.
(1) Suppl y of the area command from external sources i s
normal l y l i mi ted to those i tems not readi l y obtai nabl e i n
the operati onal area. Dependi ng on condi ti ons wi thi n the
area, thi s vari es from smal l , i rregul ar del i veri es to total
l ogi sti cal support.
(2) Asageneral rul e,sponsor-provi dedsuppl i esaredel i vered
di rectl ytothei ndi vi dual user.Fori nstance,i ftwoguerri l l a
battal i onsareseparatedbyadi stanceoftwentymi l es,the
suppl i es for each are ai r-dropped on separate drop zones
sel ectedtoservi ceeachbattal i on.
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(3) Thesi tuati onmaybesuchthatdi rectdel i verytotheuseri s
notdesi rabl eorpossi bl e.I nthi scase,suppl i esaredel i vered
to a desi gnated l ocati on and thei r contents di stri buted to
the vari ous users. Al though thi s system takes much ti me
and effort, i t permi ts central i zed control over sponsor-
provi ded suppl i es and i s the preferred method when the
si tuati on requi res cl ose supervi si on of subordi nate
el ements.
b. I nternalSupply.Thi ssystemi ncl udesal l themethodsusedby
theareacommandtoobtai nsuppl i esandequi pmentfromwi thi nthe
operati onal area. I n deal i ng wi th the ci vi l i an popul ati on, the
resi stance el ements must bal ance thei r requi rement for suppl i es
agai nsttheneedtomai ntai ncooperati onofthei rci vi l i ansupporters.
Aprocurementprogramdesi gnedwi thoutregardtotheneedsofthe
popul ati onmayi mposesuchheavycommi tmentsontheci vi l i ansthat
they refuse to cooperate and thus l i mi t the operati ons of the
resi stanceforceandi ncreasetherequi rementforexternal suppl y.
(1)Offensive Operations and Battlefield Recovery. By
conducti ng offensi ve operati ons agai nst the enemy, the
guerri l l a force i s abl e to sati sfy many of i ts l ogi sti cal
requi rements and at the same ti me deny the use ofthese
suppl i estotheenemy.Capturi ngsuppl i esfromtheenemy
has the advantage of not al i enati ng ci vi l i ans. Wi th
adequate i ntel l i gence and proper pl anni ng, rai ds and
ambushesareconductedagai nsti nstal l ati onsandconvoys
contai ni ngthei temsneededbytheguerri l l aforce.Pri orto
an operati on, each guerri l l a i s i nstructed to secure those
pri ori tymateri al srequi redbytheguerri l l aforce.I nareas
where conventi onal operati ons have been conducted,
guerri l l as can obtai n certai n quanti ti es of suppl i es by
col l ecti ngabandonedequi pment.
(2)Levy.Toensureanequi tabl esystemforobtai ni ngsuppl i es
fromthel ocal popul ati on,al evysystembasedontheabi l i ty
of each fami l y or group of fami l i es to contri bute may be
organi zed.Thi ssystemi sestabl i shedandoperatedbythe
vari ous auxi l i ary uni ts. Such a system provi des a means
whereby the burden of suppl yi ng the guerri l l a force i s
di stri buted equi tabl y throughout the ci vi l i an popul ati on.
Thepopul ati oncanbetol dthatpaymentwi l l eventual l ybe
made for the suppl i es taken. Recei pts may be gi ven to
i ndi vi dual sorrecordsofthetransacti onskeptbythearea
command suppl y offi cer. I n establ i shi ng the l evy system,
97
thecommandermustconsi deranumberofobstacl eswhi ch
mi ght affect procurement i n hi s operati onal area. Among
them
(a)Chroni cfoodshortages.
(b)Enemyi nterferenceand/orcompeti ti onforsuppl i es.
(c)Possi bl e i mpact of combat acti ons, such as "scorched
earth"pol i ci esandradi oacti vecontami nati on.
(d)Competi ti onfromri val guerri l l abands.
(3)Barter. I t may not be desi rabl e for the area command to
engage i n outri ght barter wi th the ci vi l i an popul ati on
because of possi bl e adverse effects upon the l evy system.
However, i n some cases i t i s mutual l y benefi ci al to
exchangecri ti cal i tems,suchasmedi cal suppl i es,forfood,
cl othi ngorservi ces.
(4) Purchase. Speci al forces detachments may be gi ven a
certai namountofnegoti abl ecurrencyi ntheformofgol dor
paper money. Thi s money i s for the purchase of cri ti cal
i temsorservi ceswi thi ntheoperati onal area.Therewi l l not
be enough for purchases to meetal l suppl y requi rements.
I naddi ti on,theuncontrol l edi njecti onofl argeamountsof
moneymaywel l di sruptthel ocal economy.Purchasesare
usedtosuppl ementratherthanrepl acethel evysystem.
(5)Confiscation.Confi scati oni samethodwhi chmaybeused
to ful fi l l those requi rements whi ch cannot be met by the
other methods of i nternal suppl y. Confi scati on i s often
empl oyedi ncaseswherecertai ngroupsrefusetocooperate
or are acti vel y col l aborati ng wi th the enemy. Natural l y,
confi scati on tends to al i enate the ci vi l i an popul ati on and
thereforeshoul dbeusedonl yi nemergenci esortopuni sh
col l aborators. I n al l cases, confi scati on must be stri ctl y
control l ed to i nsure that i t does not deteri orate i nto
i ndi scri mi natel ooti ng.
c. Storage
(1) Thestorageorcachi ngofsuppl i esandequi pmentpl aysan
i mportant rol e i n the area command l ogi sti cal pl an. The
uncertai nti es of the weather and enemy acti on prevent
ti metabl e recei pt of suppl i es from the sponsori ng power.
Theareacommand,therefore,mustbepreparedtooperate
for extended peri ods wi thout external resuppl y. Thi s
necessi tates stockpi l i ng suppl i es for l ater use. Guerri l l a
98
uni tsdonotmai ntai nexcessstocksofsuppl i essi ncel arge

quanti ti es of equi pment l i mi t mobi l i ty wi thout i ncreasi ng
combat effecti veness. Suppl i es i n excess of current
requi rementsarecachedi nanumberofi sol atedl ocati ons
to mi ni mi ze the ri sk of di scovery by the enemy. These
caches are establ i shed and secured by both guerri l l a and
auxi l i aryuni tsi nsupportoftheguerri l l aforce.I temsare
careful l y packaged so that damage from weather and
exposurei smi ni mi zed.Speci al i zedpackagi ngofsuppl i esi s
accompl i shedbythesponsor.
(2) Caches may be l ocated anywhere that materi al can be
hi dden-caves, swamps, forests, cemeteri es and l akes. The
cacheshoul dbereadi l yaccessi bl etotheuser.Di spersal of
caches throughout the operati onal area permi ts a hi gh
degreeofoperati onal fl exi bi l i tyfortheguerri l l aforce.
(3) General l y there are two types of caches those contai ni ng
i temsusedonaday-to-daybasi sandthosecontai ni ngi tems
tobeusedi nthefuture.Eachuni tcachesexcesssuppl i es
andequi pmentanddrawsupontheseasneeded.Onl ythe
uni t commander and key personnel know the l ocati on of
caches.I nthesamefashi on,commandersestabl i shcaches
contai ni ng suppl i es whi ch represent a reserve for
emergencyusethroughoutthearea.
92. Transportation
a. Thetransportati onrequi rementsoftheareacommandaremet
l argel y from wi thi n the area si nce i t i s usual l y i mpracti cal for the
sponsor to provi de transportati on support for operati onal use. To
ful fi l l i tstransportati onrequi rements,theareacommanduti l i zesany
meansavai l abl e.
b. Movementbyfooti susual l ythepri marymeans,especi al l yi n
thei ni ti al stagesofguerri l l adevel opment.I nspeci fi csi tuati ons,thi s
maybesuppl ementedbyl ocal l y-procuredmotorvehi cl esorani mal s.
Theauxi l i ari esprovi dewhateverl ocal transportati oni savai l abl eto
guerri l l a uni ts. Thi s transportati on i s normal l y furni shed on a
mi ssi on basi s. However, i n some i nstances, the guerri l l as
permanentl yacqui retransportati onandorgani zesuppl ytrai ns.
93. MedicalService
a. Area Command Medical Requirements. The area command
medi cal requi rements vary wi del y between operati onal areas but
usual l ydi fferfromtheconventi onal medi cal probl emi ntworespects.
Fi rst,duetothenatureofguerri l l aoperati ons,battl ecasual ti esare
normal l yl oweri nguerri l l auni tsthani nthei ri nfantrycounterparts.
99
Second, the i nci dence of di sease and si ckness i s often hi gher i n
guerri l l aforcesthani ncomparabl econventi onal uni ts.
b. Area Medical Support System. The area medi cal support
system i s based pri mari l y upon l ocal faci l i ti es suppl emented by
sponsor-provi dedmedi cal suppl i es.
c. MedicalSystemintheOperationalArea.Themedi cal systemi n
theoperati onal areafeaturesbothorgani zedguerri l l amedi cal uni ts
andauxi l i arymedi cal faci l i ti esfori ndi vi dual sandsmal l groups.The
former are l ocated i n guerri l l a base areas and staffed by guerri l l a
medi cal detachments.Theauxi l i aryfaci l i tyi sal ocati oni nwhi chone
orasmal l numberofpati entsarehel di naconval escentstatus.
d. GuerrillaMedicalDetachment.
(1) Regardl ess of the varyi ng si ze of guerri l l a uni ts, the
medi cal detachmentsretai nessenti al l ythesamestructure
andfuncti ons.Thei rduti esaretomai ntai nahi ghstateof
heal th i n the command, to render effi ci ent treatment and
evacuati onofcasual ti es,andtoi nsuretheearl i estpossi bl e
return to duty of those who are si ck or i njured. The
detachment may al so provi de treatment and drugs to
auxi l i aryandundergroundel ements.
(2) The organi zati on of the medi cal detachment consi sts
essenti al l y of three secti onsthe ai d stati on, whi ch i s
charged wi th the i mmedi ate care and evacuati on of
casual ti es; the hospi tal , whi ch performs defensi ve
treatments of casual ti es and coordi nates medi cal resuppl y
and trai ni ng; and l astl y, the conval escent secti on, whi ch
caresforpati entswhorequi rerestandami ni mumofacti ve
medi cal attenti on before thei r return to duty. The
conval escentsecti oni snotl ocatednearthehospi tal areaas
thi s i ncreases the si ze of the i nstal l ati on and thus the
securi tyri sk.I nstead,thepati entsarepl acedi nhomesof
l ocal sympathi zersori ni sol atedconval escentcamps.
(3) Duri ng the earl y stages of devel opment, the medi cal
organi zati oni ssmal l andprobabl ycombi nestheai dstati on
andthehospi tal i ntoonei nstal l ati on.Theuseofauxi l i ary
conval escentfaci l i ti esi sfoundatal l stagesofdevel opment.
e. Evacuation.
(1) Everyefforti smadetoevacuatewoundedpersonnel from
the scene of acti on. The condi ti on of wounded guerri l l as
mayprecl udemovementwi ththeuni ttothebase.I nthi s
event,thewoundedarehi ddeni nacoveredl ocati onandthe
100
l ocal auxi l i ary uni t noti fi ed the l ocal auxi l i ari es thencare
for and hi de the wounded unti l they can be returned to
thei rownorgani zati ons.
(2) The evacuati on of dead from the scene of acti on i s most
i mportant for securi ty reasons. The i denti fi cati on of the
dead by the enemy may jeopardi ze the safety of thei r
fami l i esaswel l asthatofthei runi ts.Thebodi esofthose
ki l l ed i n acti on are evacuated, cached unti l they can be
recovered for proper buri al , or di sposed of by whatever
means i s consi stent wi th the customs of the l ocal
popul ati on.
(3) Astheoperati onal areadevel opsandtheoveral l si tuati on
favorsthesponsor,evacuati onofthesi ckandwoundedto
fri endl y areas may be feasi bl e. Thi s l i ghtens the burden
upon the meager faci l i ti es avai l abl e to the area command
and provi des a hi gher standard of medi cal care for the
pati ent.
f.ExpansionofMedicalSupport.
(1) Asthearms,commandexpands,fti smoreeffi ci entfroma
medi cal standpoi nt to establ i sh a central i zed system to
provi deadvancedmedi cal care.Fi el dhospi tal spermi tmore
fl exi bi l i ty because of them wi der sel ecti on of trai ned
personnel , equi pment to provi de speci al treatment, and
they rel i eve the ai d stati ons oaf the responsi bi l i ty for
prol onged treatment of pati ents. Si nce thi s type of
i nstal l ati on may be fai rl y l arge and may have si zeabl e
amounts of equi pment, i ts mobi l i ty wi l l suffer. For that
reasoni ti sl ocatedi narel ati vel yi sol atedareaawayfrom
troopuni ts,headquartersandothersensi ti veareasbutso
astorecei vethemaxi mumprotecti onfromguerri l l auni ts.
(2) To prevent the hospi tal from becomi ng so l arge that i t
attracts undue attenti on, certai n acti ons are taken. Fi rst,
as trai ned personnel , suppl i es and equi pment become
avai l abl e, addi ti onal hospi tal s are establ i shed. Second, as
soonaspossi bl e,apati enti stransferredtoaconval escent
hometocompl etehi srecovery,I fthei ndi vi dual i spl acedi n
aci vi l i anhome,hei sproperl ydocumented.
(3) I n some cases the l ocal popul ati on may not be abl e to
support the area command Wi th qual i fi ed medi cal
personnel . As the requi rement for doctors and speci al i zed
personnel i ncreases, the SFOB may have to provi de
addi ti onal medi cal personnel over and above the
detachment'sorgani cmedi cal personnel .
101
94. Services
I n guerri l l a warfare operati onal areas, servi ces are pri mari l y
restri cted to basi c mai ntenance and repai r of equi pment. The
di ffi cul ti es i n procuri ng suppl i es di ctate the need for ri gi d suppl y
di sci pl i ne. Al l personnel must perform fi rst-echel on mai ntenance.
Pl ansprovi deforthemaxi mumuti l i zati onofavai l abl esuppl i esand
the establ i shment of l ocal repai r faci l i ti es to prol ong the l i fe of
equi pment. Necessary mai ntenance and repai r i tems such as
armorerstool s,smal l armsrepai rki ts,sewi ngki ts,oi l andcl eani ng
materi al sarei ncl udedi nsponsor-provi dedsuppl ypackages.Cl othi ng
andfootgeararerepai redl ocal l y.
102
CHAPTER8
COMBATEMPLOYMENT
SectionI.INTRODUCTION
95. General
a. Al though di scussed separatel y from other operati ons, the
combat empl oyment of guerri l l a forces commences earl y and
conti nues throughout the enti re span of guerri l l a warfare
devel opment. However, combat empl oyment normal l y reaches i ts
peak just pri or to. the juncture between unconventi onal and
conventi onal forces.
b. Control andcoordi nati onofguerri l l auni ts.i sassi stedbythe
desi gnati onofguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areas.Thesubdi vi si onal
conceptoftheseareasi sexpl ai nedi nparagraph62.
c. Guerri l l a forces have a much greater chance for success and
mosteffecti vel ysupportconventi onal mi l i taryoperati onswhenthei r
acti vi ti es are coordi nated wi th other theater forces.Coordi nati on of
the guerri l l a effort wi th the servi ce component commands' pl ans of
operati ons i s executed through normal command channel s-theater
commander,JUWTF,SFOB,andoperati onal detachment.
96. AreaControl
Guerri l l a forces are rarel y concerned wi th sei zi ng and hol di ng
terrai n.However,theyareconcernedwi thestabl i shi ngareacontrol
i nordertoexpedi teoperati ons.Areacontrol i scl assi fi ed,accordi ngto
degree,asareasuperi ori tyorareasupremacy.
a. Area Superiority. Temporary control of a speci fi c area i s
attai ned through maxi mum use of the pri nci pl es of surpri se, mass,
andmaneuver.Areasuperi ori tyi smai ntai nedonl yfortheperi odof
ti merequi redtoaccompl i shmi ssi onswi thoutprohi bi ti vei nterference
bytheenemy.
b. Area Supremacy.Compl eteareacontrol i sattai nedwhenever
the enemy i s i ncapabl e of effecti ve i nterference wi th guerri l l a
operati ons. Area supremacy i s sel dom achi eved through
unconventi onal warfareeffortsal one.
97. NatureofGuerrillaWarfare
a. Noworddescri besthenatureofguerri l l awarfarebetterthan
"fl ui d."I nguerri l l awarfarethesi tuati oni sal waysfl ui d.Bothenemy
and guerri l l a uni ts move and change thei r rel ati ve posi ti ons as the
103
resul t of tacti cal maneuvers. The area of guerri l l a acti vi ty i s never
stati c; the si tuati on changes constantl y as the enemy reacts to
guerri l l aacti ons.
b. Maxi mum effecti ve resul ts are attai ned through offensi ve
operati ons of the guerri l l a force. Normal l y, the guerri l l a force i s
pri mari l y i nterested i n the i nterdi cti on of l i nes of communi cati ons
and destructi on of cri ti cal enemy i nstal l ati ons. Except i n those
i nstances wherei n the tacti cal advantages are cl earl y wi th the
guerri l l aforce,noefforti smadetocl osewi thanddestroyai l enemy.
Conversel y, the enemy force must provi de securi ty for hi s cri ti cal
i nstal l ati ons and seek to contact and destroy the guerri l l a force.
Theseopposi ngcoursesofacti oncreateai l operati onal envi ronment
thati sfl ui d.
c. Guerri l l a area superi ori ty i s more easi l y achi eved i n di ffi cul t
terrai nthatrestri ctsenemyobservati onandmovement.Thesefactors
reducetheenemycapabi l i tytomountcoordi natedoperati onsqui ckl y
agai nsttheguerri l l asandal l owssuffi ci entti meforguerri l l auni tsto
avoi d becomi ng i nvol ved i n stati c defensi ve combat. The physi cal
characteri sti cs of these so-cal l ed "redoubt areas" are usual l y such
that cri ti cal enemy targets are not l ocated i n areas of sustai ned
guerri l l asuperi ori ty.
d. The enemy can achi eve area superi ori ty or supremacy of a
parti cul ar regi on at any ti me he i s wi l l i ng and abl e to commi t
suffi ci ent forces to do so. However, because the guerri l l a force i s
comparati vel yfreetosel ecttheti meandpl aceofattack,successful
operati ons are conducted agai nst target systems despi te enemy
securi tymeasures.
e. I n between those areas of enemy control and temporary
guerri l l a force control i s an area or twi l i ght zone subject to
permanentcontrol ofnei ther.Becausetheareacommandcal l i ni ti ate
offensi veoperati onsempl oyi ngavari etyofmethodsofattackagai nst
wi despreadtargetsystems,compl etesecuri tyofthetwi l i ghtzoneby
theenemyi svi rtual l yi mpossi bl e.
f. Whi l e guerri l l as and the enemy compete for overt control
throughoutthetwi l i ghtzone,guerri l l ascannothol danyspeci fi carea
agai nstdetermi nedenemyattack.Theenemyhol dsl ocal i ti eswhi ch
he occupi es i n force and the guerri l l as conduct thei r operati ons i n
thoseregi onswheretheenemyi sweakest.
g. The auxi l i ary organi zati on i s more effecti ve i n the twi l i ght
zonethani ti si nenemy-domi natedareas.Theguerri l l acapabi l i tyof
conducti ng offensi ve operati ons coupl ed wi th other acti vi ti es i s
i ncreased. I ntel l i gence organi zati ons report everythi ng that the
enemy doeswi thi nthetwi l i ghtzone.Throughoutthetwi l i ghtzone,
the enemy i s made to feel that l i e i s i n hosti l e terri tory; he may
104
control asmal l segmentbyforceofarms,butl i ecanneverrel axhi s
guardl estl i ebesurpri sedbyguerri l l as.
98. Effects
a. Guerri l l aoperati onsweardownandi nfl i ctcasual ti esuponthe
enemy,causedamagetosuppl i esandfaci l i ti es,anti hi nderanddel ay
enemyoperati ons.Thesuccessofguerri l l aoperati onseventhefact
that ti l e guerri l l as conti nue to exi stl owers enemy moral e and
presti ge;di sruptstheeconomy,pol i ti cs,andi ndustryoftheenemyor
enemyoccupi edareas;andmai ntai nsthemoral eandwi l l toresi stof
thenati vepopul ati on.
b. Because guerri l l a operati ons are pri mari l y di rected agai nst
l i nes of communi cati ons i ndustri al faci l i ti es and key i nstal l ati ons,
they i mpede or i nterdi ct ti l e movement of men and materi el and
seri ousl y affect the enemy's capabi l i ty to suppl y, control , and
communi cate wi th hi s combat forces. I n addi ti on, the enemy i s
compel l ed to di vert manpower and equi pment to combat guerri l l a
acti vi ti es.
99. TypesofOperationalMissions
Operati onal mi ssi onsforguerri l l aforcesarecategori zedas
a. Missions in Support of the Theater Commander. These
mi ssi ons have thei r greatest i mpact on theater l evel pl ans. Speci al
forcesdetachmentsdi rectguerri l l aforcesl ocatedi l l enemyorenemy
occupi ed terri tory. Operati onal command of these unconventi onal
warfare forces i s retai ned by the theater commander and exerci sed
throughtheSFOB.Forafurtherdi scussi onseeparagraph100.
b. Missions to Assist Conventional Forces Engaged in Combat
Operations.Thesemi ssi onsareconductedtoassi stservi cecomponent
tacti cal commands engaged i n combat operati ons, usual l y the fi el d
army and subordi nate el ements. Speci al forces detachments di rect
guerri l l a forces l ocated i n enemy occupi ed terri tory and operati onal
control oftheseforcesi sexerci sedbythetacti cal commanderthrough
a Speci al Forces l i ai son detachment. Logi sti cal and admi ni strati ve
support of unconventi onal warfare forces remai ns wi th the theater
commander. For a further di scussi on see paragraphs 132 through
139.
c. Missions Conducted After Link-Up With Friendly Forces.
Mi ssi onsmaybeassi gnedguerri l l aforcesafterl i nk-upwi thfri endl y
forces has been accompl i shed. Operati onal control maybeexerci sed
by tacti cal commanders or passed to other theater army commands
such as Theater Army Logi sti cal Command (TALOG) or Theater
Army Ci vi l Affai rs Command (TACAComd). Speci al forces
detachments may or may not di rect the guerri l l a force i n the
105
executi onofthesemi ssi ons.Forafurtherdi scussi onseeparagraphs
140through147.
100. MissionsinSupportoftheTheaterCommander
a.General.Thesemi ssi onsmaybeei therstrategi cortacti cal i n
natureandhavebothl ong-rangeandi mmedi ateeffectsontheenemy
and hi s mi l i tary forces. They consi st ofI nterdi cti on of l i nes of
communi cati ons,keyareas,mi l i tarytargets,andi ndustri al faci l i ti es;
psychol ogi cal operati ons; speci al i ntel l i gence tasks;andevasi onand
escapeoperati ons.
b. I nterdiction. Major emphasi s i s pl aced upon i nterdi cti on of
l i nesofcommuni cati ons,keyareas,i ndustri al faci l i ti es,andmi l i tary
targets. Of al l guerri l l a operati ons, i nterdi cti on usual l y has the
wi dest i mpact on the enemy and hi s abi l i ty to wage war and
consequentl y i s consi dered the basi c guerri l l a warfare operati onal
mi ssi on.I nterdi cti onhi ndersori nterruptstheenemy'suseofl i nesof
communi cati ons, deni es hi m use of certai n areas and destroys
i ndustri al faci l i ti es, mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons, and equi pment.
I nterdi cti on ranges from si mpl e sabotage by an i ndi vi dual to
concertedattacksbyguerri l l aforces.Whenproperl ycoordi natedwi th
other theater operati ons, i nterdi cti on can make a si gni fi cant
contri buti ontotheoveral l effecti venessoftheateroperati ons.Fora
di scussi onofi nterdi cti ontechni quesseeparagraphs101through126
andFM31-21A.
c. Psychological Warfare. Al l operati ons are conducted i n a
manner that wi l l create a favorabl e envi ronment for psychol ogi cal
control of the i ndi genous popul ati on i n keepi ng wi th announced
postwar objecti ves. Often the psychol ogi cal effects of guerri l l a
operati onsfaroutwei ghthetacti cal resul ts.I ntheoperati onal area,
psychol ogi cal warfare i s empl oyed by the area command to
communi catewi ththeenemyforces,securi tyforces,acti veresi stance
el ements and segments of the ci vi l i an popul ati on supporti ng,
opposi ng, or i ndi fferent to the resi stance movement. Normal l y,
separate psychol ogi cal operati ons conducted by guerri l l a forces are
desi gned to support the needs of the operati onal area, and are
governedbyoveral l theaterobjecti ves.Theabi l i tyofguerri l l aforces
to control the popul ati on and el i ci t ci vi l i an support i s l argel y
dependentuponthepsychol ogi cal i mpactoftheresi stancemovement
upon the popul ace. For a detai l ed di scussi on of psychol ogi cal
operati onsi nsupportofguerri l l aforces,seechapter9.
d. SpecialI ntelligenceTasks.
(1) Al though Speci al Forces detachments are not i ntel l i gence
organi zati ons they have the capabi l i ty through the use of
unconventi onal warfare resources to accompl i sh certai n
i nformati on gatheri ng. tasks. I ntensi ve i ntel l i gence and
106
reconnai ssance acti vi ti esareconductedtosupportcurrent
and future operati ons. Such efforts often produce
i ntel l i gence i nformati on of val ue to other theater forces.
Di ssemi nati on i s made as the si tuati on permi ts or as
di rectedbySFOB.Speci fi ci nformati oncol l ecti ondesi gned
to support other theater forces may be undertaken as
di rected. These operati ons are accompl i shed by ei ther the
auxi l i ary or underground forces under supervi si on of the
area command. Chi ef among these are target acqui si ti on
anddamageassessment.
(2) Basi ctargeti nformati oncanbedetermi nedandreportedto
the SFOB. Because of the tenuous nature of
communi cati onsbetweentheoperati onal areaandthebase,
target acqui si ti on i s usual l y l i mi ted to targets wi thout a
hi gh degree of mobi l i ty but of vi tal i mportance to the
theatercommander.
(3) Operati onal detachments can report the physi cal and
psychol ogi cal effectsofattacksconductedbyothertheater
forcesagai nsttargetswi thi nguerri l l awarfareareas.
(4) I fthei mportance,magni tudeandcompl exi tyofi ntel l i gence
tasks i n support of theater commands exceeds the
i ntel l i gence management capabi l i ty of unconventi onal
warfare forces, addi ti onal i ntel l i gence personnel are
provi ded from i nterested servi ce components. The
unconventi onal warfare force recei ves these i ntel l i gence
speci al i sts and furni shes them a base of operati ons.
Al though the parent i ntel l i gence organi zati ons provi de
separatecommuni cati onsl i nksforthei rownpersonnel ,the
areacommandercoordi natesthei reffortsi nthei nterestof
securi ty.
e. Evasion and Escape. Evasi on and escape mechani sms are
devel oped to assi st i n the recovery of fri endl y personnel . Al though
guerri l l a uni ts assi st evasi on and escape acti vi ti es, such operati ons
areconductedpri mari l ybyauxi l i aryforces.
SectionII.OFFENSIVECOMBATOPERATIONS
101. General
a. Combatempl oymentofguerri l l aforcesrequi res.speci al forces
detachmentstodi recttheeffortsofi ndi genousresi stanceel ementsi n
combat operati ons. I ntegrated wi th these combat operati ons are
psychol ogi cal warfare,evasi onandescapeandi ntel l i genceacti vi ti es.
107
For detai l s of psychol ogi cal warfare, evasi on and escape, and
i ntel l i genceoperati ons,seechapter9.
b. Rai dsandambushesarethepri nci pal offensi vetechni quesof
theguerri l l aforce,,Rai dsandambushesmaybecombi nedwi thother
acti on,suchasmi ni ngandsni pi ngorthesel atteracti onsmaybe
conducted i ndependentl y. When rai ds, ambushes, mi ni ng and
sni pi ng, are di rected agai nst enemy l i nes of communi cati ons, key
areas,mi l i taryi nstal l ati onsandi ndustri al faci l i ti es,thetotal resul t
i si nterdi cti on.
c. Detai l ed i ntel l i gence' of enemy di sposi ti ons, movements, and
tacti cs; thorough pl anni ng and preparati on; and knowl edge of the
terrai n,areprerequi si tesofguerri l l aoffensi veoperati ons.
102. CharacteristicsofGuerrillaCombatOperations
Combat operati ons of guerri l l a forces take on certai n
characteri sti cswhi chmustbeunderstoodbySpeci al Forcespersonnel
whodi rectandcoordi natetheresi stanceeffort.Thesecharacteri sti cs
aredi scussedbel ow.
a. Planning. Careful and detai l ed pl anni ng i s a prerequi si tefor
guerri l l acombatoperati ons.Pl ansprovi defortheattackofsel ected
targetsandsubsequentoperati onsdesi gnedtoexpl oi ttheadvantage
gai ned. Addi ti onal l y, al ternate targets are desi gnated to al l ow
subordi nate uni ts a degree of fl exi bi l i ty i n taki ng advantage of
sudden changes i n the tacti cal si tuati on. Once commi tted to an
operati on the area command has l i ttl e capabi l i ty to rapi dl y
mani pul ate subordi nate uni ts to other mi ssi ons, Thi s l ack of
i mmedi ateresponsei sduetotheshortageornon-exi stenceofradi o
communi cati ons equi pment wi thi n smal l er guerri l l a uni ts coupl ed
wi th rel ati vel y l arge zones of acti on. Thus, pl ans must be thorough
andfl exi bl eenoughtoal l owcommanderswhoareresponsi bl eforan
operati on or seri es of operati ons to adopt al ternate predetermi ned
coursesofacti onwhenconti ngenci esari se.
b. I ntelligence. The basi s of pl anni ng i s accurateandup-to-date
i ntel l i gence. Pri or to i ni ti ati ng combat operati ons, a detai l ed
i ntel l i gence col l ecti on effort i s made i n the projected objecti ve area.
Thi s effort suppl ements the regul ar fl ow of i ntel l i gence. Provi si ons
aremadeforkeepi ngthetargetorobjecti veareaundersurvei l l ance
uptotheti meofattack.
c. Decentralized Execution. Guerri l l a combat operati ons feature
central i zed pl anni ng and decentral i zed executi on. Acti on of al l
resi stance el ements i s di rected and coordi nated by the area
command. However, wi thi n the gui dance furni shed by the area
108
commander, subordi nate uni ts are al l owed the wi dest possi bl e
l ati tudei ntheconductofoperati ons.
d. Surprise.Guerri l l acombat,operati onsstresssurpri se.Attacks
areexecutedatunexpectedti mesandpl aces.Setpatternsofacti on
are avoi ded. Maxi mum advantage i s gai ned by attacki ng enemy
weaknesses. Low vi si bi l i ty and adverse weather are expl oi ted by
guerri l l a forces. Surpri se may al so be enhanced by the conduct of
concurrentdi versi onaryacti vi ti es.
e. ShortDurationAction.Usual l y,combatoperati onsofguerri l l a
forces are marked by acti on of short durati on agai nst the target
fol l owed by a rapi d wi thdrawal of the attacki ng force. Prol onged
combatacti onfromfi xedposi ti onsi savoi ded,
f.Multiple Attacks (fi g. 25). Another characteri sti c of guerri l l a
combatoperati onsi stheempl oymentofmul ti pl eattacksoverawi de
area by smal l uni ts tai l ored to the i ndi vi dual mi ssi on. Thi s i s not
pi ecemeal commi tmentofuni tsagai nstsi ngl etargetsbutanumber
of attacks di rected agai nst several targets or porti ons of the target
system. Such acti on tends to decei ve the enemy as to the actual
l ocati on of guerri l l a bases, causes hi m to over-esti mate guerri l l a
strengthandforceshi mtodi spersehi srearareasecuri tyandcounter
guerri l l aefforts.
103. TacticalControlMeasures
a.General. The area commander uti l i zes tacti cal control
measurestoai dhi mi ndi recti ngandcoordi nati ngcombatoperati ons.
Commontacti cal control measuresare
(1)Targets(objecti ves).
(2)Zonesofacti on.
(3)Axi sofadvance.
(4)Mi ssi onsupportsi tes.
b. Target(Objectives).Theareacommanderdesi gnatestargetsor
objecti vesforattackbysubordi nateuni ts.Thesetargetsareusual l y
l i nes of communi cati ons, mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons and uni ts and
i ndustri al faci l i ti es. Normal l y, targets or objecti ves for guerri l l a
forces are not hel d for any l ength of ti me nor are they cl eared of
determi nedenemyresi stance.
c. ZonesofAction(fi g.26).Zonesofacti onareusedtodesi gnate
areasofresponsi bi l i tyforoperati onsofsubordi nateuni ts.Wi thi nthe
zone of acti on the subordi nate commander exerci ses consi derabl e
freedom i n the conduct of operati ons. Movement of other guerri l l a
uni tsthrough an adjacentzoneofacti oni scoordi natedbythearea
command. The auxi l i ary forces wi thi n a zone of acti on provi de
supporttotheguerri l l auni tresponsi bl eforthearea.Boundari esof
109
110
zonesofacti onarechangedbythecommanderwhoestabl i shedthem
asrequi red.
d. AxisofAdvance.Guerri l l acommandersmayprescri beaxesof
advance for thei r uni t or subordi nate uni ts i n order to control
movementtotargets.Guerri l l auni tsmovetotheobjecti veareaei ther
bysi ngl eormul ti pl eroutes.
e. Mission Support Sites (fi g. 27). Mi ssi on support si tes are
uti l i zedbyguerri l l auni tstoaddreachtothei roperati onsandenabl e
themtoremai nawayfromguerri l l abasesforl ongerperi odsofti me.
Themi ssi onsupportsi tei sapre-sel ectedareausedasatemporary
stopoverpoi ntandi sl ocatedi nareasnotcontrol l edbytheguerri l l a
force. Mi ssi on support si tes are uti l i zed pri or to and/or after an
operati on.Theyareoccupi edforshortperi odsofti me,sel doml onger
than a day. As i n an assembl y area, the usi ng uni t prepares for
further operati ons and may be provi ded wi th suppl i es and
i ntel l i gencebyauxi l i aryforces.
f.Additional Tactical Control Measures. Addi ti onal control
measures may be empl oyed by smal l er guerri l l a uni ts such as
ral l yi ng poi nts, di recti on of attack, assaul t posi ti ons and l i nes of
departure.Thesecontrol measuresareempl oyedi namannersi mi l ar
tothei rusebyconventi onal mi l i taryuni ts.
104. TargetSelection
a. The general mi ssi on assi gned by the theater commander
determi nes the type target (objecti ve) to beattacked,wi ththefi nal
sel ecti on of the speci fi c target usual l y made by the detachment
commander. Occasi onal l y, the SFOB may sel ect the target. The
i mportant factors rel ated to the target whi ch i nfl uence i ts fi nal
sel ecti onare
(1) Cri ti cal i ty. A target i s cri ti cal when i ts destructi on or
damage wi l l exerci se a si gni fi cant i nfl uence upon the
enemy's abi l i ty to conduct or support operati ons. Such
targets as bri dges, tunnel s, ravi nes, and mountai n passes
are cri ti cal to l i nes of communi cati on; engi nes, ti res, and
POL stores are cri ti cal to transportati on. Each target i s
consi dered i n rel ati onshi p to other el ements of the target
system.
(2) Vul nerabi l i ty. Vul nerabi l i ty i s a target's suscepti bi l i ty to
attack by means avai l abl e to UW forces. Vul nerabi l i ty i s
i nfl uenced by the nature of the target, i .e., type, si ze,
di sposi ti onandcomposi ti on.
(3) Accessi bi l i ty.Accessi bi l i tyi smeasuredbytheabi l i tyofthe
attacker to i nfi l trate i nto the target area. I n studyi ng a
targetforaccessi bi l i ty,securi tycontrol saroundthetarget
111
112
113
area, l ocati on of the target, and means of i nfi l trati on are
consi dered.
(4)Recuperability. Recuperabi l i ty i s the enemy's abi l i ty to
restoreadamagedfaci l i tytonormal operati ngcapaci ty.I t
i s affected by the enemy capabi l i ty to repai r and repl ace
damagedporti onsofthetarget.
b. Thesefactorsarevariables.Assuch,eachtargeti sconstantl y
reeval uatedforsel ecti on.Thecri ti cal i tyofatargetmaychangefrom
ti metoti me.Arai l roadbri dgei sl esscri ti cal whentheenemyhasfew
l ocomoti ves. The vul nerabi l i ty of a target shi fts wi th the means
avai l abl e to attack i t such as expl osi ves, i ncendi ari es and speci al
devi ces. A power pl ant, command post, or suppl y depot i s l ess
accessi bl eaftertheenemyhasdetai l edaddi ti onal securi typersonnel
to guard i t. Recuperati on i s more certai n i f reserve stocks are
pl enti ful .
c. Each operati on pl an i ncl udes more than one target. Thi s
enabl es the commander to al ter hi s pl ans to meet unforeseen
si tuati onsthatmayprecl udeattackofthepri marytarget.
105. Raids
a. A rai d i s a surpri se attack agai nst an enemy force or
i nstal l ati on. Such attacks are characteri zed by secret movement to
the objecti ve area; bri ef, vi ol ent combat; rapi d di sengagement from
acti on;andswi ft,decepti vewi thdrawal .
b. Rai dsareconductedbyguerri l l auni tstodestroyordamage
suppl i es, equi pment or i nstal l ati ons such as command posts,
communi cati on faci l i ti es, depots, radar si tes, etc.; capture suppl i es,
equi pmentandkeypersonnel ;orcausecasual ti esamongtheenemy
andhi ssupporters.Othereffectsofrai dsare:todrawattenti onaway
fromotheroperati ons;keeptheenemyoffbal anceandforcehi mto
depl oyaddi ti onal uni tstoprotecthi srearareas.
106. OrganizationoftheRaidForce
a.General.Thesi zeoftherai dforcedependsuponthemi ssi on,
natureandl ocati onofthetargetandtheenemysi tuati on.Therai d
force may vary from a squad attacki ng a pol i ce checkpoi nt or
unprotectedrai l l i nes,toabattal i onattacki ngal argesuppl ydepot.
Regardl ess of si ze, the rai d force consi sts of two basi c el ements;
assaul tandsecuri ty.
b. AssaultElement.Theassaul tel ementi sorgani zedandtrai ned
toaccompl i shtheobjecti vesoftherai d.I tconsi stsofamai nacti on
114
grouptoexecutetherai dmi ssi onandmayi ncl udepersonnel detai l ed

