MARINE DIVISION

REINFORCED
JIMA
CM.,..
ACTION REPORT
31OCTOBER 1944-16 MARCH 1945
GROUP3-Downgraded at 12year intervals; not
maticalli/declassified. DOD Dili 52o0.10
sJE. COMKwJffllWi
MA ' GEN:G.B.ERSKINE,
1 1 MAY 1945 '
COPY NO.
4
Ser, 032l B
3 June I9U5.
V AMPHIBIOUS
c/o
FRAM3ISC0, CALIFORNIA..
1st 3ndorsement to
CG-JfiMarDiv I t r Ser
OI33O dtd
D
From; The Commanding Gener al .
To : The Commandant of t he Marine Corps.
Via : (1)TheCommandingGeneral,Expeditionary.Troops.
(2)CommanderJointExpeditionaryForce.- {
(3)CommanderFifthFleet*
(k)Commander-in-ChiefU<S.PacificFleetandFacificOcean
Areas.. .
Subject ActionHeport,IWOJIKAOperation.
1. Forwarded. -
2. The3&MarineDivisionwasinitiallyinExpeditionaryTroops
reserve. Oneregiment(HOT21)landedon Dplus2andwasassigned,temporarily
tothe1+thMarineDivision. TheremainderoftheDivisionlandedon Dulus5
andsucceedingdays,exceptHCT3whichwasneverreleasedtoLanding-Force
control. TheDivisionwascommittedasaDivisionon Dplus6betweenthe
and5*^MarineDivisionsinthe'vicinityofAirfield'Uo.2.
3 The3^MarineDivisioncarriedoutitsassignedtasksaggressively,
efficientlyandwithdispatch. Itwasthefirsttobreakthroughtheenemy-lines
intheNorthernpartoftheisland.
k. Thefollowingcommentscoverstatements,comments,andrecommenda-
tionscontainedinlike-numberedpages-.ofthebasicreport:
p.17Thestatementis.madethatthe1+thMarineDivisionconsis-
tentlyerroneouslyreportedthelocationofitsleftflank. Thisstatement
could-beappliedbothtoflankandfrontlinepositionsofallDivisions,this-
beingdue"inconsiderableparttotheinaccuracyofthebattlemap.The
particular situationmentionedwas.oneinwhichthe3dMarineDivisionwas'on
thehighergroundwhichstillcontainedaconsiderablenumberofenemy
1
installa-
tionswhichwereabletofireintotheUthMarineDivisionzoneofaction;
consequently,the4thMarineDivisionboweditsleftflankbackinordernotto
retardtheentireadvance.
p.23 Heconraendationsconcerningthenecessityforclosercon-
trolofreplacementsutilizedinitiallyintheshoremarty.are-concurredin.
TheserecommendationsarelargelyamatterforhandlingbytheDivisions. Higher
authorityshouldmakereplacementsavailable,intimeforintegrationintothe .
Division forinstructionbothintheirdutiesascoidbattroopsandtheir
c
dutieswiththeShoreParty.
kl3 JUN 1945
Ser*03213
Action I^epoyt IW0' 0
p.38 Paragraph7a*Inconnectionwiththeremarksconcern-
ingmassingofartilleryfirecontainedinparagraph7.the3&MarineDivision
wasconsistentlyfurnishedthebulkofthesupportingfiresavailabletoCorps.
IherewereaninsufficientnumberofCorpsArtilleryBattali.ons. The.3dMarine
DivisionartillerywasnotalllandedatthetimethisDivisionwascommitted
andbattalionswereborrowedfromthe4thand5thMarineDivisionstosupport'
the3&Divisionattackattheexpenseofadequateartillerysupportforthe
flankDivisions. Onseveraloccasionsfiresweremassedinsupportofattack
butinnocasedidthisresultinanimmediateadvanceofanyconsequence.
Theeffectsofth.eseconcentrationswere,however,usuallynotedonthedays
followingthat%nwhichtheywereemployed*
p.i+5 Thestatementthatelementsofthe8thFieldDepotand
G-arrisonForceswerelaiidedtooearlyintheoperationisnotconcurredin.
TheLandingForce,hadtheresponsibilityfortheemploymentofthreedivisions
andtheexecutionof.theBaseDevelopmentPlan,particularlythereadinessof
airfields. Itisrealizedthatthelandingof
(
suchelementsusedlighterage
thatcouldhavebeenusedbyotherunits,butthesolutiontothisproblemis
toprovidemorecraftsuitableforlandingequipmentandsupplies,
"ThatanadequateShorePartybetrainedandequipped,to
meetanycontingencyregardlessofwhethertheunitisareserveunit"iscon-
curredin. The3&MarineDivisionhadavailablethesamefacilities^asthe
4thand5thMarineDivisionswiththeexceptionofaconstructionbattalion.
Atthetimethe3&MarineDivisionlandedallLVT'.sandDUKttf'shadbeenpooled
forutilizationwhereverrequired.
p.46 Hecommendationshavebeenmadeconcerningarmoredbull-
dozersandconcerningthesupplyofanadequatenumberof.Weaselsforany,
projectedoperation. ItisconsideredthatAtheytrack-layingtrailer-tractors
aredesirableinspecialcases.
p.4-9 Atthetimethe3
d
-MarineDivisionwascommittedthe
fastcarriershadbeenwithdrawnandtherewasalimitedamountofcloseair
uppQirt'available. Allavailableaircraftwereemployeddaily. Itwasnoted,
,iowever,that-fewerrequestsforairsupportwerereceivedfromthe.3dMarine
Division'than'anyotherunitoftheLandingForce. Thiswasprobablyduein
greatmeasuretotherestrictedareaoccupiedbythe3&MarineDivisionand
thepracticabilityofexecutingmissionsontheflankswithlessdangerto-
adjacentunits.
-2-
/
31*.03313 ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation.-
Int ensi ve t r ai ni ng of ai r l i ai s on personnel has been
.idertafcen i n order t o permit more effect i ve employment i n fut ure operations,
1
H. SCHMIDT
opyto;
Commander.inChief,U.S.Fleet-(AdvanceCopy)
CommandantoftheMarineCorps(AdvanceCopy)
CINCPAC-OIHPOA(3copies)(AdvanceCopies)
CG,FleetMarineForce,Pacific.(AdvanceCopy)
CommanderinChief,SouthwestPacificAreas(AdvanceCopy)
Commander,FifthFleet(AdvanceCopy)
CG,10thArmy
CG,Air,FMF,ac
CG,IIIAmphibiousCorps
CG,1stMarineDivision
CG,2dMarineDivision
CG*3&MarineDivision
CG,4thMarineDivision
CG,5*h-MarineDivision
CG,6thMarineDivision
CommanderAmphibiousForcesPacific
'CommanderThirdFleet
CommanderSeventhFleet
CommanderThird.AmphibiousForce
CommanderFifth,AmphibiousForce
CommanderSeventhAmphibiousForce
Army-NavyStaffCollege,Washington
v
\
NavalWarCollege.,Newport,St.I.
CommandandGeneralStaffSchool,FtLeavenworth,Kansas
MarineCorpsSchools,Quantico,Ta.(3Copies)
CommanderAmphibiousTrainingCommand'Pacific
CommanderAmphibiousTrainingCommandAtlantic.
CG,TroopsTrainingUnitPacific '
CG,TrainingCenter,Camplejeune,N.C.
CG,TrainingCenter,SDA, Camp
1
Pendleton Oceanside,Calif,
OICHistoricalDiv,HQMC,Washington
CG,PacificOceanAreas
CommanderServiceForcesPacific
CommanderAircraft'Pacific
CommanderForwardAreaCentralPacific
CG,StrategicalAirForcePacificOceanArea
CG,MarineSupplyService,FMFPaa*
CG,IIICorpsArtillery
CO,VCorpsArtillery
CG
t
AGF, 86
2295
AEB/bp 3D MARIAS DIVISION, T1OT! MA.B1ITS F0RC3,
c/o F L S POST OFFICE? SAITFE/UTCISCO.
30 April
From: TheCommandingGeneral.
CommandantoftheMarineCorps*
Yiaj (1)CommandingGeneral,V AmphibiousCorps.
(2)CommandingGeneral,FMF,Pacific*
Subj ect? Action Report, IWOJ1MA Operation,,
References; (a)PacificFleetConfLetter
(Jo)FMF,PacificCenfGO
5Jnclosures:
A.
(Intelligence).
(Situation maps - Operations of
Marine Division on WO
3.
JIMA, 25 February - 16March
C. (Action Report, 9th Marines)*
D, (Action Report, 21st Marines).
Ba (Action Report, 3d Marines).
F. (Action Report, 12th Marines).
(Action Report, Service Troops)*
H.
(Action Report, Tank Battalion)
I .
(Action Report, 3d Sfoginecr Battalion),
J.
(Action Repprt, 3d Pioneer Battalion)
(Action Report, Headquarters Bat&alion)*
K.
I.
S0MMA2ST,
A* This report covers the period Ji October at which time
the, VAmphibious Corps tentative Operation Plan # 3 ~ ^ e received, , unt i l 16
March 19^5* the date on which organized resistance on IWOJIMA.was declared at
an end. . '
B. Th&3^ Marine Division {Reinf)
f
assigned as ,3bcpoditionary Troops
Reserve, began embarkation n8 February 19^5 and'coatpleted embarkation on Ik
February 19^5* Co D, 3^ Medical Battalion, which vras^to set up a hospital
aboard the LSVOZAEKand operate in tho transport area under Landing Force
control, was embarked in the OZASK on 7 February 19^5 and departed on 8 February
19^5. for SAIPAH whore i t came'Under Landing Force control* ^The 3&Tank 3n was
embarked in LSG?s 6^6 and ^77 and departed iS February I9U5 for the transport
^
n o
area, IWOJIHA, whore i t arrived 20 February 19^5 division, loss CoD,
3d Medical Bn and tho 3^ank Bn^ were embarked in Transport Squadron 11 which
was scheduled to sai l 17 February.19^5 t"o arrive in tho reserve area, approxi~
mately SOmiles southeast of ITOJIMA
f
at 2200, 19 February 3-9^5 (D-day). On
16 February 19*4-5,Transport Division 32 sailed with RCT^-21and a detachment of
Division Headquarters Group (including the Assistant Division Commander) embarked
in compliance with orders received from the Commander Joint Sxpeclitionary Jorco
on 15 February 19^5* arriving in the transport area 19 February 19
L
!-5where RCft-
21was placed in Landing Force reserve* The remainder of Transport Squadron 11
sailed on 17 February 19^-5 and'arrived in the reserve area as scheduled. On21
February 19% HCT-21was landed and attached to the ^th Marino division. Oh
22 February 19^5 Transport Division Jl, with RCT-9 and Division Headquarters
Group (less Dot) embarked, moved into tho transport area incompliance with
orders received. The division (less RCT-21 and RCT~3)
' Vx*'
Action Report, ItfO JIMA.Operation* (Cont'd),
A zone of action was assigned the division in the center with the Hth Marine
Division on the right
t
and the 5th Marine Division on the left* SGT-21, which
was in assault on the loft of the'*4-thMarino Division and in the assigned zone of
action of the 3&Marine Division> was ordered released to the 3&Marino Division.
effective' at 07OO, 25 Opobruary 19%* Division Headquarters G-roup, S.CT-9* and one
battery of the 12th Marines;were landed on the 2*+th, tfntil the 12th Marines ware
al l ashore, ar t i l l er y support was'provided "bybattalions from the 13th and l^th
Marines and Corps Art i l l ery. At 093^*
2
5 February 19^5 the division attacked in
conjunction with the kth and $th Marine Divisions with one reinforced regiment,
passing the 9th Marines (Reinf) through the 21st Marines* She attack was continued
in the division zone of action employing two,.regiments,, reinforced, ei t her in
column, abreast, or singly unt i l 3.6 March, 19^5 when a l l organized resistance was
declared at an end. (See Part IV for detailed account). On27 February 19^5,
HCI'-'3 i Expeditionary Troops^rosorvo, v/as moved into the transport area vhoro.
i t remained until- i t sailed for GUAMon 5 March 19^5* . - ' . .
I I ,
Am 1* The following i s the composition o:f the commandas embarked
for the operation:
{
3^-Marine Division
3dJASCo
3d Marine War Dog Platoon
JJCPOA Int tTeams
. >2Bth Replacement Draft
3^-^h Replacement Draft
2* 5?he 3^-AmphTruck Co and.VMO**!were under operational control
of the 3d Marine Division. The 3&Amph Truck Co was not included in the task
organisation for the operation* VMQ-1was included, but just prior to embarka-
tion, instructions wore received from Commander Joi nt Expeditionary force that
i t would not bo ombarked,
B. Joint Expeditionary Jorce Operation Plan #A2$*Jl4 assigned the
3d Marino Division (Reinf) as 3xpeditionary Troops reserve. VAmphibious Corps
Operation Plan #3-*Hi directed that when released to Corps control, the 3&Marino
Division would be prepared to land on IV/0JIMA.on or aft er Dog plus 1 day. Based
on t hi s mission plans were drawn for landing the division over any of the beaches
on tho southeast and west coasts. The preferred plan called for landing the
9th and 21st Marines abreast
#
9*h on the right, on Beaches tSLLOtT and BSD,
respectively, as*these wore the center beaches on the southeast coast, which was
the coast on which the Corps preferred plan called for the i ni t i al landing to 1
bo made. Alternate plans proscribed/landings of RCT-9 and RCT^21 abreast,
B.C2!~3 on tho ri ght , over the remaining southeast beaches and RCT-9 and HCT~21
abreast, RCT-21 on tho right,over the western beaches. In al l plans CT~3was
assigned as division reserve, prepared to land on beaches when and as ordered*
Since the situation at the time of landing could not be foreseen, plans prescribed
merely tho landing of tho division, and,movement to assembly areas, to bo assigned
just pri or to landing, prepared to execute a passage of lines to continue tho
attack, or occupy defensive positions, as ordered. It was assumed that tho
division would bo landed primarily for tho purpose of p&ssir^^jjJLgf^ggh^ either the
^ or 5tk Marine Divisions,and continuing tho attack in. th(
m 2
- - ~
* ' t
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation* (Cont
!
d).
actionofeitherofthosedivisions,or,wouldbeassignedaseparatezoneof
actiontoattackinconjunctionwiththe*Hhand5thMarineDivisions. Ineither
3aseapassageoflineswould"becalledfor* Asanoutsidepossibility,itwas
assumedthedivisionmight"borequiredtotakeupadefensivepositiontocover
awithdrawalortodefendagainstcounterlandingsontheflanks, tentative
iivisionpreferredand.alternateplanswereissuedon7Hovembor19^ Thefinal
iivisionpreferredandalternateplanswo.roissuedon22January19^5
C* 1. ]Tromth'otimethemission-ofthedivisionwasknown,emphasis
-/asplacedinalltrainingofthevariousphasesareserveunitpassesthrough
LIlandingandmovingtoanassaultrolo
#
Particularemphasiswasplacedonthe
executionofapassageoflinestocontinuetheattack. Sincethedivisionwas
lottoexecuteanassaultlanding,andsincetheexactschemeofemploymentof
;hodivisioncouldnot"beforeseen,norehearsals,assuch,worecarriedout,
AlthoughinstructionsfromCorpsindicatedthatitwas.theintentiontoprovide
thisdivisionwiththeshorepartyfacilitiesofpreviouslylandedorganizations,
inordertomeetallcontingencies
k
thoroughtraining,includingexercises,was
conductedforalltheelementsofcombatteamanddivisionshoreparties. The
28th.and3^thReplacementDraftswereattachodtotho3dPioneerBattalionfor
administrationandtrainingaspartofthedivisionshoreparty* Asthestatus
ofcombattrainingofthosetwodraftsvaafoundtobo"badlydeficient,halfof
theirtrainingtimewasdevotedtoindividualandsmallunittraining* (Stor
additionaldetailsontrainingforthisoperation,secparITe#l) Maps,models,
studies,estimates,andotherintelligenceinformationwereprocuredanddis-
tributedtoallunits, droopsweregivenallavailableinformationontho
operation,includinginstructionfrom.,mapsandmodels,aftersailingfromGrUAM
2 Althoughtheassignmentofthetacticalmissionwasreceived
In"thoCorpstontativooperationplan,received31October:19^#aCorps
tentativeadministrativeplanwasroccivedon25October19^ Onreceiptof
thisplan,immediatestepsweretakentoprocurethe.additionalequipmentand
suppliesrequiredforthoreinforceddivision. D-day,asoriginallyannounced,
wouldhavefoundthis-divisionwithanumberofcriticalshortagesinmajoritems-
ofequipment,particularlywaterdistillationunitsandgeneralengineering
equipment,butasD-daywasprogressivelymovedforward,thoseshortageswere
steadilyreduceduntilpreparationsforembarkationwerebegunwhensubstantially
alloftheTableofAllowan'cesandspecialallowancesequipmentandsupplieswere
anhand. InordertoestablisheffectiveliaisonwithCorps"andtheSupplyService,
Ji-GT,arepresentativeofthoG-^sectionwasorderedontwoseparateoccasions
toPearl'Harbor* This,measurevrasveryeffective,andtheresultinginformation
andarrangementsforsupplyprovidedthenecessaryunderstandingforintelligent
planningandpromulgationofadministrativeorders..A,tentativeadministrative
order,
1!
ListofVehiclesand3Tuel~ConsumingEquipmenttobeLifted",andan
embarkationplanweresubmittedtoCorpson10November;.19^* Upon,approval,
thesewerepublishedanddistributed,withadditionsandmodificationsnecessitated
by,changesinsuccessivedirectives,on2*+January19^5 Meanwhile,on19*December
19^<-
t
theadministrativeorderfortheembarkationwas'distributed* On15January
19te*keassemblingofcargoinareasinthevicinityofthedockswasbegun, A
eoriiplotc'system*oftrafficcontrol,ch'ockago,ancommunicationswasinstalled. 3y
6February19ty5,"beforethearrivalofthe.allocatedshipping,allcargowasin
place,palletizingcompleted,andtheloadingofficers,$($le,andassignedloading
detailswerostandingbytocommenceloading* Plannedloadswereassignedto
thevariousvoidclbs,utilizingtheircargospacefortho
- 3- - - -
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation. (Cont*d).
priorityequipment* Loadingprogressedi^'ahighlysatisfactorymanner,and
thoughtheactivities,were'spreadov.erawidearea,necessitated,"bythecongested
pertconditions,andheavygroundswellsintheharborresultedintemporary
cassationofloading,thecompletion,hourwasmet The'cooperationdisplayed^by
theofficersandcrewsofall,shipswas*decidedlyhelpful*
' ' ' > ' -
3D. 1, The t ask. organi zat i on of the 3d Marine Division as embarked
for the operation was as follows:
; - a, Hq 3d Mar Div Gfrt : , "
. . Hq Ba: . '
Atchd:
3d V/ar J)og Fl at . ^ . ^
:. 3d JASCo ( l es s Dets)
. _~ , .. J1CPOA Int e?m
. 3d Sery Bn ( l ess Dets)
, 3d, Med Bn ( l ess Cos A/B 0 8.nd D)
3d MTBn ( l ess Cos A, B a:trd 0)
3^ ^ S ^ Bn (loiss Cos A, B and C)
- . 3d Pion Bn ( l ess Cos A, Band C)
Atchd: ,'' "
Set3dJASCo '
2SthReplDraft(lessDets)
. 3*HhReplDraft(lessDets)
?
9thMarines . ,
CoA3^-ShgrBn..' .
CoA3dPioaBn '
Co.A'3dMTBn
CoB3dMedBn
Det3dJASCo ^
Det2SthReplDraft ' '.
t
,
Det>thReplD*aft
2XstMarines
~ CoB3dEngrBa
CoB3dPionBn
CoB3dMTBn
CoA3dMedBa.
Det34JASCo
Det28thReplDraft
Det3lfthReplDraft
-3^Marines
CoC3^%ng*3n
l
Co"C3dPionBn^
CoC3dMBn.
CoC3dMedBh
t
Action Report, I WOJIMA.Operation. (Coat
k
d)
d. aOE-3. - <0ont?&).
Det 3dJASCo
I)et Sth Bepl Draft
~J et 'jkth Repl Draft .' '
' ^* 1 2 t h Mar i nes ^ .. -
f. 3d Efc Bn.
ft

2. By 2200j 19 February. 19*4-5 (D--Day) t hi s division was in .
the combat area andwas disposed as follows; *
a RCT-21, embarked i n (Transport Division 32 was i n
Landing Porce reserve in the transport area. Adetachment of Hq.3d Marine Divi-
sion Group was embarked in transport Division32*
b. 3d 9?kBn, embarked in LSTs &i6and ^77 wasi n the
transport area* '
' <.
c* Hq3dMarineDivisionGroup (lessBet)"andROT-9,
embarkedin TransportDivision31,andRCT-3,embarkedin TransportDivision y$
9
wereinExpeditionaryTroopsreserve,approximatelySO milessoutheastof IWO-
JIMA* ' - '
B# Enemyforcesencountered,composition,numbers,disposition*
1* Capturedinformationhasindicatedthattheenemydefense
plans, forIWOJim,contemplatedadeterminedpassivedefensewithstrongbeach
defensescoveringthesouthern
t
landingbeaches; a mainlineof resistance
extendinggenerallynorthwest-southeast throughtheAirfieldNo*2areawith
theflanksanchoredon thecoasts;andafinaldefensive
1
linepreserveline)
generallyin thehighgroundnorth,andeastof andcoveringAirfieldNb3
(SeeEnclosureA(3)Map,e,nemyunitsencountered), ; "
2, Thisdivision,afterlanding,facedthetaskof reducing
theenemyMLRin theAirfieldHo.2areawithinitszoneof action* Captured
informationindicatesthat,atthecommencementof itsattack,the3dMrineDivision
wasconfrontedwiththebulkof the*310*
n
X
n<
iI&fBn which,designatedinitially
aspartof thereserveof the2d IndMixedBrigade,wasdefendingAirfieldHo*.2
andtheridgesto thenorththereof; wellsupportedby'artillery,anti-tank,
andair.defenseunitslocatedin thearea* Theenemydefense'sestablishedin
depthbetweenAirfieldHo*2andAirfield|To,3consistedof mutually supporting
wellconcealedpillboxes,cavepositions,anti-tank emplacements,andsome
entrenchments* Excellent enemyobservation,wellsitedandconcealedanti-
tankgunswhichwere-usedagainstinfantryaswellas tanks,andwelldirected
artilleryanmortarfire,from.bothwithinandwithoutthedivisionzone of
action,renderedthecrossingofAirfieldHo,2andthecaptureof thehigh
groundto theimmediate-northa particularlydifficulttask. Mortarsandanti-
tankgunslocatedeastofAirfieldHo*2in the4thMarineDivisionzoneof. . .
actionweretroublesometo troopsandtankssouthof".andcrossingtheairfield
untiltheweaponswereeliminatedbyadvancesofthe
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation* (Cont'd),
3 Followingthecaptureoftheildges^#A'?6if'AirfieldHo,2,
enemyresistancenoticeablydecreased,itbecameapparent,th&thismainline,of
resistancehadbeenpenetrated;,kadourtroopswereabletoadyanceintothe
westernportionsoftheAirfieldSo,3areaagainst scatteredinfantryopposition.
Artillery,mortar,andantitank
;
.fire.receivedfromthehighgroundgenerally
500yardsnorthandeastoftheairfieldrenderedmovementintheareasnorth
ofMOTOYAMAparticularlycUfficult. . '
''' 4. ThisDivisionencountereditsnextandlastserious/opposition
intherugged,brokenhigbgroundgenerally5^0yardstothenorthandeastof
AirfieldHo*3and500yardseast'ofMOTOYAMA. Hereaforceoccupyingthat,
portionoftheenemy
s
sfinaldefensivelinewithinthe3dMarineDivisionzone
ofaction,and.composedofunitsofthe5l4thIndInfBn,26thTankHegt,l45th
InfRegtand3dBn,17thIndMixedRegtaswellasmiscellaneousotherunits,
conductedadeterminedprolongedfinaldefense,iriwhichitresistedfrommutually
supportingcaves,coveredemplacements,and.openandcoveredriflepits. The
defensewasparticularlydeterminedinthecenter,ofresistancearoundHill3^2
(SeeEnclosureA (5)Map,enemydefensivedispositionseast ofAirfieldHo.3
astranslated.frommapcapturedby21st,Marines).andculminatedinthe.final
standofremnantsofthe2(SthTankKegtinTA2Q1-C,D,H,I;.18-X, (See
EnclosureA (4)Sketch,finaldefenses,26thTankRegiment),
5* Baseduponcapturedinformation,itisestimatedthatthe
3dMarineDivisxon
t
duringitsoperationsoa'ltyOJIMXfrom25February194$to
16March1945*ras
t
atvarioustimes,incontactwithenemyunitsanddetachments
whosecombinedstrengthtotalled6830* Thisfigureagreescloselywithcombat
estimates"basedoncounteddeadandtypeanddegreeofresistanceencountered,
whichasof1S00,16March1945,totalled6,5^0includingprisoners.
6. Foradiscussionofenemyunitsidentifiedinthedivision.
2oneofactionduringitsoperation,onIWOJIMA, seeEnclosureA(1),Enemy
unitsencounted.
III. ChronologicalAccountoftheAction.
25February-ByCorpsorderof24Februarythedivisionwas
assignedanassaultrole,givenazoneof.actioninthecenterwiththe4th
MarineDivisionontherightand5^
n
ontheleft,andassignedthemission
ofseizingtheline0-2,(SeeEnclosureB (2))whichextendedgenerallyalong
thehighgroundoverlookingAirfieldHo,3,initszoneofaction. The21st
Marines,attachedtothe4thMarineDivision,occupiedthi$zoneofactionon
theleftofthe4thMarineDivision.TheDivisionCPhadbeenestablishedjust
northofAirfieldHo1ph24February. Onlyonebatteryofthe12thMarines
havingbeenlandedbythemorningof25,February,the1stBn,l4thMarinesand
the4thBn,13thMarineswereattachedtothedivision* Thesetwobattalions
:fanctionedundercontrolofthe12thMarines,whoseheadquartershp,dbeen
establishedashore. The1stBn
t
l4thMarineswasplacedindirectsupportof
the9thMarines,vfrichwastomakethe'attackinthedivisionzoneofactionby
passingthroughthe21stMarines.,,.andthe4thBn,13thMarineswasassignedthe
missionofreinforcingtnefires"of'theistBn,l4thMarines. At0700the3d
TankBnwasattachedtothe9thMarinesandthe21stMarinesrevertedto3d
MarineDivisioncontrol,'ByO83Othe9*hMarineshadmovedfrom"theBivouac
areaassigneditonlandingandclosedinitsassembly
. ' *6-
t t
Action Report, I WOJIM. Operation, (Cont' d).
Enclosure 3 ( l ) , Situation' at 0830,'25 February), At 0930 tho 3tli Marinas passed
through'the 21st Marines) and launched i t s attack with the 1st ana. 2d Bns abreast,
1st Bn on the ri ght , making i t s main effort on t he-l eft , i n conjunction with
the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The attack was.preceded by a )+5minute pre-
paration by one 155
mm
batt al i6n of Corps ar t i l l er y with preparatory fire,s by the .
1st Bn, ityth Marines and'Ufch-Bn, 13th Marines as requested by the 9th Marines.
Machine guns, 37mmguns, and 60mmmortars of the 21st Marines supported .the attack
of the 9th Marines unt i l t hei r fi re was'masked. The 81mmmortar platoons of the .
21st Marines-ware attached to "the 9$k Marines. -Both runways,of Airfield Ho. 2
crossed the division zone of action directly to the front of the 9*h Marines,
providing perfect fields of fi re for enemy machine guns and antitank guns.,across
the division zone of action* The two runways--were commanded by high ground
immediately to the north. The key ground in the division zone of action was the
hi l l s at TAs 199-0 and 200-P which commanded the entire- zone of action. Enemy
emplacements, many of reinforced concrete, were located in TAs 1S2-A and B, .-
199-S, T, and 200-P immediately in front of the line of departure. The 1st Bn
on the right made good progress i ni t i al l y, but the 2d 3n on the left was taken
under heavy fire from enemy emplacements to i t s front and left flank and made
l i t t l e progress. Tanks were moved on to the runway to support the attack of the*
2d Bn by direct f i r e on located enemy emplacements* The tanks drew.heavy mortar fire
which resulted in a number of"casualties to the.infantry. $nemy ar t i l l er y and
antitank' guns, sited 4own the runwaysf knocked out nine tanks* The tanks destroyed,
several enemy emplacements and at least three guns* By early afternoon a con-
siderable gap had,developed between the-left of the 1st Bn and'the right of the
2d Bn, and the 3d Bn
f
in regimental reserve, was committed i n the gap*, attacking
generally norths The 3&Bn was taken under heavy fi re anQ. made,l i t t l e progress.
Mortar fi re was part i cul arl y heavy throughout the' day. -Upon being disengaged by
the advance of .the 9*h Marines, units of the 21st Marines were assembled i n -
division reserve south of Airfield $fa. 2., Aviation delivered four .strikes in
support of
t
the attack during the day, none in close support. ITaval gunfire , j,
delivered cal l f i r ss on deep targets beginning at dawn. ,By 1700, when l i nes were
ordered consolidated for the night, the situation was as shown on-Enclosure"B.(2),
Situation, at 1700, 25 February. Gaps were closed for ni'ght defense with support
and reserve uni t s. - . : .
26 February I t was now clear that the division was confronting
the hostile main bat t l e position which apparently extended generally northwest,
to southeast across the island along the high grcsund to the front* This high
ground commanded the entire southern end of the island as far south as Mt Suribachi.
including Airfield Uo 1. As long as.the enemy held t hi s ridge, he would be able
to place observed fi res on our reserve areas and rear installations* This he had
been doing, though not. in the volume of which, he was capable, doubtless due to .
fear of his guns and mortars being picked \xpby aviation and taken under fi re by
ar t i l l er y and naval guns. The heavily organized enemyposition clearly indicated
the massing of a l l available ar t i l l er y fi re di rect l y in front of the infantry and
moving i t ahead of the advance by successive concentrations* On 25 February, *
however, only Batteries A, C,' and P of the ,12th Marines were ashore and ready to
f i r e. " These were formed into a provisional bat t al i on. The.1st Bn, ll+th Mprines
was released to t\ie"5$h Marine Division in accordance with Corps order.. The 9tli
Marines with previous attachments, plus the 3d 3ri, 21st Marines, launched i t s
attack at OgOOi n conjunction with the tai and 5th Marine l ya^cj j s*. The 1st and
2d 3ns were again abreast, 1st on the ri ght , with the 1st-
- 7-
s
ActionReport,2W0JTMAOperation* (Cent
f
d).'
Corpsartillery(155mmHow)fireda600roundpreparationfrom0715to*0800..T|ieV
provisionalbattalionofthe12thMarines,indirectsupportofthethMarines-,
andthe*HhBn,13Marines,.reinforcingthefiresofthe12thMarines',delivered .
firesasrequestedbythe9thMarines. The$thMarinesagainreceivedheavy
mortar,artillery,andsmallarmafireinitsattempttocressAirfieldHo.2
andseisethehighground.tothenorthofit,andpragressmadeduringtheday-was
negligible* Tankswereagain.employedasassaultgunsandelevenwereknocked
out. The3dBn,9thMarinesremainedinpositionin,regimentalreserveaft'ea*
theattackjumpedoffandoccupiedadefensivepositionjustnorthoftheEast-West
runway,
{
The3dBn,21stMarinesremainedin.9thMarinesreserveinitsassembly
?reasouthofAirfieldNp..2* Navalgunfirewasagainemployedondeeptargets. ,
spottedbyaircraft,andonsuspectedgunandmortarpositionsascalledforby
nfantryunits. Eightbombersandeightfighterswereonstationthroughoutthe
Layandexecutedfourmissionsforgroundtroops,noneoftheminclosesupports
'xhisline-upofaircraftprevailedthroughoutthe.operationandwasentirelyinade-
caiatetomeettherequirementsofthesituation. Amuchlargernumberofaircraft
employedinmassagainsttargetsholdinguptheadvanceoftheinfantrywas
clearlyindicated. Thesituationat1700wasasshowninEnclosureB(3)*Situa-
tionat1700,26February* Co%+9thMarines,?wasattachedtothe1st.Bnto
closethegapbetweenthe1stBnandthe4thMarineDivision. Thisattachment
waseffectedatthe.conclusionoftheattackabout1600.
27February-Thedivisioncontinuedtheattackwiththekfhand
5thDivisionsat0S00. The9thMarines,,withnochangein*attachments,attacked
w^th'thesameformationpreviouslyemployed. Artillerynowavailabletothe
divisionconsistedofthe1stBn,12thMarines,placedindirectsupport ofthe.9th
Marines
f
andthe2dBn,,12thMarines*andUthBn,13thMarines^assignedthemission
ofreinforcingthefiresofthe1stBn,12thMarines, Corpsartilleryfireda
600roundpreparationin'supportofthattackfrom0715to08>00* Firesofthe
divisionartillerywereasrequestedbythe9thMarines. 3foprogressWasmadeby
the1stBnonther^ghtwhichwastakenunderheavyhostilelaortar,artillery,
andsmallarmsfire. !?heenemywaslocatedinwellconcealedemplacementsonand
aroundthehillsatIJ^-Oand200-P The2dBnontheleftadvancedabout150
yardsinitiallywhenitwashaltedbyflankingfirecomingfromtheenemypositions
infrontofthe1stBn, The3dBn21stMarineswasrevertedtothe21stMarines
at1200* Theinitialattackhavingboggeddown,anothercoordinatedattackwas
launchedat1250bythe1stand2dBns,9thMarinesfollowingatenminutepre-
parationbyallartillery,ofthedivisionreinforcedbyCor$sartillery. The2d
Bnmovedforwardrapidlyfollowingthepreparationforadistanceofapproximately
700-yards. The1st,Bnseizedthehillsat200-Pand199-0. Althoughthe1stBn
occupiedthehillat200-P,manyenemytroopsstillremainedincavesinthehill,
^nyattemptatadvancebeyondthehillwas-takenunderfirefromtherearbyenemy
remaininginthe'hill* Mopping-upoperationsonthishillcontinuedfor-the,next
twodays. Fourairstrikeswerecalledforanddeliveredinsupportoftheattack,
noneoftheminclosesupport. Navalgunsagainfiredondeeptargets,beginning
atdawn. At1700lineswereorderedconsolidatedforthenightandwere,asshown
uaEnclosureB(U),Situationat1700,27Feb^ruary.
28February-At0S15the21stMarines,withthe3dTankBnand
theSlmmmortarplatoonsofthe9thMarinesattached,passedthroughthe9th.
Marinesandcontinuedtheattackwiththe1stand3dBnsabreast,3d%nonthe
right,makingthejnaineffortontheleft.TheattackwasTp^^i-^^y a30
minutepreparationbythedivisionartillery,reinforced
1
- g-
Action Report, I WOJIMA Operation, (Con^d).
which was followed by a rolling "barrage which l i ft ed 100 yards every sevfen minutes
for 700 yards* The 1st Bn on the left advanced approximately 5OQyards when i t
was stopped by host i l e mortar and small arras f i r e. The.3d Bn on the right advanced
rapidly, closely following the rolling barrage. About midday the attack had bogged'
down* The.3d Bn, 9th Marines was attached to the 2lst Marines at 1200 and, 'by
Corps order, the Uth Bn, 13th Marines was released to the 5th Division* At 1300,
following a five minute preparation by the division ar t i l l er y, reinforced by
-Corps ar t i l l er y, a coordinated attack was again launched by the 1st and 3d Bns,
The 1st Bnwas unable to advance, but the 34 Bn, closely following a rol l i ng
barrage which l i ft ed 100 yards every seven minutes for 200 yards, advanced rapidly
and seized the village of MOTOYJMAand the high ground overlooking Airfield No*3*
The advance of the,3d Bn caused a gap between the left of the 3d Bn and the right
of the 1st Bn, andthe 2d.Bn, 21st Marines was ordered to attack in.the gap at' l30
following a five-minute preparation and behirid a rolling barrage, and flank
the resistance holding up the 1st Bn, ^Owing to heavy fi re received as i t moved
uj> to the line of departure, the 2d Bn was u&abild to launch i t s attack on time
and consequently was unable to closely follow the rolling' barrage. Slight pro-
gress was made in t hi s attack. The 9th Marines i ni t i al l y supported the morning
attack of the 21st Marines with machine guns and small arms unt i l fi re was masked,
When the advance of the 21st Marines permitted disengagement of the 9th Marines,
they were moved into a reserve position south of Airfield Ho. 2, Five ai r strikes
were delivered, al l on deep t arget s. Direct support destroyers fired in al l
preparations with the division ar t i l l er y, deepening the fi res of the ar t i l l er y.
At 1700 the situation was'as shown on Enclosure B (5), Situation at 1700,
28 February, ,
1 March - The'21st Marines, with no changes in attachments, con-
tinued the attack at OS3Owith the 2d and 3d Bns abreast, 3d on the right'making
the main effort. The 12th Marine8, al l battalions now ashore, reinforced by
Corps ar t i l l er y,
t
fired a fifteen minute preparation in support of the attack,
followed by a rolling barrage l i ft i ng 100 yards every eight minutes for 300 yards.
Direct support destroyers fired a t hi rt y minute preparation from 0S00 to OS3O,
deepening the fi res of the 12th Marines, The 2d Bn, 21st- Marines which had attack-
ed to the north the day before was pivoted on i t s. right and attacked to*the
northeast* Both the 2d and 3d Bns,the oriier effectively employing tanks, pro-
gressed,rapidly i ni t i al l y* moving well ahead of the assault units of the 5th
Marine Division on the l ef t . At.0930 the 9th Marines was ordered t6move one
battalion forward to TA199 H, S, T, The 1st Bn, 9th Marines moved forward-and
had closed in i t s assembly area,at 1125* At 1015 the 3d Bn, 9th Marines was
committed in the gap between the 1st Bn, 2lst Marines, which was s t i l l held up
t$r a pocket of enemy resistance to i t s front, and the 2d Bn, 21st Marines. The
3d Bn, 9th Marines was assigned the mission of attacking generally north to the
division left boundary and protecting the left flank of the 21st Marines, The
1st Bn, 21st Marines was ordered to mop up the pocket of resistance to i t s front.
The situation at 1015 was as shown on Enclosure B(6), Situation at .1015, 1
March, The 3d Bn, 9th Marines advanced..against light resistance and pri or to
1500 had arrived. at the division left boundary. By t hi s time the 1st Bn, 21st
Marines, attacking generally north to mop up the pocket of resistance to i t s front,
had mopped up the enemypocket and also arrived at the division left boundary,
on the left of the ~3dBn, 9th Marines, .By Corps order, at l^OO the boundary
between the 3&&&$- 5th Marino Divisions was modified to make the position held
by the 1st Bn, 21st Marines inclusive to the 5th Marine Division, The 5th Marine
Division was ordered to extend to the northeast and relieyMl^JMt^Bn^ 21st
. - : - 9 -
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation*. (Cont*d),
Marines* By1^5 the2dand3dBns,21stMarineshadbeenheldupbyenemy
resistance,the3dBn'byheavysmallarmsfirefrom'anenemypositioneastof
CRr325(TA201-B)andthe2dbyhostilemachinegunandantitankgunfiresweeping
Airfield-So.3* At15^5itwasdecidedtolaunchanothercoordinatedattack
with-regimentsabreast*the9thMarinestakingoverthezoneofactionofthe
rightbattalionofthe21stMarines,withthe3dBn,21st.Marinesandonetank
company,attached. The3&?ank3nlessonecompanyremainedattachedtothe21st
Marines,.Thesituationat,15*+5wasasshownon^closureB(7),Situationat
15^5,1March. At16^5theattackwaslaunched,the9thMarinespassingthe^1st
Bn,thMarinesthroughthe3dBn,21st-Marineswhichtookupareserveposition
inthevicinityofMOTOYAMvillage. The2dBn,9thMarineswasplacedindivision
reserve.inthevicinity,ofTA200-K. Theattackwasprecededb,yafiveminute
preparationbythedivisionartilleryanddirectsupportdestroyers,whichwas
followedbyarollingbarrage. Sainsmadewerenegligible againstheavyenemy
resistance,particularlyinfrontofthe9thMarines, Priorto1800,the5th
MarineDivisionhadrelievedthe1stBn,21stMarineswhichwasplacedinregi-
mentalreserveinadefensivepositionwestofMOTOYAMAvillage. Attheconclusion
ofoperationsatl$10,thesituationwasasshownonEnclosureB(8),Situation
'atl$10
r
1March. At1900,CoC
t
21stMarineswasattached,totheE&Bn,21st
Marinestoassistthe2d'Bn'intyinginwiththe
1
1stBn,9thMarinesontheright.
2March-Theivisioncontinuedtheattackat0800withthe
21stMarines(less3dBn)(Atchd3dBn,9thMarinesand1tankCo)andthe9th
Marines(less3dBn)(Atchd3dBn,21stMarines,and1tankCo)abreast. The
maineffortwasontheleftandtheboundarybetweenregimentswaschanged* The
gistMarineswereorderedtbmaintainonebattalioninregimentalreserve,tobe
committedonlyonDivisionorder. The9thMarinesattackedid.ththe1stand2d
Bns,9thMarinesabreast,1stontheright. The3dBn,21stMarinesremainedin
regimentalreserve,occupyingadefensiveposition. The2lstMarinesattacked
withthe1stBn21stMarinesand3dBn,9tnMarinesabreast,1stBn,21stMarines
ontheright. The2dBn,21stMarines\maintainedits.positionandsupportedthe
attackbyfireinitially. Thisregimentwasassignedthemissionofseizing
thehighgroundaroundTA235~U. ThishighgroundlaybeyondtheDivisionleft
boundaryinthe5thMarineDivisionzoneofactionandcommandedtheleftof
theDivisionzoneofaction,makingseizureofthathighgroundimperativeinorder
tomaintaintheadvanceoftheleftregiment. AuthoritywassecuredfromCorps,
toextendbeyondtheDivisionleftboundarytoseize,thishighground. Theattack
wasprecededbyafifteen-minuteartillerypreparationbytheDivisionArtillery,
reinforcedbyCorpsartilleryandbydirectsupportdestroyerswhichfiredondeep
targetsforthirtyminutes. Thepreparationwasfollowedbyarollingbarrage
whichlifted100ya:rdseveryeightminutesfor300yards, Porsituationat0800.,<
seeEnclosureB(9),Situationat0800,2March. The9titMarinesmadenegligible
gainsagainsthostilesmallarms,mortar,artilleryandantitank gunfire.Tanks
wereemployedinsupportoftheattackemployingdirectfire. Onegunandseveral
emplacementsweredestroyed. Itwasbecomingincreasinglyapparentthatthe9th
Marineswereconfrontedbyastrong,wellorganizedenemydefensiveposition. In
the21stMarines.zoneofactionthe1stBn,21stMarineslauncheditsattack:ina
columnofcompanies*ontheleftofthe2dBn,9thMarines,fromthearea'TA218P,
^withCoC,whichwasinthatpositionovernight,leading* Afterasmallinitial
advance,thebattalionwasdefinitelystoppedby,heavyhostilemachinegunand
anti-tankgunfiresweepingdoiwiAirfieldHoi3, The3dn,9thMarines,effectivel;
sipportedbytanksfiringdirect.fireonemplacements,moved
-10-r
t
Action Report* IVOJIMAOperation. (Cont
#
d>,
against strong enemyresistance and by 1J00 had secured a foothold on the high
ground around TA235 tf. The i ni t i al attack having Tiome to a standstill; anew
coordinated, attack was launched at 1530, This attach was preceded by a lO~minute
preparation by eight battalions of artillery, the ])ivision artillery being rein-
forced by three battalions of the l jth Marines and one of Corps afctiliery. This
was followed by a rolling barrage, She 21at Marines'had moved the 2d Bn, 21st
Marines around the western end of Airfield No. 3 to
a
position in rear pf the 3&
Bn, 9th Maxin.es in TA21#-A Pfrora which,they were to launch their attack in a
column of companies with the mission of seizing the high ground in TA21&-D* The
3d Bn 9th Marines made l i t t l e or no advance, while Co Or,the leading company of
the 2d Bn, 2lst Marines advanced a short distance beyond the right flank of the/
3d Btf, 9th Marines^ The 9th Marines was again unable to advance/ At 17**5 the
1st Bn, 21st Marines, less Go Cwhich was l eft i n position on the left pf the 2d
Zn
9
9th Marines, was moved to a position west of MOTOYAMA,village where'it
established a reserve line* ,' The situation as the attack came to a halt was as
snownon Enclosure B <9)
t
Situation at 17^5* 2 March* In tying^in for night defense
It was necessary to withdraw Co G, 24Bn, 21st Marines a short distance from i t s
exposedposition, and also to withdraw slightly the 3d Bn, 9th Marines to better
ground* The mewy was v&ry active and close to our lines in the broken terrain
on the front of the 21st Marines* Since Airfield Uo. 3 was covered by enemy fire
i t was not possible to occupyacontinuous line* The lines as organized for night
defense were shown oa Enclosure B (10), Situation at 2Q0Q, 2 March* .
3 March ~ 1* During the nigjht of 2 March an enemy sketch of the
defensive area in front of the Division (largely in the zone of action of the 9th
Marines):, captured by the 21st Marines, wag received and translated at the division
CommandPost
0
It could not "bedetermined whether the defensive area was the
enemy's entire final defensive area or just ne sector of it# Eeports of the
21st Marines on 2 March indicated a strong enemyposition in the vicinity of TA
235~
u
s^d enemy resistance to the east and southeast, thereof in front
;
of the
3d Bn* 21st Marines. The captured sketch bore out the belief that the 9th Marines
were In contact with a strongly organized enemyposition* It was hoped that a
w
soft spot
11
would be found by the 2l st Marines between this defensive area and the
enemyposition around TA235-U JOthat a wedge could be driven between the two
and $he defensive area in the division sone of action*sould be fianked. For
detailed ms^..of this defensive,,are^>ee Enclosure A (5) Map, Snemy defensive
;
dispositions east of Airfield H^3 as traAsia^ed from map captured by 21st J'larines*
l"or outline of defensive area see Enclosure B ( l l )
g
Situation at 1^30, 3March*
(
/ 2* The attack was launched at 0800 with the same
formation but with a &&w boundary*between regiments* It waspreceded by a lQ^
preparation >y the division artillery and direct support destroyers which was
followed by a rolling barrage l i fti ng 100 yards every seven minutes for 200y^
The 9th Marines was again unable to advance* In the 21st Marines 2ohe of action,
the 3d 3a
r
9th Marines maintained i t s position. By Corps order* the f>th Marine
iVision was to extend to the northeast and relieve the
v
3d Bn
r
9th Marines vrhich
was in the 5th Marine division 2oneof action* The 2d Bn* 21st Marines advanced
lowly under heavy fire andby 11^5 had secured a foothold on the h^i^h ground at
TA21&I>
#
Relief, of. the 3t Bn, 9th Marines by units of the 5th Marine pivision
was slow as elemehts of both became engaged in fi re fights while effecting.the
relief. Sy 1^30 the situation was as shown on Enclosure Bi ^J^Si t ^t i on at
^ 3 March* / *
- 11
Action fceport, 'XWO,JJMAOperation; (Cbat'd,).
. 3 It was believed ttyat no great amounfc of resistance
remained in front, of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines, though i t received heavy,fire from...
the high ground to i t s l eft in the 5th Marine Division zone.of action* The de-
cision was made to change the direction,of attack by assigning a new boundary ,'
"betweenRegiments in order to attack in flank the enemy defensive area In front
of the 9th Marines* M, 1500 a coordinated attack was launched to the southeast
with the
!
iaain effort on the l ef t , employing the same formation. The 1st Bn, 21st
Marines was released to the complete control of the 21st Marines and moved into
.position in rear of the 2dBn, 21st Marines to launch an>attack to-tne southeast
with the mission of seizing Hill $&% {TA219-V). The Zi Bn* 21st.Marines was to
continue the advance.to the northeast to ,the O+yl i ne, Cos and t of the 3&Bn,
9th Marines had at'this time been relieved by elements of the 5th Marine Division*
CoKwas attached to the 1st Bh, 21st Marines, and Co &waa attached to the 2dBn,
21st Marines, which was greatly depleted as a result of heavy casualties. 'The
9th'Marines-attacked'with the 1st and 2dBns.abreast, 1st on the right. The 3
d
Bn, 21st Marines remained in 9th Marines reserve with,the.proviso that i t was not
to be committed without divisi<v authority* The attack was preceded by a five*-
minute preparation "byartilier^ and naval gunfire. The 1st.Bn, 21st Marinesmade
rapid progress i ni t i al l y but was finally halted by heavy fire from the high
ground tp i t s front The 2d Bn, 21st.Marines seized the high ground in TA218MD
but wasunable to advance further because of. heavy flanking fire which came from
the high ground in the 5th Marine Division zone of action. 0&& platoon 0^ tanks
pf the 21st Marines, from positions in the vicinity of,MQTOlilia.Village, effective-
ly supported the attack of the 1st Bn, 21st Marines "byplacing direct fire on
enemy targets in front of that battalion. The 9th Marines was again unable to
advance* Tanks were being used singly *&& in small groups in the broken terrain
to i t s front by\the, 9th Marines and though they knocked out a number of enemy
emplacements aad some guns, they were-unable to breach this enemyposition suffi*
ciently to permit advance by'the infantry, A.number of, enemy antitank guns were*
. located in this position ?nd several,were sited to deliver converging fixe on
CiU3^$ (TA201rB)% Anumber of our tanks were knocked out before this position
V/P.S finally reduced, Tor, a.detailed report,of tank bpe^tions, see SInclosure H, .
Action Iteport, 3d TankBattalion.' At 1800 the situation was as shown 6&Enclosure
B (13), Situation at;18OO^ 3.March.
k'March * I
4
. The Cqrjts^attack was set for 0S15 this date,
sion
1
orders called for the 34 Bn, 21st"Marines to be released to the 2lst Mariifes
and to moVeprior to daylight to be passed through the 1st Bn
#
21st Marines and
continue the, attack to the southeast to eeise Hi l l 362 (TA219-tf), At apprdxi**
maiely O3OOan estimated 200 eneny troops made an infiltration attempt'in the gecp
between the 2dBn
t!
9th tiirines and the 1st Bn, 21st!Marines at the"eastern end of
Airfield Ho. 3, After a sharp fight, the b^unt of which was borne Tiythe left
companyof the 2d Bn*-9th Marines, the enemy was^repulsed with heavy,ca^ue-lties*
The 2d Bn
t
9th Marines'suffered numerous casualties also. Heports indicated^some
enemy.troops id&A succeeded in infiltrating our lines and were seen moving along'
the airfield* Patrols were sent forward to the .airfield and in rear of the 1st
and 2d Bns, 9th Marines by,the 3dBn, 21st Marines, The Jd Bn, 21st Marines .
Whichwas under orders to commence moving at O^OjC), v;as ordered to remain in place
&&& continue patrolling until ?.fter daylight when the situation could,be clari-
fied* Patrols of the,Jd $n, 21st Marines killed two,or three enemy troops by day-
light and the situation was found to be satisfactory* -" '.
. . ' , <t. '
2* Permission was, secured;from Corna to delay the attack
of the'division until the 3d ^n
t;i
2lst Marines wae in^positij
Action Report, IWOJ1MA.Operation* (Cont
!
d).
Brij 21st Marines comn)enced movement at O6^5 at which time i t reverted to the 21st
Marines, A
T
circuitous route was talcen to avoid enemy fi re \&ich was heavy in the
forward area. 3fren so, in crossing the.area-northwest and north of^Airfield ^To*
3, the 'battalion was taken under fir of enemy mortars and small arms and
considerably delayed, finally arriving in position at tlOO. Visibility' was ex-
tremely poor which Relayed and hindered preparations for the passage of l i nes.
At 11^0 the division attack was launched following the same scheme of maneuver
as oh the previous, day* with the exception' that the 3d Sn, 21st Marines%ms
passed through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* Atwenty-minute preparation by the
division ar t i l l er y with t hi rt y minutes on deeper targets by.direct support destroy-
ers was fired, and was followed by a rolling barrage l i ft i ng one hundred yards '
every seven minutes for 200 yards> The>9th Marines,vras again unable to dent the-
enemy position to i t s front. Strong resistance was met by the 21st Marines,
:
* .'"-
including direct fi re from ar t i l l er y pieces which were difficult to locate,-and
l i t t l e progress was made. The 2d Bn, 31st Marines, s t i l l unable to advance
because of host i l e flanking f i r e from the high ground to i t s left i n the 5*h V
Marine Division ^one of actiqny also suffered numerous casualties from a host i l e
field piece firing direct fi re i n enfilade of-i t s l i nef r oma position in the
vicinity of 219-K or.*;"
IV
Efforts, to definitely locate and knock this piece out
with ar t i l l er y fi re had been unsuccessful* Belief- of the 3d Bn, 9*h Marines by
units of. the 5th Marine Division was completed in the morning and Co I was
assembled i n rear ~pfthe line, . ,The battalion; less OpK, attached to the 1st
Bn,21st Marines, was moved into position southwest of MOTOHMA.village in ' "
division reserve. The 1st Bn, 21st br i ne s , after being,passed through,by the '-.'
3d Bn
t
,21st Marines, was withdrawn'to the vicinity of RJ-33O (tfA 21&-H) where Co
If was released to control of the 3d Bn, 9th Marines in i t s reserve position, Co
B.was attached to the 2d Bn, 21st Jferines, The 1st Bn, 21st Iferines,(less CoB)
was assigned as regimental reserve^ the battalion headquarters and CoAmoving
into position in the area 199~S T, and Y. Co Cremained in the vi ci ni t y of BJ~ '
330 and was employed to cover the gap between the 9^h and 21st Marines when lines
were consolidated for the night. The 3d Reconnaissance Co was attached to the 21st
Marines at 1^5 and moved to the vicinity of TA217-V, 200-B. At 1S00 the"situa-
tion was as shown on
;
2hclosure B .(l^)
v
Situation ati 1S00, h March;
... 5 March~ Inaccordance with Corps-order, no attacks were to;be
launched on this date and' one,battalion of, each regiment was 'to be rested, and
reorganized prepared to assume an assault role on the following day. Lines
held by two battalions in each regiment, Go B, lst.Bn, 21st Marines,vras detached \
from the 2d Bn, 21st Marines and' together with Co C,. rejoined the l s l Bn, 2,1st
Marines in TAsvl99-*S, T, and T where the' battalion was reeguipped and replacements
provided* Steps h'ad already been taken to provide replacernonts. and equipment to
the 34 Bfrt: 9th Marines, in
;
division reserve. Mt t l c Gneriiy activity took place
during .the day.. Artilleay an^ naval guns fired^harassing fires, througheut the
day, and one ai r st r i ke was coMucted in the Hill.362 area (o?A;219^U). - .
6 March,-, Corps orders for tEis date called for an attack in
:
echelon,by the 3d Marine Division. At 0^00 ,the 2d Bn^ 21
k
st Marines, ,v;hose further
advance depended directly on progregs made by the 5th Ma^rine Division, vfas to
attack vrith that division. At OjOO the remainder of the division was to attack
in conjunction with the 1+th Marino Division on the right. 'TTith th" exception that
the 2d :Ba
it
21st Marines (3d Ben Conowattached) was to attack an hour earlier
than the remainder of the division, there was no change in the scheme of maneuver
previously employed. The 3d Bn, 9th Marines vras attache3j||D|Ui|L21st Marines at
Action Steport, IWOJIMAOperation* <Cont*dK
0600 andmoved to an assembly area in the vicinity of BJT-33
0
( ^ 218-H). As
prescribed by Corps, a ten minute preparation fromO75O to 0800 was fired in
support of the attack of the 2d'Bn, 21st Marines by'three battalions of the 12th
Marines, threis battalions of the l&th Marines and one battalion of Corps
artillery* In support of the attack at 0900, tjiree battalions of the 12th Marines
and one battalion of Corps Artillery fired a preparation from 08^5 to O85O and from
0g^5 to 0900 and.followed with a rolling barrage lifting. 100 yards every seven
minutes for 300 yardsi Ninety minutes of naval gunfire was also put down in
support of the attack* Thepreparation in front of the 2d Bn, 21st Marines was
ineffective as the advance was stopped, immediately by heavy hostile mortar and
small arms fi re from the high ground in the 5th Marine Division ssone of action,
despite the preparation then being fired in that area. At 0900 the 3dBn, 21st
Marines and 9th Marines launched their attack but were able to make only slight
gains against email arms, mortar, artillery, and *ntit#nk gun fi re. The i ni t i al
attack having bogged down
r
another, coordinated attack was launched'at 1^0 with
the 2ist Marines passing the 1st Bn, 21st Marines, which had been released to
'their control, through the Jd Bn, 2lst Marines, This attack waspreceded by
a two minutepreparation which l i fted 100 yards andfired for five minutes*, $he
1st Bn, 21st Marines slowly advanced atyou^ 200 yards against heavy enemy fire
while the 9th Marines made negligible gains* After being disengaged by the ad-
vance of the 1st Bn
t
21st Marines, the 3d2fei
f
'21& Marines reverted to jiivision
reserve in an assembly area west of MQT0YA14A.village. At 1S00 when lines were
ordered consolidated for the night, the situation was as shown onEnclosure B
(15), Situation at 1800, 6March,
':: 7 March^ The division continued the,attack with a pre-dawn attack
at O^QQ, Kb change in boundary or formation was prescribed and the 21st Marines,
making the main effort, were assigned the objective of selling Hill 362 ($A 219UK
The'9'thMarines were ordered to advance 200.yards during darkness, as a divert
sionary measure, prepared to continue the attack at daylight to the seacoast*
3vey precaution was taken to preserve secrecy# Arequest, approvedtoyCoi$s
was made %ocease al l "illumination just prior to the attack* tfo preparation was
to be fired* The division artillery fired-harassing*'fires throughout the night
using white phosphorous, a concentration of white phosphorous'being placed around
Hill 362 (TA219 tJ) five minutes prior to the attack* No mention,of a night
attack waspermitted on radios* Troops were ordered to move as noiselessly as
possible and no firing was to take place until the attack was definitely discovered.
The 21st Marines attacked with,one battalion, passing the 3d Bn, 9th Marines
through the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* The 2d Bn, 21st Marines were ordered to hold
their position and attack in conjunction with the 5th Marine Division during
daylight* The 9th Marines (l ess 3dBn) attacked with the 1st mid 2dBns abreast,
1st on the right. The 3dBn, 21st Marines refi ned in division reserve. One
tank company remained attached to each regiment* The weather was overcast with
jtight rain at the,time the attack was launched* The'attack achieved complete
surprise, no^ a shot Toeing fired until i t became light, whichwas aboutO63O
under the prevailing weather conditions* While i t was s t i l l dark the 9th
Marines reported they had advanced 200 yards without detection and Were ordered
.to advance another 100 yards. The 21st Marines reported
f
the % Bn, 9th Marines
on the move with no enemy reaction. At the fi rst light of day the attack of the
9th Marines was detected and the 2d Bn, which was inside the envoyposition Was
.taken under fire from the fronts flanks, and rear. The1st Bnhad curled i t s
right flank around the enemyposition and was receiving fire:from the front on
the right but i t s left company WAS in the same situatioif mtf2^2Bn, In the
ActionHeport,IWOJIHA.Operation. (Cont'd)*
21stMarinaszoneofaction*the3dB
#
9thMarinescaught theenemyasleep
inhisemplacementsandtookaheavytollwitft.flamethroweraridautomatic
Veppons* Theenemywasset"backonhisheelsinthisareaAndthe3^jBn
?
jthMarinesmadeaslowbut steadyadvancethroughhispositiontowardHill.
'$Z% reportingseizureofthehillasof133O# The9thMarinessuffered-
immerouscasualties andwereunabletoadvancebeyondtheirdaylightpositions*
"he1stand2dBns,9thMarineswerewelldepletedbythistimeandat1015
s :
theboundarybetweenregimentswaschangedtopinchoutthe9thMarines, The
j'dBn,9thMarinesencountered strongenemy
v
resistancearoundthetopofHill
;<62. MoppingupoperationswereContinuedaroundHill362duringtheremainder
oftheafternoon. Effortsofthe3&3n,-9thMarinestomakecontactwiththe
:
iid-Bn
t
^thMarineswithitsreservecompanytorelieveenemypressureon,that
"battalionfailed. Thiscompanystrucktherightflankoftheenemypocketin
frontofthe9thMarines,met stiffresistanceandwasunabletoadvance* ^.
]}anksweresentintoassistthe2dBn
f
9thMarinesandsucceededineasing.;
the.pressure* The2dBn,21stMarinesmadenoprogress,sin<iethe5thMarine
Divisipnhadfailedinitsattacktoclearthehighgroundcommandingthezone
ofactionofthe2dBn,2lstMarines. Thisbattalionreporteditbelievedno
hostiletroopstobeinitszoneofaction*butthatfurtheradvancetookit
downonanopenflat shelfoverlookingthebeacliwhichwascompletely commanded
.bythehighgroundinthe5thMarineDivisionsbne-'ofaction
t
andevery
attempted
v
advancewastakenunderfirebytheenemyonthathighground* Until
the5thMarineDivisionsseizedthishighground,furtheradvancebythe2d
Bn,2lstMarineswouldbeimpracticable. At1700thesituationwasasshown
onEnclosureB(16),Situationat17
00
# 7March* The'boundarybetweenregiments
wasshiftedat17^5
r
aigktdefense"andthe9thMarinesassumedcontrol
oftheright sectorwithailthreebattalionsofthe9thMarines* CoB*21st
Marinesremainedattachedtothe3&Bn,9thMarines, SeeEnclosure (17)#
Situationat17^5 1March. The21stMarinespud3dBn,9thMarinestied .
theirlinesinattheboundarypriortodark..
i-
.
gMarch~Thedivisioncontinuedtheattackat0750. Anew
boundarybetweenregimentswasassignedfortheattackwhichwastobemade
,withregimentsabreast,9thMarinesontheright. CoB,21stMarinesremained
attachedto.the9thMarines,each'regimenthadonetankcompanyattached,
andthe3&ReconnaissanceCoremainedattachedtothe21stMarines, This
companywasnowinareservepositioninthevicinityoBJ-33Q (TA218-tH).
^heattackwasprecededbyaten-minutepreparationbythedivisionartillery,
reinforcedbyCorpsartillery,whichwasfollowedbyarollingbarrage.lifting
100yardsevery"sevenminutesfor200yards. Direct supportdestroyersfired
apreparationfromO73OtoQgOO* The21stMarinescontinuedthe,attackwith
the1stand.2dBns,21stMarinesabreast,1stontheright. The2dBn,21st
Marineswasorderedtoregulateitsadvanceonthatofthe5thMarineDivision.
Littleadvancewasmadebythe21stMarineswhichwasheldupby.flanking"fire
delivered:romthe5thMarineDivisionand9thMarines zonesofaction
wheneveran'attemptwasmadetomovedowntothecliffoverlookingthebeach.
Littleresistancewasbelievedtobeintheirfront. The9thMarinesattacked
passingthe3dBn
f
21stMarines,whichhadbeenattachedtothem,through
therightofthe1stBn,9thMarines,andcontinuingtheattacktothebeach
withthe3dBn
f
9thMarines. The2dBn,9thMarinesandCoC,theleft
companyofthe1stBn,9thMarineshadbeencloselyengagedwiththeenemy
sincethenightattack,andwereengagedinmoppinguptheenemystillremaining
intheir,rear, CoCcouldriotbedisengagedandtheIs1
. ' " ' , " . " . - - 1 5 * *
Action.Report* IttOJIM&Operation. (Cont^d)
Co G,-was withdrawn into division reserve west "of^OTOyAMA.village, fhe 3d
Bn, th Marines advanced some fco yards "beyondHill 362 toward the beach
opposed "by"bitter out disorganized Resistance* An air strike Was conducted
"bythis battalion against eneihy>A andmortar positions in.2?A219 BandW
:
.2he 3&Bn
#
21st Marine-s attacked to flank the pocket wMch hadbeen holding up
the 9th Marines with direction of attack generally north, "butmade no progress,
f
fheaction in the 9th ^r'^lnes zone of action,,Was of the Indian'fighting type
t
from sandstone butte tp e^ndstone "butt, The hostile,-resistance in the area
of the pocket was located in
v
caves and emplacements in the sandstone and
included antitank guns and well concealed, dug-in tanks, ,;Ug
llfc
andmedium,
mounting yjxm ah&kim ma* At 1600, the.situation was as shown onJJnclosure .
3 (18)\:Situation atigOQ, $ March. 5he lined of the 21st Marines attd 3d
3h, 9tn Marines^wer6 tied in at the boundary for the night, but no contact
existed between the 3dBn
f
9th MarineB and either the 24Bn* 9*k Marines or
3& Bn, 21st Marines* " . ' . - '
;
. ' ' : > . . ' . , : . . . . . / . . .
9 March- The division continued the attack at 0700 enploying
the same scheme of ioianeuver, A^^ ten-minute artillery preparatiott wasplaced^
in the zoaie of action of the 9th Marinea prior to the attack, Ulhe 3dBn
$
: ;
9th Maxines continued to advance toward the beach against sporadic.but stubborn'
enemy reaistance and by 1700 hadpenetrated to the beach area, !Phis battalion
called,o^e air strike on the area 5?A2l9-^Swhi,chhad X>$@n. a troublesome spo^
for the past two days* She 2d3n, $tk Marines, with effective assistance
from tantkrs, continued to mopup eneny elements in i t s immediate vioinity*
Puring the morning, Co0, 1st 3n
#
/$tji Marinee was.disengaged and rejoined i t s
battalion in division reserve* The 3d Bh
t
21st Marines, employing tanks,
attacked the enemypocket to its-.froat but^raade hoprogress* pnlvrone tank,
at a tine could be employed in this terrain* The enemy destroyed one of our
tanks by firing ai r bursts oVer the t^nfc;to disperWe the infantry, and coirer*
ing by smoke the approach to the tank of a demolition detachment which knocked
out the tank with a demolition change and a Molotov cocktail. Besiatance in
this pocket was passive but extremely tenacious*^ The 1st Bn, 21st Marines
advanced to the edge of the cl i f f overlooking the beach'.against negligible
refiistance and
N
sent patrol$down on the beach to the'waterline whereno
resistance was endou^itered, 3Pire, however, was received in the beach area
from the ,5th Marine Division one of action and the battalionraatntai-nedi t s
position on the cl i ff. The 2d Bn, 21st Marines advanced i t s right f^tank to
tie-in, with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines. Adestroyer'was efijployed during the
day, with the Division IJaval Gunfire OiffiCer
v
aboard, to fire on caves and enemy
position's located in the beach area. Thi^'was believed to have been quite
effective. Infantry battalions were now definitely beginning to feel the
presence of. tho large number of replacements, manifested by a sharp drop in ,
combat efficiency. These menwere found to be willing but very poorly
trained, especially in basic individual conduct, "the faulty lieamwork, resulting
from lack of small unit training, was also a definite hindrance tp the
operation of the infantry battalions. Manyneedless casualties occurred in
these replacements because of &lack of knowledge of the proper use of cover
and concealment. At 1800 the situation wasi ae shown oh Enelosure B (19),
Situation at ISOO, $March*
1^Marc^- The attack was continued at 0800
of maneuver* Koartillery, or naval gunfire preparationsw
Q
Action Steport, IWOJXlfftPfcatioa. (Contd).
9th Marines pushed down to the beach and turned southward to sweep to the .
division right boundary. Thia battalion was hindered during the, day by '
hostiji small arms fi rs delivered from the high ground to i t s flenk and rear.
The 3d Bn, 21st Marines'continued.its attack against the enemypocket to i t s
front using tanks, but made l i t t l e progress* Difficulty was experienced in
getting replacements to workproperly with tanks* The 24 Bn 9th Marines
continued to mopup enemy elements In i t s immediate Vicinity and l i t t l e advance
was made. This battalion was nowbadly depleted. The ^Ist Marines changed
direction and started a sweep toward the north* The 1st Bn, s21st Marines, by
patrols, had established that no e&&tay were in the beach area and*advanced
generally north with their right -flank on the cl i ff overlooking the beach.
The 2d Bn, 21st Marines was s t i l l unable to advance i t s l eft flank because of
hostile fire from the 5th Marine Division zone of action, although i t kept i t s
right flank in contact with the 1st Bn, 21st Marines* At 1500 the 21st Marines
reported al l organized resistance eliminated in the zone of action of the 1st
Bn, 21st Marines andpatrols were dispatched by that battalion through i t s
zone of action in rear of the line to mop-up any remaining enemy elements*
Just prior to noon information'was received from Corps that the ^thMarine
division was advancing rapidly toward the coast line and had Reported their
left;flank fOQ yards in advance of the 3&Marine Division*s'right flank*
Permission was secured to move the division reserve battalion, the 1st Bn,
9th Marines to an assembly areai n rear of the left flank of the ^th Marino
division for a flanking attack through the gp to the northeast to effect
a'Juncture with the 3&Bn, 9th Marines, thereby localising remaining enetay
resistance in the 9th Marines zone of action. The 1st Bn, 9th bri nes was
moved out early in tne afternoon and arrangements were made with the 23d
Marines to have them guided into an assembly area in rear of the left flank
of the kih.Marine Division* Onarrival of the battalion In i t s assembly area
for the attack, i t WASfound that 'the &apwas only about 200 yards and the
1
tythMarine Division left flank was not as far forward as i t had reported and
much further to the right, being actually some four or five hundred yards from
the boundary between divisions. The 1st Bn, 9th Marines launched i t s attack,
however, in a column of companies at 1535* The battalion made l i t t l e advance,
being'taken under enemy small arms fire from positions on the ridge generally
in TAs 201-J and 202-2. During the entire advance down'the northeastern slopes
to the coastline, the UthMarine Division consistently erroneously reported
the location of It s left flank, invariably placing i t forward, and usually
further to the l ef t , of i t s actual location. As the advance progressed, the
^th Marine Division gradually puljed i t s l eft flank away from the division
boundary with the result that a considerable part of the operations of the
9th Marines were carried on in the ifth Marine Division zone of action* The"
2d Bn, 9th.Marines was disengaged daring the afternoon end by 1800 had closed
in i ta assembly area in division reserve %&'the vicinity of MOTOKi Al ^Avillago
Steps were immediately taken to provide this battalion with replacements and,
equipment. At 1900.the situation was as shown in Enclosure B (20), Situation
at 1800, \Q March. , '
11 March * Ooerations begun on 10 Marchwere continued at
O739 The 1st Bn, 9*h Marines> now moving with two companies abreast made
excellent progress andwith i t s l ef t flank contacted the right flank of the
3d Bn* 9th Marines in TA202-A at 1200. The 1st Bn, fJWferinea\ then sending
i t s tesetve company to the right to sweep ilong t h e ' U ^
ActionReport.IWOJTHft.Operation, (Con^d). ' ','\
left^f,the3dBn*9thMarinesinT A202-rBatl$00* Enemyresistance,con-
sistingofafewriflemenandmachineguns,was,encountered"ontherlSgein
TA2Q2-GandH Aftermakingcontact,thesetwobattalions-changeddirection
tothewestandadvancedabreastupthehighgroundmoppingupscatteredenemy
elements* The3&Bn*.21stMarinescontinuedmoppingupoperationsontheenemy
pockettoitsfront* Althoughthe&nemywasnowcontained"byonlyone
battalionononesideofthispocket,hemade.noefforttoleaveittoconduct
offensiveoperations,orwithdrawbutconducteda.bitterdefenseinplace
whichresultedinlittleor'noprogressbeingmadebytheJ&.Bn,21stMarines.
A sled-mounted72
tt
rocketlauncher,towedbyatank,wasattachedtothe3d
Bn,21stMarines. Tenbarrageswerefiredintotheenemypocketwithun-
determinedresults^. ThedangerRadiusoftherocketswasgreaterthanfhe
rangeatwhichtheywerefired,butnilmenwerekeptundercover,andno
casualtiestoourownpersonnelweresuffered* The21stMarinesconducted
moppingupoperationsinrearofitslinesinitszoneofaction; Further
progressto-thenorthtowardthedivisionleftboundarywasimpracticable-until
the5tHMarineDivisionwasabletogaincontrolofallthehighgroundover-
lookingthebeachareainthe21stMarineszoneofaction. Unitsofthe5th
MarineDivisionhadbeenbroughtaroundintherearoftheleftflankofthe
2dBn,21stMarinesinordertomaneuveragainsteneniypositionslocatedin
theirzoneofaction* Theleftelementsofthe2dBn,21stMarines-hadb,een
passedthroughandrelievedandtherightofthe5thMarineDivisionactually
extendediniothe3dMarineDivisionzoneofaction. At.1030the"2dBn*21st
MarinesWaswithdrawntoapositionjustnorthwestofMOTOYJiMAvillage. This
battalionwasextremelydepletedatthistineandnoopportunity'hadbeen
affordedtoprovideitwithreplacements. The1stBn*21stMarinesextended
totheleftandtiedinwiththe$thMarineDivision. This"battalionhad.
clearedoutasmallpocketofresistancetoitsfrontinsomecoastdefense
emplacements,andhadblownuptheemplacements* Althoughnoresistancewas
nowremaininginthedivisionzoneofaction,the1stBn,21stMarinesreclined
inpositiontoprotecttherightflankof.the5^
n
MarineDivision, The2d,
3dfandtaiBns,12thMarinesreinforcedfiresofthe13thMarinesduringthe
day. Hoartillerywasfiredinthedivision^zoneofaction. At1800thesitua-
tionwas.asshownonEnclosureB(21),Situationat1S00,11March*
12March~At0700noppingupoperationswerecontinuedinthe
9thMarinesgoneofaction. The1stand3dBns9thMarinescontinuedtheir
advancetothewestuntilstubbornresistancewasencounterednearthecrest
oftheridgeoverlookingtheseacoast. Thisresistancewasmostlyinfront
ofthe1stBn,9thMarinos Littleadvancewasmadeduringtheremainder
ofthe,day. Thecontouroftheenemy*pocketwhichhadheldupthe9thMarines
wasnowapparent. The3dBn,21stMarinescontinueditsmoppingupoperations
andthoughsomecavesmd emplacementswereknockedout.nogreatadvanceWP.S
made. Thisenemypocketwaslocated'onaslopebelowthecrestlinetothe
eastandtheonetothesouthandwascoanmndedbygroundoccupiedbyour
troops* Howevertheterrainofthepocketwasextremely.broken*consisting
ofnumeroussandstonebuttesandthereweremanycaves?ndwellConcealed
emplacementsinthe*erea. Hostilepositionscouldnotbeidentifieduntilour
troopswerepracticallyontopofthem* #oradetailedsketchofthedefen-
siveorganizationofthispocket
r
seeEnclosureA(k)
t
Sketch,3*inal
Defenses126thTankRegiment* Ontheleftofthedivision^Jnaccordance
withCorpsorder,the1stBn21stMarinesextendedits f j y ^
.
Action Eeport* *W0jpSKPIratIon* (Contd).
\
MarineDivisionzoneofactionalongthetopofthecliffoverlookingthe"beach
in.rearoftherightofthe%%hMarineDivisioninordertoprotecttheright
flankofthatdivision. Hoartillerywasfiredinthedivisionzoneofaction.
The12thMarinesagainreinforced
N
the"fires,ofthe13thMarinesinsupportof
theattackofthe5t
n
MarineDivision* At,1800thesituationwasasshown-on
EnclosureB(22),Situationat1800,12March.
t
- . ,-
13March.-Moppingupoperationswerecontinuedat073The;
3dBn,21stMarineswaswithdrawnandrevertedtothe21stMarinasina"bivouac
areawestofMOT0YAMAvillage. The1stand3dBns,9thMarinescontinuedthe
attackagainst^theenemypo.cketfromtheeast. $ankswereusedandsome
hostileemplacementswereknockedoutandcavesclosed,butlittleadvance
wp.smade. The1stBn,21st.Marinescontinuedtoprotecttherightflankof
the5thMarineDivision* The3&ReconnaissanceGo,attachedtothe21st
Marines,revertedtodivisioncontrolinthevicinityofthedivisioncommand
post, Adestroyer,withtheAsstDivisionftavalGunfireOfficeraboard,
wasemployed.during,t&edayinfiring:atenemycavesand.emplacementsinthe
cliffsoverlookingthebeacharea,inthenorthernpartofthe5thMarine
Division-zoneofactioninordertosupportthe1stBn,21stMarinesinpro-, :
tectingtherightflank;ofthatdivision* The12thMarinescontinuedto
reinforcethefiresofthe13thMarines. Thesituationat1800wasas,shownon
Snel&sureB(23),Situationat'1800,13March. .
lhMarch-MoppingupoperationscontinuedatO63O, The3&
Bn,9thMarineswasorderedtotakeupapositiononHill362.(TA-21$MJ)and
patroltothebeachareainthe9thMarines*zoneofactionleavingthe1st
Bn,9thMarinestoreducetheenemypocket..The1stBn,9thMarines,using
tanksandflamethrowertanks,reducedthesi'seofthepocketsomewhat*At
I53Othis"battalionwasrelievedby,the2dBn,9thMarinesandmovedintoa
bivouacareainthevicinity-ofMQTOYAMiLvillage* The2dBn,21stMarine*was
orderedtomoveforwardintheafternoonandestablishareservelineinrear
oftherightofthe1stBn,21stMarinesinthevicinityofKT323(,T421S-X).
Thiswas-completedat1915* ^&e1st-'Bn,21stMarinescontinueditsmission
ofexpendingtothenorthwestbehindtherightflankofthe5*hMarineDivision
in.ordertoprotecttheright
v
flankofthatdivision. The3&Bn,21stMarines
wasdesignatedasCorpsreserve. Thesituationat1800wasas.shownon
EnclosureB{Zk)/Situationat1600,lkMarch.
lg>March~Moppingupoperationswerecontinuedat073$.*
2d.Bn,9thMarinesusingtanksandflamethrowertanksconsiderablyreducedthe
sizeoftheenemypocket. The3&Bn,9thMarines continued.patrol.operations
andmoppingupofscatteredenemyremnants.. The.1stBn,21stMarinescontinued
tofollowtheadvanceofthe5thMarineDivision. Thesituationat1000was
asshownonEnclosureB(25)t,Situationat1800,15March. '"*''
16March-.ByCorpsorder,thedivisionleft-boundarywaschanged
togivethe.northernpartofthe5^kMarineDivisionzoneofactiontothe3d
MarineDivision, At0715'elementsofthe.5thMarineDivisioninthe3dDivision
zoneofactionwererelievedbythe1st.and2(3..Bns,21stMarines,1stBnon
theright*preparatoryt.oanattackbythe,21stMarinestoclearthedivision
zoneofactionofenemyresistance. The3&Btt,21stMarineswasnovedto'a
positioninregimentalreserveinthevicinityofBJ322(TA218-1). The$th
Marines.wereorderedtoholdonebattalionin readinesslJfifci3&a
k(
ononehour's.
Action Heport, IWO<HMAOperation. (Cont'd)*
notice to support the attack. The 3&BJI, 9th Marines was designated. Th
attack was launched at 0815 after a twenty-minute preparation by the division
artillery.which was l i ft ed 100 yards at CS15 and continued for another ten
ninutes. for. situation at.03X5,;see'Enclosure 3 (26), Situation at 0S15,
16 March. The 1st and 2d3ns advanced, steadily against scattered enemy
resistance and "by I33O had reached the coastline and seized KITANOPoi nt .
Mopping up operations continued throughout the .division zone of action during
the day and by l$5 the 2d Bh, 9th Marines,had eliminated the, enemypocket o f
resistance i n TA201-D. At 1800 the situation was as shown on Enclosure.B
(27), Situation at 1800, l'S March, At the close of operations"Corps declared
a l l organized resistance on IWOJIMA, to have been eliminated.
IT.
A*.
Administration.
1.- Casualties sufferedbythisdivisionwereasshownonthe
chartbelow: .
. CASUALTIES,
QHGJyrizAiiojsr
1
KILLED W0UKD2ID MISStHG - TOTAL CASUALTIES
"OFF ML ow 03!F SBflr". OH
1
- !KX -
9t h Mari nes . 21 >7S
57 13S^
1
13 "- 79 1S75
21st Mari nes
17
2SS 127S
0
1 71 1567
12t h Mari nes 2 12 1^ 100 0 0 . 16 \
112
Hqs Bn .0 kl 0 . ' - 1 1
51
s
1
1
3d k 3a 0
19-
8
67-
0 1 8 107
3d Ser Bn.
0 "0 2 0 0
2 ^ 5
5 :
"
v
3d MTBn *
. Q
, 0, . 0 0 0 -o
. k
*3
d
Med Bn 0 , 10 0
^7
0 0 0
57 -
3d Sngr Bn
0
. 9
2 80 0 0 2
3d Pion Bn 0 2 1 6 0 0 1 8
TOTAL 2IVISIOU
HO
S27 139 3032
1
16
180
3^75