toexecutespeci al tasks.
(1) The mai n acti on group executes the major task, the
accompl i shment of whi ch i nsures the success of the rai d.
For i nstance, i f the rai d objecti ve i s to destroy a cri ti cal
i nstal l ati on such as a rai l road bri dge or tunnel , the mai n
acti on group empl aces and detonates the demol i ti on
charges.I ntheeventthatthetargetcanbeneutral i zedby
fi re, such as enemy personnel , the mai n acti on group
conducts i ts attack wi th a hi gh proporti on of automati c
weapons. I n some i nstances the mai n acti on group moves
physi cal l yonori ntothetarget;i notherstheyareabl eto
accompl i sh thei r task at a di stance from the target. The
effortsofother,el ementsoftherai dforcearedesi gnedto
al l ow the mai n acti on group access to the target for the
ti merequi redtoaccompl i shtherai dmi ssi on.
(2) I f requi red, speci al task detai l s assi st the mai n acti on
group to reach the target. They execute such
compl ementary tasks asel i mi nati ng guards, breachi ng
andremovi ngobstacl es,di versi onaryorhol di ngtasks,and
fi re support. The speci al task detai l s may precede, act
concurrentl ywi th,orfol l owthemai nacti ongroup.
c. Security Element. The securi ty el ement supports the rai d by
preventi ngtheenemyfromrei nforci ngorescapi ng.Addi ti onal l y,the
securi ty el ement covers the wi thdrawal of the assaul t el ement and
acts as a rear guard for the rai d force. The si ze of the securi ty
el ement depends upon the enemy's, capabi l i ty to i ntervene i n the
operati on.
107. Preparation
a. PlanningConsiderations.
(1) Thefi rststepi sthesel ecti onofatarget.I naddi ti ontothe
targetsel ecti onfactorsmenti onedi nparagraph104,other
i mportant consi derati ons are i n the nature of the terrai n
andthecombateffi ci encyoftheguerri l l aforce.
(2) Addi ti onal l y, the UW force commander must consi der
possi bl e adverse effects on hi s uni t and the ci vi l i an
popul ace. The guerri l l as' objecti ve i s to di mi ni sh the
enemy's mi l i tary potenti al , but an i mproperl y ti med
operati on may provoke counteracti on whi ch they are
unprepared to meet. Successful operati ons i ncrease
guerri l l a presti ge wi th the ci vi l i ans and make them more
115
wi l l i ng to provi de support. However, theguerri l l asshoul d
take every precauti on to i nsure that ci vi l i ans are not
needl essl y subjected to harsh repri sal s. Success al so
enhancesthemoral eoftheguerri l l auni tandi ncreasesthe
presti geofi tsl eaders.Ontheotherhand,anunsuccessful
attackoftenhasdi sastrouseffectsonguerri l l amoral e.
(3) Al though detai l ed, the pl an for arai dmustbeessenti al l y
si mpl e, and not depend on too many conti ngenci es for i ts
success.Dupl i cateoral ternatearrangementsaremadefor
the executi on of key operati ons to i ncrease the chancesof
success.Guerri l l aacti vi ti esi ntheareaarepl annedsoasto
gi ve the i nstal l ati on no i ndi cati on of the pendi ng attack;
Thi smayei therbesuspensi on,conti nuati onori ncreaseof
current acti vi ty. Ti me and space factors are careful l y
consi deredwhenpl anni ngtheoperati on.Suffi ci entti mei s
al l owed for assembl y and movement, parti cul arl y duri ng
darkness; the requi re menu of the si tuati on determi ne
whether movement and attack shoul d be made duri ng
dayl i ght or darkness. Darkness favors surpri se and i s
usual l ythebestti mewhentheoperati oni ssi mpl eandthe
physi cal arrangement of the i nstal l ati on i s wel l known,
Earl ydawnorduski sfavoredwheni nadequateknowl edge
ofthei nstal l ati onorotherfactorsnecessi tatecl osecontrol
oftheoperati on.Awi thdrawal l atei nthedayoratni ght
makescl osepursui tbytheenemymoredi ffi cul t.
b. I ntelligence. The rai d force commander must have maxi mum
avai l abl ei ntel l i genceofthetarget;enemyforcesabl etoi ntervene;
theci vi l i anpopul ati oni nthevi ci ni tyofthetarget;andtheterrai nto
be traversed en route to and returni ng from the objecti ve area. An
i ntensi ve i ntel l i gence effort precedes the rai d. guerri l l a i ntel l i gence
andreconnai ssanceel ementsconductreconnai ssanceoftheroutesto
thetargetandi fpossi bl eofthetargeti tsel f.Local auxi l i arysources
areexpl oi tedandtheauxi l i ari esmayberequi redtofurni shgui des.
Survei l l anceofthetargeti sconti nuousuptotheti meoftheattack.
The rai d force commander exerci ses extreme cauti on to deny the
enemyanyi ndi cati onsofthei mpendi ngoperati onthroughacti onof
ei therguerri l l areconnai ssanceel ementsortheauxi l i ari es,
c. Rehearsals of Participants. Al l parti ci pants are rehearsed for
theoperati on.Rehearsal saxaconductedasreal i sti cal l yaspossi bl e.
I favai l abl e,terrai nsi mi l artothatfoundi nthetargetareai sused.
The use of sand tabl es, sketches, photographs, and target mockups
assi sti nthebri efi ngofguerri l l atroops.Conti ngencyacti onsayeal so
116
practi ced. Fi nal rehearsal s are conducted under condi ti ons of
vi si bi l i tyl i kethoseexpectedi ntheobjecti vearea.
d. Final I nspection. The rai d force commander conducts a fi nal
i nspecti on of personnel and equi pment pri or to movement to the
objecti vearea.Weaponsaretestfi redi fpossi bl e,faul tyequi pmenti s
repl aced and the condi ti on of the men i s checked, Duri ng thi s
i nspecti on a counteri ntel l i gence check i s made of each guerri l l a's
personal bel ongi ngs to i nsure that no i ncri mi nati ng documents are
carri ed duri ng the operati on. Thi s i nspecti on assures the rai d force
commander that hi s uni t i s equi pped and condi ti oned for the
operati on.
108. Movement
(fi g.28)
Movementtotheobjecti veareai spl annedandconductedtoal l ow
therai dforcetoapproachthetargetundetected.Movementmaybe
over si ngl e or mul ti pl e routes. The presel ected route or routes
termi nates i n or near one or more mi ssi on support si tes, Duri ng
movementeveryefforti smadetoavoi dcontactwi ththeenemy,Upon
reachi ngthemi ssi onsupportsi te,securi tygroupsaredepl oyedand
fi nal coordi nati on takes pl ace pri or to movement to the attack
posi ti on.
109. ActionintheObjectiveArea
(fi g.29)
Speci al task detai l s move to them posi ti ons and 'el i mi nate
sentri es, breach or remove obstacl es and execute other assi gned
tasks. The mai n acti on group qui ckl y Tol l ows the speci al task
detai l si ntothetargetarea.Oncetheobjecti veoftherai dhasbeen
accompl i shedthemai nacti ongroupwi thdrawscoveredbydesi gnated
fi resupportel ementsand/ordartofthesecuri tyforce.I ntheevent
theattacki sunsuccessful theacti oni stermi natedtopreventundue
l oss. Speci al task detai l s wi thdraw accordi ng to pl an. The assaul t
el ementmayassembl e;atoneormoreral l yi ngpoi nts.Thesecuri ty
el ements remai n i n posi ti on to cover 'the wi thdrawal of the assaul t
el ementsandwi thdrawonsi gnal orataprearrangedti me.
110. Withdrawal
(fi g.30)
a. Wi thdrawal i saccompl i shedi namannerdesi gnedtoachi eve
maxi mumdecepti onoftheenemyandtofaci l i tatefurtheracti onby
therai dforce:Thevari ousel ementsoftherai di ngforcewi thdraw,i n
order,overpredetermi nedroutesthroughaseri esofral l yi ngpoi nts:
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118
119
120
Shoul dtheenemyorgani zeacl osepursui toftheassaul tel ement,the
securi tyel ementassi stsbyfi reandmovement,di stracti ngtheenemy
and sl owi ng hi m down. El ements of the rai di ng force whi ch are
cl osel y pursued by the enemy do not attempt to reach the i ni ti al
ral l yi ngpoi nt,butonthei rowni ni ti ati vel eadtheenemyawayfrom
theremai nderoftheforceandattempttol osehi mbyevasi veacti on
overdi ffi cul tterrai n.I fthesi tuati onpermi ts,anattempti smadeto
reestabl i shcontactwi ththerai dforceatotherral l yi ngpoi ntsorto
conti nuetothebaseareaasaseparategroup.Whennecessary,the
rai di ng force, or el ements of i t, separate i nto smal l groups or even
i ndi vi dual stowadecl osepursui tbytheenemy.
b. Frequentl y, the rai d force di sperses i nto smal l er uni ts,
wi thdrawsi ndi fferentdi recti onsandreassembl esatal aterti meand
atapredesi gnatedpl acetoconductotheroperati ons.El ementsofthe
rai dforcemayconductfurtheroperati ons,suchasanambushofthe
pursui ngenemyforce,duri ngthewi thdrawal .
111. LargeRaid
(fi g,31)
a.General.Whenatargeti sl arge,i mportanttotheenemy,and
wel l guarded, the si ze of the guerri l l a force requi red to effecti vel y
attacki ti ncreases.Largerai dsi nvol vetheuseofabattal i onormore
ofguerri l l as.Essenti al l ytheoperati oni sconductedsi mi l artosmal l er
rai ds,however,addi ti onal probl emsmustbeconsi dered.
b. Movement to Objective Area. Surpri se i s as desi rabl e i n a
l argeaswel l asasmal l errai dbuti susual l yhardertoachi eve.The
numbersoftroopstobedepl oyedrequi resaddi ti onal mi ssi onsupport
si tes. Agai n the si ze of the guerri l l a force may requi re sel ecti on of
mi ssi onsupportsi tesatagreaterdi stancefromthetargettopreserve
secrecy,thusrequi ri ngal ongermovetotheattackposi ti on.Al arge
rai dforceusual l ymovesbysmal l componentsovermul ti pl eroutesto
theobjecti vearea,
c. Control. Another probl em i nherent i n a l arge rai d i s that of
control . Guerri l l a uni ts wi thout extensi ve radi o communi cati ons
equi pment wi l l fi nd coordi nati on of vari ous wi despread el ements i s
di ffi cul t to achi eve. Pyrotechni cs, audi bl e si gnal s, runners or
predesi gnatedti mesmaybeusedtocoordi nateacti on.
d. Training.Ahi ghdegreeoftrai ni nganddi sci pl i nei srequi red
toexecuteal argerai d.Extensi verehearsal sassi sti nprepari ngthe
forceforthemi ssi on.I nparti cul arcommandersandstaffsmustl earn
toempl oythel argernumberoftroopsasacohesi veforce.
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122
e. FireSupport.Addi ti onal fi resupporti susual l yarequi rement.
Thi smaymeansecretl ycachi ngammuni ti oni nmi ssi onsupportsi tes
overaperi odofti mepri ortotherai d.Guerri l l asmayeachcarrya
mortar or recoi l l ess ri fl e round, rocket or box of machi negun
ammuni ti on and l eave them at a mi ssi on support si te or fi ri ng
posi ti onforfi resupportuni ts.
f.Timing. Ti mi ng i s usual l y more di ffi cul t foral argerai d.The
ti me to move uni ts and ti me the mai n acti on el ement needs to
perform i ts mi ssi on are usual l y l onger. Thi s requi res stronger
securi tyel ementstoi sol atetheobjecti veareaforl ongerperi ods.The
ti mi ngoftherai dtakesoni ncreasedi mportancebecauseofthel arge
numbers of guerri l l as i nvol ved. Movement to the objecti ve area i s
usual l y accompl i shed duri ng peri ods of l ow vi si bi l i ty, however
because of fi re support coordi nati on requi rements and l arger
numbers of personnel , the acti on may take pl ace duri ng dayl i ght
hours.
g.Withdrawal. Wi thdrawal from a l arge rai d i s usual l y by
smal l ergroupsovermul ti pl eroutesi nordertodecei vetheenemyand
di ssi patehi spursui t.Di spersedwi thdrawal hastheaddedadvantage
of not provi di ng a l ucrati ve target to enemy ai r and fi re support
el ements. However, the rai d force commander must consi der the
possi bi l i tyofdefeati ndetai l ofhi sforcebyanal ertandaggressi ve
enemy. The deci si on as to how to conduct the wi thdrawal must be
basedonacareful wei ghi ngofthesefactors.
112. Ambushes
a. An ambush i s a surpri se attack used agai nst movi ng or
temporari l y hal ted targets such as rai l road trai ns, truck convoys,
i ndi vi dual vehi cl es,anddi smountedtroops.I nanambush,theenemy
setstheti meandtheattacker,thepl ace.
b. Ambushesareconductedtodestroyorcapturepersonnel and
suppl i es;harassanddemoral i zetheenemy;del ayorbl ockmovement
ofpersonnel andsuppl i es;andcanal i zeenemymovementbymaki ng
certai nroutesusel essfortraffi c.Theresul tusual l yi sconcentrati on
ofthemajori tyofmovementstopri nci pal roadsandrai l roadswhere
targetsaremorevul nerabl etoattackbyothertheaterforces.
c. Li ketherai dforce,theambushforcei sorgani zedi ntoassaul t
andsecuri tyel ements.Theassaul tel ementconductsthemai nattack
agai nsttheambushtargetwhi chi ncl udeshal ti ngthecol umn,ki l l i ng
or capturi ng personnel , recoveri ng suppl i es and equi pment and
destroyi ng unwanted vehi cl es or suppl i es whi ch cannot be moved.
The securi ty force i sol ates the ambush si te Usi ng roadbl ocks, other
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ambushes and outposts, Securi ty el ements cover the wi thdrawal of

theassaul tel ement.
113. Preparation
Preparati onforanambushi ssi mi l artothatofarai dexceptthat
sel ecti onoftheambushsi tei sanaddi ti onal consi derati on,
a. Planning Considerations. Begi n prepari ng the ambush pl an,
consi derati oni sl i vento
(1) The mi ssi onthi s may be, a si ngl e ambush agai nst one
col umnoraseri esofambushesagai nstoneprmoreroutes
ofcommuni cati on.
(2) Theprobabl esi zesstrength,endcomposi ti onoftheenemy
forcethati stobeambushed;formati onsl i kel ytobeused,
andhi srei nforcementcapabi l i ty.
(3) Terrai nal ongtheroutefavorabl eforanambush,i ncl udi ng
unobservedroutes,ofapproachandwi thdrawal .
(4) Ti mi ng of the ambushambushes conducted duri ng
peri odsofl owvi si bi l i tyofferawi derchoi r2ofposi ti onsand
better opportuni ti es to surpri se and confuse the enemy
than dayl i ght ambushes. However, control and movement
to and duri ng the ni ght ambush i s more di ffi cul t. Ni ght
ambushes are more sui tabl e when the mi ssi on can be
accompl i shed duri ng or i mmedi atel y fol l owi ng the i ni ti al
burst of fi re. They requi re a maxi , mum number of
automati c weapons to be used at cl ose range, Ni ght
ambushes are effecti ve i n hi nderi ng the enemy's use of
routes of communi cati on by ni ght, whi l e fri endl y ai rcraft
attackthesameroutesduri ngtheday.Dayl i ghtambushes
faci l i tate control and permi t offensi ve acti on for a l onger
peri odofti me.Adayambushal soprovi desopportuni tyfor
more effecti ve ai med fi re of such weapons as rocket
l aunchersandrecoi l l essri fl es.
b. I ntelligence. Si nce the guerri l l as are sel domabl etoascertai n
i nadvancetheexactcomposi ti on,strengthandti meofmovementof
convoys, thei r i ntel l i gence effort shoul d be di rected towards
determi ni ngtheconvoypatternoftheenemy.Usi ngthi si nformati on,
guerri l l a commanders are abl e to deci de on. type convoys to be
attacked by ambush. I n addi ti on, i ntel l i gence consi derati ons
descri bed i n paragraph 107 for R rai d are equal l y appl i cabl e to an
ambush.
c. Site Selection. I n sel ecti ng the ambush si te, the basi c
consi derati on i s favorabl e terrai n, al though l i mi tati ons whi ch may
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exi st such as defi ci enci es i n the fi repower of guerri l l as and l ack of
resuppl y duri ng acti ons may govern the choi ce of ambush si te. The
si te shoul d have fi ri ng posi ti ons whi ch offer conceal ment and
favorabl e fi el ds of fi re. Whenever possi bl e, fi ri ng shoul d be done
through a screen of fol i age. The terrai n at the si te shoul d serve to
funnel the enemy i nto a ki l l i ng zone. The enti re ki l l i ng zone i s
covered by fi re to avoi d dead space that woul d al l ow the enemy to
organi ze resi stance. The guerri l l a force shoul d take advantage of
natural obstacl es such as defi l es, swamps, and cl i ffs whi ch wi l l
restri ct enemy maneuver agai nst the ambush force. When natural
obstacl es do not exi st, mi nes and demol i ti ons are empl oyed to
canal i zetheenemy.Securi tyel ementsarepl acedonroadsandtrai l s
l eadi ngtotheambushsi tetowarntheassaul tel ementoftheenemy
approach. These securi ty el ements al so assi st i n coveri ng the
wi thdrawal of the assaul t el ement from the ambush si te. The
proxi mi tyofsecuri tytoassaul tel ementsi sdi ctatedbytheterrai n.I n
manyi nstances,i tmaybenecessarytoorgani zesecondaryambushes
androadbl ockstoi nterceptanddel ayenemyrei nforcements.
114. ConductoftheAmbush
a.Movement.Theguerri l l aforcemovesovera,presel ectedroute
orroutestotheambushsi te.Oneormoremi ssi onsupportsi tesare
usual l y necessary al ong the route to the ambush si te. Last mi nute
i ntel l i gence i s provi ded by reconnai ssance el ements and fi nal
coordi nati onfortheambushi smadeatthemi ssi onsupportsi te.
b. ActionattheAmbushSite(fi g.32).
(1) Troops are moved to an assembl y area near the ambush
si te and securi ty el ements take thei r posi ti ons. As the
approachi ng enemy col umn i s detected, or at a
predesi gnated ti me, the ambush commander deci des
whether or not to execute the ambush. Thi s deci si on
depends on si ze of the col umn, guard and securi ty
measures,andesti matedworthofthetargeti nl i ghtofthe
mi ssi on. I f a deci si on i s made to execute the ambush,
advance guards are al l owed to pass through the mai n
posi ti on. When the head of the mai n col umn reaches a
predetermi ned poi nt, i t i s hal ted by fi re, demol i ti ons, or
obstacl es, At thi s si gnal , the enti re assaul t el ement opens
fi re, Desi gnated detai l s engage the advance and rear
guards to prevent rei nforcement of the mai n col umn.The
vol ume of fi re i s rapi d and di rected at enemy personnel ,
exi st from vehi cl es, and automati c weapons. Anti -tank
grenades, rocket l aunchers, and recoi l l ess ri fl es are used
agai nstarmoredvehi cl es.Machi ne-gunsl aybandsoffi xed
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fi re across escape routes. Mortar shel l s, hand and ri fl e
grenadesarefi redi ntotheki l l i ngzone.I fthecommander
deci des to assaul t, i t i s l aunched under coveri ng fi re on a
prearranged si gnal . After enemy resi stance has been
nul l i fi ed speci al parti es move i nto the col umn to recover
suppl i es, equi pment and ammuni ti on. When the
commander desi restotermi natetheacti onbecauseei ther
the mi ssi on has been accompl i shed, or superi or enemy
rei nforcementsarearri vi ng,hewi thdrawsfi rsttheassaul t
el ement and then the securi ty el ements. The securi ty
el ementscoverthewi thdrawal oftheassaul tel ement.
(2) I f the purpose of the ambush i stoharassanddemoral i ze
the enemy a di fferent approach may be adopted. The
advanceguardi ssel ectedasthetargetoftheambushand
the fi re of the assaul t el ement i s di rected agai nst them.
Repeated attacks agai nst enemy advanceguardshavethe
fol l owi ngeffects:
(a)They cause hi m to use di sproporti onatel ystrongforces
i nadvanceguardduti es.Thi smayl eaveotherporti ons
of the col umn vul nerabl e or requi re hi m to di vert
addi ti onal troopstoconvoyduty.
(b)They have an adverse psychol ogi cal effectupon enemy
troops. Conti nued casual ti es i ncurred by the advance
guardmakesuchdutyunpopul ar.
c. Withdrawal. Wi thdrawal from the ambush si te i s covered by
thesecuri tyel ementsi namannersi mi l artothewi thdrawal froma
rai d(par.I 10).
115. SpecialAmbushSituations
a. Columns Protected by Armor. Attacks agai nst col umns
protectedbyarmoredvehi cl esdependuponthetypeandl ocati onof
armoredvehi cl esi nacol umnandtheweaponsoftheambushforce.I f
possi bl e, armored vehi cl es are destroyed or di sabl ed by fi re of anti -
tank weapons, l and mi nes, mol otov cocktai l s, or by throwi ng hand
grenadesi ntoopenhatches.Anefforti smadetoi mmobi l i zearmored
vehi cl esatapoi ntwheretheyareunabl etogi veprotecti ontotherest
oftheconvoyandbl ocktherouteofothersupporti ngvehi cl es.
b. AmbushofRailroadTrains.Movi ngtrai nsmaybesubjectedto
harassi ngfi re,butthemosteffecti veambushi nvol vesderai l i ngthe
trai n.Thel ocomoti veshoul dbederai l edonadowngrade,atasharp
curve or on ahi ghbri dge.Thi scausesmostofthecarstooverturn
andresul tsi nextensi vecasual ti esamongpassengers.I ti sdesi rabl e
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127
toderai l trai nssothatthewreckageremai nsonthetrackstodel ay