A!EPACH1D milTS
3d JASCo "' 0 k
.5
, 22
0 0
5
26
3d Var. 3Dog P l a t
0 0
N
0 0 0 16
3 13
2St h Repl Br af t
0 , 0 0 6 0 0 0 -. 6i
3^th Repl Dr af t 0 . 0 0
. , 7
0 0 0
7
TOTAL AJMkhffBD '
0 1*8 0 0
7 5" 5 55
AGGfiSGATl TOTAL ko
.83^
iW . 30SQ 1 16
Action-Report*,IWOJIMA.Operation, (Cont'd).
g Methodsusedtomaintainhighmoralethroughouttheoperation*
:
a. TheDivisionCPwasestablishedashoreat1500, 24
February 1945(Dplus5). ,,,
b. On25February(Dplus6)books(Pocket'Readers)were
distributedbytheDivisionChaplain. Bookswere'obtainedfromshipswhich
carriedtroopsfromRearArea*
c* On25February(Dplus6),anddailythereafter,the
DivisionHewsSheetWaspublishedforallunitsofthisDivision* Adistribution
tounitsdowntothe platoon-waseffected,
s
d* At1020on25.February(Dplus6)theAmericanRed.'
CrossFieldDirectorreportedtoG-landwasdirectedbytheGKLtomoveAmerican
RedGrosssuppliestoCompany A',JdMed3n(vicinityofDivGP). Distribution
ofsupplieswasmadetoalltroopswithspecialattentiontocasualtiesremaining
ontheisland. TheAmericanBledCrossrenderedinvaluableserviceinfurnishing
casualtieswithmuchneededpersonalcomfortarticles. ' '
e. On25February(Dplus6)thefirstreligiousservices
wereconductedwhereverconditionspermitted, Serviceswere>heldonSundaysand
throughouttheweekinallunitsofthisDivision. Unit Chaplains-conducted
individualreligiousservicesovertheirdead* -
f* On26February(Dplus7)theDivision3urialand(Graves
RegistrationOfficerlandedandbeganevacuationandburial
(
ofourdead,
g. AtIl45,rMarch (Dplus10)amailplane (Curtis
Commando)wassighted. ItdroppedbagsofmailonMOTOYAMAAirfield2To.1while
thatairfieldwasunderconstruction. Mail\*as.dispatchedfromRearSchelonto
ForwardAreaonadailyscheduleandalltroopsreceivedmailasitarrived..The
v
prompt deliveryofmailwasanimportantmoralefactoranddidmuchforthe
troopsofthisDivision, .
h. 0n
x
6March'(Dplus15)aDivision/Library,underthe
controloftheDivisionChaplain*wasestablishedinthevicinityoftheDivision
C3? Numerous" copiesof"Yank
11
,^Leatherneck"and"Time"magazinesweredistribute
totroopson7Marchandfrequentlythereafter*
1. On14March(Dplus23)hotshowerswereavailablefor
troopsofthis,Division* Thei?ivisionEngineersestablishedand, maintainedthe
naturalhotwatershower.attheDivisionWaterPoint* Aschedulewhichgave
preferencetofrontlinetroopswasestablishedandmaintainedthroughoutthe
. c a m p a i g n . ' . ' .. ' ' ".-.. ' .. ' \". .
j. On14March(Dplus23),fresheggs*beef,apples.,oranges
potatoes*onions,'lard,turnipsandcarrotswerefurnishedtroopsonthefront
lines*: Morefresheggs,pork,chickenandotherfreshfoodsweredistributedto
thetroopsonMarch15,l6
t
1713a^<i21.
k. On15March(Dplus24)sel
IIHI:I AWII-UII
Action Report, IWOJIMA. Operation. (Cont
f
d)
/ & . .
Officeandimmediatelythereafterascheduleoffromtwo(2) tofour(k)
showsdailywasmaintained. Sixofthelatestl&nmfilmswereflowntoforward
Areafor,thispurpose. -
' ' ' ' ' - - ' y
1. Onl6 March (3)plus 2-5) the A&MOffice made a di st r i -
bution of one (l) candybar and one (l) can of "beerper person. At ot al of twofe)
candy bars and two(2) cans,of beer were,distributed 'during,active operations.
Arrangements for ai r transport of these supplies were approved by the Commanding
General* who authorized the expenditure of ASM. funds for t hi s purpose*
' . ' m. On16March (Dplus 25)'the Island of IWOJIMAwas
officially declared
n On20 March (Dplus 29) the A&6Office distributed
stationery, candles, and athletic gear (softball and volleyball equipment) to
troops of this Division* Candles permitted troops to write letters and read
during hours of darkness* '
o* The Division Band gave frequent concerts for front line
troops immediately following the cessation of hostilities* This included a swing
session which,gave the troops a great l i ft and.much pleasure*
*. p* Frequent vi si t s during combat by the Commanding General
and other Division staff officers to front line troops did much to bolster their
morale*
3. System of handling replacements during the operation*
a. This report i s divided into three phases, (l) Pre-
liminary or Preparatory phase, (2) Operations Phase and (3) Hecommendations.
(1) Preliminary Phase: This is a*brief resume of the
administrative preparations prior to embarkation* On 29 December/ 19^,the 2#th
and 3*fth Keplacement Drafts were attached to the 3&Pioneer Battalion for purposes
,of administrative supervision, supply and training* The combined total of
personnel in these twografts was 115 officers and 2575 enlisted. These re-
placements were to be kept intact and were to be organized, trained and used as
part of the 3d Marine Division Shore Party.
On1January, 19^5 a classification officer was
assigned to the Pioneer Battalion to review the classification cards, ascertain
special skills, prepare specialty rosters, and to assist *in the ultimate alloca-
tion of these replacements to the various-units of the Division when the draft wr
disbanded. . ' ' I
. Only one. dr^ft had a regular administrative group
attached* The other draJt madeup an administrative section from personnel in thc
4raft, All administration wasunder"the supervision of the Pioneer Battalion.
Within each draft the administrative section \*ate divided into a reer and forward
section* The Rear Echelon wasmadeup of two officers and S enlisted to handle
all property, records, change sheets and reports from the ForwardArea* The
Action Beport, IWO JIMA.Operation* ' (Cont
l
d)
Porward Schelon was madeup of
t
k.officers and 3 enlisted "menwhowere to aid in
disbanding the drafts in- the field, distribute mail and send reports to the Bear
Echelon* . , , ' '
About 10-January the S~l,.Pioneer Battalion "broke
down the"replacement personnel into nine.Battalion,Landing Team ShoreParties and
from that date on the draft personnel were trained' in those groups with the variotf
Regimental Combat Team Shore Parties. They were embarked and functioned during
the operation.under this organization*
. ' ' ' . ' ' . - '
: During thestraining period prior to embarkation,
a casualty reporting system was drawn up to conform to the Division Casualty
Reporting System. Certain problems ar
v
ose in connection with the drafts since thej-
were so^short of HCOa and the men and officers had not worked together for long.^
It was decided to place the responsibility for reporting al l casualties on each
officer in .charge of a Shore Party detail and to have reports sent through
Pioneer Battalion communication channels to the Pioneer S~l for further reporting
to Division. ' ,
3?our basic records were developed or maintained
prior to embarkation,
(a),
%
An alphabetical roster' of al l replacement
personnel* The replacement drafts*debarkation rosters were used for this purpose,
(b) Aspecialty roster grouping and listing by
name al l men qualified
1
^ for each military specialty. Basics, likewise, were-groupe
according to usable civilian skills or by aptitudes. Por example,' in accordance
with the known,desire of the 12th.Marines, menwith high,mechanical aptitude
test scores and extensive mathematics,background were earmarked for artillery.
, (c) Anassignment,notice for each officer and
enlisted man, prepared; in twp identical sections.
(d) Areport by military specialty of unassigned
personnel* \ . ^
Operations Phase: Thepersonnel used consisted of
two classification officers, three enlisted classification specialists,,one
clerks-typist, an officer in charge of the assembly area from replacement dr^ft
and several guides from the replacement"drafts
v
,.,In"addition the S-l^of the
3dPioneer Battalion was always available and frequently assisted in such,matters
as eixpecjating the release of p-ersonnel from the Shore Party,*
The records maintained weres . / .
*- " ' (a) Alog.pf directives. ' .
! ' (b) The military specialty roster.
(c) Areport of assi
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperatipn, (Cont'd)*
(I
1
) Unittowhichassigned*
(2
1
) Unitfromwhichassigned*
Thesecumulativetotalswerereportedto
M Lasof 1B00daily.
...-. (d) Areport,ofunassigned.personnel,
This"
reportwassubmittedtotheDivisionAdjutantasof11300daily.
- Replacements were ordered by directive
from ACofS, GHU The directive specified the number of personnel to be t rans-
ferred, the uni t s to which the personnel,were to-be assigned and the required
time of' arri val of ;the replacements. Whenpract i cal , the specification serial
numbers were included in the directive, . '
1
"' *: , . - , The Classification Officer selected t he. ' ,
types of personnel to b'e assigned. The types were
s
located on the specialty
roster* The'3-1 of the 3<*Pioneer Battalion was advised as to the Shore Party
det ai l s in which the needed personnel were located. The S-l provided the -
information as to which det ai l s could most.Readily provide the required number.
The assignment notices for those to be
assigned were.completed, entry was ma.de-in the withdrawal log and the assignment
notice was,divided. One half of the notice then itfas used in t hi s sequence
for assembling the personnel, completing the inventory and reporting
1
records,
writing the special orders by the Division Adjutant and fi nal l y the.return tt>
the,Classification Officer for fi l i ng. Simultaneously the other half was used
for assembling the casualty data sheets, identifying and establishing the
qualification of the personnel reporting to the regiments and on down to the \
battalions and, finally, i f the Replacement became a casualty, the notice went
with the appropriate information to the Division Adjutant who sent i t to the
Rear Echelons of the Division and.replacement draft for completing, the personnel
records. ,' " . . . ' .
2277 officers and enlisted personnel were
assigned at- IWOJIMA*
I t i s believed that the keynote to the-, '
assignment procedure i s the preparatory work done. It. made*the selecting from
the specialty rosters and-the entries on the assignment notices tiie only paper
work necessary pri or to the-assembling and dispatching ;of-personnel. I t also.
provided the receiving unit$ with a transinittal record that enabled them to di s-
tribute personnel to lower echelons without .additional paper work. This pro-
cedure i s adaptable tt> the assignment of individual replacements irtiether or not
the Shore Party i a composed of regimental personnel or replacement drafts,
personnel* , * - . . '
Personnel were assigned in accordance with
their military qualifications to the extent tha,t military specialists were avail-
able in the replacement draft s.
Action Report, IWOJlMA Operation, (Cont
f
&)
(3) Recommendations: <.]''.'
(a) I t i B'recommended that the establishment of
an assembly or stand-by pool be made at the earl i est practicable time
#
If the
personnel which can be relieved of Shore Party duties i s bivouacked in a eon-
t rol l ed area the assembling and dispatching time i s greatly reduced and i t i s '
believed, Shore Party Operation i* handicapped to a lesser degree* At I WO JIMA,
after an.assembly area was, established one det ai l of 39 ^ea Was di spat ched^
minutes after the receipt of the directive*
%
. .
' (b) I t i s recommended that closer control be
maintained over records of the replacement drafts* Considerable difficulty
was caused by the .laxity with which Shore Party Detail rosters and casualty
data sheets were handled. Rosters of personnel coming ashore xirere not retained
by the officer or ICO in charge of the detail* Approximately 4$0 casualty data
sheets had to be retyped by clerks under the direction of the classification
officer*. ' . . .
(c) I t i s recommended that personnel going
forward frQm the Shore Party be dispatched in groups not to exceed 50 i a number*
I t was found that from the standpoints of beach congestion and the- receiving
uni t s' abi l i t y to absorb personnel the number should not exceed 50 V
QT
half
hour* . . ' . ' ' . . . '
* . ,. . ' (d) . It, i s recommended that replacement draft
personnel upon being attached to the Division be assigned to Shore Party det ai l s
only after a classification officer has made his recommendations as to t he, det ai l s
to which the personnel should go. The specialists likely to be needed f i r st as
replacements should be placed-in beach or dump unloading details* Those most
likely to be used last should be placed in ship platoons* . ,
k*
i
Graves Registration. " -
,a. The Division Graves Registration Section landed onIWO
JIMii.beginning on'D plus 7 when the OinP and a small det ai l were ordered ashore
to make a reconnaissance.in order to establish the Division Cemetery*
v
A site was
selected on Dplus 7 adjacent to the already established *fth Marine Division
Cemetery in the vicinity, of Beach,YEL3JQW2. Surveying and bulldozing began on
the morning of Dplus 8 and the f i r st 3
d
-Marine Division dead were interred on
the morning of Dpus 9* - , ' ' ' "
b - Establishing the Cemetery in close proximity to that of,
the ij-th Marine Division aided this"Division to a great extent when unloading was
slowed due to heavy surf and unfavorable beach, conditions. The Graves -Registra-
tion section equipment did not land unt i l the evening of Dplus 10 The OinC
and al l hands attached to #ie ^th Marine Division Graves Registration Section were
extremely cooperative in lending tools and other implements necessary for
cemetery work* " . . ,
c* The si t e selected for the Cemetery was east of Beach
2 on a gentle slope. Conditions were veryti&MhS&LtkJhlFJQgJ^~first, few
Action Report, IWO JIMAOperation. (Cont'd).
days due to enemymortar and artillery fire* ManyJapanese land pines were dis-
covered anclDivision engineer personnel swept the area. Because of the nature
of the soil (loose volcanic ash) graves were dug to a.depth of approximately.
eight feet to allow for a drift caused by wind.
'.d. .Collecting points were established 'by;Division Units and
the Division Graves Section collecting parties made a tour of each point twice
daily in order to expedite removal of the dead* These "bodies were "brought to the
cemetery where they were placed in the processing area,* The first step, at.this
point, was to check each body for identification (tags, wallet, namein clothing
or any other available means)
1
thereafter personnel removed,personal belongings^
corpsmen fingerprinted the body and as a last step the bodywas tagged arid
sprayed prior to burial. The"body thereupon, waswrappeU in aponcho, "blanket
or shelter half, depending upon what was available, and carried to the next
vacant grave* ' .
e. Personal belongings for each individual were secured in
a "ditty bag% after proper inventory, and forwarded to the organization concerned
TheDivision Personal Effects Officer made his headquarters with the Graves
Registration Officer and maintained Very close liaison with that officer through-
out; ;' \ . .
*. f, .Thedivision Burial and Graves Registration Officer
furnished the ACofS, G-l with a daily burial report which became the Division
Daily Burial Bulletin, This Burial Bulletin was given wide distribution andwas
used by subordinate commands as a check-off* Manypersonnel originally listed as."
missing in action were picked-up through the Burial.Bulletin. This Division
inter changed bulletins with the 4th and 5*h Marine-Divisions and a coi-iplete .
and up to date burial file of all island burials,was maintained,
*
g. - During the campaign the 3dMarine Division buried the
following,personnel; . ,
MISTED- ' . UMHOM
. . hi . 909 . ., ' 1^
i Total Inten-ed "-
B* Intelligence. ' .,
1.- \Type of maps and photos furnished during operation; their
adequacy and completeness? .. ,
Photos requested during the operation were generally furnished
in quantities requested. Poor processing in certain cases reduced the effective-
ness of some sorties received. .. ' ' .
e
2. Effectiveness of procedure set up for the recovery of captured
enemy documents and material; - .
1 * a The enemy, particularly naval units, were definitely
security conscious as was verified byPOWreports end
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation, (Cont'd)*
withstanding,thenumberofdocumentsturnedinandtheinformationgainedfrom
themwashighlygratifying* Thecooperationofalltroopsinpickingupend
turningindocumentswasoutstanding. Documentswereinallcasesgathered
f
bytroopsandintelligencepersonnelinforwardandrearareasandforwarded,
viaintelligencechannels,toDivisionHeadquarters. Documentsofimmediate /
tacticalvaluetothisoradjacentdivisions,orwhichcontainedorderof"battle
information,wereimmediatelytranslatedandtheinformationdisseminatedtothe
interestedparties*.Duetomilitarynecessity,imuraerablecavesweresealed,
"beforeasearchcould"bemadeoftheinteriorsforintelligencematerial;andit
isconsideredthatmuchvaluableintelligencematerial,whichmaybefound
eventuallyascavesareopened,wasthuslostinitiallytotheassaultforces*
.'b Overrunandcapturedenenymaterialwasrecoveredbythe
DivisionSalvageSection'operatingunderG-4
#
&-2cooperatedbynotifyiiigG*k
ofthelocationsofenemymaterialasreported. Itemsofspecialintelligence
valuewerereportedbyG-2directlytoJIQPOArepresentativesforsalvage\and
recovery. Salvageofspecialintelligenceitemswasalsohandledinmanycases
directlybyG-2employingG-2ScoutObserverpersonnelforthework.
3* Effectivenessand-qualificationsofJapaneselanguage
;
personnel:. - ^ _ V
, - a. Officerspermanentlyattached:
. . . - . OfJtheofficerspermanentlyattachedtotheDivision,
sevenwereinheadquarterscoinpahy"andsixireretemporarilyattachedtothe
infantryregiments,twotoeachregimentalheadquarters. Allofficers,were
graduatesoftheHavyJapaneseLanguageSchoolandwerequalifiedbothforwork
intranslationandinterrogation. Inaddition,twoofficersintheheadquarters
sectionspecializedinenemyorderofbattle, 3?hefourofficersteiqporarily
attachedtotheinfantryregimentswhichlanded,supervisedthecollectionand
preliminary screeningofalldocumentsturnedinbytherespectiveunita. This
workwascarriedoutverysatisfactorily. Inadditiontheyinterrogatedall
prisonersbroughtinfromthebattalionsonmattersoftacticalinteresttotheir
units,andforwardedtheseprisonerstodivisionwitha>minimumofdelay.
b* Officerstemporarilyattached;
Therewerefiveofficerstemporarilyattachedtothe
divisionfromJIGPOA, PourofthesewereUavalIts,(jg)and.onewasaxiArmy
2'dLt. Three'ofthenavalofficerswerewellqualifiedintranslationandwere
ofgreathelptothesectioninthescreeningandtranslationofdocumentary
material*>Theothernavalofficer*specialisjedininterrogationand,proved
highlyefficientinthisfield* JheArmyofficerattachedassistedinboth
translationandinterrogation*
1
Healsowasofgreatassistancein supervising
theuseoforalpropagandadesignedtopersuadeenemytroopstocomeoutofhidin{
inthe,numerouscavesontheislandandgivethemselvesuptoourforces* In
severalcasesthisinvolvedconsiderablepersonalriskv ^11attachedofficers
assistedintheinterrogationofprisonerswhenlargenumberswerebroughtin
andhadtobecleexedthatday. Thisworkwassatisfactoryinallcases*
ActionReport^1WOJIMA.Operation. (Cont'd)
c. Enlisted permanently attached:
,One"enlisted,languagemanfromDivisionHeadquarters
wasattachedtoeachbattalion- *adtwotoinfantryregimentalheadquarters,The
menassignedtobattalionswereresponsibletindertheBattalionS-2forthesuper-
visionoftnecollectionofdocumentarymaterialintheirrespectivebattalions-
andforthehandling:ofprisonersbroughtintothem* Inallcases..theyper- .
formedtheirdutieswithahighdegreeofefficiency* .
d. Unlistedtemporarilyattached:
f
Therewasonlyoneenlistedlanguagemantemporarily .
attached,acorporalfromIslandCommand,OUM, Thismanwasaspecialistin
interrogationandprovedextremelyuseful,throughoutthecampaign.
:
' - e. Hiseit.
ThreeofthefiveUiseiassignedweretranslatorspjnd
twowereinterrogators. Thesemendidthebulkofthetranslation'workand
provedagainthatmenwiththeirqualification'sareindispensibletoanylanguage
sectionoperating*inthefields Thetwointerrogatorswerewellqualified
andaidedgreatlyinthisfield* Oneinparticularprovedtobeextremely
adeptincallingJapaneseandKoreansoutofcavesandwasinstrumentalinin-
ducinganumberoftheenemytosurrender,
k
m
Sffectivenessofourvocalandwritten.propaganda,"withany.
suggestedimprovements:
a* Of13POWswhosaidtheyhe?.rdourloudspeaker,1^-said
theyweredefinitelyinfluenced. SendingrecentlycapturedvolunteerPOWsinto
caves,topersuadeotherJapstosurrenderwastheHosteffectiveformoforal
propaganda^ Inthismanner1^enemywerecapturedinoneday.
!
b. ThemajorityofPOTtfshadseensurrenderleafletsand
werequiteimpressedbythem. Their'effectivenesswaslargelyduet'othefact
that,theystressedthepointthat.surrendercouldbeaccomplishedwithcoiaplete
safetyifinstructionsonhowtoapproachourlineswerecarefullyfollowed.
. -. , c. Asinpreviousoperations,,PCWsfrequentlystatedthat
theprincipalhindrancetosurrenderwasfearofbeingshotbeforesurrendercould
beaccomplished. Thus,inboth,oralandwrittenpropaganda,itisnecessaryto
emphasizethefactthatPOWswillnotbeshotiftheyfollowinstructionsfor
surrender,. ' '" '.
d Propaganda'cannotreverseovernighttheresultsofa
lifetimeofindoctrination. Itcan,however,facilitatesurrenderofJapswho
wishtogiveupandwhoneedonlyassurancethp.tsurrendercanbeaccomplishedwit
safety. . .
5 Relativeefficiencyandassistance
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation, (Cont
T
d),
v
'., a, TheJIGPOAlanguageteamassignedtotheG-2Section
was,onthewhole,wellbalanced. Itissuggestedhoweverthathebulkof
Nisei,senttothisDivisioninthefuturebe.translatorswithone-lTiseiin-*'
terrogatorincluded. , '
b. DuetothesmallnumberremainingwiththeDivision.
headquartersafterlanguagepersonnelhavebeensenttolowerechelons,'the
additionoffiveJIGPOAofficersprovestobeinvaluable. Twoofthesearegener-
allyusedforscreeningandtwofortranslationandcheckingwork, Thefifth
shouldbeaninterrogator. Asalloftheseofficersarealsocapableofdoing-
interrogationwork,abalanceddivisionsectionisassured*.
.' c. IntherecentlycompletedcampaigntheJICP'OAofficers
attachedproVedexceptionallyefficientandcooperative*
6. Intelligenceliaisonwithintelligence sectionofnexthigher
andotherechelons: *'
liaisonwiththeintelligencesectionsofhigher,lower,and
adjacentechelonswasmaintainedviaofficercontactandtelephone, liaison
wasconsidered,to*.behighlysatisfactory* Muchoftheliaisonworkwasconcerned
with,aninterchange'oforderofbattleandotherinformationbylanguageper-
sonnel. Accordingly,alanguageofficerwasdetailedtocontacttwicedaily,
theLandingForceintelligencesectionandintelligencesections,of theadjacent
divisions. Inaddition,tovisitingthelanguagegroups,theofficersodetailed,
deliveredandobtained,informationfromthecombatintelligencegroupsofthe
intelligence secti6nsvisited. Liaisonwithlowerintelligencesectionswas
maintainedbytelephone,personalcontactandvisitstoregimentalandbattalion
headquarters hy G~2orotherofficerrepresentativesofthefr-2Section*
7 Counter-intelligencemeasuresandprecautionswhichwere
taken;
.. . .' a. Duringtheinitialstagesoftheplanningphase,all
Materialrelativejbo.theoperationwaskeptinoneroomunderthecustodyofG~2,
Thisroom,undercontinualsentryguard,,wasopenedto,officersofthedivision
staff,authorizedtoentersameinconnectionwithplanning,uponrequest.
b. On7November1 9 ^ ,certainessentialdatawereissued
toRegimentalCommandersinordertoprepareplansrequire^byhigherauthority.
Theywereinstructed.that onlythosemembersoftheregimentalstaffswhowere*
requiredtopossessknowledgeoftheoperatipninordertocompleteplanswere
tobeinformedoftheoperation,.A Sa,further securitymeasure*theislandwas
givenJhearbitrarydesignationof"X-BA-T"'andwasreferredtoinpreliminary
planningordersbythatname. . ". ',
: . e. On9.November l$kkinviewofthefactthatfrequent
reference'toCIICPAC-CIHCFOABulletin$0.122-^,whichhadbeenpreviously
receivedanddistributedasaroutineconfidentialinte^
resultina,prematuredisclosuretounauthorizedperson*
Action Report, IWOJIM&Operation, (Cont'd)*
the objective, al l recipien-ts of*same were directed to handle same as'TOPSECRET
art eri al . '
. d. On.I
1
*November X3kk\ a conference of the commanding
officer^ of Service Troops and the separate battalions was called for the purpose
of' giving them certain information, concerning the,projected operation whichwas
ne'cessary in order for them to prepare plans* All officers present at the
conference were warned as-to the extreme necessity of.preserving secrecy .concern-
ing the movement. Homaps, studies, or other intelligence material were issued
at this conference. . '
e. On2 December 19^,certain additional material was ,
issued to regiments with instructions that the material could be given to
battalions for use.bybattalion staffs in planning on-1|5*December* Due to
postponement of the operation, however, regiments were subsequently instructed,
prior to 15December, to defer distribution of material to battalions until
further orders*
f. Onk-January_19^5>i
ns
*3nicflone were issued to regiments
to distribute material to.battalions on 13*January for use in planning.
g. On9 January 19^5, instructions relative to sabotage
prevention of material being accumulated in loading areas were issued.
h* On13January 19**5 in accordance with instructions
issued on k January, essential material necessary.tfor planning was distributed
to infantry, artillery, an&'separate battalions i n order that they might prepare
necessary plans. Instructions in effect stated that until further notice only
those members of battalion* staffs who needed the information for planning, and.
designated enlisted personnel authorized, to assist in the preparation and filing
of TOP S3CRETmatter would be allowed to handle the material issued*
i . On16January 19^5 instructions were issued as to the
method to be used in distributing maps and intelligence material to be issued
later
f
Permission was.also given to battalions to indoctrinate and instruct .
company commanders arid other.company officers as necessary who required prior
knowledge of the operation. Due to;the anticipated short period on board ship,
i t was deemed necessary that company officers should be indoctrinated and in-
structed in the aspects of tue operation prior to embarkation,
j . OnIS January 19^5t instructions relative to communica-
tions security during"the loading phase
1
were issued* .
k. On22January 19^5 m?tps and other intelligence material
were distributed to regiments and separate battalions for repackaging end&iat-
tribution to uni t s after embarkation. Distribution of material to units below
battalions, except for ^ower units embarked on separate ships, wasnot made unt i l
after ships had cleared the harbor bound for the objective. Enlisted' personnel*
except for those authorized to handle endprepare TOPSECKETmaterial,, were hot
informed as to the i dent i t y of the objective unt i l after shAMagdafileacscl. the
harbor
#
. . . . *** ~~
, . , . - , . - . '
;
- 3 0 - .
Action Report, I WO JlUk Operation. (Cont
f
d).
;
lv Troops were allowed to write l et t er sfind-,send same
after embarkation* tJntiX aft'er ships cleared the harbor, however, they were
authorized to write only as i f they were s t i l l in t hei r permanent cams Mail
censorship after departure o-f ships froETthe harbor was in accordance with i n-
structions issued "byhigher authority,
1 - " . , . . ' ' . . . '
n. During the loading and embarkation phase, a radio net
was i nst al l ed which, served the "various loading j oi nt s , dumps, and division
headquarters. In order to prevent compromise of the movement through intercept:,
code words were assigned various items such as trucks* ammunition, fuel, ships
and other items the naming of which would have given indications that a loading
movement'was in.progress. In order to further insure non^compromise, actual
t raffi cwas kept to a minimum; but frequent dr i l l messages were inserted.*1$Q
frequency used on t hi s net was the same as the one that had been in continuous
use previously for communications dri l l s* *v
. '.'%' -Counter-intelligence measures during the landing and
subsequent operational phases consisted of those normal instructions relative
to-camouflage end blackout discipline; those;prohibitions relative to the
carrying of personal l et t er s , di ari es, and other personal written material; and
the instructions relative to the handling of classified documents as contained
i n the then current orders of higher authority and t hi s division for the
operation* . . ' . . . ' ' . . ;' \ .
. 8>. \ Distinctive or special .enemy t act i cs observed:
-f. . , . . a . ' I nf a nt r y : ' ' : ' . _ ' '= '" . . . ' , ; . /.
s
.
. . . . . . . ' . . - - . r - ' - i . , - x . . . .
; (l) ..-' 2?he enemy doctrine of resistance was apparently
based on the premise of a determined defense from every possible' position with the
mission of exacting the maximum in casualties and material losses to ou*r forces*
(2) Noticeably absent were large scale uncontrolled ,
l
so called ^Banzai" attacks* Documents and prisoner reports indicate that"the
island defensive policy prohibited,general counterattacksby large units Enemy
counterattacks in the division zone of action were limited to unsudcessful local
small unit counterattacks launched with the apparent objective of regaining
favorable local ground or.defenses. The enemy attempted night i nfi l t rat i ons v;ithr
in tho division zone of action generallv
v
in small'groups. Prisoner reports and
captured documents indicate that jsucfr attempts were made mainly for the purpose of
scouting and patrolling rather than for destruction or with the intent of counter-
attack, Apossible exception to t hi s policy in, the division' zone of action may
have been indicated by i nfi l t rat i on attempts through our lines in the general'
area east of Airfield Ho, 3 during the night of 3*1+Iferch following which an
estimated l66cenemy were,found dead within and in front of our lines the next
morning. On another occasion 6l enemy, officer led according to a prisoner
captured l at er , who had been bypassed and were hiding in caves in the vi ci ni t y
of Ti, 199-O staged an early morning attack on our<troops i n the vi ci ni t y. Neither
of these attempts were characterized by the shouting and rushes associated' with
"Banzai
rt
charges., but were apparently well controlled J l i
Action Report, IWOJIMA Operation* . .(Cont'd)*.
(3) Small arms fi re delivered^.>yU$ncealed enemy ,, .
riflemen was part i cul arl y effective and accurate
1
at shor~%^ranges*
(k) Snemy defenses on the whole were so sited and con-
structed as to take maximum advantage of suitable defensive terrain* Deliberate,
fort i fi cat i ons in general were effectively camouflaged to the point that on
numerous occasions attacking troops were unable to locate the sources of direct
fire
r
small arms, ar t i l l er y and antitank weapons*
b, Art i l l ery, mortars and rockets:
(1)~ The enemy's use of ar t i l l er y and mortars up to
150mmin caliber, part i cul arl y in the i ni t i al stages ^hen he possessed observation
was noteworthy* Our troop'* concentrations, GP and administrative i nst al l at i ons
were located and brought under fire* liven after apparent, loss of observation*
he \*as able to bring fai rl y effective ar t i l l er y and mortar fi re to bear on defiles
avenues of approach,'and observatipn poi nt s.
, ' (2) The destructive effects of massed ar t i l l er y and
raortar fi re were not employed }iy the enemy* The majority of hi s effective fi res
are considered t o have .been delivered by one- or two gems firing at a time* Fires
delivered, however, were for the most part accurate and opportune*
. - (3) Art i l l ery and mortar f i r e were employed against our
tanks and vehicles part i cul arl y in
1
the Airfield Ho, 2 area during the early
phases of the division attack* Our tanks invariably drew concentrations, of fi re
when approaching or withdrawing from front line areas* Due to the limited and
rest ri ct ed routes' of approach, the tanks and vehicles were canalized i n areas over
which the enemy .controlled direct observation with the resultant concentrations
of ar t i l l er y, mortar and antitank f i r e whenever our tsinks were sighted* 'Hits
N
sustained by our tanks fron enemy ar t i l l er y and mortal' fire Vere, i n most cases,
not serious* Timed fi re or airbursts were frequently employed,to disperse our
infantry advancing with the tanks* The tanl^s, proceeding without infantry support,
would then be exposed to the deadly accurate fi re of close range antitank guns.
Timed"fi re 6r airbursts were also employed to.prevent retriever crews fron
salvaging tanks immobilized by mines or other causes.
(k) Rockets and the 32Onn nortar, although effective to
the point of destroying or causing extensive damage to i nst al l at i ons they hi t , wer
rel at i vel y ineffective as compared with ar t i l l er y and mortar fire, due, i t i s be-*
lievedjto inherent inaccuracies and slow rat e of.fire* > ' . .
(5) In general, i t i s considered t hat the eneny tech~
nique in the employment of mortars and"art i l l ery represented a di st i nct improve-
ment over that previously encountered by t hi s division*
c*
1
Antitank measures;
(l). The antitank measures employed are considered to
r
. .
have been the most effective encountered by t hi s division to date. The following
measures were employed either singly or in combination i n
action;
- - ." - 32-
v
Action*Report, IWOJIM' Operation. (Con^d).
Artillery.
; '' ,ATGuns
'; Mortars . ;
Immobile Tanks ' .
r
Mines
Demolitions and "Molotov Gocktails
11
Obstacles (antitank ditches)
% - ' ' '
.'
r
(2) .. artillery and mortar fi re was employed against our
tanks not only for purposes of destruction; but also' to drive off supporting
infantry* See'discussion under ar t i l l er y above* . -
(3) The energy's employment of his numerous Model 1,
47mmATGuns waspart i cul arl y effective* These guns,, cleverly concealed in caves
and emplacements, were so sited as to cover logical avenues of vehicular approach
in the. Airfield Ho* 2* MOUJOXAIU,' .and Airfield Ho* 3 areas* They were specifi-
cally sited to cover important road junctions, defi l es, and the ai rfi el ds; were
employed ati both long and short ranges; and in many cases were apparently so
sited as to take tanks and vehicles under fi re fron the flanks* The ammunition
employed penetrated up to four inches of armor on our tanks* In many instances,
the AT Guns were employed for destructive fi re 'after our tanks had been
.immobilized by mines or from other causes, and were reported, to have fired on
numerous occaeio&s at ranges hot exceeding 200 yards* 3&Tank Battalion reported
that some ATguns my have'been employed in a,mobile capacity due to the fact
t hat
t
in some cases, a ,taiik knocked out,by enemy mines or other causes would not
be subjected 0 the' destructive effect of i+7mmATfi re unt i l a considerable .
period had elapsed* , This may indicate, that the enemy mayhave shifted guns in
'some instances in order to destroy immobilized tanks*
(k) In-the MOTOYAM&area, light and medium tanks-
carrying 371 ^7 s^
d
57mm
;
guns were employed in revetted positions to augment
existing ground and.antitank defenses* Sxcept in vejcy few instances, these tan^s
were dug in so as to present only the t urret to view Although fai rl y difficult
to locate, when once found they were-eliminated without difficulty, by our tank
guns.- '
v
" ._'
(5) Tarious type mines including the,following were
'encountered in the division zone of action: - , '
BoxMines (7x7x^
ff
spprox^ ,w/black powder charge)*
\ Type 3 Ian4 nines (2 and 3 kg)-. ' . " ' '
"Yardstick Mines
1
* placed over 63 kg bombs*
Beach mines*(single and double horned).
Magnetic mines. ' ...
' , Most of the minefields encountered in the division
zone of action were apparently hast i l y l ai d and presented a generally haphazard
pattern* "So- reports of damage to our tanks from the Type 3, Box, Beach, or
Magnetic mines were received* The 3d Tk3a-reported that the Yardstick mine
employed in conjunction with the 63 kg aeri al bomb wa*ljfc*emely effective in
ActionReport
#
IVO JIMAOperation*
(Cont' d).
i nfl i ct i ng a great deal of external damage, to tanks, setting off anmuiiition i n-
side the tankst and starting f i r es. In some instances, Box and Type 3Jans
were l ai d around emplacements, apparently for the purpose of preventing our tanks
,and/or personnel from over running aane. --
In one or two instances, the enemy attempted to
blind our tanks with snoke.in rest ri ct ed areas, and under cover of the smoke,
endeavored to knock out the tanks "by attacking them with prepared charges and
Molotov Cocktails. Large quantities, of Molotov Cocktails which were found
x
assembled and boxed indicate that the eneiay anticipated their employment in
quantity* One attempt to destroy a tank, in which t?he tank was caught in a
defile, was successful following an attack by an estimated 15 enemy* The crew*
of y&ic two were ki l l ed, were forced to abandon the tank before disabling tha-
?$&i;San
#
.- During the night* the,enemy manned,the disabled tanit and succeeded in>
knocking out>one of our tanks with the JfyangtiXL of the disabled tank the next
morning. . ' , . ' . - ;
' ' (7) ATditches approximately 10 feet wide, 10 feet
deep, and 3^ feet long were encountered in the division zone of action,, but due
to the ease of detouring sane, they failed to present a serious obstacle*
' ' . ' * <
(S).BaseduponM sactions^andtheireffects,itseems
apparentthattheenemyplannedbasicallytoemployhisATgunstoGovermine-
fields,whichweresitedgenerallyinlogicalareasofvehicularapproach,aswell
a?tocoverdefilesandapproacheswhichtanksorothervehicleswouldbeforced
toemploy. Inorder
v
topermithisATweaponstooperateunhinderedatshort.
rangesagainstourdisabled.orcanalizedtanks,heutilizedartilleryandmortar
fire,bothtimeandimpactfuzed,inordertodisperseoursupportinginfantry."
Inafewinstances,heisreportedtohaveattemptedtousthesametacticsin
ordertodriveoffoursupportingtroops,allow,ourtanksto"enterrestricted
areaswithinhislines,andthendestroythe'tankswithdemolitionsandMolotov
Cocktails* Hisemploymentofhiswellsitedandconcealed M-fim.ATGunsis,con-
sideredtohavebeenparticularly effective.
d* .Tanks;- . .
Tanks were employed st at i cal l y in
%
revetted emplacements
to augment existing ground and antitank defenses. Although-reports received
indicate
1
that enemytanks were moved from one position to another, no reports were
received of t hei r being employed in any manner other than as indicated above.
The dug in tanks were -fairly difficult to locate in some instances,* but once
/
located were eliminated without, di ffi cul t y. See discussion under antitank
\ measures above. *
/

C. Operations, and Training;'- \ .

\ 1. a. "_JJo rehearsal exercises of the operation were carried
out since, "being i ni t i al l y in 23xpe;di'tionary Troops reserve, i t was impossible
to foresee the method, of ^employment of the division. As i t was expected that N
the division would be landed behind an already-established beachhead, no
; training was conducted in ship-1onshore movement, other#|||p.B&
sa
si
i
mple exercise.
Action Report, IWOJI M Operation (Cont
!
d).
early in the training period* conducted by infantry "battalions* consisting
of a movement from a line o:* departure to, the
1
beach in LVTs aiid deployment
of troops- on the "beach* Emphasis wasplaced on'the technique of offensive
operations of infantry, including the coordination of al l fires*of infantry
weapons..in support of the attack, i nfant ry-art i l l ery coordination, and infantry-
tank cooMination
a
' , ' ,
K Bal:h infantry regiment, with, a' tank company attached,,
/conductsd a field, exercise r.'a.^o'i-ted by an artillei. bat t al i on. Only the
arv' lllery'fired*. !l:h.epurpc^e of the exercise was"to Iruprove coordination, of
i.janfiry*-t'ank offensive operations with artillery.- l';anks verb moved forward
to the final objective ahead of the infantry and time fi re was placed over
the tanks* 32mphasis.was on.the maximum exploitation of the effect of. ar t i l l er y
fi res by infantry layhaving the infantry close to the minimum distance on
ar t i l l er y concentrations in order to -be able to assault the enemyposition with
the minimum time interval after l i ft i ng of the ar t i l l er y f i r e.
e# Ademonstration was conducted employing: an infantry
battalion in an attack situation supported by a battalion of art i l l ery* a .
battery of 105am howitzers (simulating a destroyer), the 1$mm gun platoon
of a regimental weapons company, and bomber and fighter ai rcraft , The purpose
of the exercise was to demonstrate the ""coordination of al l fi rss available .to
a*battalion commander in-order to achieve,the maximum fiire effect in
support of the attack of his. battalion* Emphasis wasplaced on the technique
of infantry maneuver, the pushing ahead of uni t s through soft spots, and the
employment of supports and reserves to protect exposed flanks and to flank
resistance holding U|>part/of .the uni t . Every effort was made to dispol the.=
idea, found to be quite prevalent, that assault units must maintain an
1
,alignment
and that physical cpntact between adjacent uni t s i s essential. Also emphasized-
was the necessity for the infantry to close to,within not more,,than 200 yards
of supporting ar t i l l er y fires* Since i t was expected that the division, or
elements thereof, would be called upon to execute a passage of lines in the
forthcoming operation, the demonstration began with a simulated"passage of . ,
tithes, showing part i cul arl y the use of the weapons of the unit being passed
through to support the attacking unit, Extra machine guns and mortars were'
provided to demonstrate t hi s phase. All weapons fired l i ve ammunition and
aircraft strafed, fired rockets, and dropped 500 lb bombs. All officers of
infantry regiments, the ar t i l l er y regiment, and the tank battalion were required
to. attend. Svery effort was made to have a tank company move to the fi ri ng
area for participation in the demonstration, but no route was found available ;
which did not have a bridge, and none of the bridges would support the medium
tank* , ' , ' . ' ; - ' .
, . . d. All infantry.and ar t i l l er y bat t al i ons, other than
the demonstration uni t s, were required to execute in turn the exercise of
the demonstration in the same manner that the demonstration was executed, except
t hat a shortage of 105mm ammunition required elimination of the 105mm battery
used to simulate a destroyer, 7
;
/ - - *
, e. Infantrybattalionsconductedfieldexercises"with
tanks,nofiringbeingdone.
-35-
Action Report, I WO JIMAOperation* (Cont'd)*
Much small unit training was carried out in the
assault and reduction of emplacements, using flamethrower and rocket launcher*
. g. Tworeplacement drafts Joined this division on 2&
and 29 December 19*& Theywere to-be employed primarily as shore party labor
troops in the forthcoming operation and were attached to the 3$Pioneer.&*
Investigation of the status of combat training of these replacements revealed
that their training was meager,,consisting of two to fotar weeks recruit training,
ffanyof the menhad not irej their weapons... Atraining program was instituted
for these men
r
fifty per cent of their training time being devoted to shore
party training and fifty per cent to combat ' training/individual and small unit.
The training time was inadequate and the employment of these menduring the
operation resulted in a definite drop in combat efficiency of al l infantry
units.. Replacements must be given more adequate training in training.centers
before being sent overseas to combat units.
2. a* Weapons found most effective against fortified in-
stallations are as follows: '
.(l) The tank with i t s "JJmBi gun
r
es^ployed as an assault
gun* Tanks* covered by infantry fire,were in many instances able to advance
close to emplacements, and effectively take them under fire wiih the 75mmgun.
They were extensively employed in this manner, singly and in small groups
t
by infantry units, The 75mmshell.with the T-105 concretes-piercing fuze proved
most effective when fired against embrasures* .
(2) The flamethrower tank (CB-H-l) was found to be
most effective against emplacements and caves. The longer range and all-around
traverse of the flamethrower made this type far more effective than the
I&H2-5R1with which this division was equipped. In the l at t er stages of the
operation this division was.able to borrow from the other divisions the CB--H-1
flamethrower tank and achieved excellent results, against strongly fortified
enemypockets of resistance* The type 3&H2-5E1 flamethrower tank, owing to
the short range and limited traverse of i t s flamethrower was considered of
l i t t l e value* ^ .
' , (3) $hportable f3,amethro\fer was an excellent weapon
against emplacements when i t could be worked to within range-of the,emplace-
rnent^ Casualties amongflamethrower operators were very high so that in the
l at t er stages of the operation i t was difficult to keep flamethrowers manned with
personnel of
s
any experience at all* This weapon was very effective in mopping-
up operations. , . '
(k) "The antitank rocket launcher (bazooka) was ef-
fective against emplacements when it' could be moved to a sufficiently short
range to obtain hi t s on embrasures* It was able to penetrate the lighter
constructed emplacements and was also effective in firing into caves*
(5) The37mmgun was effectively used by some units
in situations where the gun could be worked into position to bring direct fire
on embrasures of emplacements, ^P-and HE shell were used.
(6) The 81mmmortar firing, theM5
t
Action Report* I WOJIMA Operation. (Cont*d).
delayed action fuze was found to be effective against the lighter types of em*
placements* ' * ' .
(7) Small and
:
medium demolition charges were sufficient
for destruction of tne average emplacement. In closing caves, i t was usually
found necessary to use forty^pound shaped charges. .
{&) The only ar t i l l er y' f i r es which were effective against
the concrete emplacements of the enemy were those of the lj>5mm howitzers of Corps
ar t i l l er y, employing concrete piercing shell* . ;
(9) The 7*3" rocket fired from a slad towed by a tank
was employed against a fort i fi ed area. Results were undetermined. The fi res
could not be pulled in close' enough to our.troops to tajse care of the enemy to
the immediate front.and ho advance waspossible after t hei r use.
(XO) For effects of ai r and naval gunfire bombardment of
fortified positions, see-par E
t
Air, and par F, Naval Gunfire.
3. When the division was attacking with one regiment, in assault,
the tank battalion was attached to the assault regiment. After the zone of action
widened and two regiments were employed abreast, one tank company was attached
-to each regiment. ^Regiments attached companies or platoons to assault battalions
in accordance with requirements of the situation. Ho mass' tank-attacks were
feasible, owing to the strong enemy antitank defense, lack of suitable tank
approaches through the broken-terrain, and the heavily fortified nature of the
enemy
r
s defenses. The largest number of tanks employed together was ten* These
were used on the f i r st day of the division attack and were attached to the left
assault battalion of the assault regiment to assi st that battalion in penetrating
the hostile, defenses around Airfield Ho. 2, They, however^ functioned as,.assault
guns firing on enemy emplacements from positions on the runway in rear of the
assault elements* The tanks, massed on the runway, drew heavy fi re of al l types
and nine were knocked out. Thereafter, tanks were employed singly or in small
groups as assault guns and were very effective, although they suffered heavy
losses* In two instances tanks supported infantry attacks by direct overhead f i r e.
Armored bulldozers, borrowed from other .divisions, were very.useful in cutting
approaches for tanks through the broken t errai n. Their l i ght er weight ciado tjaera
l ess likely to bog down in the loose, sandy soi l than the tank bulldozer, they
were more maneuverable than the tank bulldozer^ and had the additional advantage
of being equipped with angledozer. ^ . . . .
4. Tank-infantry coordination was satisfactory. Infantry
"closely followed the supporting tanks in a few instances, but usually covered
the advance of the tanks from positions to the rear of them. The nature,of the
enemy defenses did not permit infantry to advance in the open with tanks with
impunity* The infantry commander normally pointed out the objective to the tank
commander from a position' in the infantry l i nes. Once'the tanks had launched
t hei r attack, communication with the infantry was by'SCH-^OO radio. Communi**
cation by means of the telephone, in the tank grouser box.was not feasible, for
infantry because the close proximity of the enemy did not permit infantrymen to
expose themselves for this.purpose. The greatest" \&ck,of coordin^tidn frsfrween
tanks and infantry occurred i n the l at t er stages of the operation when replace-
ment infantry were used in attacks with tanks. These men had had no training
with tanks* In one instance, a group of these men
s
was advancing with a
tank toward an enemyposition. The eneny placed snokfj j |jbfrfo*fcank and the
infantrymen withdrew, after which a group ofenergy
- 37-
Acti on Report, IWO' J | M O^erati on , ( Coat d).
destroyed i t with a demolition charge and Molotov Cocktail.
5 Antitank measures employed by units of this division were
normal, > The enemy did not use tanks offensively, so these measures were not
put to a test. Rifle companies were providedwith the antitank rocket* launcher
and antitank grenade for antitank defense* Defense in depth was provided by
37mm guns sited along roads and likely hostile tank approaches* The 15w& self-
propelled guns were usually kept mobile in the rear. " _
6*. Little use was found tor war dogs in this .operation. Kot
until organized resistance was ended,and mopping-up operations by patrols begun,,
were dogs employed* They were then used with del i ght patrols, aabushes
f
and
for night security* Dogs would not enter caves* TInits state that dogs were
unable to differentiate between friend and enemy* They were useful at-night
with ambushes and outposts, alerting to the-presence of the'enemy in a number of
instances* The presence of dogs with outposts* ambushes, and patrols boosts the
morale of the men and. they like to have them present.
;
7# & Standard infantry tactics for normal terrain were
employed,throughout by this division. At the time this division was committecC
to the assault, the Corps was confronting the enemy's, main battle position, which
was a heavily fortified.zone extending continuously across the island* The
only possible maneuver open to Oorps, or any division, was a penetration. It
i s an established tactical principle that in executing a penetration, the point
of penetration should be selected at wiiat is- believed to be the weakest point
in the enemy defenses, the main effort should be made at that point, and the
bulk of al l available artillery, naval guns, and aircraft should be assigned to
the support of the main effort, The attack should be preceded by a long prepara-
tion and successive concentrations should be^placed ahead of the assault ele-
ments,
1
It i s believed that the zone of action assigned tlyis division wes the
most suitable for making the main effort as i t extended along the high ground
in the center "of the island* Had the bulk of All supporting weapons been
allotted to thiis~division instead of being more or l ess equally distributed
between al l three divisions, i t i s believed that a penetration would have been
effected sooner and at a losJet cost. - .
b. Since i t was approximately three days before this
division\had a ful l artillery regiment in support of i t s attack, the necessary
weight of close supporting fires could not be delivered and the progress of the
attack was correspondingly slow and with heavy casualties. The i ni t i al attack
was launched on 2$ February, and, by noon 27 February l i t t l e progress had been,
made, A coordinated attack launched in the afternoon of 27 February following
a heavy artillery'and naval gunfire preparation resulted in a rapid advance being
made well into the enemy
1
a main battle position,along the entire division front.
The progress of the attack was closely watched to detect
u
soft spots
11
in the
enemy defenses which could be exploited* On the following day, after another
heavy preparation, and employing a rolling barrage, a'"soft spot" was found to
exist in front of the right battalion of the assault regiment ^nd. that battalion
was pushed rapidly ahead, Reserves were brought up behind the right, battalion
and attacked to the flank through the gap between the assault battalions to
widen the breach* This maneuver was successful and by the next afternoon the
entire enemy position in the division gone of action was occupied,, This method
of at tack; was successfully followed througnuut* Preparations preceded each
attack, as heavy as the limitations en artillery ammu
followed by rolling barrages* Where attacks "bogged doi
Action Report| IWOOTMA.Operation
of the day,, new coordinated attacks were ordered, also preceded by.preparations
and vdth rol l i ng barrages. Faval guns were employed- to deepen the ar t i l l er y
fi res in a l l cases and Corps ar t i l l er y was called upon for al l possible support
within the limitations prescribed by Corp's* Assault units which were able to
progress were pushed ahead, regardless of the progress of adjacent uni t s, Open
flanks were projected by reserves, and reserves were invariably used to widen
breaches by launching flanking attacks through gaps between assault uni t s,
c. In consolidating positions for night defense* no great
effort was made t o establish a continuous line across the front with a l l uni t s
t i ght l y tied~in. Where gaps could be covered by fi re of infantry weapons* they
were not occupied. An eheiviy attempt at night i nf i l t r at i on through one of these
gaps was stopped with heavy loss to the enemy. Illumination was sufficiently
continuous to detect any host i l e attempt to i nf i l t r at e through gap^s*
, . i '.*
d* Hight patrols were regularly employed to determine enemy.
dispositions and act i vi t i es. Onepatrol was sent out at night to destroy a hos-
t i l e machine gun, which had been firing on our l i nes
t
&xiA successfully accom-
plished it' s mission* I t i s believed that night patrols are absolutely essential
and al l infantry units must place more emphasis^on t hi s i n training.
e. One night attack was successfully launched. The hostile
defense generally northwest of Airfield Ho.3*proved exceedingly stubborn and
l i t t l e progress was made for several days in daylight attacks. A coordinated
division attack was launched one hour and a half before daylight with one
battalion making the main attack. Complete surprise was achieved and the
objective taken. 3for det ai l s of t hi s attack see Par I I J , Chronological account
of the action*
:
7 March, and Snclosure C, Action Report, S^h..Marines.
1D
* Supply. ,
1. Adequacyofalltypesofmountingoutsupplies.
a. Supplyofallclasses(IthroughV)was/adequate,
andthoughsomeitemsofClassVarrivedlaterthanoriginallyplanned,arrival
wasintimetopermitscheduledcombatloading*
' 2- Adequacyofre-supply,
a. Re-supplywasadequate,thoughshortages,undoubtedly
theresultoftheunexpectedlengthandfuryof,theoperation,didoccur,
.namelyinClassII,V, &n&afewitemsof'Class1 Howeveratnotime.were
'weaponssilencedforwantofammunition,norwereoperationsdisruptedfora
lackofsupply* Thisdivisiondidnotneed,norrequisition,anymedicalsupplies
or155mmHowitzerammunitionfromthere*supplyagency,hencenocommentcan
bemadeonthepalletizingofthisclassofsupply.
3* Palletizedcargo*
a* Thevalueofpalletizingcertainclassesofsupplycan
notbeunderestimated. Theprotectionaffordedthecargo,thecomparativeease'
ofunloadingandtransporting,andthedesirabilityof*"
. " .--39-
Action Report, WO.'J1K&Operation* (Cont' d).
items compact and segregated, amply,repays the additional labor and materials
expended in the construction of "the sled pal l et , i t must be realized, however,*
that early and adequate'arrangements must "be made with the ships to "be employed,
1
for the loading of pallets* Ships assigned to t hi s Division had not been given
advance notice t-Iuvfc pal l et s were to "be embarked, with the result i?hat note.of
the ships had proper pal l et handling gear* . I t i s mandatory that the necessary
mechanical equipment' for the proper handling of pal l et s be on the .beach and in ,
lihe.dumps, pri or to the landing of the pallets*
*^* Wilson Drums - The Wilson Drums were not afforded a
f ai r t r i a l in t hi s operation aL they were received, shortly before 'embarkation,
l ess t hei r towing bridles* However, t hei r desi rabi l i t y as a means of loading
and stowing equipment and. supplies of a nature readily subject to weather deterior-r
ation, was readily apparent.. One organization, after the.drum had served i t s
primary purpose, ingeniously converted t hi s equipment into
v
a very satisfactory
fi el d oven. . ' - ,
k
0
. Di st i l l er s. . -
a*' This division l i ft ed from G$AMa t ot al of 29 water
di st i l l at i on uni t s* 27 Badgers with a rated daily capacity of 1500 gallons each,
and 2 Cleaverbrooks with a rated daily capacity of $QQQ galIons each* providing
a potential production of 505QQ gallons-of water daily* Under field conditions, .-
these units cannot be expected to reach their maximum rated capacity, and actually
the daily output of water, maintaining a norm of 23 uni t s in operation, averaged
21000 gallons* With the reserve supply of water embarked at Guam, plus the re*
supply from ships, water supply was adequate* -Prom # plus 8, no water limits
were imposed and consumption,aver t ed about two gallon's per manper day.
5* Water Furifieation tftiit. "
a. At ot al of Ik portable water purification uni t s were
l i ft ed from GrUAM*. Iwo of -these uni t s were employed for chlorinating the water -
provided by the di st i l l at i on uni t s. No fresh water was available for purification*
6* Shore Party/. * ., .
a. Control of Shore Party labor:
Organized during the planning &n&training phase, into
labor units of 1 Officer and 25 men* including 2 iTCOs, a l l labor elements par t i -
cipated in five (5) $hore.arty exercises before embarkation* $he control and
employment of labor elements was stressed in t hi s training. Disembarkation of
Shore Party labor elements was rest ri ct ed to groups no smaller than one Shore
Party, labor uni t , or multiples thereof* Previous training stressed necessity for
the Officer in Charge of.labor unit to report at Shore Party CB"upon landing. All
uni t s of the Shore Party were assigned bivouac areas on beach by SP C0
r
and i n-
structed to maintain contact with SP GP'for^ employment* Labor was divided into
twelve hour shifts as the situation permitted. Control of Shore Party labor
throughout operation was excellent ,
b. lacaldefensemethods*
1
f
on Report* I WO JIMA Operation* (Cont' d).
In addition to the automatic weapon i nst al l at i ons of
the Pioneer Battalion, .twenty-four labor teams consisting of 1 officer and-29
men each, were ut i l i zed "by the Division Snore Party for p.erimeter defense* Eighteen
similar
1
dump unloading teams were available as re.serve, and were assigned areas
in which to assemble should t hei r employment for defense "be indicated.
c. Mechanical devices. . .
. Master bri&lea for towing of pal l et s were efficiently
employed. Sli
N
ngs, and chokers for hoisting pal l et s, 50.gallon drums, and miscella~
neous.cargo,' were used extensively. Previously prepared lengths pt wire rope
up to one inch in diameter and fi ft y feet long, were used effectively as tow l i nes,
and were attached to tractors i n order to hold LCTs, LSMs, and LSTs on the
steeply inclined beach, These lengths were also ut i l i zed for other tows,as re-
quired* One rigging t r ai l er was available in each Pioneer.Company for maintenance,
repair, and replenishment of slings, bridles and tow l i nes. Traversing cranes
with boom's up,to 30 feet were used extensively, but should not be considered as
a -substitute for manpoxirer*. At approximately p plus 20, two twenty-ton
ff
Le . "
To.uraeau
tt
cranes were necessary in order to unload heavy
1
:cargo belonging to
garrison forces* Tractors with,,blades were adequate and extensively used*
Tractors without blades were used as temporary prime-movers in unloading* .
d. ' Equipment and personnel furnished the Division Shore
Party was adequate* 3d'Marine Division Shore Party and equipment employed was
as l i st ed i n Annex Able to }6.division GOIl 6 -SOP Shore Party,- and-Annex Able-
Shore Party - to 3d Division Administrative Plan l-k% .
e* The Sth Hel d Depot was not ut i l i zed by t hi s organization
as a Divisional Shore Party Component* One.Dplus 5 the Field Depot, acting in
i t s capacity as Corps Shore Party, provided t hi s Division with the services of
forty LVT*s
f
four generators and eight flood l i ght s, and on Dplus 20
1
two
=twenty-ton
!l
l*e Touriieau
0
cranes were furnished in order to handle the heavy l i f t s
of garrison forces, '
. f. Battle Baplacement Drafts No.'2S and 3^ were given inten-
sive training as labor elements for BLIPand HGT Shore-Part i es and were< effi ci ent l y
employed as such iuring the i ni t i al phases of the operation. ,Their strength
was considerably depleted as the operation progressed when they were detached
as bat t l e replacements. . . . - ' . ,
g. Dump and,traffic control,
x
' Dumps and the distribution of supplies therefrom
t
were
placed under the supervision of the Division'Quartermaster when Division Shore
Party was activated. This procedure placed the responsibility upon the officer
best qualified*- and,has repeatedly proven successful*
Traffic Control - Military police and guides were posted
at strategic points for proper direction* of t raffi c. Properly planned t raffi c
rout es, and dump organization, reduced congestion to a minimum,in the Division
Shtf Party zo&e+
h* .Method o'f control, ship to shore c
'-41-
Action Hepor!. deration* (Cont*d).
Division- TC$fremained aboard the flagship of'Tr&nsEon
lX and controlled troop cargo pr i or i t i es for ship to snore movement as directed
by Division 0^4. Delivery of high pri ori t y items Requested ashore generally
required 12 hours from receipt of request* .
In some,cases cargo designated for 3d Marine Division
Beach landed elsewhere, due to misunderstandings between beachmasters and control
vessels* .
Cargo.tickets showing the-amount and type of cargo load-*
ed from the ship into landing' craft were made out in t r i pl i cat e by the Troop
T<$i of each ship, one copy of which he retained, one of which,was designated ..for
the control vessel and one to be delivered to the Shore Party Commander. Actually
;-*nmost ,case& the control vessel did not accept or receive i t s copy, and,two
copies arrived at the beach* Cargo t i cket s in-some caises were made out improperly
and more training in t hi s procedure i s necessary* As t hi s division landed in.
n
k
n
reserve, the use of floating dumps and the procedure of placing a Section
representative on the control vessel was not required oy the Shore Party plan.
i . transportation. '-
V/heeled transportation embarked was adequate for Shore
Party use* however, only limited use was made of wheeled vehicles by the Shore
Party i ni t i al l y because of/the soft sand.. DTJKWswere not assigned to t hi s
Division except for casualty evacuation from shore to Bhip. Some trouble was
encountered in negotiating soft sand near water' s edge
f
but
v
otherwise the VUK\f
proved to be an excellent vehicle for casualty evacuation. IiYTWs allocated-
by Corps to the Division Shore Party proved etfcelle&t and t hei r use greatly
simplified movement of cargo from landing, craft to dump areas. Transportation
.supplied was as specified in Shore Party anneat to Administrative Plan l-tyjj*
One Weasel per l et t er company and one per H&S*CompanyPioneer Battalion would
be useful as command vehicles for the purpose of rapid transportation to assi st
in coordination of act i vi t i es in beach and dump*areas.
7 Field Depot,
a Distribution of. re^supply Classes I , I I , 1 1 1 , 17, V -
The Field Depot was of l i t t l e, benefit in the.re-supply of Classes I , II*, I I I .
and IV.- The Field Depot did provide t hi s Division with a t ot al of 17,000 pai rs
of shoes', 2 outfits* cookingipack, sa^,7 flamethrowers. The re-supply of Glass
Vwas adequate, although at times, decidedly precarious, part i cul arl y in
and ar t i l l ei y ammunition. This division was required to furnish 3OOO
to the Corps on D,plus 23. .
s
.
b. Pistribut-jon of Maintenance - 3iJo maintenance f aci l i t i es
were provided t hi s division-by ti&j i eld Dep01. -
Action feeport, I WO JIMAOperation. (Cont
!
d),
c
* Other Servicea - l*or Shore Party assistance, see
paragraph 6, above* The SIeld Depot did provide, the faci l i t i es for disposal
of salvaged material and equipment beyond repair by elements of the Division*
' . ^ ' ' i - . . -
SI.. Efficiency of all shore "based supply faci l i t i es,
ft. All shore based supply faci l i t i es, employed by this
organization, other than the Field Depot covered in paragraph 7<a"bove
#
were
inttra-divisional* They functioned in a highly efficient manner,
9, Salvage and Salvage Collection, . ' " .
a. The salvage collection and reclamation as performed by,
this Division was exceptionally efficient. In a number of items the Division
returned to i t s rehabilitation area with a larger inventory than upon embarkation,
Por full report of salvage end disposition thereof see Action Report of 3&
-Service Battalion*
j .
10. Captured Material and Captured Material;Qollection>
a. .Captured enemy material was collected and returned to
division installations' by.the lower echelons, coordinating t hei r' act i vi t i es
through the Division Intelligence Section for observation..of innovations or .
new equipment,'as provided by SOP, However,.other than those items of interest
and value to JICPOA, the disposal of enemy material was a decided problem.
1
3Jb.e
terrain, restricted as i t was, offered l i t t l e space for the storage of these'
items, and destruction, particularly of ammunition, was
;
hazardous due to the
congestion,.caused ~bythe presence of .friendly forces. Directives were issued,
upon approval of higher echelon, to space enemy material dumps throughout the
organizational zones of responsibility, erecting barbed wire enclosures about ;,
them
;
andplacing them,under guard. Aproposal to boat .the ammunition, anddump
i t at sea was i ni t i al l y denied, due to a scarcity of landing craft. Towards the
end of the operation, this method of disposal was successfully employed*- for
full report of captured enemy material and disposition thereof, see Action
Hepdrt of 3d Service Battalion* ' ,
XXm Transporation* ' ' '
> ' . >'
'
a #
Adequacy of embarked wheeled and trailer transportation*
The transportation embarked was more,than adequate* The entire operation, con-
fined -as i t was to the limited terrain, did not require the full employment of
the vehicles embarked. However, such an unusual condition was decidedly ad-
vantageous, other than for the dispersal problem presented, as mobile supply
could be cohstatly maintained and forward elements spared the necessity of divert-
ing tactical,vehicles to supply purposes, . " - _
** Efficiency of cargo carrier M29Q.(Weasel) -.This, vehicle.
was ideally suitedJJO the soft volcanic soil i t so ably navigated* In the
i ni t i al phases, before the construction of,well defined supply roads, the Weasel
provided a sure means of. transportation,, .both for tactical and communication
purposes as well as for supply and evacuation* As the situation progressed and
roads were constructed and repaired
t
the Weasels were deff^tf^^^Ld jeryiced for
future combat operation.
Action Report, I WOJIMA Operation, (Cont
r
d)*
c. Efficiency of cargo\ t rai l ers, amphibious 5ijfrton - (Phis
Division was:responsible for pre-loading and embarking 5 of these vehicles
aboard an LSV for subsequent employment by other elements of VAC. HOobersvation
was made of t hei r landing at the t arget , but tests,conducted before loading
indicated the need,for a more pract i cal hitch, part i cul arl y under adverse sea
conditions, Prom a brochure prepared by the Cleaverbrook Corp/, recently received
at t hi s Headquarters, i t appears such a.hitch has now been..provided. The loss
in, loading space &t embarkation would seem to be more,than offset by the desirable
feature of-t hi s vehicle* i,'e*> protection to. cargo, both from the elements- and
pilferage* an& ready mobility for immediate dispatch to.the.using forces.
d. Adequacy of spare|>arts ~ An ample supply of sp?re
part s we-roprocured, embarked and landed at the target*
> e. Maintenance f aci l i t i es - Adequate maintenance personnel
and equipment were provided for constant servicing and.rep^4-r of vehicles, .
12* Efficiency,of supply communication - During-the assembling
of cargo,,and the embarkation of troops.and materiel, a special supply communi-* .
cation net was i nst al l ed, tying in the Division CP, the supply points, the
control points
t
the assembly and staging, areas, and the-embarkation bert hs.
Tae result was a highly, efficient communications not. During the.assault phase,
the Joint Assault Signal Company,, the ITaval Bep.ch Party, and the Division Signal
Company, provided an efficient and adequate system of communications employing
radio, visual and telephonic equipment. 'Rapid..communlcation was provided'from.
shore,to ship, from Shore Party to-divisional supply installations* .and from,
the Division'Command Post to the supply,i nst al l at i ons of higher and-lower echelons*
' ' '
13. Conclusions' and Recommendations^
, -a. In conclusion i t ' naytoe,stated: , '
' . ^ ' (1) That the shipping allocated was adequate and well
designed-for the purpose, except for-the -lifting-of the Sank Ipatt al ion. " Only,2
LSTs were provided to l i f t the flanks* (This prevented the. embarkation of
necessary supply and raaintainanee vehicles to support tank operations* Hore tanks
could have been k^ot in action in the early phase .of the operation if naintainence
vehicles and equiv^ment could have been combat unit loaded with the tanks*, t^/hen
LSTs are used for the l i ft i ng of'**..tank bat t al i on, not,less,,th^ja 3 LS2's should
be provided.^ ' . ' '
., (Z) That the equipment embarked, with'.the exception-of
galley gear, was sufficient to support 'the division.throughput the operation*
(3) That the supplies.embarked,'with the exception of
mortar and ar t i l l er y ammunition, were adequate*
(k) That the. palletizing of Approximately fifty par cant
.of embarked supplies,is-practicable and desirable, providing adequate mechanical- '
handling equipment i s available, both aboard ship and on the beach,
(5) That the wisddra of strict
(
conbat loading, even for
a division,assigned the role of Reserve, was nost definitely tffii
#
Action Report* IWOJIfaA Operation. (Cont
!
d)
#
BCT~21was ordered to proceed in advance of the balance of the division, there
was no delay created by readjustment of cargo; the^equipment and supplies of
the ROTwere entirely self-contained* '
(6) That the special vehicles, namely, the weasel-, the
armored bulldozer, and the amphibious water tight t rai l er, utilized in-combat for
the first time by this division, performed efficiently and are a desirable
addition- to the T/O of a division.
(7) That the Athey track-laying trailer-tractor combi- ..
nation again proved i t s decided value.
(8) That the "K" ration remains the least popular combat
ration. The "C" ration has been appreciably improved, and i s the most popular
combat ration. However, for al l troops not actually engaged in combat, the
10 in 1ration, and the "3" ration, in the- absence of fresh stores, are the most
:
desirable. If troops are 1jo be subsisted ashore for prolonged periods, plans
should be made to supplement the field rations with fresh foods.
x
jSven small
'amounts of meat, potatoes-, apples, oranges* unions, and eggs, are important
morale builders when added to the field ration,
. ' . (9) That elements of the Sth Hel d Depot and Gexrison
forces were landed tooearly in the operation*. The arrival of their personnel
and cargo on assault beaches, utilizing lighterage urgently needed for the lend-
ing of combat equipment ..and supplies, delayed thelanding of the l at t er items,
and created undue congestion and confusion in the resticted area available,
b. The following recommendations, based on experience-
.gained in tki's operation,' are listed below:
(1) That in-Amphibious operations, an adequate Shore.
Party ba trained-pud'equipped to -meet any contingency, even though the contemplated
role of a Division indicates a low probability of their employment,
- -
(2) That early liaison,^ accomplished prior to the arrival
at-the embarkation point, be effected-between the division and the .shipping
allocated, in order to avoid any discrepancies in loading date.
- ' (3) That approximately fifty per cent- of al l supplies
continue to be palletized, p.nd. .that al l shipping allocated be designed and
equipped for the mechanical handling of palletized cargo* '
* >
. (k) That the.Range,' field, Model 1937, or. equal, be.
embarked for any future operation, no matter how short the contemplated action.
This mage, not included in the equipment embarked for this operation, occupies
very l i t t l e -sp.ace.in loading, and CPH readily be en^jloyed to excellent advantage,
Very few periods occur during combat,when galleys could not be established,- and
.cooked meals provided all troops* ' ".
(5) That fresh, stores,
1
from the ships in the area, be
sw>pliecL to the forces ashore as early and in as large a quantity as possible*
The morale factor gained by serving fresh-food as.ranidly as galleys can be -
Action Report, I WOJ1MAOperation*. (Cont'd)*
established wi l l amply repay the effort expended,
1
.'
(6) That Regimental Train Bivouacs, as defined in M
7*3^ paragraph 57 be"established as rapidly as the terrain can "be,exploited.
This method of containing the service elements, employed in the operation by
RCT~2i
f
proved highly successful in conserving transportation and expediting
the distribution of supply*
-'-' (7) That an'.adequate and balanced supply of olothing,
shoes, and individual equipment, be embarked and remain aboard al l ships desig-
nated to receive casualties. 'In t hi s operation, a number of .""White
1
* casualties
were returned to the beach without proper clothing and entirely without equipment.
That, as early as/practicable, dual roads be con-
structed for a l l routes of supply .and evacuation,^maintaining one road for the
sole use of wheeled transportation. Though directives of higher ecftelon pre~ .
scribed t hi s construction, t raffi c on many routes remained >eongested for undue
periods, caused by tracked vehicles impeding the movement of the more rapid,
wheeled Vehicles* *
k
' * ' '
(9) That three TD~18 t ract ors with bulldozer, equipped
with 5/S
11
detachable armor, be added to the T/O equipment of the Engineer
Battalion, to be attached during combat, to the Tank Battalion, for the construc-
tion of routes of ingress and egress for areas under enemy observation and fire*
> (40) (a) That a t ot al of $k M39C (teasels) be added to
the T/O equipment of a Marine Division, allocated as folldws*
27 *i'or communication vehicles only, distributed,
as follows; 6 - Signal Co; 2 - H&SBtry,
j i rt i l l ery kegiment} 1 - Artillery Bn* 2 -
H&SCo,.. Infantry Regimentj 1 - Infantry Bn.
.57 - or supply, evacuation and evacuation and
rapid movement of supplementary weapons,
. distributed as follows: k - H&SCo,
. Infantry Regt; k^~ Infantry 3n; k ~H&S
, Btry, Art i l l ery &egtI 5' - MTBo.
(b) This vehicle has proven invaluable in traversing
t errai n prohibited to wheeled vehicles* I t should be considered a
n
Vehicle of
Opportunity*, and in no sense a replacement for the l/k ton truck (^eep), %en
conditions do not dictate i t s employment, the Weasel should be dead~lin.ed
t
completely serviced, and reserved for future employment. During,t hi s operation-,
the' Weasels , part i cul arl y successful in the i ni t i al phase* were dead-lined
within tliis Division on Dplus 15* So successfully were they maintained, that
only one We&sel was expended during the*operation, that vehicle being destroyed
.by enemy action. , . ' ' . , \ '
( l l ) That the Athey track^laying,' t r si l er - t r act or combi-
nation be-added to the T/O equipment of "aMarine Division. Thi's Division ha.s
employed,this means of transportation during three combat operations, namely,
^PJ*S
p
4
nv
*y-
e
.fi'uani,and Iwo'Jima, and in each operation tfhelr
s
value has been
4eti' niteiy established, At ot al of 18 t rai l er-t ract ors* alEJUblte'ft^lie Motor^ ..
y
Action Report, I WOJIMAOperation* (Cont
f
d).
Transport Battalion, 6 assigned to each'ROT'during combat, ideally supplement the
wheeled car'go transportation normally assigned the-RCT. The TD-l4 t ract or,
rather than the TD-9 now employed within t hi s Division, would be more .desireable
motive power. ITor transporting supplies over terrain impossible or damaging to
wheeled vehicles, the Athey track-laying t r ai l er and trpxtor, eppepr to present
the logical solution. .
(12) (a} That the Cleaverbrook Di st i l l at i on unit be wheel
or track mounted, preferably the l at t er , in order to provide nobility 'for t hi s
unwieldy 'equipment. The Cleaverbrook, a more rel i abl e though l ess economical.
di st i l l er than the Badger, i s a most desirable and necessary piece of equipment
where ever t hi s mesns of water supply i s indicated* However, i t s size and weight
require the employment of crpnes &n.& flat-bed t r ai l er s , often at times when the
l at t er equipment i s most urgently needed for Shore Party operations, ,Mobility .
would increase the value of the'Cleaverbrook considerably.
(b) That a one-ton t r ai l er be provided for each
three di st i l l at i on units employed, for the transportation of chemicals,
accessories^ and spare part s,
~E# Ar t i l l e r y . . '
" (See Enclosure 3P, Action Report,
(
12th Marines)* .
T Air, ' ,
1. The Air Liaison part i es of t hi s division performed t hei r duties
in a satisfactory manner throughout the operation. Unit commanders were con-
stantly advised of al l strikes in or adjacent to their zone of action, -Liaison
was maintained at al l times with naval gunfire and art i l l ery, ' and the fires, of^
these supporting arms were well coordinated. Radio*communication,was maintained
at al l times with Air Support Control except while displacing forward, during whici,
times any necessary transmissions could have been relayed via regimental command
radio net should the situation have warranted. Requests for ai r support were made
over the Support Air Request (SAR) net and.the direction of these strikes relayed
to the ai rcraft via-Air Support Control, This method of relaying information was
satisfactory although i t did take a greater length of time and overcrowded a
badly congested SASnet . Directing strikes wa-s quite difficult due to limited
observation by Air Liaison Officers on t hi s t errai n.
2. Communication equipment of the Air Liaison part i es of t hi s
division was adequate with the possible exception of a remote control with "battal-
ion part i es for communication .between battalion- OPand GPwhere the radio Jeep^
was-located. The SARnet was congested at al l times with too many stations on
one frequency. Improper use of the SABnet as an ai r direction net caused need-
l ess congestion. On several occasions,, when urgent strikes were requested"by
assault units against targets plainly suited to ai r attack only, i t was impossible
to transmit these requests over the SARnet because i t was being employed for the
direction of a strike in progress, Without going into the relative importance
of the targets under attack, this,was a fl at violation of all*air support doctrine
and, in these instances, precluded efficient and correct operation,
ft
The control
station for the SARnefc did not seem to exercise coajplete control. As a resul t ,
ActionHeport,IWOJIMAOperation. (Coat
1
*).
trafficonthisnettendedtogetautofhandonmanyoccasions*
3* Coloredpanelswereusedto-someesitentinmarkingfrontlines
priortoanairstrike*\Dueto- theopenterrainandthefactthattheenemyhad
observationfromcommandinggroundduringthegreaterpartoftheoperation,it
wasnotpracticabletousepanelssincetheyservedto.drawintensiveenemyfire*
HJhemarkingoftargetswasleftto'thediscretionoftheAirCoordinatorandAir
SupportControl* Mortarandartillerysmoke(W?)shellswereusedbutdiet,not
proveverysatisfactorybecauseofthepresenceofothersmokein'thesame
generalarea*placedeitherbyourownorenemytroops,orfromfirescausedby
bombardment* -'
4. a. Requestsfordoseair"supportwereheldtoaminimumby
thisdivision,withonlythoserequestsbestsuitedforaviationsubmittedto Mr
SupportControlfor'consideration* Anytargetsthatweresuitedforeither
artilleryara'avalgunfirewereturnedovertothosesupporting,arms, 2hiswaa
notoccasionedbythefactthattheadditionaleffectofairbombardmentwasnot
desirable* !3?henumberofplanesonstationdailyforsupportofthreedivisions
wasj4ght.fightersandeighttorpedobombers,adecidedlyinadequatenumber.An
averageoftwoandahalfhourswasrequiredbeforeamissioncouldbeexecuted*
Unlessthistimeintervalpanbegreatlyreduced,infantryunitswilllosecocr-
fidenceinsupportaviationandplacetheirdependenceentirelyinartillerysad
navalgunfire. Itisbelievedthatwithanadequatenumberofsupportingaircraft.
employedinmassagaiirstthehighlvorganizedenemydefensiveareasencountered,
togetherwithartilleryandnavalgunfire,,thataviationcouldhavemadeapower-
fulcontributiontothedisruptionoftheenemydefenses. Supportaircraft,like
artillery,shouldnotbefritteredawayintheexecutionofpiecemealmissionsbut
shouldbeemployedinmassinsupportofthemaineffortofthegroundforces.
b* Itisalsobelievedthat .generalsupportaircraftcarrying
nothingles>ethan. 1000lbdelayedactionbombsshouldbeusedagainstdeepenemy
defenses. Inherelandbasedheavybombersarewithinrangeofthetarget,they
shouldbeincludedintheairsupportplanforthispurpose, Hadthistypeof
generalsupportbeenemployedagainsttheenemy
1
sfinaldefensivepositionwhile
thegroundforceswereengagedintheassaultoftheenemy'smainbattleposition,
itisbelievedthatthelastphaaeoftheoperationwouldhaveproceededmore
rapidlyandwithlesscost. '
5* Delayedactionfuzes areessentialintheattackoffortified
positions. Afterreceiptoftheairsupportplan
1
forthisoperationitwasnoted
thatnoprovisionwasmade foxdelayedactionfuzes* Aspecialrecommendation
wasmadetoCorpsandverbalassurancegiven-thatthesefuzeswouldbeavailable
uponrequest. However,they^we,renotmadeavailableuntiltheclosingstagesof
theoperation* Itisconsideredessentialthatinthea'tt&ckoffieldforti-
ficationsofwhateverstrength,delayedactionfusedbombs,regardlessofsize,
beused* .. ,
6 Dummyattackswereeffectivelyused, inadjustingairattacks
onthecorrecttarget,priortoactualliveattacks. Whilethisprocedure
N
sometimestakesaconsiderableamountoftime,theincreasedeffectivenessofthe
attackwarrantstheexpenditureoftime.
t
Action Report, XWOJIMAOperation,' (float
t
d)
fm a. Conclusions. '
.. / (1) That insufficient aircraft were available for close
support of this division*
7
.- .-
(2) General
1
support aircraft were not properly employed
for deep support of troops of this division. '
:
. ?
n a t
(3) tfo greatest single defect to become apparent
in this- operation was that the time interval bettireen i ni t i al request and execution
of strikes was far..too great, i ,
. > (k) That in spite-6f the fact that al l Air liaison
Officers have received basic training from the amphibious Training Cpmmand,
Pacific Pleet, i t was .evident throughout the operation that uniformity of .training
and indoctrination were noticeably lacking*
(5) That an Air Support Control Unit operating'.ashore i s .
a definite improvement over shipboard direction in that >t affords more accessi-
ble channels for close liaison with the front line units, .
. b, Kecommendations. , -
(l)
;
fhat moraircraft be maintained on station in order
that mass air attacks against enemy fortified positions can be delivered in
support of ground troops* .
. , * (2) That the necessity of relaying pertinent information
from Bn OPto CPto Air Support Control to Air Coordinator be-eliminated. Means
should beprovided whereby a clearer picture can be conveyed to the pi l ot s and
thereby cut down the time lag in executing missions, . ;~ ' ' .,
' . (3) $bat BCF,Pa.cific issue an SOPfor, close air support
so as to standardize the procedure for the employment of air- support.
That either the syllabus under which Air Liaison-
personnel are trained be' thoroughly overhauled and modernized or that BOVPacific,
institute its, ownmeasur.es for centralized advanced training of Air Liaison per- :
sonnel prior to their assignment to JASCo.

f
.' ' - (5) That some system whichwi l l shorten the interval be- ;
twe'en the request and the execution of air strikes be adopted.- To this endi i t
is^recommended that Air Liaison Officers be trained and allpwed to direct planes
in'on targets when they have good observation, Pilots/ as.well as Air Liaison
Officers^ should be trained i n this procedure to gain confidence in each k
(6)., That a Support idr Direction frequency (mediumhigh),
or ^strike frequency
11
, be assigned on which the Air Liaison Party
r
Commander Air
Support Control andMr Coordinator can work uninterruptedly while,running a
strike; .' .
Action Report, I WOJTMi Operation* ; (Cont' d).
(7) Th*.t night harassment by aircraft be employed in the ,
early:phases of future operations to compensate for laak of ar t i l l er y support
during t hi s phase of operation, and that night observation be employed also.
(8) That strafing In close support of troops only be done
on the specific request of the Air Liaison Party concerned. , '
G. Haval Gunfire/ . * . ' ' >
-. 1. Composition of Shore,Fire Control Par t i es.
v
"a* Shore fire control par t i es, as Well as the regimental land.
divisional naval gunfire teams, were organized in accordance with the provisions.
of IMF, Pacific, Special Order S6~MK I t i s believed that, subject to minp>
changes hereinafter suggested, t hi s organization i s at,lasVand for the f i r st
time,adequate to meet the minimum requirements for control of naval gunfire on
al l l evel s. Training of al l personnel was excellent, especially.that,of the
officers.- This i s apparently the result of the extensive t rai ni ng act i vi t i es-
maintained by the Haval Gunfire Section, *JM3P
t
Pacific, in the BAWAllAlf area. The
value of gunnery exercises at It&HOOLAWSand of the technical courses of the Pleet
Gunnery and Torpedo School cannot be overestimated* jjd JASCo enlisted personnel
were in al l cases well trained.
b. There'are no recommendations regarding training except that
i t be continued on the sam general plan. Three,recommendations, however,, maybe
presented in regard to personnel. They are: .
. ' .. (l) That the provisionsof BCBVPacific, Special Order %6~kk
be continued in force., despite T/O changes to the.contrary. This order provides '
an adequate, r eal i st i c shore fi re control organization based upon the uniform
experience of the .MAHSHALLSand MASIANAS operations, and completely confirmed on
IWOJIHA Any reduction of naval gunfire elements below the-'strengths provided
therein will be gravely detrimental to efficient employment of the -arm. .
V . - '
, '
t
_ (2) That, in-view-of the. general shortages of ar t i l l er y
personnel, together with the high at t r i t i on
!
of forward observers and naval gunfire
spotters, spotters-be selected from' other sources that' fi el d ar t i l l er y officers
alone. I t i s believed that excellent spotters, of considerable technical training
and background, could be .obtained from disbanding base Cefe&se ar t i l l er y uni t s,
. These officers are al l thoroughly versed in advanced mechanistic systems,of fire
control, more so than,field artillerymen/ have received
1
elementary field, ar t i l l er y
feiraining,' and would require only additional instruction in terrain appreciation
and,forward observer spotiing as well as the Aaval gunnery indoctrination required
for either type of officer. . . <
(3). That,the Division laval Gunfire team be augmented
during operations by one additional officer of the rani of lieutenant or '
.*lieutenant (j . g). When a-division i s embpxked, the "Commending General pnd the
Assistant Division Commander are aboard separp^te ships, each with his own
"parallel" staff; thus,-the Haval Gunfire Officer, with half the team and the TCS,
Action Iteport, IWO.'JIMA Operation. (Cont'd)*
remain with the-former, while the Assistant Haval Gunfire Officer, with the balance
of the team and the '3EBX,/proceed with the latter* On i t s face, t hi s division
would appear to present no di ffi cul t i es, but in,practice* when the Commanding
General's group i s, furt her divided into a rear and forward echelon under the , >,
General and Chief of Staff respectively, i t becomes necessary for the Hava'1 Gun- "
f i r e Officer to proceed with one or the other, leaving pne echelon inoperative
during displacement. Ideally, t hi s may be remedied by coordinated displacement
of the Assistant Division Commander group, but in practice t hi s will seldom i f .
ever occur* 5?hus an additional assi st ant , to guard frequency and take action
dutdng displacement of the Commanding General*s group i s necessary. A further
use for t hi s officer i s , in effect, as a communication watch officer during
critical periods of the operational day when the Division JfaVal Gunfire Officer
and his assistant are necessarily with the G3or engaged in planning, when i t i s
nevertheless important that ,all radio...transmissions be carefully monitored and -
acted upon promptly and, correctly. Likewise, t hi s officer,would supervise the
repair, reallocation and exchange of communication equipment received from
subordinate liaison teams and shore f i r e control part i es* .I t may be added that
such,an officer ivas available in the foregoing capacities dturing t hi s operation
and functioned as herein recommended with efficiency and success.
2 draining and Planning for Operation: . '
a* All shore fir^^
on
"
t Jr 6
^ part i es of the division had operated
together as teams well pri or "to the operation, having in some cases functioned
t
together during; the lUBlMAB,campaign* In spite of the $act that al l personnel
to bring teams to the, strengths prescribed in par l . a. abovedid not arrive unt i l
the month of January, x^ell trained nuclei existed for each,of the nine SPCP, and .
sufficient.time remained for intensive training of the regimental and division
teams* I t was a matter of standing policy in t hi s division t hat , whenever eny
battalion or regiment took the field for training, i t operated with.complete S3TGP ..,
and liaison- team, usually with simulated 'dummy fire support
lr
ships
H
to enhance
real i ses hus, naval gunfire personnel participated i n battalion and regimental
field problems and GP3C, and in a two-day division GP#, which was o:f part i cul ar
value.
s
As battalions of the division went, through extensive fij.eld problems
live' ammunition of al l calibers, SPGP employed lO^mmbat t eri es to simulate.5
11
by supporting DD
9
.some 2,000 rounds being expended.
b All unit commanders within the division , down to and .
including battalion commanders and their staffs, received a''four*hour naval
gunfire indoctrination course presented by the Division laval Gunfire Officer and
hi s assistant* This course attempted to demonstrate the capabilities^,
charactaristies and limitations of naval gunfire support, and,.when followed up,
as i t was., by similar classes and seminars within regiments and battaKons,
conducted by the respective naval liaison officers, the resul t s seemed excellent*
In, short the division as a whole was thoroughly "gunfire conscious".
. c. Coordination between ar t i l l er y, naval gunfire and ai r was
continuous and complete. UFoplan as such ever existed, coordination being
achieved through mutual understanding of the characteristics and capabilities
of the respective arms, and through close personal,liaison.. "
i
/
Action Heporfc,, IftO JiHA Operation. (Cont'd)*
d. All naval gunfire officers of the division were given
comprehensive "briefing on the "operation as of
:
the date that t hi s information was
released to the respective bat t al i ons. Thus ai l officers participated with full
knowledge in the planning,of the units to which they were attached.
, e. Hot only did spotters and liaison officers confer mutually,
but regimental liaison officers held frequent conferences with the officers of
t hei r subordin?.te uni t s. *
f* Training for the operation was satisfactory and complete,
bearing in mind the, consideration that t hi s di vi si on' s role
1
, in reserve, prevented
specific rehearsal, .
3. Landing of Haval Gunfire Elements:
. a, b, b
6
Sin.ce t hi s division landed from reserve, after $*
day, no comments or recommendations are giade as to the landing phase/ except
to note that no di ffi cul t i es of communication or coordination were encountered
during displacement ashore, inasmuch as on al l levels except division jfsee (d)
below)* timely opportunity was provided for i nt act landing of SK& and liaison
teams'* . - '
d, The only comment regarding displacement concerns the si t -
uation which ari ses as a resul t of separation of the Commanding Genera! and the
Assistant Divisibn- Commander aboard separate ships., necessitating that the Naval-
Gunfire Officer, with half the tepm and the 5?CSjeep, remain with the former^while
the assi st ant , with the balance of the team and\the.TB3C, proceed with t he^l at t er.
I t would therefore appear desirable during operations to have an additional
Assistant Haval Gunfire Officer, so that the Commanding General
1
s'group could .
at al l times have available the services of a qualified officer. For other
reasons rendering the assignment .of such an officer desirable, see par (2) (b)
ante. " ' * ..
k+ Observations of 3ffeet of Scheduled Uaval Gunfire;
a This division made an unopposed landing QVear beaches
already secured, I t
;
appeared*that the prelininary bombardment h,&& been thorough*-
l y executed in t hi s area, but had not been extended to provide coraplete coverage
of the numerous i nt eri or strong.points and centers of resistance further inland. "
I t i s believed that
t
had, a longer time (seven'or more days) been available, t o-
gether with a proportionate increase in bombardment ammunition allowances, the
effects of the preliminary fires!could have been considerably increased; that many
positions which had to be reduced at high cost to assault units would have already,
been damaged or destroyed; an& that the cost of the operation in casualties could
hp.ve been substantially decreased. In view of the small size,of tWOJIMA,' al l
the are?, of .which could readily be reached by naVal f i r es, i t would seem that the
i slsnd vouid have been a targef especially suited to prolonged, thorough and
complete preliminary.'bombardment*
5 Call 31re Phase; " - . ' .
a Since t hi s division did not land in assault, i ni t i al
communications were readily established*- The 21st Marinas* i ni t i al l y attached to
H i
J
iarine Division, secured frequencies arid ships wqp^^lfj^fficjalty, and,
,
9
Action Eeport, IWOJ1MA,Operation. (Cont*d)
upon landing of t hi s division with passage of the 9th Marines^through the 21st,
frequencies of.the l at t er were assigned to the former
6
.Except during two
emergencies,'-Wire comaanication was used between division and regiments, whereas
wire and SCIKJOO, timed to the t act i cal frequency of the.."batt al ion concerned,
were 'employed "between regiment and battalions;' the' need of a.naval gunfire
frequency for SCB-3QO was greatly felt,. Subject to persistent enemy jamming on
one frequency (^5^5) coraiminication with ships was good
o
b Present organization and doctrine for call fi res i s sat i s-
factory i n al l save one respect, that of spotting frequencies* If i s strongly
recommended that sufficient spotting frequencies be available in each operation
to permit the permanent- assignment of a frequency to each SJTCP
P
as such an.
arrangement would reduce the, staff work load markedly on all"levels*
c
o
Coordination within regiments was achieved by regimental
liaison officers when necessary? Across division boundaries, similar coordination
was readily achieved ^r verbal arrangements with adjacent division gunfire offloors
through the medium of the supporting arms telephone net maintained by 5*h -
Amphibious Corps* It uas a nat t er of standard procedure to coordinate fi res
along division boundaries or in adjacent zones by t hi s method, and intervention
of Corps was rarely required*
d. The basic method of coordination between supporting arms
was to achieve close personal liaison on al l levels. Targets were freely inter**
changed according to the method of attack best suited, "and, whenever operations,
were in progress or prospect, ' the ar t i l l er y, naval gunfire and ai r officers were
together or readily accessible to each other by wire* Plans,for scheduled fires
or pre-King Hour preparations ware habitually prepared j oi nt l y, ,and so'presented
to the O-3-t Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General. Much of "the success
achieved may be traced to the separate maintenance of a
n
supporting arms
v
tent
fr
,
so-called, adjacent to the (5-3 Section. In t hi s center, wire communications con-
verged from the division switchboard, from the similar 5th Ainphibious Corps
establishment, from the division ar t i l l er y fi re direction-center* and from the
naval gunfire and ai r radio centrals* I t was thus possible to establish any sort
of communications necessary, and to plan without interruption* while being within
a few steps of the G-3 Section*.
e SJPGP fired approximately ISO cal l missions, not including
those conducted or called by ai r spotters, or fired (though technically by call
of syCP) as part of an approved and scheduled preparation. In these missions,
some 17i5
00
rounds of 5" were expended, of which i t i s estimated thft$ 85$ wasAAC,
and the balance common or WP, I t i s further estimated that 55$ of al l missions
were conducted by spotters, kQ$by ?0# spotters, and 5$ by HIOj no missions are
known to have ibQ&n. conducted by scout sergeants* Approximately 91&0 rounds of
5|
f
and 2,400 rounds of main battery were fired in scheduled preparations.
,\
f Ifo night cal l missions are laaown to have been fired,
although harassment by direct support DEon schedules approved by regimental
HL0were delivered nightly, and with seemingly satisfactory resul t s. I t i s
believed t hat , had more ammunition been available, i t could readily have been
used for niglit harassing. /
g. Call fi res were not usually brought closer to friendly
Action Heport, X*!Q JIHA.Operation* (Cont
f
d),
troops than 150-200 yards, and then only when i t was evident that a good solution
had "been. obtained by"the firing ship. In- this-connection, the outstanding
performance of 1200 f/s i*v, charges should "be emphasized, 'for i t was with this."
'type of aanunitioh, employing-overhead fires," that, -in at least one instance, 5
W
fires were brought-to within-75 yards of a supported battalion, the troops of
which had previously been.vanned*" In other'cases this fire was "brought within
100 yards, always with'consistent performance, close grouping "both in range and'
deflection, and with characteristics generally analagous:to howitzer fire* Safety
measures employed were of'.two general types:' -(l) Thepractice of commencing
an.adjust;.!eat on a.point, remote'from friendly troops, and of gradually "bringing
the f i r ei nj (2) That bf .employing SKIP in the front lines for safety control
whenever airspot or unobserved fires vrere .employed, thus permitting positive
control and instant cessation of fire whenever dangerous conditions obtained. As.
a further aethod'of positive safety control, the so-called "ISxbrook" transmissions
directing al l ships to check lines of fire, and announcing.repprts of fire falling
short, when not worked to death by poorly confirmed r erroneous reports, were
a"lagt resort of muchvalue* . .
5
ft
; & ,(1) commonwas employed with some frequency against located
pillboxes and similar point targets with which TWO JIKAabounded. Perhaps i t s '
most successful employment was in conjunction with 1200 f/s charges, when good -
(large) angles of fall could be obtained, thus causing positive setback^ She .' ' *
delay, combined with the reinforced ogive, made this type of projectile effective
agairist^aany targetsba^tnd the capabilities of AAC, especially small pillboxes and
similar emplacements of reinforced contraction* Numerous recommendations have
been-received f.or base^detonating elements with longer delay, (as great,as 6*1
second)* If this could be"achieved withiut.prejudicing the success of missions ,
afloat, it. is considered desirable, _ . .
(2) 5" AAG,.as always, was,the work horse. In this operation,
however, i t vas not always
1
,usable with the "best results
f
due to the strength of
memyfortifications -and to
%
the fact that virtually al l enomypersonnel stayed
below ground*. Nevertheless
t
this type of shell accounted for the gr'eat majority
of rounds fired, and was used against great'numbers of targets,
' (3) Intermediate and major caliber APwere rarely used by this
division, since general support missions were fired throughout under Corps control*
Ample opportunity'existed however'.for extensive us.e of such ammunition, and, had
the division been allowed reinforcing heavy ships under i t s own control - as had
boon anticipated i~undoubted benefit would have been.derived*
(k) Intermediate and-major caliber HOwere^employed in the
majority"of general support or reinforcing missions - on division level, usually
for the thickening,and deepening of the intense pre-attatsk preparations vrliich-
are considered standard in this division. In a few instances-, GLvrere assigned
in.direct support of assault battalions, and ~6
n
HOwas found to be of great value*
. ' ^ ' -
(5) Air burst wasused to a negl i gi bl e extent- '^ySJOP although
on two occasi ons,TOTspot t ers employed i t agai nst penmortar posi t i ons v-Lt.b. good
r es ul t s , .,
- : .-_ ..- (&) .Impact burst comprised the great maj ori t y, due-'to t he .
;ever(f?heliaing;j)roportion of mat eri el and covered t arget s* f9t%P~f act or s, t he
/hatu:fe.
y
bf .vrhich,m'ay.on\y be.hazarded, t her e appeared to ^ ^ I W ^ ^
i
Action Heport, %'tiO JIM* Operation.
;
(Cont
f
^}.
number of impact duds, many-of which were rounds with steel nose plugs*
ij)' '-jjp vas, as usual, in much greater demand than: could
be supplied. It wasuniformly used.* Mid highly valued* as a casualty producing
agent, whereas the' screening role was usually left to art i l l ery smok<3, of which
the supply was more generous. Adeficiency.in ships
1
ammunition allowances was
the small number of rounds,per;gun of^tfP, Dnemyprisoners indicate that i t i s one
of our most feared auaitions.,- Current modifications of WProunds with.the Hk 13
fuz-e g;Lve good results on impact, but i t i s believed that a W round constructed
on the same design as the 5" A&J*-namely, with both time (MkIS) t*xi&. impact.
(Mk 2%)fuzing-would be most satisfactory, - . > '
- (&) ^Ommwas.but' rarely employed, due to the .gm&llness of
the island, the proximity of friendly i^roops, and the broken, rocky terrain which
tended to produce ricochets. For cave shooting* so-called, i t was found fet t er
to employ 5" due to the decreased likelihood of ricochet, and the tight, positive
.control not possible with automatic, cannon, even on Wz*37
W gOmawas,not employed, for the same reasons;as indica*
ted"above,, end, in addition, because i t would have been ineffective against the
heavy fortifications and entrenchments on1V0
^ ^ 1200 f/s charges, a? indicated in.par (6) (g) ante,
played an especially valuable role in close supporting missions ^hen fires 'could
best be brought in overhead, ' targets attacked'with these charges were thos3
against which large angles of fall were desired, and results were comparable to -/
those "of overhead,howitzer fire* I t wasnoted, however, that some ships seemed
reluctant or hesitant' to deliver these fi res, due apparently to inescperience in
applying the necessary computer corrections for the differing trajectory end.
change in i
#
v. I t . i s "accordingly recommended-that further eniphasis be placed up-
on 1200 f/s exercises at !UH00LAW3 SO that both ships and gunfire personnel may-.
become b'etter acquainted with i t s use.* . - .
^ ^ Rpffisfcg were not employed in support of the division,
due to limiting factors of accuracy, and unavailability of rocketcr&ft.
' ' ' (12) ^2
tt
iBortar shells were used, on request to Corps, for
night harassing fires; no information i s 'available as to , its affect.
i . Air spot was used on.approximately kOfy of the fi remissions
conducted by this,division* ' Standard procedure was used throughout, in which the
ai r spotter eaters the SFC,spotting net. In view of the adverse observation, .
which frequently limited front line sppt t erst o a hundred 'y&rds
1
field of viex^r,
the services of.TOPaircraft were invaluable, and i t i s to the credit of V03
1
.
squadrons that their pilots were able to meet the test so we3i not only in the
precision pf their fires, but in the excellent technique end communication
procedure-employed, ASan illustration of tlae high coordination end flexibility
of VO?work', the following incident i s, ci t ed. > VOFpireraft observed an eneuiy-
ATgun., firing from a camouflaged position, v/hich was apparently holding.up
progress f friendly tanks. ' The spotter reported this-to the I\fLOvia the , '
spotting frequency, and the information was in turn relayed to the tanks; mean-
Action Report, IWOJtMAOperation, (Cont*&)
while the VOJspotter commenced strafing the Al gun,' thus leading the tanks i n
t
designating the target, and neutralizing the weapon which was thenknocked out
"by our tanks* .
Support Shifts; . .
a* In order to get additional ships, i t \iras,necessary for the
originator of the request to obtain approval through-normal channels from
division, which then passed the request to Corps for a.ction* Considering the
limitations inherent in the situation, when ammunition, end ships had to be care-
fully apportioned, ships Were furnished-in adequate numbers, and with promptness,
nevertheless assignment of at least a GLto a division would have materially
assisted us in theprompt execution of counterbattery, counterraortar, and attack
preparat i on, fi res, as well as in the other /general support missions, ASmatters
stood, however, the Division.Gunfire Officer did not ordinarily have means at. hia
own disposal for influencing the progress of the bat t l e, except upon request to
Corps*
b It* i s no1^believed efficient or economical to assign more
than a single ship to one SPCP, nor toas such a practice ever followed in t hi s
division, although the reverse whetfein ships were "spl i t " between two and
sometimes three SK3? -. frequently occurred*
c In general, requests for
;
fires were promptly-.and accurately
ful fi l l ed, and al l observers seem agreed that the standards of efficiency in fi re
support ships are consistently high* Pew reports of gunfire falling short
originated in uni t s of t hi s division, and i t i s to.tire credit of the regimental
and battalion l i ai son officers' that the majority of these WQTQfully.investigated,.
and found to "be groundless or at any rat e not -due ,to naval gunfire* As a resul t ,
when such reports reached the division lev$l, they were usually factual and
accurate, so that prompt action could be taken to l i t or cease firing as might
be.necessary. In a very few instances fi re support was unsatisfactory, but the
overwhelming percentage of missions were faithfully and promptly executed*
d* Due to the broken t errai n and to the i nt eri or zone.of
action of the division it' was impossible to engage targets by direct fi re unt i l '
the very l ast ; when our units were breaking through to the s&a. At t hi s tifte*
for two days (9-*10 March), a DDwas employed in direct f i r e shooting under the.
control of the Division" Naval Gunfire Officer or hi s assi st ant , with additional
SPgP control for safety* Due to the proximity, of friendly.troops, and the lines
f fi re (frequently pointed,directly into our own l i nes), i t was not considered
safe to conduct such missions unless under control of an embarked officer from the
division. Nevertheless, these missions were-very"useful in' pealing off cave
entrances, and demolishing beach defenses which would otherwise have had to*be
attacked by infantry* Approximately twenty (20) caves were attacked, with good
results* he usual method of target identification was visual; however, smoke
grenades and mortar smoke were also employed by SPCP* i , ' - , ' .
7 Scheduled Fires During Continuation Of The Attack:
a. -Preparation fi res by ships were fully and habitually used
for attacks b^ t hi s division, to thicken 105mm;fi res, and to deepen the beaten
Action Report, IWOJIlErcSferatioiu (Cont*dh
sones of "barrages* Procedure for t hi s type of fi rs ws.sto have battalion requests
for coverage of certain targets coordinated by the regimental M.Os, who would
then submit tentative schedules of "fire to the Division Uaval Gunfire Officer, who
would in turn prepare the final fi re plan, making the necessary adjustments to
coordinate naval fi res closely with ar t i l l er y and ai r and t o ensure that the
final plan made the best and j-iost complete use of fi res available^ /Upon approval
of t hi s fi re plan, i t would be transmitted for execution at. the times and targets
scheduled, by the SKIP to
4
whom ships were assigned,
- b, t arget s of opportunity were attacked as they appeared.
There were few such, however* due to the poor observation which generally obtained,
throughout the operation, and to the enemy
r
s tenacity in remaining underground*
Cave mouths'from which a few rounds at a time were fired by'the enemy were the .
most usual type of targets in t hi s category, although mortar positions were ^one-
times surprised in action by V03? aircraft*
c. Counterbattery and countermortar fi res were extensively
used. Due to close liaison with the art i l l ery* i t was possible to divide counter-
battery missions between the two arms. 5
1
*AACwas found suitable for countermortar
woric, and to neutralize thougjh not to destroy, enemy gun emplacements i f not too
heavily constructed* ?OTheavier counterbattery fi res, i t was necessary to submit
requests for general support heavy ship missions to Corps* ASa rule", these were
promptly executed. Nevertheless, the need for assignment of a heavy ship to
division control i s especially evident in connection with counterbattery missions*
d. .Might harassing fi res were provided by three netiiods,.e*g*
the use of 4.'2
lf
mortar craft in general support for very deep area coverage; hy
request to Corps for intermediate or major caliber harassing on selected targets;
and by approval and 'coordination of suggested -harassing-plans submitted by the .
battalion HLOfor ships assigned them in direct support, usually with 75-100
rounds of 5
tt
per ship.' Had ammunition supply-permitted, the last amount might
profitably have been doubled or trebled as enemy nocturnal activity was con-
siderable* Illumination
:
provided-iacidental additional harassment*
e 33binterdiction missions as such are known to have been
fired, due- to the absence of enemy'movement by day,, and the difficulty in keeping
continued fi res on a point by night, v;ithout adjustment, "
f. for fi res against coastal targets and caVes, see par , .
(d) ante. At, the conclusion of the operation, when SHI"elements had reverted
to J"ASCo control, one duty SIPGPwas kept da 30 minutes
1
notice to
v
take the field
t*n<L -render support to any battalion which might need it*. On23 March, heavy..
fi res from two saves embarrassed patrols 6$ the*'filet Marines, and a DBwas
accordingly requested and dispatched' to tne scene, concurrently with the duty -
SKIP. The target vi ci ni t y end location of friendly troops was reconnoitered,*
communication established,, and the target marked by smoke grenades for direct
f i r es. The cave's -were then attacked and sealed, within approximately 90 minutes
after the i ni t i al request. This incident i s related in det ai l because i t indicate?
how efficiently ships' ,fi res can assist coastal mopping-up, even though'SOT have
already terminated active operations. ' ' -
Xlluain-aftlon; " '
:
<
a* Starshell illumination only was u$ed
;
Searchlights would
hav-e.disclosed ships
1
positions not only to enemy submarines, but to return f i r e,
,Which continued unt i l the l as t . ' " .:*
Action Report, I WO JTM&Operation* (Cont'd),
b*
:
Illumination was normally coordinated by having one direct
support 3DDilluminate for an entire,.regimental, front, (often this took in the
whole division frontage) whereas the other direct support D#carried out al l
scheduled harassing missions and remained ready to execute call.missions*'
Illumination between divisions was coordinated laterally by 2Taval Gunfire ,
Officers, and,, in many instances, this division obtained considerable benefit
from tea and 5th Marine Division illumination which was obligingly positioned so
as to "bemost helpful in our zone* er contra, a niglit attack was seriously
endangered through failure by an.adjacent division to check starsnell firing,
although previous arrangements had been carefully made to prevent such an even-
tuality* " .
c* Rates of fire were kept -as slow as possible, being limited
by the division operation order^to six stars' per hour except when positive
evidence existed of enemy activity*. In at least one instance, however*
fT
runatiray
N
"spotters expended,illuminating ammunition at excessive rates before being checked
bjr higher authority* Toward the conclusion of the operation, one star every
15 minutes was considered adequate*
d. Star shell illumination i s the most practicable type
available. On a constricted battlefield such as this* the old type stars were
fully adequate; however, with extended frontages^ i t i s probable that the
brighter
f
new type star would be better suited*
e, l\Fopersonnel of this division were injured by star shells
or casesi
9* Equipment;
a* Asprovided by M?, Pacific,Special Order SQ~kk equipment
was generally sufficient* subject
7
to recommendations for minor changes in par
(c) post* The adequacy of al l materiel provided by this order was likewise
complete, subject to the pressing need for a remote control attachment for the
ma x * / - ' . .
;
b
#
- All faci l i t i es for repair and replacement wire completely
adequate* First and second echelon repair:was accomplished under supervision of
the communication officer tof the division team, employing the part tine services
of a JASCo technician* ?or higher,echelon repair and for exchange of sets, the
Signal (Section of the division was always available and able to provide complete
and expeditious service*
c* It i s recommended that' the provisions of SMF, Pacific,
Special Order. S6- ^ be modified as follows*
(1) Allow two 3&-S-A telephones and one reel of combat
wire to the division.team, to permit intercommunication between radio control
and supporting arms tent, .
(2) Modify the transportation for regimental teams to
substitute one 3?CStruck (installation MZ), J ton, Ux&.with t rai l er, i ton
t
2
wheeled* cargo, for the present J ton cargo truck and TBX*!Ehereasons for this
recommendation are the greater range and power of the TCS, tjfcteAJ3kC
n
junction
Action Sepor
t
IWO JIKA.Operation, (Cont*d)
with the fact that regimental CPi are sufficiently rearward to allow use of the
vehicular radio rather the
{3) With regard to radar "beacon; i t Is recommended that
these be subjected to further operational test. In this division, there wasno
opportunity for proper employment or testing of beacons* due to the pressing
exigencies of operations, . It i s believed that i f the "beacon i'B ever to have a
fair test} i t must be by Aselected team sent in only for this purpose*
(k) It i s recommended that current T/Aallow one complete
spar$ SCfr*28^or TBX tot each three 8?<3?
4
as i t was repeatedly demonstrated that
a quick exchange followed bv subsequent repair was the most effective way of
keeping the greatest number of sets operational*
d# During this operation* pacfcfcoards procured by the G~*twere
experimentally employed by SPCP, They were an entire success, and their final
allowance in the ratio of one per radio set i s strongly recommenced*
/ 3L0 Casualties:
- (
a. *The following casualties were sustained among thi naval
gunfire elements attached to this division;
" ' - , , ;
TOTAL
Spotters 2
2
Scouts X
5
0
0
0
0
0
0 21
Baddomn Z
Wlremen 0
General duty man 1
2
3
TOTAL '
6
{*) Ineludea k wounded, but not evacuated from IV/0
(#) Includes k evacuations for combat fatigue or
^associated neuroses.
b. The following m^r casualti es to communication e<joipment
are tabulated* HTumerousminor casualties occurred incident to ordinary
operations' or light battle damage, andwere made good in the course of the actioiu
Destroyed or damaged "beyond repair: 1 TBX; 5
Z SCR^JOO; k telephones
1HB2,
Lost in action: 9 breast reels, (CEIII).
11* C^trational features: """.'
a# The etteetiveness of the chain of command among various
echelons of naval gunfire control was complete except in on aspect* th lack of
a division common frequency for the SCft*3OO although the reason for this lack
(namely, theifae.* that this division had one l ess frequency than jfche other two
of the Corps)' &$\!m$prstood, i t i s strongly believed that control and <joordihation
'
N
were greatly handicaped^hereby* 2hr^ry division should have an SCR*30Onaval
Action Eeport-,*&W0
r
J-lMk.Operation. (Coat H)
gunfire common frequency, so assigned, in or4er that the Haval Gunfire Officer
and the regimental' liaison officers mayhave instantaneous communication with
front line elements*
b# The following outstanding or unusual features of naval
gunfire support during the operation,are summarised: . . -
(1) .The outstanding degree of coordination achieved ea .
al l levels between artillery, . ' naval gunfire and air* The close knit relationship
between the supporting arms, especially on the division l evel , t?ecame a byword*
(2) The marked success obtained with 120Q f/s reduced
velocity 5
1
* charges. ' . . .
(3) The safe delivery of 5" direct fi res into the faces
of cl i ffs whose tops were occupied by friendly troops* .
(k) The high quality of air spotting services rendered by
VOPaircraft (though t hi s was somewhat rest ri ct ed due t o. t he paucity of airplanes).
(5) he lack of good ground observation was one of the
most evident aspects of the operation, and, i f not taken into account, might
lead to the opinion that ground spotting was of secondary importance when compared
with ai r, whereas t hi s i s not the
v
case except "Vtpon t errai n which i s consistently
uphi l l and where the attack tuns against, rather than with the observation, as was
the case upon IVO' JIMA. . '
12 Additional Comments and Recommendations^ *-
a. In instances i n which a single regimental liaison offices
or one of hi s subordinate teams was vi t al l y affected, radio transmissions oh the
gunfire control net tended to omit the regimental officers either as action or
information addressees* These oiaissions tirould not have caused difficulty were i t
not for the fact that' radio watches were habitually maintained by enlisted
personnel, rather than the officers concerned, whose station was in the operations
section* Thus i t often happened, that regimental sections' failed to receive
complete information due to the understandably smaller abi l i t y of t hei r enlisted
personnel to screen and evaluate t raffi c not addressed to them.
b. The heavy at t r i t i on among spotters and scout sergeants
speaks for i t sel f . Although t hi s division operated with but six of . i t s battalions,
exactly 5Q$of the t ot al number of spotters and scouts for the ful l strength
division became' casualties; Applied against the number of teams in action, t hi s
percentage ri ses to 75$ &&&* had i t not been for the avai l abi l i t y of replace-
ments from the uncommitted StCPattached to the 3&Marines, all^of whomwere
eventually employed, the situation, might have become cr i t i cal , ft i s accordingly
recommended that &minimum of three replacement spotters and three scouts be-
supplied as bat t l e replacements sufficiently in advance of pxxy operation to permit
t hei r final training and intergration into the gunfire elements of the division.
If possible t hi s group should be augmented at the same time by a replacement
cadre of Hayyofficers qualified to act as battalion mQ
Mt
j>M..naval gunfire
I ]
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation, (Cont'd)*
communication personnel* in number to be determined after study of overall
attrition,* ,
;
c. Theproposal has been broached of assigning calls, to
naval gunfire teams ojther than those now customarily in use, e*g', the "Charley*
and
>r
Oboe'
1!
system* 'Ho single, change in naval gunfire communication procedure
could be more pernicious or confusing in i t s effect, inasmuch as i t i s difficult
under,fie,ld conditions even to keep track of ships' calls, l et alone a whole new
vocabulary for naval gunfire teams. . \ ''
d It was noted that due to difficulties of ammunition' re-
supply, al l general support vessels (CL, CAand OBB) remained under Corps
control; i t i s hopedfchatmeasures can be taken in future to provide at least
one general support ship for employment under division control* ' '
H, . E n g i n e e r .
t
, ' . ' ' ' " .
(See Enclosure I , Action Report, Jd.Engineer Bn)*
I , Trailsportftuartermaster. .
1
#
a .Loading and
1
embarkation of the 3&Marine Division for
the IWC;JIMjft. Operation commenced at GUAM'on SFebruary 19^5 sn& continued,
uninterrupted, unt i l 1^ February 19^5, consuming a period of. six days to
^coiitplete tliis phase*of the operation. ' \ *
b. Cargo assembly areas were selected in the"SQK4T-CSABHAS
areas and'although, these areas were not in .the immediate-vicinity of tne docks,
l i t t l e difficulty was encountered in view of adequate transportation"facilities
and no time ^^^as lost in this respect.
. c, The assembly area at CABSASproved to .be quite undesirable
due to natural terrain features which caused'the operation of tractor cranes.on
such a severeslope a,s to be a most difficult problem. However, i t was the only
area in that general vicinity which was available at the tirae of embarkation,
and caused only minor delays in a few instances. Two' (2) cranes and ten (10)
trucks were assigned each assembly area. Average running time per truck from
assenbly area. Uo ship was fifteen (l$) minutes. - . . .
i . "d. Seven.(7) docks were allotted which permitted'the docking'
of al l ships of a Transport Division simultaneously (5 <6PAs and 2 AKAS)^.
, . . 2 a The average time consumed.for loading each ship'was
approximately sixteen (16) hours* However, a few APAS.
;
with light tonnage.
consumed less tine and UKAQ required more. The average load per +&& was eight
hundred (SOO) tons and for each')KA twelve hundred (1200) tons.
_ Control Point v/as set up in tlie vicinity of -the
.docks and -periodic progress reports were submitted from each ship when i t was
5ff 75%9 2&ours from'cor^leUott
r
and 100$ loacLed.
c When the 2 hour report^was rece;
Action Eeport, IWO JIM*Operation* (Cont
f
d).
sonnel for that particular ship were notified to commence embarkation* This
1
,
system eliminated excess- troops being aboard the ship while the loading of cargo
was in progress.
d
#
. Considerable difficulty was encountered in
1
the handling
of palletized cargo aboard some of the ships due- to the absence of proper equip-
ment to get the pallets back into the wings and awayfrom the square of the of
the hatch* In hold sections- where a smooth^deck existed it waspossible to rig
a snatch block and snake the pallets back-on rollers, which consumed a consider-
able amount of time and effort* Jn a few instances it was.necessary to break"
downpallets in order to-load,the required amount of supplies and equipment.
e. 'The below listed chart gives the total. tine for completing
the loading of, each shi-p: .. ." '
g/g-i 1800i;2/6/.|2200J g/9/j 02001.2/9/!0^00'
2/ 8/ ! 23001
2/ 9/ ' O3OOJ2/9/I 0500'
2/ 8/ 1900;2/9/j 0100; 2/ 9/ ! 0800 2/9/1 1000
LESDSTOM
2/8/123Q0! z/S/\0lOo\z/9/\ O5OOI
2/S/i 2000; 2/9/1OlOO! 2/9/i 0600 2/9/10830
:
2//!'20O0;
2/9/^0600!2/9/i
I 2/10 I I I
' Q800 2/9/! 0800; 2/9/i 2200]2/10!0300'
2/10
PESS J^CKSOHi - 1700
2/lOi 21Q0!2/Xl! 0100! 2 / l l 0600 2 / l l 1100-
2/ XI; l^OOJ 2/11: ISOO 2/ l l i 2200 2/12,0600
2/lliI5OO;2/ l l | 2000
i/lO|1900|2/10| 2400!
2/12
1200 2/12; 1900J
g/ l 3jQ900
2/97
2/9/i 2100J
^A2
Action Report, IWO JIMa Operation, (Cont
!
d).
- ' ' >
HAM2
SIMS
TIME OP
2
p
%
i 5C$ 1 7
100%
OP OP
1
SHIP ARRIVE1TURE DATS, nm
L-n ! J
T-ESCB! EUJESI (PIMS; DATEJ Tli'jjE
2/9/
2/10 ' ! i ;
PUE3TOH
| 1700 2/9/11900
12/10!0100:
2/10 O6OOJ2/K>Ui3Oj
2/lO
;
1500
1300
2/3/
I 2/10
j
O'HAIU,
1300
j 0700
2/9/
2200[2/1010700!2/10 113O;2/lO l600!2/10! igoo
I . f . . 1. j
!
2/9/
i 2/11 ;
1 ' :
ALHSITA
1500
1 0700
'2/9/!
2300 2/10
l
l60O.:2/l0i23O0
:
2/ i n0100^
3* a
#
Only two (2) 5?ransBivs of t he SJraapsort Squadron were
tmloAd$d on t hi s operation; TransDiv 3^ containing BC!T-9 s^
1
^ TrpnsSiv 32 which
coatfeiaed. RCT-21, "EranaDiv 32 was the f i r s t JrensDiv to commence l eoar kat i on.
b. The oelow l i s t e d chart gives t he unloading t i nes for
each eaipt
STATUS 0? mOAjDIIK}, RCT-21 - -
i Tot al : ' Cargo.
, - (Joiamenced Conpleted Elapsed :, Remaining
SHIP Unloading
r
Unloading ; Time' i Aboard