traffi c for l onger peri ods of ti me. Fi re i s di rected on the exi ts of
overturned coaches and desi gnated groups armed wi th automati c
weapons rush forward to assaul t coaches whi ch are sti l l standi ng.
Othergroupstakesuppl i esfromfrei ghtcarsandthensetfi retothe
trai n. Rai l s are removed from the track at some di stance from the
ambushsi tei neachdi recti ontodel aythearri val ofrei nforcements
by trai n. I n pl anni ng the ambush of. a trai n, remember that the
enemy may i ncl ude armored rai l road cars i n the trai n for i ts
protecti on and that i mportant trai ns may be preceded by advance
guardl ocomoti vesori nspecti oncarstocheckthetrack.
c. Ambush of Waterway Traffic. Waterway traffi c l i ke barges,
shi ps, and other craft may be ambushed i n a manner si mi l ar to a
vehi cul ar col umn. The ambush party may be abl e to mi ne the
waterwayandthusstoptraffi c.I fmi ni ngi snotfeasi bl e,fi redel i vered
by recoi l l ess weapons can damage or si nk the craft. Fi re shoul d be
di rected at engi ne room spaces, the waterl i ne and the bri dge.
Recovery of suppl i es may be possi bl e i f the craft i s beached on the
banksofthewaterwayorgroundedi nshal l owwater.
116. MiningandSniping
a. Mining(fi g.33).
(1) Mi ni ngaffordstheareacommanderameansofi nterdi cti ng
enemy routes of communi cati on and key areas wi th l i ttl e
expendi ture of manpower. Addi ti onal l y, mi nes al l ow the
user to move away from the mi ned si te before the enemy
acti vatesthem.Thepl anneduseofmi nesasani nterdi cti on
techni queal sohasademoral i zi ngeffectonenemymoral e.
(2) Mi nes may be empl oyed i n conjuncti on wi th other
operati ons, such as rai ds, ambushes and sni pi ng, or used
al one.Whenuti l i zedal onetheyareempl acedal ongroutes
of communi cati on or known enemy approaches wi thi n an
areaatati mewhentraffi ci sl i ght.Thi sal l owspersonnel
empl aci ng the mi nes to compl ete the task wi thout undue
i nterferenceandthenmakegoodthei rescape,
(3) The use of mi nes to' cover the wi thdrawal of a rai di ng or
ambush force sl ows enemy pursui t. Thei r uti l i zati on i n
roadbeds of hi ghways and rai l roads i nterferes wi th
movement. Mi nes may be empl aced around enemy
i nstal l ati ons.Thesemi neswi l l causecasual ti estosenti nel s
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129
and patrol s and tend to l i mi t movementoutsi de of enemy
i nstal l ati ons.
b. Sniping (fi g. 34). Sni pi ng i s an i nterdi cti on techni que. I t i s
economi cal i ntheuseofpersonnel andhasademoral i zi ngeffecton
enemy forces. A few trai ned sni pers can cause casual ti es among
enemy personnel , deny or .hi nder hi s use of certai n routes and
requi rehi mtoempl oyadi sproporti onatenumberoftroopstodri veoff
thesni pers.Sni persmayoperatetocoverami nedarea,aspartofa
rai di ng or ambush force or by themsel ves. Sni pers operate best i n
teamsoftwo,al ternati ngtheduti esofobserverandsni perbetween
themsel ves.
SectionIII.INTERDICTION
117. General
a. UW forces use i nterdi cti on as the pri mary means of
accompl i shi ng operati onal objecti ves. I nterdi cti on i s desi gned to
prevent or hi nder, by any means, enemy use of an area or route.
I nterdi cti on i s the cumul ati ve effect of numerous smal l er offensi ve
operati ons such as rai ds, ambushes, mi ni ng, and sni pi ng. Enemy
areasorroutesthatofferthemostvul nerabl eandl ucrati vetargets
for i nterdi cti on are i ndustri al faci l i ti es, mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons, and
l i nesofcommuni cati on.
b. Theresul tsofpl annedi nterdi cti onprogramsare
(1) Effecti ve i nterference wi th the movement of personnel ,
suppl i es,equi pmentandrawmateri al .
(2)Destructi onofstorageandproducti onfaci l i ti es.
(3) Destructi on of Mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons. For posi ti ve resul ts
attacks are di rected agai nst the pri mary and al ternate
cri ti cal el ementsofeachtargetsystem.
c. Profi tabl esecondaryresul tscanbeobtai nedfromi nterdi cti on
operati ons i f they are conducted over a l arge area. When the UW
force empl oys uni ts i n rapi d attacks i n di fferent and wi del y spaced
pl acesi t:
(1) Makes i t di ffi cul t for the enemy to accuratel y l ocate
guerri l l abasesbyanal yzi ngguerri l l aoperati ons.
(2) Causes the enemy to over-esti mate the strength and
supportoftheguerri l l aforce.
(3)Maytendtodemoral i zehi mandl essenhi swi l l tofi ght.
d. Sui tabl e targets for i nterdi cti on are faci l i ti es and materi al
uti l i zed by an enemy to support hi s war effort. Major targets
suscepti bl etoattackbyUWforcesi ncl ude:
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131
(1) Transportati onrai l road,hi ghway,water,ai r.
(2) Communi cati ontel ephone,tel egraph,radi o,tel evi si on.
(3) I ndustrymanufacturi ng faci l i ti es for weapons, ai rcraft,
vehi cl es,ammuni ti on,shi ppi ng,etc.
(4) Powerel ectri c,nucl ear,chemi cal .
(5) Fuel gas,oi l .
(6)Mi l i taryi nstal l ati onsandpersonnel .
118. Planning
a. TheUWforcecommanderbasesi nterdi cti onpl anni nguponhi s
mi ssi on.Themi ssi onshoul dspeci fytheresul tsdesi redbythehi gher
commanderi nanoperati onal areaandprescri bespri ori ti esofattack
agai nst target systems. The resul t of i nterdi cti on by UW el ements
combi ned wi th attacks conducted by other forces i s desi gned to
seri ousl yhamperordestroytheenemy'sabi l i tytosupporthi scombat
forces.
b. The area commander sel ects targets and desi gnates
subordi nateel ementstoattackthem.Targetsel ecti oni sbasedupon
the mi ssi on and the cri teri a di scussed i n paragraph 104. Normal l y,
operati onsaredi rectedagai nsttargetsonasbroadascal easpossi bl e
uti l i zi ngal l avai l abl eUWel ementswhi chhaveacapabi l i tytoattack
thetarget.Guerri l l auni tsconductovertattacksagai nsttheenemy,
hi s suppl y ai d producti on faci l i ti es and hi s l i nes of communi cati on.
Cl osel y coordi nated wi th these overt attacksi s a wi despread
programofsabotage,stri kesanddi saffecti oni ni ti atedanddi rectedby
the underground and auxi l i ary forces. Attacks are ti med so as to
achi eve maxi mum resul ts from surpri se and confusi on and often
coi nci dewi thoperati onsofothertheaterforces.
c. The enemy reacti on to wi de scal e UW operati ons i s usual l y
vi ol ent, i mmedi ate and di rected agai nst the ci vi l i an popul ati on.
I nevi tabl y, l osses among ci vi l i an support el ements (auxi l i ari es and
the underground) may be hi gh. Conti nued pressure by the area
command may l essen or di vert thi s reacti on to other areas. The
effects of enemy reacti on on the UW force i s an i mportant
consi derati oni npl anni ngi nterdi cti onoperati ons.
119. RailroadSystems
a.General. Rai l roads presents one of the most profi tabl e and
easi l y accessi bl e target systems for attack by guerri l l a forces. I n
general , open stretches of track; swi tches, repai r faci l i ti es, and coal
and water suppl i es provi de unl i mi ted opportuni ti es for attack. On
el ectri fi ed rai l roads, power, sub-stati ons, pl ants end l i nes offer
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cri ti cal targets.Typesofrai l waytargetsvarywi ththegeographi cal
area.
b. Tracks. Rai l roadtracksareeasi l yattackedbyguerri l l auni ts
because i t i s al most i mpossi bl e to guard l ong stretches of track
effecti vel y. Li ghtl y armed, mobi l e guerri l l a uni ts can i nfl i ct heavy
damage on tracks. Guerri l l a attacks agai nst rai l shavefarreachi ng
effects on an enemy who rel i es heavi l y upon rai l road traffi c for
mi l i tarymovement.
(1) Attacksonopentracksusefewerexpl osi vesthanattackson
other rai l roadi nstal l ati ons.anei ght-toten-manguerri l l a
uni tcandestroyaconsi derabl eamountofrai l roadtracki n
ani ght.I ti spossi bl eforasmal l groupofguerri l l asworki ng
regul arl y to keep a si ngl e track out of operati on
permanentl y.
(2) Attacks on, tracks shoul d cover a wi de area. Mul ti pl e
breaksshoul dbemadei nareasi nwhi chguerri l l aforcesof
squad si ze or l arger can be used. Si ngl e breaks by
i ndi vi dual sorverysmal l teamsshoul dbemadeonal arge
peri meter and i n areas not accessi bl e to l arger guerri l l a
forces.Tel egraphandtel ephonel i nesal ongtherai l roadare
cutsi mul taneousl y.
(3) When conducti ng attacks on more than one rai l road l i ne,
attacks are careful l y pl anned to use guerri l l a forces and
suppl i es economi cal l y and to the best advantage. The
determi nati onofmai narteri esofrai l roadtraffi candthei r
connecti ngl i nesi sessenti al ,i npl anni ngforattacksagai nst
arai l system.
(4) Whennecessary,securi tyel ementsarepl acedonthefl anks
of the attacki ng el ements, al ong the tracks, and on any
roads l eadi ng to the target area. Coordi nati on i s made,
parti cul arl yatni ght,sothatsmal l uni tsattacki ngastretch
ofrai l l i nedonotbecomeacci dental l yengagedi nfi refi ghts
among themsel ves. Successi ve ral l yi ng poi nts are
desi gnatedtopermi twi thdrawal ofuni tsfi rreorgani zati on.
c. CriticalEquipment.Becausetheyareusual l yguarded,repai r
faci l i ti esandreservestocksofequi pment,rai l roadcranes,andother
cri ti cal i temsmaybemoredi ffi cul ttoattack.Thi sl ackofaccessi bi l i ty
can be overcome by careful l y pl anned and executed operati ons.
Resul ts expected from these operati ons are wei ghed agai nst the
probabi l i tyofi ncreasedguerri l l acasual ti es.
d. Rolling Stock. Rol l i ng stock may be si mul taneousl y attacked
wi thtracki nterdi cti on.Demol i ti onoftracks,attheti mewhentrai ns
are passi ng can i ncrease the damage to the tracks and track bed,
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resul t i n captured suppl i es, ki l l and wound enemy personnel , or
l i berate pri soners. Trai ns movi ng through areas menaced by
guerri l l as move sl owl y and are guarded. Attacks on guarded trai ns
requi re wel l -trai ned and wel l -armed guerri l l as. Rocket l aunchers or
other weapons capabl e of fi ri ng l arge cal i ber AP ammuni ti on are
usual l ynecessary;mi nesmayal sobeused.
e. Critical Points. Bri dges, tunnel s, and narrow rai l way passes
areusual l ywel l -guarded.Repai requi pmentandbri dgi ngequi pment
are normal l y l ocated i n the vi ci ni ty, and shoul d be attacked
concurrentl y.
f. Effect of Railway I nterdiction. Li mi ted operati ons agai nst
tracks and traffi c onl y cause harassment, therefore wi despread
operati onsarenecessarybeforeanysevereeffecti sfel tbytheenemy.
Harassmentofrepai rcrewsbysni persandambushesi seffecti vei n
reduci ng enemy moral e and the wi l l i ngness of hi s personnel to
parti ci patei nrepai rwork.
(1) Underground and auxi l i ary uni ts i nterdi ct rai l roads i n
areasawayfromguerri l l acontrol .
(2) I nterdi cti onofrai l traffi coverawi deareai susual l ymore
effecti ve than attacks ai med at compl ete destructi on of a
shortstretchofrai l road.Apartfromthepsychol ogi cal effect
on the enemy forces and ci vi l i an popul ati on, i nterdi cti on
over a wi de area hampers enemy movement more than
l i mi tedtotal destructi on.
(3) The earl y i nterdi cti on of rai l roads i nterferes wi th the
enemy's offensi ve momentum andmayforestal l l argescal e
deportati on of ci vi l i an popul ati ons. The pri mary effect of
i nterdi cti onofrai l roadsi sdi srupti onoftheenemy'sfl owof
suppl i es, movement of troops, and i ndustri al producti on.
Secondaryeffectsare
(a)Di srupti on of the orderl y processes of di spatchi ng and
control l i ngrai l movements,whi chi nturnmayresul ti n
the accumul ati on of si zeabl e targets at rai l termi nal s,
juncti onsandmarshal l i ngyards.Thesetargetsarethen
suscepti bl etoattackbyotherservi cecomponents.
(b)Depl eti on of reserves of repai r materi al s whi ch often
resul tsi nthedi smantl i ngofsecondaryrai l l i nesforthe
repai rofpri maryl i nes.
(c)Transfer of rai l traffi c to pri mary roads and hi ghways,
whi charevul nerabl etoguerri l l aandai rattack.
(d)I ncreasi ng the burden upon enemy securi ty forcesand
repai rcrews.
134
120. HighwaySystems
a. Hi ghwaysarel essvul nerabl etargetsthanrai l roads.Damage
i nfl i cted i s more easi l y repai red and repai rs requi re fewer cri ti cal
materi al sandl essski l l edl abor.
b. Bri dges, underpasses, and tunnel s are vul nerabl e poi nts on
roadnetworks.Secti onsofroadwhi chmaybedestroyedbyfl oodi ng
fromadjacentri vers,canal sorl akesareal sovul nerabl e.I naddi ti on,
aroadmaybei nterdi ctedbycausi ngrockorl andsl i des.
c. Si nce hi ghways have fewer vul nerabl e spots, i t i s l i kel y that
thesepoi ntswi l l beheavi l ydefended.Thi srequi resal argeguerri l l a
force and the use of heavi er weapons to neutral i ze protecti ng
pi l l boxesandforti fi cati ons.Becauseofthi s,i ti sbettertoconcentrate
onattacki ngenemyconvoysandcol umnsusi ngthehi ghways.I nthe
i ni ti al stagesofhosti l i ti es,smal l bri dges,tunnel s,cuts,cul vertsand
l evees may be i nsuffi ci entl y protected. As guerri l l a attacks i ncrease
i nfrequencyandeffect,enemysecuri tyforcesi ncreaseprotecti onof
thesel i kel yguerri l l atargets.
d. Wheretheroadscannotbedestroyed,traffi ci si nterruptedby
real and dummy mi nes. Ambushes are conducted when sui tabl e
terrai ni savai l abl e.Long-rangefi resfromposi ti onsawayfromroads
di sruptenemytraffi c.
e. Poi ntsfori nterdi cti onaresel ectedi nareaswheretheenemy
cannoteasi l yre-establ i shmovementbymaki ngashortdetour.
121. WaterwaySystems
a. The vul nerabl e porti ons of waterway systems are el ectri cal
i nstal l ati ons, dams and l ocks whi ch are usual l y wel l guarded. The
destructi on of these i nstal l ati ons can di srupt traffi c effecti vel y for
l ong peri ods. other waterway i nstal l ati ons such as si gnal l i ghts,
beacons and channel markers can be effecti vel y attacked. Si nki ng
vessel si nrestri ctedchannel sbyfl oati ngmi nes,l i mpets,orfi refrom
heavycal i berweaponsmaybeeffecti vei nbl ocki ngwaterwaytraffi c.
b. Droppi ng bri dges i nto the waterway, creati ng sl i des, and
destroyi ngl eveesal l hi ndershi pmovementonwaterways.
c. Personnel who operate the waterway faci l i ti es such as pi l ots
andl ockoperatorsmaybeel i mi nated.Thesepersonnel arenoteasi l y
repl acedandthei rl osswi l l effectoperati onofthewaterway.
d. Mi nes and demol i ti ons charges may be pl aced at strategi c
poi ntsonthewaterway.I ffl oati ngmi nesareusedthewaterwayi s
reconnoi tered for possi bl e anti -mi ne nets. Cabl es supporti ng these
netsareattachedtopol esortreesonbothbanksofthewaterwayor
135
are supported by boats i n the stream and shoul d be cut before
empl oyi ngfl oati ngmi nes.
122. AirwaysSystems
a. Ai rways are i nterdi cted by attacki ng those faci l i ti es that
support ai r movement. Ai r termi nal s, communi cati ons systems,
navi gati onal systems, POL dumps, mai ntenance faci l i ti es and key
personnel aretargetsforattack.
b. Si nceai rtraffi ci sdependentuponfuel ,l ubri cants,spareparts
and mai ntenance tool s, l i nes of communi cati ons and i nstal l ati ons
provi di ngthesei temsareattacked.
123. CommunicationSystems
a. Wi re communi cati ons are vul nerabl e to guerri l l a attack,
however,destructi onofasi ngl eaxi sofawi resystemsel domresul ts
i n the compl ete l oss of l ong di stance tel ephone or tel etype
communi cati ons. Al ternate routi ng i s normal l y avai l abl e, but the
destructi on of any porti on of the system tends to overl oad the
remai ni ngfaci l i ti es.
(1) Long di stancetel ephoneandtel etypecommuni cati onsuse
cabl eoracombi nati onofcabl eandradi orel ay.Thecabl e
maybeaeri al orunderground.I npopul atedareasthecabl e
normal l yfol l owstheroads,whereasi nunpopul atedareasi t
may run cross country. Underground cabl e usual l y runs
crosscountry,buttheroutei smarkedfortheconveni ence
ofthemai ntenancecrews.
(2) Aeri al cabl e can be destroyed by cutti ng the pol es and
cabl e. Underground cabl e often runs through concrete
condui tsandrequi resmoreti metodestroy.Repai rofcabl e
can be del ayed by removi ng a secti on of the cabl e.
Destructi on of tel ephone central offi ces and repeater
stati onscausesgreaterdamageandtakesl ongertorepai r
thancutti ngthecabl es.
b. Radi o stati ons may be l ocated i n wel l -protected areas and
di ffi cul t to attack. However, antenna si tes are often l ocated a
consi derabl edi stanceawayfromtherecei verandtransmi tter.These
faci l i ti esarei nterconnectedbytransmi ssi onl i nes.Destructi onofthe
antenna si te and/or the transmi ssi on l i nes i s usual l y easi er to
accompl i shthandestructi onoftherecei verortransmi tterstati on.
124. PowerSystems
Powerl i nesarevul nerabl etoattackmuchi nthesamemanneras
wi re communi cati ons. Large transmi ssi on towers often requi re
demol i ti onsfordestructi on.Cri ti cal poi ntsi nanypowersystemare
136
the transformer stati ons. I f these stati ons are not accessi bl e to
attacksbyguerri l l auni ts,l ong-rangefi refromsmal l orl argecal i ber
weapons may di srupt thei r operati ons. Power produci ng pl ants and
steam generati ng pl ants may be too heavi l y guarded for rai d
operati ons.Todi sabl ethem,UWforcesshoul dconcentrateoncutti ng
offthefuel suppl y.
125. WaterSupplySystems
The di srupti on of water l i nes suppl yi ng i ndustri es can often be
profi tabl y accompl i shed; water suppl i es general l y are conducted
throughundergroundpi pel i nes,andmaybedestroyedwi thexpl osi ve
charges.Rai dsagai nstreservoi rfaci l i ti esandpuri fi cati onpl antsal so
arefeasi bl e,butthepossi bl eeffectsupontheci vi l i anpopul ati onmust
beconsi dered.
126. FuelSupplySystems
Petrol eum and natural gases for an i ndustri al area usual l y are
suppl i ed by pi pe l i nes; damage to l i nes i nfl i cted by rupture and
i gni ti onoffuel i sconsi derabl ygreaterthandamagei nfl i ctedonwater
l i nes. Large storage tanks at ei ther end of a pi pe l i ne are hi ghl y
vul nerabl e to weapons fi re, especi al l y when usi ng i ncendi ary
projecti l es.Contami nati ngagentsmaybei njectedi ntopi pel i nesor
fuel tanks.
SectionIV.DEFENSIVEOPERATIONS
127. General
Guerri l l a operati ons are pri mari l y offensi ve i n nature. Guerri l l a
uni tswi ththei rrel ati vel yl i ghtweaponsandequi pmentarenormal l y
i nferi or i n strength and fi repower to organi zed enemy forces. They
shoul dnot,therefore,undertakedefensi veoperati onsunl essforcedto
dosoori nsupportofspeci al operati onsconductedbyothertheater
forces. When the enemy attacks, guerri l l as defend themsel ves by
movementanddi spersi on,bywi thdrawal s,orbycreati ngdi versi ons.
Whenever possi bl e, defensi ve operati ons are accompani ed by
offensi veacti onsagai nsttheenemy'sfl anksandrear.
128. PreparationAgainstEnemyOffensives
a. Adequate i ntel l i gence measures normal l y provi de advance
warni ng of i mpendi ng l arge-scal e counter guerri l l a operati ons.
Guerri l l acommandersmustbecogni zantofthefol l owi ngacti vi ti esor
137
condi ti onswhi chmi ghti ndi catei mpendi ngenemyoffensi vesi nthei r
operati onal areas
(1)Adventofsui tabl eweatherforextensi vefi el doperati ons.
(2)Arri val ofnewenemycommanders.
(3) Any change i n the conventi onal battl e si tuati on whi ch
rel eases addi ti onal troops forcounterguerri l l aoperati ons.
Such changes i ncl ude enemy vi ctori es over al l i ed
conventi onal forces, a l ul l i n acti ve operati ons, and a
reducti onofthesi zeofthebattl earea.
(4) I ncreasei nthesi zeofl ocal garri sonsorthearri val ofnew
uni ts i n the area, especi al l y i f these are combattroopsor
troops wi th speci al counter guerri l l a capabi l i ti es such as
radi o di recti on fi ndi ng uni ts, CBR uni ts, rotary wi nged
ai rcraft,mountai n,ai rborne,orreconnai ssancetroops.
(5) Extensi on of enemy outposts, i ncreased patrol l i ng and
aeri al reconnai ssance.
(6)I ncreasedenemyi ntel l i genceeffortagai nsttheguerri l l as.
b. Upon recei vi ng i nformati on that i ndi cates the enemy i s
pl anni ng a counter guerri l l a campai gn, the commander shoul d
i ncrease hi s own i ntel l i gence effort, determi ne the di sposi ti on and
preparednessofhi ssubordi nateuni tsandrevi ewpl anstomeetthe
anti ci patedenemyacti on.
129. DefensiveMeasures
a. To di vert the enemy's attenti on the commander di rects that
di versi onary acti vi ti es be i ni ti ated i n other areas. Li kewi se he may
i ntensi fyhi soperati onsagai nstenemyl i nesofcommuni cati onsand
i nstal l ati ons. Ful l uti l i zati on of underground and auxi l i ary
capabi l i ti esassi stsdi versi onarymeasures.
b. I nprepari ngtomeetenemyoffensi veacti on,keyi nstal l ati ons
wi thi naguerri l l abasearemovedtoanal ternatebaseandessenti al
records and" suppl i es are transferred to new l ocati ons whi l e those
l ess essenti al are destroyed or cached i n di spersed l ocati ons. I nthe
event that the commander recei ves posi ti ve i ntel l i gence about the
enemy'spl ansforamajorcounterguerri l l aoperati on,hemaydeci de
toevacuatehi sbaseswi thoutdel ay.
c. Thecommandermaydeci detodel ayandharasstheadvanci ng
enemy. Here hi s object i s to make the attack so expensi ve that the
enemy wi l l termi nate operati ons and be, content wi th hi s ori gi nal
di sposi ti ons. Fi rst, securi ty acti vi ti es on the peri phery as wel l as
wi thi n a, base are accel erated. Maxi mum uti l i zati on i s made of the
defensi ve characteri sti cs of the terrai n; ambushes are posi ti oned to
138
i nfl i ct maxi mum casual ti es and del ay; anti personnel mi nes are
empl oyed extensi vel y to harass the enemy. As the enemy overruns
vari ous. strong poi nts, the defenders wi thdraw to successi ve
defensi ve posi ti ons to del ay and harass agai n. When the si tuati on
permi ts, they may di sperse, pass through the l i ne of enci rcl ement,
andi ni ti ateattacksontheenemy'sfl anks,rearandsuppl yl i nes.I f
theenemyi sdetermi nedtoconti nuehi soffensi ve,theguerri l l aforces
shoul d di sengage and evacuate the area. Under no ci rcumstances
doestheguerri l l aforceal l owi tsel ftobecomesoengagedthati tl oses
i tsfreedomofacti onandpermi tsenemyforcestoenci rcl eanddestroy
i t.
d. When faced wi th an enemy offensi ve of overwhel mi ng
strength,thecommandermaydeci detodi spersehi sforce,ei theri n
smal l uni ts or as i ndi vi dual s to avoi d destructi on. Thi s course of
acti onshoul dnotbetakenunl essabsol utel ynecessaryi nasmuchasi t
makestheguerri l l aorgani zati oni neffecti veforaconsi derabl eperi od
ofti me.
130. Encirclement
Anenci rcl i ngmaneuveri sthegreatestdangertoguerri l l aforces
because i t prevents them from maneuveri ng. Once the enemy has
succeededi nenci rcl i ngaguerri l l aforce,hemayadoptoneofseveral
possi bl ecoursesofacti on(fi g.35).
a. The si mpl est i s to have hi s troops cl ose i n from al l si des,
forci ng the guerri l l as back unti l they are trapped i n a smal l area
whi ch i s then assaul ted. Di fferences i n terrai n make i t al most
i mpossi bl eforhi stroopstoadvanceatanequal rateal l aroundthe
peri meter, thus creati ng the possi bi l i ty of gapsbetween i ndi vi dual s
anduni ts.
b. I n other cases the enemy may deci de to break down the
ori gi nal ci rcl ei ntoanumberofpocketswhi chwi l l becl earedoneby
one. The creati on of these pockets 16 a repeti ti on of the Ori gi nal
enci rcl ement.I nthi ssi tuati ontheguerri l l asmustei therbreakoutor
escape through gaps, whi ch may appear as enemy forces are
maneuveri ngi ntonewposi ti ons.
c. Perhaps the most di ffi cul t si tuati on for guerri l l as to counter
wi thi sanassaul tafterenci rcl ementhasbeenaccompl i shed.I nthi s
maneuverenemyforcesononesi deoftheenci rcl edareaei therdi gi n
orusenatural obstacl estobl ockal l possi bl eescaperoutes,whi l ethe
forcesontheopposi tesi deadvancedri vi ngtheguerri l l asagai nstthe
fi xed posi ti ons. As the advance conti nues,enemyforceswhi chwere
139
on the remai ni ng two si des are formed i nto mobi l ereservestodeal
wi thanybreakouts(fi g.36).
131. DefenseAgainstEncirclement
a.I nitialActions.Aguerri l l acommandermustbeconstantl yon
the al ert for i ndi cati ons of an enci rcl ement. When he recei ves
i ndi cati ons that an enci rcl i ng movement i s i n progress such as the
appearanceofenemyforcesfromtwoorthreedi recti ons,theguerri l l a
commanderi mmedi atel ymaneuvershi sforcestoescapewhi l eenemy
l i nes are sti l l thi n and spread out, and coordi nati on between
advanci ng uni ts i s not yet wel l establ i shed. Records and surpl us
equi pment are ei ther cached or destroyed. Thus, the guerri l l a force
ei ther escapes the enci rcl ement or pl aces i tsel f i n a more favorabl e
posi ti on to meet i t. I f for some reason, escape i s not i ni ti al l y
accompl i shed, movement to a ri dge l i ne i s recommended. The ri dge
l i neaffordsobservati on,commandi ngground,andal l owsmovement
i n several di recti ons. The guerri l l as wai t on thi s hi gh ground unti l
peri ods of l ow vi si bi l i ty or other favorabl e opportuni ty for a break-
throughattemptoccurs.
b. Breakout(fi g.37).Twostrongcombatdetachmentsprecedethe
mai nbodywhi chi scoveredbyfl ankandrearguards.I fgapsbetween
the enemy uni ts exi st, the combat detachments sei ze and hol d the
fl anks of the escape route. When there are no gaps i n the enemy
l i nes, these detachments attack to create and protect an escape
channel .Thebreak-throughi sti medtooccurduri ngperi odsofpoor
vi si bi l i ty,freefromenemyobservati onandaccuratefi re.Duri ngthe
attempt, guerri l l a uni ts not i ncl uded i n the enemy ci rcl e make
attacksagai nsthi sreartol ureforcesawayfromthemai nbreak-out
attemptandhel ptocreategaps.Afterasuccessful break-through,the
guerri l l aforceshoul di ncreasethetempoofi tsoperati onswhenever
possi bl e, thus rai si ng guerri l l a moral e and maki ng the enemy
cauti ousi nthefutureaboutl eavi nghi sbasestoattacktheguerri l l a
areas.
c. Action I f Breakout Fails (fi g. 38). I f the breakout attempt i s
unsuccessful ,thecommanderdi vi deshi sforcei ntosmal l groupsand
i nstructsthemtoi nfi l tratethroughtheenemyl i nesatni ghtorhi de
i ntheareaunti l theenemyl eaves.Thi sacti onshoul dbetakenonl y
asal astresort,asi tmeanstheforcewi l l bei noperati veforaperi od
of ti me and the moral e of the uni t may be adversel y affected.
Reassembl yi nstructi onsareannouncedbeforethegroupsdi sperse.
140
141
142
143
144
SectionV. EMPLOYMENTOFUNCONVENTIONAL
WARFAREFORCESTOASSISTCONVENTIONAL
FORCES'COMBATOPERATIONS
132. General
Whentheareaofi nfl uenceofthefi el darmy(orotherconventi onal
forcecommand)overl apsaguerri l l awarfarearea,operati onal control
oftheguerri l l aforcesconcernedi spassedtothefi el darmy(orother
conventi onal forcecommand)commander.I nterdi cti onoperati onsare
ofgreateri mmedi atei mportanceandarepl annedtosupporttacti cal
objecti ves. Attacks agai nst enemy suppl y depots, l i nes of
communi cati ons and other i nstal l ati ons essenti al to support of hi s
tacti cal troops i ncrease. The psychol ogi cal i mpact of the success of
fri endl yconventi onal forcesi smagni fi edbyi ntensi fi edUWacti vi ty.
Psychol ogi cal warfare efforts expl oi ti ng these condi ti ons are
expanded. Enemy tacti cal targets are l ocated and reported to
conventi onal forces on an ever-mounti ng scal e, thus supporti ng the
i ncreased range of modernweapons.Evasi onandescapeoperati ons
expandtohandl el argenumbersoffri endl ypersonnel whomayfi nd
themsel ves evaders. I n addi ti on to the aforementi oned tasks,
guerri l l a forces can expect mi ssi ons whi ch di rectl y assi st combat
operati ons of fri endl y tacti cal uni ts. Al though pri mari l y of val ue i n
support of the tacti cal offense, guerri l l a warfare can al so assi st
fri endl yforcesengagedi ndefensi veoperati ons.Duri ngtheperi odof
operati ons to assi st conventi onal forces, l i nk-up between fri endl y
tacti cal commandsandguerri l l aforcesusual l ytakespl ace.
133. Missions
I n addi ti on to an accel erati on of acti vi ty di scussed i n paragraph
132,guerri l l aforcescanassi stthecombatoperati onsofconventi onal
forces engaged i n envel opment or penetrati on operati ons.Exampl es
of mi ssi ons appropri ate for guerri l l a forces to assi st fi el d army (or
otherconventi onal forcecommands)are
a. Sei zure of hey terrai n to faci l i tate ai rborne an u amphi bi ous
operati ons. Thi s may i ncl ude porti ons of the ai rhead or beachhead
l i ne,dropandl andi ngzonesorreconnai ssanceandsecuri typosi ti ons.
b. Empl oymentasareconnai ssanceandsecuri tyforce.
c. Sei zure of key i nstal l ati ons to prevent destructi on by the
enemy.Exampl esarebri dges,defi l es,tunnel s,darns,etc.
d. Di versi onary attacks to support fri endl y cover and decepti on
operati ons.
145
e. Operati ons whi ch i sol ate sel ected porti ons of the battl e area,
ai rborneobjecti veareaorbeachhead.
134. SpecialConsiderations
a. Tacti cal commanders who empl oy guerri l l a forces must
careful l yconsi derthei rcapabi l i ti eswhenassi gni ngthemoperati onal
tasks.Guerri l l auni tsareorgani zedandtrai nedtoexecutepl anned
offensi veoperati onsi nenemycontrol l edareas.Thesustai nedcombat
capabi l i ti es of guerri l l a uni ts are affected by several vari abl es such
as:si ze,organi zati on,l eadershi p,trai ni ng,equi pment,backgroundof
personnel and extent of ci vi l i an support. These di fferences are
usual l ymorepronouncedamongguerri l l auni tsthani nconventi onal
organi zati ons of comparabl e strengths. Consequentl y, l i ke-si ze
guerri l l a uni ts may not be capabl e of accompl i shi ng comparabl e
mi ssi ons. Assi gnment of mi ssi ons to guerri l l a uni ts shoul d take
advantageofthei rl i ghti nfantrycharacteri sti csandareaknowl edge.
AttachedSpeci al Forcesl i ai sonpersonnel recommendtothetacti cal
commanderappropri atetasksforguerri l l aforces.
b. Perhaps the severest l i mi tati on common to guerri l l a forces
when empl oyed wi th fri endl y tacti cal uni ts i s thei r shortage of
adequate voi ce communi cati ons equi pment and transportati on. Thi s
i sparti cul arl ytruewhenguerri l l auni tsareoperati ngwi thamobi l e
force i n a penetrati on, envel opment or expl oi tati on. For thi s reason
guerri l l auni tshaveasl owerreacti onti mei nterrai nfavori ngahi gh
degree of mechani cal mobi l i ty. Conventi onal commanders may
overcomethi sdi sadvantagebyprovi di ngthenecessaryequi pmentor
uti l i zi ngtheguerri l l aforceonanareabasi s.Forfurtherdi scussi on,
seeparagraphs136through138.
c. Another speci al consi derati on i s the requi rement for
restri cti onsi ntheuseofnucl earweaponsandCBRagentsbyother
fri endl yforces.Thi si sparti cul arl ytruewhenal argesegmentofthe
ci vi l i an popul ati on supports the resi stance movement. Careful
coordi nati on of targets sel ected for nucl ear and CBR attack i s
requi redbetweentheconventi onal forcecommanderandtheguerri l l a
force. Provi si ons must be made to provi de adequate warni ng to
fri endl y el ements of the popul ati on who may be /endangered by
nucl earandCBRweapons.
135. CommandRelationships
a. General(fi gs.39and40).Whenoperati onal control oftheUW
forces i s passed to the fi el d army (or other conventi onal force
command) commander, admi ni strati ve support of the guerri l l a
warfareareai sretai nedby,theSFOB.Concurrentwi ththechangei n
146
147
148
operati onal control of the guerri l l a force from theater to tacti cal
command l evel , the Speci al Forces group commander provi des a
l i ai son detachment to the headquarters of the command concerned.
TheSpeci al Forcesl i ai sondetachmentassi ststhetacti cal commander
i n the di recti on and coordi nati on of attached guerri l l a forces.
Operati onal control ofpartofal l oftheguerri l l aforcemaybepassed
to l ower tacti cal echel onsasrequi redbuti snormal l ynotdel egated
bel owdi vi si onl evel .
b.SpecialForcesLiaisonDetachment.
(1)Composition. The Speci al Forces l i ai son detachment i s a
non-TOE team whi ch may vary from a mi ni mum of one
l i ai sonoffi certoamodi fi edoperati onal detachmentCorB.
The si ze and composi ti on of the l i ai son detachment i s
di ctated by the type headquarters havi ng operati onal
control ; si ze, command structure, and di sposi ti on of
guerri l l a forces concerned; and avai l abi l i ty of requi red
communi cati onequi pment.
(2)Functions. The l i ai son detachment assi sts the tacti cal
commander i n the coordi nati on of Speci al Forces di rected
admi ni strati ve operati ons and tacti cal uni t di rected UW
operati ons.Thedetachmentcommander
(a)Pl ansandrecommendsempl oymentofguerri l l aforces.
(b)Exerci sesoperati onal control overguerri l l aforceswhen
thi sauthori tyi sdel egatedbythetacti cal commander.
(c)Mai ntai ns l i ai son wi th subordi nate tacti cal head
quartersasdi rected.
(d)Mai ntai ns l i ai son wi th Speci al Forces group
commander.
c. Communications. Communi cati ons between the SF l i ai son
detachmentandoperati onal areasmaybeestabl i shedi nseveral ways
(1) The l i ai son detachment may have a di rect l i nk to the
operati onal area (1, fi g. 41) . I n thi s si tuati on, addi ti onal
radi o equi pment i s provi ded by the SFOB for the l i ai son
detachment base stati on. The advantage i s di rect
communi cati ons. The di sadvantage i s that addi ti onal
equi pment and personnel usual l y must be provi ded by
othertheatersi gnal sources.
(2) TheSFOBmayactastheradi oi ntermedi arybetweenthe
l i ai sondetachmentandtheoperati onal area(2,fi g.41).
149
150
I n thi s si tuati on messages are rel ayed from the tacti cal
command headquarters vi a the SFOB to the operati onal
detachment.Communi cati onsfromthedetachmentuti l i zethe
reverse sequence. Thi s system has the advantage of uti l i zi ng
establ i shedcommuni cati onfaci l i ti esandrequi resnoaddi ti onal
communi cati on equi pment and personnel wi th the SF l i ai son
detachment. However, the ti me l apse between i ni ti ati on and
recei ptofmessagesi si ncreased.
(3) A vari ati on of the sol uti on ci ted i n c(2) above may be
adopted when both seni or and subordi nate tacti cal
commandscontrol di fferentel ementsoftheguerri l l aforce.
For exampl e, both fi el d army and corps control guerri l l a
forces, yet i nsuffi ci ent communi cati ons equi pment i s
avai l abl etoprovi debothheadquarterswi thabasestati on.
TheSFl i ai sondetachmentl ocatesi tsbasestati onatfi el d
army headquarters and corps rel ays i nstructi ons to
guerri l l auni tsunderi tscontrol vi atheSpeci al Forcesradi o
faci l i ty at army. Speci al forces l i ai son detachment
personnel arel ocatedatbothhead,/quarters.
136. SupportofGroundOffensiveOperations
a.General.Astheconventi onal forcecommand'sareaofi nfl uence
overl apstheguerri l l awarfareoperati onal area,guerri l l auni tsshi ft
tooperati onspl annedtoproducei mmedi ateeffectsonenemycombat
forces. I ni ti al l y, these acti vi ti es are di rected agai nst the enemy
communi cati on zone and army support troops and i nstal l ati ons. As
the di stance between guerri l l a and conventi onal forces decreases,
guerri l l a attacks have greater i nfl uence on the enemy combat
capabi l i ty. Guerri l l a operati ons support penetrati ons and
envel opments and are parti cul arl y effecti ve duri ng expl oi tati on and
pursui t
b. Guerrilla Operations During a Penetration. Due to the hi gh
densi ty of enemy combat troops i n the i mmedi ate battl e area,
guerri l l ascangi vel i ttl edi rectassi stancetofri endl yforcesi ni ni ti al
phasesofapenetrati on(ruptureoftheenemydefensi veposi ti onor
wi deni ng the gap). Guerri l l a forces can best support the attack by
i sol ati ng,orassi sti ngi nthesei zure,ofthedeci si veobjecti ve(fi g.42).
Guerri l l a forces hi nder or prevent movement of enemy reserves,
i nterrupt suppl y of combat el ements, and attack hi s command and
communi cati ons faci l i ti es, fi re support means and ai r fi el ds.
Locati ons of cri ti cal i nstal l ati ons and uni ts whi ch the guerri l l as
cannot effecti vel y deal wi th are reported to the tacti cal commander
for attack. As fri endl y forces near the deci si ve objecti ve, guerri l l a
uni ts di rect thei r operati ons toward i sol ati ng the objecti ve from
151
enemy reserves. I n some i nstances guerri l l a forces may be abl e to
sei zeandhol dtheobjecti veorkeyapproachestoi tforal i mi tedti me
pendi ngl i nk-upwi ththeconventi onal force.
c. GuerrillaOperationsDuringAnEnvelopment.
(1) Guerri l l a uni ts assi st the envel opi ng force i n much the
same way as i n a penetrati on (fi g. 43). Guerri l l as can
conduct di versi onary attacks to assi st other forces' cover
and decepti on pl ans. As i n the penetrati on, guerri l l as
hi nder movement of reserves, di srupt suppl y, attack
commandandcommuni cati onsi nstal l ati onsandreducethe
effecti veness of enemy fi re support. They may assi st i n
contai nment of. bypassed enemy uni ts. They attempt to
i sol atetheobjecti veoftheenvel opi ngforce.Theymaysei ze
and hol d cri ti cal terrai n, such as bri dges, defi l es and
tunnel s, to prevent enemy destructi on. They may perform
screeni ngmi ssi onstothefrontandfl anksorbeasecuri ty
el ement to fi l l gaps between di spersed uni ts of the
envel opi ngforce.
(2) I fusedi nareconnai ssanceorsecuri tyrol e,guerri l l auni ts
operate on an area basi s. That i s, they perform thei r
securi tyorscreeni ngrol ewi thi naspeci fi edareaduri ngthe
ti me the envel opi ng force passes through the area.
Guerri l l auni tsusual l ydonotpossessthetransportati onor
communi cati onstoaccompanymobi l eforces.
d. GuerrillaOperationsDuringExploitation.Asfri endl ytacti cal
uni ts pass from a successful penetrati on or envel opment to the
expl oi tati on of thei r gai ns, guerri l l a operati ons i ncrease i n
effecti veness. As the enemy attempts to reconsti tute an organi zed
defense or wi thdraw to new posi ti ons he i s attacked at every
opportuni tybyUWforces(fi g.44).Enemytroops,normal l yavai l abl e
forrearareasecuri tyduti es,arecommi ttedtoattemptstorestorehi s
defensi veposi ti on,thusenabl i ngguerri l l aattackstobei ncreasedi n
scopeandmagni tudeagai nstrearareai nstal l ati onswhosecapabi l i ty
fordefensei sreduced.Guerri l l aforcesassi sti ncontai ni ngbypassed
enemyuni ts,roundi ngupstraggl ersandpri soners,sei zi ngcontrol of
areasnotoccupi edbytheexpl oi ti ngforce,attacki ngenemyuni tsand
i nstal l ati onsandaddi ngtothegeneral demoral i zati oncausedbythe
expl oi tati on and subsequent pursui t. As l i nk-up wi th the expl oi ti ng
forcei saccompl i shed,guerri l l aforcesmaybeempl oyedasdi scussed
i nparagraphs140through147.
152
153
154
155
e. Command Rel ati onshi ps. Operati onal control of the guerri l l a
forcei sretai nedatthel evel bestabl etocoordi natetheacti onsofthe
operati on. As l i nk-up becomes i mmi nent guerri l l a uni ts nearest the
attacki ng force may be attached to or pl aced under the operati onal
control of that force. Concurrent wi th l i nk-up, responsi bi l i ty for
admi ni strati vesupportoftheguerri l l aforcei spassedtothetacti cal
command.Whenl i nk-uphasbeeneffectedtheuti l i zati onofguerri l l a
forces i s i n consonance wi th gui dance provi ded by the theater
commander. See paragraphs 140 through 147 for post l i nk-up
empl oyment.
137. SupportofAirborneOperations
a.General.
(1) Guerri l l a forces, by vi rtue of thei r l ocati on i n enemy
control l ed areas, can materi al l y assi st conventi onal forces
engaged i n ai rborne operati ons. They support ai rborne
forcesduri ngtheassaul tphaseandsubsequentoperadons.
They may al so be empl oyed i n conjuncti on wi th ai rborne
rai dsandareai nterdi cti onoperati ons.
(2) For detai l s of l i nk-up between ai rborne and guerri l l a
forces,seeparagraph139.
b.GuerrillaAssistancetoanAirborneAssault(fi g.45).
(1) I ni ti al l y, UW forces can provi de sel ected current
i ntel l i gence of the objecti ve area upon whi ch the ai rborne
forcecommanderbaseshi spl ans.I mmedi atel ypri ortothe
assaul t, guerri l l a uni ts may be abl e to secure drop and
l andi ngzones;sei zeobjecti veswi thi ntheai rheadl i ne;and
occupy reconnai ssance and securi ty posi ti ons. Concurrent
wi thl andi ngoftheassaul techel on,guerri l l ascanconduct
reconnai ssance and securi ty mi ssi ons; provi de gui des and
i nformati on; i nterdi ct approaches i nto the objecti ve area;
control areas between separate ai rheads and di spersed
uni ts; attack enemy reserve uni ts and i nstal l ati ons; and
conduct di versi onary attacks as a part of the cover and
decepti on pl an. Addi ti onal l y, UW forces may control
ci vi l i answi thi ntheobjecti vearea.
(2) Correct ti mi ng of guerri l l a operati ons wi th the ai rborne
assaul t i s essenti al . I f commi tted prematurel y, guerri l l a
forcesmaynul l i fythesurpri seeffectoftheoperati onand,
i n turn, be destroyed by the enemy. Conversel y, i f
commi ttedtool ate,thedesi redeffectsoftheguerri l l aforce
empl oymentmayneverbereal i zed.
156
157
c. GuerrillaAssistancetoSubsequentOperations.Astheassaul t
phaseofanai rborneoperati onpassesi ntothedefensi veoroffensi ve
phase,UWforcesconti nuetoexertpressureontheenemyforcesi n
thevi ci ni tyoftheobjecti vearea.Guerri l l asconti nuetoprovi deup-to-
date i nformati on on enemy moves and di sposi ti on. Attacks are
di rected agai nst enemy uni ts attempti ng to contai n or destroy the
ai rborneforce,thusrequi ri nghi mtofi ghti nmorethanonedi recti on.
Ai rborne forces whi ch have an expl oi tati on mi ssi on may empl oy
recovered guerri l l a uni ts i n reconnai ssance and securi ty rol es as
gui desandtoassi sti ncontrol ofvoi dareasbetweendi sperseduni ts.
I ftheai rborneforcei stobewi thdrawn,theguerri l l ascanassi stto
cover the wi thdrawal by di versi onary operati ons conducted i n the
rearofenemyforces.
d. Airborne Raids. Guerri l l a forces assi st ai rborne rai ds i n a
si mi l arfashi onastheydotheassaul tphaseofanai rborneoperati on.
They provi de i nformati on and gui des; perform reconnai ssance and
securi tymi ssi onsanddi vertenemyforcesduri ngthewi thdrawal of
the rai di ng force. An addi ti onal factor to consi der before usi ng
guerri l l aforcestosupportanai rbornerai di stheundesi rabl eeffectof
enemy reacti on on resi stance organi zati ons after wi thdrawal of the
rai di ngforce.
e. Area I nterdiction Operations. Ai rborne uni ts are sel dom
commi tted to guerri l l a warfare areas to conduct i nterdi cti on
operati ons i f the guerri l l a force has the capabi l i ty to conduct such
operati ons. However, i n areas where no effecti ve resi stance exi sts,
ai rborneforcesmaybecommi ttedtoconducti nterdi cti onoperati ons.
Whatever guerri l l a forces are l ocated i n areas sel ected for ai rborne
i nterdi cti on, assi st the ai rborne force to conduct thei r operati ons.
They provi de i ntel l i gence i nformati on and gui des; conduct
reconnai ssanceandsecuri tymi ssi ons;control theci vi l i anpopul ati on;
assi st i n col l ecti ng suppl i es and general l y ai d the ai rborne force
commanderi nmaki ngthetransi ti onfromconventi onal operati onsto.
guerri l l a operati ons. Speci al forces detachments, i f avai l abl e, may
conduct speci al trai ni ng wi thi n the operati onal area toi ncreasethe
capabi l i tyoftheai rborneforcei nguerri l l awarfaretechni ques.
f.CommandRelationships.
(1) Operati onal control ofguerri l l aforceswi thi ntheobjecti ve
area or i nfl uenci ng the mi ssi on of the ai rborne force i s
exerci sedbytheai rborneforcecommander.Control ofother
guerri l l aforceswhoseeffectupontheai rborneoperati oni s
i ndi recti si ni ti al l yretai nedbythecommanderdi recti ngthe
158
ai rborne operati on (joi nt ai rborne task force or theater
armycommander).
(2) Concurrent wi th l i nk-up, responsi bi l i ty for admi ni strati ve
supportoftheguerri l l aforcei spassedtothel i nk-upforce.
For empl oyment of guerri l l a forces after l i nk-up, see
paragraphs140through147.
138. SupportofAmphibiousOperations
(fi g.46)
a.General.
(1) Guerri l l as support conventi onal forces engaged i n
amphi bi ous operati ons, general l y i n one or more of the
fol l owi ngways(fi g.22)
(a)By conducti ng operati ons to hi nder or deny the enemy
approachtothebeachhead.
(b)Bysei zi ngandhol di ngal l oraporti onofthebeachhead.
(c)Byassi sti ngai rborneoperati onswhi chareapartofor
compl ementtheamphi bi ousassaul t.
(d)Byconducti ngcoveranddecepti onoperati onstodecei ve
theenemyastothel ocati onoftheactual beachhead.
(2) Guerri l l aforcesoperati ngwi thi ntheobjecti veareawi l l be
assi gnedtotheoperati onal control oftheamphi bi oustask
force commander when he becomes responsi bl e for the
objecti ve area. Operati onal control of guerri l l a forces i s
furtherassi gnedtothel andi ngforcecommanderwhenhe
assumes responsi bi l i ty for operati on ashore. Normal l y,
operati onal control ofguerri l l aforcesassi sti ngamphi bi ous
operati onsi snotpassedbel owdi vi si onal l evel .Concurrent
wi th l i nk-up, responsi bi l i ty for admi ni strati ve support of
theguerri l l aforcei spassedtothel i nk-upforce.
b.GuerrillaAssistancetoanAmphibiousAssault.
(1) I fthesel ectedbeachheadi sdefendedi nstrength,guerri l l a
operati ons are pl anned to hi nder or deny the enemy
approachesi ntothebeachheadarea.Byprearrangedpl an,
guerri l l a uni ts i nterdi ct approaches i nto the area; attack
reserves; destroy command and communi cati ons faci l i ti es;
l ogi sti cal i nstal l ati onsandai rfi el dswhi chcansupportthe
enemy defense forces i n or near the beachhead. Fi re
support el ements wi thi n range of the beachhead are a
pri maryguerri l l atarget.
159
160
(2) I fthesel ectedbeachheadi sl i ghtl ydefendedorundefended,
guerri l l a uni ts may sei ze and hol d porti ons of the
beachhead.Guerri l l afarcessei zethei robjecti vesjustpri or
to the i ni ti al assaul t. When requi red, l andi ng force uni t
tasksmustprovi deforearl yrel i efofguerri l l auni ts.Pl ans
for naval fi re support to guerri l l a forces must i ncl ude
provi si ons for the conduct and adjustment of fi res. Naval
l i ai sonpersonnel ,shorefi recontrol parti es,andtacti cal ai r
control parti eswi l l beattachedwhenrequi red.Thesi zeof
the beachhead, enemy si tuati on and si ze of the guerri l l a
force govern the extent of the beachhead to be al l otted to
theguerri l l as.Forempl oymentofguerri l l aforcesafterl i nk-
up,seeparagraphs140through147.
(3) I f are ai rborne operati on i s conducted as a part of or to
compl ement the amphi bi ous operati on, guerri l l as can be
empl oyedasdescri bedi nparagraph137.
(4) Guerri l l asmaybeempl oyedi nacoveranddecepti onrol eto
assi st amphi bi ous assaul ts. Guerri l l a forces i ntensi fy
operati onsi nsel ectedareastodecei vetheenemyastothe
exactl ocati onofthemai nl andi ngs.Ai rdefenseradarand
coastal detecti onstati onsaretargetsforguerri l l aattackto
reducetheenemy'searl ywarni ngcapabi l i ty.Rumorsasto
ti me and pl ace of l andi ng may be spread among the
popul ati on.Asuddeni ncreasei n,orcessati onofresi stance
acti vi ti estendstokeeptheenemyonedgeanduncertai n.
The empl oyment of the guerri l l a force i n support of cover
and decepti on i s i ntegrated i nto the overal l amphi bi ous
operati onpl an.
(5) Guerri l l a operati ons i n support of the l andi ng force after
compl eti on of the assaul t phase and termi nati on of the
amphi bi ous operati on are as di scussed i n paragraphs 136
and140through147.
(6) As i n ai rborne operati ons, ti mi ng of the use of guerri l l a
forcesi nrel ati ontotheamphi bi ousoperati oni sextremel y
i mportant, Premature commi tment al erts the enemy and
may l ead to the destructi on of the guerri l l a force.
Conversel y, l ate empl oyment may not have the desi red
effectupontheenemy.
139. Link-UpOperations
a.General.
(1) Most offensi ve operati ons i n whi ch guerri l l a forces assi st
tacti cal commandsi nvol veajuncturebetweenel ementsof
161
the two forces. Normal l y duri ng l i nk-up operati ons, the
guerri l l aforcei sthestati onaryforce,andtheconventi onal
uni tthel i nk-upforce.
(2) Notal l guerri l l aforcesi nanoperati onal areaarei nvol ved
i nl i nk-upwi thtacti cal uni ts.Someguerri l l auni tsmaybe
assi gned mi ssi ons assi sti ng tacti cal commands where the
requi rements of the operati on precl ude physi cal juncture.
Forexampl e,duri ngarai dorareai nterdi cti onoperati ons
byai rborneforcesorwhenconducti ngoperati onsaspartof
a cover and decepti on pl an for an amphi bi ous force, i t i s
often undesi rabl e to l i nk-up al l guerri l l a uni ts wi th the
attacki nguni ts.
(3) Concurrent wi th l i nk-up responsi bi l i ty for admi ni strati ve
supportoftheguerri l l aforcepassesfromtheSFOBtothe
l i nk-upforce.
(4) Regardl ess of the condi ti ons under whi ch l i nk-up occurs,
thefol l owi ngconsi derati onsgovernpl anni ng:
(a)Commandrel ati onshi ps.
(b)Li ai son.
(c)Coordi nati onofschemesofmaneuver.
(d)Fi recoordi nati onmeasures.
(e)Communi cati onscoordi nati on.
(f)Empl oymentfol l owi ngl i nk-up.
b. Command Relationships. Operati onal control of guerri l l a
forcesi sretai nedbythemajorl i nk-upforceunti l l i nk-upi seffected.
For exampl e, a di vi si on maki ng an ai rborne assaul t exerci ses
operati onal control oftheguerri l l aforce.Whenl i nk-upwi thguerri l l a
uni ts i s accompl i shed, these uni ts may then be empl oyed under
di vi si oncontrol orattachedtosubordi nateel ementssuchasabri gade
on an i ndependent or semi -i ndependent mi ssi on. For a detai l ed
di scussi on of command rel ati onshi ps i n vari ous si tuati ons, see
paragraphs136,137,and138.
c. Liaison.
(1) As operati onal control of guerri l l a warfare areas are
transferredfromtheaterl evel totacti cal commands,l i ai son
personnel are exchanged between the SFOB and the
tacti cal commandconcerned.TheSFOBattachesaSpeci al
Forces l i ai son detachment to the tacti cal command
headquarters. For composi ti on and duti es of thi s l i ai son
detachment,seeparagraph135.
(2) As the di stance between the tacti cal command and
guerri l l a forces decreases, operati onal control of the
162
guerri l l a warfare area may be transferred to subordi nate