JAOKSOE ,
]
21 Pe"brup.ry : . 6 March t 1^, 4ays : 60 Tons
ADAI
i
-lS 21 February U March : ' 12 days t 60 Tons*

BOLIV.i
21 Pebruary j

6 March
l
' lty days ! 60 Tons
i
OiPE JOHiTSOI.
. 21.Pebruary , 5 March , 13 days
I 60 Tons
i
D0Y3N , ', 21 February j 6 March : Ik days UO Tons
LIBHa- . j 21 Pebruary .: 6 March i 1^4- days s 260 Tons
JUPIT2R j
21 Pebruary ; 6 March ; lk days 260 Tons
3 MU S .OPUHLOADIITG,RCTv9
Total Cargo
Comaenced
Conipleted . Elapsed Remaining"
SHIP Unloading Unloading. Time
1
Aboard
2*4- Pebruary S March 12 days 50 Tons
Pebriia,r.y
28 Pebruary days Hone
Pebruary 2S Pebruary k da:
y s
LSBDSTOl^T
Pebr uar y S March
-Tons
- 63-
Action Eeport, I WOJ1R& Operation, (Coat' d).
i : . - . - '
STATUS OF JS8XME1S&, KCT-9 (Cont'd)
Total ; Cargo
SHIP ' \
Commenced
Unl oadi ng
Completed
Unloading
Slapsed
'Time t
Remaining
Aboard"
:
.
H^HBTIBB j 2k February 28 February. k days ETone"
'AL^CK- 'S
1
, Zk February : .8 March ,12 days i 15^-Tons

WAEHICE ! 2^ February ; 8 March i 12 days tr 185 Tons

H a# Unloading was accomplishad under extremely di ffi cul t
conditions* n.anely weather and surf conditions. The,debarkation was limited to
tfreuse of LCTs or larger landing craft, and these were assigned to the Transport
Squadron as.they became available* At no time did the Transport.Squadron have
more than two (2) LSMs-and two (2) XCTsregularly assigned for-unloading* Other .
craft were assigned.for one or two t r i ps after which they were assigned to other
ships having a.higher unloading pr i or i t y. '
'b; Tliese conditions, coupled.with, ^piecemeal
1
* landing.of
uni t s of the division, "greatly increased the unloading time*
- c* A considerable quantity of fuel and certain items of Cpd '
supplies were not required on tho bea.ch'which, resulted in these supplies being
returned to GtfAM* ' . . - .
5 . a. Several ships were lacking sufficient or proper handling
equipment for- cargo. I t was necessary to-construct slings for the handling of
pal l et s in severe,! ships* "All.other cargo.washandled with the standard-universal
sling' and cargo net s. ^ . , '
b. ,It i s felt" .that the importance of having ships
report to, the embarking unit during the planning phase for temporary'duty cannot
be. over emphasized* ,In the case of t hi s division the ships' 9K$le reported in
ten (10) days-prior to embarkation and t hei r assistance ,in the planning was \
invaluable. '
J
#
Ordnance,
1* Weapons.
a. dumber,, type and caliber of weapons used.
Carbine, cal , . 30, HI
Rifle, cal.43O, Ml
Rifle, cal..3O Browning Automatic
Pi st ol , cal . . 45, M1911A1
G-un, Submachine, cal.^5 Thompson
Shotgun, 12 gauge
Gun, Machine, cal*.30 M1919A4-'
" ' ' Oun,' Machine, cal ..30.MI917AI
Oun,.Machine, cal,#5O/M2
Action Report, IttfO JlUk Operation, (Cont'd)*
Gun, ytm
t
AT, M3
Mortal' ,- 60mm, M2 -
J5
Mor t ar , Slam, Ml
26
Howi t zer, Pack,,75mm, M1A1 ' .
26
. Howitweiij 3O5np-, M2A1
26
. Lauacfc.er
9
Roclcot, 2*36", AT, H9A1
139
Launcher., Grenade* Ri f l e
8
147
7S5
Launchor
t
Grenade, Carbi ne, MS
3<
:
lame Thrower, 142-2:
556
172
b , lumber of days "bat t l e employment*
(See paitIV, par J* 1. b* of ISnclosures C,"3)and Hand
part IV, par 0.'1. o of Enclosure S
1
).
c Itfumber, type and caliber of weapons lost*
. H o . Lost Ho. Salvaged l?o
4
Servicable iJo
#
Surveyed
Carbine, cal..3G
t
Ml
75S 722 , 25S
Ri fl e,
Ri fl e,
cal,.3O, Ml
cal3Q Browning
651
130
2,242
329
v
.
.
1,765
16T
. kit
160
Automatic
Pi st ol , cal , . ^5, ICL911A1
99
' .- .
(run, Submachine, cal,
f
^5
15 - . 2 2 '"
Thompson
Shotgun, 12 guage Z 2 "
Gun, machine, caL.30*
75
72- 42 30
Gun, machine, cal.30f 12 Ik
9 5
M1917A1
Gun, machine, cal,,5Q M2- = -
6 3 3
Mor t ar , 60mm, M2
13
2k
6 is .
Launcher, r oc ke t ,
A3?',M9A1
2m$6
a
6
ki
17
Launcher, Grenade,' Ri f l e , M7 103
tf
>32
29
.3
Launcher,
tJtCf !
Grenade, Carbi ne,
90
ss
05
3 .
HO .
Plame Thrower, M2-2' .. . '. 9 * 5 ' .
12 - , 30
d. Mal f unct i ons,
(See part IV, par J# 1. b of Enclosure C, part IV
f
par
J. 1. d. of Enclosure D, part IV, par C. 1, b
#
of Enclosure P and part IV, par
J, 1. b. of Enclosure H)\ ' ' ^
e# Adequacy of spare par t s and accessories.
. (See part IV, par J, ! c. of Enclosure Cand D, part IV,
par
v
C. 1. b. of Enclosure f and part IV, par J, 1. d of Enclosure H),
f. Recommendation's as | o modifications of existing tjpes
and for new types.
Action Report ation*
* " (See part IV, par J* l*4*of Enclosure C, part IV, par J . 1*
f* of Enclosure' D, part IV, par C*i
#
b of Enclosure ? and part rVVp.ar J* I*c%
o f E n c l o s u r e H) _. - - ."
2* Combat Vehicles* . ,.
a# Humber and type of combat/vehicles used*
3?ank,-medium*
Gun, 758femotor> 1 carriage M3 S
b* Sumber days
1
bat t l e employment. , '
(See part XV
t
par J, 2. of Enclosure C
t
part IV, par J*2*
b* of Enclosures Dand Hand part IV, par C* 2* b* of. Enclosure*3P)..
c Humber end type lost or damaged beyond repair*
Tanlc, medium, M^A2 . 15
d* Malfunctions* .
(See part IV, par J* 2* Of Enclosure C, part IV,par J* 2.
d* of Enclosures D"andHand part IV, par p* 2. b* of Enclosure V)+
e. Principal items of maintenance difficulty*.
(See part IV, par J* 2* of Enclosure 0, part IT, par J .
2. c. of Enclosure D, part IV, par C# 2. b* of Enclosure P.and part IV, par J .
2. e* of Enclosure H). , /
f, Adequacy of spare part s and accessories.
(See part IV, par J*. 2* of Enclosure C
t
part jV
t
par J*
2 0 of Enclosure D, part IV, par C. 2. b* of Enclosure I atit part IV, par' J . .
2* e. of Enclosure H). .
Hecommendations as to modification of existing types and
for new types* .
(See part IV, par J. 2* of Enclosure C, part IV, par J .
2. g* of Enclosure !D,part IV, par 0. 2. b* of Enclosure 2
1
and part IVpar J.
2* e. of Enclosure H). ,
, 3 Ammunition, .
a Humber of rounds by exact nomenclature, expended (or lost)
Cart, bal l , Carbine - 357,100
Cart, grenade, Carbine, M6
32, ^0
Cart/AP &
t
cal**30 Belted
1,71+7,000
Cart, AP cal*,56 5-rd clip
3 ,
'Cart, J!3? Cftl..3b S-rd clip
83s,7.M0
Cart, AP&Ball, cal*,30 bulls:
5PQ
Action Report, I$0 JIMA-Operation, (Cont' d),
, Car t , Tr acer , cal
f
. 3O Ml 62,000
Cart , Grenade, Hi f l e, M3 - 2,400
Cart , Bal l * c a l . . 45H1911 3 t 5
Cart , A? &'T, c a l . . 50 Linked
277,5^3
Shel l , "HE, M$3, 37mmG
100'
Shot, APCM51, 37mmG
100
Cani st er , M2
t
37mmG J
260
Shel l , HS, H%A2
t
60mm M
29,52^
>Shel l , Ilium* MS3,'6OmmH.
She l l , HE,.M43A1, SlmmM 17,830
Shel l , HE, M56, Slmm H. " 11,966
Shel l , Smk, I P, M.57, SlmmM . 1 , 9 2 0
Shel l , HE, MUSvr/fuze M^S, 75mm G * 7,062
Shot, APC, M6l, 75mmG ' . . k
9
&Z6
Shel l , Smk, WP,'Mte I I , . 75mm G 33
Fuze, PD, UkS . . - 283'
Shel l , H$, M4S, w/f MU8, 75mm H 37.277
Shel l , m
f
Uk$
t
w/f M5^, 75mm H 26, 63^
Shell^ Smk,'W\ Ii6k, 75mm H . 6,265
Shel l , HE,- Ml, w/f M^S, lO^mrn H . 27,850
Shel l , HE, Ml, w/f M5V 105mm H 19,O2l'
. Shel l , Smk, W, M60, 105mmH 2,$37
Pr oj ect i l e, HE/.AT, M67, lO^mm H 27S
Grenade,.Hand, Prag
r
Mk IIA1 . 29, 535
Grenade, Hand, Smk, HC,'M8 950
Grenade, Hand, Srak, W
9
M15 3,SOS
Grenade, Hand, Smk. Colored, iisst*& Ml6 SI3
Grenade, Hand, Il i um. Mkll 2,170
Grenade, Hand, Incend* Ml^
y
, 600
Grenade, Hif i e, AT* H9A1 3,^20
Grenade, Ei f l e, ?r ag, Impact, M17 2,S00
Adapter , Grenade Proj.,Chem. T2
Adapter,' Grenade Proj
k
Ml
1,302
Signal, Tery, As.st'd
5
.Signal, Grnd
%
Asst
r
d (f/ Proi ) ,
265
Si gnal , Grnd Asst ' d (f/ Bfl Lchr)
1,300
Pl ar e, Tri p, Parachute
2S0
J l a r e , Tri p, Parachute
90
.Eocket, AT,.2.36"M6A1
2,35|+
Eocket,. Smk, 236, -.W?T26
Torpedo, Bpiigalore, Ml 120
.Charge, Demolition, IS
Explosive, THT, l bs
7,197
B^l osi v' e, Composition, 02
5,01*1
Primacord,, Detonating, feet
12,700
Charge, Shaped, ^0- l b, T3
JuzS, Safety, Time, feet
Cap, bl as t i ng, non- el ect r i c 13,900
Ca|>, bl ast i ng, -el ect ri c . ^ 1,500
Device, f i r i ng, a l l tvp.es 2S0
Charge,
t
Shaped, 35^-lb, T3.
Block, Demolition,,Chain, Ml
Block, Demolition, h
-67-
1
Action Report* IWOJlUk Operation* (Conf'd).
' ' \ v . -
. Hapalm, type "ii",lbs . ,
N
" Napalm* type B\lbs 3>2OO
Cylinder, Nitrogen . ^7
Cylinder, Ignition, HI , 1,680
Id fitter, fuze , *12,3S0
b. Methods and problems of supply*
Howitzer ammunition was delivered direct from the beach
to the ar t i l l er y regiment ammunition dump. Al^ other ammunition was delivered
to division ammunition dump and there issued to units as required* As defi-
ciencies developed in certain calibers, and typ*es, requisitions for replenishment
were mad on 3Tifth Amphibious Corps* Adequate replenishments were furnished*
a* Methods and problems of storage*
Bomb and hell craters were ut i l i zed for storage of f i r st
loads of ammunition delivered to division ammunition dump* Bulldozers were
employed for excavation of emplacements* All ammunition at the-dump was
segregated by caliber and type* iops of pi l es were not higher than the surface
of the ground of surrounding area.
d. Adequacy* types and packaging,
{1) As a whole the supply of ammunition was"adequate,
although at times reserve stocks of some items reached a cr i t i cal l y low l evel .
(2) Present packing of non-ele^ctric blasting cssps* 15
second delay detonators* and time fuze. ,is unsatisfactory. Eecommend ai r tight
metal containers. . ,
' , {3) New type metal containers for 60mmMortar ammunition i s
unsatisfactory* In handling, covers become loose, and moisture enters containers*
Old type fiber container bundles are preferred ~by using troops,
;
.- . .e# Recommended changes in Unit of 3'ire.
Presont unit of fi re for flamethrower i s excessive.
Unit of fi re for flamethrower recommended by I t r CQ*felF,PAC*Ser 22260 to
CMC, dtd 30 March 1^5, i s considered adequate, * '
f Hew types desired. '
' ' > ' . . - .
; >. s e l e c t i ve fuze t o per mi t super - qui ck or del ay act i on
f or 81mmMor t ar , HE.a he l l . . " - . - ^ '
k
m
Mlscel. laneous Ordnance Equipment,
a. 2?umber. and t ype used.
Flaxaethrpwer, 3^5 (mechanized Tank mounted)
Bulldoser
v
(Tank mounted)
Action Eeport, IWO JIMA Operation, (Cont
f
d)*
b. Number of days bat t l e employment.
(See Enclosure H, part XV, par J 3 "&*)*
d* Malfunctions,
(See Enclosure H, part IV
t
par J* 3 *>)
d. ''Adequacy of spare par t s and accessories*
(See Enclosure H
t
part JV, par J . 3* &)
e* Recommendations as to modifications on existing items and
for n&w types of equipment* \
. (See Enclosure H,,part IV, par J . 3 ^*)
5* Enemy Materiel. -
a eapons.
(1) ITumlJer, type and caliber salvaged. .
Zttlo* cal,*3Q3C
96
Gun, machine* caj , . 3
o
3 l i ght X7
Gun, machine, caL. 303 lewis 9
Gun, machine/ cal^.3^3 f/tank
1
Gun, machine, cal , . 3^3 heavy IS
Gun, machine, AA,, cal.51 19
Gun, AA.,.20mm
13
Gun,.Ai , 251am , 12
Pischarger*' grenade ik
Mortar, knee 2
Mortar, &lmm
6
Mortar, 2M)mm 1
S
tt
Launcher, rocket,
3
Flamethrower 2
Gun, A3\ kjmn . ' .
5
Guui^ yOnua 2
75
mr a
Gun,
l
Howitzer, 75'^^ l
Howitzer, 105mm 1
Bayonet ..
(2) Performance, i f used.
Hot used*
b
#
Combat Vehicles*
(l) Number and types salvaged*
Tank, l i ght , M95
Action Export, IWOJIMA..Operation (Cont*d)
(2) Performance* i f used.
Hot used,
c* Ammunition.
(1) number, type, and caliber salvaged.
t
Cart,
X4
g
S0O
3*75
dar t , cal . . 51 .
2,632
Sh^l l , HE,.A3?, 37mm a
2,2^6
Shelly H3
#
.AT, ^7ram ft .
Shel l , HS
f
- 75^m&
Shel l , HE, 7 7 ^ ft ' -
Shel l , HU/120mm a
200
Shel l , H2, 4,7mmG
1,600
Shel l , knee mortar >
201
Shell,'H3,-'giiamM . '
Shell,HB,15cmM -
Orenade,hand, fragmentation
156
Mines,^P,5ID
M i n e , y a r d s t i c k . . , . - -
Fuze, 77& .
:
. ' .
Fuse, mech
ltr
time, ^, 7^^
200
Booster ,
Fl are, asst ' d ' 990
Explosive, pi cr i c acid, lb
100
Bomb, denu, 63kg
Performance, i f used.
:
Hot used.
d Miscellaneoixs Ordnance Equipment*
(l ) Uumber and typ^es of equipment salvaged.
Bag, brass,- MG .
Bag, grenade , .
- Bel t , bayonet 11
Bracket, aiming. .. ' 1
Carri er, ammunition, knee M- 2
Carri er, ammunition^
5
\ Carri erj M.ft. . 1
Case, f i el d gl ass 1
Cover, "M.ft. . 2
-Maga^ne, M
%
(J, . .
Mount, if searchlight, binoculat tripod
Sight,-gun, antiaircraft
6
5
.
Sight, telescope,-M^O-. ..
Telescope, spotting, v/tripod
Scabbard, bayonet
- 70-
1
1
Action Report, IWOJIMa Operation. (Cont' d).
(2) performance, i f used,
JTot used.
6 Recommendations, . .
a. That Ordnance Companypersonnel and repair equipment be
brought ashore as soon after D-day as the situation will permit,
b* That current T/O be modified to provide an.ammunition
section in the Ordnance Company, t hi s section t a comprise one officer and
twenty five enlisted technicians.
c* That during future operations, a mine* booby t rap, and
bomb disposal platoon"be attached to the division, '
d That the Tank Maintenance Platoon of the Ordnance
Company be deleted from the T/o of that organization, and added to the T/O of
the Tank Battalion,
s
.
K, Chemical .'
<;
'
1 Chemical aspect of: . '
a. Planning Phase*
(l) The plan for chemical warfare defense provided for:
(a) Sach individual to carry a gas mask, protective
cover, one (l) tube each of protective aintiSent S*k&land BAL*and shoe
for emergency protection anot f i r st aid* -
(b) Sach battalion to carry one (l) squad decontami-
nating set with i ni t i al allowance of expendable supplies, protective clothing,
for use loydecontaminating squads, gas alarms and vapor detector ki t s .
(c) I ni t i al reserve supplies of al l chemical
decontamination items tfo be carried by and landed with the Chemical Supply
Section. '
(d) Each company or similar unit to have at least
one (l) MX) and seven (7) privates trained as a decontamination squad
t
' / . ' "
* .
(e) Individual, collective and t act i cal protection
to be in accordance with Division SOP (GO#i l 3)
#
'
m
' '
b loading Phase*
(1) Gas masks and other individual equipment x^rere carried
as unit, baggage by companies and similar uni t s and issued to individuals j ust
prior to disembarkation at target*
(2) Baieh battalion loaded i t s decont
to assure avai l abi l i t y immediately upon landing.
' ' Action Report, IWOTlMA.Operation* (Cont'd)*
(3) Reserve supplies were palletized and carried by the
Division Chemical Supply Section, - .
c
#
Landing Phase*
(1) Immediately following the establishment of Division
Headquarters ashore, orders were' issued by G-4 authorizing the collection and
placing in battalion, dumps of al l gas masks* \
> . d Inland Phase*.
(l) Chemical warfare supplies carried by battalions
were placed in individual battalion dumps. Reserve supplies carried by the
Chemical Supply Section were placed in the Division Quartermaster dump under
supervision'of the Division Chemical Supply Officer*
It* Medical* ' ' "
-1*, Embarkation,
a. Personnel.
Regimental battalion and companypersonnel embarked with
t hei r respective units* . * ' ' " ,
Personnel of the medical companies of the medical
battalion embarked as follows:
Company A, 3d Medical Battalion with RCT~21i n
Transport Division 32 ,
Contpany B
t
3d Medical Battalion with RCT-9 i a
Transport Division 31.
Company 0
t
3d Medical Battalion with RCT-3 i n
Transport Division 33.
Company D 3d,Medical Battalion was attached to
' 5th Mphibious Corps for t hi s operation.
Company B* 3d Medical Battalion i n Transport
Division 31.
K
H&S Company,
s
3d Medical Battalion in Transport
. Division }Z*
b.. Material*
Ten-day supply was combat loaded in the vehicles of the.
regimental, battalion and company medical departments and wag embarked with
respective units* ,
.. .. Medical companies embarked with thirty-days' supplies
and equipment^ combat loaded in company vehicles to c&pacity
f
:with remaining
supplies pal l et i zed or in Wilson Drums.
2. Aboard Ship.
#
Action Report
t
XWaJl m^JIBst i oa* (Cont*d)..
"a. Sickness. .
; . , . .
v
Admissions to the sick l i s t were minimal. The health
of the troops.in .general was excellent, No epidemic diseases occurred,
b. Sanitary Conditions. .. '
(l ) Sanitary conditions.in general were excellent.
(a) Heads on. al l ships were inspected daily
and were found to.be clean and in excellent pol i ce, -
("b) Living quarters were clean and comfortable,
ventilation was adequate, and no condition of serious overcrowding was reported
"by troop medical officers, .
) <(c) Messes were excellent* Pood was sat i s-
factory as to quality and quantity.
(d) Galleys were inspected daily by troop
medical officers and, found to "be clean and well policed* Pood was prepared in
a sanitary manner. Galley ut ensi l s were clean.
(e) Cooks and messmen were' clean, efficient and
i n proper uniform. Troop cooks and messmen were assigned to assi st ships
1
personnel*,
?
c, 'Special Precautions,
Paily inspections of heads, troop living quarters,
messes and galleys were made by troop commanders and troop medical officers.
Troop sick-call was held twice daily by medical officers of their respective
uni t s,
3 Debarkation.
a. Personnel.
Regimental, battalion.and company medical personnel
debarked with t hei r respective units*
Personnel of the medical companies of the medical
battalion debarked as follows:
Company A, 3d Medical Battalion with RCT-21, on
2k February 19^5.
Company B
$
3d Medical Battalion with HCT-9, on
2*+February 19^5-
Company C 3d Medical Battalion did not debark
and remained aboard ship.
CompanyB, 3d Medical Battalion remained aboard
ship.
- 73-
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation. .(Cont'd)*
y
II&SCompany,3dMedicalBattaliondebarkedon
26!friary1 9 ^ . ,
'I'fce.collectingsectionofCompanyDwasattached
toH & SCompanyforthisoperationandwasrusedas
replacementpool*
b. Material*
Regimental, battalion and company medical equipment
was landed in combat loaded vehicles and by corpsmen-carried packs*
Medical company supplies and equipment were landed in
combat loaded vehicles, landpalletized supplies were landed in small landing
craft and trucked to medical company areas,
c
#
Losses of personnel and material..
k* Ashore - Assault Phase.
v
a. Medical Inst al l at i ons.
(l) Regimental* battalion and company aid stations
were set up immediately upon the establishment of their respective CPs*
Companies Aand B gradually evolved from aid stations to company hospi t al s.
The gradual evolution was due to the different times of landing of personnel
and material. The f i r st casualties were received 26 February 19^5
(2). Location with regard to;
(a) Roads or t r ai l s*
. Company A, Target Area 165-F in a revetment
west of H"-S runway of MotoyamaAirfield Ho. 1. Jt was accessible by roads
from north and south. '
L
"
!
'
CompanyB, i ni t i al l y at Target Area 1S1-X
directly on supply road. On 20 March 19^5 moved to Target Area I63-J j ust off
main supply road*
Regimental, battalion and company aid
stations were established near main roads and t r a i l s .
(b) Cover.
. " Company*A was located in a revetment and
ut i l i zed two concrete water storage tanks for surgery and fi rst -ai d.
CompanyB was situated southwest of a high
embankment which afforded good,cover from fl at trajectory weapons.
#
Action Beport, IWO JIMA Operation* (Cont' d).
'
;
' : Regimental,"b a t ^ stations
ut i l i zed al l natural cover -available and also previously construeted Japanese
caves and pillboxes* ' -

:
' . '' ' ' ,"' - ' " . , ( c ) D i s p e r s i o n , . ..
' Companies'A and B dispersion was limited due
to the confines of the areas assigned. .
battalion and company aid
stations had maximum dispersion consistent with the t errai n.
(d) Other Medical' Inst al l at i ons, f. '
s
/'- (I
1
) Whole blood.bank for the ent i re island
Was situated at target Area ISl-^X adjacent to CompanyB,3d Medical Batt al ion
(*) 33ie island ai r evacuation station was
l o c a t e d i n t h e s a m e . a r e a , ./
;
\ .
/
, . . ../ . , ' ' ' . ; ' , . '
' (e) Proximity to cr i t i cal poi nt s.
Companies
1
Aand B areas were well chosen on
main roads, as far from military targets as possible and taking full advantage
of the high bluff offering cover on the north.
(f) All medical i nst al l at i ons were a.long the
natural lines of drift of walking wounded.
i (3) Protective measures taken:
(a) local security^
....'. Within the perimeter of defense, al l unit0
established outposts with adjacent uni t s.
. . (b) Cover,
" All'advantage taken of bover offered by
nature of t errai n an4 captured Japanese i nst al l at i ons,
(c) Concealment.
By natural features of t errai n, Japanese
i net al l at i ons and in some,cases by camouflage nets and natural vegetation.
(d) Shelters and dugouts.
Captured Japanese i nst al l at i ons, caves, and
f oxhol e s . ' ' , ' _ ^ '
;
:
" '' / _' ... .
t
' . . . . . . - . . ' ; . ;
(e) Blackiput precautions.
Action Report, I WOJJMA Operation. (Cont' d),
Be^dmental sick bays in small black-out
t ent s. CompanyB had Dallas Hut operating room. Company Aut i l i zed l i ght tight
Japanese water tanks as firet-oicl and operating rooms. Red flash l i ght s used
at night when required.
Any special features or comments.
The new type Dallas Hut i s much harder to erect
than the type previously used, due to the increased size and weight of the sec-
t i ons.
b. Hospitalization.
(1) Sunctibningi
Medical companies functioned as aid'and screening
stations during the early phase, and pat i ent s were rapidly evacuated to ships
present.
(2) Adequacy.
Hospital f aci l i t i es were adequate due to the rapid
evacuation of wounded to the ships* and to.Corps Medical f aci l i t i es already
established.
(3) Equipment, supplies and personnel. "
Adequate.
(k) Number of pat i ent s.
' . 2,666. / .
(5) Operations performed.
General surgery was performed by Companies Aand
B after 15 March 19^5* Only emergency life-saving surgery was done.
c. Evacuations. ' , '
(1) How effected.
During.the early phase evacuation was handled
by the 4th and 5th Divisions
1
Evacuation Stations. Immediately upon landing
of the 3&Division
1
s Evacuation Unit^evacuation was started on respective
beaches. Casualties were given emergency care by company aidraen, transported
by l i t t er to battalion aid stations* Ambulances conveyed wounded from regimental
and battalion aid stations to the medical companies. Prior to 15 March 19^5 al l
pat i ent s were given'any additional emergency treatment necessary and evacuated
to the 9fch and 21st Evacuation Stations on the beaches for evacuation to ships
present* After 15 March 19^5 the medical companiesperformed major surgery,
Air. evacuation became available on 3.March 1.9^5,-andtypgpatf#i6%&re_ so
:
:
' ' : . : ' - < ' : , . - ' O - r e -
Action Bepor?J
88S
iW!!nHFMfffljjgfation. (Coht
f
d).' - ' *
evacuated* Pat i ent s evacuated to 5th Aisphibious Corps numbered 66O* -Total*
evacuations were H,5Of of these 3l2 were evacuated to ships present.
Total e va c ua t i ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ambulatory*..*..*,
Li t t er , . . *
Ai r**. . . *. . *. . *.. . 5
* * Other f aci l i t i es on island** 860
To ships present*.. 3,182.
These figures include some ^th and 5th Division personnel
(2) Adequate or inadequate*
Considered adequate in that al l patients were
evacuated within an hour after t hei r arri val at evacuation stations,
/.
: d Casualties Treated. . .
(l) Number*
(a) Retained*:.,. 92 .
(b) Evacuated*' 19^7
(c) Di,ed,, 25
. . . , *. . . : * 206k
(2) Type.
-..;' ' Medicalandsurgical*
(3) Walkingwounded--1117. ,
"(k) Stretcher cases-.-9^7* -
e. Sanitation. . ; .
(1) Special measures:
The principal problem in. sanitation was-fly
control* This was effected"by such measures as policing of areas to remove and
bury food residues, both ours and the enemy
1
s; the insistence on the use of
"heads, preferably the barrel type; early burial of al l dead; and the l i beral .
use of DDTinsecticide in places which seemed likely to breed or harbor f l i es.
This program was aided very greatly by airplane spraying of large areas of the
island with DDT.
(2) Food:
1
* ' During"the. greater.part of the campaign mosfr of-.
the troops subsisted oh individual canned rat i ons. Although t hi s was primarily
a matter of military expediency, i t also acted as a factor in preventing the
onset of food-born^ diseases. "Galleys were,operated in nqat^f_the rear uni t s
during the l at t er ' par t of the"campaign. TheseWr e inspT "" "
- 77-
Action Report, I WO SpefRfion. (Cont' d),
that proper standards of sanitation were being maintained in the preparation
and handling of food, in the cleaning of mess gear and the disposal of galley
waste*
(3) Water:
Drinking water was derived in sufficient quantities
from the following sources;
(a) Ships; This water was obtained from the
islands of GrVM and SAI3W and transported in suitable containers by ships*
Five (5) gallon expeditionary cans were refi l l ed from LSTs at the beaches,
(b) Di st i l l at i on Units: There were two uni t s in
operation by the 3&Engineer Battalion with a-combined di st i l l at i on capacity
of about 30*000 gallons daily, (Che raw water was obtained from the sea. Samples
from al l sources were examined daily and found to be.potable, Ground water could
not be used except for showers because of the high sulphur content. Many of the
enemy-built cisterns were inspected but in most cases i t was found that the
water was so grossly dirty as to be of no use, and no cistern water was used
for any purpose at any time. In some of the cisterns fecal contamination-was
revealed, but i n none was any evidence found of attempted poisoning of the water
by the enemy*
f. Disposal of Dead.
'_(l) Our own dead were removed by Graves Registration
personnel and det ai l s from the troops, and interred in the Division Cemetery.
Shis was inspected by.personnel of the Epidemiology Unit and found to be done
in a sanitary manner. - .
(2) Many enemy dead were l eft in the caves in which
they were ki l l ed
f
and the cave entrances blasted shut by the engineers. Other
enemy dead were buried near the place where they f el l , generally being placed
in bomb craters and covered. !This was done by det ai l s from various bat t al i ons,
Graves Registration personnel* and by Korean prisoners,
#
This was supervised by
personnel of the Epidemiology Unit, insofar as i t was feasible.
(3) Sanitary precautions taken;
In most cases enemy dead were, sprayed withDD2?~
either at/tjie.timfe of buri al . Xn some c^ea^wlaere this^cpu
:
14,4P'b
!b.e done f q the graves was sprayed l at er. ,
g;, " Epidemics; or unusuaX diseases in
(1) Our troopsj
Ho epidemics or any prevalence- of any disease*
(2) Civilians:
Mbci vi l i ans encountered.
Action Heport, IWOJIMA.Operation. (Coat'd)*
' " ' _, (3) Enemy forces?
No disease was found in any of the prigoners
examined, Japanese medical officers and corpsmen captured*stated that the only
diseases prevalent i n their forces to any appreciable extent were dysentery and
upper respiratory infections. Stool examinations of prisoners revealed, no -
parasites or pathogenic organisms. All prisoners examined were found to be
infested with body l i ce.
M Insects:.
;
,
By far the most important encountered were f l i es
of several species, the breeding of which was favored by the presence of
unburied enemy dead, human excreta, and decomposing food* These were controlled
satisfactorily by policing,the areas and spraying with DDT* A small amount of
mosquito breeding was found In cisterns, but were not of disease bearing species*
All prisoners examined we,re found to harbor lice* There was an isolated, instance
in which a group of marines was bi t t en by fl eas. 3?heemen had loeen sleeping
i n a cave formerly occupied by the enemy. At the time of examination none of
the pests were present, but the men stated that they had recognized the fleas
themselves* Afew mites were found on some of the sparce vegetation, but these
were not the species that convey Scrub Typhus* .,
h* Dental Service:
There was no dental service other than emergency
f
treatment. Each medical company dental officer did occasional emergency dental
treatment. -..-"
i . Care of Civilians*
2Soci vi l i ans were encountered*'
j * Prisoners of
Wounded prisoners of war were treated at Headquarters
Battalion sick bay. Seriously wounded ware evacuated at once*
k. Medical Organization:
(1) Suitability of present type:
Found suitable for t hi s operation*,
(2) Suggested changes:
Fone. ' . .
1* Medical personnel:
" (1) Adequate or inadequate:
- ~ Adequate, as i t was brought to J.0^ above !TaT?les
of Organization pri or to campaign.
- 79-
Action Report, IWJXMA. Operation. (Cont ' d),
(2) Employment?
The organic medical,personnel of regiments*
battalions and companies were- employed by carrying out their normal functions,
The personnel of medical companies were divided into,four groups, i . e,
9
Hospital
Section (6 officer, 36 corpsmen and30 marines), and three Collecting Sections
(13 corpsmen an&1 marine)*
(3) Losses and replacements:, , .
9th Marines: 65 casualties* ^repl acement s.
21st Marines* 79 casualties, 27 replacements.
CompanyA*3dMedical B&ttaliom 35 casualties,
1&' evacuated* ' .
t
,
CompanyB, 3dMedical Battalion; '15 casualties,'
i 9 evacuated. ,;
.ft&SCompany, 3dMedical Battalion; to casualties*
Medical Companies A,B
#
andH&S'had no-replace-
ments*
N (4) State of training;
Considered good.
' ' ,(5) ..Specialties neededt
m. Piel dMedical Equipment} . .
' ' ' . ' ' ^
(1) Proportion of allowance carriedi
. All Hel d Medical units allowed for medical
companies were carried except Hel d Bent&l Units (Unit Ho# 35)* "
, . '
t
' All Field'Medical units allowed for'regimental
and battalion. aid stations were carried.
(2) Pilferage and losses:
* * '
Ho pilferage or loss wasreported.
. (3) Adequate, inadequate or overage:
-
. Equipment wasadequate at al l times.
N
(k) Suitability of.present type: , ' "
, Present portable operating hut {Dallas Hut) i s
considered too bulky for ship loading. f _ / , .
Action Report, 1W0JIMA.Operation. (ContJd).
(5) Improyements: , , , .
Small type portable operating hut, formerly used,
more satisfactory.
(6) Resupply:
Ifo resupply of equipment was necessary,
n. Medical Supply:
(1) Amount carried:
Athirty-dayisupply for each medical company,
and a ten-day supply fdr each regimental and battalion aid station was carried
into combat,
(2) Pilferage and losses:
4
Hopilferage was reported. 15 Wilson Drums fi l l ed
with "blankets were landed "but not received by Division Medical Supply Officer.
(3) Adequate, inadequate and overage: .
There were adequate supplies at al l times with the
exception of l i t t e r s . This shortage existed only one day.
(k) Resupply: ''-
Supplies were furnished by 8th Hel d Depot and
3d-Marine Division Salvage. These supplies were issued to Medical Companies
A and 3 which in turn furnished medical, supplies to the 9th and 21st Regiments,
Separate' battalions were supplied by 3d Marine Division Medical Supply Officer.
' (5) Adequacy of block shipments:
s
Ho block shipments were landed.
Om Motor vehicles and rol l i ng stock:
(1) Humber and type carried:
Regiments and battalions l i f t ed t hei r Tables
of Organization strength in' vehicles* The medical bat t al i on l i ft ed the follow-
ing vehicles: ' , _ _ .
30 J-ton k x h ambulances,
6 3-ton k x k ambulances.
3 -|-ton k x k ca^go, ,
6 l^ton k x h cargo* ' -
6 2f~tdii 6 x 6 cargo.
'' 5 1-ton 2*-wheel t r ai l er s
Act i on Heport IWO JIMA Oper at i on. ( Cont ' d) .
5 ,3-ton 2~wheel t rai l ers, sterilizer, shower*
5 generators* 9.^ KVA, t rai l er mounted.
(E) iosses: ^
1 -t~ton k x k ambulance, enemy action,
' ' 1 l--ton k x ^ trucks enmy action.
(3) Howutilized and maintained* .,
"Vehicles were al l combat loaded. Whenin the
target area they were used for the evacuation of patients &n$ the procurement
of food and water. ,
* ' '
Maintenance was accomplished bypersonnel of the
medical companies-withJ>h exception of lubrication and major repair done by
the Division Motor.Transport repair section. ' /
Adequacy! .
Vehicles and rolling stocjt available for the
operation were adequate* addition, of one jeep t rai l er for each company
Would facilitate movementv
. p. Quartermaster Supplies: " *
; . : . , . }
(1) Amount carried:
Only class II equipment in the amount necessary.
, for the operation for the field hospital* regimental end battalion aid stations
and evacuation stations was taken forward. Pour portable operating,rooms were
. carried but onlytfneutilised* ' ,
(2) Availability ofj .
Most of the equipment was combat'loaded. Pield
cots andpads were palletized and,easily obtainable on the-beadi.
(3) Eesupply:'
"Moeq.uipmentwasreplacedduringtheoperation*
Automaticsuppliesand"clothingworeobtainedfromthequartermaster* .,
(k) Eeclothingofpatientsj \
%
' ' Adequatequantities'*were:onhandandavailable..
(5) Adequateprinadequate: '*,~
Adequate* . .
\ \ ''
#
Action Report, IWOJIM Operation* (Cont'd).
(6) Suitability:
Present supply i s considered suitable.
q. Malaria and Epidemic control supplies:
(1) Amount and type carried;
(a) Insect repellent (Sfcat) 2
(b) Insect repellent (1 gal. cans). . . . IS cans.
(c) Insecticide powder , . . 200 cans,
(d) Atabrine 500,000 tablets,
\ (e) Pield tools (shovels, picks, etc).
(f) Decontamination sprayers,
(g) Laboratory equipment and. supplies - for doing
bacteriology, parasitology, chemistry and toxicology.'
(2) Howused:
Items' (a), (b) and (d) above were not used.
Items (c) and (f) above were used in fly control. Item (e) wasused in the
burial of enemy dead, and item (g) for the daily examination of drinking water
for potability, examination of water remaining in old cisterns for possible
poison and for examination of FOWsand food handlers*
(3) Availability of:
ExceptforDDTwhichwasnotlandedbythe
quartermaster,allnecessarysupplieswereavailable.
Losses:
Ho losses,
(5) Suitability of present type:
Present Ifcype of equipment and supplies i s
considered suitable and adequate,
5* Ashore After completion of assault phase.
a, Hospitalization:
Considered adequate,. This organization remained on
the island only a short time after the island was secured*
b. Medical supplies, Quartermaster supplies and equipment!
'Adequate.
" c , Food and* wa t e r :
.. .?. . . Adequate* Galley facilities
available.
- S3-
Action Report, IWOJIMA,Operation* (Cont'd)*
d
#
Sanitation; . '
*-. r Improvement was noted in the Li t t er part of the campaign^
e Sickness, epidemic or unusual diseases in troops or
native population:
' There was no epidemic or unusual diseases,
- .. . Recommendations.
a. That each medical company with i t s equipment "be
embarked intact aboard a single ship.
b That the pri ori t y be raised on debarkation of medical
supplies.
c. That six amphibious t r ai l er s be assigaed each medidal
battalion* . . . ' \
N
d. That a suitable black-out tent,, permitting the entrance
of a patient on a l i t t e r , be made standard equipment for medical companies and
regimental aid st at i ons. The standard black-out tent i s too small for surgery
and first-aicl and a-patient on a l i t t er , danhot T&ecarried through the entrance,
. e. ' The new type Dallas. Hut i s composed of .pieces so large
and heavy that heavy equipment i s needed to l i f t and erect. Recommended that
they be modified and reduced in size and weight,
f. That the.new high top field boot without leggings be
made uniform for combat duty. The few pai rs tested in t hi s campaign were
reported as far superior to the standard boot with leggings.
g. That instructions be issued to al l medical officers
explaining the proper use of the diagnosis "Combat Fatigue",. "War Neurosis" and
"Blast Concussion". The present confusion in the us of'these, diagnosis,may
lead to future unwarrantable di sabi l i t y claims against the government.
h* That each division participating in a campaign place
contact men at each evacuation station to obtain reports of their ownmen
evacuated by other divisions, these reports to be submitted to their respective
Evacuation Officers, i
1, That contact men, previously trained in t hei r duties,
be left aboard each ship receiving casualties as long as the ship remains in
the
t
area* The reports received from marines l eft aboard ship to l i s t pertinent
data on division casualties brought aboard proved"most helpful to the.Division
Evacuation Officer during t hi s campaign*
j v That medical companies be*
J
not placed under ROT control,
or i f they must be so placed due to the military situation, that they revert to
| l ian4
:
m,edica^Lj;battalion control as early as possible*]
Action Report, Iwu H$isl8eration. (Cont'd).
k. That ECS?commanders be instructed to locate their
regimental aid stations not too f?x forward,
M* Signal.
1. Communication Plan (SOI). .
a Q. Was the plan adequate?
A
o
Theplan was excellent. The only confusion that
arose was in the various uses of the "Shackle
11
for encipherment, message text
authentication and station authentication. Someof the changes were made rather
late and were not altogether clear.
t>. Q,. Were sufficient frequencies made available to
tactical organization? .
A. Sufficient frequencies were available for al l
radios except SCR-536 and. SCR-JZO* More could not be made available due to the
limitation of the sets. It i s believed that the sets should be redesigned to
admit of more frequencies for the infantry, Also, if the frequency range i s
extended to give consideration to reequipping the art i l l ery with SCR-3OOS in
lieu of SCR-6lOs in some instances,
c, Q. Were sufficient call signs assigned?
A. Call signs were satisfactory. The discontinuance
of persona,! call signs was an improvement,
. d. Q,. Was there duplication of c'ommunication'systems? |jf
so, to what extent? .
;
A. Yes, all liaison comnunications are duplication*
unnecessary and \*asteful. Staff communications paralleling command comnunications
are usually unnecessary.
e, Q. Was liaison effected during the planning stages?
If so, how was this accomplished? '
A, Yes, by a vi si t of the Division Signal Officer to
Fifth Amphibious Corps Headquarters in lovember. Information received then
required l i t t l e revision for the final plan and was very valuable in allowing
adequate time for planning and for training purposes. More valuable training
would have been received had SCR-5OOand SCR-600 radio series been received
sooner,
f, Q. "Was sufficient time available to draw up coDpnuni*-
cation plan?
A. Yes, see above# *
g, Q. Were communication plans
-85-
ActionReport*IWQJIMAOperation,'(Cont'd).
insufficienttimetopermit study,criticism,andmakenecessarychanges?
A.,Tobeansweredby
:
C.Ts- (Theplanofhigher
echelonswerenotincludedintheSOIuntiljustpriortoembarkationforsecurity
reasonsinorderthat.SOImightbeusedfortrainingbyallpersonnelwithout
disclosingtothemtheorderofbattleanddestination. TheSignal Communication.
AnnextoOperationOrderwhich.wasclassifiedTopSecretdidincludesuch
information. The501was-Confidential). ; '
h. Q^ Didplanincludepreventativemeasuresforavoid-
ancesofdestructionofwirelinesbyourownvehicles? Wasthispartofplan
successfulintheoperation?
A* Yes,itwasincludedinCommunicationAnnexto
DivisionOperationOrder. Theonlyinterruptionofwirebyownvehicleswere
bytanksinforwardareasandwasunavoidable* Theoverbadingofwirecontri-
butedsubstantiallytothesuccess,ofwirecommunications.
2 Rehearsal. .
Ha->rehearsalwasheldbythisdivision
3*' EmbarkationandVoyage*
Wasequipmentloadedaccordingtoplan? v
A. loadingwasinaccordance"Withspaceassignedby
* - s S
inAdministrativePlan.-
b. o
%
any equipment damaged in loading? If yes,
describe.
A.. None known.
c. Q. \Jere such items as storage bat t eri es checked during
voyage?'
A. Yes, they were readily accessible and checked as
required*
d. ty. What type of t rai ni ng was carried out aboard ship?
A. All personnel on ship on which Division Headquarters
was embarked were on radio, message center or messenger watch throughout-period
from embarkation to debarkation. Air and 3SFG-J
1
nets were monitored pri or to D*-day
and delivery of intercept affected.- Thereafter al l command nets in addition
thereto were jnonitored and delivery of intercept effected*
e. Q,. Were personnel of any assistance to shi p' s com**
munication officer? If yes,
v
what did they do? '
A, Messengers were provided in Communication Office*
The ship did not guard.the majority of the above nets and information received
thereon was routed to Commander Expeditionary 'Force Reserve and was available for
Action Eeport, IWOJIHA Operation. (Cont*d),
others* . . .
f. Q.Didlandingforce*messagecenterandship(orflag)
communicationofficeroperateJointly? Comment,
' , -
A
#
- .iTo,Ouractivitieswerecoordinatedoutoperated
separately,generally,troopsguardedLandingForce, MrandNavalGunfirenets,
andshipguardedItfavyandcontrolnets. Therewerenoradioroomswhereall
nets,couldbeguardedinthesameplaceandhjthesametokenotherstaffsections
operatedmoreorless'separatelyfromtheir.Havycounterpartduelargelyto
accomodationsnot"beingsufficientfor"bothatasay.oneplaceandto acertain
extenttolackofnecessityforsame. Therewasnolackofliaisonbutduetothe
typeofshipandourmannerofemployment,theseparationofactivitiesseemed
highlysatisfactoryandpreferable* _-.
k. Personnel. .
a. Q. Are you satisfied with present allowances ofper-
sonnel?
A. Personnel requirements areel ast i c and vary with
each operation* Present allowances are satisfactory asamean but would not"
be adequate inal lsituations* .Wheapri or knowledge ofthetype of operation
dictates the necessity formore personnel, such should befurnished regardless
of T/O. . .
b. Q. What changes, i f any, arespecifically recommended?
, . A. A light construction wire platoon should betemporal
r i l y attached toDivision Signal Companyforeach operation-
al <^." Was* ' training, of-personnel adequate?
A.
;
, Yes* Some non->GP^utilized' x^rerenotreceived
sufficiently inadvance tobeuptostandard forGPbutt hei r performance was
excellent considering their"backgrounds
v
d* Q. What recommendations, i f any, aremade.,forspecial
training? . .
A.. Stress communication procedure forradio and message
center, switchboard operation forwire, 1stand 2dechelon maintenance for al l
personnel." ' . . . . . -
' , e. %9 List overages.or shortages of communication personnel
in your unit embarked aboard ship forthe. operation*,
A. The division was short 3^0Communication Personnel.
This deficiency was largely fi l l ed byut i l i zi ng non-CP. 39replacement wire
personnel and one wire platoon.-wete assigned todivision from Mfth Amphibious
Corps,, Provisional; Signal, Construction Company*
;' V . f. 'Q- List losses ofpersonnelab
-87-
JIHA..Operation. (Cont' d).
A* Hone
g. Q List lasses of personnel in the period from after
landing unt i l operation was completed, .
o
A, 1*K) GPt non-GP doing GPduty not known,
h. fy. List losses o| personnel in effecting the landing*
A* Hone known*
i . fy. Were,communication personnel employed for duties
other than communications? What were t hei r duties?
A , , - B b . . - . .
j Q>* Howwere bat t l e casualties replaced?
A. 35 radio operators were assigned from Replacement
grafts* As "beaches were consolidated personnel-from Shore Party Conmunication
Teams were used as replacements for infantry uni t s. Since al l Air Liaispn Part i es
and Shore Hr e Gontrol Part i es were not employed at one time they provided their
own replacements or received them from Shore Party Comiawnication Yearns as .
necessary*
Equipment* . .
a. C^. List overages and shortages -of major items of
equipment.
A, Ihe only major shortages were k 2?C-4s; in addition
some SD~96s wore used in lieu of TC^^s, Overages consisted of e^erimental
weasels equipped as;radio vehicles and/or \wire laying vehicles*
t>* C^. List losses of equipment aboard ship before landing.
i A#
/ /
.lone known. . , '
c. C^ Li st losses of equipment in effecting the landing.
. A, 3^JASCo lost one iMPA-l^ and damaged one MPA-1and
i n unloading*. One-infantry battalion lost several items in un-
loading; the l at t er &ayaot have been unloaded., 3d Seconnaissance Company landed
at night and had 3 SCR^JOOs damaged by salt' water* ITo other losses known.
d Qt List losses of equipment in the period from after
landing unt i l operation was completed.,
A. ' This l i s t has been submitted separately,
e. Qt* Was equipment suitable (desi^L^n^^iiantity) for
the particular task to"be performed? Jf not, l i s t
Action Report*
r
IWOJIMA Operation. (Cont' d).
A* The equipment i s "better than any previously avail-
able. JMradios are excellent but SCR-6O9/6lO and 5O9/5IO are not sufficiently
portable for some of the uses that the troops desire them for; the SCR-609/6IQ
i s considered not sufficiently portable for ar t i l l er y FOsj likewise the SCR-509/
510 for tank reconnaissance elements and observers* SPB-3OQ needs more channels
for a 3 division operation* The SCR-6O9/6IO could be made more portable by
changing position of handles* About one half of wire and radio jeepsshould be
replaced by weasels. The quantity of equipment i s adequate.
f. Q
v
In light of the specific operation, what changes
in equipment are recommended? State reason.
A. Seefe%iabove.
g. ty. What new equipmment i s recommended? Explain
specific proposed employment and "whether or not additional personnel would be
required to operate i t .
A. (1) Radio and wire weasels - no additional per-
sonnel.
(2) Cable plow, earth auger, rubber cable, wire
laying vans - al l to be operated by light construction platoon on temporary
duty from Corps.
h. q,. Did your organization employ &nyequipment which
i t had never used in action before? If yes, state items and describe performance*
Gave recommendations for improvements.
A (1) Yes.
(2) (a) SCR-610 and SCR-6OS - excellent - see
e..above.
Kb) tyeasel - excellent - make TAitem.
(c) SGR-508 - excellent - substitute SCR-5OS
for like number of SCRr[>10s as follows: 2.Headquarters, Tank Battalion; 1 each
Tank Company.
(d) SCR-510 - fai r - not comparable to SCB-61O
in range and ruggedness; make more portable.
i . Q. What water proofing was done and how effective
was i t ?
A. All equipment likely to be exposed to salt water
was waterproofed or carried in.rubber bags; loss due to salt water was negligible.
j . Q,- tfes there, any equipment used,not included in
If yes, l i s t and state how employed.' Make recommendation for inclusion inT/A.
A.. Yes, wea,sels; employed as radio and wire vehicles;
recommend 6/Signal Company, 6/ Art i l l ery Regiment,
- 69-
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation. (Cont'd).
equippedascombinedradioandwirevehicles.
k. Q,.'WasallsignalequipmentauthorizedbyT/Aused?
Ifnot,shouldit"bedeletedfromT/A? Statereason.
At Substantiallyallequipmejitwasused. Ifweasels
arereceived,somereductioninjeepscouldbemade.
!
Wasallyouequipmentunloadedfromtheshipduring
theoperation?
A. Al l except 30 days replenishment of 3d JASCo which
was not needed, andwas l ef t aboard for t hat reason,
m. Q* Wasyour equipment landed a,t the proper beach?
I f not , whynot?
A. Yes.
6. Supply,
a. Q. What equipment could not be loaded and.was l ef t '
behind?
A. Substantially none*
b. Q* Did this effect the operation in any way?
A* Ho.
c* Q,. What specific items placed the greatest strain on.
supply?
A.' The supply was never cri t i cal on any items*.
,d. Q, What change in replenishment rated* if any, are
recommended?
A.* Replenishment rates should depend on the type of
operation, arrival of resupply ships, and duration of operation, *Present rates
are adequate as a mean. However, ultraportable radios, mine detectors, and items
of a like nature should be carried in .apool as well as replenishment items..
The pool should be about kOfo of i ni t i al allowance.
e. Q,, What method was employed by your organization for
resupply?
A. This division required no resupply after al l equip-
ment was ashore* Corps,, other divisions,and Base Depot were available if required,
f.' Q, (l) What reppir faci l i t i es did you have available?
(2) Were they used?
. . (3) What major items of eq\
90-
ActionReport,IWOJIMA.Operation, (Cont'd),.
A. (l)Generally,3^-Schelonmaintenancefacilities.
(2) Yes*
(3) All authorized and requiring same,
g* ty. What method was employed for resupply and repair?
A. Aforward wire and battery dump was established near
regiments; main dump and repair f aci l i t i es at division GP; units turned in
equipment and drew from dumps on verbal requisition? division delivered i f the
unit so desired, or i t was more convenient to do so*
h* Cfc. How could repair faci l i t i es be improved?
A, Faci l i t i es were satisfactory*
i . Q,. Were equipment spares carried with equipment? If
not* state why*
A* Ho spares were available for SCR-510, 50g
t
$36*
60S.or 6lO*
j . Q# Were equipment spares adequate?
A* lio, not in aXl instances*
k. Q,, Were,sufficient spare parts available other than
equipment .spares?
A* Some spares were taken from destroyed equipment and
some by cannibal!zation **notadequate*
1* Q,, Was there sufficient transportation available for
transporting equipment?
A* Yes,
m. ty* Are there any recommendations for changes in
transportation?
A* Ho*
n*. Q,* Did the field depot signal corcpany oper?.te under
the Signal Officer command? If not, under whose commandwas i t ?
A, S
t
eeFifth Amphibious Corps answer.
0. Q, Howwas the depot signal company employed in the'
early stages of the assault?
A
#
.See Slfth Amphibious Corps answer*
p Q. IVhen was depot signal company ready to_supply equip-
ment and assist in repair"?
Action Heport, IWO JIMA. Operat i on. ( Cont ' d) .
A* See Hf t h Amphibious Corps answer. '
p . Q. When was depot si gnal company ready to supply
equipment and a s s i s t i n r epai r ?
A, See tfifth. Amphibious Corps answer.
q $ ere any t a c t i c a l si gnal uni t s furnished si gnal
r epai r 'detachments from tlie depot si gnal company?
- A. See Pi fth' Amphibious Corps answer.
r . Q. Did t he depot si gnal company del i ver suppl i es and
equipment t o Corps and di vi si on si gnal dumps?
A See Pi f t h Amphibious Corps answer,
s. Q,. Comment at l engt h on method of operat i on of depot
si gnal company*
A. See Pi f t h Amphibious Corps answer.
7 Operat i on. "
a, Q,, What agenci es were est abl i shed t hat were not normal?
A* Message cent er runs t o hi gher and adjacent echel ons,
b, Q,. What was t he most overloaded agency?
A. I\To agencies were overloaded, telephone was XL&8&
most.
c, k^. What st eps were taken t o overcome t r oubl e experiencec
i n b. above?
A. Ho t r oubl e was experienced.
d, Q. Was t her e any unnecessary dupl i cat i on of agenci es
used? . .
A. There was some dupl i cat i on i n a, above but t her e
was adequate per sonnel and equipment t o perform same*
e, Q* I n t he l i ght of possi bl e oper at i ons on l ar ge land
masses, would pr esent normal operat i ng agenci es be adequate?
A# I r anspor tat i on would probabl y be. inadequate for wire
and message cent er , andTpersonnel would be inadequate for wire*
f* C^ Where would t he agencies probabl y break down?
A. See e above,
g* Q,
#
Of t he frequenci es assigned t o ..your uni t , were t her e
any not used?/ I f , y e s , s t at e why,
>v... . A. Due t o t h i s di vi si on l andi ng^n reserve t he l ogi s -
t i c a l frequency was not used.
Action Report, IWOJIMA Operation, (Cont' d)
h. Q,. List difficulties encountered inr
(1) Radio communication.
(2) Wire communication.
(3) Visual communication.
(h). Messenger coranunication.
A. 'All difficulties were minor and easily and.rapidly
rectified.
i . Q. Were any communication difficulties encountered in
t hi s operation that were not 'encountered in the previous operations? If yes
y
what do you-attribute the difficulties to?
A. Ho.
j Q. Was any communication improvement noticed "between
t hi s operation and previous operations?
A. Yes, primarily because of reduced distances.
k. Q. Idst communication failures during the ship-to-shore
movement.
A. Hone.
1. Q,. Wereofficersrequiredtooperateandmaintainany
agencyofcommunication"becauseofenlistedcasualties? Ifyes,describe.
A. Hone known.
nu Q,. \^QVQanyenemycommunicationsinstallationscaptured?
Ifyes,wnatusewasmadeofthem?
A. Ho.
n. Q, Tiftiat methods vrere used for the Infantry-AmphiMous'
tractor communications? Were they successful?
A. CO?(lo Amphibious Tractors used).
o* ^. What methods'woveused for the Infantry-Tank
communications?
A. CT (Covered in Division SOP)*
S, Operation in Headquarters Ship. ,
Hote: ' This division did not have a headquarters"ship* The
ship provided was satisfactory but many of the questions "below are not pertinent
"because we did not have a combined set-up.
' a. Q,. Were additional personnel required other than
that normally assigned-to the ship?
Action Report, I WO JIMAOperation, (Cont
!
d)-
A.' JTo.
b. Q Were headquarters ships signal or Marine Corps
communications detachment assigned to landing circuits?
c. Q. Wasadditional equipment operated in addition to
that normally installed aboard ship?
A, Ho. This division used equipment i ni t i al l y installed
for the Support Air Commander on a previous operation*
- Q,. What,faci l i t i es were made available to Landing ITorce
Headquarters?
A. See c. Message center was also installed in the
same room with the radios*
e. Q> If answers to a,, b,
f
and c. are yes, explain.
f. Q, Wasnet discipline satisfactory?
A. Yes*
g. Q^. Was there interference between radio nets?
A Ho.
h . Q. Was there interference betv/een radio and radar
equipments?
A Hone identified,
i . Q,. Were messenger boats available to landing force on
call?
A, Hone required but available.
j Q. Describe operation of ship-^to-shore teletypewriter
circuit?
. A. Hone installed,
9 Security and Countermeasures by the Enemy
t
a. Q. IVhkt cryptographic aids were used?
A. Ashore-ShackleandCodewords loat-
Shackle,CCBPQI3O-D2,Hagelin,Ships3CMandCodewords.
Action Report, IWOJIMA*Operation. (Cont
f
d),
b. Q. Is;anycriticismmadeofpresentaids?
,A. COHP0130-1)2andHagelinaretooslow,
c Q Whatauthenticatorsystemwasusedandhoweffective
wasit?
Shackle. Adequate,
d. ^ Didtheenemyattempttousepurauthenticator
system? Ifyes,describe. Howeffectiveweretheirattempts?
A, Therewerenowell'authenticatedinstancesofthe
enemyattemptingdeception,
v
e, << Werepersonnel sufficiently trained.in signal .
security?
'.. A . Y e s * - . . . . . - ' . ' - . - . . ' . ,
f, Q, What specific recommendations are made to insure
proper security?
- ' ' " " ' " . " : . ' ' ' ' ' . ' ( ' . ' - " . ' ' ' -
-. A. Continue t r a i n i n g by.ROM u n i t s . ' . ,
g Q,, X)id your or gani zat i on have a
n
Si gnal Secur i t y Pl an"?
A,
1
Yes. I t i s i ncl uded i n di vi s i on SOP,Si gnal *
h,\ -Q^ Didt heenemy user adi o countermeasures? Describe^
M There were nowell authenticated instances of same*
i . Q,+ Wha.tmeasures were- employed to-overcome eneinyj '
interference?
/ '
Am- I nt er f er ence wasalmost ne gl i gi bl e - no measures
necessary*
j . ^* :What recommendations-do youma3s:e t o ai di n t r a i ni ng
per sonnel t o overcome enemy^i nt erference? .
A
#
. Continue t r a i n i n g byROMu n i t s ; orgaM' zat i onhas
oper at or s coxoy t hrough i nt e r f e r e a c e ; . i nt r oduce decept i on t n GPXs byus i ng addi t i onal
stations; bring results to attention of all personnel. -
: : . ..; ' 1 0
#
A i r
. ..'. Since t hi s division did not 3.an&in assault, noAit-Warning
units were attached to-it* However, t hi s Headquarters guarded the local Air.Warning
circuit ajid received early warning over same as well- as over al l other'Hi-Command
circuits gu?xded* I t wasalso received over land teletyo^^fl^feWLi-tLwas established
ActionReport,IWOJIMA.Operation. (Cont
r
d)
ashore. Informationreceivedwasdisseminatedtosubordinateunitsbythemost
expeditiousagencyforunitsconcerned* Thesystemprovedmost satisfactory^
11# .Shore Party Communications,
a. Q
m
What type of ai r warning was established by shore
party?
A. Air Warning was received from Division Headquarters
and from Corps Shore Party by telephone and by radio on the Shore Party Lateral
and the Shore Party CommandNeta respectively* I t was disseminated locally
by telephone
t
public address system, and siren,
b. Cfr Was there coordinated training before operations?
A. Yes, each Shore.and Beach.Party Team trained with
i t s respective Shore Party Plp.toon as well as
!
participating in Command Post
Exercises of the various echelons. .
c. Q. Whenwas inter-beach wire established after landing?
A. The Division Shore Party was established onD
plus 5 and two (2) trunks installed to e"ach of the following on the same day:
Begimental Shore Parties,
Division Headquarters,
Corps Shore Party,
d CJ.
1
Were wire lines damaged to
r
a great extent by our
Vehicles? What steps were taken to overcome this?
A. Maintenance was difficult during the fi rst twenty-
four (2^) hours prior to the complete overloading of al l wire l i nes. Thereafter
damage was negligible.
e. Q,. Was the ship-to-shore administrative radio circuit
satisfactory? If not, why?
A. This circuit was efficiently operated by the
Navy Beachmasters, Shore Party and Beach Communications,were coordinated
through the Shore Party Message Center.
f. fy. What were the losses in men and materials?
A. One (l) man was wounded and one (l) TBZradio was
lost and one (l) MPA-1Public Address System was damaged on the beaches' while
employed in the Shore arty phase,. Subsequently, Communication personnel of
the Shore Party section were used as communication replacements in the infantry
units and suffered additional casualties of two (2) killed and eight (g) woundecU
g. Q,. Howwer<3losses in f# replaced?
A. Consolidation of beaches prec^j^ffL^tJie necessity
' .' - 96-
t
ActionReport,IWOJIMAOperation, {Cont'd),
forreplacementswithintheShoreParty* ..
h* Q Wasunitheldafloat-untiloperationallyrequired?
A* Twoteamsattachedtotheregimentlandingunder
operationalcontrolofthekthDivisionwerenotrequiredforaboutforty-eight
(k%)hoursafterlandingduetothefactthatthe"beachwasnottakenoverfrom
otherunitsofthe4thDivisionuntilapproximatelythattime*
i* $. Howwasconsolidationofthe"beachesaccomplished
aspertainstocommunications?
A* Consolidationwasnormal. Radionetsweredis-
continuedwhenreliablewirecommunicationswereestablished. Wireinstallations
oflowerechelonswereconsolidatedasthebeachesofsuchunitswereconsolidated,
j* Q. Wascoordinationbetweensnorepartyandbeachmaster
communicationsaccomplishedsatisfactorily? . '
A. Yes.Seee*above.
12# AirLiaisonCommunications*.
a* Q,. Wasthesupportairrequestcircuitovercrowded?
A*.Yes.Theerroneoususeofthiscircuitforsupport
airdirectionwastheprincipal,reasonforcongestion,
b#ty*|Wereaircraftavailablewhenrequest? .
A. Hotalways*
c
#
Q,* What was the average time from a request until
aircraft reported?
A* Two and a half hours,
d. q. \fhat method was employed to .direct aircreJ't?
,A. Thebattalions passed information and directions
over the Support Air Request net to Air Support Control and the l at t er directed
the planes on the Support Air Direction net*
v
&. Q Was lateral coaumunication maintained between Air
liaison Parties? If not, why not?
A * Y e s * * : \\,
f
m
<^. Howwere front- l i nes marked for ai r cr af t ?
A* . By colored panel s and colored smoke grenades*
g* Q^ What were the l osses i nmen
-97-
Action,Report,I0JIMAOperation* (Cont'd).
1
A. -Six(6)enlistedmenwerewoundedandone(l)
AM/VRO-1radiowasdestroyed*
h. Q,. Waspresentequipmentadequate?
A- ires*.
13* ShoreBasedAirSupportCommunications.
ShoreBasedAirCommunicationswerenotunderthecontrol
ofthisdivision*therefore,Idonotfeelqualifiedtoreportinthatrespect*
l4. ShoreM.reControlCommu&ications.
^ -
a, ^ How soon after reaching the "beach did S3TCP establish
communications with i t s assigned firing ship?
A. Since the division did not land in assault, communi-
cations were not established with, ships until units went into the lines* This
was, in both the 9*k sad- 22^st Marines-, shortly prior to E-hour. Ho difficulties
or undue delays were experienced in establishing prompt communication with ships.
b
#
Did each SJOT keep i t s frequency throughout the
operation?
A., 23b. Frequencies were assigned at the same time as
fire-support ships. The necessity for continually juggling frequencies was one
of the most troublesome staff-problems of the operation*
c .
Wasnet discipline practiced?
;
A, Habitually. Procedure and discipline were excellent
and personnel took full advantage of alternate means of communication, such as
telephones (over which wire-communications were highly satisfactory).
d Q,. What were the losses in men and material?
A. Casualties:
EIA WIA MIA TOTAL
Spotters 2 2 0
k
6
k
I
Scout s 1
5
Radiomen(CP) 2 2
0
0
Wlremen(GP) 0
3
3
0
0 Generalduty,men
X-.
TOTAL D" 0* 21
(*) includes k wounded but not evacuated from
*IW0JIMA*
^
, , (#) includes ^ evacuations for combat fatigue or
associated neurosis.
Actio.i Report, IWOJTMA.Operation. (Cont'd),
Serious materiel casualties:
Destroyed or damaged beyond repair, 1TBX;
y SGK-ZBk; 2 SGR-3OO; \ telephones/sE-S-A; l.HBZ.
Lost in action:
9 breast-reels, CS-0.11,
There were no equipment-failures worthy of comment,
e* Q,. Howwere losses listed in d replaced?
A. By obtaining spare sets from the 3dJASCo (mainly
shore and beach equipment) arid from the i3ignal Hepair Section of the Division.
1 f Q,
o
Is present naval gunfire communication plan
adequate? If not, howmayi t be improved?
A* Theprincipal inadequacies of the gunfire comrauni-
cation-plan are those of frequencies* More SFCP.frequencies are urgently needed,
so that part i es can have and retain their ownthroughout an operation* Further-
more, in t hi s division (due to lack of an extra frequency), a serious handicap
was imposed uponaaval gunfire communication's through lack of an SCR-3OQcommon
frequency, which would have enabled the Division Naval Gunfire Officer to retain
continual communication with forward observers as well as al l otKer elements of
division gunfire. The only materiel lack i s that of a remote control system for
the TBXradios with which wewereequipped*
15 Summary. .
a* Q (rive account of difficulties not covered in previous
questions.
_
'Am The overall communication plan was excellent.
Certain undesireable*features were contained for which there was no solution
because i t was necessary to make compromise due to limitations of-.the frequency
spectrum, types pf equipment employed, and'conflicting interest. Other features
required interpretation or clarification. It is