tacti cal el ements. The SF l i ai son detachment furni shes
necessary l i ai son personnel to these subordi nate
headquarters. I n those i nstances where onl y one
operati onal area exi sts the enti re l i ai son detachment i s
attachedtothesubordi nateheadquarters.
(3) Whenl i nk-uppl anni ngcommences,provi si onsaremadefor
anexchangeofl i ai sonpersonnel betweenthel i nk-upforce
and the guerri l l a warfare area command. A l i ai son party
fromtheguerri l l aforcei sexfi l trated.Thi sparty,consi sti ng
ofSFandi ndi genousrepresentati ves,assi stsi nthel i nk-up
pl anni ng for the tacti cal commander. The guerri l l a force
l i ai sonpersonnel areabl etoprovi dethel atestfri endl yand
enemy si tuati on and recommend l i nk-up coordi nati on
measuresandmi ssi onsforguerri l l auni ts.
(4) Shortl y after removal of the guerri l l a force's l i ai son party
from the operati onal area, the tacti cal commander
i nfi l trateshi sl i ai sonpartytojoi ntheareacommand.Thi s
l i ai son party consi sts of representati ves from the G3
secti on, the Speci al Forcesl i ai sondetachment,tacti cal ai r
control parti es, forward observer tears, and
communi cati ons personnel and equi pment. The l i ai son
party furni shes the guerri l l a area commander the l i nk-up
pl anandappropri atemi ssi ons.
(5) Armyavi ati oni sgeneral l yusedtotransportl i ai sonparti es
i ntoandoutoftheoperati onal area.
d. Coordination of Schemes of Maneuver. Standard control
measuresareestabl i shedtoassi stl i nk-up.SeeFM57-30,FM7-100,
andFM17-100fordetai l softhesecontrol measures.Guerri l l auni ts
are usual l y di spersed over a l arger area, consequentl y l i nk-up wi l l
take pl ace at several wi del y separated areas, thus necessi tati ng
desi gnati onofmorel i nk-uppoi ntsthannormal .
e. FireCoordinationMeasures.Fi recontrol l i nesandbombl i nes
are establ i shed to protect both the l i nk-up force and the guerri l l a
forcesfromeachother'sfi res.Agai nbecauseofthedi spersi onexi sti ng
amongguerri l l auni tsandthefactthatci vi l i ansupportorgani zati ons
areapartoftheUWforce,addi ti onal restri cti onsonsupporti ngfi res
are necessary. I n parti cul ar, the empl oyment of nucl ear and CB
weaponswi thi nguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areasmustbeseverel y
curtai l edandthoroughl ycoordi natedwhenused.
f. Communications Coordination. General l y, radi o
communi cati ons equi pment wi th the guerri l l a forces i s severel y
l i mi ted.Thetacti cal commandermustprovi deequi pmentwi thavoi ce
capabi l i tywhi chcanl i nktheguerri l l aforcetohi sheadquarters.Thi s
163
equi pment i s brought i nto the area by the l i ai son party. Vi sual
recogni ti onsi gnal saresel ectedtoassi sti nl i nk-up.I ntheeventthe
necessary pyrotechni cs and other marki ngs are not avai l abl e to the
guerri l l aforcetheyareprovi dedbythel i nk-upforce.
g. Employment Following Link-Up. General l y, the theater
commander prescri bes the condi ti ons and durati on of uti l i zati on of
the guerri l l a forces after l i nk-up. Wi thi n thi s gui dance the tacti cal
commandermayempl oyrecoveredguerri l l aforces.Foradi scussi on
ofempl oymentafterl i nk-up,seeparagraphs140through147.
SectionVI.EMPLOYMENTOFUWFORCESAFTER
LINK-UP
140. General
I n the event control of guerri l l aforcesi sretai nedbytheUni ted
States, mi ssi ons maybeassi gnedguerri l l aforcesafterl i nk-upwi th
fri endl y forces has been accompl i shed. Operati onal control of
guerri l l a forces may be passed to theater army l ogi sti cal command
(TALOG), theater army ci vi l affai rs command (TACAComd) or
retai ned by the tacti cal commander. Usual l y Speci al Forces
detachmentsshoul dremai nwi thguerri l l auni tsduri ngthi speri od.
141. Missions
a. Reconnai ssance and securi ty mi ssi ons may be executed by
guerri l l a uni ts such as screeni ng the fl anks of fri endl y forces;
patrol l i ngvoi dareasbetweendi sperseduni tsandprovi di nggui des.
b. When properl y trai ned, organi zed and supported, certai n
guerri l l a uni ts may have the capabi l i ty of performi ng conventi onal
combat operati ons. Normal l y, supporti ng combat uni ts such as
arti l l ery andarmorare.provi dedbythetacti cal commander.Asan
exampl e, the contai nment or destructi on of bypassed enemy uni ts
maybeassi gnedtoguerri l l as.
c. Rear area securi ty mi ssi ons such as guardi ng suppl y depots,
l i nes of communi cati on, mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons and pri soner of war
compoundsmaybeassi gnedtoguerri l l auni ts.
d. Counterguerri l l aoperati onsdi rectedagai nstenemydi ssi dents
maybeperformedbyguerri l l auni ts.
e. Guerri l l a forces may be uti l i zed to assi st ci vi l affai rs uni ts.
Suchtasksaspol i ceofci vi l i ancommuni ti es,col l ecti onandcontrol of
refugeesandassi stance,i nci vi l admi ni strati onareexampl esofci vi l
affai rsassi stancemi ssi onstowhi chguerri l l auni tsmaybeassi gned.
164
142. CommandRelationships
a. The theater commander prescri bes the condi ti ons of
empl oyment and durati on of attachment of guerri l l a forces to
conventi onal commandsafterl i nk-up.Guerri l l aforcesmaybeuti l i zed
by tacti cal commanders or attached to other theater servi ce
componentsortheaterarmycommands.
b. Guerri l l a uni ts are attached to the conventi onal force and
responsi bi l i ty for admi ni strati ve support of these uni ts passes from
theSFOBtotheconventi onal force.
c. I nmostsi tuati ons,Speci al Forcesdetachmentsshoul dremai n
wi th the guerri l l a force duri ng post l i nk-up operati ons. The
requi rementforthei rempl oymenti notheroperati onal areas,coupl ed
wi th the effi ci ency of, and type mi ssi ons assi gned, are factors
governi ng the retenti on of Speci al Forces detachments wi th the
guerri l l aforce.
d. Upon compl eti on of the mi ssi on or when di rected by the
theater commander, guerri l l a forces are rel eased for demobi l i zati on
andreturntothei rnati onal government.
143. ConventionalCombatOperations
Properl ytrai nedandequi ppedguerri l l auni tscanbeempl oyedas
conventi onal combatuni ts.Normal l y,theyrequi readdi ti onal combat
andl ogi sti cal supportsuchasarmor,arti l l eryandtransportati on.A
peri od of retrai ni ng and reequi ppi ng i s usual l y necessary pri or to
commi tment to combat. When so empl oyed they shoul d be
commanded by thei r own offi cers. Usual l y the speci al forces
detachment remai ns wi th the guerri l l a uni t to assi st them i n the
transi ti on to the status of a combat uni t operati ng i n a strange
envi ronmentunderunknownhi ghercommanders.
144. ReconnaissanceandSecurityMissions
a. Because of thei r fami l i ari ty wi th the terrai n and peopl e i n
thei roperati onal areas,guerri l l aforcespossessauni quecapabi l i tyi n
areconnai ssanceandsecuri tyrol e.However,thei rl ackofvehi cul ar
mobi l i ty and voi ce communi cati ons equi pment are l i mi tati ons on
thei r empl oyment wi th mobi l e forces. When empl oyed wi th mobi l e
uni ts, the tacti cal commander may provi de the necessary
transportati onandcommuni cati onsequi pmentforsel ectedguerri l l a
uni ts.
b. The normal method of empl oyment i n reconnai ssance and
securi tymi ssi onsi stoassi gnguerri l l auni tsanareaofresponsi bi l i ty
165
(fi g.47).Wi thi nthi sareaguerri l l aforcespatrol di ffi cul tterrai nand
gaps between tacti cal uni ts, establ i sh road bl ocks and observati on
posts, screen fl anks, provi de gui des to conventi onal uni ts and seek
outenemyagentsandstraggl ers.
145. RearAreaSecurity
a. Guerri l l a forces may be assi gned rear area securi ty mi ssi ons
wi thvari oustacti cal commandsorwi thi nthetheaterarmyl ogi sti cal
commandarea.I nassi gni ngguerri l l aforcesarearareasecuri tyrol e,
thei r area knowl edge shoul d be the governi ng factor and, where
possi bl e,theyshoul dbeempl oyedwi thi nareasfami l i artothem.
b. They may be used as securi ty forces at l ogi sti cal and
admi ni strati ve i nstal l ati ons, suppl y depots, ai rfi el ds, pi pel i nes, rai l
yards,portsandtacti cal uni ttrai nsareas.Guerri l l aomi ts.,anpatrol
di ffi cul tterrai n whi ch contai nsbypassedenemyuni tsorstraggl ers;
pol i ce towns and ci ti es; guard l i nes of communi cati ons such as
rai l roads, hi ghways, tel ecommuni cati ons systems and canal s. When
provi ded wi th appropri ate transportati on, guerri l l a uni ts may be
empl oyedasamobi l esecuri tyforcereserve.
c. Sel ected guerri l l a, auxi l i ary, and underground el ements may
beeffecti vel yusedi nsupportofci vi l censorshi poperati onsconducted
throughoutthecontrol l edarea.
146. CounterGuerrillaOperations
Guerri l l aforcesareadaptedbyexperi enceandtrai ni ngforusei n
counterguerri l l aoperati ons.Thei rknowl edgeofguerri l l atechni ques,
thel anguage,terrai nandpopul ati onarei mportantcapabi l i ti eswhi ch
can be expl oi ted by conventi onal commanders engaged i n counter
guerri l l a operati ons. Guerri l l a forces may provi de the pri nci pal
sourcesofi ntel l i gencei nformati onaboutdi ssi dentel ementsopposi ng
fri endl yforces.Theyhavethecapabi l i tyofmovi ngi ndi ffi cul tterrai n
and l ocati ng guerri l l a bands. They detect guerri l l a supporters i n
vi l l ages and towns and i mpl ement control measures i n unfri endl y
areas.Whenproperl yorgani zedandsupported,guerri l l aforcesmay
be made compl etel y responsi bl e for counter guerri l l a operati ons i n
sel ectedareas.
147. CivilAffairsAssistance
Because of thei r knowl edgeofthel anguageandfami l i ari tywi th
the l ocal popul ati on, guerri l l a forces or sel ected ci vi l i an support
el ements may be assi gned to assi st ci vi l affai rs uni ts. They may be
di rectl y attached to di vi si onal , corps or army ci vi l affai rs uni ts or
pl aced under command of the theater army ci vi l affai rs
166
167
command (TACAComd). Guerri l l a forces can perform refugee
col l ecti on and control duti es, ci vi l pol i ce duti es, assi st i n the
psychol ogi cal operati onscampai gni nrearareas,hel pestabl i shci vi l
government,apprehendcol l aboratorsandspi es,recrui tl abor,furni sh
or l ocate techni ci ans to operate publ i c uti l i ti es, guard key
i nstal l ati onsandpubl i cbui l di ngs,assi sti ntherevi ewandcensorshi p
ofmateri al fordi ssemi nati onthroughpubl i cmedi afaci l i ti es,andi n
general ,assi sti nrestori ngtheareatosomesembl anceofnormal i ty.
168
CHAPTER9
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONSINSUPPORTOF
UNCONVENTIONALWARFARE
148. General
a. Unconventi onal warfare i nvol ves i deol ogi cal , rel i gi ous,
pol i ti cal , and soci al factors whi ch promote i ntense, emoti onal
parti sanshi p.Resi stanceorgani zati onstendtoattractpersonnel who
acceptvi ol entchangeasameansofsoci al acti on;theyaremoti vated
by hope for change. But, the fl ui d nature of resi stance acti vi ty, the
al ternate, peri ods of i sol ati on and combat, the surrepti ti ous l i fe
makes resi stance personnel parti cul arl y suscepti bl e to propaganda
affects.
b. Thei deol ogi cal andpol i ti cal factorsassoci atedwi thresi stance
acti vi ty create a ferti l e fi el d for propaganda. Members ofresi stance
movementsareacti vepropagandi sts.Hence,wefi ndparal l el i ngthe
guerri l l a mi l i tary effort a propaganda effort conducted by al l
resi stanceel ementsseeki ngtogai nsupportforthei rmovement.The
rel ati ve i sol ati on and cl andesti ne atmosphere associ ated wi th
resi stance acti vi ti es creates a conti nui ng need for propaganda to
supporttheeffort.
c. I npeaceorwarSpeci al Forcesuni ts,bythei rverypresencei n
aparti cul arcountry,haveapsychol ogi cal i mpactonsel ectmi l i taryor
parami l i tary el ements and on i nformed el ements of the popul ati on.
The i mage created by Speci al Forces personnel i s mol ded by a
mul ti tudeoffactorswhi chbearheavi l yonthesuccessful outcomeof
the operati on. These factors i ncl ude tangi bl e evi dence of Uni ted
Statesi nterestandsupportofthepeopl ebythepresenceofSpeci al
Forcespersonnel ,theresul tsofday-to-day,face-to-facemeeti ngsand
an i ntel l i gent understandi ng of the objecti ve and probl ems of the
i ndi genousguerri l l aforce.Thei magei smorefavorabl e,however,i f
psychol ogi cal operati ons techni ques are used at al l stages i n the
organi zati on of the guerri l l a uni ts, especi al l y i n the prei nfi l trati on
stages,topreparethepotenti al guerri l l aforceandauxi l i aryforcesfor
thearri val ofUni tedStatespersonnel and,subsequentl y,i npoi nti ng
upmutual effortstoachi evecommonpol i ti cal andmi l i taryobjecti ves.
Thi s new focus i mposes addi ti onal burdens on the detachment
commander, requi ri ng hi m to have a detai l ed knowl edge of
psychol ogi cal operati onscapabi l i ti esandthei magi nati ontousethem
169
wi thi nthepecul i aroperati onal envi ronmenti nwhi chhei si mmersed.