acknowledged that the overall

plan cannot cover al l contingencies that mayarise, and certain improvisations
must be made to fi t the changing tactical situation. Lack of prior knowledge
of the exact details of employment of this division required that the communica-
tion plan be sufficiently flexible to meet changing requirements* The .
difficulties encountered did not constitute major problems and were solved'by
1t
on the spot
tr
coordination, by clarification from higher headquarters,or \>y "
interpretation by this headquarters. They are listed for information:
(l) he classification of the CommunicationPlan
i s Top Secret and Cent ComTwoandPac calls are secret* It i s necessary that
al l communication personnel be familiar with certain portions of all these
documents.. The distribution of these documents, restrictions governing their
handling and accounting, and their high cl assi fi cat i on. j fc
Action Report* I WOJ'IMA.Operation* (Cont'd)*
rest ri ct i ons on the dissemination of information to the people required to have
same* 3&Lrest ri ct ed di st ri but i on, bulk, and regulations governing handling and
accounting preclude t hei r being given to al l concerned and require that essential
information be extracted and disseminated* This i s normally done by including
such extracts in the Signal Operation Instructions (SOI) of the unit concerned*
Because of the wide distribution of the SOI and the necessity for i t being used .
by al l communication personnel for training, i t i s not feasible to accord i t
handling and stowage higher than Confidential. Provisions should be included i n.
the basic documents so that a division could extract al l information required for
internal training and reclassify same as Confidential.
(2) Security regulations governing radio-transmissions
during training in forward Areas were toostringent to^permit efficient training
for combat i f interpreted l i t eral l y' , ,It i s believed that the advantages,gained
by supervised training using effective frequencies, calls, authentication, and
cipher systems outweigh any disadvantages that might- accrue through the enemy having
an opportunity to intercept such transmissions.
(3) Shore Sire Control Parties of t hi s division were
not assigned individual spotting frequencies* There were a limited number of
frequencies available to the Corps for that purpose and pr i or i t y was given to the
assault divisions because of t hei r paramount requirements. Subsequently, t hi s
division was committed and continuous coordination was necessary in order to obtain
the required spotting frequencies and keep al l concerned informed, .Whenever
practicable each Shore Pire Control Party should have en individual spotting
frequency* A suggested method of obtaining same would be to reduce the number of
frequencies for internal assignment to a division and specify -that the infantry
battalion medium frequency net and the naval, gunfire spotting net be combined*
Heither net i s overcrowded, the requirements are not conflicting, and i t would
frequently result in an economy of personnel and equipment*
The frequency plan provided for separate frequencies
for ai r observation and for ar t i l l er y ai r spot of each di vi si on Such missions
were performed by carrier based planes as well as OY-1planes. OY-1planes
attached to landing force uni t s were pooled for t hi s purpose but could not guard
the frequencies for al l units for whom they were required to fly missions* Such
planes should be equipped to guard the frequencies of al l units with whoa they may
be required to work. -
(5) The tfasic system of message text and s.tation
authentication should be changed so that the number of variations based upon the
form of the messages and type of transmission' is reduced. Variations,between
voice, CW, code, plain
t
phonetic, and abbreviated transmissions are not necessary
and result in confusion. Some changes to the authentication system were ambiguous
and received too l at e to obtain cl ari fi cat i on, requiring interpretation by t hi s .
headquarters pri or to dissemination.
(6) There'was oneinstance of a regiment of t hi s division
having a telephone code name corresponding to the radio cal l of an adjacent unit
in another division* This resulted in some confusion.
b* Q. ' Comments and recommendations.
Action Report, 1WOJIMAOperation* (Cont*d) \ 'V'
A* The,following comments and recommendations are
submitted i n addition to those made above: -JHtf
' *
(1) Communication plans have become overly complicated
in an effort to maintain security of information, to prevent deception, and in
order to cloak the Order of Battle after battle has been joined. At the same
time l i t t l o effort i s made to simplify operation instructions and thereby speed,
.up communications* Any compromise between speed and security are usually decided
in favor of security in the planning phase. However,, complicated instructions
favoring security are disregarded to a large degree in combat when the need or
speed becomesparamount* Different standards of security are promulgated for
infantry, air
f :
and naval gunfire in communicationplans,- Hot only does the stand-
ard of security become the same aa that of the unit having the lowest standard,
i t mayresult in a false sen"se of security and the compromise of existing security
systems* In view of the inability 61 certain units to operate with and enforce
complicated security regulations, and in view of the fact that the enemy does
not .appear to make any effort to benefit by interception of our transmissions,
i t seems that simplification of operation instructions are justified even though
i t mayresult in an apparent reduction in security* The following changes are
suggested for purpose of simplification: ,
(a) Usejths sane system of radio code words for
al l units and the same system of code words for both telephone and radio*
(b) Simplify th authentication system as outlined
above. .
(c) Reduce the number of codes held by"units below
a division or separate unit to one* TheJoint Assault Code could be discontinued
as i t i s rarely used and once compromised the complete code must be superseded
since there i s no key that can be changed*.
(2) This division carried a non table of allowance
i ton k Xk truck outfitted to serve as a small repair shop until less portable
equipment could be movedashore. It.was equipped with a generator (PE-75)
for power supply, a drying oven, trays for spare parts and space for carrying
test equipment* It was landed i ni t i al l y with the regiment i ni t i al l y attached
to the 4th Division andperformed the major portion of al l repairs for that*
regiment until such time as this headquarters was landed and the Division Repair
Shop was established ashore* Arepair team from the Division Repair Section
landed with this truck* It i s recommended that three (3) similar trucks be
authorized for each division. They should be apar t of the Signal Goripaay but
loaded one to.the Embarkation Group of each Regimental Combat Team* It should
remain with the Regimental Combat Teamuntil the Division Repair-Section i s pre-
pared to function ashore. - . , . . . . ,.
(3) Alight wire construction platoon should be opera-
tionally..^tt^ched f*om a Corpspool to each division during the period of a
Ah.allowaiice'of.'2O* XZ" JJH $2ji&-~should be always
provided for over&eading of
-aox-
Action Report* IWOJIMA.Operation* Cent
f
d),,
T, Conclusions and Recommendations: ,
A*.. Conclusions*
1. That the combat training of the 28th and 3*tth Heplacement
Drafts assigned this division as battle replacements prior to the operation was
extremely poor* Insufficient $ime was available to adequately train them
within the division. Forced employment of these menwith infantry Units in
combat resuited.in a sharp drop in combat efficiency, and an increase in
casualties*
l
2. That the C3-H-1 flamethrower tank proved to be one f the
most effective weapons in dealing with enemy-occupied emplacements and caves*
3* That the armored bulldoz-er proved more effective in cutting
routes of approach to enemypositions in the terrain encountered than the tank
bulldozer because of i t s lighter weight, better maneuverability, and because i t
i s equipped with angiedozei*.
1+* That aircraft were provided in insufficient strength for
the si?>port of ground operations after the first few days of the operation,
and bombardment aircraft employed instantaneous fuzed'bombs almost entirely
with l i t t l e effect on enemy fortified positions.
/5 3fibat insufficient attention was given to the massing of the
bulk of available fi res, including aircraft* in support of the main effort
of the ground forces, with resultant slower progress and greater casualties.
B* Recommendations.
1* That replacements be given more and better training before
being assigned to divisions, or that they be assigned a sufficient length of
time prior to operations to enable divisions to adequately train them with
infantry units to which they will be assigned in combat*
2# That the present organization of the tank battalion be
increased by one company of CB-H-1 flamethrower tanks*
3* That in future operations against well-fortified areas a
much larger number of aircraft be maintained oh station, or at least on call',
for close support of ground troops, and that bombs carried for such operations
be preponderantly delayed action fuzed*
* /
k
m
That in future operations more use be made of ^massed fires",
to. include the bulk of artillery, naval gunfire, and aircraft, in close support
of the main effort of the ground-forces.
5* Ska* three (| ) TD-1S tractors with bulldozer, equipped with
5/8
tt
detachable armor, be-added ba the
1
Tables of.Organ*salfBfc'equipment of the
engineer battalion, to be attached during,combat to the tankn&attalion for the
construction pf routes of ingress and egress for areas uj||p||^^nein.v observation
and fire. /
. > ' ~1Q3~
' I ' V *
f
Action Report, I0.JIMA.Operation, (<k>nt
f
d).
.6 That a t ot al of eighty-four (S4) M29& (weasels) be added to
the Tables of Organisation equipment of the Marine Division, allocated as follows:
Twenty-seven (27) for communication vehicles only, distributed
as follows:
i.-
Six (6) - Signal Company.
Two (2) - H&8 Battery, Art i l l ery Regiment.
One (l).- Art i l l ery Battalion.
Two (2) - H&S Company, Infantry Regiment,
One (1) - Infantry Battalion*
Ilfty-seven ($?) for supply, evacuation^ and rapid movement
of supplementary weapons, distributed as followss
Four (l|>) - B &S Company, Infantry Regiment*
your (k) *-Infantry Battalion*
Pour (k} H&SBattery, Art i l l ery Regiment.
Five (5) - Motor Transport Battalion,
7 That the Athey track-laying t r ai l er - t r act or combination be
added to the Tables of Organization equipment of a Marine Division. A,t ot al
of eighteen (IS) t r act or - t r ai l er s attached to the Motor Transport Battalion;
six (6) assigned to each RCT during combat, ideally supplement the wheeled cargo
transportation normally assigned the RCT.
8# That over-printed enemy i nst al l at i ons be eliminated from
future t act i cal map3prepared for use by infantry units*
That the new high-top fi el d boot be made uniform for combat
duty.
* ' " '
ft. B. ERSKIN3
ENCLOSURE A
INTELLIGENCE
(1) Enemy Units Encountered.
(2) Comments and Recommendations.
(3) Map. Enemy Units Encountered.
(4) Sketch. Final Defenses, 26th Tank Regiment
(5) Map. Enemy Defensive Dispositions East of
Airfield No.3 os translated from map
captured by 21st Mar.
Basedonavailableprisonerreportsanddocumentary information,itis
estimatedthatunitsofthefollowing organizationswerecontacted,eitherin
wholeorpart,"by the3&MarineDivisioninthecourseofitsoperationson
IWOJIMAduringtheperiod25February- 16March, ^
109thDivA AArty Unit
Mkth.Machine Cann6n (MO)Unit
109thDiv Keikaitai (Radar Unit)
2dMBArtyUnit - ' - '
2dMBSngrUnit ,
310th. IndInfBn . . - ' '
311thIndInf3n
3lUth Ind.InfBn , - . . ;
1^+5thInf-HegtArtyUnit'-' ' ' .
3dln,17th Ind Mixed.Eegt.-. '
1

26th TankRegt < - ' -
;
9thInd.ATBn '"" ". ,.
11thInd A TBn
12th IncLA T B n ' '. ,
%
. , "
1stIndhGBn " ' *. .
2dIndMaBn.
20thIndArtyMortar3n .
2dMediumMortarBn " * " * .
^d, MediumMortarBn
SocketUnit (Army)
IWOJ I M A N A Y A L GUARDFORCE .
:

AABtryG-roups.&CDBtryGroups; .
20thMachineCannon(MO)Unit*(Army)
21stMachineCannon(MC) Unit (Army)
SHOTOAirGroupBLF
25th TorpedoMaintenance Unit
2dKav.al-.A^r Depot .
Adiscussionofprincipleunitsfollows. HeferalsotoEnclosureA
-
(3)*"
' ' v Army U n i t s . " - ..
109th,Piv Hg '
r ;
. _'...
109th.DivAAArtyUnit: The2d,3d,andonehalfoftheHth(Searchlight)
Btrysofthe109th A A UnitwereidentifiedinTA213HE
#
- Threeprisonersinfti-
1
catedthatthe2dPtryhad.90men'"andoperated'6-7cmAAguns. The3
d
^tryhad
120menoperating6*7cmAAguns. TheUthBtryhadkQmenmaking,- withaHqof
^2,around290-300menand12-7craAAguns* AleoattachedtothisAAUnitwere
twoMCUnits (J+3&andUUth)consistingofSOand60enrespectivelywith6-2$m
machinecannonsineachunit* This"broughtthetotalofthe109th A A Unit0
around^30men. It^isbelievedthe.toftheattachedunits,onlytheUUthMC
UnitwasencounteredinthedivisionZofA
109thDiv-RadarUnit (Attached'totheIfctvy): Thisisthefirst operation
inwhichthe3
d
MarDivhasencountered.anArmy-RadarUnit* Thisunitconsisted
ofaround5^
m
enoperatingaEadarStationinHA219-Q*
2dMixedBrigade " ;-
1
' -' .
2dMixed3riga.de.ArtyUniti' 'The'1stBtry.oftheBrigade, ArtyUnit;.^hich
documentsindicated. ha,dits'gtm-position'inthecentralsectoraround_JJOjOYjtMA;
(TA200-3)'wastheprincipaluhit'endouhtered':. The1stBtryoriginallycon^-
sistedof5-75mmfield.-gunsand,around120men..- Later-,however,, a,pla'tobftof
3*-12cmhowitzerswasaddled. ' . ';'-;
page1of5pages
foQtliInd,Inf-3n'i.IhisBnwastheprincipal-infantryunitencountered*
The310thIn&InfBnwasdesignatedastheBrigadereserveunit;andcaptured
maps/indicatepositionsofthisBninTA.200and199NorthBast..Documentand
POV/-reportsindicatethatthisunitformed,theislandreserveorsecondline*f
defense* Documentsindicatethattheorganizationofthe310th
1
IndInfBnwas
approximatelyasfollowsatfullstrengths
BnHq
MO
1stHifleCo 125 *HGD,LMG-
2dRifleCo
125
3ditifleCo
125
HMGCo 130 12HMG
InfGunCo 80 2-70mmflow
TOTAL 625' *H&avyGrenadeDischarger
The311thIndInfBnwas"defendingtheHISHISector(TA181,IJB)* OnFeb25th
itis"believedthatthe3dMarDivwasincontactwith,themainstrengthofthe
310thIndInfBn,andwithpossibleunitsofthe311thIndInf3n(defendingin
T*s181and198onthe.left)
3 IndInfBn; IdentificationsofthisBnweremadeintheDivZtfA.
inTA216,21^,201and202 Acapturedmanindicatedthatthecompanypositions
ofthisBnwereinthisgeneralareaoftheSastSectorunderlQ9thDivcontrol.
Prisonerreportsandunitsincontactasreportedlaythe5thMarDivindicate
thatunitsofthisBnwerewithdrawnfromtheEastSectorandcommittedinTA's
235t251inthelaststagesoftheJapanesedefense,, Documentsindicatethat
theorganizationofthe31^thIndInfBn.wasasfollows:
3nHq(andattached"
elements)
go
1stSifleCo
135
HGD
,LMG
2dEifleCo 1^-5 HGD ,-LMG
3dEifleCo 1^+5 HGD ,LMG
MGCo 170 16
HMG(?)
InfGunCo 125 4-7
OmmHow(?)
TOTAL BOO
2d1MBSngrUnit,? IdentificationsofthisunitweremadeinTA201;,"but
itisnotbelievedthatmainstrengthoftheBrigadeEngrUnitwasencountered*
3dBn
t
lfthIndMj.xed;Hegt: ThepresenceofthisunitbnIWOJ1MAwasntt
known"beforeB-Day Documentsandmapsindicate,however,thatitslineswere
IntheT E E M Sector(TA235-W)
an<i
formedmrtofthefinalline_6fdefense.
ThisBnwasunder109thD4vcontrol* Organizationwasasfollows:
Hq
35 5
LMG,
6 HGD
7thHifleCo ' LMG,
115 5 6
HGD
8thRifleCo
115 5
LMG,
6
HGD
3dMGC#. 120 gHHG
AttachedUnits:
2dCo,1stIndMG
Bn ' 100 g HMG
-
1stLightMortar -
Bn 155
12-glmmMortars
TOTaL 755
Identific:-.tions'Cfthe3d3n,17thIMRweremadeinTA235end21SCentraland
Northeast ThisunithadntBnguns(70iiimHow)orATgunsandreliedmainlyon
page*2of5
EHCLOSOBB
smallarmsfire.*FOWshavereported,thatanJ2ngrUnitofaround100menwas
attached.
l^thInfRegt; IdentificationsofthelstBn,l^thEegtweremadeinT Al6^
and182;"butaccordingtoprisoners*thisBnwaswithdrawnon21FebtoIA2l6#
Onthebasisofthisinformationitwouldappearthatnomajorunitsofthis
Bnwerecontacted* Identificationsofthel&Bn1^5*hInfRegtweremadein
s
.TA's201-202;"hatisis"believedthatthemainstrengthofthe3&
S nwa
againstthe4thMarDivinconjunctionwithunitsofthe31^*^*
n
&XnfBncon-*
tactedin"bothzonesofaction.
ArtyBn, InfRegt: The3dand*HhBtrysofthelU5thArtyBnwere
locatedinTA219&nd218* Capturedmapshaveconfirmed thesepositions;andhave
indicatedthatthe1stand2dwerein218~Jand235-Vrespectively. TheT/0
of'theiU5thArtyBnspecified3batteries. However,earlyin19^5#&"battery
of12cmhowitzerwasaddedtothisBn* Thereforetheorganisationwasasfollows:
q
3FdGuns (75mm?)
1stBtry
G>uns
"3^ (75mm?)
2d" -Btry'
3FdGuns (75mm?)
34 Btry
(est)5-12cmHowitsera
4thBtry
ApproxTOTAL
26thTankHegt: TnisunitwascontactedinlA
r
s200and201Acapturedmap
indicateddefensivepositionsothisunitin201^I>,I "Documentsfoundinthis
areafurtheridentifiedthe26thTankEegt Itisbelievedthatthisunitcon-
stitutedthemainstrengthofthedeterminedfinaldefenseconductedinthe
vicinityofT A
!
S20l-C,D,H,IJ 21&-X.Acountofdestroyedenemytanksinthis
area,afterresistancehadIjeeneliminated,showedgmediumtanksand flight
tanksduginandrevettedinsupportoftnedefenses. Ti:isfactcombinedwith
thediscoveryoflt.rgestoresoftankpartstjid-tnetypeanddegreeofresis-
tanceoffered,giveseve.-yevidencetht.ttheentiretankregiment(lessone
companybelieved,tohavebeenemployedprincipallyintneMOTOIAMA area)may
havebeencommittedtothedefenseofthispocket* SeeEnclosureA(*O ,for
sketchdescriptionofthedefenses* Theorganisationofthe26thTankHegt
wesunioue. The26thTankHegtlost36tanksintransittoIVOJIMA,althoughno
personnelwerelostaccordingtoacaptureddocument.. Therewere2^ tankson
IT/TOJIMAaccordingtoCaptureddocuments..Presumably,therefore,theTpnkSegt
originallyhad60tanks..TheJapanese^rmyMobilizationFlanOrderfor19^1
shows^suchaTt.nkHegtashaving65Omen. Assumingthattherewere6^0men,
the26thTankHegtisbelievedtohavebeenreorganizedintothefollowing
reinforcedorganizationforastaticdefense:
Hegt Hq
1st Tank Co
2d'
:
Tank#d -
fc
50
'go
' g o
kLight T?>nks,UMedTanks
M LightTrnks,kMedTanks
3d Tank ^0 80 ULightTanks,kMedTanks
Maintenance Co 100
Arty Co
125
hT9075mmFieldG-uns
Sngr'Plat"" * 20
Inf Co -
115
-630 ;
Is t&2dIndUS Identificationsoftheseunitsweremadeinthedivision
zoneoffciCtjion,'UniUsoftheT'2cLCo.'lst-IndMGBnwhich-wasattached.tothe
3dJ3n,17thIi-iSinfch'eTJS^Zii*
1
.Sector (T-.
s
*21S),we'reprobablyencountered. Other-
documentary'evidenceisnotconclusive-astowhat'Org8Hiied
5
unitsofthese
page3of5pages
ENGLO5D33B'A
IndMOBns-weredefinitelycontactedin3dMarDivZofA, Documents,htwever,
indicatethatM3-CossupoertedInfBnsectorsofdefense. The1stand3&Cos
6fthe'1stMG-Bnand1stGof2dHOBn-were.underBrigadecontrol"butitis
notcertainhowtheywereemployed*
,_9th,3.1th,j.2thIndATBns: OfthefiveIndAT!Bnsonjn/OJIMA,threewere
^identifiedintheDivZofA. AStheseunitswereorincioallydeployedinitially
r
tocvertheprobableapproaches01tanksoarticUlarlyinTx>.s182,l#3r199&
ncl
-
200
t
itilsbelievedthataconsiderableportionofthefirepoweroftheseATBns
v.asconcentratedintheDiv2-of;w OfthethreeATBnsidentified,itis "be-
lievedthatinitiallythe11thATBnwasdeployedwithcompanypositions'in
To.200,201and185ilorth,andthe12thATBnwasdeployedaboveandcovering
thewo,1airfieldinTA1S2;andthatsubsequently,unitsofthis3nwithdrew
topositionscoveringAirfieldao2. The9tkATBnwasdeployedwithpositions-
inTAl&ilNorth,199and2l6Central. ThisBnwasreinforcedby2companies
(less1plat)fromthe10th#$Bn,butnoidentificationsfromthoseunitswere
reported(positionsinTA.196K IdentificationsoftheSthATBninTA183,
werereportedalso;-buttsoughfire,fromthisunitmayhavebeenreceived,it
isdoubtfulifitwasactuallyContactedbythisdivision*
MortarUnitsan4.Socket'Units:
20thIndMortarBn;'Thefollowingrareestimatedtohavebeencontacted-in
235,, 236, 2ia,219 " / "
BnHq
1stCo
2dCo (!)
3dCo
LightMortarCo
.
.
Hqj.1docketPlat
60
"".65
65
130
150
I7O
2320Mortars
2320Mortars
1+320Mortars
2570-glmmMortars
l6RocketLaunchers
TOTAL
2d&3dMediumMortarBni Smalldetachments ofthesrunitswereidentified.
Thepositionsofthes.-*twounitswereconcentratedintheIIISHI'Sector(TA2l6,
199. 19S}andMINijMISector(TA201,202,ISk,185),Firefromthesepositions
howeverwasreceivedwithintheZofAo"fthisdivision. *'<''
HavalUnits
IWQJIMAQ-uardUniti Captureddocuments-aridmapsindicatepositionsforthe
followingprincipalgunsinthe3^MarDivZofA(personnelstrengthestimated).
anditisreasonabletoconsiderthatthemainstrengthoftheseunitswere
encountered: .
NorthSectorGroup:
2-15cmCD(219-1,,M) ho
2-12cmShort(235)
35
.10-13cmMO(219)'
5~25mm(TM)(21^-0)
50
&-25'mm(SM)(235)
.S~25mm(SM)
10-13omMG-(218)
OP (235~v)
MOTOXitMn.Sectorgroup:
5H-12cmUP(199-6) 110
>}r &?'::<&'
pageh>-of5pages
ENCLOSURE A (1) ( Cont
!
d)
,g~25mm (TM) (199) 75
5-25nun (SM) (200) 30
(TM) (218-.U) 60
Mort ar (201-G) $0
TOTAL 685
North Sector ILF: Uni t s of the SHOTO Air G-roup HLF and one conroany
of t he 204t h Havy Cons t r uct i on tTnit were or gani sed i nt o a North Sect or Ifravy
l and Force
1
of a"bout UOO-U5O men or gani zed wi t h 2^0 r i f l e s , 8 HM5, 13 HD, U Plame
t hr ower s, 11 MO, and 1 LMCr, These u n i t s cooper at ed wi t h t he army u n i t s i n defense
of t he Hort h Sect or and i t i s "believed t h a t t he main u n i t s of t h i s NLF wore con-
t act ed.
ISTLF: Although the main s t r engt h of t h i s uni t was cont act ed "by
kth MarDiv i n TA 1S3~18
1
+ el ement s of t h i s u n i t were i d e n t i f i e d i n TA 201, 202'
Nort h, I t i s Rel i eved t o have been--organized from 1,500 WAMPO SHOTO Ai r Group
G-round per s onnel , 200 mai nt enance men of 2d Mavy Ai r Depot, 25th. Torpedo Main-
t enance Sect i on ( ? ) , and 1 Co of t he 20^t h SETSUEITAl.
page 5
ISJJIGLOSUKB A ( 2 )
' V
HSaOMMSIT'DATIOIJS
a . Maps:
(X) Itisrecommendedthatoverprintedenemyinstallations"beeliminated
fromfuturetacticalmapspreparedforusebyinfantryunits. Theobscuringof
terraindetailduetooverprintedinstallations;andtheattemptbypersonnelto
usetheindicatedinstallationsaslandmarksvhen,infact,theymayhavebeen
obliteratedorburiedduetotheeffectsofgunfireandbombing,tendtoconfuse
ratherthanclarifythemaps*
(2)Roadsshouldbeindicatedbytheircorrectconventional sign.The
tacticalmapsofIWO'JIMh.indicated,asimproved,roadswhichbyAmericanstand-
ardst.reunimproved. Ifonlysurfcicedroadsareindicatedasimprovedonmaps,
andallothersarecorrectlyindicatedasunimprovedroadsandtrails,troops
willencounterlessdifficultyinorientingtnemselvesbyroadnetworks,
(3) Tacticalmapsforuseintheox^erationshouldbepreparedatthe
latestpossibledateinprdertoindicatecorrectlythelatestchangesinter-
rain,particularlyroadandairfieldconstruction.
Legiblegriddedmosaics,scale1:12,500shouldbeprovidedforall
officerstoincludeforwardobservers,navalgunfirespottersandplatoonlead-
ers* Halftonephotomaps,unlesspreparedverycarefullyandmadefromexcep-
tionallyclearphotographs,aregenerallytooblurredforeffective orientation
purposes.
(5)-JPoreffectiveuse,reliefmapsmustbeaccuratelypreparednot
onlyastoscale,butalsoastoexactgroundconformation. Itisnotconsidered
thatreliefmapsfurnishedpriortotheoperationwereaccurateenoughasto
terraindetails. Itisrecommendedthateveryeffortbeexertedtorenderas
exactaportrayaloftheterrainaspossible,particularlyofruggedareas,in
futurereliefmapsprepared.
b. Photos:
(l) Navalandotherbombardment,wassoeffectiveon1*10JIMAthat
practicallyallofthevegetationwasburnedordestroyed;andinmanylocalities,
thesurfaceofthegrounditselfwasConsiderablychanged* Cuetothesechanges,
itwasfoundthatphotographstakenpriortothebeginningoftheintensive
bombardments,althoughstilluseful,weregreatlyreducedineffectiveness.Due
tothechangesinterrainandvegetation,smallunitleadershadconsiderable
difficultyinlocatingthemselvesonthegroundexactlybyusingthemapor
previouslyissuedphotos. Whenlandingandsubsequentinlandoperationsare
preceededandsupportedbysimilarintensivebombardments,itisrecommended
thatConsiderationbegiventoprovidingasmanyprintsoflateaerialcover-
agesasmayberequiredtoequipproperlyallcombatantofficers,toinclude
companyofficeis
4
withthelatestphotographicinformationoftheterrainover
whichtheymustoperate*
2 JICF'OATeams
a. ,-.fterlanding,aJICPQ*'Field StudyTeamforthestudyofenemyinstalla-
tions,wastemporarilyassignedtoworkwiththeDivisionbyIuiiJKJR. Thisteam
performedhighlysatisfactoryworkanditisrecommendedthatsimilartec.uisbe
employedinthefuture,attachedtodivisions,forthepurposeofobtaining,
directly,thatinformationdesiredbyhigherauthorityforthepreparationof
theirstudiesonenemyinstallations* Inthisoperation,theJICPOATeam
page1'of2page s
SiJCLOSUHSA (2) (Cont*d)
assignedworkedinveryclosecooperationwithdivisionAPtandEngineerperson-
nelvhowereengagedinadetailedstudyandsurveyplotofallenemyinstalla-
tionsencotinterodwithinthedivisionzoneofaction*
tu AJIGPOtt,SalvageTeamwasnotassignedforthis.operation. Itiscon-*
sideredhighlydesirablethatsuchateamequippedwithpropersalvagefacilities
"befurnishedeachdivision,whetocommitted^in,orderthathighlyimportant
equipment ofintelligencevaluecanberemoved,toaplaceofsafeIceepingas
soonaspossible^
. ' , . . ' ,
page' 2erf2.pages
ENCLOSURE A (3)
ENEMY UNITS ENCOUNTERED
CONFIDENTIAL
c?
p
T
*
A 75MM ANTI-TANK GUN S DUGIN TANK
ENCLOSURE A O)SKETCH.
y 47MMANTI-TANK GUN jj REVETED TANK
MACHINE GUN POSITION - TANK
DEFENSES, 2 6
T H
TK.REGT.
7 f COVERED RIFLE PIT
1*1 EMPTY TANK REVETMENT
A PILLBOX
R TRUCK REVETMENT
VJ-U-TRENCHES
d CAV E
ooo. ROCK WALL
J. AMMUNITION STORAGE
<*. TANK. US MEDIUM
CAMOUFLAGED POSITION 1OOYDS
O WATER CI STERN
UNIDENTIFIED
NOTE: ARROWS INDICATE PRINCIPLE DIRECTIONS OF FIRE.
ENTIRE AREA DOTTED WITH RIFLE PITS AND FOX HOLES-
ENCLOSURE A(5)
ENEMY DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS EAST OF
AIRFIELD NO.3 AS TRANSLATED FROM
MAP CAlfliAECk Rl 21ST. MAR.
ENCLOSURE B
SITUATION MAPS
OPERATION
1
5 OF 3D MARINE DIVISION
IWO JIM
A
25 FEBRUARY - 16 MARCH, 1945
( i )
Situation 0830 , 25 February
(2) Situation
1700 , 25
February
(3)
Situation
1700 , 26
February
(4)
Situation
1700 , 27
February
(5)
Situation
1700 28
February
(6) Situation
1015, 1
March
(7)
Situation
1545, 1
March
(8)
Situation ,
1810 , 1
March
(9)
Situation
0800, 2
March
(10)
Situation
1700, 2
March
Situation
2000 , 2
March
(12)
Situation
1430, 3
March
(13)
Situation
1800, 3
March
(14)
Situation
1800, 4
March
^ (15)
Situation
1800, 6
March
:
i (16)
Situation
, 1700, 7 March ^
(17) Situation
1^45
r
- 7
March
:
(18) Situation
IB00, 8
March
(19)
Situation
1800, 9
March
(20) Situation
1800 , 10
March
(21) Situation
1800, II
March
(22) Situation
1800 , 12 March
v
(23) Situation
1800 , 13
March
(24) Situation
1800 , 14
March
(25) Situation
1800 , 15
March .
(26) Situation
0815 16
March
(27 Situation
1800, 16
March
(28) Map of IwoJima'
' . - . ' ' . . - . . - .
\ l>-r
A ' B C D
A ' B C D ' E ' A ' B C D ' E
Q R S R S T
U V W X U V W X Y U V W X Y
A B C C D E A B C D
F G H
P Q R S R S T P Q R S T P Q R S T P Q R S
U V W X W X ^ l U V W X Y U V W X Y
U V W X
A B C A B C
R S T
W X Y -- U V W
C D E A B C D E C D E
HIRAIWA BAY
F G H 1 J F G H G H
U V W
A B / C D - A k B - C
A B C D E
SPECIAL AIR AND GUNNERY TARGET MAP
SCALE I : 20. 00 0
THE SPECIAL GRID SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS MAP IN PURPLE
COLOR THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE USED FOR PIN POINT DESK3WATIONS.
THE ARBITRARY TARGET SQUARE SYSTEM IS SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS
MAP IN SALMON WITH BLUE LETTERS AND NUMBERS THIS SYSTEM IS TO BE
JSED FOR AREA DESIGNATIONS
THE NUMBERING OF THE 1000-YARD TARGET AREAS AND LETTERING
OF THE 200-YARD TARGET SQUARES HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBERING
USED IN THE GRID SYSTEM EXAMPLES FOLLOW
U V W X Y U V W X Y
RJI 0 6 IS IN TARGET SQUARE 132 A
PIN-POINT DESIGNATION OF RJI 06 IS BC 750- 70 9
0 AND] IN SMALL TARGET AREA SQUARES ARE
UNDERLINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISTING-
A B C D E
UISHING THESE TWO LETTERS FROM THE
NUMERALS ZERO ANDONE
DEFENSE SYMBOL KEY
G H I J 6 COASTAL DEFENSE GUN mi PILLBOX
DUAL MOUNT DUAL PURPOSE GUN RADAR
DUAL PURPOSE GUN POSITION (Empty) SEARCHLIGHT
SINGLE MOUNT HEAVY AA COMMAND POST
AUTOMATIC AA OBSERVATION TOWER
COVERED ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT ANTI-TANK BARRIER
RANGE FINDER RADIO STATION
0 UNIDENTIFIED INSTALLATION RADIO TOWER
B R.D.F. ANTI-BOAT BARRIER
4 RIFLE PIT OR FOX HOLE
OPEN ARTILLERY EMPLACEMENT
U V W X
A
D
MAST OR TOWER
UNDERGROUND ENTRANCE
ANTI-TANK TRENCH
EMPTY REVETMENT
+-H 1I
9
AIR RAID SHELTER
ANTI-TANK GUN
AMMUNITION STORAGE
FIRE TRENCH
O WATER STORAGE SHORT SECTIONS OF ANTI-TANK TRENCH
0 MACHINE GUN xBARBED WIRE
BLOCKHOUSE EARTH COVERED STRUCTURE
DOTTED SYMBOL INDICATES POSSIBLE INSTALLATIONS
CAUTION: POSITIONS MARKED AUTO AA CAN BE USEO AS AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AGAINST GROUND TROOPS
j Q7
S T P Q R S
U V i W V W X
J 1
CAUTION: THIS MAP HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS w'lTHOUT ADVANTAGE Of
GROUND CONTROL OR RECONNAISSANCE; THEREFORE AZIMUTH AND SCALE ARE NOT
ACCURATELY DETERMINED. THEY ARE REPRESENTED AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE
FROM AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION. CORRECTIONS AND OTHER COMMENTS ' 0 0 0
SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO CINCPAC-CINCPOA, PH.
NOTE: CONTOURS BY I633RD ENGR. PHOTOMAPPING PLATOON, SEPT 1944
UTILIZING MULTIPLEX AERO-PROJECTORS FROM SINGLE LENS IWO JIMA
THIS CLASSIFICATION Mil .' Bf t\-
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.
6 4 T H ENGR. TOR BN. USAF CPB f
(HIGHLY DURABLi AND UO/SfU/t ReSISTAHT) MAP REPRODUCTION
WO 1070- 1
PLANT
NOV. 1944
ENCLOSUREC
9TH MARINES
ACTION REPORT
S,tflBTHMARIHSS,
VISION, FL3ST MASlSTHiFOF.C1,
, SANFRAtTOISCO,CJ
20 April
CG, 3d MsrDiv
Subject:
Action
Reference:
(a) GO137* * MarDiv.
Snclesures: A.
3,
0*
Action Report,
Action Report,
Action Report,
1st -sn-9th Marines.
2d 2n 9^&Marines*
J&3a 9th.Marines..
9th Marines at
In accordance with Ref
IWOJIKA, VI i s hereby
(a) t he following report
submitted:
of act i on of t he
FAKE! I .
SummaryofAction,
A.
This report covers the period from 2*4*Fetouary to k April
3 Included herein i s &report of actions of the Ninth Marines,
3d Marine Division at r*0 JTMA, VOLCANO XSI4JSFDS. !This Re^t as a part of the
landing Force Reserve, Task Force 51*landed on 2*fFebruary 19^5 (Dplus 5)
was committed to action near' Airfield #2 on'25 February. It then remained in
a'ction occupying all"or part of the 3d Division zone of action for a total of
18 out of 20 days that the division was engaged unt i l the zone was declared' se-
cure on 16 March 19^5 ^he regiment participated in the capture of Airfield
num"ber 2, and in the subsequent continuous attack to the north and east end
of the island* After the cessation of organized resistance, tjfcie regiment en-
gaged in mopping up operations unt i l 0700 k April 19^5, at which time i t was
released from t act i cal responsibility "bythe 1^7tii Inf
f
AITS,
PART I I . Preliminaries.
A 'The9th .landedD plus 5 on
:
IIjf0~JIMA-was
posedofthefollowingunits:
9th Marines.
CoA3Snginear isn.
CoA3&PioneerBn
CoA3
d
-Motor Transport 3n,
Co3 3dMedical 3n.
Det 3dJASQO,
Det 23th Replacement Draft.
Det 3^th Replacement Draft.
3* ' Prior to the action t hi s raim*nt was stationed at GUAMandwas
undorgoing intense training in infantry t act i cs. Among-th&most emi:Kasi
1
2dd
training ribjecta were: assault and reduction of pillboxes tysmall oidtSi
snell unit te.ctic.si i nfent ry-art i l l ery coordinated training, This training
included a large amount of field firing; of al l types of Inf I^ns and de-mcXitions,
0, Our mission, as a regiment of the Sspeditionary Force Reservewas
to land on any of the designated landing "beaches on order. Plans were formula-
ted acfcrdingly and necessary operation orders issued, Loading plans were pre-
pared,"based-on regular assault landing requirements.. Loading.plans having "been
completed andpreliminary preparations made, ship loading onTRA3TSDI7J l com-
menced on 8FeT/ru&ry.19^5at GUM. Ship assignments andunits ware as follows:
3LT1-9 FAYSTT3
# . & & , .
Strt>jet: Saport (Cont'd) 20 April
Additional detachments of reinforcltfg units end cargo wara
s
l o a d e d onI
T
SS JA.W.QIVS^ t
T
S3 xL.33.~TL32, .tTGS JL&'JL.\CT * UHT78S *t.3?.IC,E.
Cara loading and embarkation, t troops was completed by"2000
10 February
D EOT 9 departed from GttiM for TfO Jl l i i on the morning of 17
February aboard T'iUlISFOit? DIV 31, arriving in the reserve area on 193*
Orders for landing war^ received at the SOU?IIq.aboard tha
USS KHtiX in the early morning on 24 February end debarkation of troops com-
menced at 0330 the sassa'data, xw*nty*-four (2*+) I&Ms.were used for
aacfy 31$ said assault vehicles in the following order:
3LT - 2
3LT - 1
Thara was no t act i cs ! disposition of units for landing i nas-
much as the.regiment was landing cvax.previously, established "beaches, l(5Ha
ware.used because heavy surf conditions precluded tha use of smaller craft ,
Sach LCMlanded from 90 to 100 troops* Tholnnding was made by two or thrsa
LCMs at a single instance over a beach area which was roughly the boundary
between Beaches 335>-2 and TSLLCW-l. (l at er redesi'gnated as BLACK>each). ^>---..
v
Th.e regiment assembled in &n ersa just aouthcasiToT the" south
end of Airfield Fo 1 (See Map).
+
U1 three 3LTs hf.d arrived in t hi s assembly
area prior to dark on 2*4IPebrurry 19^5* Thaunits ashore at that time end>
t hei r disposition was as follows:
313J 1-9 jj
1st 3n 9th Mar.
1st Plp.t CoA3d 3ngr 3n.
1st Plat '''fpns Co 9th Max.- -
1st Coll Sec Co 3 3d Mad'Bn.
' . ' ^De"t 3dJASCO.
In Hagtl assembly area at 1^7-3,J.
. 3LT 2-9
2d 3n ?th Mex,
2d Plat, 0a A3d 3ngr 3n,
2d Plat %ns Go 9th Max, .^-r^.
'. . -2d Coll Sac Co 3 3d Med3n,
' " " In Hagtl as^cirbly area &t 1^7~D,I# . ......
mm
. ..***..
' 3L2 3-9 . '
3d 3n 9th Mar,
3d Pl'at Cft A3d ^ingr 3n.
3d Pl at Vona Co 9th Mar.,
3d Coll Sec C 3 3d-Mad 3n,
Det 3d JAoCO.
In Hegtl assembly area at l6W7,Q.
C A 3d Pin ^n. *
On 3each,.IS33>-2 commencing Shore Party functions.
Co A3d VLT 3n.
On 3aach 3J1>-2 commencing Shore Psxty functions,
- Co 3 3d Med3n, ,
In 2egtl assembly ?
(Cont
f
d) .0April
TheHegtlCPwas establishedashoreatlUOO2kFebruary
atl^S-A(Q),
31, Enemy,composition,dispositionand number.
Priortothelanding"by the 5*h PhibCorpsonI WOJIMA., the
Japanesehad adefenseforceofabout22,000troops,botharmyand navy, but
predominantlythe former,under'thecommandofLt,GeneralX'JRIBAIYASHICG
ofthe Ogase.waraSector,
Duringthe operationthe 3& Mar Div metelementsof almost .
everyunitthatwas onthe island* Withapproximately50separateunits
present,withnumerousattachmentsandsupportmissions,withelementsof
overrunorganizationsfallingbackand takinguppositionswithotheroutfits,
itisdifficulttoreportwhatunitfacedCT 9,whereendwhen* Thus, any
recapitulationoftheenemyforcesril.Ybein partinaccurate.
Th3HOT 9movedintothe line-25 Eeb
J
45 in lAslS2
t
IS3 onthe
southsideofAirfield#2, Theretheyfacedand overranelementsof310Ind
InfBn,309thInd Inf and the leftflankofthe 311thInd Inf Bn,all units
ofthe 2dMixedBrigade,
VfaileclearingthesepositionsaroundthesecondAirfield
theycameunderfirefromartillery,mortarand rocketunitssetupthrough-
outtheNorthernhalfofIWO. Inthe vicinityofbotheirfie3dspersonnel
fromtheNavyIwo GuardForcewhoseprimaryjobwas AAand CDfellinwith
thearmyinfantryunitsdefendingthatsector, Setsueitai (construction)
personnelv/erealsoarmedand foughtfromcavesvrheretheyhad hidden.
Partofthe 2dCo, -1stIndMGEndefendedfc.b.epecoDdfield
fromthe NW, supportingthe 9 ^IndependentATBnariredwithhighvelocity
hfvwATguns. Tothe eastofthe fieldthe11thid
1
5ncoveredall approached
andthe runwaysthemselves. Severaltanksfromthe cSth0?takregimentwere
employedfromdu-dnpositionsintheindicatetfeferseof Airfield#2,
Tiedefense&safterthetakingofthisobjective,werenever
againsoeffectivefroathestandpointcfcasra.ltiecinfIf.cted. Between#2
and#3airfields,on.
1
y t h e 3
1 0 I n < i e
PInf Bnblockedthe way usingstraggler*
fromotherimitstofillthe gaps. Intheattenktowardthethirdairfield
*the"Pocket"was iaetonthe rightflankanda2weekbattleensued,
Alastlineof* defenserunningSI fromTA233throughtheair-
fieldandintothe pocketwas mannedintheHOT 92ofAbyanassortmentof
stragglers; melded.Intoadefensivesectorheldchieflybythe26thTk
Hegt,3d.Bn1^5thEe/rtand theNorthSectorNI*FoftheIwo GuardUnit,
...->;; '.- .-.Escortingconstantpressureallalongits front,HOT 9 fOffeed
a, we<igeonits^eft flankwhich'reachedtheoceanandmoppingupfrom the.
; / j
^
:
'' r e a r b e g a n , ' : .. ..- - . .-..- ~""
:
;^ ' ' -'"
;
,. '" '
Supportingthe threeunitsmanningthelastdefensiveline
wereelementsofths 1stIndepM&Bnr- theArtyBnoftheikythInfRegt(use*
asinfantrywhentheirweaponswere; destroyed)and the11thIndATBn,
Slowly-aBtronswellOrganizeB. pdek^^was<i<?ve3opedinTAs
216-X,T,201-D,B,I,Jand 202-A
f
Bwiththe ?.6thTkRegts.sacerewithabout
20flightand modfauntanks,s.11diigin.The11thATXaprotectedthe approach-
esfromattackfromany direction, Remnantsofthe 3lA!-thIndInfand mostof
theTamanayamaNLJts
1
formedthe infantrycomponentofthe pocket, Promacom-
plexcavesystemofmanyentrances,chambersahundiedfeetdeep,passages
hundredsofyardslong,.thepocketwithstoodtwo weekscfreaselessassault
beforebeingoverrun, ^__,
Thispockettypefteiijtheenemyinfa.it 1 /cctionthroughout,
yromtheircaveand pillboxpositions, theycouldfira 'nanydirection. When
rockets,artillery,mortarsand'tankssupportedcur attack,theenemymoved
deeperintohiscavesystemuntilthepreparationorbarragehad ceased,then
returnedtohir, protectedfirifig'positions; Longafterthe pockethadbeen
ovcrrvjiand ca~eesee.le'*..the' on-^myvouxddigorblastlfiswayout ?nd fight
again. . "'
Subject; Action Heport
W
WtmW)t%j^ 20April
During thecampaign tmvrtwfdflL fa landing totheday when
the bulk of RCT9 reembarked, February 2k-Afi{l^m an estimated *4219 eneay
were killed, 1208 caves and pillboxes destroyec$^9 tanks knocked out, 66
art i l l ery pieces, mortars, rockets anJLAS?guns captured or destroyed. S3
POWawere taken* ,
PARTI I I . Chronological account of the action.
Note: The mapherein referred to is the Special Air and Oun-
netfy ffsrget Map IWOJIJU, Scale: 1:10,000, All time referred to herein i t
ZoneKING (2-10),.
A. The regiment was committed to action on 25February bypass-*-
in through the lines of the 21st Marines, 3d Mar Bir, The i ni t i al attack
commenced at 0930 following a heavy Arty and Naval gunfire preparation with
the 1st and 2d battalions abreast, 1st Bn on the right. Heevy fire from .
along the entire front met any of our advances. 'i'Lis recistance* the type of
which was foimd to prevail throughout the several Keeks
r
action, consisted of
snail armc fire from exceptiona,.\ly well concealed -positions, so well concle4
in fact, that our troops were unable to locate the srorae in many instances un-
t i l within 25 yards of i t . Areas in defilade to one enemy automatic weapon
were covered by another and presented a difficult problem throughout the action.
In addition enemy mortar, art i l l ery and occassaionally rccket fire was well
sightad in on al l approaches to his positions and many times intense fire on
our advancing troops and front lines caused severe damage and stopped any move-
ment at i t s inception.
l ha, fi rst day
!
s attack progressed slow3y in face of heavy mortar
and art i l l ery f i r e. Tanks were brought into,use, but because of accurate heavy
anti-tank fire they were unable to assist appreciably. This d&y
:
e acticu took
place on and around Airfield number 2. The 1st 3n having crossed the E~Wrun-
way in passing througL the 21
:
sVMarines right, advanced tovarA Hill 200-P; the
commahdihg ground directly in i t s sector. Reaching Thi". hi l l necessitate"!
crossing*the NB-SVrunway of Airfield number 2 which,was well oovered by small
arms, mortar and anti-tank fi re. Anumber of the taioks which nosed cntb the
runway became casualties* almost immediately, and some of the infantry troops
fared l i t t l e better. However, units did, with the assistance of supporting
art i l l ery and NG3\ cross and gain the base of 200-P* %ndafter heavy fighting,
had a foothold on the hill* .
The 2d Bnon the left met heavy resistance in the form of small ,
arms fi re ftfom well dug-in and concealed pillboxes on ^ rici^e in i t s left
flank. At t hi s particular area tanks were able to render valuable assistance
with point-blank fire on enemy installations. Tank acbivity was confined to
a small area because of the terrain and enemyfi re, but the presence and fire
support of two or three tanks was a decided advantage* CoG, the left Co'of
the 2d Bn, after sustaining serious losses made a 200 yard advance oh the left.
The right of the 2d Bnmade similiar gains against heavy reactance. At 1^30
of the fi rst day, the 3d BiiWas count ed to flank from the v*ight th6 strb'hg
enemypositions holding up ihe 2d Bn. Thie battalion crossed tlite airfield'
between tho f i r st and second batteJLicns at 195-V,' and in d rapid 'thrust auc-
c edod in advancing feo yards from the airfield. The advance war stopped
y aa tae enemypoured well aimed, intense Arty and rortar fire en the,
elements of this battalion thus interdicting them from the &ro\Jid
The fire was so intense aB to cause an adjnsirnoiD'
1
' <y
9
posi^icvi b;
r
the
3d 3n. to the north e<Xge of the airfield wnore i t tied f.a oeJvv'ee.i the 1st anX
2r? r.B+The fi rst ^ay
T
s fighting then netted this rc.^int^Av <&dd^arcy ax
1
a2one i t s front of froa 200 cp '400 yards.
Action of the ?auu<.iatr.ro
r
.3 th?.t described above conl'oiued
for two more drys on 2o and 27 if^bna^y v
-
the general vicini.ty of airfield
number 2. Eacli mcrniiw; a pre-Ki\
:
f hou.. ftitil.'-oiy ar.d FG3
1
preparation of he^vy
intensity was laiC down on en^iry pooifiontJ- Tanks ramr into more c,nd moreuse,
asp.eria.
1
ly'on"the left, and aided the advance materially* Infantry troops
1
fought cloce :".n, using flame throwsrs, anti-taak rockets to goou adv.aiitage
#
wtoalc'on 27 IPebxiaary resulted ir. sjaall g*\5no 0:1the left
onet* owthe"righ
4
"- of the rg''.me.it. The 1st Bnen
the' north slope of Hill 20C-P and around the base or. boti
20 ^pr i l l9
1
+5
Fire from well concepled positions on the north slope of HILL 200-P and frow
the hi l l at 199*-Qprevented a sizeable advance, l i r e from 1B9-0 also hindred
the 2d battalion
1
8 movement on the l eft . An attack at 1250 the"seme day, how-
ever, well coordinated with Arty fife finally "broke the severity of the r e-
sistance^and both battalions were able to .move ahead'and clean out a great
many positions to their immediate fronts, hi afternoon attack was made not
without losses to our own troops as the enemy, though overwhelmed with fi re,
continued t o fiis&t "back, Both hi l l s 200~? and199-0 were taken. At the close
of the t hi rd day of action of the regiment (Bplus %), i t had captured e.ir*-
field Ho 2 and commanding terrain in proximity of i t and had advanced the 3&
Mar Div front Iin3s from 300 to 1200 yards, features of this action were the
ski l l , determination and aggressivaness displayed "by our own troops* the un-
precedented tenacity and defensive resourc#fullness displayed by the enemy
(in the left of the 2d 3n 77 large pillboxes were counted); the decisive aid
rondsr^d infantry troops by tanks; and finally* the excellent coordination of
al l supporting units with infantry manauvera. -
After the action described above, the 9th Marines passed into
division reserve aftar a passage of l i nes by the 21st Marines at 0S15 on Tab
23.
OnMarch 1st at 1&J-5 th* 1st 3n 9th Marines passed through the
3d 3n 21st Marines, the right battalion of that regiment, and began an action
which might be called the second phase of the 9th
r
Mar action* Here commenced
an attack on &. strongly fort i fi ed enemy position manned by an estimated Inf
b&ttaltanless one company (the 1^5th -Inf) plus tanks. The enemy had. organised
an area of roughly 600 by 300 yards, the center of which appeared to be about
at 201-D end a, or 1000 yards due east t>f the village of M65JOT.$U* .In t hi s
.area the enemy resisted savagely to the l est manfor sixteen days.. He,fought
from well concealed caves dug deep into rock; from large bunkers each pro-
tected by mutually supporting pillboxes which' wera in turn protectect.by r i f l e
pi t s , end from d-sip pi t s dug straight, down 15 to *K)feet into the .aerth.
At lb^-5 on 1 March,tha 1st 3n passed through t he l i nes of the
3d 3n 21st Marines snd mrda small gains bafore being stopped by small arms
fi re from conceded positions to the front pnd right front, he Bagtl frpnt
line at the time was about $00 yerds 3ast of MOTOTAMurunning north end south
end w*is of some 300 yerds froxitagd. This point may^be spid to 'be the outer
defense of the enemy strong point just described.'
On th3 morning of 2 Marcli the' 2d in moved into position on the*
l eft of tha 1st 3n and the two battalions, attacked abreast at 0S00. This
attack was precdaded by 30 minutes each of 5GS
1
and ar t i l l er y preparation,
3oth battplions werj &bl^ to move forwexd i ni t i al l y, but were stopped soon by
intense enemy f i r e. Another atte-ck 'b:
r
both battalions at 1*53$ the *ama day,
this also proceeded by ar t i l l er y rnd HG-7'barrs^es, netted only small gains,
the result again of hc3avy small earns fi r a from the front end right front. At
intervals intanse anamy inortcr and ar t i l l er y fir<3 f el l on the attackdra and
inflicted numerous casualties, Supporting ar t i l l er y was drpwn in close to
the front lines in an attempt to alleviate the f i r e, lanxt enemy M&positions
even closer to the front lines than p.rtillery could safely be placed con-
tinued to pin down the pttacking elements^. Tenks from Co C ^d Tank 3n sup-
porting the 1st 3n succeeded in knocking out a number of enemy i nst al l at i ons
l at e' in the afternoon of t hi s day,.
Attacks wera made on 3 ^ && &of March against enamy posi-
tions in t hi s area. On each day the 1st and 2d 3ns attacked abreast after
th> usual heavy,ar t i l l er y, ai r and BQrY prapp-ration. In spita of al l of the
preparatory fi res (art i l l ery alone fired upwards from 1500 rds per preparation),
no large gains' ware-made. Supporting firas ware not confined to preparations,
but- continued elDost constantly and s t i l l the enemy persisted apparently
N
.in-*
effected. Advances up to a total, of 150 yards wer^ made during these three
df^ys, afcar wjiich no noticeeble decrease of onrfmy resistance prevail-ad, The
egtl; frontage during t hi s period was about 5OO-6OOyp;:ds running north and
south, and the center of the front lines was about 600 yards due ea.3t of
Page 5
Subject: Action Report
On the. night of 6 Mtrch the regiment received order for an
attack to jump off at 0500 on 7March thus tfJdtng advantage of about 1 hour
of darkness. The 3d 3n 9th Mar, at .the time attached to the 21st Marines,
was to"attack at the same hour in a southeasterly direction from a position
on the l eft of the 2d 3n and seize HILL 362, The attack jumped off at 0500
7 March, preceeded hy smoke preparation. Tha attack apparently heA i t s de-
sired surprise effect and both battalions advanced up to 200 yards al l along
their fronts. 3y 0100 of the ssjne day, howevar, the two assault companies of
the 2d3n and the l ef t company of the 1st 3n were pinned down by fi re from
both the front and from by-prssed positions to the rear. Tha 2d 3n companies,
Co3 and Co 3?suffered here their severest casualties of the campaign. About
noon the enemy counterattacked in the 2d3n sector accompanied by heavy mortax
f i r a. The 2es company of the 2d 3n with supporting tanks was moved into posi t -
ion and aided tho assault companies in repulsing the attack. Assault platoons
of Co f of the 2d 2n were pinned down by enemy fie for more than 30 hours
and were finally removed from the position by tafrkS|Who ski l l ful l y moved into
the area and brought out the few remaining riflemen and company commander.
Meanwhile during the day of 7 March, Co Cof the 1st 3n attacked and seized
some high ground on the right of the battalion sector* The enemy, however,
soon placed effective heavy mortax fi re on the hi l l eii6.i nfl i ct ed a loss of
^h o.ut of the 5^ attacking troops forcing them to abandon t hi s pesition in
the face of registered KGand Mort fi ra for one in defilade behind the hi l l .
The 3d 3n, during t hi s day succeeded in capturing HILL 3^2, an
important gain for the entire Corps.
During the l ast four days' action tanks of the 3d Tk 3n, 3d
Mar Div ware employed and proved to ba the most formidable supporting weapon
at our disposal, hair use wns rest ri ct ed *gr two features, namaly terrain
and well sighted heavy enemy anti-tank guns which disabled tanks in some i n-
stances with one well placed round* The former difficulty was overcome to
some extent by bulldozing roads with tank dozers and an exmored ftulldo*er;
the l at t er difficulty by overrunning AT gun positions. ATmines were also a
serious hazard which was difficult to ovarcoj&a as en?my f i r e prevented mine
removal. Special engineer aiid Inf teams arid tank and Inf teams had t e be im-
provised for use of tanks due to nt.reads- or mined roads. In the vicinity of
the area under discussion an estimated 15 tenks were disabled, nevertheless,
tank support was the deciding factor in t hi s action as will be further veri -
fied belew,
With the seizure of HILL 362 en March 7 by the 3d 3n, the reg-
iment was.able to surround part i al l y the enemy resistance which had been hold-
ing up any considerable advance for days. Sasistanca now remained in front
of the 1st end 2d battalions and on the.long ridge at 202-A, 3, G-, E.
OnMex'ch.U the 3d 3n 21st Marines was attached to the 9th Max,
The former passed through the 1st 3n 9th Max and attacked with the 3d 3n 9th
Max on i t s l ef t . The 2d 3n held i t s ground of the previous day pnd with the
assistance of tanks begfn a systematic cleaning up of the resistance to i t s
front. On t hi s day the 3d-"3n 9th Mar began en attack from HILL 362 to the
coastline/ reaching i t s objective on the morning of March 10. The 3d 3n 21st
on the right of the regiment hammered at what l at er va.s found to be the
approximate center of the enemy position* Arty and rockets did l i t t l e to
soften the resistance, and the use of tanks was very rest ri ct ed, the rough
t errai n being the limiting factor.
The 3d 3n 21st Marinas continued i t s attack in the face of
fierce resistance, on March 9 rnd 10, and n&&& small gains. Thasa gains,
though they did result in tha OT-%rr*Jinring of soma positions, did not not i -
cably decrease tha enemy's.defnsiv3 power. I t WF,Sdecided to further an-
valop t hi s strong point by attaching the ridge 202~A,3,G>E from the south
rr.ther than frontally, and to than push to tha coast on the risrht of the
?.egtl Z of Aand join the 3d "n 9th Mar on the bench. Orders were issued
accordingly to the 1st 3n, and i t jumped off on'ah attack to the north at
1535 10 March. Tha attack was mat immediately by enamy small arms f i r e and
t hi s battalion succeeded no farther than to a smaller ridge\at 201-U, 600
yarls from i t s objective where i t tied in on the left.with tjfr* 3d 3n 21st Max.
OnMarch 11 tha 1st 3n was ordered to contactJh6 3*3n 9th
Page .
* *
4{-.0it\
# $ .
Subject: Action Beport (Cont
!
d) 20 April
Mar along the beach at 202-3, the approximate center of the Segtl Zone of
Action* The 2egtl attack order for the dey called for, in.addition to that
v
mission just stated, the 1st Jin to' attack KS
?
sieze the ridge, and then
attack !3e,st, The attack jumped off at O73> At l5l5 the 1st 3n^and 3d 2n
9th made physical contact on the "beach in the centar of the Begtl Zone of
Action and "began mopping up toward the high ground overlooking the "beach,
These two battalions made contact aHf% just south of KILL 3^2* Onhi l l 202-
*i, which the 3d 3n seized in a rapid adven*ce from just east of i l l l l 3^2
against slight resistance. Th<high ground SCOyards off of the beech was
organized for the night, and the beach i t sel f 'eatposted. The 3&^
n
21st Mar
during the day attacked eastward against the ever-strong defenses, aa.&suc-
ceeded in destroying positions, but were unable to mske a meeiureable advance.
OnMarch 12 th enemy s t i l l held'out in two areas. One in the
previously described area 1000 yards Sast of KOTOY-AMA, an area of about kOO
yards square and, two, on the extreme S3 end of the ridge 202-G,H an area of
about 200 yards sq.uare. i t was the decision of the 3.egtl Comdr to neglect
the l at t er pocket until a few days l at er, since i t was small and isolated
end offered no serious trouble, and to concentrete on the larger end far more
heavily defended area.
The disposition of our troops on the evening of 11 Marchwp.s
t hi s: The,3d 3n 21st Mer facing eastward in frontage of 200-300 yards, and
the 1st and 3&3ns 9th Mar facing westward on a frontage of cboub 600 yards.
500^600 yprds separated thasa two forces who were in fact facing each other.
The ground,"between these forces contained the last large remnanty of Jap-
anese in the 3d Mar Div Sone of Action. The 2d 3n as division reserve was
just east of MOTOYAMA, and had been engaged during the days previous to t hi s
in mopping up the northernmost remaining enemy of the satte strong point. I t
also formed a line some ^-00 yards!long which presented a etop^gap for my
enemy withdrawal or escape westward from this pocket. Orders were given for
an attack in a westward direction with two battalions abreast; the 1st rnd
3<i3ns 9th Mar.- The 3d 3n 21st Mar was to act as a holding force as was the
division reserve,- the 2d Sn 9th Msr, The attack ^uiff^ed off at 0700, 12 y$r
m
-
The 1st 3n met strong resistance pnd it advance was slow* Tanks were brought
into the action^ but their use was again restricted by poor terrain. An
armvad bulldozer was used to de a r a road for the tanks. At.most, two tanks
were able t operate in $hls area, ' ^ i e 3&3a 9th Mer to the north had some-
what easier going as resistance was l i ght , especially on i t s righfc (H)
The same attack was continued *n March 13th and agaii> on
March, The 1st ^n relieved the engaged elements of the 3dBn 21st Mar on the
morning of March 13th and the l et t er reverted t control of i t s own regiment
at 0930 13.March'., definite progress was made by the 1st 3n who, with the use
of tamjes, succeeded in knocking out many well fortified positions* The 3^5n
had cleared i t s zone of action and had withdrawn-on the morning of lh .March.
to the vicinity. f HILL 362 thereat* iiommence systematic mopping up* *.t 153
the 24 3n 9th Mex reverted from Div Hes to control, and et 17^+5passed through
the 1st isn in an attack on the rejoining enemy pocket- which at this i.lme.\he.d
"been reduced to an area x>f about l^0 ycrds square. AX1100 on the lUth the
WeKp^na Company 9th Marine* commenced mopping up the aforementioned remaining
resistance on the ridge at 202~0-,H, ?he enemy here vrns again dug-in, in
.caves <ai/5ng the seaweed cliff face of the ridge EMontop ^of t he ridge at
..fche. S3 tip* The;enemy forces hsra, were not l^.rge, but ware p,s tenacious
;f-fi-
:
-else"riaereen4-resisted to tho las' ;.
Onthe 15th and l6
;
jh of Mrx'ch tha -2d3n rirtA the Wpns0--cOBk-
|;inued their actions tigainsb refpective i>ockdts. The 2d 3n had use of a
3-aree flama thrower tank which belons^d to -the 5th Krx Div end used i t to
ex^^iiant-advantage, Thi& taak, which shoots a flnme about 125 .vards, proved
to *>a the weapon that worked when'ell other* failed. I t s long tlzma rftn^e
end the area corerad by Dne "burst were the contributing factors, to i t s r^-
The Weapons*'Coused i t s 75ram SF guns to blast coves in the
seaward-face of the cliff 3 on l
}
Hh March, and the entire Co operated as 1ft-
fentry on the 15th and l^th Krrch in u*-attack S3J ^ | | | ^ ^ ^ f j ha Hdga.
Subject*. Action Report (Oont'd) ' . 20 April,
At 1350 n 16 March tha2d3n repprted overrunning al l
i sed resi stance i n the enemy strong point at,2G1-Paa&tha-tfpns Cohadcom-
pl eted i t s mopping up an tb.d ridge at 202-0,H
:
to such an.arb*?nt that the Ragtl
CoinSr was a"ble to r.dpTt that all, organized-reistance-had ceasad in the9th
Marinas Zkno of Action,. This ended the'assault.- phaso of thi s operation,,
On17 Mar^h,>*gstn the'mopping up phe,sd of the rtper&tion.,- .This
operated l a the-...original* cone of action on this, date. OnIS March
mo?adinto the UthBiv zone of, action rel i evi ng that.Div end"bag^nningpa-
t rol l i ng andnapping up perations i n that sector. Mopping up was carried,
on t>ypatrols ranging i n size, from onroinferced Sq,dto osa'roinf6u?c-i.pl a-
:
t5n. Th*average num"ber of patrols daily:was f i f t een, , Demolition menfrom
Ca A3d 3n^r 3n accompanied the patrols andtlaw ca^es as they wero aisoovered.
On 26 March the Eegt todlt ever an additional area of-patrol
which then'gave i t roughly half of the i'sland to patrol andmop-'up.
up progressed sat i sf act ori l y, Uo or^ai1.sed resistance s^ain presented*.$>self
save a sjall pocket at 18^U2J, lfi?5-A which hetd,out against the ^ i
for three days after i t was discovered. It was f i nal l y eliminated-with
flam^e throvers, ATrockets -andAeiaoli.feiojftiu AmTsushes were sat.at night and
succeeded in killlni?WndBrinarwngH"E!rWps end'individuals
of hiding in saai^ch of food-end water. During the mopping "upphase the regi -
meni ki l l ed 306 and captured 65 Japanese andsealed 7^7 caves. Tha re/jimant-.
found and "buried 3^5 previously, ki l l ed Japs end removed nineteen Marine "bodies
of tae.Uth MarDiv to the Division Gametery* . . ;..,
. QnApril kth 19U5the l ^ t h Inf AtJS-relieved the 9th-Her,..-of.
al l patrol and security .responsi"bility, Tha.'battallans coaimencad.reembarkaw
tion on6 April, The1st and2dbattalions em"barkei that date de.parta,&fr.oa
IVO.JIMA on 7 April* andarrived at GUAM%n April 3 19^5. TheThird bat t al i on
embarked April 12 arrived at GTJ^MApril IS l9"+5^ * * ,; . i
PART IV.
V
/ Comments. . >. , . . ,' .
&* Administration. -,
1. Casualties of .th^s regiment to 1300 k ^ r i l 19U5 are as follows 1
KU
GST
22
ML
k&
TOTALS
50S
tU 62 1*402 lJ+o*^
MIA 0
7 7
vrn
k 53 57
TOTALS IB 1 9 ^ 2Q3b
Parssnnal data sheets- prepared prior to combat provad a very
expeditious means of casualty raport^g^v I t was necessary to-prepare ^ddit
ionel sheats to report secondjwyund^or a.chanfra i n/ st at us, Asupply of the5
should "beprepared prior to,an>
f
oper^ajtiQ^^ .SJr-rqrs occuradi n reporting da^s
of casual.ties, Greater accur-aey 00^d-havevbean obtained *ap?>ori
allovi-sg company ttyp$&1$i%%tg$&:m6r*- tln>. to veri fy' i nfot
from squad leaders, ate, . >
2. Morale throughout the operation was excel l ent. Graves raei s-
personnel functioned a^sresivaly in the prompt removal of our dead,
MaM received yas promptly, dispatched to front l i ne units sad .distribution
effected in every case as soon as tha t^eb-tc.al situation allowed. In tha
dec-n up phaee of tha campaign movias vjre efcu*n nightly,
3 PO'f
f
s were processed "byXntllieanc.a endlaneuaga personnel.
Ho ci vi l i ans or natiires were encour.tored
w
Page <^
r f l (Contact) ' 20April,
3, Intelligence.
1, MapsendPhotos,priorU operation*
' a ; M a p s . :. .;/... .-..
r
'. ' '.-
1:5,000 IWO,Terrai n, Special Air &Gunnery.
3.rlOf<Pp XtfOy !?firr*.in
;
Special Air A Gunnery.
l?100C0 XWO? Eifemy F.spo^it?.on, Special Air &Gunnery.
lJlCfQOi') IWOi 3 shaftt^j 3ne-iy i)ispo.sitioti, Special Air
Gunnery. :
1:20,000 IWOi t e r r a i n, Special Air &Gunnery.
l
n
- 2 naut i cal miles XVrOj^fcr^ain.
1:30,000 (approximately) .YWO-. lov Troops.
1?1[>,000 (spproxJ-ta^te^y) TWO,Hoad Ma.p
e
.
There was an adequate supply of a31 maps. More*raaps of
scale 1120,000 could hare been used Lecause JI tb.e:'x
s
.uonv**nleii* risse* The
1?20,000, for an operafc5.on on an island tMs $\\:z is very satisfactory. The
l?f-,OCO map was too large to "beus^fi'
5
!., and where i s l i t t l e need .for aEtap
of fchis scale for any ki ci of work,
l'he Eaps whanmade wera eviden'tXy accurate. Subsequent
cons-ruction by the enemy and great changes "brought about by bombar<?mort and
shelling, however
f
' raada the iaaps almost unreadable at some stages of the cam-
paign. " .
b* Photos.
Prior to the operation, a large number of photos, ob-
lique, verticals and mosaics of al l scales, were distributed to this Hq..
Sime t hi r organization did not land J^n assault, obliqueg of^ t i e beach were
only of casual interest. Oblique^ taken of verz'ai'a inland are seldom of
mr.cnvalue because of their inherent orientation characteristics except as
netel i?i p2,rai'raph 2 .
Sufficient photos of scale 1,10
r
000 and above were
available, buk these photos lose much of their value because of need for
magnifying glasses, stereoscopes and considerable API training to understand
thea, lijiCOO photos can be read and understood by al l personnel who will
have acres'? to photos. Sufficient quantities of photos of this scale were
net f-vailatle.
The value of mosaics i s questionable
t
but they are
better than no photo (unless lithographed), and thsy are easy to handle*
2. Maps and Photos* during operation,
Up to date maps of..enemy dispositions (1:10,000) were
iistriimted during the operation. All requests for maps needed to replace
losoes were fi l l ed. There were sufficient maps at al l times,
. Soraephotos in small quantity but large scale were
during the operation. Thepho^oe, u.ucrti;nate}y, vere of very poor
* Several rsquost-i for phoJjoe vere :nade bub revolts were URfcr/bis-
in ^jxntity. Coverage and qt^ality. It :ls >elieved that if high and
?.ow an,,^le ob~-iqj.es of centers of reaistanoe or pockets couldbex
iri:*ta^ aad ii-siribiitad -^tain Pkhours t.hey wauld be of
BO
1
)?.3 lar.dod in reserve cjid al l necessary hydrographic
information was sent frc.a tan b^ac'i. iiiiTu whi.-;L<wap available pricr to
vho lauding was.rear.ourVly a:.cu:-ata and-in suffic.ien-i q,iantity.-
Pago 9
Subject: Action Report (Ctnt'd) * t f ^f SO April 19**$
k. Intelligence diseminated from G-2.
- j - .
Jlasn reports frtm IJivision were madepromptly and
completely and follcw-upB were made where necessary* G-2Periodic re-
ports reached this Bq about l6 hour* after the end of the period* facil~
i t i es were not available in this Hq t send copies downto battalions and
i t i s suggested k or 5 copies of 0-2 report be sent by 0-2, It i s f el t
that more information of an intelligence nature bmade available concern-
ing adjacent divisions. The C~2 report i s received Mo hours after the
period and i s only a summary.
5. Recovery of enemy documents and material.
Theuse of Intelligence Teamscomposed of about 5men
under an NCOi s effective in recovery of enemy documents and naterial.
JICP0A Div Reconnaissance Co and similiar organizations are of
help in ltcating documents and material,
6* Language Personnel*
a* Nolanguage officers permanently attached*
b Two language officers were attached temporarily. Their
work in document sorting was satisfactory. They were the chief factors
in the capture of most of the S3POWstaken by the 9th Marines* ^ ;4
It iai recommended that sia^h officers, "be atta^h^ll^jiiii:
about ono monthprior to date of; embarkation in order to train Intelligence
teams and to indoctrinate al l personnel in the importance of capturingP0Ws
t
turning in documents and reporting locations of material*
c. No language enlisted personnel attached*
d* The enlisted men, temporarily attached* of whom there
were five, one in each Bn, two infi&S0o were used to make the preliminary
interrogation of prisoners, %ctguard them, to sort documents and to
deliver them to the next echelon* Insofar as thoy had been trained* they
were effective. They are not qualified to makemore than a preliminary
interrogation* In further questioning, the interrogators tend to use
leading questions which almost invariably result in an exaggerated report*
They tend to over emphasise the importance of manydocuments*
e. NoNisei attached. In one case a USANisei of Island
Conwaandmade a hasty interrogation of a woundedprisoner, passed on, with-
out further checking, the report that 1000 organised armed enemy remained^
in the ECT9 area under eomaAnd of a major. This report caused ooj
erable unnecessary effort on the pan of the 9th CT. Our
fleers further interrogated this prisoner and learned that:
(1) prisoner gave wrong name and rank.
(2) Prisoner had never seen more than Uof-this ^1000
anapd enemy
f
.
(3) He w4s ia ths area named only 2 nights*
(H) Xi oMstderst estimaU waspossibly 300 aad
knowno%hinf m^it their weapons*
" ' ' (?)Ali^fficr^i^od.^^'t^^
J00
f
had,eeoordingtootherprisoners,beendeadforconetime.
Onthe other hand, Nisei attached to Division working
in this CT*s Zaf Ashowed considerable -bravery and ingeniuty in their
attempts to induee enemy to surrender.
' Page 10
Action lieport (Ooat
1
^) , 20 *pr i ! 19*+5.
7, Yocftl eJid
Afccrttthalf tk# prisoners had seen written propaganda,
"but only 5-10 acted on i t . Very faw reportad hexi ng the sound truck.
Sound equipment, hand carried to the mouths of caves, was af;ffeefctvi
#
Troops should "be carefully informed of instructions contained in l eaf l et s.
Closer liaison should 'be established between sound truck personnel end the
unit present in the area they intend to -work*
H. JlpPOA and Qaves.
UToJICPOApersonae! attached. -Bequests for tOTPOA
personnel to pick up captured equipment, supposedly of interest to them,
were seldom answered the day of the request.
9, Counter Intelligence.
:
''Uo counter taken other than those
established in SOQ?s
int
.
elligence measures
'
N
10. Special or dis
*
Fromt he f i r st
tinctive
contact
enemy t act i cs,
i t wag evident

th?t the enemy i n-
tended to conduct a defensive "battle from long prepared positions, making
the capture of each position es expensive as possible. The enemy
f
s tanks, of
which ha had about 20 in the 9th 0!T 2 of A, were never used as more than
highly mobile ar t i l l er y, to be dug-in whenever possible. They were not u*d
in an attack against any elements of t hi s unit. .
His aaifci-fcank guns which were very effective against our
tsinks completely covered airfields' #2 and #3 e^d- *
ild
approaches to them.
When teaks Were not pr e s e t as t arget s, the enemy usad hi s &Tguns against
personnel. His fear of our taafcs was evident from the "beginning, imy un-
covered movement "by the tanks brought a shower of ar t i l l er y and mortar f i r e,
Almost without exception! Wads were mined, approaches to important i ns t al l -
ations were mined. In several instances, when tanks preceeded the infantry
in attack* the enemy l ai d a smokescreen round the tf-nks in order to permit
his infantry to attack them. Such attacks were "broken up chiefly "because of
the poor quality of t hei r smokancreen,
His defense, as a whole, was orthodox, well thought out
end tenaciously maintained. !Phe enemy counter attacked only to regain close
in local objectives. Ho large scale ^bBeizai
1
' attacks were made. Whenever
gaps in our lines ware discovered, the enemy attempted i nfi l t rat i on. His
defense in 3D? 9 Z of Awes built altxng two l i nes, ona running through ei r -
fi el d #2 from east to west and the second in the vi ci ni t y of ai rfi el d #3
running W-S3.
She enemy
f
s i nt ri cat e crve system combined with wall
placed pillbdSes ma;da him axtremajy difficult to reach, either with infan-
t ry or shelling or bombing. His defense which pertoitted him to f i ^ t from
covered positions with, adequate ar t i l l er y and mortar support. aerainst ex-
posed troops was the most 3ffactive yet encountered by t hi s organization.
111. Snamy.Intalligdnce Orgpjiization*
3n3my
f
s intelligence organization i s difficult to
evaluate. His usa of obsarvrtipn was excellent throughout the operation.
Heusually knavr of 6r found the gaps in our lines and attempted i nf i l t r a-
tion through them. On at least on* occ&sfcion, his night security was poor
for in a predawn attack our troops moved to or passed through his lines
vi rt ual l y no opposition for as long as half
Page 11 -
ActionJtepor*rf.W^ft ^| | ^ p t ^ ^ . 20April
S&ere wasno evidence of his destroying documents, "butthe nature of his
defense caused many documents to T>*buried or'sealed in "byour
Prisoner8 showed no evidence of having >ean told howto conduct
i f eaptured; for the most part they were willing to answer.any question they
could, andmanyvolunteered to help in ai^way they could. TJnder interro-
gation they so lacked instruction thet %bo$r gave the password endcounter-
signs ' - . . - .- . -"
Diaries andreports indicate that they had"been expect-
ing the landing, hut no evidence was found to show that this was more than
estimation of plans. . ; < '
12. Ci vi l i an Popul ati on. -:'
ci vi l i an personnel on the island had"been evacua- '
ted prior to our landing* ^
X$i HewTactics and
. a. New tactics*
(xj Time-fire* ' '""*"'"**'*"'"*-"*"'
(2) T7se of smoke against /m individual tank to cofer
and i nfmtry attack* ' "
(3) TTse of caves to ho ua s a l l personnel; on island.
with installations as much as 1000yards long end100feet deep*
"b. UewWeapons.
(1) ^7XTshellwhichwouldpierceCurrentofSherman
tank* ' ' ;' -
::
. V ' .
(2)"dockets* -...^......:.^ .*.-**
(3) 150m and320mm mortars.
(k) ''Pottery endwooden land mines.
l U-
#
Jiaison. .
Intelligence liaison vltEin the Uivision WP.Sgood. As
noted earlier, i t is suggested th&t enoui^i'copies of l^eridfiic^report "be
madeto effect distriijution to "battalions* *Tery l i t t l e knowledge of tha
situation of Divisions on"bothflanks we.s available* Asummary of R4T.
jacent division activity included in or with 34W^DivPeriodic report
w o u l d " b e h e l p f u l . "
;
; f ^ -
;
- _ ^ . . / .
:
' . . / ' y . * - / * -
0. . _' Operations anddraining*
;;>
^
:
'
:
- >''
1* ?ro'ba'g
5
v
)<
^ems t^ZnjStfrSaa^hksisedtraining' subject wasJthe
tacti cs of the P.SojLr^^tiCuT^
tions. All ri f l e units'hada considera^ii enibtait of thi i training which in**
eluded a great deal of fi el d firing'and he4"becomehi#ly proficient. Troops
were trained to assault'^ililfoiaji^4n'%eai!hf^^V''ifaeA lirith a flsjne thrower,
smoke grenades end demolitions. Inf-^k
;
-training was instituted, 'but insuf-^
fi ci entl y enrphasi^ed. Kdre small uitlij tr^inine with trnk will famili^risse
Sq.ds with tank problems of the type encountered at-r*0 JIMAvhe*e.tank roeds
and tank operations hadt<?"bemade under cover of infantry weapons, -
L
Of i^eat "benefit during the pre-operption training period,was
a large amount of f i el d firing of al l infantry weapons. All ri f l e company
menwere familiar with their company weapons* they were well trained in
moving under their ow-*itre and employing and coordinatii
ing weapons.
*ag 12 - ' j
f
Subject: Action Report (Cent
r
d) ' 20 April
2, The most effective supporting weapon in this action was the.
tank. Of the tanks the C3-H-1, which shoots a 125 yard flame from the muz-
zle of i t s 75mmgun, proved to be ^hmost powerful offensive weapon at our
disposal,
<
2he reason for thi s, i t It supposed, i s that the flame wes able
to enter small pillbox apertures end small cavo openings and to engulf all
contours andfolds of the structures. Positions that withstood constant
vartillery, HG3\ ajad75mmdirect fire succumbed to the'03-8*1 taaks
1
envelop- ;
;
ing .-flame.. ' ' ''. ' - . ' . . ., ". '. '.,, , - . -
;; The regul ar tank is, tq&ally a* i nsert ant as the C3~K-1, '
v
^
throughout the act i on these tanks rendered val uabl e stuport by. t he| r' heavy '
mobile f i r e power and s hi el di ng c har ac t e r i s t i c s , They destroyed:nundre.ds of
pj l l boxes end other emplacement^and were a de c i s i ve f act or i n t he success
of the act i on, Tank crews were we l l tr&ined, l eadershi p, and cooperati on were
exemplary andworthy of commendiitionV
/ - Ar t i l l e r y, Hay, Air."boraherdj&ent and mofter f i r e a l l ai ded. It
i s difficult to judge the relative effectiveness 6f one against the other.
Generally, supporting fire from these weepont would have probably "beenmore
effective had larger shells and "boci^s al l with delayed fuses /been us#d. A
75a fuze q.uick shell had l i t t l e ffe6t on an enemy "bunker. 5* Naval*'shells,
of which the largest'amount used was. the MO shall, in many instances
chipped the outer surfaces of some pillboxes which had walls of rein/orci&d
V*o#pVwei
i
e' v^jtl under"'overhead'c^v
3^" 3Plem throwtw?s were valuable weapons. The .portable' tjrpe# ,27-
f which were,carried "byeach "battalion, were put to continual use in pleen-
ing tut pillboxes and cav.es. T&era w^re occassjLdaa "where, on account,pf the
flame throwers
1
restricted range, thej^were ineffective, as the operator*
could not get close enough to the target. . . , . . , . - - . . , .
Standard flame thrower tankB, the^type which'fired-f:Lm&
its, front KG- port
f
.were used to some..artent, "but this ,ves limited "bythe
terrain, Under-*fchis limitation tanks could not is'aneuvar^sufficiantly to
within 50 yards af*the target"and- so'tne-f 1 &Be' th*6wer"*was of not muchuse.
Furthermore this flame thrower could'not be aimed*'without"moving tne tank
which again handicapped,its value. The C3-H-1 tank, on the other hand, was
an exceptional weapon and proved i t s worth time after time, as has been pr*~
v ; ; W
'
:
'
V
v l o u s l y r e c o r d e d , ' . ' -
t
. -," .' , - :"' _.". '/. ,".
:
'.. . . ' .
. . , . : . . . " . ' ' , ' - > f ' ' ' ' . , ' * . ' ,
U, Infantry-tank coordination we* very good considering the dif-
fi cul ti es encountered in terrain and severe battle conditions. Tank-person-
nel were very cooperative and familiar with infantry demands. ;*There exists a
definite need, however, for additional training in'tank-infaatry taqtica.
The tactics of tanfc-infantry ^un^Le fighting which emphasizes the employment
of tank platoons, protected by an Inf unit, had been'discarded in our pre-
oparation t-raining infevor of open^erffain, tank-mess tactics. The former
tactics- had to be used end were employed with the Resultant loss of effic- _.
iency because of l i t t l e training, Surther trfining on all types of tank-
infantry tectics i s highly advisable. All Comdrs andmen must be taught to
use tanks at every turn. They are a formidable weapon rnd make going
' ' ' *>V
y r
aaeaytfhfe-teaak^measuresconsiste'd primarily of very well
emplaced anti-tank guns, the majority of which were U7mm, augmented by di-
rect fire from large eaiibre *UWpns andArty; :All open appropches^to $he
enemy!s pol i tion which could be-;: negotifid^ed by tanks were veil covered. In
addition-to these well spotted AS gvaas*?Arty PndMortar enncantrations had-
obviously been plotted, on certain tank approaches, and during.the early
phase of the regiments p&rtiSip&tion-, hafy interdictor-" fire wwsplaced on
tanks wherever they come".under the nemy
f
s observation. Anti-tank'mines
Cttasdd some--trouble- and knocked o_ut'..aa2srFl tpuvs, though not-destroying
th*mbayond recovery andrepair in most ca^e. M1na removal was carried
^y BSngr and Inf tdkitft uftdar covering fira f r o m
t
t j M) | | n| f | t 'f*f*
i
Subject: Actitn report . (Cont fl>rjLl 1 j Gpfr^ 20 April
The 3nemy had not cof*structed m J
sonw ditches and remnant* of concrete obstacles were.encaunterQd,~T&"thTs""
RCtipn the terrain was i tsel f an exc^ll^nt tnk obstacle especially at the
northern twb-^thirds of the island*
6. War dogs ward not.used until the latter, stages of the opera-
tion and than not extensively* Thei* Soain lisa was' employmnt with moppinfe-
up patrols* an assig&mea'V;at which they worked,satisfa$ttitflly> though not
exceptionally w$ll. $oga,also worked at nlgjit security. Reports from 3ns
are not over commendatory about the
?
use:of 4&gIn *tE& cisufipaign. There were
colp^laini* about performances and instanced cie where dogs hare not acted
properly, stmt i t can "fediaid that dogs wer d&ciiely helpful in the task- as-
signed them, The psychological -factor nlone was a benefit especially as
security at night. ' .
:
. , . ,
Tha unuauel 'Dfidbtle conditions duriiig the assault phase of the
operption,more or Lass precluded en extensive u^e of dogs at that"time except
perhaps as^messengers and for security purposes.
.7.^ . ATrockets were,,used extensively, "byfront Una troops against
caves and pillboxes. These;rockets must>e classified as an effective w^e^
pon. They ware used to fi.rd..deep %u%&_peves which- could not otherwise- "be _ .
brought under fir^e. They were febleto penetrate small pillboxes, though re-^
latively few of thesewere encountered, and also to neutralize hastyJio
emplacements, j" ._ ' . . . 1 ' * . .
iV
Sarra^e rockets were used at 2Q1-!D by the ^d,3n, l^lst Marines
whij.e attached to,this' regiment. Hea*^pr^Pfsrations
1
w&refired for Jbwodeys
afc the same*general areafin en-attempt%<y soften .up the r^$istance-.thr^, It
i s almost unbelievable that their apparent effect,on this particular defeW
sive position was neiigtt>re
#
Troops met he*vy resistance when,attacking
on l i f t i ng of this fi re, Thoui the resistance a,t t^tf
peared not refected, it i s believed,thft this rocket fire did hjnre'fW Effect
on the uitimate downfall of the re$stence et this point. .The emtire s i t -
uation here speaks again for the unparalleled defense system ?nd the, deter-
mined deferisive spirit' of theenemy*
^ Supply.
%
1. .;"Themounting.i*ut supplies-^of .Olass I,
(
I| II
f
I, IV, andV^
we're adequate in every respect. *it aohtime during ihe
N
inftipl ishase of the
operation was there a shorte^e of any typ^Tof .supplies. , ' .
. 2 . . a, THe resupply of "Glass Xarticles (rations, "type 3) wes
inadequate in thr.t before thie^rm%r^jfirx\of %#$ operation there wks'a short-
age of certain t^pesef food. sTMs^'aiio doubt caused' <fcie to the operation
extending over a Ipnger period^ihan-^yaifc^anticipated, 'Jhdre WES^a-s^ffiie^
quantity of emergency rations at<&Xl~ times'. In general*"although there
* the vexied diet desired ther^ was sAfficifent food at al l times*
b, %b&. resuppljr of. glasses II, III, IV, end Vwas.adeq.uate
al l times'with the exception oftofifflJ.lluminoting, KS3 w/f 6
3
J
a
# k
Palietied Ccrgo,^ri s;^veral instances,became, a.very >< .
serious problem, bbtli In the XiHfcdl&? and;t,jaldaciing. ..*?hen loadingftfl-4un<-*
loading palletised -carg i^ is*very esedntial ,that adequate exidproper equip-
ment_i s furnished, ,It was also fo,und t f t t seVereJ. of, the ships "hed nd ejg.ulp-
taentfor handling-palleti*e^ cargo ?jidi t Xe-s impossible to u/fciy^e al l
available space,in the holdjs because the pallets were too/heavy Tor working
pestles to staolc on top *f one another^ Proper slings for.loading end un-
loading palletized cargo i s very essi.ehtlsl also. In severe! c*aq%l^-watf.
necessary to break down a'good manypellets before they could be"Io"a3!ed
#
'
b,.' Wilson Drums proved satisfactory but
advantage. It was noted, however> that,while they were
Page Ik
t
<
Cont1d
Subjects Action Report .
Segtl Q# dumpi t was unnecessary toWep.them covered in^rder tokeep equip-
ment Inside dry. Theuseofthedrumi s limited inthat Only mfclllartfcdk-ee
can 'be stored therein. Someunite packed radio batteries and other heavy
articles inthedrums causing t&mtobetooheavy tobeeasily.handled,
k
t
Salvage and salvage collection worked very smoothly and very
successfully inthis regiment, ASalvage officer waa appointed prior to the
operation along with asalvage detail $tem men taken fromtheSand8
platoon, Duringthefinal phase of salvage it was found thevt additional
personnel were ndiddd and working parties offrom tentothirty additional
menwere furnished "byunit* oftheregiment inareserve status* All sal-
vage was "brought into theSu^.ld, dumpwherei t was "broken down, segregating
the serviceable and unserviceable, Snougi serviceable equipment wasre-
tained forre-issue tocasualties returning toduty andreplacing l ost iterns>
the remainder along with theunserviceable was turned into thedivision
salvage. Salvaged enemy ammuni'tion and salvaged unusable} Amartean ammunition
was turned over totheOorps/Salvage dump* Items,of.anamy eojaipmenttoo
large to"behandled "by organisational equipment was reported to Division
Sal vage* . , . . , ' '
Salvage during anoperation "becomes afunction of priaeim-
portance. ong "before thelending, units should h?ve salvage crews design^'
atad and under thesupervisi6n - efenofficer whoi s thoroughly cojn-
petent*. ' . ' ''."
;
','; .
Salvage crews should "be trained intheproper procedurefor
handling 'snemy mines, "boo"bytraps and ejcmunition ofalltypes, .:ilthough
al l typee 'ofequipment end'ammunition were telvaged,. only oneaccidentoc-
curred in salvage during theentire operation. This accident injuried
three men, none critically. .
5; '.& Transportation during theentira operation presented
no pro^lei6'whktevar. With theunit transportation and Hhat furnished"by
the attached K*T* Compeny adequate transportation was avail&'ble atal ltimes
The gdod ro%ds and short hauls, helped greatly' intheconservation ofal l
transportation. Maintenance f aci l i t i es and edeqtuacv- of spere ^>arta were
excellent
1
, fh MT. unit attached tothis organization gnve excellentend
prompt service onal lvehicles needing servicing
"b* The Cargo Carrier M29c (Weasel) i snotsatisfactoryas
a gendral purpoSd>vehicid. There 'are, however, several types of terrainin
which
v
this vehicle operates well, such.es deep loose sand, deep mudand
-swamps, ojiiat "bodies ofwatsr ana very st^ej? grades. Generally, thacexgo
carrier opafata8 wall inrough country whara roads ^renotavailable, "but
dudtoi t slowcenter, i t i s easily hung up, Ifhara roads eraavailable,
i t s slow speed and"the ease with which thetracks arethrown onturns greatly
handicaps-i t suse. Ithas"be^n stated that thacafgt carrier's lowsilhou-
ette makes this vahicla highly desirable foroperation naar thafront lines.
The silhouette of tha- truckt t
A
^*Kc?rgo
#
topremoved, i s lowar. Tha
Trucki ton, kik
s
cargo hasmuch greatar speed and meneuvarability.
In thafutura, i f cergo carriars eraused, i t i s racom-
m^nded that theybestripped ofpontoons andused exclusively asland ope-
ratad veh'iclas* Vltb thi s racommandc'tion i t i s suggaatad that thabody panel
on thel eft aida oftka driver "baraaovad forease indismounting during
combat, . '
It was found that thatrailer-1 ton, cargo i stooheavy
a load fortheWeasel* Pintlas wara ruinedbytoogreat atrailer load.
The cargo carriar cannot compete with the$ tontruck .
except under vary special conditions^
' . Page 15
Subject: Action Report w* a nl _ l C%<^ . 20 April
Artillery.
The 1st jal l ation 12th Marines was embarked and landed by
"batteries with the 3_Ts of thi s regiment. Arti l l ery fire was furnished
;
this ragiraent from i t s first attack until ihe cessation of host i l i t i es, A
liaison officer from the 1st 3n 12th Marines was always presant with the .
Hegtl operations section pnd the Inf 3ns ware likewise in liaison with the
Arty. . ' . . ; .
Artillery fira w*>s always prompt pnd.in the quantity called
for. This fire support was th# most reliable for *all missions of al l sup-
porting arms, . . ,*,** < *&* ' '
The a r t i l l e r y communication system, as i t af f ect ed t hi s !l3gt
f unct i oned pe r f e c t l y almost throughout the.operat i on. Telephone communi*-
cat i on wi t h the f ront l i n e forward obsarverB was e xc e l l e nt and wal l main-
tained, and often resulted in rapid dispatch 6f first hand information to.
the JUgtl CP. itadio also was good* though, some difficulty was encountered
with the $03.6l0 radio "because of i t s frequency selectivity, Achange to
the 50H J00 radio i s recommendecL. Most fire missions were conducted "by tel e-
phone.
The 75ramshell was too small to Ife effective against the
type of installatiftna encountered. More d^siructive. power was needed. There
were very few instances where enemy personnel were^eoqJosed Sufficiently to"be
seriously affected "by75^ *"i
rd
^
nd
expected decrease in enemy resistance
as a result of a heavy artillery "bomisardraent "by
t
75Si 105 end 155s was not
realized. This may"be-explained, however, Tjythe fact that menyc?ves were
ten to fi fty feet underground, end no weapon at^our disposal could touch"them,
Haa-lar guns, the 105 lor instance, tx$ much"better for any
type of resistance which i s at' al l &ug~in in fortified positions.
All artillery had one particularly advantageous effect in
that i t completely and continually prevented any movement "bythe eneiny,
eithar "byda^ or l5y night. Hewas una"ble to cpunterattii.ck he,d ha so desired,
so well were his positions covered,
. Boiling 'barrages were used considerp*>ly in the morning Atks,
It was a mistake to expect the infantry to maintain tjia speed isiven the
^.ngT>errage which was usually 100 yards every ,? minutes* The rolling 'b
was as such a.waste of ammunition or at "best a poor use of ammunition,.
The enemv employed his^-rtll^ery well,until, the l ast, Eis '
positions were well concealed and cov^rdd-i his prearranged fiije concantret'ions
well placed. Important terra|n
;
f^ati^^Jlost to him camdundfr intense f i r*
which included time fi re ^j^^^^qm^^o&pB. reached thdse positions, 3y
far the majority of our casualtias wdra^from"an^my firtill#fy fi re. His in-
tention apparently was to deny.all prominent ground and approaches thereto
by artillery fira once his troops ha4 bean driven off, ,,
Snemy gunpositions were^located mostly by gvm flashes and
effective counterbatt^ry placed on them, Othp targets for -otr -aarjbillery
wr located by fcont line troops and artillery forward observers.
I
1
. A i r . . ' _ ' ' . ' .
1, Theeffectivenessofpreliminaryheavy stVf&e-sTagainst
enemyinstallationsisdifficult*toestimate. Thedesireddegreeofneu-
tralization;wasnotattained,"thoughscoresofknowntargetswere
2. Air liaison parties performed their duties in .a commendable
manner. They were well informed,of the
;
situation both of infantry end avail-
able air support, The 2.egtl Air In 0 coordinated air activities of the three
battalions so thet at no time was thdraany gr^&t difficulty in air liaison.
The Icegtl Air Ln0 worked closely withArfey and NGP^^5f3^&t all_times,
Pag* 16
* *
AeUea *?** (OtdMlM*"
1
"
1
*** " 20 April
y air strike was coordinated with ether supporting firea. Air attacks were
directad expeditioualy endwell once planes had been allotted,
3, Communications was good with the following exceptions:
a* The jSAR.net was overcrowded.
b. The Air Ln Officers with battalions at times could not
take their radioJeeps over the rough terrain to forward positions from wherd
they were to direct strikes* It i s suggested that in addition to the radio
jeep, a portable radio "bepart of the 3n i\&hteams' equipment for use in.
emergencies, '
k, Targets, were marked by smoke from mortars or artillery or"by
.oral description "bythe "battalion AGLofficer. These methods were sati s-
factory to, air, as in most cases the targets were well identified "byplanes,
Planes after having "been directed'to targets by smoke and far description
"bybattalion A&Lofficer^, then made dummyruns on the fcsrget and were fur-
ther.adjusted*on target "byradio. Front lines ware marked with smoke on some
occassions, "but not
#
to a"great extent since i t disclosed our position. j?enels
were seldon used,
5 timing of air support missions was not entirely satisfactory.
Air missions from their beginning until completed required usually ovar one
hour. There seemed to "bea conatpnt "backlog of requested fire missions,
Time required to get on target was long, "but probably seemed the more so in
contrast with repid fire adjustment of KG?and artillery. It. i s appreciated
that planes require much more time to get adjusted on target then do Arty
and ]p? particularly when close support i s desirecL, but some improvement
might be ma^e in Air-ground technique of adjustment*
6
#
Dummyattacks were used only in adjusting on terget. This
mayhave had some effect on enemy troops but probably not as they were well
prepared even for air attack. Dummyattacks did assist the AGfrand infantry
officers in adjusting fire and gave front line troops an opportunity to see .
exactly where the strike was being placed. Control of air from the flouad ,
was satisfactory and i s more effective than trying to contrel the same from
the air, '
7i It i s recommended that further instructions inair support
be given infantry officers so thr.t they will know whet to expect of air
support and moreover when to ask for i t . Air spot features of air support
shoul'd be improved. One tactical air observer for the three divisions was
not sufficient. Heavier bombs with delayed fuses would probably have been
more effective. 1000 pounders might have destroyed some positions not ..
nautralizsod by smaller bombs,
Gv Naval Gunfire.
1, Shore Fi re Control personnel attached t o t hi s regiment
were,, without except i on, wel l t rai ned end performed t hei r jobs i n an ex-
emplary manner. There were, occassi ons where. addi ti onal spot t ers coul d
have been used advantageously., but i n general the number of personnel
was adequate* ,
2 The T3Xradi o now used by SK! part i es wi th bat t al i ons i s
too-cumbersome f or t hose teams to handle i n any unst abl e s i t uat i on. I t
i s recommended by 1TG5
1
of f i c e r s that the 5<n 69U be s ubs t i t ut ed f or t he
T3X wi th bat t al i on S?C teama-and a T0*5-be s ubs t i t ut ed i n t he case of the
regimental NLO. Otherwise comiDunisatians worked wel!
Page 17
Action-Report (0<t%)ri\\*W#fr*^ 2April'13U5
-" 3 I
n
general, i t appeared thpt,n4MMpmfira, though well plan-
ned endexecuted,' didnot create, the effect, that wnsdesired from i t . This,
in fact, maybe said of all'supportine fires. Theexplanation i s thfc,t the _
defenses were tooheavy andwell
4
dug~in<for th# shells used, There i s l i t t l e
doubt, however, that naval gunfire, both thepre-1an&in*bombardment andcall
fi res, destroyed practically al]t exposed ganpositions andinstallations,
probably destroyed many covered positions pudinstallations,
a. Targets of opportunity were fired onconstantly. Such
targets as located pillboxes or instHations andoccassionally exposed,
enemy troops. Theeffect of this-,fi re on'pillboxes wasvaried. Somewere
destroyed, "butthelarger ories were not.affected; C*?vas were damaged very
l i t t l e being, -asthey were, well underground,
b. Counterbattery missions were fired occassionaly at
locajted targets, ^dsults in some cases were unknown, buton several in-
stances definite proof of enemy gun.positions being destroyed wasestab-
lished. Counterbattery fires were adjusted^by SFCspotters. aa&~Air spo***-"
Missions of this type w^rerapidly executed, ; r; .
c. light harassing fi re, though i t may-never havd account-
ed for destroying personnel orpositions didprevent movement of any size
and generally contributed to theanxiety of theenemy. Illumination* In
addition to112,restricted movement orlocated i t forthefront l i nes.
There i s aneed, in this connection, to acquaint CoComdrs in theuseof
illumination andto prevent waste when i t i s unnecessary. Some officers
did not realize theran^e of effective illumination fromonestsx shell,
d. Interdiction andnight harassing fires by$0$and Arty
could reasonably >a credited with preventing large counterattacks or night
infiltration whether ornotthe enemjtwasinclined to these tacti cs. In
terdiction fires were.,plpeed onroads endroad junctions andother pre-
t
viously'located or established opportune targets.- Many times night haras-
sing fires andinterdiction fires were oneandthesame,
*
. e, fires a#ainst coastal targets didconsiderable damage
because ships were able toputpoint blpnk direct fi re onthe target. How-
ever, some CPV3S onthe coast fired at byDDs were found unharmed. The
Weapons Co9thMarfinally destroyed manyof these caves with direct fi re ',
from 75mmguns at 150-200 yards rpnge. It'appeared from this thpt a direct
hit wasthe only onethat hadanyeffedt. Some other caves farther inland
and,many of thelarger pillboxes could withstand 5 inch direct hits endof
these, several were unharmed by%inch fi re. Larger calibre, naval gunfire
direct hits were not observed. .
f. Air spot wasused for fire missions oiL.t.arge.ts ofop-
portunity deep within the zone of action Host deep^ir spot -lira,in
9th Marzone wasstraight from plane to ship without close control onthe
part of theItegt. This wassatisfactory endin fact anaid. Air spoton
targets located byair observers andfront line troops wascelled for
about sixor eight times andeach time executed well,
g. This reginunt fired approximately 95 call-missions
and used some 10,000 rounds, .
^, a* Excellent coordination byHOPwith"adjacent units, Arty
and air always existed, ^equests for fire into anpdjacent unitfs zone.. *
were made of theunit concerned before anytype of fire wasplaced there-
in,, Of'fcan fires across each other's front in support of ep.ch other's
attack wore arranged andcoordine,ted with the^+thMarine
Page18
t
?*<,
UNCIASSIB
Subject? Action .leport .(Oont'd). . .. 20 ,
20 Ap r i l
April
,19Ui
IILO,AGLofficer*andartilleryliaisonofficer,allhad .offleasinthe
sectionoftheregiment,andeachwasreadilyconversantwiththeothers
1
supporting'fires. ..
TheUtrFcontrolchainofcommandfunctionedsmoothly.
Requestsforadditionalshipswerepromplyfilledandcoordinationwith
hitlerechelonseffected.
5. ItisrecommendedthatinthefutureemploymentofWrf
f
two
spotters"be attachedtoeachassault"battalionrethepthanthepresent one
inOrdertogive"better ISQrJcoverageto theattackingunits.
Heaviershellswithdelayedfusesshould\be usedWheneverit
"becomesapparent-th&theavilyconstructedpositionsratherthanunprotected
personnelcomprisetheresistance. * .-
Hi Engineer;
.. ' ' . 1, GoA3^ Engineer battaJtion was attached to this regiment
throughout the action. The. times platoons of CoAwera attached each to
one of the battalions. Their duties were primarily."basic engineer. At the
beginning of the^operation they were used and performed excellently di an
emergency as stretcher "bearers. Mine detection and removal was the most im-
portant engineer function required from these units. I t was found that only
5 or bjnen of the platoon wera proficient at mine removfi-X. This is according
to T/O,but was far from the number needed to accomplish the task* The entire
1
platoon should be well trained at mine removal and also engineering demol-
i t i on. During the mopping up phase engineers wera used as demolition teams
to blow caves,end pillboxes and remove booby traps. This they did satisfaci~
orily.
. The equipment carried was adeq.ue.te; road construction and re-
pair adequately-handled? It*i s recommended that the engineers be equipped
with armored bull-dosfcrs to overcome the very difficult problem of making
tank'roads under ri fl e and mortar ,fire. .
I , Transport Q;cup,ri;armaster.
1, Total time required to lo?u pud embark the 9th Embarkation
Q-roup was forty ho^'s- atid thirty .minutes, This was the total time required
"by the A3O-SQ;, (USS^arrick). ' '
The greatest difficulty encountered during the loading was
the handling of the palletized cargo in the limited cargo assembly areas.
S*me.assembly areas wkra located on. hi l l y terrain makingi t difficult to
move trucks an/ cranas with efficiency and safety. iSvery effort should be
made to provide sufficient cexgo nets durisg loading. *i.lso if pallets ere
to be ust'd th^y should Veprovided with propar slings before being deliverad
to the a&s^aibly area* It is very essential that sufficient cranes and com-
petent operators be on h&a.&at al l timas during the loading, proper l i ght -
ing for night loading is rory"essentlair' In meny cases i t was necessary to o
Toreek down a good mciny paileen In order to gat the j^quipment aboard.
Tho aoser:.Vl7 area for troops awaiting embarkation w^.s not
satisfactory^ It is.."believed that t*cleared assembly area, providing tem-
porary heads *md garbage pi';s and the erection of more prominent signs would
eliminate som>3difficulticj*? in loading troops, \ '
, ,. The unloftd.tng cf ship&was a very difficult and uncertain
task. Due to the fact that orJlyequipmeni that was called for tt&s unload-
ed i t took several days to onload the) eauipmant rnd gssr thft wes landed.
Avery high surf at al l timesraa,de i t impossible to unload with LCM'a. LST's
and ISM^sv&ra
19
Subject: Action Report f oWw# Jff0b. 20 April,
J Ordnance.
1. . a, following number, typfr<(^l cal i ber ofweapons were
used and l os t during t heoperation which covered aperi od of22days
Type and Caliber Total Lost
tJsed
Oar"bine,cal,3^Ml 171A
339
Flamethrower^portable,M2-2
91 0.
0 ..
Gun, Machine,cal.30Browning
36 0
Gun,Machine,cal.30.Browning (Jlexlble)
10-
Gun,Machine,cal.50BrowningM2H.3.
Sun, 37nim M^, (Anti-tenk)
Gun, 7 ^ . M139?A*V (Hadio Squip)
Launcher, docket, 2.36
l!
M$Al
Mortar, 60mm, M2
Mortar
t
Slmm,Ml
12
k
62
Uo
13
0
0
2
0
0
-
Pi s t ol , Automatic,..Cal. *+5, M19U-A1
?dfl a, TJS, cal . 3O.'M1
2352
^6
317
Hi fl e, Auttmp^ic, cal . 30,Browning, !
"b. A^eat aj nounV of t roubl e dixreloped int hefunctioning
of a l l weapons due tot he rolcenrcTdust and the prasenpe of sulphur "bed's* *
throughout t hei sl and. She weapon most affeiete^ WPS t he Browning .Automatic
Bi f l e. 3>ust f i l l e d t hegas por t s causing f ai l ur e toej ect and/or improper
feeding. Dust col l ect ed intherecei ver slowing down the foreword motion
of t he "bolt end socausing mi ssf i r es, Bust entered t he "buffer, group caus-
ing t he ,sear r el ease end/or act uat or to- freeze int he rearward posi t i on,
This prohi bi t ed the weapon from-firing theslow. r,r.te off ul l automatic f i r e ,
although si ngl e shots, could/be f i r ed.
The Ri f l e, US Cal, 30,Mlend the Oarbino, Cal. 30, Ml
were affect ed "by ^ust i nthege.aport requi ri ng manual operation of the
s l i de af t er every round fired* The pi st on heads seemedtorecei ve exees-
sive wear and allowed gas toescape, t hi s ceuaad f ai l ur e of ext ract i onof
th expended round and/or feeding of.the new round.
. The sulphur T3?ds gave offmuch steam and' gass, caus-
ing a l l metals t or ust and corrode overnight, .^hen necessary todi g fox-
holes i na sulphur ar ea the weapons underwent severe punishment
r
t urni ng
red with rust i nfoui? hours.
Oil could "be used onweapons "but sparingly asthe dust
adhered totheo i land allowed dpim orcompletely stopped t he normal act i on
of t haweapon, ' '
Other weapons int h i s organi sat i on wete no*b fffact ed "by
the elements asgun covers prot ect ed themorthey were prot ect ed "by non-,
us3. Ilhera tr,
B
nocomplaint other than h*r& st at ed onthe funct i oni ngof
e l l weapons.
\ c, The allowance of orgenizatiAn&l spare par t s and acces-
sori es set s aresuffi ci ent f ore l l normal operations end seemed tobe (i n
t hi s campaign), i n excess of thf.t act ual l y needed.
._ During t hef i r s t f i f t y cornet hours ashore therapedr*
and supply ofweapons was a ma
v
i6r~pro"blam ast he3dm
y
i
s
i o n Ordnance~Co'*~~*
WFS s t i l l at sep,
#
J f t er t he ^dDivision Ordnance Co landed our contact "bet-
ween front end r ear l i nes was Easi l y medntpinad and weapons needing r epai r*
or cl eani ng were serviced i nt her a^r are^s much more 8Ftis| cJ:orl;ly than
in forward areas. * -
20
Subject; Action Seport (Cont'd) 20April19^5
A defi ni te shortage which has"^aen prevalent for quite
some time i s theBelt mag,?/3
f
A.B. K1937* *iaee theBandoleer 3,A,"*.
4
h?s
"becons obsolete theassistant PAitomatic rlfleft&i hasno syB<tem of cprrying
hi s quota of magazines, Asubstitute fortheBandoleer 3,A.":, id defi ni tel y
needed, , .
A device forchecking the completed el ect ri cal ci rcui t
on theLauncher, rocket, 2.36", M9A1i s needed. Vith thi s device* launchers
(new orused) issued during combat could "be tested for completed ci rcui t
without actually fi ri ng theweapon.
The supply of Launchers,, grenade, M7i s inadequate.
This organization used everyone i t could acquire. All launchers were con*
tinually i nus^during thecampaign.
2, Thefollowing combat vehicles were used:
75mmGuns,AJ
13 trucks,1ton
cexgo
guns were employed for fi ve days endthe Trucks,
1 ton for twenty-two days* One$ruck, 1 tonwasdestroyed "by enemy f i re.
2hera.,waa nomalfunctions of anyvehi cl es noranymaintenance di f f i cul t i es . /
3 "below l i s t ed number of rounds of ammunition were expended
during th'eoperation. . . '
^artridge,_0al. }0.,
Oerbine,"Ul 173,000
A? 4 T, "blt'd ( al l ratios) 721,000
"A? or "ball, 3rd cl i p 266,000
ATzar "ball, Srd cl i p
nJracer,..Ml "
Cert, "ball CPI.M,
'
V-1911
59,000
6QmmMortar
;3i'V$9Ar*fi 32. (light) . ,
Illuminating M?3w/f M65 :7,1.66;
Fortar '-
w/f M52
^0,535!
in, M56, w/
Smoke, Phos, M57
*S5*'
J^mm Gun
w
/ f M^a, esc)
3-32 '
Grens-des/ Hand
13.176
Pre.g, Mkllal, w/fM10A3
725
Smoke, H0 H3
Smoke,. WP, Ml5
3,533
Smoke colored asstdMl6
500
Illuminating,Mkl 2,550
Inceadiary,Ml^-
150
Grenade, Iiifla
.2,200
AT, M9A1 -
1,520
Jrag, Impact,M17
Pyrotechnics
Signgrd asstd ( f / rf l lchr)
1*5
l l are, t ri p parachute\^Z 90
f l are, t ri p,M^-9
1,672
docket, ATM6A1, 2.36" .
1,559
Socket, Smoke 2.36" X d
21
Subject: Action Report (Cont
!
d) 20April
19*5.
r
Engineer Demolitions
Torpedo, "bangalore, Mi 60
Srplosive,OT? 226cases
Primacord, detonating 6,000feet
3\ize, safety, time 3,000faet
Caps "blasting, non-elec 1*000
device, (al l types) 2S0
shaped 351Vi T3 150
Block demolition, M3 37
Cylinders Mtrogen ^7
Ammunition supply functioned very well durine the- entire
operation, mainly due to the fact that there wps an-adequate amount of t rrns-
portation "both in the regiment and"battalions* Durine the f i r st few days the
munitions officer operated directly from the division ammunition dump, Su"b-
sequent to that a regimental ammunition dumpwas established and a l erel of
one-unit of fi re was maintained at al l times". All the pole charges used"by
the regiment were constructed at the regimental dump and made ready for units
at any time. This was also is:<ue as far as flame thrower fuel was concerned,
Asupply of ready mixed fuel was available at al l times at the regimental
ammunition dump.
All ammunition on hand in the regimental dump was stored in
r
revetments dug "by a "bull dozer on the reverse side of, a hi l l . Demolitions
and pyrotechnics were kept covered trith canvas. .
Adequate amounts of al l types of ammunition were available at
al l times mth the exception of 60mm Illuminating, M83w/f M65. .
I t i s recommended that "blasting caps, non-electric and electric*
primer cord and safety fuse "bepacked in water tight containers.
The CinCi OATj/lPi s considered adequate for weapons in this
organization.
k, jjJnemy Material
1
a. The "below l i st ed salvaged enemy weapons were turned into
the salvage section of division ordnance during the operation.; . .
27 ?l fl e, Cal, 30? .
2 Gun, Machine light, Cal, 303
7 Gun, AA/AT 51 Cal.HMG
5 Mortar, 31mm.
5 Gun, AA/AT Automatic 25ram,
5 Gon, 20mm, A/A ' ,
1 Tinme thrower
2 Gun, HMG, Cal. 31
2 " Lauaeher, Rocket
4-
D. The division salvage section was notified of the loca-
tion of al l enemy vehicles. Ho enemy vehicles were salvaged "by this organ-
ization.
c. The following i s a l i s t of splvaged enemy ammuniti'ori
which was turned over to thd'Oorps salvage dump during the operation, .
7 7 cases
911 . ^Jram, cases
^91 Slmin, oases Slmin, oases
30 3
v
u3e
f/TJ
f/TJmm, cases
172 ~(*Jmm car t r i dge, cass case
31 50ramKortar,'-.case cases ^
9^, C8 30 Grenade,Frag,cases
rage 22 22
ActionReport (Cont&)
20April
16 3odie for Rocfcet# cases
51 Gal. cases ,
30 20mm, cases
27naft.| cases
kk
Tai l assmy for Rocket, cases
3
Me.g, for 27mm, cases
200
70nan,cases
6
ISOnaa, cases
27
6" Mortar, cases
96
Tuse for 120cm, cases
9
Boostersfor120cm,cases
12
25mm,cases
8
37mm,cases
Chemical,
K.
1. T?he chemical aspect of this operation consisted mainly of
planning defense chemical warfare*
Decontaminating agents and gas masks were the main items of
stipp-lies. Gas masks, shoe impregnate, and gas proof capes were issued each
individual immediately prior to embarkation, All troops landed with gas
masks prepared to use them.
N
.
On?eb 25, ,iust prior to this regiments fi rst attpck, geti
masks w#re collected by "battalion quartermasters #nd later returned to the
Division QK.
2. The enemy did not actively use chemicals in his defense
However, one patrol on March 3V-i
n
"blowing a cave at 201-3 exploded a cy-
linder of Adamsite or si ni l i ^r gas* Several men "became nauseated, "but no
serious casualties resulted. vDhegas was tested "by ISOOMIWOJIMA Int
L, Medical.
1. The Hedical Section emberked on the 9th of February
HASCo and 2d ^afrtalion aboard the V3SKHOX, the 1st i at t al l en aboard the
USSFAYST'TUand the 3d battalion al5OeJ:d tiie tJSS'LjJ!i2)ST0^. Unit material
was embarked on the same ships as th^ personnel,
2. Abo^xd ship there wai very l i t t l e sickness. Afew cases of
mild respiratory infection occurred* The majority of patients seen were for
blistered feet from the preeinbarkation hike* Sanitary conditions aboard
ship were excellent, Itfo special precautions othur than routine inspections
were observed* ,.>,'.
3* Upobreaching the theater of operations the Kedieal;Sections
da"barkad ^dth their respective units ov$r a rou^fe, surf in LCMs All units
were ashore by 1200 on 2^-February
U Personnel went ashore with individual madicel units and car-
ried extra case* of stretchers, plasma, and battle dressings* Two of the
Eeelraants eight ambulances vrere lended by 1700 on the 2^+th of February 19^5f
the others were sent ashore duririg the next seven days. There were no losses
of personnel or material during d
:
eb-arkption, .
5. TTponarriving at our fi rst bivouac area, units, set up Aid
Stations in shell holes. As the different- T;p,tt al ions want into assault,
A&Stations wara set. up in the vicinity of tha 3n C?s These locations
were always by &road or t r ai l . The installations were set up in shell holes
f-nd sr.m<L "bags were us^d to ^ive added protection,
- ' Iage 23
Action Report
20 April
were dispersed in severe! holes.. Ike locations were such &to give the
turning casualties the mogt available protection. All posi"ble measures were
taken to provide protection, Stations were placed "below ground l evel , s?nd
"bagswere used, tsl&ckout precautions were followed s.t ni|3at
t
. captured ceves
were used vary nicely at several locations sadaffor<&d wonderful protection
as they gave the "best protection from morto and artill'ery fi re.
6, ifracuation was "by jeep ambulances from.the Aid Stations, the
fi rst three or four $ays, al l cases were sent to the "beech end were handled
"bythe Regtl Shore Party. Then the attached Medical Kioset up an evacuation,
station end al l casualties were sent to that station, and evacuated -ffroo
there to ships, "by air to i>ase Hospitals
;
and also to Oorpe Medical 3n Hosp-
i tal s which were set up tfter the fi rst tan or twelve day
P
; Ivacur^ioi
repid said efficient. Casualt,ies treated "bythe Regt were as:foOELowsi:
160
57 ; ;
casualties,
Honcpm"bai;ant casualties
153
1130
Stretchercasualties
RecapitulationofCasualtiesis follows:
Off
IIA "22
JTLA.
1M02
MIA"
1KRIA
Total m
7* The fir8t two^day ashore, straddle tranches were used for
heads. After that lime, drums with prefabricated seat covers were used. All
garbage and trash was disposed of "by"burial. Thirlng the assault phase only
packaged food was eateni water was supplied "bythe Quartermaster section in
cans and trailer tanks. JThis water.was made "by evaporation of sea water at
the Division water pfcint, and waschlorineted as an added protection..
S, Our dead were collected'"by the Graves Registration Section,
identified end moved to the division Cemetery as rapidly as the tactical situ*
ati.}D /culd allow. The. enemy dead were "buried where they were fo;un& also as
repxdly as the tactical situation would allow, There were ?n;:epi^mits and
practically no infections diseases in the troops. Only 158 patients were
conditions. ' ' J . ; . ^ - : : ^ ' ^ . - ..- , . , ; . . ; . . . . ' . . ?
9 Dental 8eiairlo#^wa&-eiapjiiiad 1y a Regtl De^itiat... Ntunber^of^
ca^es., Two (2). Shose two cases "being, a Fractured Mendi'ble, which wasevb
cuate&j and a soft tissue infection of the 3d Molar region. This patient was
fd.\rah systematic treatment with Sulfadiazine. ?wo othar cesas were sent^to
he l i f t h iunph Oorps Ked 3n for treatment. 2Toadditional duties for Segtl ^
10. Twenty-ning prisoners nt war were csred for. All Were treat-
ed for Fragment v/ouiids or flash "burns., "'hey were then evacuated to the Div
Eq. CoAid Station.,
.2k
Subject: Action Report (Cont
r
d) ." &*&#
2 0
11. The Medical Organisation in i t s present type functions exceed-
ingly wel l . Recommendations wi l l follow i n paragraph 16. The personnel are
adequate. Their employment wi l l be discussed in paragraph 16, The Regiment
landed with 137 Corpsmen and kOCorpsman attached as col l ecti ng secti ons.
Seventeen Corpsmen were ki l l ed, Fifty-four were wounded of which twelve re-
turned to duty, sixteen were evacuated with Combat Ueurosis and 4isea.se;
Sixteen Corpsmen
w
from the col l ecti ng sections'were used*as company aid men,
Two replacements were supplied "by TA.vision Medical *ai t al i on. Training of
the Oorpsmen was excellent & regards to f i rs t ai d, "but should "be improved
as to infs&try tacti cs and "battle techniques,
12. Helical equipment and supplies are very sati sfactory end ade-
quate* A ten day Supply was carried ashore by.the Regt, Resupply from be,p.ch
party,, ships, and from Division Radical battalion yes excel l ent.
13. fi ve jeep ambulances were crrried "by the Pest, plus three
col l ecti ng section ambulances from the
v
attached Medics! Go, One erabulan&e
x
was knocked out due t o enemy action. The sfc'bulpnces were ut i l i zed to eve*-,
cuate . casualties, haul medical supplies andaare very suitable i n every way,
. 1^* Malaria and epidemic control equipment Was carried by Division,
The Division Sanitation Officer furnished a three gallon s}pray with "DDT in
di esel oi l to spray galleys and heads for f l y control, Th# i sl and was dusted
with i>DT powder from planas, which probatly helped control tha f l / popu-
l at i on, \\xb hot as Wdll as should,"be done.
15. lifter -ths completion f the as asui t phase, hospitaliaati&a was
furnished "by the attached Ma4icel Company. Medical supplies from tha attached
Medical Company. Quartermaster supplies from the Regimental QuartermEster,
Sanitation was carried on cs "before. 'Wator'Was the seme as et the "beginning
of tha operation* Son fresh food was preprred at Company gal l eys. Ho epi -
demics or unusual diseases were encountered,
> ' . .
16* Recommendationst ' ,,
a. If possi bl e, Corpsmen replacements be screened, and none
over twenty-eight.years of age or physically below ar lent' to infantry Rag^s,
One mora ambulenee and ?ive more Corpamen be seiit Xo each infantry, battal i on.
All Corpsmen in the Regt be trained ao that any man could ba used for front
lijne duty. Do away with the col l ecti ng section as such.
># In t hi s operation sixteen col l ecti ng section
were used *s company aid men and iour were ki l l ed, whereas 10^ Battalion
Oorpsmen were used-as company aid men and only tMrtean were ki l l ed due to
more trai ni ng in infantry t act i cs and better acquaintanceship with the man
they were serving.
Vim Signal, ,
Herein included as the signal report i s the Comraunicp.tion -
Operational Report on th 1^0
;
JIWA Operation furnished by-thi* organization
to CG, 3?aeet Marine 3Torce Taci fi c.
i Vi . . ' * . . . '
1, Communication i-Ian (301)
a, Were communi.cation plans received by lower echelons i n
Sufficient time to permit study, cri ti ci sm, and maka necessary changes.
Yes,
m
lage 25 I
t.ActionEeport (Cont
!
d)
20April1
b Rehearsal, ,
< -
Uo comment. . ,
c
3nTbarkationandVoyage,
1, Vaaequipment loaded accordingtoplan? "
Yes.
describe?
2, ^as any equipment damaged in loading? i f yes,
3 Wtdre such items, as storage batteri es checked dur-
ing the rcyage?
T e a , - ' : ' ' . /
:
. . '
h, >Jhat type of.training was carried *uf aboard
. Instruction i n the SOI, Communication Annex to
the Opn Order, study of OpnPlan, instruction in SO?Sltt 3JVO, and instruction
v
fr each indiridual i n hi s particular assignment,
5 Were personnel of any assistance to shi p' s cinamuni-
cation officer? If yes,- what did they do?
Personnel from Hsg Cen section "ass'ltfted, ship's com-
munication officer* Mag Can personnel serviced al l inctming ani outgoing
traffi c for troop commander and operated i n conjunction with the ship's per-
sonnel, ' "; . '.-/
d.
. 1. Are you sat i sf i ed with present allowance of per-
. * ' " * .
sonnel?
T e a . - . - , .
2.
changes i f any are speci f i cal l y recommericte&?
Ho comment, . - '. .."
3. training of personnel adequaia^
4. Vhat recommendations i f any are made fdr special
training? *. - -
^ Ho comment, .
;
* ' " . - . .
5 List overages or shortages of communication person-
nel , in your unit embarked aboard ship for the operation*
Shortage of 57 CP men in thi s HOT, "l6S embarked .
aboard ship for thi s operation. There were 67 non-C? men th*t had been trai n-
ed Vy t hi s HOTfor communication work and these men were usad as' communication
personnel to augment thd exi sti ng shortage,
List l osses of personnel aboard ship before landing.
Two (2) men.
7 List l osses of personnel in effecti ng the landing.
Hone.
r
. '' ;
5. List l osses of personnel fn t^he period from after
landing unt i l operation was completed, ' * \
ti fty-one (51) men,
' 9. were communication personnel employed for/ duti es- '
other t^an communications? ^hat were their duties?
1
H o , . , ' , , ' : ' " ' ' -
. 10, Howwere battl e casualties replaced?
^ff^drsonnel from the 3d JASCOend by CP per-
sonnel from replacement drafts,
26
Subject: Action Report (Oont' f j W^ / l i J Iff
1
*##*ff 2
A
P
r i l
a. Squipment,
1, List verges endshortages of major items of
equipment.
There wasa pool of fi*e '(5) SCB-3^O
!
inex-
cess of T,v. - ' .,
2, LiBt losses of equipment aboard ship "before landing,
^ None, - .
3* List losses of equipment in effecting the-landing
Hone,
k+ t i s t losses of equipment in theperiod.from after
lending unt i l operation wascompleted.
Hadio equipment; 22SCB-^36, 2 SC^OO;
T
*ire
equipment; 6 telephones, 13~-A
f
20CS-11, 11^3-33, 2 terminal st r i ps, 1
Tsuzaer M3Z-2, 2>sound-powered handsets, Usound-powered hea4*chest sets* 1
5 *
AT
&Sequipment suitable (design andquantity) for
the particular task to*beperformed? Tf no,l i s t equipment andstate reason
6. Inlightofthespecificoperation,what changesin
equipmentarerecommended? Statereason?
Nocomment, ,
7 *Vhatnewequipmentis recommended? Sxplenspecific
proptsedemployment andwhetheror notadditionalpersonnelwould"berequired
tooperateit.
Nocomment,
8, Bidyourorganizationemployanyequipmentwhichit
hadneverusedin action"before? ifyes,stateitamsanddescribeperformance,
(riverecommendationsforimprovements,
SCR-6O0, lerformedin averycreditablemanner'
inEegtlandDivisionnets* . . - , . * ,
SCB-610, Thisportablesetperformedvarysatis-
factorilyinRegtlandDivisionnets. "
9*'ftic.twaterproofing;wasdoneandhoweffectivewas'it?
Vfeterproof"ba^swareusedto waterproofallsets
and.telephoneswitchboards. Vehicleswerewaterproofedaccordingtodivision
specifications,
v
aterproofingwasveryeffective, SCB-53^
r
swerewater-
proofed"byplacingcellophaneoverthediaphrams.
10, *7asther;eanyequipmentusednotincludedinTA?If
yes,listandstatehqwemploya'd. MakerecommendationsforinclusioninTA
None,
11, Wasal l signal equipment authorized "byTAused? If
not
r
ahauld i t "bedaletad from TA, State ree.son.
Tour (k) T(V-5
f
s authorized "byTAwere not used*, ;
12, **afc al l your Equipment unloaded from tha shipdur-
ing tha operation? .
Yes*
13, V'asyour equipment landedat theproper T^each? If
not, whynot?
Yes,
fi Supply* /
1#
T
Jhat Equipment cotild not"beloaded pndwasleft "be-
hind?
2, Didthisaffecttheoperationin anyway?
Hocomment,
27
2 0
April
speci fi c items pieced ffcia greatest strai n
3
supply?
Wire W-110, 3&ttery 3A-70* 3attery-a&~30, Battery
, Wire
^fhat changes i n replenishment rates i f any are re-
commended?
v It i s recommended that allowances of ty-110 "be i n-
creased about 17 miles for Regt Connranication Ilatoon end allowance of ^,130
"be increased for the "battalions. The "battalion allowance of combat wire has
proven i nsuf f i ci ent . ,
5, Wip.t'method was employed >y your organization for
The exchange of operative ecjuiP^
en
* for
t i ve equipment "by the RC* Thi^ inoperative e
J
quipraent was sent to di vi si on
and exchanged for operative equipment end the inoperative equipment was re-
paired "by di vi si on repair section for farther exehsngs*
6 (a) '"ftiat repair f ac i l i t i e s did you have avella'blef
("b) >
T
ere they used?
(c) *4iat mp^or items of equipment were repairedt
(a) ^here ytm a smell repair uni t, for e l l items
of signa^ equipment, set up which allowed a minimum 1st and 2& echelon repair,
" ' ' , ("b) It.was used for minor repairs, of radio and
wire equipment.
(c) Repairs were made on SCS-3^'s
f
?3A,and-
switchboard 3D-71.
7
Were equipment spaJes carried with equipment? If
not, state why? .
Yes.
3 Vere equipment spares adequate?
' T e s . . , ' ' . : [ '
Were sufficient spare parts available tther than
equipment spares?
Tes.
10 ' -Was"there sufficient transportation available for
transporting equipment? - . .
' l l v Are there my recommendations for changes i n trans~
portation? '.
I t i s recommended that a 1 ton truck be added to
transportation allowance for RC? and 3LT communication platoons.
1, 'tfhat agencies werj established that were not normal?
Hone.
2
#
Khat was the most overloaded agency?
3* *fcat steps were %dkento overcome trouble experi-
enced i n *k> above?
v
Thero.was no undue trouble expertanc3d i n *^2 ,.'
above, but i t was urged that pdministrftive t raf f i c of a len^fthy nature end
low precadancta-^ put out on r?.<iio to avoid f>ny possi bl e delay i n operational
t f f i '
.r duplication of agencies
ttsadf
l i f o , '
Subject: Action Report .( Go S ^ f . ^ WM| I fLIJ>0 April
5. .Of the,frequencies assigned to your to.it, ware there
any not used? If yea, steta why.
6* Liet difficulties encountered in:
(a) Ila&io communication.
(b) Wire communication. ' ,
(c) Visual communication.
(d) Messenger communication.
(a) At extended ranges \l% miles) the SCH-30G
had a tendency to fade However, over the terrain in which i t was operated,
there was frequent possi bi l i t y of masking the set and t hi s would proT^tiXy
account for a large percentage of the trouble, SOE-300 handset geve trouble,-
"because of the "brittle wiring which had a tendency to "break and short out. ' .
(ID) Wire lines were cut "by enemy mortar f i r e,
friendly tanks, "bulldozers, graders,fenff*
J
WtHervehicles. The existing t errai n
made i t difficult to lay wire safely, "but "by"burying or ovarhaa&i-ng lined at
known road crossings &n<llaying along axis presumably inaccessaole t%vehic-
l es, wire line trouble was kept to a minimum, Whan poles.were made available*
al l lines to units of t hi s commend were cabled end overheaded, and there was
l i t t l e trouble thereeft er, ' ' . . - , .
(e) No visual communication used.
(d) Thdre were no difficulties encountered In
messenger communication^
/-