The psychol ogi cal i mpl i cati ons of unconventi onal warfare make a
knowl edgeofpsychol ogi cal operati onsi mportant.Thi si sparti cul arl y
truewhenSpeci al Forcesoperati onsarepredomi nantl ypsychol ogi cal
operati ons,suchasi nthei ni ti al phasesofformi ngguerri l l auni tsand
seeki ngtowi ntheassi stanceofsupporti ngel ements.
d. Thi s chapter outl i nes how psychol ogi cal operati ons assi st
Speci al Forces uni ts i n carryi ng out thei r mi ssi ons, hel pi ng to
maxi mi ze the chances for success and thereby contri buti ng to a
shorteni ngoftheconfl i ct.
149. ConceptandOrganization
Pl anned psychol ogi cal operati ons assi st i n the conduct of
unconventi onal warfareoperati onsbothbeforeandduri nghosti l i ti es
and through those col d war acti vi ti es i n whi ch the Uni ted States
Armymaybeengaged.Thesepsychol ogi cal operati onsaredesi gnedto
create, rei nforce or sustai n those atti tudes hel d by the popul ati on
whi chcausethemtoacti namannerbenefi ci al tothei rownandto
Uni tedStatesobjecti ves.
a.National Programs. The Uni ted States I nformati on Agency
(USI A) conducts psychol ogi cal operati ons whi ch have the broad
objecti ve of general l y defi ni ng Ameri can pri nci pl es and ai ms and
i nterpreti ng Ameri ca, and i ts peopl e to otherpeopl es.Thi si ncl udes
supporti ngtheri ghtofal l ofthepeopl esoftheworl dtochoosethei r
own form of government. USI A programs can be used to prepare
potenti al or desi gnated Speci al Forces operati onal areas for the
psychol ogi cal acceptanceofAmeri canmi l i tarypersonnel .
b. Theater and Service Component Commands. Army
psychol ogi cal warfareuni tsareavai l abl ewi thi ntheoverseastheater
orcommandtoassi sti nampl i fyi ngthebroadpol i ci esandgoal si nthe
parti cul arareai nwhi chunconventi onal warfareuni tsarecommi tted.
Duri nghosti l i ti esapsychol ogi cal operati onsstaffoffi cercoordi nates
wi ththeJoi ntUnconventi onal WarfareTaskForce(JUWTF)toassi st
Speci al Forces detachments i n thei r respecti ve areas of operati ons.
Pl anni ng for Speci al Forces operati ons i ncl udes the use of
psychol ogi cal operati onsi nal l phasesoftheunconventi onal warfare
operati on, from psychol ogi cal preparati on stage through
demobi l i zati on.
150. TargetAudiences
a. Enemy Target Audience. The enemy target audi ence may
consi stofseveral .el ements:
170
(1)EnemyMi l i taryForces.
(a)Enemymi l i taryforcesmaybeofthesamenati onal i tyas
the popul ati on or they may represent an occupyi ng
forei gnpower.I nei thercasetheguerri l l aforceandthe
auxi l i ary personnel supporti ng them attempt to make
enemy sol di ers feel i sol ated and under-supported by
poi nti ng up any i nadequaci es i n thei r suppl i es and
equi pment, and the perenni al danger of death. By
focusi ng on the enemy sol di er's frustrati ons,
psychol ogi cal operati ons can l ower hi s moral e and
reducehi seffecti veness,parti cul arl yi nconjuncti onwi th
thepowerful pressuresgeneratedbyconti nuouscombat
acti on.Ambushi ngsuppl ycol umns,sni pi ng,smal l scal e
rai ds agai nst i sol ated uni ts, cutti ng enemy
communi cati ons l i nes and the destructi on of vi tal
objecti vesatni ghti nduceabasi cfeel i ngofi nadequacy,
i nsecuri tyandfeari ntheenemysol di er.Thi sfeel i ngof
i nadequacyandfearpermi teasyaccesstothemi ndwi th
the several tool s of psychol ogi cal operati ons, and make
the enemy sol di er vul nerabl e to appeal s urgi ng
surrender, mal i ngeri ng, or deserti on. The enemy
sol di er's feel i ng of i sol ati on and hi s recepti vi ty to our
appeal sarefurtherai dedthroughl eafl etsandbroadcast
messageswhi chstressthepopul arsupportoftheai ms
oftheguerri l l as.
(b)The psychol ogi cal "i sol ati on" campai gn may be
suppl ementedbyamoreposi ti vetechni quedesi gnedto
el i ci t more readi l y observabl e reacti ons. I f the Speci al
Forces commander desi res to i nduce enemy sol di ers to
defect or desert, sati sfyi ng and real i sti c goal s must be
i ntroduced to attract the target audi ence. The enemy
sol di ershoul dbetol dwhyandhowheshoul ddefectand
gi venassurancesconcerni nghi ssafetyandwel comeby
the guerri l l a force. When enemy sol di ers are taken by
the guerri l l as, promi ses of safety and good treatment
must be kept. Proof of good treatment i s passed on to
enemyuni tsbyphotographi ngthesol di er,havi nghi m
si gn l eafl ets, or even havi ng hi m make l oudspeaker
appeal stohi sformercomrades.I fthesetechni quesare
unfeasi bl e,auxi l i arypersonnel mayi nformenemyuni ts
by word of mouth of the wel l bei ng of defected or
captured personnel . Obvi ousl y, the defecti on of an
enemy sol di er i s i mportant news to hi s former
171
col l eagues,si ncei ti ndi catestothoseremai ni ngbehi nd
thatadefector'ssafetyi sassured.Thi sfactcanhavea
great psychol ogi cal i mpact on the enemy and on the
guerri l l as themsel vesthe enemy i s made to feel that
hi sowncomrades,arewaveri nganddonotsupportthe
enemygoal s;whi l etheguerri l l asl earnthattheenemy
i s weakeni ng and thei r own chances for success
i ncreasi ng.
(2)Civilian collaborators. Ci vi l i ans i n the operati onal area
may be supporti ng a puppet form of government or
otherwi se col l aborati ng wi th an enemy occupati on force.
Themes and appeal s di ssemi nated to thi s group vary
accordi ngl y, but the psychol ogi cal objecti ves are the same
as those for the enemy mi l i tary. An i sol ati on program
desi gnedtoi nsti l l doubtandfearmaybecarri edoutanda
posi ti ve pol i ti cal acti on program desi gned to el i ci t acti ve
support of the guerri l l as al so may be effected. I f these
programs fai l , i t may become necessary to take more
aggressi ve acti on i n the form of harsh treatment. Harsh
treatment of key col l aborators can weaken the
col l aborators' bel i ef i n. the strength and power of thei r
mi l i tary forces. Thi s approach, fraught wi th propaganda
dangers,shoul dbeusedonl yafteral l otherappeal means
havefai l ed.I fused,theymustbemadetoappearasthough
i ni ti ated and effected by the guerri l l as to reduce the
possi bi l i tyofrepri sal sagai nstci vi l i ans.
b. CivilianPopulation.
(1) No guerri l l a movement can succeed wi thout a majori ty of
the popul ati on bei ng favorabl y i ncl i ned toward i t. Often,
however, i n the i ni ti al stage of hosti l i ti es, the popul ati on,
because of fear or uncertai nty about the ai ms of the
movement, may be neutral or opposed to the guerri l l as.
Thi s i s understandabl e because the popul ati on i s caught
betweenthedemandsandcontrol softheenemyforceand
thoseoftheguerri l l as,I nthi si nstance,forceandthemai n
objecti veofpsychol ogi cal operati onsi nguerri l l awarfarei s
topersuadethetargetgroupthattheguerri l l asarefi ghti ng
forthewel fareandgoal softhepopul ati on,thatthesegoal s
areattai nabl eandthattheUni tedStatesi nsupporti ngthe
guerri l l aforcei spressi ngforthesamepol i ti cal andsoci al
goal s.Psychol ogi cal programsai medatthi stargetaudi ence
stressappeal sdesi gnedtoi nducethepopul ati ontosupport
and obey the guerri l l as i n achi evi ng recogni zed common
objecti ves.
172
(2) By thei r presence i n the operati onal area, Speci al Forces
personnel areabl etogatherexpl oi tabl ei nformati ononthe
i mmedi ate si tuati on and on the atti tudes and behavi or of
thel ocal popul ati on.Theguerri l l aforceandi tssupporti ng
el ements are a val uabl e storehouse of i nformati on whi ch
can be used to strengthen psychol ogi cal operati ons pl ans
di rected at ci vi l i an and enemy target audi ences. Armed
wi th thi s i nformati on, the speci al forces commander can
then request support from the theater psychol ogi cal
operati onsoffi certoassi sti ncarryi ngoutapredetermi ned
and coordi nated psychol ogi cal program. Thi s support may
take the form of droppi ng newspapers and other,
semi offi ci al medi a to the popul ati on, suppl yi ng the
guerri l l as wi th materi al to produce pri nted Matter and
provi di ng the speci al forces commander wi th addi ti onal
advi ceandtechni questoconductadetai l edandi ntegrated
psychol ogi cal program to suppl ement the guerri l l a
operati on.
c. GuerrillasandtheAuxiliaries.Thethi rdmajortargetaudi ence
to be consi dered by the Speci al Forces commander compri ses the
guerri l l as,theauxi l i ari es,andthoseundergroundel ementsassi sti ng
the guerri l l as. The guerri l l a force has been gi ven proof that the
Uni ted States supports the general objecti ves of the guerri l l a
movement. But, as the representati ve of the Uni ted States theater
commander,theSpeci al Forcesdetachmentcommandermusti nsure
that speci fi c goal s for the guerri l l as and i ts support el ements are
rei nterpreted and reemphasi zed conti nual l y duri ng the hosti l i ti es
phase.
151. Types of Psychological Warfare Operations in Guerrilla
WarfareOperationalAreas
a.Action Operations. Acti on operati ons are those operati ons
takenbytheSpeci al Forcescommanderwhi charedesi gnedtohavea
psychol ogi cal effect on any of the three major target audi ences. As
i ndi catedabove,somecombatacti onsmaybei ni ti atedbytheSpeci al
Forcescommanderpurel yforpsychol ogi cal purposes,especi al l ythose
rel atedtorai si ngthemoral eoftheguerri l l afi ghtersortomani fest
guerri l l a support of the peopl e. The purpose of these acti ons i s to
rei nforce bel i ef i n the strength of the guerri l l a force and i n the
ri ghtness of thei r goal s. These bel i efs when hel d by the popul ati on
openupsourcesoffoodandi nformati onrequi redforthesurvi val of
the guerri l l a force. Enemy credence i n the strength of the guerri l l a
173
force tends to l ower hi s moral e and weaken the effi ci ency of hi s
operati ons.Exampl esofacti onsi ni ti atedpri mari l yforpsychol ogi cal
reasonsthatcanbetakenbythespeci al forcescommanderare:
(1) Assi sti ng the ci vi l i an popul ati on by di stri buti ng and
admi ni steri ngmedi cal suppl i es;
(2) The rescue and evacuati on ofkeyci vi l i anssupporti ngthe
guerri l l acause;
(3) Warni ng the ci vi l i an popul ati on of i mpendi ng ai rcraft or
mi ssi l e attacks i n the l ocal area. These warni ngs i mpl y
guerri l l acontrol overtheoperati onandfurtheri ncreasethe
bel i efi nthestrengthoftheguerri l l aforce;
(4) When area supremacy i s achi eved, encouragi ng and
assi sti ng the ci vi l i an popul ati on to resume thei r normal
acti vi ti es. Thi s may i nvol ve use of the guerri l l as or
auxi l i ary uni ts i n assi sti ng the l ocal popul ati on to repai r
bui l di ngs, bui l d needed structures, harvest crops, reopen
school sandchurches,organi zesoci al acti vi tygroups,etc.;
(5) The i nsti tuti on of honest and effecti ve government i n the
area. These psychol ogi cal programs must carry the ful l
wei ghtofthepresti geandl egal i tyoftheUni tedStatesand
i ts al l i es. Thi s i s demonstrated by havi ng appropri ate
di recti ves emanate from Uni ted States authori ti es at
theater l evel or hi gher. Joi nt di recti ves i ssued by Uni ted
States and i ndi genous guerri l l a l eaders or a credi bl e
government-i n-exi l e gi ve added force to the acti on
programs.
(6) Meeti ng ci vi l i ans face-to-face. Duri ng those peri ods of
operati ons before the Speci al Forces commander can
acti vel yassi sttheci vi l i anpopul ati ontoresumearel ati vel y
normal l i fe,thecommandermustrei nforcewri ttenappeal s
by conducti ng meeti ngs or di scussi ons wi th the l ocal
ci vi l i ans. Theseprovi deaddi ti onal tangi bl eevi dencetothe
popul ati onthattheguerri l l asaresupportedbytheUni ted
States and that both are worki ng i n the i nterests of the
popul ati on. Members of the Speci al Forces detachment
parti ci patei nsuchmeeti ngstoestabl i shful l rapportwi th
the popul ati on, thereby di mi ni shi ng the "forei gnness" of
Speci al Forcespersonnel . Thesemeeti ngshel pi denti fythe
gueri l l asandUni tedStatespersonnel wi ththepopul ati on.
b. Printed Media. The l eafl et, poster or bul l eti n i s the most
common and most effecti ve type of pri nted materi al used by the
174
Speci al Forcescommanderandtheguerri l l asi ntheoperati onal area.
Smal l pri nti ng presses and other si mpl e types of reproduci ng
machi nescanbeusedtopri ntl eafl etsandnewscommuni qus.The
techni cal probl emsassoci atedwi thpri nti ngmaybeconsi derabl eand
di ssemi nati onofthel eafl etsdi ffi cul ti nthoseareaswheretheenemy
i s abl e to mai ntai n fi rm control . I n the i ni ti al stages of hosti l i ti es,
whenpsychol ogi cal operati onsaremostvi tal ,guerri l l aforcesmaynot
havethefaci l i ti estoproducel argeamountsofpri ntedmateri al .
Thetechni quesofl eafl etwri ti ngforunconventi onal operati onsare
thesameasthoseforconventi onal programs.Guerri l l as,ai dedbythe
Speci al Forcescommander,canusual l ysel ectthemeswhi charemore
ti mel y,morecredi bl eandmoreconsi stentthanthosewhi chemanate
from sources outsi de the operati onal area. The Speci al Forces
commander can augment the l ocal l y prepared program by havi ng'
smal l newspapers dropped i nto the area to suppl ement bul l eti ns
i ssued through auxi l i ary uni t channel s. Pri nted materi al shoul d be
usedtoemphasi zefavorabl easpectsofci vi cacti onprogramsal ready
undertaken.Warai msshoul dbepubl i ci zedasaspectsofpermanent
nati onal ai ms and pol i ci es and di ssemi nated as offi ci al l ooki ng
l eafl ets. Leafl ets carryi ng the offi ci al text of joi nt communi qus
si gned by the theater commander and known resi stance l eaders
shoul dbeoffi ci al andformal i nappearancewheni ssuedtothetarget
audi ence.
c. Rumor. Rumor can be an effecti ve propaganda devi ce,
especi al l y when empl oyed to di ssemi nate bl ack propaganda. The
Speci al Forces commander, usi ng guerri l l as and auxi l i ary
i nformati on channel s, can i ni ti ate rumor campai gns i n the
operati onal area, i f the si tuati on cal l s for them. Themes that the
Speci al Forcescommanderwoul dberel uctanttosancti onasoffi ci al
i nformati on can be spread through the medi um of rumor.Al though
rumors are di ffi cul t to control and the target audi ence never
speci fi cal l y i sol ated, thi s medi um does have the advantage of bei ng
vi rtual l yi mpossi bl etotrace.Si ncethi sdevi cei sal soexpl oi tabl eby
the enemy, rumors whi ch are detri mental to the guerri l l a effort
shoul dbecounteredbyl eafl etorface-to-facemeeti ngswi thsel ected
membersoftheci vi l i anpopul ati on.
152. PsychologicalOperationstoSupportDemobilization
Psychol ogi cal operati onsareusedtoassi sti nthedemobi l i zati onof
aguerri l l aforce.Theyconsi stofprogramsusi ngal l medi atoexpl ai n
to the guerri l l a steps to be taken i n the demobi l i zati on process. I n
addi ti on,rehabi l i tati onprograms,sponsoredbytheUni tedStatesor
175
the nati onal government concerned, are expl ai ned to the guerri l l as
wi th emphasi s on the guerri l l a's rol e i n the future pl ans for thei r
country. I n general , psychol ogi cal operati ons ai d i n the orderl y
transi ti onoftheguerri l l aforcetomorenormal pursui tsandprepare
theci vi l i anpopul ati onforthereturnofguerri l l ael ements.
176
CHAPTER10
DEMOBILIZATION
153. General
Whenjuncturebetweenfri endl yconventi onal troopsandthearea
command i s compl eted, the abi l i ty of guerri l l a forces to support
mi l i taryoperati onsgradual l ydi mi ni shes.Uni tsretai nedbeyondthei r
peri odofuseful nessmaybecomeal i abi l i tyandapotenti al sourceof
troubl e. Consi derati on i s gi ven to the demobi l i zati on of guerri l l a
conti ngentsi nsectorsoccupi edbyU.S.troops.Thedeci si onregardi ng
the transfer of guerri l l a forces and associ ated organi zati ons to the
nati onal governmentconcernedi sonewhi chmustberesol vedatthe
theaterl evel .Probl emsofi nternati onal rel ati onshi ps,atti tudesofthe
ci vi l popul ati ontowardtheseforces,andvi ceversa,andthepol i ti cal ,
economi candsoci al i mpl i cati onsofsuchatransferareaparamount
consi derati on. I n the event thatno recogni zed nati onal government
exi sts,thedeci si ontodi sbandtheforces,i npartori nthei renti rety,
l i kewi serequi rescareful consi derati on.Di sbandi ngofguerri l l aforces
when composed of el ements forei gn to the area may be extremel y
dangerous. I n any case, Speci al Forces uni ts may be i nvol ved i n
demobi l i zati on procedures. Measures to achi eve adequate
coordi nati on between speci al forces, ci vi l affai rs (CA) and other
appropri atemi l i taryandpol i ti cal authori ti esarei nsti tutedtoi nsure
a di sposi ti on of guerri l l a forces i n harmony wi th the l ong-range
pol i ti cal objecti vesoftheUni tedStatesi nthearea.
154. RoleofSponsoringPowers
a. When a theater command has compl eted combat operati ons
wi th a guerri l l a force, i t may rel ease the force to the provi si onal
governmentrecogni zedbytheUni tedStates.
b. Al though the responsi bi l i ty for demobi l i zati on and uti l i zati on
ofguerri l l aforcesbel ongstotheprovi si onal government,theUni ted
States i s responsi bl e for restori ng and mai ntai ni ng publ i c order, as
faraspossi bl e,andmayhavetoassumetheseobl i gati onstemporari l y
unti l aneffecti veadmi ni strati onhasbeenestabl i shed.
177
155. Planning
a.I nitiation of Plans. Long-range pl anni ng for the eventual
di sposi ti onoftheguerri l l aforcecommencesattheaterl evel assoon
as these forces have been organi zed. Pl anni ng i s conti nuous and i s
revi sed concurrentl y wi th operati ons to refl ect the exi sti ng pol i ti cal
and mi l i tary si tuati on. Appropri ate i nstructi ons are i ncl uded i n
theaterci vi l affai rspl ans.Deci si onsaffecti ngtheeventual di sposi ti on
of U.S. sponsored guerri l l a and associ ated forces are made at the
hi ghestpol i ti cal andmi l i taryl evel si nthetheater.
b. CivilAffairsRole.Demobi l i zati oni nstructi onsarewri tteni nto
CA annexes to theater pl ans. Al so, CA teams may be provi ded to
assi st i n demobi l i zati on procedures, parti cul arl y when no sui tabl e
provi si onal government exi sts to assume control . CA personnel are
normal l y attached toSpeci al Forcesdetachmentspri ortorel easeof
former guerri l l as to CA authori ty i n order to mai ntai n adequate
l i ai sonthroughoutthetransi ti onanddemobi l i zati onperi od.
c. SpecialForcesRole.CommandersofSpeci al Forcesuni tsthat
havebeensponsori ngguerri l l auni tsandcommandersofCAel ements
thatareassumi ngresponsi bi l i tyestabl i shl i ai sontoassureturnover
wi thout l oss of control or i nfl uence. SF commanders provi de CA
commanderswi ththefol l owi ng:
(1) Al l avai l abl el i stsofguerri l l as,thei rsupportersandother
key i nhabi tants, together wi th any knowl edge as to thei r
pol i ti cal atti tudes, thei r l eadershi p or admi ni strati ve
potenti al , and other i nformati on that mi ght be hel pful i n
operati onssubsequenttotheUWphase.
(2) Area studi es and i ntel l i gence not al ready avai l abl e to CA
el ements.
156. DemobilizationCoursesofAction
a. Demobi l i zati on by U.S. forces may take any one or a
combi nati onofthefol l owi ngcourses:
(1) The guerri l l a forte, wi th al l ari l s and equi pment, may be
rel easedtotherecogni zedgovernment.
(2) The guerri l l a force, mi nus U.S. suppl i ed arms and
equi pment,mayberel easedtotherecogni zedgovernment.
(3) The guerri l l a force may be, demobi l i zed and rel ocated by
theU.S.
b. Demobi l i zati oni spl annedandconductedsoastoi ncl udethe
fol l owi ng:
(1)Assembl yoftheguerri l l aforce.
178
(2) Compl eti onofadmi ni strati verecords.
(3)Settl ementofpay,al l owances,andbenefi ts.
(4)Settl ementofcl ai ms.
(5)Awardi ngofdecorati ons.
(6)Col l ecti onofarmsandequi pment.
(7)Careofsi ckandwounded.
(8)Di scharge.
(9) Provi si on for the rehabi l i tati on and empl oyment of
di scharged guerri l l as. Preventi on of bandi t or
anti governmentbandsformi ngfromguerri l l ael ements.
157. AssemblyoftheGuerrillaForce
a. The guerri l l a force i s gathered by uni ts i nto assembl y areas.
Al l recordsandequi pmentarebroughtwi ththeuni ts.Hospi tal sand
conval escent camps are central l y l ocated. Trai ni ng programs are
conductedtooccupyandreori entthemen.
b. The guerri l l a force, duri ng demobi l i zati on, may represent a
powerful pol i ti cal el ement i n the l i berated area. Support from i ts
membersforvari ouscausescanbesoughtbyfacti onsbothwi thi nand
outsi detheguerri l l aforces.I nthei nterestoforderl ydemobi l i zati on,
pol i ti cal acti vi tybyoramongthe,guerri l l asi scl osel ysupervi sedand
movement of the guerri l l as i s control l ed to prevent deserti ons and
absencewi thoutl eave.
158. CompletionofAdministrativeRecords
Al l el ements of the guerri l l a force compl ete the admi ni strati ve
recordsofthei runi ts.Certi fi catesarepreparedtocoverrecordsthat
havebeenl ostordestroyed:Compl etepayrol l sarepreparedandare
reconci l ed wi th authori zed uni t strength fi gures. Arms and
equi pmentarei nventori edandaccountabi l i tyi sestabl i shed.
159. SettlementofPay,AllowancesandBenefits
Membersoftheforcearepai dafterprevi ousparti al payments
have been deducted. Authori zed benefi ts are pai d to l egal
survi vorsofmenwhohavedi edorwereki l l edi nacti on.
160. SettlementofClaims
Admi ni strati vedel ayi nthesettl ementofcl ai msari si ngfromthe
acti vi ti esofresi stanceforcesi sd,potenti al sourceofi l l wi l l andoften
resul ts i n i njusti ce. The method of settl ement outl i ned bel ow
el i mi natestheneedforanel aboratecl ai msservi cebyaheadquarters
whi ch mayberequi redtoactwi thoutadequatei nformati on.I tal so
makes possi bl e the prompt payment of cl ai ms and mi ni mi zes the
possi bi l i tyoffraud.
179
a. Afi xedsumi scredi tedtotherecogni zedl ocal governmentfor
settl ementofauthori zedobl i gati onsi ncurredbyguerri l l aforcespri or
tothei rdemobi l i zati on.Wi thi nthatsumandpri ortoanannounced
future date, cl ai ms may be approved and certi fi ed to CA; the CA
commander, after revi ewi ng avai l abl e records authori zes payment.
The above procedure does not appl y i n the case of cl ai ms made
agai nsttheUni tedStates.
b. Cl ai ms teams are set up wi thi n each guerri l l a uni t havi ng
authori ty to i ssue recei pts or otherwi se i ncur fi nanci al obl i gati on.
Di sbursi ng offi cers are attached to each cl ai ms team. Noti ces are
publ i shedi ntheareaofoperati onsannounci ngthatcl ai msteamswi l l
bepresentonspeci fi eddatestorecei veandpaycl ai ms.
c. The cl ai ms team establ i shes an offi ce i n the area and bri ngs
wi thi ttherecordspertai ni ngtorecei ptsandexpendi tures.Recei pts
areveri fi edandapprovedbytheguerri l l amembersoftheteamand
presentedtothedi sbursi ngoffi cerwhomakesi mmedi atepaymentto
thecl ai mantfromfundscredi tedtotheuni t.Cl ai msforservi cesor
damagesnotcoveredbyrecei pts,i ftheyarebel owaspeci fi edamount,
are processed by the cl ai ms team based on i nformati on, avai l abl e.
Largercl ai msareforwardedtohi gherheadquartersforacti on.
161. AwardsandDecorations
Prompt acti on i s taken on recommendati ons for decorati ons and
awards for deservi ng guerri l l as and other resi stance members. The
awardsaremadeatl ocal ceremoni esattended,whenpracti cal ,bythe
guerri l l atroops,theci vi l i anpopul ati on,hi gh-ranki ngoffi cersofthe
conventi onal forces and offi ci al s of the provi si onal government as
soonafteranoperati onaspossi bl e.
162. CollectionofArmsandEquipment
a. I farmsandequi pmentaretobecol l ected,theyareturnedi n
by the guerri l l as before the settl ement of pay, al l owances and
benefi ts. Care i s taken that weapons are not hi dden for l ater and
unl awful use. Publ i c announcement i s made that weapons must be
turned i n and that, after a speci fi ed date, unl i censed Possessi on of
weaponsormi l i taryequi pmentwi l l beunl awful .
b. I ntheeventthattheguerri l l aforce,wi tharmsandequi pment,
i stobeturnedovertoarecogni zednati onal government,thi sphase
i s omi tted. I nventori es of arms and equi pment i n hands of the
guerri l l as are conducted joi ntl y by representati ves of the l ocal
nati onal governmentandU.S.forces.
180
163. CareofSickandWounded
Guerri l l ahospi tal sarekepti noperati onunti l thepati entscanbe
taken over by mi l i tary hospi tal s or by ci vi l i an i nsti tuti ons. Every
efforti smadetoi nsurethatwoundedandsi ckguerri l l asol di ersare
gi ven necessary care. Permanentl y di sabl ed guerri l l as may be
grantedpensi onsbytherecogni zedgovernment.
164. Discharge
I n the event that a person sworn i n as a member of a guerri l l a
force i s to pass from control of the Speci al Forces detachment, that
person i s gi ven a di scharge and testi moni al of hi s servi ces. The
di schargeprovi si onsappl i cabl etomi l i tarypersonnel wi l l beusedasa
gui de. Current Department of Army forms appropri atel y modi fi ed
maybeused.
165. RehabilitationandEmploymentofDischargedGuerrillas
a. Sui tabl emeasuresaretakentoassi stdi schargedguerri l l asi n
assumi ngthei rpl acesi nci vi l i anl i fe.Somemaybegi venempl oyment
by the conventi onal forces or by the newl y consti tuted government.
I ndi vi dual s or enti re uni ts may be i ncorporated i nto the pol i ce or
armed forces of the new government. Where feasi bl e, assi stance i n
rebui l di ngdamagedhousesorfarmsbel ongi ngtoguerri l l asmaybe
granted.However,rehabi l i tati ondoesnotusual l yi nvol veU.S.forces
whereaprovi si onal governmentcapabl eofrenderi ngai dexi sts.
b. Perhapsthegreatestdangeri nanydemobi l i zati onprogrami s
the possi bi l i ty that former guerri l l as wi l l resort to di ssi dence,
facti onal quarrel soreventobandi try.Othersmaytakeadvantageof
the preval ent unstabl e condi ti ons to organi ze quasi -mi l i tary or
pol i ti cal groupswhi chwi l l confl i ctwi ththeprovi si onal governmentor
U.S.authori ti es.I ti svi tal ,therefore,thatdemobi l i zati onprocedures
be executed expedi ti ousl y and wi th foresi ght. Procedures whi ch are
i nsti tuted wi l l be an outgrowth of del i berati ons on a hi gh l evel by
mi l i taryandpol i ti cal authori ti es.I nthei mpl ementati onofdi recti ves,
maxi mum coordi nati on between Speci al Forces, CA and other
appropri ate el ements i s necessary. To precl ude troubl esome
si tuati ons from ari si ng, ti ght control measures shoul d be i nsti tuted
and persons suspected of favori ng acti on hosti l e to the establ i shed
authori tyarekeptundersurvei l l ance.Everyefforti smadetofoster
acceptance on thei r part of peaceful means to bri ng about a
restorati on of the governmental structure and assi mi l ate the
readjustments i n soci ety whi ch accompany a cessati on of warti me
pursui ts.Psychol ogi cal operati onscanbeofconsi derabl eassi stancei n
theseacti vi ti es.
181
166. AuxiliariesandtheUnderground
Demobi l i zati on procedures usual l y have l i ttl e effect upon the
auxi l i ari esandtheunderground.Wherepossi bl e,theareacommand
furni shes names of known acti ve underground and auxi l i ary
personnel to the new government. I t can be anti ci pated that these
personnel wi l l recei ve l ess i n the way of actual benefi ts than the
guerri l l as but they shoul d recei ve some publ i c recogni ti on for thei r
servi ces.
182
1. General
JCSPUB1
AR220-50
AR320-5
AR320-50
FM21-5
FM21-6
FM21-30
FM21-50
FM21-75
FM21-76
FM21-77
FM21-77A
FM21-150
FM31-21A
FM31-30
FM31-40
FM31-70
FM31-71
FM33-5
FM100-1
FM100-5
FM101-5
FM101-10
DAPam108-1
APPENDIXI
REFERENCES
Di cti onaryofUni tedStatesMi l i taryTerms
forJoi ntUsage.
Regi ments,General Provi si ons
Di cti onaryofUni tedStatesArmyTerms
Authori zedAbbrevi ati onsandBrevi tyCodes
Mi l i taryTrai ni ng
Techni quesofMi l i taryI nstructi on
Mi l i tarySymbol s
RangerTrai ni ng
CombatTrai ni ngoftheI ndi vi dual Sol di erand
Patrol l i ng.
Survi val
Evasi onandEscape
Evasi onandEscape(U)
Hand-to-HandCombat
Guerri l l aWarfareandSpeci al Forces
Operati ons (U) .
Jungl eOperati ons
Tacti cal CoverandDecepti on(U)
Basi cCol dWeatherManual
NorthernOperati ons
Psychol ogi cal WarfareOperati ons
Fi el dServi ceRegul ati onsDoctri nal Gui d-
ance (U)
Fi el dServi ceRegul ati ons,Operati ons
StaffOffi cers'Fi el dManual ;StaffOrgani za-
ti onandProcedure
StaffOffi cers'Fi el dManual ;Organi zati on,
Techni cal andLogi sti cal Data,PartI .
I ndex of Army Moti on Pi ctures, Fi l m Stri ps,
Sl i desandPhono-Recordi ngs.
183
DAPam310- Mi l i taryPubl i cati onsI ndexes(asappl i cabl e)
seri es
NWP43 Evasi onandEscape(U)
2. DemolitionsandMines
FM5-25 Expl osi vesandDemol i ti ons
FM5-31 UseandI nstal l ati onofBoobytraps
FM5-34 Engi neerFi el dData
FM9-40 Expl osi veOrdnanceReconnai ssanceand
Di sposal
FM20-32 LandMi neWarfare
FM31-10 Barri ersandDeni al Operati ons
SM9-5-1375 FSCGroup13:Ammuni ti onandExpl osi ves;
Cl ass1375:Expl osi ves,Sol i dPropel l ants,
andExpl osi veDevi ces
TM5-223 Forei gnMi neWarfareEqui pment
TM9-1910 Mi l i taryExpl osi ves
TM9-1940 LandMi nes
TM9-1946 Demol i ti onMateri al s
3. Weapons
FM23-5 U.S.Ri fl e,Cal i ber.30M1
FM23-7 Carbi ne,Cal i ber.30M1,M1A1M2,M3
FM23-15 Browni ngAutomati cRi fl e,Cal i ber.30
M1918A2
FM23-25 Bayonet
FM23-30 GrenadesandPyrotechni cs
FM23-32 3.5-i nchRocketLauncher
FM23-35 Pi stol sandRevol vers
FM23-41 Submachi neGuns,Cal i ber.45,M3andM3A1
FM23-55 Browni ngMachi neguns,Cal i ber.30
M1917A1,M1919A4,M1919A4E1,
M1919A6,andM37
FM23-85 60-mmMortar,M19
FM23-90 81-mmMortarandM29
4.Communications
FM11-16 Si gnal Orders,Records,andReports
FM24-18 Fi el dRadi oTechni ques
TM11-263 Radi oSet,AN/GRC-9,AN/GRC-9A,AN/
GRC-9X,AN/GRC-9YAN/GRC-9AX
AN/GRC-87,andAN/VRC-34
184
TM11-296 Radi oSet,AN/PRC-6
TM11-612 Radi oSets,AN/PRC-8AN/PRC-8A,AN/
PRC-9,AN/PRC-9AandAN/PRC-10
AN/PRC-10A,andAN/PRC-28
TM11-666 AntennasandRadi oPropagati on
TM11-486-6 El ectri cal Communi cati onSystemsEngi neer
i ng, Radi o.
TM11-5122 Di rectCurrentGenerator,G43/G
TM32-220 Basi cCryptography(U)
ACP121 Communi cati onI nstructi ons,General
ACP122 Communi cati onI nstructi ons,Securi ty
ACP124 Communi cati onI nstructi ons,Radi oTel egraph
ACP131 Communi cati onI nstructi ons,Operati ng
Si gnal s
5.Medicine
FM8-10 Medi cal Servi ce,TheaterofOperati ons
FM8-35 Transportati onoftheSi ckandWounded
FM8-50 Bandagi ngandSpl i nti ng
FM21-10 Mi l i tarySani tati on
FM21-11 Fi rstAi dforSol di ers
TM8-230 Medi cal CorpsmanandMedi cal Speci al i st
6.AirandAmphibiousOperations
a.AirOperations.
(1)J ointAirForce/ ArmyPublications.
USCONARCTT110-101-1(TACM55-2)Joi ntAi r-
borneOperati ons.
USAFESuppl ementtoUSCONARCTT110-101-1
(TACM55-2)
(2)AirForcePublications.
TACM55-13TACStandardi zati onManual ,Troop
Carri erAi rcraft.
UTS120-4TroopCarri erUni ts(Medi um)(Assaul t)
(3)AirNationalGuardPublications.
CONACAi rcrewTrai ni ngHandbook200-4,Ai r
Nati onal Guard,TroopCarri erUni ts,Medi um,
SA-16,Part2.
(4)NavalPublications.
LFM-24Hel i copterOperati ons(U)
NWI P41-6Hel i copterOperati ons
185
(5)ArmyPublications.
C5,TM10-500Ai rDel i veryofSuppl i esandEqui pment:
General
DALogi sti csDi recti veNo.163-700(U),dated1June
1959.
ST57-150ArmyPathfi nderOperati ons,USAI S
b.AmphibiousOperations.
(1)J ointLandingForceManuals.
JLFM-15(FM110-115)Amphi bi ousReconnai ssance
(2)MarineCorpsLandingForceManuals.
LFM-1 Trai ni ng
LFM-2 Terrai n,HydrographyandWeather
LFM-4 Shi ptoShoreMovement
LFM-19 Speci al Landi ngOperati ons(U)
(3)NavalWarfareandWarfareI nformationPublications.
NWI P1-1 Mi ssi onsandCapabi l i ti esofUSNavy
Shi psandAi rcraft(U).
NWP22 Amphi bi ousOperati ons
NWI P22-4 UnderwaterDemol i ti onTeamsi nAm
phi bi ousOperati ons
NWI P22-6 Shi ptoShoreMovement(U)
NWP23 Submari neOperati ons(U)
NWP37 SearchandRescue
7.IntelligenceandSecurity
AR380-5 Safeguardi ngDefenseI nformati on
AR380-8 Securi tyCl assi fi cati onSpeci al Forces
Acti vi ti es.
AR381-25 ArmyI ntel l i genceCol l ecti onI nstructi ons
AR381-205 ProceduresFaci l i tati ngI ntel l i genceExpl oi ta
ti onofCapturedEnemyPersonnel
FM19-40 Handl i ngPri sonersofWar
FM30-5 CombatI ntel l i gence
FM30-7 CombatI ntel l i gence-Battl eGroup,Combat
CommandandSmal l erUni ts
FM30-9 Mi l i taryI ntel l i genceBattal i on,Fi el dArmy
FM30-15 I ntel l i genceI nterrogati on(U)
FM30-16 Techni cal I ntel l i gence(U)
FM30-19 OrderofBattl eI ntel l i gence
FM30-28 ArmedForcesCensorshi p(Army)
186
FM110-101 I ntel l i genceJoi ntLandi ngForceManual
DAPam30- I ntel l i genceCol l ecti onGui de;I denti fi cati onof
102 SMD
DAPam21-81 I ndi vi dual Trai ni ngi nCol l ecti ngandReporti ng
Mi l i taryI nformati on
DAPam30-26 AGui detotheCol l ecti onofTechni cal I ntel l i gence
DAPam30- I ntel l i genceCol l ecti onGui de,
100 Tel ecommuni cati ons
187
APPENDIXII
CATALOGUESUPPLYSYSTEM
1. General
a. Thi s appendi x i s a gui de for Speci al Forces commanders and
staffsi nthepl anni ngandpreparati onofacatal oguesuppl ysystem.
I n addi ti on to the catal ogue, i t provi des i nformati on rel ati ve to
packagi ng,ri ggi ng,andrequesti ngprocedures.
b. Thecatal oguesuppl ysystem
(1) Uti l i zes a brevi ty code i n whi ch a si ngl e i tem or several
associ atedi temsarei denti fi edbyacodeword.
(2) Compri sesbothpackagesofassoci atedi ndi vi dual i temsand
uni ts compri si ng several packages. Thi s combi nati on
permi tstheusermaxi mumfl exi bi l i tyi nchoi ceofsuppl i es
consi stentwi thtransmi ssi onsecuri ty.
(3) I s based upon the guerri l l a organi zati on descri bed i n
currentDAdoctri ne.
c. The catal ogue suppl y system shown i n thi s appendi x i s a
sampl eonl y.Speci al forcesgroupcommandersshoul dnothesi tateto
modi fy the basi c l i st to conform to varyi ng operati onal condi ti ons,
equi pmentchanges,anddi fferencesi nsi gnal cryptographi csystems.
The catal ogue provi ded to the operati onal detachment shoul d be
si mpl i fi edandreproducedi nmi ni ature.Lami natedcardsor35-mi n
fi l mrol l saresuggested.
2. PackagingandRigging
a. The packagi ng system i s based on man-portabl e packages
wei ghi ng approxi matel y 50 pounds. Thi s faci l i tates the removal of
suppl i es from a recepti on si te by carryi ng parti es i f . other
transportati on i s not avai l abl e to handl e del i very contai ners i ntact.
For a manageabl e l oad, the man-portabl e package i s equi pped wi th
carryi ng straps or mounted on a packboard. Each package i s
waterprooftopermi topenstorage.
b. The man-portabl e package i s sui tabl e for use i n the present
aeri al del i very contai ners as wel l as those now under devel opment.
Thi stypeofpackagepermi tsthepresentcontai nerstobeadaptedfor
del i verybyanymeansthesupporti ngagenci esmaymakeavai l abl e.
c. Wei ghts used are approxi mate and are computed wi thout
packagi ng materi al and wi th the i tems stri pped of shi ppi ng
contai nerstothei ri nsi deweatherproofcoveri ng,whereappl i cabl e.
188
d. Separate cl othi ng packages for Speci al Forces personnel are
omi tted. I n general , Speci al Forces personnel draw cl othi ng from
suppl i es i ssued for guerri l l a use. I n the event that separate speci al
cl othi ng packages are requi red for Speci al Forces personnel , these
maybeaddedtothecatal oguei nthetheaterofoperati ons.
e. The effi ci ency of the catal ogue suppl y system i si ncreased by
useofthefol l owi ngprocedures
(1) Packi ng, wi th al l equi pment, i nstructi onal materi al whi ch
i s pri nted i n the appropri ate l anguage. Such materi al i s
si mpl y wri tten, confi ned to essenti al s, and makes the
maxi mumuseofgraphi cs.
(2) I ncl usi onofani nventoryl i sti neachdel i verycontai nerto
ai di ni denti fi cati onofl ostordamagedmateri al .
(3) Maxi mum use of reusabl e i tems for packagi ng materi al .
Exampl es are cl othi ng and bl ankets as paddi ng and
ponchosaswaterproofi ng.
(4) I ncl usi onofmoral eandbarteri temswhi chmaybeusedto
promotegoodwi l l wi ththei ndi genouspopul ati onorforthe
procurementofsuppl i esandservi ces.
(5) Marki ng each i ndi vi dual bundl e wi th l umi nous tape or
pai nt so that the contents are readi l y i denti fi ed wi thout
openi ngthepackage.
f. Thepreparati onofequi pmentforthevari oussi zeduni tsi sthe
responsi bi l i tyoftheSpeci al Forcesoperati onal base.Thenumberof
del i very contai ners i s determi ned by the del i very means avai l abl e.
The50-poundpackagei suti l i zedtothemaxi mumi nthepreparati on
ofthei ndi vi dual del i verycontai ners.
3. RequestProcedure
a. The code used i n the catal ogue suppl y system i satype code
onl yandshoul dbechangedandcl assi fi edwhenusedoperati onal l y.
The codi ng system i s not secure by i tsel f, but wi l l reduce message
l engthwhenavari etyofsuppl i esareordered.Forthi sexampl e,each
general typeofsuppl yi sassi gnedl etterdesi gnati ons:
Secti on CodeDesi gnators
I Chemi cal ALHPAALPHAthroughDELTAZULU
I I Demol i ti ons/Mi nes ECHOALPHAthroughHOTELZULU
I I I Medi cal INDIAALPHAthroughLIMAZULU
I VWeapons/Ammuni ti on MIKEALPHAthroughPAPAZULU
189
Secti on CodeDesi gnators
V Quartermaster QUEBECALPHAthroughTANGO
ZULU
VI Si gnal UNIFORMALPHAthroughWHISKEY
ZULU
VI I Speci al X-RAYALPHAthroughZULUZULU
b. To reduce unreadabl e garbl es when orderi ng suppl i es, use
phoneti c spel l i ng. Some uni ts and packages are fol l owed by a
numberedl i stshowi ngthecontentsofthepackageoruni t.Forthese
i tems,theuni torpackagecanbeorderedcompl ete,oranynumbered
i temmaybeorderedseparatel y.Forexampl ecl othi ngandequi pment
for40meni srequi red.Determi nethebootsi zesneededandi ncl ude
i nthemessage.Assumethatthefol l owi ngbootsi zesaredesi red:Ten
pai rsi ze81/2W,si xpai rsi ze9M,threepai rsi ze91/2N,fourpai rsi ze
10N,si xpai rsi ze10M,twopai rsi ze10W,fi vepai rsi ze101/2M,four
pai rsi ze11M.Themessagewoul dread:
ONEQUEBECALPHAPDBOOTSTENSI ZEEI GHTPTFI VE
WHI SKEY SI X SI ZE NI NE MI KE THREE SI ZE NI NE PT
FI VE NOVEMBER FOUR SI ZE TEN NOVEMBER SI X
SI ZE TEN MI KE TWO SI ZE TEN WHI SKEY FI VE SI ZE
TENPTFI VEMI KEFOURSI ZEELEVENMI KE.
Cl othi ngi spackedtoapproxi matel ymatchbootsi zes(secti onV).On
the other hand i f onl y 40 ponchos were desi red, the request woul d
readTWOZEROQUEBECALPHASEVEN.
c. I tems l i sted i n each uni t may be ordered separatel y i f
necessary.Whenpracti cal orderthecompl eteuni t.
d. For i tems not l i sted, order by name i n suffi ci ent detai l to
i denti fythei tem.Forexampl eTWOGASOLI NELANTERNS.
SectionI.CHEMICAL
Code
Unit
Designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
pkgs
Contents
ALPHA
ALPHA
Chemical
Grenade No. 1
(16 rds).
46 lbs 1 Sixteen grenades, hand,
smoke WP, M15
packed in individual
con-tainers.
ALPHA
BRAVO
Chemical
Grenade No. 2
(16 rds).
incendiary, (TH) AN,
M14 packed in indi-
vidual containers.
190
Code
Unit
Designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
pkgs
Contents
ALPHA
CHARLIE
Chemical
Grenade No. 3
(16 rds).
34 lbs 1 Sixteen grenades,
smoke, colored, M18
(Green, red, violet and
yellow) packed in
individual containers.
ALPHA
DELTA
Chemical
Grenade No. 4
(16 rds).
tear, CS, M7A1
packed in individual
containers.
ALPHA
ECHO
Detector kits (8). 43 lbs 1 Eight detector kits,
chemical agent, M18.
ALPHA
FOXTROT
Food Testing
Kits (24).
45 lbs 1 Twenty-four food testing
and screening kits,
chemical agents, ABC-
M3.
ALPHA
GOLF
Leather
Dressing (96).
43 lbs 1 Ninety-six cans leather
dressing, vesicant gas
resistant, M2.
ALPHA
HOTEL
Protection &
Treatment Set
(70).
50 lbs 1 Seventy protection and
treatment sets, chemi-
cal warfare agents,
M5AL
ALPHA
INDIA
Water testing
Kits (24).
50 lbs 1 Twenty-four water test-
ing kits chemical
agents, AN-M2.
ALPHA
JULIET
DANC Unit (1). 59 lbs 1 DANC solution unit, 3
gallon M4.
ALPHA
KILO
Decontaminatin
g Agent (1).
61 lbs 1 Decontaminating Agent,
STB.
ALPHA
MIKE
Protective Mask
(10).
44 lbs 1 Ten masks, protective,
field, M17.
ALPHA
NOVEMBER
Impregnating
Set (1).
57 lbs 1 1. Impregnating set,
clothing, field M3 (55
lbs).
2. Kit. testing, impr-
egnite in clothing, Ml
(2 lbs).
ALPHA
OSCAR
Napalm 42 lbs 1 Eight cans chemical
agent thickener 5 lb
can.
191
SectionII.DEMOLITIONSANDMINES
Code
Unit
Designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No
pkgs
Contents
ECHO
ALPHA
Demolitions
No.1
(20Blocks).
50lbs 1 20blocks,demolition,
M5A1(2lbcomp
C-4)
ECHO
BRAVO
Demolitions
No.2
(2assemblies).
44lbs 1 Twoassemblies,demoli-
tionM37(2lbcomp
C-4)8blocksper
assembly.
ECHO
CHARLIE
Demolitions
No.3
(45blocks).
45lbs 1 45blocks,demolition,(1
lbTNT).
ECHO
DELTA
DetonatingCord
(6000ft).
Note1
42lbs 1 6000ftcord,detonating,
1000ftperspool(6
spools-42lbs).
ECHO
ECHO
Detonators
(150).
45lbs 1 150detonators,friction,
8seconddelayM2and
15seconddelayMl
packed10perbox(15
boxes-45lbs).
ECHO
FOXTROT
FiringDevice
No.1(200).
40lbs 1 200firingdevices,set,
demolition,delaytype,
Mlpacked10perbox,
consistingof-
1.Two15-minutedelay.
2.Three1-hourdelay.
3.Three2-hourdelay.
4.One11-hourdelay.
5.One13-hourdelay.
(20boxes-40lbs).
ECHO
HOTEL
FiringDevice
No.2(116).
44lbs 1 116firingdevices,de-
molition,mixed,
packed29perbox
consistingof
1.Fivepressuretype
M1A1
2.FivereleasetypeM5.
3.Fivepullfrictiontype
M2.
4.Fivepullreleasetype
M3.
5.FivepulltypeM1.
192
Code
Unit
Designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No
pkgs
Contents
6.Fourdetonators,con-
cussiontypeEMl.
(4boxes-11lbsper
box).
ECHO
INDIA
Fuze(27,000ft)
Note1
45lbs 1 27,000ftfuze,blasting,
time,100ft,packages
packed30packages
permetalcan.(9cans-
45lbs).
ECHO
JULIET
FuzeIgniters 45lbs 1 225igniters,blasting,
fuzeweatherproofM2
packed5perbox(45
boxes-45lbs).
FOXTROT
ALPHA
PrimingMaterial
No.1.
47lbs 1 1.250caps,blasting,
specialtypeIIJ2PETN
packed50perbox(5
boxes-5lbs).
2.6000ftcord,detonat-
ing1000ftperspool(6
spools-42lbs).
FOXTROT
BRAVO
PrimingMaterial
No.2.
48lbs 1 1.500caps,blasting,
special,non-electric
typeIJ1PETNpacked
50percan(10cans-5
lbs).
ing,1000.ftperspool
(4spools-28lbs).
3.9000ftfuze,blasting,
time,100ftpackages
packed30packages
permetalcan(3cans-
15lbs).
FOXTROT
CHARLIE
Non-electric
Demolition
UnitNo.1.
Note1
55lbs 1 1.Oneassembly,demoli-
tion,M37(22lbs).
2.10blocks,demolition,
11bTNT(10lbs).
3.50caps,non-electric
(lb).
ing(7lbs).
5.Twocrimpers,cap.
6.25destructors,explo-
193
Code
Unit
Designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No
pkgs
Contents
packed5perbox(5
boxes-6lbs).
7.3000ftfuze,blasting,
time(1can-5lbs).
8.15igniters,blasting,
fuzeM2packed5per
box(3boxes-3lbs).
9.1rollinsulationtape,
electrical(1lb).
FOXTROT
DELTA
Non-electric
Demolition
UnitNo.2.
745lbs 15 1.Onenon-electricde-
molitionunitNo.1.
2.250caps,blasting,
special,nonelectric
TypeIJ1PETNpacked
50percan.
3.Onedetonatingcord
unit.
4.Onetimefuzeunit.
5.Twelvedemolition
unitsNo.1.
FOXTROT
ECHO
Electric
Demolitions
UnitNo.1.
93lbs 2 1.50caps,electric(1lb).
ing(7lbs).
3.500ftcable,power
electricalfiringonreel
RL39B(36lbs).
4.Oneassembly,demoli-
tionM37(22lbs).
5.10blocks,demolition
1lbTNT(10lbs).
6.25destructors,explo-
siveuniversalM10
packed5perbox(5
boxes-6lbs).
7.Onegalvanometer,
blasting(21bs).
8.Onemachine,blast-
ing,10capcapacity(5
lbs).
9.Onepairpliers,line-
man's(1lbs).
10.200ftwire,electrical
annunicatororreel(2
lbs).
194
Code
Unit
Designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No
pkgs
Contents
FOXTROT
FOXTROT
Electric
Demolition
UnitNo.2.
740lbs 14 1.Oneelectricdemoli-
tionunitNo.1.
2.250caps,blasting,
special,electricTypeII
J2PETNpacked50
perbox.
3.Onedetonatingcord
unit.
4.Twelvedemolitions
unitsNo.1.
GOLF
ALPHA
Anti-tankMines
No.1.
Note 2
50lbs 1 10mines,lightATM7A2.
GOLF
BRAVO
Anti-tankMines
No.2.
Note 2
56lbs 1 2mines,AT,M19.
GOLF
CHARLIE
Anti-Personnel
Mines,No.1.
Note 2
40lbs 1 128mines,AP,M14.
GOLF
DELTA
Anti-Personnel
Mines,No.2.
Note 2
47lbs 1 6mines,AP,M16,
bounding.
GOLF
ECHO
Anti-Personnel
Mines,No.3.
Note 2
45lbs 1 15weapons,AP,M18,
Claymore.
NOTES:
1.Assembledintwopackagesduetobulk.
2.Fuzesincludedineachpackage.
3General.
a.Accessoryitemssuchasprimingadaptersanddetonatingcordclipsmaybeadded
tothepackageasdesired.
b.Peculiarnon-standarditemsareaddedtothelistinthetheaterofoperations.
SectionIII.MEDICAL
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
INDIA
ALPHA
Combat
Aidman'sSet.
48lbs 1 Ei ght surgi cal i nstru-
ment and suppl y
sets, i ndi vi dual ( 6
l bs) standard
medi cal suppl y set
195
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
consi sti ng of
1. Onebottl eof Acetyl -
sal i cyl i c Aci d
tabl ets, USP bottl e,
100 per bottl e.
2. Fi ve morphi ne i n-
j ecti ons, USP 16mg
( gr. ) pkg.
3. One tube of Tectra-
cai ne Ophthal mi c
oi ntment 1/8 oz
tube.
4. One package
Benzal koni um
Chl ori de Ti ncture.
5. Two bandages,
gauze, 3 i nch.
6. Two bandages,
musl i n.
7. Two dressi ngs, f i rst
ai d, f i el d, 7 x 8".
8. Ei ght dressi ngs,
f i rst ai d, f i el d, 4" x
7".
9. One spool of
adhesi ve pl aster,
surgi cal , 3".
10. Two packages of
bandages,
absorbent, adhesi ve,
18 per package.
11. One pai r sci ssors,
bandage, angul ar,
heavy.
12. One tourni quet.
13. One thermometer.
14. One card of pi ns,
saf ety, 12 per card.
15. One penci l .
16. One surgi cal
i nstru-ment set,
mi nor surgery:
a. Two needl e hol ders.
b. Two f orceps.
c. One bl ade handl e.
d. Two packages of
bl ades No. 10, 6 per
package.
e. Twopackages of
bl ades No. 11, 6 per
package.
f . One probe.
g. One pai r sci ssors.
196
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
wi th needl es.
INDIA
BRAVO
FieldSurgery
Set
Note 1
50lbs 1 1. Two bags, canvas,
M-5 wi th shoul der
straps.
2. Two hol der, suture
needl e, 7".
3. Four f orceps, he-
mostat, curved, 6
".
4. Four f orceps, hemo-
stat, strai ght, 6".
5. Two f orceps, hemo-
stat, strai ght, 7".
6. Two f orceps,
Foerster type.
7. Two f orceps, ti ssue,
tweezers, 5".
8. Twohandl e, surgi cal
kni f e, No. 3.
9. Two packages, sur-
gi cal kni f e bl ade
No. 10.
10. Two packages, sur-
gi cal kni f e bl ade,
No. 11.
11. Two sci ssors,
band-age, angul ar,
heavy,
12. Two sci ssors,
band-age, angul ar
Li ster, 8
13. Two sci ssors, gen-
eral surgi cal
curved, 7 ".
14. Two sci ssors, gen-
eral surgi cal ,
strai ght, 7".
St eri l i zat i on and
Surgi cal
Preparat i on
15. Ei ght contai ners of
detergent, surgi cal ,
5 oz.
16. Two razors, saf ety.
17. Si x packages of
bl ades, saf ety
razor, 5 per
package.
18. Si x cakes of
surgi cal soap 4 oz.
cake.
19. Two brushes,
scrub.
197
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
20. Two pai rs of
gl oves, surgi cal ,
si ze 7 .
21. Two pai rs of
gl oves, surgi cal ,
si ze 8.
22. One steri l i zer, sur-
gi cal i nstrument,
boi l i ng type.
28. One heater,
surgi cal dressi ng,
steri l i zer.
24. Four hand towel s.
SutureMaterial
25. Two packages of
needl es, suture,
cat-gut, Mayo.
26. Two packages of
needl es, suture,
surgeon' s regul ar,
3/8 ci rcl e, cutti ng
edge, si ze 2, 6 per
package.
27. Two packages of
needl es, suture,
reg-ul ar, %s ci rcl e,
cut-ti ng edge, si ze
16, 6 per package.
28. Two spool s of su-
ture, non-
absorbabl e,
surgi cal si l k
brai ded, si ze 000.
ture, non-
absorbabl e,
surgi cal si l k
brai ded, si ze 00.
ture, non-
absorbabl e,
surgi cal si l k
brai ded, si ze 0.
31. Two packages of
suture, absorbabl e,
surgi cal , boi l abl e,
pl ai n si ze 000,
si ngl e armed,
ci rcl e needl e, 12
per pack-age.
32. Two packages of
suture, absorbabl e,
surgi cal , boi l abl e,
198
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
armed, ci rcl e
needl e; 12 per
pack-age.
33. Two packages of
suture, nonabsorb-
abl e, surgi cal si l k,
si ngl e armed, 3/ 8
ci r-cl e needl e si ze
000, 12 per
package.
34. Two spool s of
tanta-l um wi re,
si ze . 028.
SyringesandNeedl es
35. Two syri nges, 2 cc,
Luer.
36. Two syri nges, 10
cc, Luer.
37. Two syri nges, 30
cc, Luer.
38. Oneboxof needl es,
gauge 23, 12 per
package,
gauge 20, 12 per
package.
gauge 17, 12 per
package.
Anesthesia
41, Four bottl es of
Li do-cai ne, 2%, 20
cc bottl e.
42. Two bottl es of Pro-
cai ne
Hydrochl ori de, 1%,
30 cc bottl e.
43. Two ether masks.
44. Four cans of ether,
1/ 4 l b per can.
45. Four vi al s, 0. 5
gm. , Thi opental
sodi um.
46. Twotubes, petrol a-
tum, 1/ z oz.
47. Two bottl es, atro-
pi ne, 25 cc.
48. Two ai rway, phar-
yngeal , Guedal ,
rub-ber, adul t.
49. One ai rway, phar-
yngeal , Guedal ,
rub-ber, chi l d.
199
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
50. Catheter, i ntratra-
cheal , Magi l l , wi th
rubber.
DiagnosticI nstruments
51. Four
thermometers,
cl i ni cal oral .
52. One stethoscope,
combi nati on type.
53. One otoscope,
opthl moscope set
wi th batteri es.
54. One bl ood pressure
cuf f , aneroi d.
Bandages
And
Dressings
55.Twenty-fourband-ages,
gauze,3"x6yds,
sterile.
56.Twelvebandages,
muslin.
57.Tworolls,cotton
purified,1oz.
58.Twosurgicaldress-ing,
field,large.
59.Sixsurgicaldress-ing,
fieldmedium.
60.Fourpackages,
petrolatumgauze,3
perpackage.
61.Onepackage,gauze
pad,2x2",199per
package.
62.Onepackage,gauze
pad,4x4",200per
package.
63.Twoboxes,bandage,
absorbent,adhesive,
100perpackage.
DrugsandReagents
64.Twobottles,epine-
phrine,injection30cc.
65.Sixpackages,mor-
phinesyrettes,16mg.,
5perpackage.
66.Twobottles,benzal-
koniumchloride,4oz.
200
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
thoniumchloride,250
mg,80tabletsper
bottle.
68.Onecan,benzoin
tincture,1pint,
69.Fourtubesbacitracin
opthalmicointment,1/s
oztube.
70.Fourtubes,tetra-caine
opthalmicoint-ment,
1/8oztube.
71.Eightsyrette,atro-pine
injection,2mg.
Miscellaneous
72.Twotourniquet,non-
pneumatic,1"x42".
73.Twocatheter,French,
urethral,size16.
74.Twocatheter,Foley,
urethral,indwelling
size16.
75.Twotubes,Levin,K-10
(Baxter).
76.Twoadapters,Luer
syringeforrubber
tubing.
77.Twodrains,Penrose,
3/8"x36".
78. Fourpencils,gra-
phite,No.2.
79.Onebook,record.
80.Twobooks,emerg-ency
medicaltag.
81.Fourcards,pin,safety,
orthopedic,medium,
12percard.
82.Fiftyenvelopes,drug
dispensing.
83.Onetube,lubricant,
surgical,4oz.
84.Twocannulas,tra-
cheotomy,nylon,size5
INDIA
CHARLIE
FieldSurgery
SetSupple-
ment.
45lbs 1 Standardmedicalsupply
set6545-927-4400.
1.Onebag,waterproof,
signalequipmentwith
201
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
x18".
2.TwobottlesofDex-tran
injection,500cc.
3.Sixpackagesof
MorphineinjectionUSP
16mgm(gr),5per
pkg.
4.OnebottleofPeni-cillin
CtabletsUSP,250,000
units,100perbottle.
5.Fivepackagesof
Penicillininjectioninoil
400,000unitscartridge-
needleunit1cc,10per
package.
6.Twosyringes,car-tridge.
7.SixbottlesofAl-bumin,
normalhu-manserum,
100cc.Note1.
8.OneboxofNalor-phine
hydrochlorideinjection
USP,5mgm,(1/12gr)
percc,6perbox.
9.Sixbandages,gauze,
camouflaged,3inx6
yds.
10.Fourbandages,
muslin.
11.Twodressings,firstaid,
field,11"square-
large.
12.24dressings,firstaid,
fieldmedium.
13.36dressings,firstaid,
fieldsmall.
14.Onespoolofad-hesive
plaster,surgi-cal,3".
INDIA
DELTA
MedicalDis-
pensarySet.
40lbs
()
1 1.OnebottleofChlor-
pheniraminemaleate
(chlortrimenton)4mg,
tablet.1000Perbottle.
2.OnebottleofTerpin
hydrate1lbbottle.
3.OneboxofTetra-
hydrozolinehydro-
chloride(Tyzine)nose
drops,12perbox.
4.OnebottleofAPC,
202
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
bottle.
5.SixbottlesofCo-deine,
gr.tablet,100per
bottle.
6.Sixpackagesof
Morphine,syrette,15
mg,5perpackage.
7.OnebottleofAcetyl-
salicylicacid(aspi-rin),
5graintablet,1,000
perbottle,8.Six
bottlesofDeca-
vitamins,100per
bottle.
9.SixbottlesofChlo-
roquin,500mgtab-let,
100perbottle.
10.Sixbottlesof
Phenobarbital,30mg
tablet,100perbottle.
11.SixbottlesofTetra-
cycline,250mgtab-let,
100perbottle.
12.Sixpackagesof
penicillin,procaine,
400,000unitcar-tridge,
10perpack-age.
13.Sixcansoffootpowder.
14.12tubesofUnde-
cylenicacidointment,2
oztube.
15.TwoboxesofBaci-
tracinneomycinoint-
ment,oztube,6per
box.
16.SifttubesofZincoxide,1
oztube.
17.OnebottleofCala-mine
USP,1lbbottle(in
powderform).
18.TwobottlesofPo-
tassi um permanga-
nate tabl ets, 5
grai ns, 100 per
bottl e.
19. One can of Methyl
sal i cyl ate ( oi l of
wi ntergreen) , 1 l b
can.
20. Si x bottl es of Bi s-
203
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
5 grai n tabl et, 100
per bottl e.
21. One bottl e of
Opi um, ti ncture,
USP pi nt.
22. One bottl e of Cas-
cara sagrada, tab-
l ets, 100 per bottl e.
23. Two boxes of
al umi -num
hydroxi de mag-
nesi um tri ci l i cate
tabl ets, 100 per
box.
24. Two bottl es of pro-
panthel i ne bromi de,
15 mg, 100 per bot-
tl e.
25. Si xteen syrettes,
Atropi nei nj ecti on, 2
mg.
Miscel l aneous
26. Four pl asti c
bottl esof Phi sohex,
5 oz.
27. One cartri dge sy-
ri nge.
28. One package of
gauze pad, 4 x 4.
29. One stethescope,
combi nati on type.
30. Two boxes of
absorbent-adhesi ve
bandage ( bandai d) ,
100 per box.
31. One box of tongue
depressors, 100per
box.
32. Four penci l s, gra-
phi te, No. 2.
33. Two packages of
en-vel opes, drug
di s-pensi ng, 100
per package.
34. One book, record,
rul ed.
INDIA
ECHO
DentalUnit 21lbs 1 Three dental ki ts,
emer-gency f i el d
( 645-927-8440) .
204
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
INDIA
FOXTROT
SplintSet 26lbs 1 1. Spl i nt Set consi sts
of
a. One rol l , spl i nt
set, tel escopi c
spl i nts, empty.
b. 18 bandages,
musl i n.
c. Three straps, l eg
tracti on.
d. Three spl i nts,
wood.
e. Three spl i nts, l eg,
Thomas, hal f ri ng,
al umi num.
f . Three l i tter bars,
l eg spl i nt
supporti ng.
g. Three spl i nt sup-
ports and f ootrest,
l eg.
h. Three spl i nts,
wi re, l adder.
i . Three rods,
i rri gator
supporti ng.
2. Two bl ankets.
3. Si x dressi ngs, f i el d,
medi um.
4. Si x dressi ngs, f i el d,
l arge.
INDIA
GOLF
WaterPufifica-
tionUnit
Note 2
23lbs 1 300 bottl es of water
puri f i cati on tabl ets,
i odi ne, 50 per bottl e.
INDIA
HOTEL
InsectControl
Unit
Note 2
25lbs 1 I nsect repel l ant,
dretnyetol uami de.
INDIA
INDIA
SurgicalPrep
Set
45lbs 1 1. Twel ve cakes of
soap, surgi cal , 4 oz
cake.
2. 24 contai ners of de-
tergent, surgi cal , 5
oz. contai ner.
3. Si x hand brushes,
surgi cal .
4. Two bowl s, al umi -
num.
205
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
zal koni um chl ori de,
25 cc bottl e.
6. Twel ve pai r of
gl oves, surgi cal si ze
7 .
7. Twel ve pai r of
gl oves, surgi cal , si ze
8.
8. One box of tal c USP,
l b box.
9. Twel ve packages of
cotton, steri l e, 1 oz
package.
10. Two saf ety razors.
11. Two packages of
razor bl ades, doubl e
edge.
12. Twel ve hand
towel s.
13. Two bath towel s.
14. Si x l ap sheets,
smal l
15. Si x surgi cal
drapes, smal l .
INDIA
JULIET
NarcoticsUnit 20lbs 1 1. 120 boxes Morphi ne
sul f ate, 15 mg syr-
ette, 5 perbox.
2. Si x boxes of Nal or-
phi ne hydrochl ori de
i nj ecti on, si x per
box.
3. 24 bottl es of
Codei ne phosphate,
30mgtabl et, 100per
bottl e.
4. Si x bottl es of Mepe-
ri di ne hydrochl ori de,
smal l .
INDIA
KILO
LocalAnesthesia 25lbs 1 1. Ten cans of Pro-
cai ne, cartri dge, 25
per can.
2. Two cartri dge syr-
i nges.
3. 20 bottl es . of Li do-
cai ne, . 2%, 20 cc
bottl e.
4. Si c . Syri nges, 10 cc.
206
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
cc.
6. Three boxes of
needl es, gauge # 23,
12 per box.
7. Three boxes of
needl es, gauge #22,
12 per box.
8. One box of needl es,
gauge #20, 12 per
box.
9. Two cans of al cohol ,
USP, 1 pi nt can.
10. Si xpl asti ccontai n-
ers of phi sohex, 5 oz
contai ner.
11. One package of
cot-ton, rol l ed.
INDIA
LIMA
MinorBurnsUnit 40lbs 1 1. Twel ve detergent,
pl asti c contai ner,
surgi cal .
2. Two al umi num
bowl s.
3. 30 packages of pet-
l atum gauze packs,
12 perpackage.
4. Two packages of
gauze pads, 2 x 2.
5. Two packages of
gauze pads, . 4 x 4.
6. Two boxes of band-
ages, gauze, steri l e,
3 i n, twel ve per box.
4 i n. , twel ve per box.
8. Two boxes of el asti c
bandages, 3 i n. , 12
per box.
9. One box of el asti c
bandages, 4 i n: , 9
per box.
16. One j ar. of Ni trof u-
azone, 1 l b j ar.
11. Si x hand towel s.
INDIA
MIKE
MajorBurnsUnit 45lbs 1 1. Si x uni ts of
al bumi n, 100 cc
uni t.
207
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
Note1.
2. Three uni ts of Dex-
tran, 500 cc uni t.
3. Four bottl es of nor-
mal sal i ne, 1000 cc
bottl e.
4. Four bottl es of Dex-
trose, 5%, 1000 cc
bottl e!
5. Ten i ntravenous
tub-i ng assembl i es.
6. 24 packages of sodi -
um chl ori debi car-
bonate mi x, 2 per
package.
7. Twel ve boxes of pro-
cai ne peni ci l l i n 400,
000 uni ts cartri dge
f i el d type, 10 per
box.
i nges.
9. Two Catheters, my
dwel l i ng, French,
si ze 16.
10, Two Catheters, i n-
si ze 18.
11. One Fl ui d
cal cul ator f or burns
( non-standard) .
Morphi ne i nj ecti on
15 mg, 6 per
package.
INDIA
KILO
LocalAnesthesia 25lbs 1 1. Ten cans of
Procai ne, cartri dge,
25 per can.
i nges.
3. 20 bottl es of Li do-
came, 2%, 20 cc
bottl e.
4. Si x syri nges, 10 cc.
5. Three syri nges, 20
cc.
6. Three boxes of
12 per box.
208
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
7. Three boxes of
12 per box.
8. One box of needl es,
gauge #20, 12 per
box.
USP, 1 pi nt can.
10. Si xpl asti ccontai n-
ers of phi sohex, 5 oz
contai ner.
11. One package of
cot-ton, rol l ed.
INDIA
LIMA
MinorBurnsUnit 40lbs 1 1. Twel ve detergent,
pl asti c contai ner,
surgi cal .
2. Two al umi num
bowl s.
3. 30 packages of pet-
rol atumgauzepacks,
12 per package.
4. Two packages of
gauze pads, 2 x 2.
5. Two packages of
gauze pads, 4 x 4.
3 i n, twel ve per box.
4 i n. , twel ve per box.
8. Two boxes of el asti c
per box.
9. One box of el asti c
per box.
10. One j ar of Ni trof u-
razone, 1 l b j ar.
INDIA
MIKE
MajorBurnsUnit 45lbs 1 1. Si x uni ts of
al bumi n, 100 cc
uni t,
Note1.
2. Three uni ts of Dex-
tran, 500 cc uni t.
3. Four bottl es of nor-
209
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
bottl e.
4. Four bottl es of Dex-
trose, 5%, 1000 cc
bottl e.
5. Ten i ntravenous
tub-i ng assembl i es.
6. 24 packages of sodi -
um chl ori debi car-
bonate mi x, 2 per
package.
7. Twel ve boxes of pro-
cai nepeni ci l l i n400, -
000 uni ts cartri dge
f i el d type, 10 per
box.
i nges.
9. Two Catheters, i n-
si ze 16.
10. Two Catheters, i n-
si ze 18.
11. One Fl ui d
cal cul ator f or burns
( non-standard) .
Morphi ne i nj ecti on
15 mg, 6 per
package.
13. Si x cannul as, tra-
cheotomy, nyl on, si ze
5.
INDIA
NOVEMBER
ShockSetNo.1.
Note3
30lbs 1 24 bottl es of al bumi n,
normal human
serum, 100 cc bottl e
wi th i nj ecti on
assembl y.
INDIA
OSCAR
ShockSetNo.2. 24lbs 1 12 bottl es of Dextran,
500ccbottl ewi thi n-
j ecti on assembl y.
INDIA
PAPA
ShockSetNo.3. 25lbs 1 1. Three bottl es of nor-
mal sal i ne, 1, 000 cc
bottl e.
2. Three bottl es of
Dextrose i n water,
5%, 1, 000 cc bottl e.
210
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
i nj ecti on assembl i es.
4. One spool of adhe-
si ve tape, 3 i n.
5. Two boxes of Lev-
arterenol ampul e, 12
per box.
6. Two vi al s
Epi nephri ne 1: 1000
30 cc vi al .
INDIA.
QUEBEC
Intravenous
FluidsNo.1.
25lbs 1 1. Four bottl es of Dex-
trose i n water 5%,
1000 cc bottl e.
2. Two bottl es of Dex-
trose i n water 10%,
100 cc bottl e.
si ve tape, 3 i n.
4. Ei ght i ntravenous
tubi ng assembl i es.
INDIA
ROMEO
Intravenous
FluidsNo.2.
25lbs 1 1. Si xbottl esof normal
sal i ne, 1, 000 cc
bottl e.
si ve tape, 3 i n.
4. One box of Potas-
si um chl ori de 10 cc
vi al , si x per box.
INDIA
SIERRA
Intravenous
FluidsNo.3.
25lb 1 1. Si x bottl es of
sodi um l actate,
1, 000 cc bottl e.
INDIA
TANGO
SterileDressing
Unit
26lbs 1 1. Twel ve dressi ngs,
f i el d, l arge.
2. 36 dressi ngs, f i el d,
medi um.
3. 36 dressi ngs, f i el d,
smal l .
age, gauze, 3 i n. , 12
per box.
211
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
per box.
INDIA
UNIFORM
BandageUnit 22lbs 1 1. Si x packages of
gauze pads 2 x 2 i n.
2. Fourpackagesgauze
pads 4 x 4 i n.
3. Si x packages band-
ages, absorbent, ad-
hesi ve ( bandai d) 100
per package.
4. Si x spool s of adhe-
si ve tape, 3 i n.
5. 12 packages of cot-
ton, steri l e, 1 oz
package.
I 6. Two boxes of rol l er
gauze, 2 i n. , 12 per
box.
7. Two boxes of rol l er
gauze, 3 I n. , 12 per
box.
8. Two boxes of rol l er
gauze, 4 i n. , 12 per
box.
9. Two boxes of musl i n
bandage, 24 per box.
INDIA
VICTOR
ElasticBandage
Unit
25lbs 1 1. One box of band-
ages, cotton, el asti c
2 i n. , 12 per box.
3. Four boxes of band-
4. One box of band-
5. Two spool s of adhe-
si ve tape, 3 i n.
INDIA
WHISKEY
LitterSet 46lbs 1 1. Two l i tters, f ol di ng.
2. Two bl ankets.
INDIA
XRAY
MountainLitter
Set
44lbs 1 1. One l i tter, ri gi d,
mountai n.
2. Three bl ankets.
212
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
INDIA
YANKEE
BlanketSet 50lbs 1 Ten bl ankets.
INDIA
ZULU
OrthopedicCast
Set No.1.
50lbs 1 1. One rol l stocki net, 3
i n. x 25 yds.
2. One rol l stocki net, 4
i n. x 25 yds.
3. One rol l stocki net, 6
i n. x 12 yds.
4. One rol l bandage,
f el t, 3 i n. rol l .
ages, cotton, pl aster
i mpregnated3i n. , 12
per box.
8. One box bandages,
cotton, pl aster i m-
pregnated, 6 i n. , 12
per box.
9. Si x heel s,
orthopedi c cast.
10. One pai r shears,
pl aster cast, hand.
11. One saw, pl aster
cast cutti ng, hand.
12. Two pl asti c
buckets ( non-
standard) .
JULIET
ALPHA
OrthopedicCast
No.2.
50lbs 1 1. Three boxes band-
per box.
2. Three boxes band-
per box.
3. Three boxes band-
per box.
JULIET
BRAVO
Eye,Ear,Nose,
ThroatSet.
25lbs 1 1. One nasal specul um
2. One myri ngotome.
3. One box of cotton
213
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
per box.
4. One box tongue de-
pressors, 100 per
box.
5. Two bottl es Chl or-
pheni rami ne mal eate
( chl ortri meton) , 40
mg, 1, 000 per bottl e.
6. Two boxes Tetra-
hydrozol i ne hydro-
chl ori de( tyzi ne) nose
drops, 12 per box.
7. One bottl e APC,
tabl ets, 1, 000 per
bottl e.
8. One bottl e ASA, 5
gr. tabl et, 1, 000 per
bottl e.
9. Si x bottl es Codei ne,
gr. tabl et, 100 per
bottl e.
10. One box MBA ear-
drops, 12 per box.
11. Two bottl es Terpi n
hydrate, 1 l b bottl e.
12. One bottl e Bori c
aci d, 1 l b bottl e.
13. Si x tubes
Pol ymi xi ni B-
Baci traci n-Neomyci n
ophthal mi coi ntment,
oz tube.
14. Three tubes corti -
sone opthal mi c oi nt-
ment, oz tube.
15. One mi rror, l aryn-
geal .
JULIET
CHARLIE
SkinDiseaseUnit 25lbs 1 1.24tubesundecylenic
acidointment,2oztube.
2.Twelvecansoffoot
powder.
3.Threeboxesof
bacitracin-neomycin
ointment,oztube,6
perbox.
4.Fourtubesofdibucaine
ointment,1oztube.
5.Onejarofwoolfat.1lb
jar.
214
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
6.Onecanofpetrola-tum,
1lbcan.
7.Onejarofzincoxide,1lb
jar.
8.TwobottlesBurow's
solution,tablets,500per
bottle.
9.Eightbottlesofpo-
tassiumpermanga-nate
tablets,5grain,100per
bottle.
10.Onebottleof
methylrosaniline
chloride,1lbbottle.
11.Sixbottlesselenium
sulfidesuspension,four
ozplasticbottle.
12.Twelvetubesof
hydrocortisoneacetate
ointment,1/6oztube.
13.Sixtubesofbenzene
hexachloride,1%
ointment,60gmtube.
14.Onebottlecalamine,
USP,1lbottle.
15.Onecanmethylsali-
cylate(oilofwinter-green)
1lbcan.
JULIET
DELTA
Depressant
Stimulants
Unit.
20lbs 1 1.24bottlesphenobar-
bital,30mgtablets,100
perbottle,
2.Twobottlessecobar-bital,
100mgcapsule,500per
bottle.
3.Twobottlesmepro-
bamate,400mgtablet,
500perbottle.
4.Twelvebottlesof
dephenhydrainine
hydrochloride(Benadryl)
50mgcapsule,100per
bot-tle.
5.Twelveampulesof
amobarbitalsodium,
sterileintravenous
injection,7%grains,
ampule.
6. Two boxes pentyl en-
etetrazol , 100 mg,
215
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
box.
7. Ten bottl es of dex-
troamphetami ne, 5. 0
mg tabl et, 100 per
bottl e.
JULIET
ECHO
Gastrointestinal
DiseasesUnit.
20lbs
(-)
1 1. Two bottl es of
Kaol i n, 1 l b bottl e
( powder) .
2. One bottl e of pecti n,
l l b bottl e ( powder) .
3. Fi ve boxes of al um-
i num hydroxi de gel ,
and magnesi um tri -
si l i cate tabl et, 100
per box.
4. One bottl e of
ti ncture bel l adonna,
1 pi nt bottl e.
5. Si x bottl es of
cascara sagrada
tabl ets, 100 per
bottl e.
6. Two bottl es of
opi um, ti ncture, USP
pi nt.
7. Si x bottl es propan-
thel i ne, bromi de, 15
mg, 100 per bottl e.
8. Twel ve bottl es phe-
nobarbi tal , 30 mg
tabl et, 100 per
bottl e.
9. Three bottl es of
chl orampheni col ,250
mg tabl et, 100 per
bottl e.
10. Threebottl estetra-
cycl i ne, 250 mg
tabl et, 100 per
bottl e.
11. Si x bottl es of neo-
myci n sul f ate, 500
mg tabl et, 20 per
bottl e.
12. Si x bottl es of
chl or-promazi ne, 25
mg, 50 per bottl e
13. Si x bottl es of Bi s-
muthsubcarbonate5
216
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
bottl e.
14. Fourtubesof di bu-
cai ne oi ntment, 1 oz
tube
JULIET
FOXTROT
TropicalDisease
Unit
20lbs 1. Si x bottl es of tetra-
cycl i ne, 250 mg tab-
l ets, 100 per bottl e.
2. 48 bottl es of hexyl -
resorci nol , 200 mg, 5
per bottl e.
3. 24 bottl es of carba-
sone, 250mgtabl ets,
20 per bottl e.
4. Si x boxes of
sti bophen, i nj ecti on,
64 mg. , 5 cc, 10 per
box.
5. Twel ve bottl es of
di ethyl carbamazi ne,
50mgtabl et, 100per
bottl e.
6. Si x bottl es of
chl oro-qui n, 500 mg
tabl et, 100 per
bottl e.
7. Si x bottl es of pri ma-
qui ne, 25 mg tabl et.
JULIET
GOLF
MalnutritionUnit 25lbs 1 1. 36 bottl es of decavi -
tami ns, 100 per
bottl e.
2. Onebottl eof f errous
sul f ate, 5 grai n
bottl e.
menadi one, 2. 0 mg
tabl ets, 50 per
bottl e.
4. Si x bottl es of
ascorbi c aci d, 50 mg
tab-l ets, 100 per
bottl e.
5. Si x bottl es of ri bo-
f l avi n, 1. 0 mg
tabl ets, 100 per
bottl e.
6. Si x bottl es of Thi a-
mi n, 5. 0 mg tabl ets,
100 per bottl e.
217
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
7. Four cans of
ski mmed mi l k,
powdered, 1 l b can.
JULIET
HOTEL
MalariaUnit. 20lbs 1 1. 24 bottl es of chl oro-
qui n, 500 mg, 100
per bottl e.
pri maqui n, 25 mg,
100 per bottl e.
3. Two bottl es of ace-
tyl sal i cyl i c aci d, 5
grai ns, 100 per bot-
tl e.
JULIET
INDIA
AntibioticsNo.
1.
25lbs 1 1. 50 packages of pro-
cai ne peni ci l l i n,
400, -000 uni t
cartri dge, 10 per
package.
2. Si x cartri dge
syri nges.
tetracycl i ne, 250 mg
tabl ets, 100 per bot-
tl e.
4. Twel vebottl eschl or-
ampheni col , 250 mg
tabl ets, 100 per bot-
tl e.
JULIET
JULIET
AntibioticsNo.
2.
18lbs 1 1. Two bottl es of sul -
f asoxi zol e, 500 mg
bottl e.
peni ci l l i n, 250, 000
uni t tabl ets, 100 per
bottl e.
JULIET
KILO
AntibioticsNo.
3.
20lbs 1 1. One box of
peni ci l l i n,
crystal l i ne, 200, -000
uni t vi al , 100 per
box.
2. Three boxes of
tetracycl i ne hydro-
chl ori de,
i ntravenous, 250 mg,
12 per box.
218
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
chl orampheni col ,
i ntravenous, 100 mg,
12 per box ( non-
standard i tem) .
4. Two boxes of water
f or i nj ecti on, steri l e,
5. 0 cc vi al s, 12 per
box.
JULIET
LIMA
MassImmuniz-
ationSet.
48lbs 1 1. Four trays, i nstru-
ment wi th cover.
2. Onesteri l i zer, surgi -
cal i nstrument f uel
heated.
4. Two bowl s, pl asti c
( non-standard i tem) .
5. Si x cakes of soap,
surgi cal , 4 oz cake.
6. Si x contai ners of
detergent, surgi cal , 5
oz contai ner.
7. Si x bottl es of benze-
thoni um chl ori de
tabl ets, 80 per
bottl e.
8. Two Foerster
f orceps.
pi nt can.
10. Si x bottl es of Ben-
zal koni um chl ori de,
25 cc bottl e.
gauze pads, 2 x 2 i n.
12. Two packages of
cotton, puri f i ed,
rol l ed.
13. 48 syri nges, 5. 00
cc.
14. Twel ve syri nges,
10. 0 cc.
15. Foursyri nges, 20. 0
16. Two books, record,
rul ed.
17. Si x penci l s.
18. One package of
gauze pads, 4 x. 4
i n.
219
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
12 per box.
20. Twel ve boxes
12 per box.
21. Three boxes
12 per box.
22. Three boxes
12 per box.
JULIET
MIKE
DiphtheriaIm-
munization.
Notes4and5
20lbs 1 Di phtheri a-pertussi s-
tetanus vacci ne, 300
ampl ues.
JULIET
NOVEMBER
TetanusImmuni-
zation.
Notes4and5
20lbs 1 300ampul esof tetanus
toxoi d, 5 cc ampul e.
JULIET
OSCAR
TyphoidImmuni-
zation.
Notes4and5
18lbs 1 50 vi al s of typhoi d-
paratyphoi d vacci ne,
50 cc vi al .
JULIET
PAPA
Smallpox
Immunization
Notes4and5
11lbs 1 150 boxes of smal l pox
vacci ne, 10 per box.
JULIET
QUEBEC
TyphusImmuni-
zation.
Notes4and5
30lbs 1 150 vi al s of typhus
vac-ci ne 20 cc vi al .
JULIET
ROMEO
CholeraImmuni-
zation.
Notes4and5
26lbs 1 Chol era vacci ne, 20 cc
vi al .
JULIET
SIERRA
Poliomyelitis
Immunization
Notes4and5
30lbs 1 300 bottl es of
Pol i omye-l i ti s
vacci ne, 9. 0 cc
bottl e.
JULIET
TANGO
YellowFever
Immunization
Notes4and5
11lbs 1 75 ampul es of yel l ow
f ever vacci ne, 20-
dose ampul e.
JULIET
UNIFORM
PlagueImmuni-
zation.
Notes4and5
22lbs 1 150 vi al s of pl ague
vac-ci ne USP, 20 cc
vi al .
JULIET
VICTOR
RabiesKit.
Notes4and5
18lbs 1 1. 20 packages of
220
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
14-dose package.
2. 80 ampul es of anti -
rabi es serum, 1, 000
uni ts ampul e.
JULIET
WHISKEY
TetanusAnti-
toxin.
Notes4and5
11lbs 1 1. 100 bottl es of
tetanus anti toxi n,
1, 500 uni ts per
bottl e.
2. 20bottl esof tetanus
anti toxi n, 20, 000
uni ts per bottl e.
JULIET
XRAY
GammaGlobulin.
Notes4and5
10 1 Tenbottlesofglobulin,
immuneserum,10cc
bottle.
NOTES:
1.Thefieldsurgerysetmaybeaugmentedwith:
a.Medicaldispensaryset.
b.Supplementalsupplyset.
2.Quartermasteritems.
3.Albumindoesnotwithstandfreezing.
4.Immunizationsfor1,f>00personnel.
5.Vaccinerequiresrefrigeration.
6.Manymedicalpackagesweighconsiderablylessthan60lbs.Thesupplyagencyadds
itemswhichareinconstantdemandtofilloutlightermedicalpackages.Examples
are-blankets,extrabandages,anddressings.
7.Chloroquineisdeletedfrompackagesusedinnon-malariaareas.
SectionIV.WEAPONSANDAMMUNITION
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
MIKE
ALPHA
AutomaticRifle
(3).
250lbs 3 1. Oneri f l e, automati c,
cal . . 30, M1918A2
( 20 l bs) .
2. Thi rteen magazi nes,
AR ( 6 l bs) .
3. One bel t, ammuni -
ti on, AR ( 2 l bs) .
4. 480 rds, cartri dge,
AP cal . . 30, 20 rd
cartons, packed i n
ammuni ti on can M8
( 2 cans, 32 l bs) .
221
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
accessory packet ( 2
l bs) Note1.
1 960 rds, cartri dge, AP,
cal . . 30, 20 rd
cartons, packed i n
ammuni ti on can M8
( 4 cans, 64 l bs) .
MIKE
BRAVO
Carbine(20). 240lbs 4 1. Fi ve carbi nes, cal .
. 30, M-2 ( 30 l bs) .
2. Fi f teen magazi nes,
carbi ne, 30 rd
capac-i ty ( 4 l bs) .
3. 800 rds cartri dge,
bal l , carbi ne cal .
. 30 M-1, packed i n
am-muni ti oncanM6
( 1 can, 25 l bs) .
MIKE
CHARLIE
LightMachine-
gun(2).
484lbs 2 1. One machi ne gun,
cal . . 30, M1919A6
w/shol der stock and
bi pod ( 37 l bs) .
l i nked, cal . . 30 4AP-
1TR, packed i n am-
muni ti on box M1A1
( 1 box, 22 l bs) .
3. One spare parts and
l bs) . Note1.
8 550 rds, cartri dge,
l i nked, cal . . 30,
4AP-1TR, packed i n
ammu-ni ti on box
M1A1 ( 2 boxes, 44
l bs) .
MIKE
DELTA
Mortar(1). 320lbs 1
5
1. One mortar, 60mm,
compl ete wi th base
pl ate, mount and 1
si ght ( 46 l bs) .
2. One base pl ate, Ml
( 4. 5 l bs) .
l bs) . Note1.
222
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
HE, 60mm mortar,
M49A2 packed i n
i ndi vi dual
contai ners ( 53 l bs) .
MIKE
ECHO
Pistol(12). 90lbs 2 1. Si x pi stol s, auto-
mati c, cal . . 45
M1911Al ( 15 l bs) .
2. Ei ghteen magazi nes,
pi stol , cal . . 45 ( 5
l bs) .
bal l , cal . . 45 packed
i n ammuni ti on box
M5 ( 1 box, 29 l bs) .
4. Si x shoul der stocks,
pi stol ( 6 l bs) .
MIKE
FOXTROT
RecoillessRifle
(2).
406lbs 2 1. One ri f l e, 57mm, re-
coi l l ess, T15E13 or
M18, compl ete f or
shoul der f i ri ng, i n-
cl udi ng tel escope
si ght M86C ( 45 l bs) .
2. One cover, overal l ,
M123 ( 3 l bs) .
l bs) . Note1.
6 Ei ght rds, cartri dge,
HEAT, 57mm RR,
M307, packed i n
i ndi -vi dual
MIKE
GOLF
RocketLauncher
(3).
330
lbs
3
3
1. One l auncher, Rock-
et, 3. 5 i nch, M20A1
or M20A1B1 ( 14
l bs) .
2. Four rds, -A-f ,
HEAT, 3. 5 i nch
M28A2 packed i n
i ndi vi dual
Si x rds, rocket, HEAT,
3. 5 i n. , M28A2,
packed i n i ndi vi dual
223
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
MIKE
HOTEL
SniperRifle(6). 165
lbs
3 1. Two ri f l es, cal . . 30,
M1C, compl ete ( 23
l bs) .
AP, cal . . 30, 8 rd
cl i ps i n bandol eers,
packed i n
ammuni ti oncanM-8
( 2 cans, 32 l bs) .
MIKE
INDIA
SubmachineGun
(9).
175
lbs
3 1. Three submachi ne
guns, cal . . 45, M3A1
( 21 I bs) .
2. Ni ne magazi nes,
submachi ne gun,
30- rd capaci ty ( 7
l bs) .
bal l , cal . . 45 packed
i n ammuni ti on box
M5 ( 1 box, 29 l bs) .
MIKE
JULIET
GeneralUnit.
Note2
2560
lbs
46 1. One automati c ri f l e
uni t, 3 ARS.
2. Onecarbi neuni t, 20
carbi nes.
3. One l i ght machi ne-
gun uni t, 2 LMGs.
4. One mortar uni t, 1
mortar.
5. One pi stol uni t, 12
pi stol s.
6. One recoi l l ess ri f l e
uni t, 2 RRS.
7. One rocket l auncher
uni t, 3 RLS.
8. One sni per ri f l e
uni t, 6 ri f l es.
9. One submachi ne
gun uni t, 9 SMGS.
NOVEMBER
ALPHA
Carbine
Ammunition
No.1 (6400
rds).
200
lbs
car-bi ne, bal l , cal .
. 30, 50 rd cartons,
packed i n
ammuni ti on can M6
( 2 cans, 50 I bs) .
NOVEMBER
BRAVO
Carbine
Ammunition
200
lbs
car-bi ne, bal l , cal .
224
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
rds). packed i n
ammuni ti on can M6
( 2 cans, 50 l bs) .
200
lbs
1 1. 800 rds, cartri dge,
carbi ne, bal l , cal .
packed i n
ammuni ti on can M6
( 25 l bs) .
carbi ne, tracer, cal
packed i n ammuni -
ti on can M6 ( 25
l bs) .
NOVEMBER
CHARLIE
RifleAmmunition
No.1
(2880rds).
192
lbs
cal . . 30, 20 rd
cartons, packed i n
ammuni ti on can M8
( 4 cans, 64 l bs) .
NOVEMBER
DELTA
RifleAmmunition
No.2
(2880rds).
192
lbs
cal . . 30, 20 rd
cartons, packed i n
ammuni ti on can M8
( 4 cans, 64) .
1 1. 240 rds, cartri dge,
AP, cal . . 30, 20 rd
cartons, packed i n
ammuni ti on can M8
( 1 can, 16 l bs) .
tracer, cal . . 30, 20
rd cartons, packed
i n ammuni ti on can
M8 ( 3 cans, 48 l bs) .
NOVEMBER
ECHO
RifleAmmunition
No.3
(1920rds).
128
lbs
cal . . 30, 8 rd cl i ps
i n bandol eers
packed i n
ammuni ti on can M8
( 4 cans, 64 l bs) .
NOVEMBER
FOXTROT
Machinegun
Ammunition
No.1
(2200rds).
176
lbs
l i nked, cal . . 30,
4AP-1TR, packed i n
ammu-ni ti on box Ml
A1 ( 2 boxes, 44 l bs)
225
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
NOVEMBER
GOLF
Machinegun
Ammunition
No.2
(2200rds).
176
lbs
4 550rds,cartridge,linked,
cal..30,2AP-2API-1TR
packedinammunition
boxMIA1(2boxes,44
lbs).
NOVEMBER
HOTEL
Pistol
Ammunition
(2400rds).
232
lbs
4 1200rds,cartridge,ball,
cal..45,50rdcartons,
packedinammunition
canM5(2cans,58lbs).
NOVEMBER
INDIA
RecoillessRifle
Ammunition
No.1
(48rds).
300
lbs
6 Eightrds,cartridge,HEAT,
57mmRR,M307packed
inindi-vidual
containers(50lbs).
NOVEMBER
JULIET
RecoillessRifle
Ammunition
No.2
(48rds).
300
lbs
6 Eightrds,cartridge,smoke
WP,57mmRR,M308,
packedinindi-vidual
containers(50lbs).
NOVEMBER
KILO
RecoillessRifle
Ammunition
No.3
(48rds).
300
lbs
6 Eightrds,cartridge,HE,
57mmRR,M306,
packedinindividual
containers(50lbs).
NOVEMBER
LIMA
Mortar
Ammunition
No.1
(60rds).
121
lbs
4 Fifteenrds,shell,HE,
60mmmortar,M49A2,
packedinindividual
containers(53lbs).
NOVEMBER
MIKE
Mortar
Ammunition
No.2
(24rds).
110
lbs
2 Twelveshell,smokeWP,
60mmmortar,M302
packedinindividual
containers(55lbs).
NOVEMBER
NOVEMBER
Mortar
Ammunition
No.3
(24rds).
96lbs 2 Twelveshell,illuminat-ing,
60mmmortarpackedin
individualcontainers
(55Ibs).
NOVEMBER
OSCAR
RocketLauncher
Ammunition
(48rds).
456 8 Sixrds,rocket,HEAT,3.5
inch,M28A2packedin
individualcontainers
(57Ibs).
NOVEMBER
PAPA
GrenadeNo.1
(50rds).
60lbs 1 50 grenades, hand,
f ragmentati on, M26
( T38E1) packed i n
i n- di vi dual
contai ner ( 60 l bs) .
226
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
NOVEMBER
QUEBEC
GrenadeNo.2
(50rds).
45lbs 1 50 grenades, hand,
i l l umi nati ng, MK1,
packed i ndi vi dual
contai ner ( 45 l bs) .
NOVEMBER
ROMEO
Pyrotechnic
SignalNo.1
(60rds).
15lbs 1 1.Twentysignal,redstar,
ground,redstar,
parachute,M126(T72),
packedinindividual
container(5lbs).
2.Twentysignal,ground,
whitestar,parachute,
M127(T73),packedin
individualcontainer(5
lbs).
3.Twentysignal,ground,
greenstar,clusterM127
(T71),packedin
lbs).
4.Oneprojector,
pyrotechnic.
NOVEMBER
TANGO
Pyrotechnic
SignalNo.2
(60rds).
15lbs 1 1.Twentysignal,green
smoke,parachute
M128(T74),packedin
lbs).
2.Twentysignal,red
smoke,parachute
M129(T75),packedin
Ibs).
3.Twentysignal,yellow
smoke,streamerM139
(T76),packedin
lbs).
4.Oneprojector,
pyrotechnic.
NOTES:
1.Thesparepartsandaccessorypacketincludesitemsmostsubjecttodamageorwear
andtoolsrequiredforthecareandmaintenanceoftheweapon.
2.Thegeneralunitcontainsthebasicweaponsforatypeguerrillaplatoonplusweapons
peculiartoweaponsplatoons.
3.General
a.Weaponsunitscontaincleaningandpreservingmaterialsuchasrods,lubricants
andpatches.
b.Ammunitionisstrippedofitsoutershippingcontainersanddeliveredinitsinner
weatherproofcontainer.
227
SectionV.QUARTERMASTER
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
QUEBEC
ALPHA
Clothingand
Equipment40
personnel.
Notes1and2
840lbs 20 Two man uni t
consi sti ng of
1. Two bel ts, pi stol
OD.
2. Two bl ankets, OD.
3. Two pai r boots,
com-bat.
4. Two coats, man' s,
water resi stant
sateen ( f i el d
j acket) .
5. Two canteens, di s-
mounted w/cup and
cover.
6. Two caps, f i el d,
popl i n.
7. Two ponchos,
coated nyl on, OG-
107.
8. Two pouches and
packets, f i rst ai d.
9. Two pai r socks,
wool .
10. Two pai r suspend-
ers, trousers, OD-
107.
11. Two pai r trousers,
men' s, cotton, water
resi stant sateen
( f i el d trousers) ( 42
l bs) .
QUEBEC
BRAVO
Clothingand
Equipment
100personnel
Notes1and2
2100lbs 50 Consi sts of 50 two-
man uni ts.
ROMEO
ALPHA
Rations,indig-
enous
Personnel
100men.
Note3
1750lbs 35 Hi gh f at content meat
or canned
f i sh/poul try, sugar,
tobacco, sal t, cof f ee
or tea, grai n f l our or
ri ce, accessory i tems
and water
puri f i cati on tabl ets
( 50 l bs) .
228
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
ROMEO
BRAVO
Rations,Indig-
enous
Personnel500
men.
Note3
85001bs 170 Hi gh f at content meat
or canned f i sh,
poul try, sugar,
tobacco, sal t, cof f ee
or tea, grai n, f l our or
ri ce, accessory i tems
and water puri f i -
cati on tabl ets ( 50
l bs) .
ROMEO
CHARLIE
SpecialRations-
96men.
Note4
136lbs 4 24 f ood packets,
survi val , ( arcti c or
tropi c) ( 34 l bs) .
ROMEO
DELTA
SpecialRations-
96men.
192lbs 8 12 i ndi vi dual combat
meal s ( 24 l bs) .
ROMEO
ECHO
Packet,barter.
Note5
500lbs 10 50lbspackages.
NOTES:
1.Itemsvarywiththeclimaticzoneandseason.Thispackageisbasedonthetemperate
zoneforspring,summer,andfallseasons.Forwinter,addglovesand1extrablanket
perindividual.
2.Clothingsizesareissuedassmall,medium,andlarge.Clothingismatchedtosizeof
boots.Bootsizeisincludedinthemessagerequestingtheclothingpackage.The
packagingagencydictatesmatchingofbootandclothingsizesbaseduponexperience
factorsapplicabletotheoperationalarea.
3.Specialrationsforindigenouspersonnelaredeterminedbytheareaofoperations.
Allotmentis15lbsperindividualpermonth.
4.Thefoodpacketvarieswiththeclimaticzone.
5.Contentstobedeterminedbytheareaofoperations.
SectionVI.SIGNAL
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
UNIFORM
ALPHA
BatteriesNo.1. 48lbs 1 6 BA 279/Uf or
AN/PRC-10.
UNIFORM
BRAVO
BatteriesNo.2. 50lbs 1 20 BA 270/Uf or
AN, /PRC-6.
UNIFORM
CHARLIE
BatteriesNo. 3. 53lbs 1 1. 15 BA 317/& ( 15
l bs) .
2. 100 BA 32 ( 25 l bs) .
3. Fi ve BA 1264/U ( 10
l bs) .
4. TwoBA58/U( 1l bs) .
5. Two 13A 261/U ( 2
l bs) .
229
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
UNIFORM
DELTA
FieldWire
(1mile).
56lbs 1 1. One mi l e wi re WD-1
i n di spensers, MX
306-two di spensers,
total ( 52 l bs) .
2. One tool equi pment
set TE-33, ( 2 l bs) .
3. Tape, f ri cti on, 2
rol l s, ( 1 l b) .
4. Tape, rubber, 1 rol l
( 1 l b) .
UNIFORM
ECHO
Flashlights(20). 45lbs 1 1. 20 Fl ashl i ghts ( 15
l bs) .
2. 120Batteri es, BA30
( 30 l bs) .
UNIFORM
FOXTROT
PowerUnitUGP-
12(1).
60lbs 1 1. One engi ne
generator ( 15 l bs) .
2. 5 gal s gasol i ne ( 42
l bs) .
3. One qt oi l , SAE 10
or 30 ( 3 l bs) .
UNIFORM
GOLF
RadioSet
AN/PRC-10(1).
42lbs 1 1. One AN/PRC-10
compl ete ( 18 l bs) .
2. Three batteri es BA
279/U ( 24 l bs) .
UNIFORM
HOTEL
RadioSet
AN/PRC-6(2).
Noted
43lbs 1 1. Two AN/PRC-6,
2. 14 batteri es, BA
270/U ( 35 l bs) .
UNIFORM
INDIA
Telephones(4). 42lbs 1 1. Four tel ephones,
battery powered ( 38
l bs) .
2. 16 batteri es, BA 30
( 4 l bs) .
UNIFORM
JULIET
Switchboard(1). 1134lbs 28 1. One swi tchboard,
SB 22, compl ete ( 40
I bs) .
2. Ei ght batteri es, BA
30, ( 2 l bs) .
UNIFORM
KILO
SignalEquipment
Battalion.(90
lbs).Note1
42lbs 1 1. Two f l ashl i ght uni ts
2. Ei ght radi o set
uni ts, AN/PR-6 ( 344
l bs) .
230
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
AN/PRC-10 ( 210
l bs) .
4. 200 Batteri es, BA
30 ( 50 l bs) .
5. Seven battery uni ts,
BA 270/U ( 250 l bs) .
6. Fi ve battery uni ts,
BA 279/U ( 240 l bs) .
UNIFORM
LIMA
SignalEquipment
Area
Command,HQ
andHQ
Company.
1599
lbs
31 1. One f l ashl i ght uni t.
( 45 I bs) .
2. Two radi o set uni ts,
AN/PRC-10 ( 84 l bs) .
3. One swi tchboard
uni t, SB-22 ( 42 l bs) .
4. Three tel ephone
uni ts ( 126 l bs) .
5. 20 wi re uni ts ( 1120
l bs) .
6. 150 batteri es, BA-30
( 38 l bs) .
7. Three battery uni ts,
BA 279 ( 144 l bs) .
UNIFORM
MIKE
RadioSet
AN/GRC-109
(1)
92lbs 1 1. Radi o Transmi tter,
RT-3 ( 9 l bs) .
2. Radi o recei ver, RR-2
( 10 l bs) .
3. Power suppl y, RP-1
( 25 l bs) .
4. Operati ng snares
and accessori es ( 6
l bs) .
1 5. Generator, G-43/G,
compl ete, ( 22 l bs) .
6. Adapter, RA-2 ( 4
l bs) .
317/U ( 16 l bs) .
UNIFORM
NOVEMBER
RadioSet
AN/GRC-9(1).
99lbs 1
1
1. Recei ver-
transmi tter, RT-77
( 32 l bs) .
317/U ( 15 l bs) .
3. Generator, G-43/G,
231
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
4. Antennas and
antenna accessori es
( 23 l bs) .
5. Audi o accessori es ( 5
l bs) .
6. Spare parts ki t ( 2
l bs) .
UNIFORM
OSCAR
Telephones
Sound
Powered.
45lbs 1 1. 3 Reel Equi pment,
CE-11 ( 15 l bs) .
2. 3 spool s DR-8 wi th
3/8 mi ( 30l bs) WD-
1/TT.
UNIFORM
PAPA
Switchboard
Emergency.
108lbs 1 1. Wi re WD-1/TT, one
mi l e, 2 di spensers
( 52 l bs) .
1 2. Wi re WD-1/TT, one
mi l e, 2 di spensers
( 52 l bs) .
3. Swi tchboard,
93/GT, 1 ea ( 4 l bs) .
UNIFORM
QUEBEC
RadiacDetector
Set.
40lbs 1 1. Twenty radi ac
detector chargers
1578/PD.
2. Twenty radi ac
detectors I M 93
U/D.
NOTES:
1.AppropriatesetsofcrystalspackedwithAN/PRC-6radiostoallowfrequencychanges.
2.GeneralColdweatherbatteriessubstitutedwhenappropriatetoseasonandarea.
232
SectionVII.SPECIAL
Code
Unit
designation
Unit
wt
Unitdata
No.
Pkgs
Contents
XRAY
ALPHA
RiverCrossing
UnitNo.1.
50lbs 1 1.Fiveliferafts,in-
flatable,oneperson
capacitywithCO2
cylinderandacces-
sorykit.
2.Fivelifepreservers,
yokewithgascylin-
der.
3.Fivepaddles,boat,
fivefeetlong.
XRAY
BRAVO
RiverCrossing
UnitNo.2.
90lbs 2 1.Oneliferaft,in-
flatable,sevenper-
soncapacity,with
CO2cylinderand
accessorykit.
2.Sevenlifepreservers
yokewithgas
cylinders.
3.Fourpaddles,boat,
fivefeetlong.
233
APPENDIXIII
AREASTUDYGUIDE
SectionI.INTRODUCTION
4. General
Thi s appendi x i s an area study outl i ne for Speci al Forces
personnel .Secti onsI I andI I I aretobeusedforstudyoftheregi onof
expected warti me assi gnment and as a gui de for a more detai l ed
eval uati on of a sel ected country. The outl i ne provi des a systemati c
consi derati onofthepri nci pal factorswhi chi nfl uenceSpeci al Forces
operati onal pl anni ng.
5. Purpose
The purpose of the area study gui de i s to provi de a means for
acqui ri ngandretai ni ngessenti al i nformati ontosupportoperati ons.
Al thoughthebasi coutl i nei sgeneral i nnature,i tprovi desadequate
coverage when ti me i s l i mi ted. As more ti me i s made avai l abl e for
study, vari ous subjects shoul d be di vi ded and further subdi vi ded to
produceamoredetai l edanal ysi softhearea.
6. TechniqueofPreparation
Themaxi mumuseofgraphi csandoverl aysi sencouraged.Mostof
thesubsecti onsl endthemsel vestoproducti oni ngraphi cal oroverl ay
form.
SectionII.GENERALAREASTUDY
7. General
a.Political.
(1) Government,i nternati onal pol i ti cal ori entati on,anddegree
ofpopul arsupport.
(2) Atti tudesofi denti fi abl esegmentsofthepopul ati ontoward
theUni tedStates,i tsal l i esandtheenemy.
(3)Nati onal hi stori cal background.
(4)Forei gndependenceand/oral l i ances.
(5) Nati onal capi tol and si gni fi cant pol i ti cal , mi l i tary and
economi cconcentrati ons.
b. GeographicPositions.
(1)Areasanddi mensi ons.
234
(2) Lati tudeandcl i mate.
(3)General i zedphysi ography.
(4)General i zedl anduti l i zati on.
(5)Strategi cl ocati on.
(a)Nei ghbori ngcountri esandboundari es.
(b)Natural defensesi ncl udi ngfronti ers.
(c)Poi ntsofentryandstrategi croutes.
c. Population.
(1) Total anddensi ty.
(2)Breakdowni ntosi gni fi cantethni candrel i gi ousgroups.
(3)Di vi si onbetweenurban,rural ,and/ornomadi cgroups.
(a)Largeci ti esandpopul ati oncenters.
(b)Rural settl ementpatterns.
(c)Areasandmovementpatternsofnomads.
d. NationalEconomy.
(1)Technol ogi cal standards.
(2)Natural resourcesanddegreeofsel f-suffi ci ency.
(3)Fi nanci al structureanddependenceuponforei gnai d.
(4)Agri cul tureanddomesti cfoodsuppl y.
(5)I ndustryandl evel ofproducti on.
(6) Manufactureanddemandforconsumergoods.
(7)Forei gnanddomesti ctradeandfaci l i ti es.
(8) Fuel sandpower.
(9)Tel ecommuni cati onsandradi osystems.
(10)Transportati on-U.S.standardsandadequacy.
(a)Rai l roads.
(b)Hi ghways.
(c)Waterways.
(d)Commerci al ai ri nstal l ati ons.
e. NationalSecurity.
(1) Center of pol i ti cal power and the organi zati on for nati on
defense.
(2) Mi l i tary forces (Army, Navy and Ai r Force): summary of
orderofbattl e.
(3) I nternal securi ty forces-summary of organi zati on and
strength.
(4)Parami l i taryforces:summaryoforgani zati onandstrength.
235
8. Geography
a.Climate.General cl assi fi cati onofthecountryasawhol ewi th
normal temperatures,rai nfal l ,etc.,andaverageseasonal vari ati ons.
b. Terrain. General cl assi fi cati on of the country noti ng
outstandi ngfeatures,i .e.,coasts,pl ai ns,deserts,mountai ns,hi l l sand
pl ateaus,ri vers,l akes,etc.
c. Major Geographic Subdivisions. Di vi de the: country i nto i ts
vari ous defi nabl e subdi vi si ons, each wi th general l y predomi nant
topographi cal characteri sti cs, i .e., coastal pl ai ns, mountai nous
pl ateau, rol l i ng, heavi l y forestedhi l l s,etc.Foreachsubdi vi si onuse
the fol l owi ng outl i ne i n a more speci fi c anal ysi s o1.' the basi c
geography
(1) Temperature. Vari ati ons front normal and, noti ng ti re.
monthsi nwhi chtheymayoccur,anyextremesthatwoul d
affectoperati ons.
(2)RainfallandSnow.Sameasc(1),above.
(3)WindandVisibility.Sameasc(l ),above.
(4)Relief.
(a)General di recti onofmountai nrangesorri dgel i nesand
whetherhi l l sandri dgesaredi ssected.
(b)General degreeofsl ope.
(c)Characteri sti csofval l eysandpl ai ns.
(d)Natural routes for and natural obstacl es to cross-
countrymovement.
(5)Land utilization. Note any pecul i ari ti es, especi al l y the
fol l owi ng:
(a)Former heavi l y forested areas subjected to wi despread
cutti ng or di ssected by paths and roads; al so, the
reverse, i .e., pasture or waste l and whi ch has been
reforested.
(b)Former waste or pasture l and that has been resettl ed
andcul ti vatednowbei ngfannedorthereverse(former
rural countrysi de that has been depopul ated and
al l owedtoreturntowastel and).
(c)Former swamp or marsh l and that has been drai ned;
former desert or waste l and now i rri gated and
cul ti vated;andl akescreatedbypost-1945darns.
(d)Whenever not coi nci dental wi th c(5) (a), (b), or (c),
above, any consi derabl e change i n rural popul ati on
densi tysi nce1945i snoted.
(6)Drainage.General pattern.
236
(a)Mai nri vers,di recti onoffl ow.
(b)Characteri sti cs of ri vers and streams such as current,
banks,depths,typeofbottomandobstacl es,etc.
(c)Seasonal vari ati on,suchasdrybedsandfl ashfl oods.
(d)Large l akes or areas of marry ponds and/or swamps,
(potenti al LZsforamphi bi ousai rcraft).
(7)Coast. Exami ne pri mari l y for i nfi l trati on, exfi l trati on and
resuppl ypoi nts.
(a)Ti desandwaves:wi ndsandcurrent.
(b)Beachfooti ngandcoveredexi troutes.
(c)Qui etcovesari dshal l owi nl etsorestuari es.
(8)Geologicalbasics.Typesofsoi l androckformati ons(i ncl ude
areasforpotenti al Usforl i ghtai rcraft.
(9)ForestsandOtherVegetation.Natural orcul ti vated.
(a)Type,characteri sti csandsi gni fi cantvari ati onsfromti re
normandatthedi fferentel evati ons.
(b)Coverorconceal ment-densi ty,seasonal vari ati on.
(10) Water.Ground,surface,seasonal andpotabl e.
(11) Subsistence.Noti ngwhetherseasonal oryear-round.
(a)Cul ti vated-vegetabl es,grai ns,frui ts,nuts,etc.
(b) Natural -berri es,frui ts,nuts,herbs,etc.
(c)Wi l dl i fe-ani mal s,fi shandfowl .
9. People
Ti re fol l owi ng suboutl i ne shoul d be used for an anal ysi s of the
popul ati on i n any gi ven regi on or country or as the basi s for art
exami nati onofthepeopl ewi thi nasubdi vi si onassuggestedi n5c.I n
al l eventsparti cul arattenti onshoul dbegi ventothoseareaswi thi na
country where the l ocal i nhabi tants have pecul i ari ti es and arc at
consi derabl evari ancei noneormorewaysfromthenormal ,nati onal
wayofl i fe.
a.BasicRacialStockandPhysicalCharacteristics.
(1) Types,features,dressandhabi ts.
(2)Si gni fi cantvari ati onsfromthenorm.
b. StandardofLivingandCultural(Education)Levels.
(1)Pri mari l ynotetheextremesawayfromaverage.
(2) Cl assstructure.(Degreeofestabl i shedsoci al strati fi cati on
andpercentageofpopul ati oni neachcl ass.)
c. HealthandMedicalStandards.
(1)CommonDi seases.
237
(2) StandardsofPubl i cHeal th.