fiuayc^mmjiai.cation difficulties encountered in

this operation that were not encounterad in the previous operation? If yes,
what do you attribute the difficulties to? * ; .
N
3acPU8e of the.-small-area of operat i ons and hesvy
enemy f i r e t here \rm an i ncr ease i n wi re lianas knocked out . "Other than t h i s ,
there were no other increased di ffi cul t i es,
#, Was any' communication improvement noticed between.
this operation and previous operations?
J
'
. . Yes. ' ', '- " -* ,
9. List coramuriication failures during the ship-to-
shore movement.
10, Were officers required to oper^tw and maintain any
agency of'communication because of enlisted casualties? If yes, describe,
Ho, . .. . ,
11. V/are any enemy communication installations captured?
If yes, what use was made of them?
Tnare were few enemy communielation i nst al l at i ons
captured ejad these wer^' not used* . . . - .
12*, What methods were used for the inf&trytank cem-
wunications? Were they successful? .
S3B-30Q communication between tank and infantry
companies was successful. When tanks oper&ted with piatoonspetrols, the
tank was furnished an SCB-53^f
or
communication with the.$>letoon pnd t hi s
proved successful. Locel wire communication was also successful,
13> ^het methods,were used for the Infantry-AmphiTiious
tractor communications? Ware they succoi:;ful? . .
This EC!Tdid not operate with Amph t ract ors.
h. Operation Iji Edad^u^rters Ship,
Uo.comment,. .', -
Iage 23
Subject: Action Report (Cont'd)
'&P*i*L
"''' * , S e c u r i t y . . ,.
1. What cryptographic aids were used?.
. The shackle nuraaral cipher. . '
t
2, Are any critism mada of present ai ds!
No.* " " "' . "' ' ."'"'
f
3, Vhat euthenticator system, was uAed andhow
tive was it?
:
Message text authentication and station uthan~
tication systems were used effectively.' ' ' .
W. Did the enemy attempt to use our authenticator
system? If yos, describe. How effective were their attempts?
"5 * ^
T
erepersonnel sufficiently trained in signal
security? ' .
- Y e s *
;
' ' " ' * ' _ . :
6, -/flaat speci fi c recommendations are madd to insure
proper security? . . ."" .**.-......*...-..
None other then adherence to exi sti ng security
;
SO?.
7 Didyour cr^anis^atiGn have a."Signal Security -J'lan
1
!'!'
. . Yes, the signal security'plan for thi s EOT was
included ^.nparagraph 3 W andparagraph 5 of tha signal annex to theQpn
Order. . , .. . . . . . , . . " ' . .
Countermeasure8 "by3nemy, . ' ;.
1. Did
use radio* cqunterraeasures? Descried*
lo
knbwledgti of the enemy usinc radio
countermeasures.
2. "What measures ware empltyed to overcome enemy i nt er-
ference?
No comment.
3 Vhftt.rdcomm'endatioiRf do you mak^'to ai d i n t rai ni ng
personnel t o overcomd enemy i nt erf erence?
. ' ITo comment,
J Alt
Nocomment. <
k. ShoreTpxtyCommunlcations'.
Air Li ai 8on Communication*
No comment.'
Shoye ^ased ^l r Supx^ort Communications. /
m,
No cmmemt.
n.
Shore ?l r e Control Oommunlcations*
Nft c o mme ^ i t . . .. -
> *
Summary.
1. Giveaccountofdifficultiesnotcoveredin
vious questions*
Nona.
30
#
Subjecti ActionBep6rt ( *f l JLM\ ^i r l r l i 20 April
2 Comments endrecommendations,
Ir themost effi ci ent i nst al l at i on! operation,
and maintenance of a complete communication system, i t i s essenti al that
there "becl ose l i ai son "between theaomwaiication offi cer andtheunit
operations officer or section,
PARTV. Conclusion andRecommendation*
A
Conclusion, :
The training methods andcombat effectiveness oft hi s regiment
were proven sati sfactory in combat bytheoperation records of theyd.MarViv
which show that offi cers end troops of the>th Marines attacked aggressively
and advanced over andcaptured themajor hervily defended areas oft he sector
operated i n"bythe3&Mar Div, These facts are"borne out"bythe fcollewing
records: ' . '
1* Officers andmen ki l l ed in action ejid died of wounds i n
9th Marines exceeded thet ot al ,of such l osses of al l other troops^of the3d
Mer Divcombined. Along-with these figures thenon-effective rel at i ve figure
for theRegt wasmuch "below that of thetotal fortheremaining troops oftha
3d Division* Theother infentry regiment engaged carried 6 xwm~tfff esti va
figure more than 35^ higher than that of the9thMarines.
. 2# Thedefense of Ai rfi el d fe
9
.thehl gi ground from HH-L
362 (TA235-tr) to Hi l l 36a($A219-tT) andeest tothesea,theenemy pocket
i n TA 218UXT* 201-D3I andtheremainder of theenemy pocket inthe^th Pi v-
i si on sector at l S^B, lS^-A wert al l f i nal l y taken andcleaned out"bytroops
of the9thMerines.
captured.
1. That every possi bl e effort agdsafeguard be interposed
to prevent theuseof In8d.equa.taly trained recruits in action as replacements.
2; That every possible effort bemade to increase ammunition
and time allowance to train as many men aspossible in every armofthe
infantry, ,
3 That th*major features of training bebui l t aboutthe
squad andi t s operations with tanks andsupporting weapons, endthatthe
major portion of trai ni ng time beused intheoperation ofthesquad.
N-. That sguad training beplaced upon theuseof just the
two elements (assault andsupport) of thesquad wehave hadmen enough to
operate tfith both i n training endin combat, endthat l i t t l e time bawast3d
;
on theoretical sfiued operation*that is"l ost bythetime infantry units
to furnish scouts andspecial det ai l s,
HCWAHDH,
31
A.
ACTION ESPOHC 1ST? 3ATTALI0H SW MABIK3S
From: CO.
To ; CO*9thMarines*
Subject: ActionReport*IwoJime.
Reference: (a)3dMarineDivisionGeneralOrder137*dated
PARTI, Summary,
A. Theperiodcoveredbg^t&i**$of*t|rom
AlltimesmentionedarsKINGtimes.
B* This battalion participated isi p& of the actual ground
fighting on Iwo Jima le?.anl from BO*pl ut 6, wlieji i t paed through units
of the 21at Maxdnes, unirJl the'
:
'i*3ancL was officially declared secured and
then continued with mopT>inp:~up ope.ratisuvs and active pat rol l i ng. I t par-
ticipated in the fight fc*Moto/ama Airfield No, 2, and in the fight for the
ruggad terrain in tiie northsm section bi Iwo. Jima,
PASTII. Preliminaries.
A
#
BLT1-9consistedof|helstBn,SthMar;BtprA,ISthMar;1st
Hegi
f
l% n sCo,9thMar;istPlal,CJ^jdShgrlnjlsf>lat,CoA,3dPion
Bn;airaadB&fXialsontenmsfroathe3dJASCO;detachmentsfromthe28th
and3^thre^acementdiaftejaadrajR0llec1;lngsecMotfromCo3,3dMedBn,
Hewe-76r>t^iareport#ill:dealmainlyniththeIstln,?thpar,inthatthe
unitsmentionedabovewerenotattachedthroughouttheaction.
B. Thetrainingofthisbattalionpriortothecampaignconsisted
ofellphasesofinfantryworks fromthesquadtothebattalion,attack:and
defense,nightandday, Theemphasiswasplacedoatheattackandreduction
offortifiedpositionsbySquadsandplatoons. Thisbattalionwaslaanex-
cellentstateoftrainingattheoutsetofthe#pration,themoralewashigh*
andthequalityofofficersandaba-commissionedofficerswasexcellent.
C. Allordersissueddaringtheactionwereoralorders*
PASTIIX. 'Chronologicalaccountoftheaction,
A. Thisaccountcommence*withthedaythisbattalionlandedon
theislandandincludesalltheimportantactionsuntilthetimewede-
partedfromtheisland. . .
I* ShisBLJcompletedloadingcargoandtroopsaboardthe
USSPAYSETS(PAU3)on 9February,l9U5,Immediatelyafterwhich
wepulledoutintotheharboremd.remainedthereuntiltheoon~
voydepartedfortheoperation. Wereceivedwordontheafter*
noonof23FebU5thatwewouldlaadonthefollowingday.V
landedasorderedinLCM<s~thesurfbeingtooheavyfortCVP*
atXkoOton2*tFebU5*aBeachYellow2,aadproceededtoanas*
semblyareasouthaadwattbtMotoyamaAirfieldHo.1.BtryA,
12thMar,andtheShip'sPlatoonrsmainedaboardasdidtheBa
5?qHwhowespreparedtounloadiaeshipuponorder. Were-
ceiveds$HMMiomortarandartilleryfireintheaeaablyarea
throughoutthenight.
-Page1af11
Subject; Jteport.
18 April, 191*5,
8. Ihe following day, 2 5 2 ^ 5 , t hi s- f ^j i a/ i
0
*
1
passed through
elements of t he 21st Marinas witii theni
4
ss5cn cf sei si ng the high
ground overlooking Ai rfi el d No ,1.
M
5.th I>
V
L
r
.P"a.v.d'0
1
' abr east ,
n
3" u j)i.8z~* cf H\. esaal ware jn the r i ^Ji t , ' ve effected x-athe
at t ack a*
1
".O^.vOwrMi "talk, ftitMl'uy* TUJP v''?9pcru,
:
&'iC T/bir- wath
;.in^ of a:^h^eeoayai8;.ut *r
%
ch5high g;rcuid 't T!')OP Clwo
L/.l^
r
Ov/O) eni tlie v-iclrilij" *M3}
</
rf^ qniue oLa"*.c ' ' Kill
3
#
Jfftljt James S, Bo-wHi^
fl
0"
, waswounded
shor t l y eftftr '-he.att.acfe vanvjJ3
.-lo gain
much
r
,To 6..-.ff
mori-ix, ard
of
| f
0"Co,v
the? l i i l l . ^.-u.i
\ j , Co
un-*er O.r
t
;t '?oi:i;'^'.iI
prsition
"beLiui l/.e .isw.il;,
v
'- S. Clajyp
of " 1 " Oohyc* "u?^a v>K*a
v
dyd 'vxlw tiio
Viiliair. wcC^orywa :Tii-jr..;
c
S'Vi 1I nes' w*are r.iori In wi t h
t he &.i t he ?.uPii# 9^r ^T on hs l e f t ,
r
l en a
*r. The ne' t t day Oo"A"pasced t r o u g h Co " 0
u
t
aod wi t h
"A
11
aitd "E
1
i n i he a s r a ul t ve or-oo aggi i t i *i ?l t o e^inp ;
:
Ki i l
Pe t e r " VI A i t s- a^s- s ^f ^avefi ?ndpi.iT>-:ie.;, Oa^tM^Crory of
ir:.d sa
Af.3? P
I.-Ii s
gained*
Co "L
<<:
,
' r ?
jnt aid
;' in
?
P
0^ the <?7*^O*
1
P9T8riary wecase agi i n attacked with
r
B
lf
"A", ar.d"L" (at t ached), anl tif^fr i nt ense figiiitag a l l
day tiie P9isy
:
ji back va^l>ikni, 9153* hc;,0.*;hehjlg/' ground
whec daT^r-eee f oi l . Bma?,Lpat^oifi were seut cut dariaij t hat
ni ght ,it-h thes-ission oi"Cbptiiri*g pr i soner s, Intt wereun-
succesrful ,
o. AtOS15on the 28th of February the 3dBn, 21stMa-*
r i nes passed through ourl i ne* andcontinued the at t ach. Wa
went i nt o a reserve posi t i on *&&$* weremained unt i l Iw5. -
I V ^ when w?pa&qed i^rou^L ipQtwflfttii of i^ie^l et Maria*
p ^ p
about 600ysrds eaft a? Mcioyama
v
Tiila* ana continued the
at t ack t j .8<*i8rt "tife layft'iil'fih ground <i t he3^te%D'i^:soae of
act i on i n thenort hern endt>t.*h.ei sl and. Byt hi s timeour
casual t i es hedts'e^n hcavyy. part i cul arl y i n of f i cer s andn&iw
cpffiffiissioxidd officers. , .\ ^i usd recei ved replacements someof
whom wer? ptit cut r,o -cb-3ceotpanjar
4
ot hers of *jhon w*re r e-
t ai nel "byt!ie3n CPfor supply aad evacJUafcicn purposes. We
Weat t acked 3a;&i n ^heati*?ii\ooa with Co
f
e, "B*
1
e^5,
ft
C^a-
br eas t , andiuadc l i t t l e ^ro^ress s^ainet intei^.^c ev.cwy f i r e
of a l l type's .bef&'K ni ght f al l , Co"B'
f
was'^ cc:.r:-a-\^dby
2dLt John H^.; ^i #ot Co
M
0
M
by i^t-t.^; Bftvwtna s Coet-jatf.-.ui,
1
and
Co A!'by, ( ^t ^y^4i 6; ^r J t t r pe i
crganxaction '
l y
against pi l l boxes andcaves ands t i l l . our advance could
measured in yards. Wmanaged to pass one company ihrotgh
2 of 11Pages _
V '
ion Report. (Coat*d) ISSprit,
other or to make a relief after darkness every day* ao that
each company could get into a reserve position for rest and re-
organization once about every third day. Wesuffered more
casualties during those days and gained but about 350 yards,
6, At O&55 IMar^, we attacked under caver of darkness
fl
B
H
with
H
B
W
and
tt
O
l!
06*8 in the assault, on the right, and by
dawnboth companies hadmadeapproximately 200 yards with no
resistance. Ac i t appeared, they had by-passed the pillboxes
and caves which hadpreviously held themup. Conseijuently, i t
took several hours for the assault platoons to send back strong
patrol* to their rear to clean out these pockets. Wewere un-
able to evacuate wounded or to supply the "front line platoons
until this was done. This being done, the assault companies
jumped off in an organized attack at 1200, Shortly afterwards*
Co
H
C
H
, on the l ef t , was held up, having once again met strong
enemy resistance. Onthe other hand> "B", the right company,
reported that they were moving steadily forward and that Co
w
Gr
n
,
2Jd Marines, on their right, was doing the same. It was then
that the order was issued to Co
4I
B
H
to disregard the company
on i t s l eft and continue the attack to the l ast high ground*
at which place they could ti e in with the JdBn, 9th Marines*
who held Hill 362 in 219 tJi This would cut off completely
al l remaining Japanese in that area. The companypushed for-
ward as directed and gained a foothold on the high ground, and
were holding i t under severe enemy fire from the front and
l ef t flank. The 3dBn, 9th Marines, marked their right flank
with smoke and the .gap was too large to fi l l , . Furthermore*
the enemy s t i l l held the intervening ground, and the company
on
n
3
M
'Co.
1
s right hadpulled back to a better defensive line*'
Confronted with this situation and with many casualties, we
withdrew
fl
B
11
Co to a better defensive line. Under cover of
2dLt William J. Zimmer (later killed in action) of Co
H
A,
and his platoon, Co "*B.*withdrew to the new l i ne. Twenty-four
dead had to be l eft on the hi l l and twenty wounded were e-
vacuated under cover of darkness,
% The following day elements of the 21st Marines once
again passed through our.lines after which we went into Di-
vision reserve until 10&$arty>
#
Onthis day we received orders
to sweep the beach area in the 9th Marines eone of action.
Wecommenced this action late in the afternoon and finished
i t the next day, Asocket of Japs was l ef t , however, in
202 H, That night wemovedup on to the*high ground over-
looking the beach andprepared to attack west the next, day
against a pocket of the enemy which the 3dBn, 21st Marines had
been attacking from the east,
10. For three days we attacked this -nocket and gained
about 350 yards until on the lkth of Marchat 17^5* the 2&Bn,
9th Marines* passed through our lines and continued the attack
on what later became known as "Oushmen's Pocket*
1
. Wemoved to a
reserve area and from there to a patrol area on the eastern side
of the island, From there we actively patrolled until the bat-
talion left the island and returned to the base camp.
IV. Comments,
A. Administrative.
\
- Page J of 11 Pages -
18 April,
1. This battalion landed with 3J Marine officer* and J59
men, 2 officers (USN) and 38 men. Total casualties, as of k
April* l9ty>i wre 25 officers and 6fift msa. This figure includes
al l replacements sent to this organisation after landing* Tne
) A
following i s a breakdown of the casualties as reported on that
da y : ' ,
; ;
_ . -
OFFICERS ENLISTED TOTAL
KilledinAction Iks
157
WoundedinAction
xk
klk
MissinginAction
5 5
DiedofWoundsReceivedin
Action 20
I
a
Non-effective
I
97 98
55 S8\ 709
Side, war neurosis, etc,
(a) 7 officers and 196 men joined this battalion
during the'campaign, a very large majority of whomwere
nothing more than recruits, and we had very manyttn*-
fortunate experiences.wiAk~ttierl~.*Xfc.i s strongly. reCjjm-
mended that such individuals not "besent as front l i ne
replacements, for they simply cannot do the job without
fi rst having "been'trained with the unit with which they
ere fighting, They cannot "beexpected to f i l l in the
ranks when noaaeof them knewhow to operate a flame
thrower, a "bazooka", or how to set off a r>ole change,
.and many did not knowhow to $$$?&$& a BAR, much l ess a
machine gun/of mortar. Uon-commissioned officer re-
placements were mainly experienced only as drill in-
structors; occasionally one was found who had hadpre-*
vious fi el d work. However* these same replacements
proved their mettle,as carrying parties to supply the
companies and to evacuate woun&ed. Wecould not have
done without them. Hence, onfthe basis^ of this, i t i s
further recommended that If re|^ceaients are available
they be sent to the infantr^ Vittaiions for just such
purposes, but not for duty with the ri fl e companies.
In that way they do not have to do,a job which requires
previous training; they are of invaluable assistance and
simultaneously they "become accustomed to the noise and
confusion of battle. Whenthe-jMR$l'gn *
s
over and they
receive training with the compariieej they should nrove
easy to indoctrinate. Replacement officers, though in-*
experienced, proved capable of taking over at any time*
Fourbut of seven became casualties in this organisation
*the other three have platoons and are rendering com-
mendable service.
l a
A
d i n
S
t u t
2 The morale of ^ r tifrffairpi".Wtf m?
a
? 1**"* vp9$. , .
decreased gradually as the operation continued. There was'not*a
great deal that we could do for morale except when,i n a reserve
status we would serve hot coffee and doughnuts, allow the men to
rest , and have the Red Cross representatives and the chaplains do
thei r share-. It Is no coincidence that the chaplains always have a
large turnout during a campaign.
3# ^T prisoners captured war* briefly questione
given fi rst aid i f needed, and sent to higher echelon.
ft - Page k of 11 Pages -
Subject: ActionReport* (Cont'd). 18April,
ence.
The inapt, andphotographs furnished for ouruse were very
good. Mostly ufcei va* Iwo Jima, i/10,000; however, i t was not en-
tirely accurat3. Pfcovcgrsphs -err-excellent, particularly gridded
ones. The 3-- officefcerstus some laOe photographs .taken after the
operation had commenced) of the area in which we were working at one
particular time, and
A
,hey were extremely helpful. It i s recommended
that in the future, battalions be furnished gridded phonographs of a
scale l/5f00O to be used in conjunction with the map, and that they
be crf^iaually furnished late photographs of their sectors as the
battle progresses and the terrain becomes distorted.
2. One Japanese language man,, a private first class, was at-
tached throughout. Heappeared well-trained, efficient, andwas
very satisfactory.
3* No new Japanese tactics were encountered except possibly
his reluctance to counter-attack. The enemy simply has got to be
given credit for conducting an intelligent defenaa.
k. The use of POW
!
s to induce their comrades tft surrender
worked well at one time during the patrolling phase. Agroup tf
enemy soldiers were hiding in a deep cave and would not surrender
to the interpreter, but did so after aPOIflfwas sent into the cave
to talk to them. Onanother occasion when this was triad the enemy
in tip cave held the POWend would not l et him come tack out.
C
Operations and training.
1. Troops;wereschooledondetailsoftheoperationwhile
aboardship. Allmaps,phoicgraphs,charta,orders,intelligence
data,etc.,weremadeavailableforplatoonleaderstoholdin-
struction!whichtheydid. Debarkationdrillswereheldoften*
* . . "
2. Theinfantry Scfua&v/ith flame throwers, pole charges,
smoke grenades, rocket laimcfcers, etc. , i s uti.M the most affec-
tive weapon again*t enemy fortifications. Theinfancry-tank team
Cannot be beaten. They should train together a3 imicli as possible*
Wheno&rmen, skilled in these things were gone, our attack suffered
gjreatjy* Theportable flam* thrower, M2-2* ia excellent. Flame
thrower operators must be taught to crawl or.-tlaeir oellies and
operate from their belliee.
3. EnemyATmeasures were not unusual; they use their
tanks as pillboxes, digging thorn in leaving them immobile. They
were known to change the location of these tanks during the night.
k
t
Infantry-tack coordination was carried on by the use
of the SCR300 5n the platoon leader
f
tank and Ui- xrtip com-
panies* SCR200, ?*he araorod Imlldoser wa&v.seci -.IH;.flerably on
this operation. It wu3 blow but to was the en*:./? ^cr.Ttion.
5. ' War dogs wer3i^oc- n.^i .
r
-'L.'^?e;o^.rolling -jhase of
the operation. The d^a rcttc^a v... -v.wi tli?. 7vh ~J?TDogPla^
toon, and as a group did ao
i;
a;v>s>. v.--.a- t.?aiJie5. In-one irstance
a Jap cravrled to within 10 ya.?/.? of ?.&J?and ?e fsiled
Onanather occasion, the ecjv-t <^C^P iefc a T>6i*7.1
;
r^n
Rof.11
Subject: Action PspcrC
bivouac area, and bi t tvo marines, . i t i s reeffdraijlld that war .
dogs be trained in working against, caves* The non-commissioned
officer in charge of this platcon admitted that he had seme very-
poor dogs. Ba further said that he had recommended that J,Me
dogs be replaced "before th^ O'nenviozi.t "but his recoiniranda.::.on was
turned dcwn,
C. Diiring the campaign one night attack was oor.cca-.te-ib^*
the "battalion, the order for which wts received after darkness?,
t hi s, the attack w*nfc fai i l y well, for the enemy v~s
;'- caught sleeping. fl-*vaver, i t 1.3 ra^commend^i
4
.li*rl night
opera'-3^r. orders >.e iesied at 3e,3st f>j
f
&^ one-half hour** before
darkness. Hhe reasons ;cr.' t.hxe- are cW^'oa?
5
, Nitjht efc^acJcfi witfe
limited objectives mayprove very effective particularly rince
the Japanese io not.p-xpect th^m from -us.- '
D.
1. The supply picture >"ab whcl3.7%^i-ecp.acr ertcej.t for the
shortage of 81mmmortar aamuaJtSon i.&l>. t-pa?^ i"! dJlfctr
t
re:.t
periods. In connection with I hi i , hor^?., ai- "-];luaiiy ierge
amount of Slmmmortar anmuniti'.on wa e:.Tsep.'tel on Miis ox,er&v>cn
2. Bations yere adequate, iTba
?!
O
J
ration i s very we'j.l
liked {by the troops now that i t has levisea. menae. West e B
ration when we commencedatr-olling; however, very l i t t l e variety
in those rations made a*fry monotonous, diet.
N
25ie *C
n
ration
with the Ten-in-One along with the extra components of the B
would have served j ust as well, The CoXemen gasoline stove was
widely used and should be issued on the basis of one per eight men,
3. Palletized cargo did not work out satisfactorily be-
cause the U3S 2VOTUTEdid aot have the f aci l i t i es to handle i t .
It could be loaded only on the hatch square, because they had no
equipment to move i t from there to the corners of the holds, and
tbe pallet loads were too heavy to manhao.ais
#
Cpn^eqaently, the
pal l et s had to be broken down and the cargo loaded by cargo nets
except for the l ast palleta loaded, which were left on the hatch
8cpaarea, The Wilson drums,were satisfactory. They were easy to
handle, they kept the paa^o-dty.and undamaged, and whan the time
came to reembark they were used again, Awooden oraie %ormai;ty.
i s sirashed beyond any possibility ^-
:
iag i t twice. - . , . '
k, T'ie shore party functioned well ai\d ao change is,
recommsnd^d.
5. Tn;.s battalion had two cargo carriers M29C (Weasel),
two cna-ton trucks, four one-toa t r a i l e r ^ four quarter-ton
trucks, and five qtiarter-ton t r ai l er s, a i l of which, was adequate
transport ition for our supply nee&s. Wepacked one Weasel
and t r ai l sr w5th heavy machine uns and ammuniticn; a ono^-ton
tnct" ard t r ai l er with Home thrower servicing gea
1
*, and another
ore-ton truck anC t r ai l er vith extra flame throwers andSlmm
the
r
ie specially iostcLfrd V3'* C.LOS we* >u,c uerjdedj'buit ihe idea
i s oxcsl l ^t enl sliov-l''.IV*,'re^ in- WJ* h
>-Page 5 of U prges -
18 Apri l , 19U5.
1. Ih:? l a r a Uo t t had the r.sual a r t i l l e r y l i ai son and 50
teams, "both of vlj.^L +rr.ntidied ex~ei:.en';ly. Two FO teams, one
vibh ep.cn as-.&uH ^'..-.v^ir-, ^;uri coiAp*ac.My with us . Each team
ex o u o ' l i j e i , o:ie 3oc.it. aer^esnt, one radioman, one
r d mo .. ui et r ^i ^t r>r.i*-8^, whioL ivas adequate personnel ,
i ue-am. whicr o p e ^ t ^ in. the bat t al i on GP, consi st ed
of
A
r.e cf-ticei, one zo^serge, , .-,ne ral:\o:.iaa, and si x wiremeni which
r i s e p-o>.>.c "be auequ+.>, ' i l l i nf9i i *ry-art i l l ery l i ai son was
""
1
.by di r ect ^ot' T^rsatior oetweeu *hc ' "battrlicn commander
avt i l l er y liaiHo;i of f i cer . The system i s ef f i ci ent and
2 The personnel of the FO teams eni the l i ai son team
v/ero Tsry well >iained; Vaey knew t hei r jr"bs thoror.ghly.
3, .Both used the SCS 6lO which functjonod eyccl l ent l y.
110 roinirunications wire wr>.s .layed from the "bati-,ery po^i t i ci to
+ha i nfent ry "battalion C? ai d l }0 comaran5.cai,i.)r*e wS.re war Isy
fror. the bat t al i on CP i*c !?0 'ieanir. wft h' fue a"'sa*vufc companies,
JLs v.sual, the t:mks vere eta carare cf troJren v.i.-:e .T03
1
; ).T the
x'j in ganer&l, the commuiicaticTi'i wore s-9
l
"l-'Ca' ory.
T
i-, 0"br,eTr-at:.on va"5 f ai r on iwy JLma i nsoi Tr -^s s<?Zac
;
:ton
n
f OrJ? i ^ concej:nev3.: i..Awdve*
%
?
i t was rn P%:^f>edingly rtsi-rtiroes
t l ^e :o 'vocwfVrra fror. the front li.aes *dl.;H c
v
.e- ">>? of
. ^ '.out c
5, Amr.uni'-i-jn nupply Permed ta present no problem.
thon^h we vere :L;.fo,?ned a fe-A
r
time3 t hat 75 pack hovi t t er ara-
munition -'/a? rTraniA^ t'ho.fi wo-^era a"b?e to obt ai n a i l ra-
6, The effect of our own ev'tiXlevy wa& hard to determine
i n tlteU the i nst al l at i on' s above g:rDuivl v^ere VedXy iJ. stcrtad t-y
a l l types of i"2ro. Foweve.r, our ar^il"
1
e*r
r
w*.t> ru-t ef^ec+.jve
aga' ns' i caves and concrete pillbox: wMc?\ r.ne l e *el vi*.h vc
t}e surface of the ground,
7* Snamy a r t i l l e r y was def i ni t e] / cf/.-c^JTe agrinr-t ns .
However, i t could have "heen more so i f they
v
<,.d un^i-ed th.oir
S Enmy t ar get s were l ocat ed and f i r ed itpon mainly by
the FG nethod
9, Fo change i s recommended in the present i
aptlxl-3ry x i i i
3.. Pro.Hm5nary heavy flt.r^kds h^d l i t t l e , i f ery
f
effect
npon enery i ^a t a l l a i - r^v Vxi in-, -i t -/ o^ t-ie r>08iii
r
>u8 er-
countered werft inde^r-')'.-
1
-"!. ?.-a ... _r VXIV-J b3en di f f i ^ul i t^>
icnojk j^. t -Tve.n with pz-a-^i-^.?r >-.^i..i,.j
gr eat er de'.ay fi ner si")\t]a
1
vrc, 'Le.a
p or ?-.*-
could lot, oTisiive ttv.: aJTfeitr of pr3l l . i i naryft*,?;.fc
'-cjfce " T 11 Pag
Subject; ,\ct.\on Bepoxi.
3. Performance by t he a i ^ l i a i F s n pari / i ea wa? wr coi l er t ,
Th^y ver** well t rri n^ci "Old sf^ir".e;:*-,. VrtTus"
1
. cont'ac* 'c3 :ia..r\~
tarne."
1
. with naval g*oaii.: Jird a t ^ l l p x y Ii?-'l3on off5cart- ^ ch'.n
t he bat^tcliojc vl.p., Mi.fyxoc r:5.^e*s <'o/.
:
ai r ed aI"
1
p- i c*ue-vl
l
v
.i0*iaa*i6n. Air rt-ceckr were dne ot a d we?.I vud. r ;,td,rvaif;i;-ii
-
CoDdlt.ijns, Hsdio coLaciuiications wi ,b-i.lr S^ippoi-t JcuV
p:1
oI vo;*e
ma.in^rinod r t ^.11 l i ^es v/xiMe ih'.v II'T wei
hare Ve^ri r. ' el t-.3T^.-3er. ACI/ 1.8%s '-wn.tn -'j '.Vno st:.5.t^-si sn.l
tl;,-- .J:1 rpo^Ci^ft t-oi, vi - u ICC - w i t >i . i ^.
o.. Pan-e."'.. crera effcv-
1
;..-
5
-v^-.:i..a markirg fri' ^ni";/ "-'iiypR.
6, T'im^ng of st r i ko* vas SjowTintii Vo.c/ ec-ju^lly got
st art ed. , Tilts iva" r!?-.e '.'> .i r,-jjibj? -jf ^c.t or i . 1, c , ..-.--v-ra
long (
7 iDumny at t ack3 wore not unr.c! *-nx-"-2 rn .?.:>-i/"nVr
our troops
:>
Tkurcny at t acks pr i or to !o-,
r
<-: ..7"ins xo~"a' ^^rix^i i-
ware efv'BC-VjV''?* partic*i.1.at*.L^- in ac.iur-t-ing (."'r^i^o.a oJ s^ach. ,
?, non
J
^'o!'. of aircTafVfrod the gr.:ind C(/cli b^Ts"baeii
bet t er had-ihs SaTj net been uflod^
9. It 5e re'ioir.TneDied tbat night observation plane? bo
kept 5n the ai r a
4
- al l *;1JI?B
#
When these vrere enplov3u
r
enemy
ax"!j.a.'
l
er;"ard ror^ar ii"*e --TR*minimised,
J
0
'J't.^
1
:i'i3 l i r e Oc?itrol personnel that opara'ied vi';!\
tli' s >a^a_?6a cor.&it9d of one"TOtea*i (l officer ard5men)>
anr". ure Mar*so:v ^am Ci officer andf>raen). They were cd^^Uat
fo^ vl.etpe:.pt.;.on an!wsre' ffff^.clent and well vrniaod.
c-. I t 3 SOH28
ij
wasf.sec. by the Tia.'.son andPOteamsand
p e d :;o "0.^ ar> 3.T.C3"J.3e n t e b .
j , ri ght harasemen'; f i r es were used every night, the
effeu 0^ wLJ'T'i coulu.not ae o>se?rvd.
*, i'Cwdine.tic-i ta^^aer. aC^acent uni t e regardJ.ng f i r i ng
H2
r
ijic' i.ll . ^i aAt i ^i i vas do.nfc eif--wtfvely "hj rarHc .Vf -"3 ve.r
i a a ricrao' o. a wn*re >e we"*e rec?3v
4
.:\g :Oie-ri'll';.- x-^-c.j ^r i : / : ra
lux T;C 97X01, *',& 3i::iH*vr. o+f-.?s.v aa3.1.?'
;;
t>?. -
v
ivr;*--<'"" r^.
x
i. who
i:" run wailed tHc '^n
+
-..*o''. "-lixj,>
r
.
L
..<- jcnt.'."j
>;
--i:'p ^Le'
cf
COT1
S !7.1Pages.
,onv'u.)
E,
1. , At least one p}atoon cf en^ia^ere WPS attached to us
a.bio?-*-. continuousLy !Tie Brigineerr lid rot turn cut. to be en*.i.rely
satisfactory i-i that tkaii tiatriir
1
^ and e^nerionco with mines and
booty traps Peers to hav^ b>?6,a tie^leVuel.,,
f
iho IM'arv^ry Vrully
n3ed3 combat engineers WIJO ran ag^rs.^si^ely clear mine :?iel<?.3
and booby-trapped areas. They must jrke their rirfca also. Their
use of demolitioDB,in'cealiog' cever v<rs-s-ei'y well done however.
X, It tcok 2.9 hours to load the USS FATlTTE, which time
could have "been decreased but for the fo?lowing: (l) Almost al l
pal l et s had to "bebrokeit down at the cargo assembly ?xrea, (2)
The cargo assembly area was too small; only two trucks could load
there simultaneously, (3) There were no l i ght s in the cargo as-
sembly area and there was a delay while they were being i nst al l ed,
and (k) APlash Red delayed the loading slightly but when i t was
over no one around knew how to st art the generator which caused
further delay unt i l i t could be started*
2. Total time elapsed in unloading was 12 days, which was
a result of poor hydro'graphic conditions, and the overall picture
of the operation i t sel f .
J. Ordnance,
1 iDhiabattalionusedthefollowingweapons,allof
whichfunctionednormally,fortheentireoperation.
Rifle,Ml 1*55
Carbine klk
BAR 81
LMG IS
HMO 18
RocketLauncher 12
FlameThrower,M2-237
M cal.,pistol 21
Thefollowingisanapproximatelistofammunition
TYPE ROTJITDS
Cartridge. Bal l , Carbine, Cal .30 Ml g,000
Oertrid^e, Grenade, Carbine, Cal .30 M6 3,000
"art ri ' l ge
:
A? Cil .30 M2 (5 rd. cl i p) 50,000
. "ar. jrjge, AP Cal .30 M2-(8 rd. cl i p)
ver
u
rid^;e, Trace^, Cal .30 M?
v)pvi-.j.r<ife3 Mf l e Grenade, Cal .30 M3
<,ono
OLjtiidge, A? St Cr, Belied Cal .JO
f (
a r t i r ^ e , Bal l , Cal \
r
".0,000
V;00.
, IIS,
Shel l ,
?"..nrr
500
Cre-v-.ed3, Hani, ? g
C-reaado, Kpnd, I l l un,
Pa-^es
ibjeci nt'd).
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Y2, M15
}
-!-,X)O
Grenade, Hand, Colored, Red <5
3, Haad, Ool orei , Yellow T.H
>, Pdf l e, AT,K9A1 2
f
000
Li-reuada, itsf i e , Fraf, Tmp, Ml7 . . . - , ' ' -
G-rsnade, ki ' f i e, ftriolra
Grenade, Ri f l e , Cmoke, Golored, Red
25
Grenade, Ri f l e, Lmoke.. Colored, Yellow
Grenade, Ri f l e , fcmoke, Colored, Amber 25
Rocket, HE,AT, . 36", MaA3
Adapter Gx*enade Pr oj ect i or , Ml 200
Fl ar e, Tr i p,MU9
Caps, Bl as t i ng, Non- el ect r i c, #g ?.vX>0
Cord, det onat i ng (prima Cori) 50 rolls
Block, Demolition, Chain, Ml 50 cases
Block, Demolition, .0-2
50 cases
Expl osi ve, (DM,3/ 2 l o , bl ocks 75 cases
Fuse,blasting*time
^, 000
feet
1,000
Fuselightera
Cylinder,Ignition
;
Ml
150
Napalm
700 gal.
Hitrogencylinder 15 cyl.
3. Onejeepambulancefrom"B"MedicalCoandourown
jeepambulancewereusedinadditiontothevehiclesmentioned
earlierinthereport. Allvehiclesprovedsatisfactoryand
wereusedduringtheentirecampaign. OneWeaselwasdestroyed
byadirectartilleryhit. TheWeaselisgoodiathesaad,but
itthrowstracksveryeasily. Turnshavetobemadeveryslowly.
Thepintleontherearofittowhichtheone-tontrailerwas
latchedwasnotstrongenough. Theybenteasilyandevensnapped
attimes.
K, Chemical.
1, Priortotheoperationeverymanwastrainedintheuse
ofthegasmask, EachCohadtraineddecontaminationsquad. Masks
wereissuedpriortoembarkation;theywerecarriedashoreandplaced
indumpsonDplus6.Theremainderofthebattaliongasequipment*
whichconsistschieflyofdecontaminationgear,wasunloadedand
keptin adumpduringtheentireoperation. Noenemyuseofchemi-
calswasnoted,
L.
Medical.
1. Therewerenogreatproblemsofsanitationduringthe
operation;however,thereweremanycasualtiestobetreated.
Thebattalionaidstationtreated523casualties,I+U7ofwhich
wereevacuated,andfGreturnedtodutyonIwoJima. Therewere
317walkingwoundedand206stretchercases. Evacuationwasef-
fectedbylitterbearersfromthefrontlinecompaniestothebat-
talionaidstation,andbyjeepambulancefromtheretothemedical
companies. The2$litterbearersineachcoutpanyweredefinitely
inadequate. Theaidstationwasalwayssetupwithintheperimeter
ofthebattalionCPanditssecur:.tyandprotectioncamefromit.
Oneblackouttentwasusedvixenthesituationpermitted.
2. Theequipmentcarriedashoreconsistedoffourcombat
caseswithbareessentials,twoCasesofplasr
restofthegearwasunloadedandkept
n >.*'
VPages -
t
- -i * . '
18
?f<
The two J^rn? am"bulanc3B w$re adequate for evacuation purposes,
Wound*!#0W>a were gt^tt th aam **aiea*-as our men
t
aad
seat to the*rea* S&eay dead were Juried wherever found;
own ^were'dent io the*eemetsryf^^^' ^^* '-." *
4
' *** ^"^
3. Albtiaen was frequently used tn l i eu of plasma,
cause i t i s easier to carry and to
'\, Because of tH heavy casualties suffered, i tWAS
necessary to replace ki l l ed, wounded, and fatigued corpamen from
the ri f l e companies with those from the aid station group. It
was discovered that the aid station corpsmn were not well enough
acquainted with the way the companies worked in matters of cover,
concealment, etc* Jt i s recommended that al l corpsmen receive
training with the ri f l e companies. That wi l l be the pol i cy in
t hi s battalion i n the
5. This organisation had, upon landing, two doctors and
thirty~eiht hospital com&men. The TOcal l s for three corpsmen
-attached t><>each ri f l e corapaaayj laowever, ye use s^x in each
t
i^pany an.%tvp wi
:
fh ijk -S|mw mortar is(|tfeo^a,, ant ' ^e res^t
e battalion aid stati on. It i s a much more satisfactory
works
al l of^which funetiened excel l entl y. The 110 Iatera3
wire
in.adjaceftt. unjlt.affords, the n*es:t ef f i ci ent
ther
i <
*>"UU Li
\ '.. . * *
. . "A
*'1*
4 . . , n . i '
j
- ? -
2B01OS0ES-3,
ACTIOH to
RSC/reb
HEADQUARTERS,SECOND3ATTALIF,NI
MARINEDIVISION,FL3ETMARIN
JNTHEFIELD,
NTHMARINES
EFORGE,
19April,
From* C0
To t CO,9thMarines*
Subject! ActionReport,IVOJIMA.
References (a)GO137>3*Mar2>iv.
InaccordancewithRef(a)thefollowingreportofactionofthe
SecondBattalion9thMarines,IWOJIMAOperationisherebysubmitted?
PARTI Summary.
km Periodcovered2UFeb-"7April,19^5.
B* ThisbattalionscampaignonIw>Jimafoilsintokphases;l)
CaptureofAirfield#2j2)assaultonenemystrongpoint201Es3)Hedr-
uctionof201Efromrearafterithadbecomeapocket:k)Patrolling
andmoppingup.
PARTII Preliminaries.
A* Compositionofthereportingcommand.
1. 2ndBn9thMar.
2, ArtyLnPersonnel*
3 NavalGunfireLnPersonnel*
b. AirLnPersonnel.
5* 2ndPlatRegt'lWpnsCo,9thMar.
6 TwoPlrts3&TkBn.
7* OnePlatCoA3dEngrBn.
B Themissionofthisbattalionwasthedestructionofthe
enemyinitszoneofaction* Theactioninvolvingthebattalionwasoneof
continuousassaultonenemyemplacementsandpillboxes. Themissionwas
assignedfromdaytodaytheeveningbeforetheattack,leavingnotime
forrehearsalortrainingfortheattapk. Theplanninginvolvedwasthat
ofcoordinatingthefiresoftheattachedsupportingweaponsandunits.
The.onlytrainingconductedlythebattalionbccuredtowardtheandof
theperiodwhencasualties
1
intrinedpersonnelmadeitnecessaryto
instructthereplacementpersonnelintheintricaciesofpillboxreduc-
tionandthespecialwerjpons(flamethrowers,demolitions,bazookas,
automaticrifles,etc)employedinsuchassaults.
C, Thisbattalioniscreditedwithhavingkilled12^0enemy
troops* Thisfigurebeingasummaryofdailyestima-tes. Thetotalenemy
deadcannotbeaccuratelyoreportedasthenumberofenemysealedinto
emplacementsandcavescanneverbesccuratlydetermined. Throughoutthe
BattalionZof&stragglersandremnantsofenoffijrunits,destroyedelse-
where,weremet*.Intheseinstancestheyhadbeenmoldedintoadefen-
sivetatt
fm
^
L
assignedadefinitedefensivearea* Duringtheattackfrom
thevicinityofAirfield#2totheberchthisBnencounteredpartsofthe
IwoJimaGuardFaces,9NavrlUnit,comprisedofbothinfantryand&nti~
aircraftpersonneli thi 11thAntiTonkCompany;the20thMcciiin
CannonCompany;elementsofthe20thIndependentKortarBattalion;and
elementsofthe1^5thInfRegt. Thefinoloi-gr-r^zedstrongpointin
201Bwascomposedofthe31^+thIndependentInfBnvdtliatle^sttwo
companiesofthe26thTankRegt?>sitscore* Fribdydefenseswerecharac-
terisedbynumerouspillboxesofftoneconstmcrlon ^s*.oneblocksap-prox-*
iaatalyonefootsquare}eachsitedtodelivp|^lly supportinggrazing
Subject? ActionReport*_IWO JTKA,
fire* Individualriflep5.i,econstructed similartothepillboxeswereso
disposedastocovereachpillbox* Inadditiontotheaforementioned
defensiveinstallationsartilleryandmortar"barrageswere employed
extensively* Aftertheassaultphasewasoverandpatrollingandmopping
up.started* theenemyused>cavesando#enholesasDdefense* Theseposition*
offeredlittledifficultytnthatthecavesandtunnelswereofsuchdepth
thrtsealingtheentranceswassufficient Thecavesandtunnelsrequired-
hugequantitiesofexplosivestoaccomplishthissealingoperation*
PARTIII AccountofAction, . *4r
FIRST PBAS-3E? CAPTUKB OF Ai mW ) #2 . *
& Afteranuneventfullandingon2kFebandonenightin
assemblyareaikfyD
f
theb&ttolionwasorderedto.passthrough2~21and +-&
seize0-2at0330,25Feb* VowerefacedwithaUoOydreentrant which
precluded closesupport byheavyweapons* Reconnaissancewramadeand3n
attackorderissuedatOS^O* Considerationwasj^iventoriding infantry
on"backsof,tan2acrossairfieldbutwsrejected"becauseheightofenemy
M&firewasnotknownandbecausetankscouldnotbedeployedinacovered
positionandmortarfireontankswasintense* ConsequentlyInffollowed
LD
t
ran into o highly organised maise of rauturlly supporting pillboxes with
automatic wpns and AT guns slipcovered by riflemen in cavea nd trencher*
After 2 | days of painstaking t^nk infantry assault t hi s strong point f el l
on the 27th* In the mean time at 1130 on 26 Feb the reserve Co was pushed
up behind the ri ght company

, ^ The F.es Co attacked to the West, madte contact

with the uni t on the lt. and thus eliminated the reentrant* On the
morning of the 2j t h both assrul t Cos lumped off rad by the end of t he day
a
had token the hi#h ground at 1.95 I a. 7 i.a k
a]
*d to hand assault with the
bnyonet* On the morning of the 29th 1-21 executed a passage of limes an
we went into Reft. ^
2* ThiB phase w*s marked by continuous use of support by t rnks,
art y 1 Favel Gunfire, a i r , and mortars* Both HE o.n& smoke were used* For
the Inf i t was a continuous pillbox assault using immense quantities of ;
rocketsj.and flame* livery yard was fought for, andwhen
washeld under intense enemy mcrt^r and art y fire* Without our
own s-jiperb supporting werpons, success would h?ve been doubtful^
D
) ...3* To our credit? t hi s atk rdvanoed one mile {1700 yds)
through fi erce resi st ance, breo.ched the Jvp MLR defending ."irfield #2,
ki l l ed ^nroximptoLy 730 Japs and knockec. out 77 pillboxes*
b) To our debi t : t hi s r.tk cost us about 250 casual t i es
including a large number of -leaders which was to prove serious l at er*
, SSCOflD PHASE; ASSAtLT PIT 201 E*
1* After being ^.n Res 2? ?eb and."l Mar We w? ordered to otk
N.U of Motoyama in a wedp:e shaped sector* The ptk w: e nrde in a column of
omp-mios i nl t i r. l l y V/hen the etk had .^dvfnced 200 yda tuo sector hrd
vudejLRd PO that at 1300 a second Co wrs pushsd to the fron^;* At about t hi s
t i r e Jrp center of resi st ance was encconierei r.bout 500 y6x square, the
core cf \-hich was in 201 S
2y We beat against t hi s position fo:
v
eifh'j cortiruons days usin^;
every supporting weapon* ^/hen relieved on }0 Viv 'v& he? descroyod r l l AT
f i r e 5.n our S of A and had eliminated 25C yds of wiio r si stance,, TLe coro
t
201 iJ; s t i l l remained* The 3n was exhr.usted *- a^r-.o^l rli ler'de^s were jone
and the In nupiwered ab^ut- '400 including sane Zb& '.t-eT'I^emont^* Xt wp.d
e^dent tfc^t the Pi rat Hiass, iird t.*?.cn. the EK*1.1-J^ leader J ^id !ihe "drive
11
Subject* vt , IVfO JIMA
3 This phase w?.s a eonttnuoup pi l l box as s aul t for t he Inf and
we l acked s ki l l ed t roops
p
Sapr, nrt .in .weapon* were-cup&2ib agai n and accounted
for our l i mi t ed ;succeed -* some 40C ^ds i n E ..clays, . Sneny a r t y and mortar f i r e
were noc' as hervy as i n Phrse Ons and l essened dry "by day; ' however Jap
machine, ^;un ond r i f i e f i r e was dovn-stctinf; end us ur l l y f a t a l . Al l vacua**
t i ons , supply, and r e l i e f s had' t c "be na&e ct nif<ht. They were so mn.de wi t h
great success,, This phase was al so char act er i zed "by 2 ni;:ht i nf i l t eaj i on
p
i
i
n forc
forc
e (1H0
(1H
Jr p
0 Jr p
s oech
h
tims) on" J
J
ond 9
d
Ma
9 Ma
r These were not
These were not
Bsnari
n e s oec t i ms) , on" on r
at t acks end. were repulsed* ' -
a) The enemy position was a maze of CPVCS, piiDboxe"~,
tanks, stone walls* PE&tr^r-o'i-So Only'these JTinedJr.toly in
fie troops cc*a3& be lccai.ee!*- fuel oerbu-3 of tlie J&pa uso of
">owd-er s^me of" these were xwfc krown
0
"Out r.f f>tout 150 oi these
positions (by r> l'
r
ter count) we knev about 20 - 30 ^f tliem
c
The' closest of
these known positions were about 50 yds from our frrnt l i nes,
b) About 75$ of the attacking riflemen had' norcr be
j
n in
a ni,;jTit operation even in tr^iiiing, .sone 2 ^ h?>d never been in any kind of
an attack* Very few lenders were leffc-> ''The troops haji assruluid these
positions for four dry3 with he>vy les'-es and were discouraged* No fresh
troops were avoi
c) The ;BtrimeiTt
#
on the l eft has. pushed' throudi to high
ground, md I fel t t hi s shctJLd be exploited to attack this center of r esi s-
tance from i t s re^r. I hed so reconifiended verbally to the^ADC
t
C~3 C~3i
and He^t ,
1
.
d) The rt k or&er" wntOrecelved about 2kOO - five hours
to Kin#; hour asid during
These regoranendnt-i^s di^. not outweir;ht other factors,
the order wrs /^iven, careful prenar^ti^ns were mrde
f
*nd the assault
troops jucrped off et 0500* Suich pillboxes ^s were known or found were
knocked out
r
SurpriBewae -cos^lete* fhe trorp. preceeded
v
200 yds ond
re,flrrnizcd as dawn brolce
r
In" the dnxk thby hufi. slipped through nlr
;
ost to
the* cent er frf t hi s mcze of fort i fl o^' t i ori s and when d^yliyi
cut then to. Pi eces frorc
f
*>11-* s i des , '#&$- fl$*ilfi*?' wnif* fidrce- bat -confused,
At noon enough i nformst i on W$Bobt r i ned to count er at t ack wi t h t he Res Co,
-JSyf i ght i ng unt i l nl *&t fl l they ext r i cat ed mest of tho remnants* The next
day a foray-by tf>nk extrid&fced t he remrin^ieif^ ^.bfeut- JO "out cf ,100
' at t acki ng t roops ret urned* They fe^d i nf l l ^t e' d tfror1t> d^R??^e on t h e ^ n s ^
knocking out r:-t ank PXUX ^juciei*f>,us piiiboac>oe*> but- a t such cost t hey were
unable to const
1
licVi.te And hol d their-' pi ns , ~-no^> could t he Res Co do mo-re
thnn reach o ncsltiom to cover them by f i r e . This rvtk di d soft en the
posi t i on, sr t hr t V t he 10th of, J4P.r' tf-nks and Inf pushed SCJUQ X50 yds from
tho Of-00 LB of 7 Mar-* The Bn was thr& put i n -Div-Hes for- .four -d^ya
v.i5 ca ijiten?1ve trrinin^-and r ^ t r o l l i n c were crnducted*
TTACK C^
1
01 B PJBOI>:
1',. The cen'tcr- of r.i)sistance i n 201 % h.ving been made a pocket
by 1-9 c l ^s i n^ a ^ i n s t l-refi/^ttoie-Ba-<nr*se& jthru$i'Z-9 ar
to t he v/c-st of 17
3
-'5 on. lU Mor* Inconcl usi ve har^d jo h' nd f i r ht i ng
a nt i l dark** The s t k W' *"S^ reeuneti t he Brext &~.yand "by us in:; tmKB abou+ Jn^.
t he pocket v?Sf reduced duri ng t he l5t^- ?t t
1
ccsiv of Ul cr.^ufi..ties, $.
ni^h* r e l i e f of one Cc wns n^dej t he ^t k wr-s uonli-a'acd" ond- b / ROOH cf t he
iGth th-e socket wrs cl ear ed, , and.by e^pening ex tLr. ^7t,h wr.r uc-j ;cd irp* ~
Subject* Action Report, IWO JIMA,
2. Almost al l of the Inf were replacesent8,ThJfo lacked entirely the
will to close with the enemy* Tanks mad* success possible* Armored
. bulldfcsers were also *ery valuable* Aflame throwar tpnk, new type,
borrowed and proved the aelutlon to the whole problem*
, - - .
FOURTHPHASE?
1% Commencing 0700, 16 Mar this Bnwas assigned a,patrol sector
in the Forth of the old Uth MarSir Zof A* Qopatrolled and closed
with,demolitions; Ambushes were set at night,. Dogs were used to some
tage* Boring"this period.small poorly armed {$roups of Japs {from 1 to
10) were al l that were encountered *- mostly tfy the night ambushes*
IV Comments* . ,
A* Administration*
1* Apersonnel report was submitted to the R-l office at
This rqporVshowed e*feetl* strength* mm***of itt?
MIA, and the non effetti^es* Thie report was contolidpted from
reports of the CoU and, ty cheeking with the Aid Station when i t
b tc cofttasi th
2% A iftsvXty repvT%wns submitted on each casualty by the
These reports were mode on forms preriously provided by the
showed th&*d&t* typ of psualty andother information ecrerintf the
the c^sev - .. . - . - . , * . . % . .
3 '
T
At .this
r. KIA b Off %% enl i sted.
WJA26 ' W t
DWIA 2 '
TOTAL: 88
s
#
0 the 52** WlAt 65 *e effective^atid^are.inowTon duty*
^. . (Mxe 3n feceivd^X6 officer** and;356*enl i sted
monts during the period 1 Har .29-Maf*>
- if;
TV : :. . il$t . . ' .
5 The strength of the Bn wheni t landejl was J5 of fibers
827 enlisted*, , ' - l a ot yr ^ >.* ' ."
6 TheeffectiveStrengthof theBntthecl^eeofthe
e,B20,offic
B. '-
1 The maps and aeri rl photos furnished thi s organization
*)rior tc the derati oncwerei suffi ci eatvi n numb#f*,-dH-ps.,wefce*fmttL4t|ol-^t^
,^naccur>:t.Q:-ini'So.ei'.tplac-es.:possibly- ftue to- the ,recent construction ^n-ltfc:
1
4 i ^ n ofground-iforne,
:
-rMB,.
^ furnished during,J$
obliques and soipe verti cal s These photos were excellent
one rcopu of each was furnished; therefore their T*lue w#s limited*
HeDort, -IWOJIMA
3# ' Hydrographicinformationwascorrect"butasthisBndid
notlandIntheassaultitsimportance*7>sgreatlyredeced*
h
9
v
O-2intelligencereportswerenotreceivedfromRegiment
twodaysbeforewelefttheis
5 ?heproceduresetupfortherecoveryofcar>tured
mentsandmaterialswas
6# TheenlistedJr.pr.neselanguageinterpreterattachedta
thisorganizationwasusedonlytosegregateor.ptureddocuments* Sincethe
onlycafaresbythisorganizationoecuredlatointhecanpaign^andftinoe
lf
hot
M
no documentswerecaptured,hisservicescannotbefairlyjudged* His
servicestotheorganizationarehighlydesirable*however*
7% Novisibleresultswereobtainedfromwrittenorvccal
propaganda* IfvocalpropagandaIsto"beusedinthefutureit-mustbe
crrdinatedwiththeunitsontheground. Thesecannotbefightingonone
sideofarordandftunitontheothersidetryingtotalktheJrpinto
surrenduringasoccuredohoneoccasion*
S# JICPOAtemrfirenderedsomeassistancetothisor^artlaa
tionintherenoTalrfcapturedmaterial*
% Intelligenceliaisonwiththenexthigherechelonewas
satisfactoryasregardsemergencyinformationbutnot
w
sregard*routine
periodicreports. ^
10* Counterintelligencemepsursswereadequate*
11, Heencounteredno
B
3anz*iattacks"
12, Hewtacticdencounteredwere*
b. Rockets*
', ., c
#
fimelyandeffeetlveuseofsmrkewhenfighting
curtanks*
C OperationpndTraining
1, Duetotheoriginalassi
f
>nedmissionsofthis3n,part
ofCcrpsReserve,andduet^theshortlrpsooftimefollowingthe
asfilingofaspecificattackmissionanditsexecution*ncrehearsals
wereconducted. Anextensiveover.?ilstudy,oftheentirec
r
mpainwas
madeaboardshipandtheprogressoftheassaultunitsashrreclosely
followedtopreparedforanyeventuality* Allhandswerekeptabreastofthe
situationashrrethroughdailyinstruction^mapandaerialphotoctudy.
2.0 Tanks f i r i ng Vytm anti Hjoncrete s he l l s bazookas, flame
throwersi demol i ti ons , and pol e chr>r/5ee wi th a 3 see fu,e were fcund to be
the most e f f e c t i ve werpfrne used agai nst f o r t i f i e d T>ositions
3* The fl*me throwers were i ndi s pens abl e. !Phe port abl e
flame throwers were hi^h^y s at i s f ac t or y, f unct i oni ng wel l a t a l l t i mes . The
tank mounted flame throwers cf the 3d MarDiv were somewhat bet t er than our
port al be vrf i et y# 3y f^r the best flame thrower wss the tank mounted
flame thrower of t he Uth and 5t h Mar B4or This type tank h^s a 300 gal
f uel tank and shoots a flame 100 to 150 yds l oi uj for U mi nutes.
i^# The Japrnese used AT s^uns,> their own tanks dug in as
pillboxes* AT mineftf and assaults by individual soldiers with sachel g
explosives as counter measures a^inst sur- t gy^^ Thejlrj^uns^tanks, and
mines were ski l l f ul l ^placed eM enrpred. U f l N J i " ^ "
ActionReport,IWOJ.IKA*
defensiveposition** .
5* War&were6rloyedforni.;htsecurity
t
.
andrJLlitambushesduringthefinalphaseoftheoperation* Security
ambushdo$6alertedeneveryoccasionexceptonewhenJepsapproached.
Severaltimesambushdo^sbrrkedorgrowledthusgivingawayourpositions,
Dcgsusedonpatrolswerehighlysatisfactory;noneofthesedc^sweretv&.
shybutwereveryscaredofdemolitions, Futuretrainingofdo#sshould
teachthemtoalertatnightwithoutbarkkagorgrowll&g*toacquaintth&m
withdemolitionsandtotenchthento"bea"oneram*dog* TDo^e'that'could
behandledbyseveralpeopledid-unsatisfactorywork*
D* Supnly*
li Alltypesofmountingoutsupplieswereadequate.
2. Hesupplywasexcellent*
3, PalletisedCargowassatisfactory* WllionDrunspro-
videdexcellentstoragespaceformedicalandcommunicationsupplies*
U. SalvageofourownequipmentaswellASenemyequip-
mentwascarriedoutwhenthesituationpermitted* S*lvreduringthe
assaultphaseswasextrenelydifficultduetothehe^vyenemyfirecovering
allsectorsoftheZofA V.hensuddenmovesbytheBattaliontornewZof
Aoccured,salv^jebec^-ineimpossibleasallagenciesoftheorf^nitation
beenmetiec
1
.ur>insupply*
5 ^neayorterialswereeithersalvagedbythisorganisation
orreportedtothenex$higherechelonforsrlvage,
6* Alltransportationemployedbythisorganizationwith
theexceptionoftheUreaseftwassatlsfaftory* Theterraininmostins-
tanceswasunsuitedfortheWensel,thesoftsandandruggedterrain
causedfrequentbreakingorthrowingoftracks* Jnmostinstancesthe
tonUxUTruckaccomrilishedthemissionwithlessoechanicalfailures*
B* TransportQuartermrster*
1* Trocpsweredebrrkedinabouttwohours* Theartillery
wasloadedinthesecondtripoftheboats* AlltroopsweredebrrkedIn
LCM*sandtroopshadsomedifficuliietgettingintotheboats* Theship
wasequippedwiththenewtypedebarkationnetsmadeofchainandwood*
Severaloftheseladdersbrokeandduetotheroughseasitwasdifficult
toholdtheninoidethelandingboats* Allc^jgowatunloadedinfive^
days* Puetotheheavyseasandhi^hsurfmostcargohadtobeunloaded
byLCTsorLSM&. AfewvehicleswereloadedintCk** Someboatswere
loadedandcouldnotgetonthebeaehfortwelvehoufsor"more* SoVe,^!
timescargoidstaken^bac>caboardshipfrom,boat!kh
r
lh^dbrokendownor
wereabouttosinkduetoleaks* OnlyoneIC$w>iassit^riedtotheihlp
forunloadingfindthatwasforoneloadonly* OtheriCTs6tLSMswere
partloadedbyothershipsslidwfreloadedtocnpacHybytheKnox*
JSveryshipshouldbeassignedofceortwoW$ orLSMsforunloadinginfuture
operationswherethereisaroughsenandhigjfcsurf* Allofficersandmenof
theshipwereveryCooperativeintheunloading* Theyusedeverypossible
meanstogetcargoonthe
* IHshipusedthesvinf;in^boomforunloadingvehicles*
U!heboomaadstaywasusedtounloadallbulkeargoandpallets* Theship
hadadequateequipment for~unloo'd^ngalltypesofc^rgoandaminimum
amount-Of'tiffljewa*lo*fc,
3 Presuma^biychainandwooddebarknetsaretoreplace
l-Ianilr.nets* Ifropeisavailable.itisstron^tlyreoommendedasthechain
netsnowisuse^k terrible* Thejyjbre^icrtea^r'ttw^sandequipment d
arealia(ystlmpMiJWLetoclimb ^ " ^B
Subject: ^AcJ&iog.^egpjPt^IWOJIMA
Weapons,
a
#
Funiber#yoeandcaliberofweaponsusedt
US3turbines-
Cal \ 3
it it
774MlRif3a*
121J&R
IT
n
tt tt
P6 LMG-
12 Mortars
60mra
^ Mort ars,
Blnra
27 -Sinnie Throwers
2,36 in*
19pi stol s Gal .
b Due^ibturnoverInpersonnelandthecontinual
replacementofworponsofsnai&caliberitisimpossibletoestimatethe
numberofdaysthattypesof-^weaponswereused* ?herenj&inCngweapons
employed continuouslythroughtheentire c
Ntuater,typeandcrliterofweapon*fk>t
Thefollowingisalistofalltypesofwerponr
drawnbythisbattalionduringthec^mpr.ign, Thesefiguresdonotgivean
accuratepictureofwer.ponslost*themajorportionofthemwereevacuated
withthewoundedpersonnel* TheHeavierweapons,nachieP & 8 ,mortars,flame
throwersandbazookasweredamagedduringthebattleandturnedinto
salvagewhenthereplacementwasdrawn*
205 Carbines Cal
30,
hyt Ml Ri f l es.
tt