(3)Medi cal Faci l i ti esandPersonnel .
(4) Potabl ewatersuppl y.
(5) Suffi ci encyofmedi cal suppl i esandequi pment.
d. Ethnic Components. Thi s shoul d be anal yzed onl y i f of suffi -
ci ent si ze, strength and establ i shed bonds to consti tute a di ssi dent
mi nori tyofsomeconsequence.
(1)Locati onorconcentrati on.
(2) Basi sfordi scontentandmoti vati onforchange.
(3) Opposi ti ontomajori tyand/ortothepol i ti cal regi me.
(4) Anyexternal orforei gnti esofsi gni fi cance.
e. Religion.
(1) Note wherei n the nati onal rel i gi on defi ni tel y shapes the
acti onsandatti tudesofthei ndi vi dual .
(2) Rel i gi ous di vi si ons. Major and mi nor rel i gi ous groups of
consequence.Seed(1)through(4)above.
f.TraditionsandCustoms.(Parti cul arl ytaboos.)Notewherethey
are suffi ci entl y strong and establ i shed that they may i nfl uence an
i ndi vi dual 'sacti onsoratti tudeevenduri ngatearsi tuati on.
g. RuralCountryside.
(1) Pecul i arordi fferentcustoms,dressandhabi ts.
(2)Vi l l ageandfarmbui l di ngsconstructi onmateri al s.
h. PoliticalPartiesorFactions.
(1) I fformedaroundi ndi vi dual l eadersorbasedonestabl i shed
organi zati ons.
(2) I fasi ngl edomi nantpartyexi sts,i si tnati onal i sti ci nori gi n
ordoesi thaveforei gnti es?
(3)Majorl egal parti eswi ththei rpol i ci esandgoal s.
(4)I l l egal orundergroundparti esandthei rmoti vati on.
(5) Vi ol ent opposi ti on facti ons wi thi n major pol i ti cal organ-
i zati ons.
i. Dissidence. General acti ve or passi ve potenti al , noti ng i f
di ssi dencei sl ocal i zedorrel atedtoexternal movements.
j. Resistance. (I denti fi ed movements.) Areas and nature of
acti vi ti es, strength, moti vati on, l eadershi p, rel i abi l i ty, possi bl e
contactsandexternal di recti onorsupport.
k. Guerrilla Groups. Areas and nature of operati ons, strength,
equi pment, l eaders rel i abi l i ty, contacts and external di recti on or
support.
238
10. Enemy
a.Political.
(1)Outside power. (Number and status of nonnati onal
personnel , thei r i nfl uence, organi zati onandmechani smof
control .)
(2)DominantNationalParty.Dependenceuponandti eswi th
an outsi de power; strength, organi zati on, and apparatus;
evi dences of di ssensi on at any l evel i n the party; and the
l ocati onofthoseareaswi thi nthecountrythatareunderan
especi al l ystrongorweaknonnati onal control .
b.ConventionalMilitaryForces.(Army,Navy,Ai rForce.)
(1)Nonnati onal oroccupyi ngforcesi nthecountry.
(a)Moral e,di sci pl i ne,andpol i ti cal rel i abi l i ty.
(b)Personnel ,strength.
(c)Organi zati onandbasi cdepl oyment.
(d)Uni formsanduni tdesi gnati ons.
(e)Ordi naryandspeci al i nsi gni a.
(f)Leadershi p(offi cercorps).
(g)Trai ni nganddoctri ne.
(h)Equi pmentandfaci l i ti es.
(i)Logi sti cs.
(j)Effecti veness(anyunusual capabi l i ti esorweaknesses).
(2) Nati onal (i ndi genous) forces (Army, Navy, Ai r Force).See
(a)through(j)above.
c. I nternalSecurityForces(includingborderguards).
(1) Strengthandgeneral organi zati on,di sti ngui shi ngbetween
nonnati onal andnati onal el ements.
(a)Overal l control mechani sm.
(b)Speci al uni tsanddi sti ngui shi ngi nsi gni a.
(c)Moral e, di sci pl i ne and rel ati ve l oyal ty of nati ve per-
sonnel totheoccupyi ngornati onal regi me.
(d)Nonnati onal survei l l ance and control over i ndi genous
securi tyforces.
(e)Vul nerabi l i ti esi nthei nternal securi tysystem.
(2) Depl oymentanddi sposi ti onofsecuri tyel ements.
(a)Exactl ocati ondowntothesmal l estuni torpost.
(b)Chai nofcommandandcommuni cati on.
(c)Equi pment,transportati onanddegreeofmobi l i ty.
(d)Tacti cs(seasonal andterrai nvari ati ons).
239
(e) Methodsofpatrol ,suppl yandrei nforcements.
(3) Thel ocati onofal l knownguardpostsorexpectedwarti me
securi tycoverageforal l typesofi nstal l ati ons,parti cul arl y
al ong mai n LOCs (rai l roads, hi ghways, and
tel ecommuni cati on l i nes) and al ong el ectri cal power and
POLl i nes.
(4) Exactl ocati onanddescri pti onofthephysi cal arrangement
andparti cul arl yofthesecuri tyarrangementsofal l forced
l abor or concentrati on camps and any potenti al POW
i ncl osures.
(5) Al l possi bl edetai l s,preferabl ybyl ocal i ti es,ofthetypesand
effecti veness of i nternal securi ty control s, i ncl udi ng check
poi nts,i denti fi cati oncards,passportsandtravel permi ts.
11. Targets
Theobjecti vei ntargetsel ecti oni stoi nfl i ctmaxi mumdamageon
theenemywi thmi ni mumexpendi tureofmenandmateri el .I ni ti al l y,
theoperati onal capabi l i ti esofaguerri l l aforcemaybel i mi tedi nthe
i nterdi cti onordestructi onofenemytargets.Thetargetareaandthe
speci fi c poi nts of attack must be studi ed, careful l y pl anned and
pri ori ti es establ i shed. I n general , targets are l i sted i n order of
pri ori ty.
a. Railroads.
(1)Consi derati onsi nthesel ecti onofaparti cul arl i ne
(a) I mportance,bothl ocal l yandgeneral l y.
(b)Bypasspossi bi l i ti es.
(c) Numberoftracksandel ectri fi cati on.
(2) Locati on of mai ntenance crews, reserve repai r rai l s and
equi pment.
(3)Typeofsi gnal andswi tchequi pment.
(4)Vul nerabl epoi nts.
(a) Unguardedsmal l bri dgesorcul verts.
(b)Cuts,fi l l s,overhangi ngcl i ffsorundercutti ngstreams.
(c) Keyjuncti onsorswi tchi ngpoi nts.
(d) Tunnel s.
(5)Securi tysystem.
b. Telecommunications.
c. POL.
d. ElectricPower.
e. MilitaryStorageandSupply.
240
f. MilitaryHeadquartersandI nstallations.
g. RadarandElectronicDevices.
h. Highways.
i.I nlandWaterways-Canals.
j. Seaports
k. Naturalandsyntheticgaslines.
l. I ndustrialplants.
Note.Targetsl i stedi nbthroughl aredi vi ded a subsecti onsgeneral l yasshown
i naabove.Di ffer encesi nsubsecti onsarebaseduponthepecul i ar i ti esofthepar ti cul ar
targetsystem.
SectionIII.OPERATIONALAREAINTELLIGENCE
12. General
Thi s i s a gui de for operati onal area i ntel l i gence. The attached
outl i ne serves to bri ng the essenti al s i nto focus. I t i s bui l t upon
secti on11,General AreaStudyGui de,butnarrowsthefactorssothat
they appl y to a rel ati vel y smal l and speci fi c area. I t refi nes the
cri ti cal el ements and puts them i nto the perspecti ve of an actual
operati onatagi venti me.
13. Purpose
Tooutl i nethedevel opmentofdetai l edi ntel l i genceonanassi gned
guerri l l a warfare operati onal area to support the commi tment of a
speci al forcesdetachment.
14. Format
a. Sel ectthoseel ementsthatareappl i cabl etothesi tuati onand
the assi gned guerri l l a warfare operati onal area for the ti me of the
yearfromsecti onI I .Useappropri atesecti onsofparagraphs5-8.
b. Cul l al l nonessenti al s and prepare a strai ghtforward
summati onofbasi cfacts.
c. Note seri ous gaps i n data as processed i n b above and take
i mmedi ate acti on to fi l l them wi th the most current rel i abl e
i nformati on.
d. Prepare or request graphi cs; l arge-scal e sheets and speci al
maps coveri ng the assi gned area; the l atest photography and
i l l ustrati on or i nformati on sheets on targets wi thi n the area; town
pl ans, sketches of i nstal l ati ons, ai r andhydrographi cchartsrel ated
tothearea.
241
e. Wi thi n the ti me l i mi ts permi tted, assembl e the materi al for
ready reference. Then proceed to pl ot on maps and/or overl ays,
whereverfeasi bl e,thefol l owi ng:
(1)Recommendedi ni ti al guerri l l abasesandal ternatebases.
(2) Pri maryandal ternateDZs,LZs,orpoi ntsforotherforms
ofi nfi l trati on.
(3) Possi bl e di recti on and ori entati on poi nts for i nfi l trati on
vehi cl es(ai rcraft,boat),l andmarks,etc.
(4) Routesfromi nfi l trati onpoi nttol i kel yguerri l l abasewi th
stopoversi tes.
(5) Poi nts for arranged or anti ci pated contacts wi th fri endl y
el ements.
(6) Enemy forces known or anti ci pated-l ocati on,strength and
capabi l i ti es.
(7) Esti mate of enemy operati ons or movements duri ng the
i nfi l trati onperi od.
(8) Settl ements and/or scattered farms i n the vi ci ni ty of the
i nfi l trati onpoi ntandtentati veguerri l l abases.
(9) Al l rai l roads, hi ghways, tel ecommuni cati ons, etc., i n the
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal area.
(10)Al l i mportanti nstal l ati onsandfaci l i ti es.
(11)Si gni fi cantterrai nfeatures.
(12) Off-roadroutesandcondi ti onsformovementi nal l di rec-
ti ons.
(13)Di stancesbetweenkeypoi nts.
(14) Recommendedpoi ntofattackonassi gnedtargetsystems
andsel ecti onofotherpotenti al targetareas.
f. As ti me permi ts, conti nue to col l ect i nformati on and revi se
esti mates i n keepi ng wi th more current i ntel l i gence. Devel op
i ncreasi ngdetai l on(1)through(14)abovewi thspeci al emphasi s
(1) Onthel ocal i ndi genousi nhabi tants
(a)Ethni cori gi nsandrel i gi on.
(b)Local tradi ti ons,customsanddress.
(c)Food,rati oni ng,currency,etc.
(d)Atti tudes toward the regi me, the Uni ted States, for or
agai nstexi sti ngpol i ti cal i deol ogi es.
(e)Any pecul i ari ti es, or vari ances among i ndi vi dual s or
smal l groups.
(2)Enemy,mi l i taryforcesandi nstal l ati ons.
(3)I nternal securi tyforcesandpol i ce.
242
(a)Organi zati on,l ocati onsandstrengths.
(b)Uni tdesi gnati ons,i nsi gni aanduni forms.
(c)Areascoveredanduni tresponsi bi l i ti es.
(d)Checkpoi nts,control sandcurrentdocumentati on.
(e)Patrol sandmobi l euni ts.
(4)Geographi cfeaturesi ngreaterdetai l .
(5) Approachi ng seasonal cl i mati c changes and thei r effect
uponweatherandterrai n.
(6)Targetcategori esandtargetareasi ngreaterdetai l .
243
APPENDIXIV
AREAASSESSMENT
SectionI.GENERALANDINITIALASSESSMENT
15. General
a. I n order to pl an and di rect operati ons, Speci al Forces
detachment commanders need certai n basi c i nformati on about the
operati onal area. Thi s i nformati on, when gathered or confi rmed i n
theoperati onal area,i scal l edanareaassessment,
b. Anareaassessmenti sthei mmedi ateandconti nui ngcol l ecti on
of i nformati on started after i nfi l trati on i n a guerri l l a warfare
operati onal area.I thasthefol l owi ngcharacteri sti cs:
(1) I tconfi rms,corrects,orrefutesprevi ousi ntel l i genceofthe
areaacqui redasaresul tofareastudi esandothersources
pri ortoi nfi l trati on.
(2)I ti saconti nui ngprocess.
(3) I tformsthebasi sforoperati onal andl ogi sti cal pl anni ngfor
thearea.
(4) I n addi ti on to i nformati on of the enemy, weather, and
terrai n, i t needs i nformati on on the di fferentl y moti vated
segmentsoftheci vi l popul ati onandtheareaofoperati ons.
c. Thei nformati ondevel opedasaresul toftheareaassessment
shoul d be transmi tted to the SFOB onl y when there i s suffi ci ent
devi ati onfromprevi ousi ntel l i genceandthei nformati onwoul dhave
ani mpactonthepl ansofhi gherheadquarters.TheSFOBprescri bes
i nappropri ateSOP'sandannexesthosei temstobereported.
d. Thefol l owi ngoutl i ne,contai ni ngthemajori temsofi nterestto
theareacommand,i sanexampl eofhowsuchanassessmentmaybe
accompl i shed.
e. Emphasi s and pri ori ty on speci fi c i tems fl uctuates wi th the
si tuati on.
f. Thi s outl i ne i s desi gned to faci l i tate the col l ecti on processi ng,
andcol l ati onoftherequi redmateri al andmaybeconsi deredtohave
twodegreesofurgency.
(1) I mmedi ate. I ni ti al assessment i ncl udes those i tems
deemed essenti al to the operati onal detachment
i mmedi atel y fol l owi ng i nfi l trati on. These requi rements
mustbesati sfi edassoonaspossi bl eafterthedetachment
arri vesi ntheoperati onal area.
244
(2) Subsequent.Pri nci pal assessment,aconti nuousoperati on,
i ncl udes those col l ecti on efforts whi ch support the
conti nuedpl anni ngandconductofoperati ons.I tformsthe
basi sforal l ofthedetachment'ssubsequentacti vi ti esi nthe
operati onal area.
16. InitialAssessment
a. Locati onandori entati on.
b. Detachmentphysi cal condi ti on.
c. Overal l securi ty,
(1) I mmedi atearea.
(2)Atti tudeofthel ocal popul ati on.
(3)Local enemysi tuati on.
d. Statusofthel ocal resi stanceel ements.
SectionII.PRINCIPALASSESSMENT
17. TheEnemy
a. Di sposi ti on.
b. Composi ti on,i denti fi cati on,andstrength.
c. Organi zati on,armament,andequi pment.
d. Degreeoftrai ni ng,moral e,andcombateffecti veness.
e. Operati ons.
(1)Recentandcurrentacti vi ti esoftheuni t.
(2) Counterguerri l l aacti vi ti esandcapabi l i ti eswi thparti cul ar
attenti onto:reconnai ssanceuni ts,speci al troops(ai rborne,
mountai n,rangertype),rotarywi ngorverti cal l i ftavi ati on
uni ts, counteri ntel l i gence uni ts, and uni ts havi ng a mass
CBRdel i verycapabi l i ty.
f. Uni tareasofresponsi bi l i ty.
g. Dai l yrouti neoftheuni ts.
h. Logi sti cal supporttoi ncl ude
(1)I nstal l ati onsandfaci l i ti es.
(2)Suppl yroutes.
(3)Methodoftroopmovement.
i. Pastandcurrentrepri sal acti ons.
18. SecurityandPoliceUnits
a. Dependabi l i tyandrel i abi l i tytotheexi sti ngregi meand/orthe
occupyi ngpower.
245
b. Di sposi ti on.
c. Composi ti on,i denti fi cati on,andstrength.
d. Organi zati on,armament,andequi pment.
e. Degreeoftrai ni ng,moral e,andeffi ci ency.
f. Uti l i zati onandeffecti venessofi nformers.
g. I nfl uenceonandrel ati onswi ththel ocal popul ati on.
h. Securi ty measures over publ i c uti l i ti es and government
i nstal l ati ons.
19. CivilGovernment
a. Control sandrestri cti ons,suchas:
(1)Documentati on.
(2)Rati oni ng.
(3)Travel andmovementrestri cti ons.
(4)Bl ackoutsandcurfews.
b. Currentval ueofmoney,wagescal es.
c. Theextentandeffectofthebl ackmarket.
d. Pol i ti cal restri cti ons.
e. Rel i gi ousrestri cti ons.
f. Thecontrol andoperati onofi ndustry,uti l i ti es,agri cul ture,and
transportati on.
20. CivilianPopulation
a. Atti tudestowardtheexi sti ngregi meand/oroccupyi ngpower.
b. Atti tudestowardtheresi stancemovement.
c. Reacti ontoUni tedStatessupportoftheresi stance.
d. Reacti on to enemy acti vi ti es wi thi n the country and,
speci fi cal l y, that porti on whi ch i s i ncl uded i n guerri l l a warfare
operati onal areas.
e. General heal thandwel l -bei ng.
21. PotentialTargets
a. Rai l roads.
b. Tel ecommuni cati ons.
c. POL.
d. El ectri cpower..
e. Mi l i tarystorageandsuppl y.
f. Mi l i taryheadquartersandi nstal l ati ons.
g. Radarandel ectroni cdevi ces.
246
h. Hi ghways.
i. I nl andwaterwaysandcanal s.
j. Seaports.
k. Natural andsyntheti cgasl i nes.
l. I ndustri al pl ants.
m. Keypersonal i ti es.
22. Weather
a. Preci pi tati on,cl oudcover,temperatureandvi si bi l i ty,seasonal
changes.
b. Wi ndspeedanddi recti on.
c. Li ght data (BMNT, EENT, sunri se, sunset, moonri se, and
moonset.)
23. Terrain
a. Locati onofareassui tabl eforguerri l l abases,uni ts,andother
i nstal l ati ons.
b. Potenti al l andi ngzones,dropzonesandotherrecepti onsi tes.
c. Routessui tabl efor
(1)Guerri l l as.
(2) Enemyforces.
d. Barri erstomovement.
e. Theseasonal effectoftheweatheronterrai nandvi si bi l i ty.
24. ResistanceMovement
a. Guerrillas.
(1)Di sposi ti on,strength,andcomposi ti on.
(2)Organi zati on,armament,andequi pment.
(3)Statusoftrai ni ng,moral e,andcombateffecti veness.
(4) Operati onstodate.
(5) Cooperati on and coordi nati on between vari ous exi sti ng
groups.
(6) General atti tude towards the Uni ted States, the enemy
andvari ousel ementsoftheci vi l i anpopul ati on.
(7)Moti vati onofthevari ousgroups.
(8) Cal i berofseni orandsubordi natel eadershi p.
(9)Heal thoftheguerri l l as.
b.Auxiliariesand/ ortheUnderground.
(1) Di sposi ti on,strength,anddegreeoforgani zati on.
247
(2)Moral e,general effecti venessandtypeofsupport.
(3)Moti vati onandrel i abi l i ty.
(4)Responsi venesstoguerri l l aand/orresi stancel eaders.
(5) General atti tude towards the Uni ted States, the enemy,
andvari ousguerri l l agroups.
25. LogisticsCapabilityoftheArea
a. Avai l abi l i tyoffoodstocksandwatertoi ncl udeanyrestri cti ons
forreasonsofheal th.
b. Agri cul turecapabi l i ty.
c. Typeandavai l abi l i tyoftransportati onofal l categori es.
d. Types and l ocati on of ci vi l i an servi ces avai l abl e for
manufactureandrepai rofequi pmentandcl othi ng.
e. Suppl i esl ocal l yavai l abl etoi ncl udetypeandamount.
f. Medi cal faci l i ti es to i ncl ude personnel , medi cal suppl i es, and
equi pment.
g. Enemysuppl ysourcesaccessi bl etotheresi stance.
248
APPENDIXV
GLOSSARYOFTERMS
26. General
a. Thi sgl ossaryoftermsi sprovi dedtoenabl etheusertohave
readi l y avai l abl e terms uni que to unconventi onal warfare found i n
thi smanual .Al thoughsometermsarecontai nedi nJCSPub1and
AR 320-5 they are reproduced here for the benefi t of personnel not
havi ngreadyaccesstothosepubl i cati ons.Othertermsarenotfound
el sewherebutarei ncommoni magei nSpeci al Forcesuni tsandare
moredescri pti vethanotherpresentl yacceptedtermsorfi l l agapi n
theabsenceofaterm.Wheredi fferencesexi stbetweenarmyterms
andJCSterms,theJCStermi susedbecauseofi tsjoi ntacceptance.
27. Terms
a.Area Command.Theorgani zati oncomposedofSpeci al Forces
and resi stance el ements (guerri l l a forces, auxi l i ari es and the
underground)l ocatedwi thi naguerri l l awarfareoperati onal areafor
the purpose of di recti ng al l area operati ons. Al so cal l ed sector
command when a subdi vi si on of an area command. See
unconventi onal warfareforces.
b. Area,Complex.Anareacompl exconsi stsofguerri l l abasesand
vari ous supporti ng faci l i ti es and el ements. The acti vi ti es normal l y
i ncl udedi ntheareacompl exare:securi tyandi ntel l i gencesystems,
communi cati ons systems, mi ssi on support si tes, recepti on si tes,
suppl yi nstal l ati ons,trai ni ngareas,andothersupporti ngfaci l i ti es.
c. AuxiliaryForce.Thatel ementoftheareacommandestabl i shed
to provi de for an organi zed ci vi l i an support of the resi stance
movement
d. DeniedArea.Compri sestheenemyhomel and,enemyoccupi ed
terri tory and other areas i n whi ch the government or peopl e are
subjecttothedi rectori ndi rectcontrol oftheenemy.Byvi rtueofthi s
enemycontrol ,theseareasarenormal l ydeni edtofri endl yforces.
e. Evasion and Escape. That part of unconventi onal warfare
whereby fri endl y mi l i tary personnel and other sel ected i ndi vi dual s
areenabl edtoemergefromenemy-hel dorunfri endl yareastoareas
underfri endl ycontrol (JCSPub1).
f. Guerrilla. An armed combatant who engages i n guerri l l a
warfare.Aguerri l l abel ongstoauni torgani zedal ongmi l i taryl i nes
andmayormaynotbeamemberofami l i taryforce.
249
g. Guerrilla Base. A guerri l l a base i s a temporary si te where

i nstal l ati ons, headquarters and uni ts are l ocated. There i s usual l y
morethanoneguerri l l abasewi thi nanareacompl ex.Fromabase,
l i nes of communi cati ons stretch out connecti ng other bases and
vari ousel ementsoftheareacompl ex.I nstal l ati onsnormal l yfoundat
a guerri l l a base are: command posts, trai ni ng and bi vouac areas,
suppl ycaches,communi cati onsandmedi cal faci l i ti es.I nspi teofthe
i mpressi on of permanence of ti l e i nstal l ati ons, a guerri l l a base i s
consi dered temporary and tenant guerri l l a uni ts must be abl e to
rapi dl yabandonthebasewhenrequi red.
h. GuerrillaForce.Theovert,mi l i tari l yorgani zedel ementofthe
areacommand.
i.GuerrillaWarfare.Combatoperati onsconductedi nenemyhel d
terri tory by predomi nantl y i ndi genous forces on a mi l i tary or
parami l i tary basi s, to reduce the combat effecti veness, i ndustri al
capaci tyandmoral eoftheenemy(AR320-5).
j. Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area (Guerri l l a Warfare Area,
Operati onal Area). A geographi cal area i n whi ch the organi zati on,
devel opment, conduct and supervi si on of guerri l l a warfare and
associ ated acti vi ti es by speci al forces detachments assi sts the
accompl i shment of the theater mi ssi on. The terms operati onal area
andguerri l l awarfareareaareusedsynonymousl y.
k. Guerrilla Warfare Operational Sector. A subdi vi si on of a
guerri l l awarfareoperati onal areawi thi nwhi chasi ngl especi al forces
detachmenti sresponsi bl efortheorgani zati on,devel opment,conduct,
andsupervi si onofguerri l l awarfareandassoci atedacti vi ti es.
l. J oint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (J UWTF). An
organi zati oncomposedofel ementsoftwoormoreservi ceswhi chi s
consti tutedanddesi gnatedbythecommanderofauni fi edorspeci fi ed
commandtopl anforanddi rectunconventi onal warfare.
m. Mission Support Site. A rel ati vel y secure si te, uti l i zed by a
guerri l l a force as a temporary stopover poi nt. I t adds reach to
guerri l l a operati ons by enabl i ng uni ts to stay away from and go
fartherfrombasesforal ongerperi odofti me.Food,ammuni ti onand
thel atesti ntel l i gencei nformati onmaybemadeavai l abl eatthi ssi te.
n. SpecialForcesOperationalBase(SFOB).
(1) Anorgani zati onwhi chi scomposedofaspeci al forcesgroup
and attached or supporti ng uni ts to provi de command,
admi ni strati on,trai ni ng,operati onal supervi si on,l ogi sti cal
support and i ntel l i gence for commi tted speci al forces
detachments.
(2)Thel ocati onoftheSpeci al Forcesgroupduri ngoperati ons.
250
o.Sponsoring Power. Any nati on whi ch supports a resi stance
effort.
p. Subversion Against a Hostile State (Resistance). That part of
unconventi onal warfare compri si ng acti ons by underground
resi stancegroupsforthepurposeofreduci ngthemi l i tary,economi c,
psychol ogi cal ,orpol i ti cal potenti al ofanenemy.Asresi stancegroups
devel op strength, thei r acti ons may become overt and thei r status
shi fttothatofaguerri l l aforce(JCSPub1).
q. Unconventional Warfare. The three i nterrel ated fi el ds of
guerri l l awarfare,evasi onandescape,andsubversi on.(JCSPub1).
r. Unconventional Warfare Forces. Forces who engage i n
unconventi onal warfare.Forthepurposeofthi smanual ,UWforces
i ncl ude both U.S. forces (speci al forces detachments) and the
sponsored resi stance force (guerri l l as, auxi l i ari es and the
underground).Oftenusedi nterchangeabl ywi thareacommand.
251
INDEX
Airbornespecialforcesgroup:
Additionalconsiderations--------------------------------
Administrationdetachment-----------------------------
Augmentationdetachment------------------------------
Capabilities------------------------------------------------
Communicationsplatoon -------------------------------
Concept ----------------------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Headquartersandheadquarterscompany -----------
Intelligencerequirements -------------------------------
Intelligencesection ---------------------------------------
Logisticalresponsibility----------------------------------
Mission-----------------------------------------------------
OperationaldetachmentA ------------------------------
OperationaldetachmentB ------------------------------
OperationaldetachmentC ------------------------------
Organization-----------------------------------------------
Specialforcescompany----------------------------------
Areaassessment----------------------------------------------
Areacommand:
Commandgroup------------------------------------------
Composition-----------------------------------------------
Concept ----------------------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Areastudyguide----------------------------------------------
Auxiliaryforces:
Characteristics--------------------------------------------
Location----------------------------------------------------
Methodofoperation--------------------------------------
Organization-----------------------------------------------
Definition --------------------------------------------------
Missions:
Civiliancontrol ---------------------------------------
Counterintelligence ----------------------------------
Evasionandescape ----------------------------------
Intelligence --------------------------------------------
Logistics -----------------------------------------------
Other ---------------------------------------------------
Psychologicalwarfare --------------------------------
Recruiting ---------------------------------------------
Securityandwarning --------------------------------
Cataloguesupplysystem ------------------------------------
Paragraph
15
14
17,21b
15
25a
14
13
45b
16,21c
27
37
14
17
17
17
15
17,21c
63b,app.IV
65b,72
65b
65c
65a
app.III
69
69a
69c
69b
68b
70g
70c
70h
70b
70d,90c
70i
70f
70e
70a,79
app.II
Page
18
18
21,27
18
34
18
18
55
19,28
38
47
18
21
21
21
18
21,28
70,244
72,86
72
72
72
234
80
80
82
80
80
85
84
85
84
84,96
85
84
84
83,92
188
252
Combatemployment::
Afterlinkup:
Civilaffairsassistance-------------------------------
Commandrelationships-----------------------------
Conventionalcombatoperations-------------------
Counterguerrillaoperations -----------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Missions -----------------------------------------------
Rearareasecurity------------------------------------
Reconnaissanceandsecuritymissions -----------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Toassistconventionalforces:
Commandrelationships-----------------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Linkupoperations------------------------------------
Missions -----------------------------------------------
Specialconsiderations-------------------------------
Supportofairborneoperations --------------------
Supportofamphibiousoperations ----------------
Supportofgroundoffensiveoperations-----------
Communications:
Air-groundsystem ---------------------------------------
Areacommandsystem ----------------------------------
Areainternalsystem -------------------------------------
Basecommandsystem ----------------------------------
General ----------------------------------------------------
Influencingfactors ---------------------------------------
Meansavailable ------------------------------------------
Radiooperatortraining----------------------------------
Security ----------------------------------------------------
SFOBtheatersystem ------------------------------------
Specialpurposesystems --------------------------------
Demobilization
Assemblyoftheguerrillaforce -------------------------
Awardsanddecorations---------------------------------
Collectionofarmsandequipment ---------------------
Completionofadministrativerecords -----------------
Coursesofaction -----------------------------------------
Cureofsickandwounded ------------------------------
Discharge --------------------------------------------------
General ----------------------------------------------------
Planning:
Civilaffairsrole ---------------------------------------
Specialforcesrole ------------------------------------
Rehabilitationandemployment ------------------------
Roleofthesponsor---------------------------------------
Settlementofclaims -------------------------------------
Settlementofpay,allowancesandbenefits ----------
Auxiliaryandtheunderground ------------------------
Paragraph
147
142
143
146
140
141
145
144
95
135
132
139
133
134
137
138
136
48c
48d
48c
48b
47,84
50,87
49,85
52
51,86
48a
48f
157
161
162
158
156
163
164
153
155
155
165
154
160
159
Page
166
165
165
166
164
164
166
165
103
146
145
161
145
146
156
159
151
59
59
59
59
58
61,94
61,94
62
61,94
58
61
179
180
180
179
178
181
181
177
178
178
181
177
179
179
253
Evasionandescape:
Definition --------------------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Mission:
Auxiliaries ---------------------------------------------
Guerrillas ----------------------------------------------
Glossaryofterms ---------------------------------------------
Guerrillaforces:
Combatemployment,general --------------------------
Defensiveoperations:
Defenseagainstencirclement ----------------------
Encirclement ------------------------------------------
Measures ----------------------------------------------
Partridgedrive ----------------------------------------
Preparationagainstenemyoffensives-------------
Definition --------------------------------------------------
Demobilization --------------------------------------------
Establishment --------------------------------------------
Evasionandescape --------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Logistics----------------------------------------------------
Missions:
AssistconventionalforcesengagedinCombat
Operations----------------------------------------
Interdiction --------------------------------------------
Psychologicalwarfare --------------------------------
Supportthetheatercommander-------------------
Organizationalgoal---------------------------------------
Specialintelligencetasks -------------------------------
Guerrillawarfare:
Characteristics--------------------------------------------
Definition --------------------------------------------------
Effects ------------------------------------------------------
Forces:
Capabilities--------------------------------------------
Limitations --------------------------------------------
Nature ------------------------------------------------------
Responsibility ---------------------------------------------
Guerrillawarfareoperationalareas:
Areacontrol -----------------------------------------------
Areacommand--------------------------------------------
Areasuperiority-------------------------------------------
Areasupremacy ------------------------------------------
Commandandcontrol -----------------------------------
Commandgroup------------------------------------------
Communications -----------------------------------------
Controlcriteria--------------------------------------------
Designation------------------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Paragraph
app.V
2,36,8a
70
100e,132
app.V
95
131
130
129
130
128
67c
153-166
67d
100e
67a
88-94
99
100b
100c
99,100
67b
100d
6
5
98
8a
8b
97
3
96
65
96a
96b
64
72
84-87
65d
9b,62a
95
Page
249
3,12
83
107,145
249
103
140
139
138
139
137
80
177
80
107
79
95
105
106
106
105,106
79
106
8
8
105
12
13
103
3
103
72
103
103
70
86
93
73
14,69
103
254
GuerrillawarfareoperationalareasContinued
Infiltrationofdetachment::
ExpansionfromOneDetachment -----------------
ExpansionfromSeveralDetachments ------------
MultipleDetachments -------------------------------
OneDetachment -------------------------------------
Intelligence ------------------------------------------------
Logistics ---------------------------------------------------
Organization:
Areaassessment -------------------------------------
Areacomplex -----------------------------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Guerrillabase-----------------------------------------
Objectives ---------------------------------------------
Responsibility ---------------------------------------------
Sectors -----------------------------------------------------
Infiltration:
Air:
Advantages --------------------------------------------
Characteristicsofaircraft ---------------------------
Disadvantages ----------------------------------------
Responsibility-----------------------------------------
Definition --------------------------------------------------
Influencingfactors ---------------------------------------
Land:
Advantages --------------------------------------------
Disadvantages ----------------------------------------
Means ------------------------------------------------------
Staybehind:
Advantages --------------------------------------------
Disadvantages ----------------------------------------
Water:
Advantages --------------------------------------------
Disadvantages ----------------------------------------
Initialcontact:
Coincidentwithinfiltration -----------------------------
Priortoinfiltration ---------------------------------------
Intelligence:
General ----------------------------------------------------
JUWTF -----------------------------------------------------
Operationalarea:
Agenciesandsources--------------------------------
Capabilities -------------------------------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Guerrillawarfare -------------------------------------
Operationaldetachment --------------------------------
Postinfiltration -------------------------------------------
Pre-infiltration --------------------------------------------
Requirements ---------------------------------------------
Specialforcesgroup -------------------------------------
Paragraph
65C
65C
65c
65C
81-83
88-94
63a
66b
66a
66b
63a
3b
62b
56
56
56
56
55
60
58
58
55
59
59
57
57
54
53
4d
45
82
83
81
46
45
45
45
45
45
Page
72
72
72
72
93
95
70
77
77
77
69
3
69
64
64
64
64
64
67
66
66
64
66
66
65
65
63
63
54
54
93
93
93
57
54
54
54
54
54
255
IntelligenceContinued
Specialforcesoperationalbase ------------------------
Specialintelligencetasks -------------------------------
Interdiction
Airwaysystems -------------------------------------------
Communicationssystems-------------------------------
Fuelsupplysystems ------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Highwaysystems -----------------------------------------
Planning ---------------------------------------------------
Powersystems --------------------------------------------
Railroadsystems------------------------------------------
Watersupplysystems -----------------------------------
Waterwaysystems----------------------------------------
JointUnconventionalWarfareTaskForce:
Functions --------------------------------------------------
Intelligencerequirements -------------------------------
Logisticalsupport ----------------------------------------
OperationalcontrolofUWforces-----------------------
Organization-----------------------------------------------
Logistics:
DoctrineandPolicies ------------------------------------
Evacuation ------------------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
J4 ----------------------------------------------------------
JUWTFResponsibility -----------------------------------
Management ----------------------------------------------
MedicalService:
Evacuation --------------------------------------------
Expansionofmedicalsupport----------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Guerrillamedicaldetachment----------------------
Organization-----------------------------------------------
Services ----------------------------------------------------
Specialforcesgroup--------------------------------------
Specialforcesoperationalbase ------------------------
Storage -----------------------------------------------------
Supply:
Accompanyingsupplyloads ------------------------
Accountability ----------------------------------------
Automaticresupply ----------------------------------
Caches -------------------------------------------------
Cataloguesupplysystem ---------------------------
Emergencyresupply ---------------------------------
Externalsupply---------------------------------------
Frequencyrate----------------------------------------
Internalsupply ---------------------------------------
Prepackaging------------------------------------------
Requirements -----------------------------------------
Stockpiling--------------------------------------------
Paragraph
45
100d
122
123
126
117
120
118
124
119
125
121
11
45b,45c
33b
12
10
38
40
88
35
34
43
93e
93f
93a,b,c,
93d
90
42,94
37
32
91C
I41
41
41
41
41,app.II
41
91a
41
91b
41
41,89
41
Page
54
106
136
136
137
130
135
132
136
132
137
135
15
55,56
46
16
14
48
48
95
47
46
53
100
101
99,100
100
96
53,102
47
42
98
I49
49
49
49
49,234
49
96
49
97
49
49,95
49
256
LogisticsContinued
Theaterarmy----------------------------------------------
Transportation --------------------------------------------
Operations
Defensive:
Defenseagainstencirclement ----------------------
Defensivemeasures ---------------------------------
Encirclement------------------------------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Preparationagainstenemyoffensives-------------
Offensive:
Actionintheobjectivearea -------------------------
Ambushes ---------------------------------------------
Characteristics ---------------------------------------
Conductoftheambush -----------------------------
General ------------------------------------------------
Largeraids --------------------------------------------
Miningandsniping ----------------------------------
Movement ---------------------------------------------
Organizationoftheraidforce ----------------------
Preparationforanambush -------------------------
Preparationforaraid --------------------------------
Raids ---------------------------------------------------
Specialambushsituations -------------------------
Tacticalcontrolmeasures---------------------------
Targetselection---------------------------------------
Withdrawal --------------------------------------------
PsychologicalOperations:
Concept ----------------------------------------------------
Missionforguerrillasandauxiliaries -----------------
Organization:
Nationallevel------------------------------------------
Theaterlevel ------------------------------------------
Targetaudiences:
Civiliancollaborators --------------------------------
Civilianpopulation-----------------------------------
Enemymilitary ---------------------------------------
Guerrillasandauxiliaries ---------------------------
TypesofPsychologicalOperations:
Actionoperations-------------------------------------
Printedmedia------------------------------------------
Rumor--------------------------------------------------
References
Resistance:
Definition --------------------------------------------------
InfluencingFactors --------------------------------------
Nature------------------------------------------------------
Security:
Bizonalsystem:
Innerzone ---------------------------------------------
Outerzone --------------------------------------------
Paragraph
36
39,92
131
129
130
127
128
109
112
102
114
101
111
116
108
106
113
107
105
115
103
104
110
148,149
70f,100c
149
149
150a
150b
150a
150c
151
151
151
app.I
4b
4d
4c
74b
74c
Page
47
48,99
140
138
139
137
137
117
123
108
125
107
121
128
117
114
124
115
114
126
109
111
117
169,170
84,106
170
170
172
172
170
173
173
173
183
5
6
5
87
87
257
SecurityContinued
Counterintelligence --------------------------------------
Discipline --------------------------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Marchsecurity --------------------------------------------
Principles:
Coveranddeception ---------------------------------
Dispersion ---------------------------------------------
Mobility ------------------------------------------------
Reactiontoenemyoperations --------------------------
Roleofauxiliariesandunderground ------------------
Specialforces:
Capabilities------------------------------------------------
Coldwar ---------------------------------------------------
Generalwar -----------------------------------------------
Limitations ------------------------------------------------
Limitedwars ----------------------------------------------
Operations-------------------------------------------------
Specialforcesoperationalbase:
Activation --------------------------------------------------
Administration --------------------------------------------
Administrativecenter ------------------------------------
Briefingcenter --------------------------------------------
Communicationscomplex ------------------------------
General-----------------------------------------------------
Intelligence ------------------------------------------------
Liaisonofficers -------------------------------------------
Location----------------------------------------------------
Logistics----------------------------------------------------
Logisticssupportelement -------------------------------
Mission-----------------------------------------------------
Operations-------------------------------------------------
Organization-----------------------------------------------
Plans -------------------------------------------------------
Supportoperations---------------------------------------
Supportingunits -----------------------------------------
Operationscenter ----------------------------------------
Training ----------------------------------------------------
Uncommitteddetachments -----------------------------
Theater
Logistics----------------------------------------------------
OperationalcontrolofUWforces----------------------
OrganizationforUW -------------------------------------
ResponsibilityforUW ------------------------------------
Unconventionalwarfare:
Definition --------------------------------------------------
Responsibilities -------------------------------------------
Paragraph
78
76
73
77
75c
75a
75b
80
79
8a
7c
7a
8b
7b
7
19b
31
21c,28,29
21b,24
21b,25
19
27,45c
23
19a,c
32
21e
20
22-27
21
26
29
21e
21b,23
30
21e
33b
72
10
9
2
3
Page
91
90
86
91
90
87
90
92
92
12
12
11
13
12
11
26
41
28,39
27,32
27,34
26
38,56
30
26
42
28
26
29
26
37
39
28
27,30
39
28
46
16
14
14
3
3
258
UnconventionalWarfareForces:
Operationalcontrol:
Tacticalcommands----------------------------------
Theater-------------------------------------------------
Underground:
Comparisonwithauxiliaries ---------------------------
Definition --------------------------------------------------
General ----------------------------------------------------
Logisticalrole ---------------------------------------------
Securityrole-----------------------------------------------
Paragraph Page
12b,c 16
12a 16
71b 85
71a 85
71a 85
90d 96
79 92
BYORDEROFTHESECRETARYOFTHEARMY
G.H.DECKER,
General,UnitedStatesArmy,
Official: ChiefofStaff.
R.V.LEE,
MajorGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy,
TheAdjutantGeneral.
Distribution:
ActiveArmy: LOGCOMD(1)
DCSPER(2) Armies(25)
ACSI(2) Corps(3)
DCSOPS(10) Div(2)except
DCSLOG(2) ArmorDiv(5)
ACSRC(2) DivArty(2)
CRD(1) Bde(1)
COA(1) Regt/Gp(1)except
CINFO(1) TOE33105(20)
TIG(1) InfBg(1)
TJAG(1) Bn(1)
TPMG(1) Co/Btry(1)
TechStf,DA(1) BrSvcSch(5)except
USCONARC(10) USAIS(2530)
ARADCOM(2) USASWS(1500)
ARADCOMRgn(1) USACGSC(5550)
OSMajComd(5) USAINTC(415)
NG:StateAG(3);UnitsorganizedunderfollowingTOE:33106,
33107(1).
USAR: SameasActiveArmy.
Forexplanationofabbreviationsused,seeAR32050.
*U.S.GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICE:1961610531/13028
259

1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations 264p

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1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations 264p

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FI ELD MANUAL

(1) Establ i shmentofaworki ngcommandrel ati onshi pbetween

the auxi l i ari es survi ve by remai ni ng i n pl ace and

g.CivilianControl.Tocontrol thepopul ati onandgi vetheenemy

secti on deal s onl y wi th the securi ty measures appl i cabl e to the

uni tsdonotmai ntai nexcessstocksofsuppl i essi ncel arge

grouptoexecutetherai dmi ssi onandmayi ncl udepersonnel detai l ed

ambushes and outposts, Securi ty el ements cover the wi thdrawal of

toderai l trai nssothatthewreckageremai nsonthetrackstodel ay

guerri l l a warfare area may be transferred to subordi nate

wi thi nthepecul i aroperati onal envi ronmenti nwhi chhei si mmersed.

(2) StandardsofPubl i cHeal th.

g. Guerrilla Base. A guerri l l a base i s a temporary si te where

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1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare &amp; Special Forces Operations 264p

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1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare &amp; Special Forces Operations 264p

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FI ELD MANUAL

(1) Establ i shmentofaworki ngcommandrel ati onshi pbetween

the auxi l i ari es survi ve by remai ni ng i n pl ace and

g.CivilianControl.Tocontrol thepopul ati onandgi vetheenemy

secti on deal s onl y wi th the securi ty measures appl i cabl e to the

uni tsdonotmai ntai nexcessstocksofsuppl i essi ncel arge

grouptoexecutetherai dmi ssi onandmayi ncl udepersonnel detai l ed

ambushes and outposts, Securi ty el ements cover the wi thdrawal of

toderai l trai nssothatthewreckageremai nsonthetrackstodel ay

guerri l l a warfare area may be transferred to subordi nate

wi thi nthepecul i aroperati onal envi ronmenti nwhi chhei si mmersed.

(2) StandardsofPubl i cHeal th.

g. Guerrilla Base. A guerri l l a base i s a temporary si te where

You might also like

1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations 264p

1961 US Army Vietnam War Guerilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations 264p