16 BAB,
ft tt
11 1KG
tt
60nun
13 Tlrme Throwers
13 3o?ookp.s 2*36 i n.
d Initiallyallreportedmalfunctionswerefoundto
becausedbythe4ustanddirt?clog,i&gthemovingpartsoftheweapons*
Aninvestigationshowedthat-tels*ran$.fujieti0ni^wasnotduetonegltgenie
onthepartoftheindividualasfirstsuspected^butduesolelytothe
accumulationofdirt,etcf^i.-occured duringtheattack^ Duringthe
finalphrsesreportedmalfunctionsinautomaticweaponswarefoundto*bd
duetoinadequateknowledge$theweaponbynewpersonnel*
e, Sp^rfprrtsandaccessorieswerewdequ^ternd
ecsilyobtained, .
t$ TSacis'tingWeaponsnreadequateandnomodifications
aresuggested, AHapolm typeshellthatcouldbefiredfromthe
Mortarwouldbeofgreatassistance*
2 Combrt Vehicles,
e,
9
Iftiniberandtypeofvehiclesusedj
k *ton kxktruck.'
J
tt ff
1 ambulance,
1 t " " TCSHrdioffruck
5 i
n
toilers,
2 1 "kxktrucks,
k 1 "Trucks.-
2 Carg c-p^r-lorfcM290(l
Subject: Action Report XWOJIMA -
b All venicles l i st ed above were employed every dajr
from 2$ fob for *+l dr,ys*
c Onvehicle* \ ton J*a&ftabulrnfcewas drjnaged beyond
d* The only iBP-lfunctioa* in any of the Above yahiel%s
was in the Cfcrgo Carrier H29C (We^sej.) vrlkich continually l ost trflelM or
tracks In the rouga tandy terrain.
e There wejro no m4.ntainaace di f f i cul t i es
$ S3*
1
re prrt^ were adequate pad rsprlr apeedily
accomplished*
no recoaundnd^tions for modifications
these vehlclsst
3* Ammunition,
a. Number gff rounds by e*ac$ nomenclature
unit of f i re originally landed, expanded or lost* These figures include
thrt ararrunition turned over in dijcips to relieving; uni ts, or issued to
units when their ^munition supply was low,
20,000 rdi of carbine* ; ;
318*opb rdt-A) or
63#i0# rds
# w
*
rdi * *
rdi Ml tracer,
rds Cart*"Rifle Grenada
rdi 3^11 C^l ^5*
rds HS<K*
3$O# rds illumine-ting M83w
t
375 ^ K15 Hftfed Grenades* ,
200 Smoke colored Ml6, Hand torenede*
^00 Illuminating* Hrnd
75 Incendpry HPH&
73Q Orenfdei Ri fl e, AT
" Impoct VXJ.
Adftptcrs eren^des for
*fOBftngolore Torpedo
60 cases TPT explosive*
100 crses C2
50 rolls prioftcord, detonating
300 3ft fu$e, safety time,
electri d l
p
12 cylinders nitrogen*v
136 ^ i gni t i on
k rds HSM6W/PM 53 (glmra Mort
rdi HEM&3*1/5M52 (61no Mort
200 SiriokeW*
0% M e d i c a l * . ... ' ,-. ' ,
:
; , , - . ; . . , . .
1 Embarkation*
. % Personnel? Medical section carrying assault
embfrke4 wiih th-3n
,
Action Report
%
XWO JIMA*
>,i * ^ * ' ' W$>$$%*& i *
on
ambulance and t r ai l er , loaded with
3
sttpi3iementary supplied, were taken aboard with the high pri ori t y Bn Train*
30 day replenishment was packed in water tight .Wilson Drums end loaded
with low pri ori t y Quartermaster supplies,
2 Aboard Ship*
a* Sicknesswasnogligebleexceptforanepidemic
acuteupperrespiratoryinfectionofvirusAyes* Thiswasprobablyspread
fromreplacementpersonnelwhorecentlyleftthetJ*S*andjoinedthisBn
onship* Sixmenwerehospitalizedfor2-6dayswithcomplications
(Sinusitisandpheumoniti*)* Onetroopmedicalofficerandaboutsix
troopcorpsmenhandledtroopsj.ckcalldailyintheShipSickBay. Ship's
stafftendedhospitalizedpatients*
b* Sanitaryconditionssatisfactory* Heatand
humidityoflivingquartersexaggeratedexistingtropicalskindiseases
whileinport. SleepingondeckwasprohibitedbytheShip
1
*Captain*
C SpecialPrecaution*: TheShip'sSenirrMedical
OfficerassignedtroopMedicalOfficersandPickedCorpsmentostations
anddutiesdesignedtosupplementtheShip
1
*Staffineventofmajor
combatmedicalemergencyonShip*
3* Debarkation(2kFob,19^5)
a. Personnelweredebarkedbyboatgroups(3boat
groupstooneLCM)withtheBnassaultmedicalsuppliescarriedashorein
twoequalloads. TheBnSurgeonandhalftheCorpsmen.landedintheassigned
JPifthwaveLCMJ theAssistantSurgeonandotherhalfoftheCorpsraenin
theSixthWavet*CM* Althoughthiswasnotanassaultlandingthebeachwas
undersporadicmortarfire,sobothgroup*movedrapidlyinlandtotheBn
assemblyarea, im.AidStationwassetuphereforthenight*
b* Material*
(1) Assaultsup-olioswerehandcarriedbythe
boatgroup*onlanding*
(2) Ambulanceon&.trailerloadedwithsupplnm*.
entnrysupplieslandedon26#eb,19^5heavysurfandbeachcongestionpre-
ventedearlierlanding* Cammanderedvehiclesevacuatedwoundedadequately
untilambulancearrived,
(3) BnmedicalreplenishmentinWilsonDrums
waslocatedlateinMarchintheHegt
f
ldump;conditiongood*
C Nolossesofpersonnelctmaterialoccurred
duringthedebarkationpha.se*
H, a* Medicalinstallations*on25Peb,thisBnattacked,
executingapassageoflinesthroughthe2nd3n,21stMarines, Duringthe
FirstPhaseofthisBn'scombat(25feb-2SFeb)aforwardAidStation
wasmaintainedadjacenttothoBn C0
!
sOPanda.rearAidStationwassetup
withinthe3nCP, OneMedicalOfficerandapproximatelyhalftheHqColl
SecHospCorpsmenmannedeachAidStation* WhentheCPdisplacedforwnrd
f
tharearAidStationmoveduptojoinit,becoramingtheforwardAidStation
untilthonextmove* duringtheSecondPhaseofcombat(28Fob-10Mar),
onlytheforwardAidStationwasmaintained;thoCPwa.soutoftheBnZof
A* Difficult
1
frontlinoevacuationmadeformuchnightwork;acavewas
usedasablackoutroomforni^htmedicaltreatmentsandasshelterforthe
medicalpersonnel* Becauseofthelimitedcoverfromfrequentraortarbarr-*
agesandthevolumeoftheni^htwork,theHqCoMedicalpersonnelagainwa*
splitintotwogroup*;onegrouprrstedattheCPwhiletheotheroperatedt
theAidStationattheOP,alternating^
a
*-^Mm%yMVHl^StflilftPV
1
!^^
Phases(lkMarandsubsequently)theCPQ^^JHlffPffOT
t
%
3
^
3
^M'll
y
^1^
re
Subject* ActionReport,IWOJIMA*
HqMedSecjouchreduced"bycasualties,worked
LocationWithregardto*
(a) Roads *allA14Station setups
wereonroads*
(b) Cover-Defilades*.caret*or
tunnelsandfoxholeswereusedatalltimes*
(c) Dispersion-workingintwogroups
wasaneffectivemeasureofdispersionduringthemortarbarra^gsofthe
FirstandSecondFhases*
(d) OtherMedicalInstallations *--
excellent cooperation"betweenthisandadjacent3aAidStationswasmain**
tPinedatalltimes*
() WalkingWounded-canefromfront
lineswithstretcherorcarryingparties.
(2) ProtectiveMeasuresTaken*
(a) Localsecurity!medical personnel
stoodnightfoxholesentrydutythesameasadjacentOPorCJ*personnel.
(b) Strict"blackoutwasmaintained*
Fightmedicaltrertmentwas^ivenincaveswhenpossible*
b* HoSpitaliaationf theonlyhospital!tationprac-
ticedatthisactivitywasll^htdutypartiesattheOPforthelessSevere
BPproblemsandminorinjuries. Thesepatientswerereturnedtofullduty
asrapidlyasshrapnelfragmentswereremoved* .
c* Evacuation* FrontlinetoAidStationbyMaiine
stretcherpartiesrecruitedfromHqpersonneliattachedunitsandreplace*-
mento. Stretcherpartieswerewellhandled,oftenheroic*alwaysadequate*
AidStationtoHigherEchelons:"byvehicle* Velicuterevacuationwas
adequatebuthaphazarduntilambulancescameashore263Peb* Athird
arabulancewasnedestary*duringtheSecondPhrse*becauseofthevelumeof
casualtiesanddistanceofevacuation*
d. C8U3ltlesTreated;
(1) lumbers
(a) Retained 2Z
(b> Evacuated f2k
(c) Died 3^
(2) Hypei
(a) Concussion Atmospheric was
prominentduringthefiercemortarbarragesoftheJirstandSecondIhaseSp
andabsentinthesmallarmsactionthMcharacterisedtheThirdand
Fourthphases*
(b) IT*I*problemswerereraarkedly
rare* AveryfewCoabatFatigueand'arFeurosiscaseswereseenduring
theTirBtandSeconddayfi^htinf;DJXCinthel^.rgereplacement:groups*
DuringtheSecondPhr.seAtmospheric OoncussionandOverworkSxhauaationwere
complicatingfactors*
(c) Fra.gmentwoundswereprominentin
thePirstT^haseandprogressivelydiminishedasmortarfirediedout*Gun
Shotwoundsbecamerelativelymorefrequentinthe.letterphases;theratio
ofkilledtowoundedshowedashp.rprisewiththesmallarmsclosecontact
v^.' CJJ. ./*
II
(O
'?.) Ho* sal t ws/ier shower was nr:
y' djl 20 ilarj -the water-vw.t too Let mo. insufficient In quantity for -\d<>
qua<E> This r*n.8 the fi rs' : a';T,e.
:
.i7-)t vo provide general washing, f re Ilrflie'-'
r'.nco *he So lanled^
(t) !)D"*J s^pa;r from niro-nL^-ne vas in
he for appar^iifc effect, in this LD o;
t
A 'The dry^i ^f nature of tU^
f.cTxr.in defeated the spraj% Eanci pprn^rox f'.y infested nreaa was carried
oat when possi t l o,
I !
0'
:
\F) *-E
ir
ji and "T*
1
* rations were
ii5ed entirely and individually during vhoFl ret rncl Second Phases. They
were available as supplements duri.iK "the Third, and Fourth Fhr.ees*
(b; TWO cooked meals a dc.y of fresh
food were prepared daily in a recr <-.rea inri served in Co areas during the
'Third and Fourth Phases. UsueJ b^nitaiy rae^avxes and inspections wero
ecplcyed
(3) ^at.fci'j in drums and expeditionary cans "
obtained from rear area sources in satisfactory quality and quantity
for eating and drinking. It was insufficient for adequate "bathing.and
washing purposes*
f Disposal nf Dead;
(1) Marine - collected and sent to 3^ Mar Div
Cemetery for internment
(2) Jai^anese ** sprayed with DDT solution and
buried on the "battlefield as soon as possible*
Epidemics of Unusual Diseases in Troops:
(l ) Noen hnve "be m otisorved.
h. Dental Sorvices}
(l) No dental problems "beyond Aid
measures were encountered* Ho dentist i s attached to this 3s.fctPlion
i
%
Pr i s one r s of War, Care of,
(1) One prisoner of War was treated with
Flasrwa, Morph* sulfa pr^wder dresein^s; a second prisoner was examined,
dressings changed, and medical str.uur noted on intelligence record. 3oth
were evacuated to the Berriirait-^i CT*
r
-'
n
."c was adequate ajid no special dls
^ftses vrero noted*
j# M^dioal Or ^
(i
N
I13nej.1t cypo appears sufficient^
(l> Acorju^o in maabcsr... Of t hi s nuiuly./.
:
ra^ny are unfit for IrJTantty 3r. 3>:.i,y 07 reibon o^ a^e (over 2b years)
*)eir.perraer.t * pnysiquej and yi
#
eviois comoat wound.3 or combat fatx.'nie-
'&) ii"'fc Co Aid men to each chr-?e
'cl) 7o on proper by suppl i es, ,
' ? ; Tv:o o:a cl er i cal ; .
\'^) C.a*3 to S..;re.ve"-- .?.ogictrr,tior*e
i ) remainder in Aic. Station
(3;
("b) bounded and evacuated 18
(e) Wour.ded returned to duty 3
(d) F.? 7 Mod Evacuated* *
(e) Two .Replacements were received*
(f) Two Collecting Sec Corpsmen wero
orrowed from other Bns twice.
This i s gceatly inadequate com-
pared to Marino replacements received during the campaign and for the /best
medical service* -Replacements of Company Corpsmen casual t i es were drawn
from the Aid Station group and the Collecting Section* I t was necessary
to cut the companies from 5 to 3 Hospital Corpsmen apiece during-the
Second Thaso and from 3 to 1 during the Third and Fourth Thases
0
"because
of lack of Corpsmen replacements to the Bn*
(k) Stpvte of t rai ni ng v/as excellent in
pri mary assignments* Seme of t he Col l ect i ng Section Cer?>sraen lr>ck "basic
A*d Ft at i on t r ai ni ng* Compruy Aid rr-^.'.f-^eFents suffered probabl y un~'
necessary cas ual t i es baca^rc of I r . j r r
+
.i.nfojitrv t r ai ni ng*
\\- . "J^o^ia^tios needed - none* The addition
of a l ol i pl r i s t about b m'ruthu >.<$ Las "beon 1* v
o
>ry valuable asset during
ohe ^rrdning period; ho do^p r e^ul u Vi.c
1
bta'bi on work In combat*
' !
Subject: ActionReport*IWDJIM.
(3) Suitable.
MedicalSupplies*
/i/
(1) ContentsofallMedicalUnitsexcept
QasCasualtyunitsweremadeup"bythe3nSurgeonbasedonhisandother3n
Surgeonsexperience*
(2) Holosses,
(3) Medicalsupplieswereadequateexcept
thebrinndyrationvhichwasincompletesndinadequfte
(k) Sesupilywasexcellent(3MedCo*)
m
#
MotorVehiclesandJRollin^.Stock*
(1) Oneitonambulanceandtrailerisassl<?
nedthis.3n
t
OneJtonambulanceisattachedwiththeCollectingSection
from
n
3*MedCo*
(2) Lossesonitonambulancewassurveyed
becauseofcombatdamage*
lf
3*MdCofurnishedatemporaryreplacement*
(3) Adequney*tw^ambulanceswereadequate
mostofthetime* Oneadditionalarabulancewasnecessaryasnoted
$
(k) Ira-ororeraents-AnInfantry3nshouldhave
twoambulancesandonetrailerpermanentlyassignedandcneambulanceon
collduringcombatfrom'theMedCo
;
.....
5* Ashore-AftercompletionofAssaultThass*
a^ Bl8cuseedinThirdandFourthPhases*
6 Becoiaaendationst
a MedicalTersonnel *carefulselectionof
RBSignadandattachedHospitalCorpsmenfrrinfantry3nstofulfillthese
requirements. < _ *
(1) Age-under26years*
> - * .
(2) Aptitude * should have the physical and
mental nakup of a Marine, , . .
:
'* " '
(3)
v
HeB.i6ai History - no previous severe
wound or Combat 3?atiUe
.. ... <
." jRota.ti-onofCorpsmento aMedCoafter
812monthsinfantry3nservicewruld.promotemorale*increaseefficiency,
andprovideatrainednucleusforCollectingSectioncombatfg^ups.75^
of3nCorpsmenwhouldbetrained^Co.Afldmentoallowforreplacementand
rotationofdutyincombat=-..-
b Vehicles'two'tonambulancesandonetrailer
shouldbepermanentlyassignedeachinfrntry3n#
c He-ItcementsCorpsmenreplacementsincombat
nustbeavailableinproportiontoMarinaReplrcementsreceivedbya^
3tw
d Three^rer-tiaent.featuresdeservenote*
Subjecti actionReport,1WDJIMA
(l) Coaidmencarried1or2unitsofserum
albumen,foremergencyuseonthefrontlinew^ilethetroopswerewell
hydratedjplasmawassubstitutedduring;theletterpartofthecampaign.
Thesebloodsubstituteswereusedwithgoodeffoetonnight casualtiesthat
"beevacuatedforsomehoursandonseverelywoundedmen*
(2) Whole"bloodwasavailabletotheAid
StationaftertheFirstThase, Itwasnotuseddueprincipal^totherapid
evacuationavailabletohigherechelons. Underotherconditions this
bevery
(3) 'CapturedJapaviatorsoxygencylinder
about2feetlongandUinchdiameterwasfittedinplaceoftheeannister
onanAmericangnsmaskpndoxygenadministeredtoonepatientindeep
treuraaticshockwithexcellent effect* Fivesuchunitscouldbeusedto
goodeffectinaBattalionAidStationandduring.evacuation*
e. Medicalpersonnel*worWragwiththeir
constantlyandusingweaponsonlyfordefenseatcloserange,shouldbearmed
with.V>caliberpistolsinsteadofcarbines. ThisIsespeciallytruefor
CompanyAidmen*
H .Signalj
1. Frequency of interference encountered!
ITooutsideinterferenceswereencounteredenfrequencies
usedbythis3nduring,themajorportionoftheoperation* Onnumber
1891.9slightinterferencewascausedbylocalM Sa Thiswastakencareof
byhavingthemshi^ttotheiralternatechannel. On25and26FebJapanese
talkedonthecompsnySCR300commandnettojamit#itdidnotworkas
theJapsdidn
1
ttalkenough*
2, Adequacyof3nsSystemofHadioFets:
systemofnetseimloyedwassufficientbutan
alternatechannelfortheSCR300wouldbedesirablefortheFavalGunFire
Teams,
3 Communication delaysinvolvedinspottingfire,
Fone
t
astheyweregivenpriority,
U, Assistanceif anygivenby^rrrisonforce Communication
personnelandEquipment
Fone,
5 Communica.tion duringOperations
TCS Ste^jtl CommandNe t ,
if n n
SCR 610
SCR 300
n u n
SCR 300 3n Command Fet i ncl udi ng Tks &FGF,
SCR
193
Air l-n Net,
T?X
11 H M
&HGF Ln Het*
SCR F&F Spotter Team,
SCR
536
Co ne t s , 81mm Mort, Fwd Obs Teams.
Subject! Action.Report,IWOJIMA,
PerformanceofHadio-AllradioBperformed
inacreditablemanner*
b Howwereradioswaterproofedbyuseofrubber
containers*
c* OthercommunicationTele-phonoand.Runner
McsBangersweretheonlyothermeansofcoiruiranicationemployed* ?heywere
bothhighlysatisfactory*
d Communication Supply~Supplywasexcellent
throuejhlutthecampaign.
PASTT Conclusion.
1* ThePirforce-producedzeroresultsfromaninfantry-pointof
viewbypreinvasionbombardment.
2 Againstenemydugintnsolidrockatleast2000lbbombsshould
havebeenusedandpreferably6,8,or11tonbombs. Forclosesupport,
later,wefoundittook2tkhrstogetaIfcvpalinstrikeandthat500lb
bombswerethelargestwecouldget*
3 Itismyconsideredopinionthctagainstsuchanintricateand
highlyorganizedposition*nightraidsngainstknownpillboxes*progress^
ingdeepereachtime>wouldbepreferabletongeneralni^htattack* Raids
wouldkeep%ibblihg
w
atthopositionandwouldnotresultinmenbeing
surroundedbyenemypillboxes. Innycasetrainedmenonlyshouldbeusedat
- excellent,includinglowvelocityoverheadfireandsmoke.
5 Tanksneedheavierarmor-Japkjmmpenetratesatpresent**
6* Weneedthebijjflamethrowertank, Comparedtothistankcur
own3&WarDlvflamethrowertanksarealmostuseless, Thistankscoutshuge
flaraes100-150ydsforkminutesandcantraversetheflameinanydirection
andcanchangeitselevation* Vtemusthavesomeofthesetanks*
7 Detailingofpersonnelwithotherjobsas2$litterbearerdoes
notwork* Weneedthebandsectionbackforthis*
8* Armoredbulldozersareoodwhencoveredbyfire-muchbetter
thantankdoier*
9* JapsmokelesspowderisanImmenseadvantagetothem.
JRO?BRT3.CtlSHMAlx,Jr.,
,USMC#
UNCLAS
MCLOSTIRS C
ACTION BSPOB2! - 3D
HCB/tjb ' Hq,3dBn
f
9thMarines,
3DMARDIV,FMF,IntheField,
20April,1945,
From: CO
T : CO,9thMarinee.
Subject: ActionReport,IWOJIMA* ' . '
Reference; (a)GO137,3dMarDiv.
InaccordancewithRef(a)thefollowingreportof
actionoftheThirdBattalion9thMarines,IWOJIMAOperationis
herebysubmitted:
I* Summary .
A* Thisreportcovers,mainly,theperiodfromthelandingof
thisbattaliononIWOJIMAon24February,1945tothedeparture
fromIWOJIKAon13April,1945.
B The3dBn,9thMarines,landedonBLACKBEACHatabout1600,
24Feb45andwentintoanassemblyareaatTA164-U,Q.'Thenext
day,25Feb,thebattalionmovedtoanassemblyareaatTA165-Ain
Regimentalreserveatabout0930,asthe1stand,2dBn*spassed
throughthe21stMarinesandattacked. Atabout1400theBnre-
ceivedorderstopassthroughthe2dBn,9thMar,andcontinuethe
attackwhichitdidexecutingthepassageoflinesat1500sustain*
ingheavycasualties,andgainingverylittlegroundbeforenight-
fall* '
Thebattalionwas-inturnpassedthroughbythe2dat0900,
26Feb,andrevertedtoRegimentalReservewithcompaniesremaining
inpositionatTA^-WjX,?.. Cotwasattachedto1stBn,9thMar,
lateinafternoontofillgap
7
between3dand4thDivisions* Batta~
lionremainedinthispositiononthe27thwiththeexceptionthat
LCoattachedwiththe1stBnuntilpinchedoutoftheline. On
the28th,theBattalionmovedbacktoA182-K,IJat1100tore- ,
.organize,thenwasattachedtothe21stMarinesat1400,andat
about1600,establishedaRegimentalReservelinethroughTA199-J,
200<-F,GjMandorganisedforwardslope'sofhillat2Q0-P.
Onthe1stofMarch,thebattalionattackedontheleftof
the21stMartoclosethegapbetweenthe
4
3dand5thDivisions
(21st&26thontheleft)whichitwassuccessfulindoing. Onthe
2d,thebattalionattackedandseizedhill362inTA235-Uandad-
jacenthighgroundinacostlybuthighlysuccessfulpush,thrust-
inga700yardwedgeintotheJaplines. Thebattalionreverted
toRegimentalReserveonthe3d. ICowasattachedtothe2dBn,
21-st Mar,asBnReservefortheirattackonhill357,K&LCo*s
remainedinpositiononHill362untilpassedthroughbythe1st
Bn,21stMar,thenKCowasattached,about1630,tothe1stBn,
21st,toprotectthelatter
1
openright,flank. Duringthenight,
LCowasmovedtoapositionin-218-Ftocovertheflatacrossthe
airfieldwhenareportwasreceivedthatabreakthroughhadoccurr-
edbetweenthe9th&21st. Nocontactsmade*
Uponrevertingbackto9thMarcontrol4March,thebattalion
wentintoanassemblyareaatTA182-3,J,Itorestandreorganize*
ThestrengthoftheriflecompaniesatthistimewasI4Off-67
Enl,K3Off-52Snl,L1Off-1WO-100Snl,whichwasbuilt
upbyreplacementduringthe4thand5thofMarchtoI5Off-111
Enl,K6Off-115Enl,L3Off-1W/0'--122Enl. Thetwodaysat
thisareawerespentresting,cleaningup,reorganizingandtrain-
ingreplacementsinuseofflamethrower,bazooka,demolitions,MG-
andmortar;andfirstmailwasreceived. BattalionmannedDivRes
LineatTA200-H,Nfromdusktodaylightthe4th-and5th.
ActionReport,IWOJ1MA (Contact)
Thebattalionwasagainattachedtothe21stMseronthe6th
ofMarchandmovedtoahassemblyareainTA218^G>HinRegimental
Reserve. Receivedordersat2230tomakeapre~dawnattackto
seizeHill.362 inTA219-U. Movementof.companiestok/Dcommenced
0530,7March,andattackjumpedoffat0500,asscheduled,,with
twocompaniesabreast. Hill362,whichwas600yardsfromtheL/D
ratherthant
;
he200yardsreportedbytheunitpassedthrough,was
seisedandoccupiedby1400af$&,.&virystifffightentailing
heatoylosses. Thebattalionrevertedbackto9thMarat1745,
Theattackwasresumedat*0750,8March,andthehighground
overlookingtheseaatTa219-Q,Vwasseized. On9Marchthebatta^
lion,twocompaniesabreast,attackedtothesea(acanteenofocean
waterwassenttoCG,3dMarDivjandpatrolssweptthebeachfor
200yardsoneithersideofthebattalion
f
sZofA. Havingreceived
order'stodoso,acompanypatrolwassentouttatherightofthe
battalion'sZofAon10Marchtopatroltheshelfabovethebeach
infrontofthe1stBn*s%ofA* Thepatrolwaspinnoddownby
automaticweaponsfirefrompill-boxesandcavesintheoverhanging
cliff-linetoitsrightasitadvancedsouthward,andwasextricated
withdifficultywiththesupportofveryexcellentfire(HE&smoke)
bythe81mmMortars, Casualtieslightconsideringseriouspredica-
ment. Thebeachitselfwaspatrolledwithoutcontact. Thebatta^
lionlinewasadjustedsothatitfacedSouth,leftflanksonwa-
-ter'sedge,rightflanksonhighgroundatTA219-V. On*llMarch
thepill-boxesandcavesintheclifffaceonthenortheasternside
ofTA20-F,Gwereneutralizedordestroyedbytheemploymentof
tanks'atpointblaTikrange, Toassistthe1stBn,onecompanyof
tjie3rdBnseizedandoccupiedthehillatTA202-A. Intheevening
thebattalionmovedbafekfromthebeachareatothehighgroundand
establishedalinefacingwestinthevicinityHill362.
On12Marchthebattalion,in.conjunctionwith1stBnonthe
left,advancedtoTA2l8-R,Winmop-upoperationtowardRegimental
RearBoundary, Onlylightresistancereceivedatfirstwhichwas
quicklyovercome; tanksemployedlatertodestroyafewUG-positions,
Severeresistancewasmetby1stBnon'left. Thesituationremained
theasmeonthe13th,.nomovement?"beingmade. On14Marchthebatta-
lion,lessIComovedagaintothehighgroundoverlookingthebeach
andduginaperimeterdefensein*TA219~V,202-A. Ambusheses~
tablishedfornightonbeachandhighgroundoverlookingbeach
killedseven(7)Japs.
Acombatpatrolconsistingofoneriflecompanysenttopa^
trolhighgroundonTA202-E,G,on15March,metsevereresistance
(rifle,MGandmortarfire)whenitwaswithin75yardsofthetip
ofthespurandwasunabletoadvancefurtherbeforedusk.iLints
vereadjusted,andthe.companyduginatTA202-G-fortheni'ght. On
16March,thecompanywaspassedthroughbyR/WCO,9thMar,and
withdrewtoformnaperimeterwithKCoat219~n,V. Patrollingof
BnZofAwasconductedon17March,nocontacts.
On18March,battalionmQvedtoanassemblyarea:at201-J,
P,K,Qfromwhenceintensivepatrollingwasbeguninanallottedsec-
torofthevacated4thDivZofA. Thesectorwasdividedintofour
sub-sectors,eachofwhichwasthoroughlypatrolleddailybyarein-
forcedplatoonfromthe18thtothe25thofMarchatwhichtimethe
2
ActionReport, IWOJIMA (Cont'd)
battalion'spatrol sectorwaschangedandinlarged. Thenewarea
dividedintosixsub-sectorseachofwhichwaspatrolled daily
arifleplatoon ortheequivalent fromthe26thofMarchto0700
f^pril, 45,whenthebattalionwasrelievedby abattalionofthe
;
$4?thInfantry
1
whichtookoverthepatrolsector.
Worthyofmentionduringthepatrollingphaseisthefact
thatthisbattalionwipedoutawellorganizedenemypocketofre-
sistanceinTA184-E,185~#"on22Marchbyaconcertedcompany attack
supportedbyaplatoonoftanksplusoneflame-throwertank* During:
theentireperiod2to6ambusheswereestablishednightlyand
1
were
:
regularly successful* Thepatrollingphaseresulted inthekilling
;
of169Japs',capturingof6,burialof.231deadJaps,recovery of
17deadMarines,closingof53gcaves(quiteofnumberofwhichcon-*
tainedliveJapsJ disposalofinnumerable unmarkeddudsandmines
andoneunmarkedminefield,veryextensivepolicing ofunsanitary
trash.(emptyration cans,andbitsofration's,,human excreta, etc)
andsalvageofvast quantitiesofusable suppliesandequipment (amm^
unition,water,rations,weapons, stretchers,-etcj. ->
II*.Preliminaries,
- A. ThisBattalionLandingTeam consistedoftheinfantry batta-
lion,one37mmgunplatoonoftheRegimentalWeaponsCo
f
oneplatoon
ofcombat engineers, onepioneerplatoon, andNGF.I4e.is.p-nandsp<&t~
terteam, oneAirLiaisonteamandone Shore&BeachParty Communi-
cationTeamfrom,JASCO* oneMedicalCollecting Section,oneArtillery
LiaisonTeam, andtwoArtilleryForwardObserverTe,ams*
B* Verylittlepointedtrainingandnorehearsalwaseffected
betweentheassignment ofthemission andthebeginningofitsexe-
cutionbecause ofthegeneralandtentativenaturerofthemission*
Trainingwithtanksincomparatively largenumbers,passageoflines,
andattackoffortifiedpositionsinopenterrainwereemphasized in
unittrainingwithaviewtowardanoperation ofthetypeundergone*
Specificplanningwasalmost impossible;however, anintensive study
ofmapsandphotograpswasundergone aboardshipttyallofficers.and
rankingN,CO's,partlcul.r-|tttention beingpaidtobeachesandroutes
northward therefrom.
C* Themission oftheBattalion.LandingTeamwastolandona
beachtobedesignatedbyCO,RCT-9,move,toanassembly#reatobe
allotted,preparedtoexecute anyreservemissionassigned* The
initialplanbeingsimply toget thebattalionacrossthebeachin
awelldispersedbytwellorganizedformation, orderswere issued
tosubordinate unitsdirectingthe'portionofthespecifiedbeachthey
weretolandon,whentheyweretoland* that theytakeupapproach
marchformationuponlandingpreparedtpmovetoanassembly area
inland, andthat theright company wasthebase company*
D. Thelanding ofthisbattaliononIWOJIMAwasanythingbut
organized. Alastminutechangeinlandingplans calledfordebark- .
ationintoLCYP's,transfertoLCM'satthecontrol
1
vessel, and
landingfromtheLCM*s. Theresultwasavery scatteredlandingof
various "lumps"of'thebattalion inaverynon-tactical sequence
anywherefromthelettofbeachR2D-2totherightofbeachBLUE^l.
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (dont<d)
Thesituationprovedonethings-thatawell$rairiedoutfit"nangs
together"inthefaceofthegreatestdisorganization-*for*inan
extremely shortspaceoftime,theBLTwasformedintactandmoved'
inroute^columntoinitialassembly,areaat164#uVQ,L ,*.
E, Noenemyforceswereencounteredduringthelandingoron
themoveto.theassemblyarea. Verylittleornoenemyfirewas
received." .
IllChronologicalAccountofIndividualActions,
A. ThefollowingaccountIsofmovementsand'actionsparticipate
ed inbythisbattalionwhicharethoughtworthyof;detailednarra-'
tion* 'Thechronologyofinterveningeventsoflessernotemaybe '
readilygleanedbyreferencetoPartI(B).
1, On25Fefy 45\thebattalion,wasinRegimentaiReserve-
inanassemblyarea'attA164-E,165~A,when,atabout1400,the " .
battalioncommanderwassummonedtotheBegimenfcalOP andissuedan.'
ordertopassthroughtherightofthe2dBn*alines*continuethe -
attackandeffectajunctionwiththe26thMarontheleftifpossi-
ble. Thesituationatthetimewasstagnant,t>bthassaultbattalions.
(1stonth*right,2dontheleft)beingheldupbyheavyautomatic
weaponsfirefromconcretepill-boxesandbyacourMemortarand
artilleryfire* Thestiffestresistancebeingon.theRegimentalleft
flanks,thescheweoftheCO,9thMar,wastopassthisbattalionth
throughtherightoftheleftbattalion,avoidingtheheavyresistancei
makecontactwiththe1stBnohtherightand>then;byextendingthe,
linetotheleft,gaincontactwiththe26thx%rwhoserightflank
wasabout300yards"inadvanceofthe9thMarleft. Theresulting
by-passedpocketontheleftwastobecontainedandsubseouentlyre-
ducedbythe2dBn Speedofexecutionofthismissionwasofprime
importance*
TheplanoftheCO,3dBn,wastoexecutethepassageof
lineswithtwocompaniesabreast,eachonanarrowfrontage,makecon-
tactwiththe1stBnanddriveforwardinaconcertedattackuntil
themaincenterofresistanceonthe
t
leftwaspassed,thentofocus
effortstowardgainingcontactwiththeunitontheleft. Ifan^.ad-
justmentoflines(byincreasingcompanyfrontages'to,theleft)proved
unsuccessful,itwasplannedtoutilizethereservecompanyin"effect-
ing.thecontact,ifpossiblepinchingouttheleftcompanyinthepro-
cess. Orderswereissuedtothecompaniesbeforeleavingtheassembly
areawithexceptionofthedosignationofKhour* Inbrief,theorder
directedthatthepassageoflineandattackwouldbsmadewithIand
KCo'sabreast,KCoantheright,e^ichonafrontage,of200yards/
KCotogainandmaintaincontactwiththe1stBnontheright;ICo'
tomaintaincontactwithKCopreparedtoeffectajunctionwith26th
.darontheleft; LCoinreservepreparedfollowICobyboundsand'
contact26th*i4arbypassageofextensionoflinesonorder.
Thebattalion,lessHqCo,-movedoutfromtheassembly"-
areaatabout1420inanapproachmarchformation.andtheassault'}$*&:$$<
companieswereinpositionalongthesouthsideofAirfieldNo2by *
X445* Guidesfromthe/2dBnwerecontactedandthecompaniescommen-
cedcrossingtheairfield,undersee11armsrndartilleryfire,at1500
t
i
ActionReport,IWOJIM (Cont'd)
Theactualpassageoflineswasmadeat1510*
.' Immediatelyuponadvancingforwardofthe2dEn'slines,tt
theassaultcompaniesbeganreceivingintenserifleandautomatic \
weaponsfirefromthefrontandleftflank,andthemortarand
artilleryfireincreasedinvolumeandaccuracy. ICo'sleftjila-*
toonwaspinneddownbyextremelyHeavymachinggunfirefrompill-
boxesdirectlyonitsleftflankwhileKCo,andICo'srightpla*
toon,wereabletomakeveryslowprogressbyfir.*andmovement;
eachcompany&adhbeenabletoworkmachinegunsintopositions
from.whichcoveringfirewasbeingdelivered,andKCohadbegun
firing60mmmortarsattargetsofopportunity
%
Casualtiesfrom
mortarandartillery,fire"weremountingandthecompaniesweredirect-
edtoadvanceasrapidlyaspossibletothehighgroun$tothefront;'
ICoComdrwasinstructedtoattempttomovehisleftplatoonthrough
the.zoneofactionofhisrightplatoonuntilthecenterofresis-
tanceontheleftlanHwasby-passed. Itseemedatthetimethat.
thesuccessoftheattackwascontingentupontheseizureofthe
highgroundtotheimmediate.front-contactwiththeunitonthe
leftwouldhavetobeeffectedlater. KCowasincontactwith
the1stBnontheright* '. .
, Slowbutsteadyprogresswasmadebytherightandcenter
oftheassaultline,withKCosupportingIGobyfire,untilan
approximateEast-Westlinethroughthenorthof$&TinTA199
wasreached* Thevolume,ofsmallarmsfirefromthefront,-left
flankandleftrearatthisstageof,theattackwas'extremelyin-
tensewhilethemortarbarrage,whichhadmovedasthetroopsmoved,
wasstillfallingaccuratelyalongtheassaultline,andcasualties
tokeypersonnelcaused,theattacktofalter. Bothassaultcompany
commanderswerekilledwithinafewminutesofeachotherand-7
otherofficersandalargepercentageofkey-NCO'sbecamecasualties
inrapiqsuccession. Thetimewasabout1700andtheassault
troopswereshowingsignsofdisorganization. Leaderlesselements
ofthelinesweregivingunderthewitheringfireandmovingback
over"someofthegroundgained. Thiswasparticularlyprevalentin
KCoontherightwhichhadlost5officersandmanyNCO's. The
Bn-3jCaptJ,T.McFadden,wassummonedtotheBnOP(ontheair-
field)anddirectedtotakecommandofKCo,reorganizeit,regain
contactwith.the1stEn,andreportwhenthiswasaccomplished,
1stLieutRAOverpeck,senior*officerleftinICo,wasalsocon~
tactedattheOPandgivensimilarinstructions. CaptMcFadden.did"
anoutstandingjobinrallyingthecompanyandaccomplishing,his
missionirithefaceofseriousdifficulties,andICo>reestablish-
ingcontactwithK,wasabletofollowsuit. SinceI,tokeepin
contactwithK,wasunabletomakecontactwithanyunitonits
left,anddarknesswasabouttofall,hCowascommittedat1830
toeffectatieinforthenightbetweentheleftflanksofICo
andapointinthe2dBn
f
sline. By1915thebattalionhadesta-
blishedalineestimatedtorunfromTA199-S(SE),whereitjoined
the1stBn,westtoR(SC),southwesttoW(WC),southtotheedgeof
theairstripinTA182-C(NW)whereitjoinedapointinthe2dBn's
lines. EstimatedJapskilledintheattackwere75;.casualtiesto
owntroopswereI73,K20,L3,HqS,'totalforBn104. The2d
Bnpassedthroughourlinesthemorningofthe26thandthebattalion
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (Cont'd)
againwentintoRegimentalReserveinanassemblyareaatTA
L , i 4 , N . - , - . '
2* Onthe1stofMarchthebattalion,thenattachedtothe
23.sti^iar,wasgiventhemissionofclosingthegapbetweenthe2lst
Marandthe26thMaronthe"left. Thesituationreportedtothe
battalioncommanderattheRegimentalOP(200-P)at1000wasthat
theleftflankofthe21st(2-21)wasinthevicinityofRJatTA
217~H(S),,therightflankofthe26thMarsomewher-ealongthe
boundarybetweendivisionsinthevicinityof21?-P(NE)orL(SW)
t
Thebattalion,at'the\timetheorderswerereceived,wasinRegi-
mentalReserveatTA 200-F,<T,M
- ' '
Thebattalionw^smovedinroutecolumntothevicinity
ofRJ336whereitwashelduhwr^coveruntilthe-commandercon-
tactedtheCo,2-21,toascertaintheexactlocationofhisleft
flank. Itdevelopedthatthesituationasregardedtheflankloca-
tionwassomewhat.hazyandthatitwasnotactuallyasfarleftae,
previouslyreported. Itwasdecidedtoattackalongtheroadrun-
ningnorthincolumnofcompanies,theassaultcompany(I)ona
frontageof250yds,jumpingofffromanEast~
T
vestlinethrough
RJ338withitsleftjustinclusiveoftheroad.LCoto.follow
theadvanceofCoI*echeloned150ydstotheleftrearprotecting
ICo
l
sleftflank,preparedtooiakecontactwiththe26thMaron
the-left. KCowashel,din-areserveassembly,areaprepared,on
k
order,tofollowtheadvanceoftheattakingcompaniesbybounds*
Orderstothiseffectwereissuedtothecompanycommandersnear
HJ336-atabfut1115andK-houH'fortheattackwassetat1150.
^, TheattackjumpedoffasscheduledandICobeganre*
ceivingamoderatevolumeofsmallarmsandintermittentmortarfire
almastimmediatelyafterleavingtheL/D. Themosteffectiveenemy
fireseemedto*becomingfromtheirleftfrontandtheICoMG
platoontookthatpprtionofthefrontundercoveringfire. Upon
reachingthenorthsideoftheairstrip,itwaslearnedbyaction
ofsmallcontactpatrolssentoutfromICoand2-21thattheflank
soughtwas,atthattime,some300yardstotherightrearofI
Co'srightflank* Actingupon'thisinformation,ICoWasdirected
tomovetotheright,coveredbyfireofCoL,untilitgainedcon-
tactwith2-21,thentotakeupalineof300yardfrontagefacing
north. Withtheleftcompanyof2-21cooperatingthiswasaccom-
plishedbyabout1530,theverysmall-gapresultingbeingheavily
coveredbymutuallysupportingautomaticweaponsofthetwocompan-
ies. Thisputtherightflanf%rCo ataboutTa217-T(EC)and
itextendednorthwesttoaboutN(C)
#
ThemovementofCoItomakethejunctionwith2-21had
drawnconsiderablefirefromalow,brokenridgelineinTA217-Mre-
sultinginafewcasualties* Itwasdecidedthereforetocapture
thisridgelineusingLCowhichwasinanexcellentpositiontodo
so. LCowasaccordinlyorderedtoattackfromitspresentposi-
tion,onafrontageof250yards,seizetheridgeinquestion,and
toestablishcontactwithICoontheright. Theattackjumpedoff"
atabout1600and,byutilizinga*holdingforceotonerifleplatoon
plustwosections.o^-M&'sfiringfrompositionsinRwhileonerifle
platoonwitha&&sectionattachedmaneuveredaroundtheleftand
5
ActionReport,IVCJIM (Cont*d)
attacked-fromtheenemy'srightflank,themissionwasaccomplished!*
inlessthananhour. By1700LCohadestablishedalineextend-
ingfromTA217-M(WC)easttoN(C)whereitmadephysicalcontact
withICo
r
sline. Shortlythereafterscompanyofthe26th^ar
movedu>behindLCoandfilledinthegapbetweenthe3dand5th
Divisionsbeforedart. KCoestablisheda B R L fromRJ338to
Asaresultofthedaysaction,thebattalionkilled
anestimated50Japs;casualtiestoowntroopswereI55,K40,
L12,Hq10,
3* On2war45,he3dEn,9thiar,wasorderedtoattack
incolumnofcompaniesandseizeHill362andtheadjacenthigh
groundinTA235-U,V. Weweretobetheleftbattalioninthe
attackandm?kethema.ineffortinthe21st#arZofA;the1st
Bn,21stwasonourrightwithasimilarmission. Attachedwere
twoplatoonsoftanksandonePlatoonofengineers. Khourwas
setat0800withthenormal,higherechelon"controlledsupporting
firesofthevariousheavierarmsscheduledtofallontheobjec-
tiveandotherpointsof,enemyvantagefromX-30toKplus10with
athree-liftrollingbarrageofartillerythereafter. . ,
Theplanofthebattalioncommanderwastoattack.with
ICoinassaultjumpingofffromitsppesentlines(see
;
above)at
Kh/ouronafrontageof250yards,andseizingtheobjective;l>
CotofollowtheadvanceofICoecheloned150ydstotheleft
rearprotectingtheleftflankofthe21stilarandmaintaining
contactwiththe5thDivisionontheLeft;KCoin.reserve,to
awaitordersinitspresentposition. The3dplatoon',CoBEngrs
were-settoworkimmediatelyafterreporting(about0700.)clearing
a"safe"laneforthetankstotheimmediate"rearofthefrontlines*
ThetankswerebroughtupasfarasRJ336assoonaspossible
(shortlyafterXhour)andorderedtostandbypreparedtomoveto
theL/Danddeliversupportingfire.
OrderswereIssuedtotheunitcommandersabout0645
atRJ338and,by0730,thecompanieswereinpositionwaitingto
jumpoffatKhour. However,onebatteryofartilleryfallingshort
intoICo'slinesduring;almosttheentire10minutepreparation
causedanumberofcasualties ndsodisorganizedthatcompanythat
itwasdecidedtouseLCoinassaultinsteadofI. Orderstothat
effectwere,issuedtoLCobySCR300atabout0:00andtheattack-
didnotgetunderwayuntil0820. ICowasorderedtofullfillthe
missionorginallyassignedtoLCoasitwasabletoreorganize
intimetodoso. KCo'sordersremainedthesame.
AsLCo'slinemovedforwardofthebrokengroundinto
theopenflatwhichhadtobecrossedbeforetheobjectivewasreach-
ed,itreceivedfirefromseverallargecaliberflattrajectory
pieceswhich'openedupfromthevicinityof"Hill362,anditwasde~
cidodtousethetanksindirectsupportofthecompany'sattack.
Thegeneraltarget.areawaspointedouttothetankcompanycommander
froiTithebattaliqncommander
1
sOPatTA217-R(NC),andalsoanarea
in./
A
(C)from"whichitseamedtankswouldbeaffordedhull-downfire
positions. Thepositionprovedverysatisfactoryandoneplatoonof
tankswasquicklymovedin.
T<
JiththeLCoCommanderdirectingthefire
bySCR00,thetanksbroughtindividualgunpositionsunderheavy
andaccuratefireenablingtheattackingtroopstoadvance.
ActionReport,IttoJI^A (Cont'd)
Althoughthetanksdrewbothmortarandflattrajectorygunfirewhile
moving"fromRJ333tothefiringposition,verylittle(and.that
inaccurate)firewasbroughtt,obearonthemonceinposition. They
keptupacontinuousandveryeffectivefireontheobjectiveand
thehighgroundoneitherside,interchangingplatoonswhenone
k d DOtakeonmoreammunition,sothattherewouldbenolullin
thefiring. Atleastfiveenemygunswerepiercedbytankfire.
Itbecameevidentveryearlyintheattackthat-one
companyofthepresentreducedstrenghtcouldnotadequatelycover..
thezoneofactionassignedand,sincethelargergapwasonthe
right(ICohadtotheleftrearasordered),KGowascommitted
totheattackintherightofthebattalionZofA,withordersto
seizetheportionofthebattalionobjectiveinitszone,maintain-
ingcontactwithhCoontheLeft* Byabout1100theattack
hadadvancv3dtothehillatTA217-S(e)andsmallarmsresistance
wasgreatlyintensified,whilea'fevflattrajectorypieceswere
firingfromtherightofHill362downthedrawatTA218~A,Finto-
KCo
1
slines* 81mmMortarswereeffectivelyusedagainstthe
latter,thetanks,byexercisingcare,werestillabletofire
attargetsofopportunityovertheheadsoftheadvancingtroops.
Followinga10minutepreparationofartillery,theattackcontin-
ued/ Thebattalionhadpulle'ST'awa^fromunitsonrightandleft
inadvancingtheattackandareportwasmadeofthissituationto
CO,21stliar. Inanswer,thebattalionreceivedorderstoadvance
asrapidlyaspossibletoitsobjectiveirrescardlessofunitson
eitherflank. . " ,
T&eattackcontintf&5^veryslowlyaginstincreasingly
heavyresistance,allcompanies(includingI)makingfulland
effectiveuseof50mmmortarsforgeneralclosesupportandontar-
getsofopportunity. Asthetroopsapproachedto'within10to150
ydsoftheridgeline.ICobecameheavilyengagedwiththeenemy
firingfromtheleft'ofthebattalion
1
sZofA,anditwaslargely
throughthat-company
1
seffortsthattheassaultline'wasableto
continueitsadvanceto.theobjective^ Around1350,thegunfire
fromthevicinityofT&2c'5^V(S)caused,aseparationbetweenICo*s
tworifleplatoon,,tholeftplatoonremainingfcncontactwithLCo.
Followingabitterstruggleatclosequarters,theob-
jectivewasoccupiedatabout1420."~TherightplatoonofJKCowas
pinneddown,byfiattrajectoryandMGfire,"stillseparatedfromthe
restoftheline,somewherein218~B(W). Anintensefirefight
continuedbetweenourtroopsonthehishgroundandtheenemyjust
beyonduntilabarrageoffriendlyartillery,firedinpreparation
forarenewaloftheattackofadjacentunits,fellshortintoour*
lines. Therewassomedelayingettingthebarrageliftedandquite
i.fewcasualtieswerecausedinIandLCos. Asaresult,thefor-
wardprogressofthebattalionwashaltedforreorganization*
FrompositionsinKCo'sleftplatoon,excellentobser-
vationofthe^unpositionswffichseemedtobedisruptingtheline
wasafforded. TheycrovedtobeopenAAemplacementsandI Cowas
abletoplace~.ccuraie60mmmortarfire-'onthematcloserange,
puttingatleastfou>"ofthegunsoutofaction. Undercoverofthis
concentrationandsmallarmscoveringfirefromtherestofKCo,
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (Cont*d)
therightplatoonmovedtotheleftandmadecontactwithitscompany*
IComadecontactwithLGO'S,leftflankandestablishedaline
bendingbackandfacingwesttoprotectthebattalion'sleftflank
KCo*srightplatoonwentintoasimilarpositionfacingeastto
protecttherightflank.
Abattalionofthe-2~thMarandthenthe2dEn,21st
movedinbehindHill362inourZofAandattackedleftandright
respectivelyjustbeforedusk. Eacheffectedatie-inonthebatta-
lion'sflanks. Thebattaliondue:inforthenightalongaline
runningfromTA234-Y(SC)toY.(EC)to235-U(SE)to218~A(EC). As
aresultofthedaysactionthebattalionkilledanestimated50
Japsandknockedoutaminimumofninelargecalibergunsinaddi-
tiontonumerouspillboxeshousingautomaticweapons. Casualties
toowntrooewereI20,K30,L.65,Hq8.
4. Worthyofpassingnotewasalimited*,ctiojibyICoof
thisbattalionon3Mar45. Actingasflankprotectionforthe
2dBn,21stMartowhomtheyweretemporarilyattached,thecompany
echelonedtotheleftrear,founditselfwithinverycloserange
ofseveraldualpurposeguns(estimated3inch)inthevicinityof
TA218-C(WC)whichtheenemywerepreparingforaction. Unseenby
the,enemy,thecompanycommanderforkedthree"bazookas
11
intoa
positionabout75yardsfromthegunsand,atthesametime,laid
his.60mmmortarsonthem. Heopenedfirewithbothweapons
simultaneouslyandkeptupaheavyaridaccuratebarrageonthepo-
sitionsforabout10minutesmakingonlythechangesnecessaryto
movehisfirefromoneenemyemplacementtoanother. Duetothe
factsthattheJapsweretakencompletelybysurprise(theiratten-*
tlonhadbeenfocused-onunitsofthe5thDivisionmovinguponthe '.
left)andthattheemplacementswereoftheopentype,theaction
resultedinthealmostcompleteannihilationoftheenemymanning
theguns,andcasualtiestoICo'stroopswereonly3wounded(by
hastyemailarmsfire). Theenemygunsfailedtogetoffaround.
Fourwereknockedoutandanestimated25Japskilled.
5. Againattachedtothe21stMar,thebattalionwasin
anassemblyareainreserveinthevicinityofRJ330(218-H)on
6aar. Atabout2230thatdate,thebattalion.commanderreceived
verbalordersbytelephonetopassthroughthelinesofthe1stBn,
21stat05007.Mar)andseizeHill362inTA219~U. Sinceaday-
lightreconnaissancewasdeniedtheCO,the
H
mechanics
JI
oftheattack
wastobebaseduponthepositionof1-21'sfrontlines(theL/D)and
therelativepositionoftheobjective,whichwastobepointedout
totheassaultcompanycolanderebythecompanycommandersof1-21
thenintheline. Thefrontlineof1-21wasreportedtobe-accurate-
lydeterminedandrunningfrom219-K(C)toP(K)to*>(WC)toT(WC),
andHill362,wasreportedtohavebeenobservedduringdaylightjust
200-250yardstothefront.
Thebattalioncommander,withtheBn-3endsradioman,
movedfromtheBnCP(217-0)toa%nownpointnearRJ330,wherethe
companycommandershad(justprior)beeninstructedtomeet,atabout
2300. TheCO^.1-21,-wascontactedinthatvicinityandordersissued
tothecompanies. Realizingfrompastexperiencethepossibilityof
errorsinpinpointingpositionsonthemap,itWESdecidednotto
ActionReport;IWOJIMA (Cont'd)
assignadirectionofattack(whichwouldhave-hadtobemeasured
byprotractor),buttomakeaconcertedattackontheobjectivepointy
edoutby1-21and,atdaylight,makeanynecessaryadjustments,from
anobservationoftheground,soastoremaininthezoneofaction
assigned. Itwasplannedtomoveallthreeriflecompaniestothe
vicinityoftheL/Dundercoverofdarkness,thetwoassaultcompanies
$otakeuppositionsimmediatelybehindtfyerightandleftcom-
:
paniesof1-21attheL/D,thereservecompanytogointoan
assemblyareabehindtheassaultcomjjnies, KandLCoswereto
attackabreastwithKthebasecompany,ontheright;ICowasin
resei've. Theassaultcompaniesweredirectedtoshootahazimuth
ontheobjectivesindicatedby1-21
f
scompanycommanders,contatt
eachotfyertomakecertainthere.wasnoappreciablevariancebe~
t.weentheazimuths,andattackon200ydfrontageinatightlino
ofskirmishersinthedirectionascertained,-LCotomaintain
physicalcontactwithK,radiosilencetobemaintaineduntil
activecontactwiththeenemywasmade*
At0320,thecompaniesmovedfromtheassemblyarea
totheL/Dincolumn'offilesintheorderK,L,Iledbythe
companycommandersof1-21whohadreturnedto-thatpointtoact
asguides* * "
Theordersissuedwere^carefullycarriedoutandthe*
attackjumpedoffpromptlyat0500undercoverofaheavysmoke
preparation. Thefirstresistancewasintheform,ofaJapMG-
whichopenedupinLGo'sZofAabout0535followedbyasustained
burstfromanLCoflamethrower/Thereafterthere;wasscattered
rifleandautomaticxveaponsfirewithoccasionalflamethrower
-burst,principallyintheleft.ofthebattalionZofA,.untilshortly
after0600whenLCoranintoiieavyresistanceonitsleft* Hav-
ingclosedtowithinveryshortrangeoftheJapposition,LCo
wasobligedtoreduceitbysmallunitmaneuveringwithuseof
Bazooka,flamethrower,demolitionsandsmallarms* Scattered*
resistancewasbeingmetbyKCoontherightbutnothingheavy
enoughtoholdthemup. .
Atdaybreak(about0620)thebattalioncommander,from
anOpinthecenteroftheL/D,madeathoroughcheckoftheground
againstmapandphotographandwashabletodefinitelylocatethe
positionsofthecompanies-Itwasdiscoveredthatthegeneralsit-
-jtionwasnotasfaradvancedaspreviouslysupposed* At0645,the
rightcompanywasintheprocessofoccupyingHill331,andthe
e-D^roxicsatefrontlineranfrom218~S(SS)toT(NC)to'O(NE);stiffest
iii&tancewasontheleftwhereautomaticweaponswerefiringfrom
plxlboxesandcaves. TheBnOPwasat218-N(NE)andthefrontline
^1-21
4
(stillinposition)wasfoundtorunfrom218-M(SC)to'N(SW)
UJ.N(NS)toI(EC). Thisshowed&.nadvanceof200-250yardssince
t,nostartoftheattack. EvidentlyHill331had.beenmistakenfor
.:-.7.1.362* Theassaultcompanycommanderswerecontactedandan
opderforthecontinuationofthSAttackissuedover%heSCR500.
I
4
;wasapointofextremegoodfortunethatthedirectionofattack
wasalmostexactlycorrect,andthe*orderwasVerybrief(mostlya
matterof'reorientat}.on)* Khourwassetat0715withatenminute
artillery-preparationfromK-10toKhouronHill562andadjacont
ActionReport,IWOJIKA (Cont*d)
highground. KCo,makingthemaineffort,,wasorderedtoseize
Hill362andsupportbyfiretheattackofI*Coontheleft.
Theattackmovedforwardveryslowlyoverbrokenand '
treacherousground,theheaviestresistancestillontheleft*
KComovedforwardmorerapidlyontherightbutitsfiresinsup
portofLCowerealmosttotallyineffectiveduetotheextremely
choppedupnatureoftheterrain. Themosttellingresistanceduring
thisphaseoftheattackCamefromcavesandbunkers,setlowinthq
numerousgullys,fromwhichfirewasdeliveredatverycloserange
attheattackingtroopsastheycameinto,orthrough,thegulleys.
Itwassimplyamatterofhavingtoreducepositionafterposition
withflamethrower,bazookaanddemolitions,eachpositioncalling
foraseparatebitofmanueveringbythesmallunitwhichcontacted
it. Theresuldwaspainfullyslowadvanfee*
KCoseizedandoccupiedHill362justprldr'to1400
anditwasorderedtoorganizethehillandassisttheattackofL
Cobyfire. LCowashavingconsiderabletroubleadvancingtothe
highgroundin219-P, Anefforttogaincontactwith'theuniton
therightbycommittingICoonKCo
1
srightflankprovedunsuccess-
.fuland,atabout1800,ICowasorderedtomakecontactwithKCo'-s
rightflankandtakeupalinebendingbackandfacingsouthto
securethebattalionsrightflank. Thefrontlineatthistimeran
from218-0(SE)to219-P(SC)toU(C)toU(SW)to218-Y(-$C)Asup-.
pbrtplatoonfromKCo,notusedintheattack,wasattachedtoLCo
forleftflanksecurityandjonthelinespecifiedabovethebattalion
duginforthenight. - . . _ -
Mostnotable,inthenightattach,wasthe'factthat,al-
thoughnearlyallthebasic,dopewasba&,^thestrategyprovedvery
sound,sinceitturnedoutthattheopengroundtakenundercover
of-darknesswasthemostheavilyfortifiedofallterrain,captured-
thatday,infact,thestrongestcenterofresistanceencountered '
betweenRJ330andthebeach,andtheenemyoccupyingthisvital
groundweretakencompletelybysurprise(actuallysleepingintheir
pillboxesandcaves). Itisassumedthatthisstrongpointwaspart
ofthedefensesystemofwhichTA201-Ewas-anadjacentpart.
AmongsttheweaponsreducedinthisareaweretwoheavycaliberAT*
weapons(approx3")inreinforcedconcretepillboxesabout75yards
apartin218-0,four13mmMGs
1
inpillboxes,numerous7.7mmMCJsin
bunkers,andfive8"rocketlaunchers(wheeltype). It'shouldbekept
inmind,however,thatastrokeofluckwentalongwaytowardmak-
ingtheattackasuccess. .
v
Havingrevertedtocontrol,ofthe9thMar,thebattalion
withBCo.,21stMarattachedcontinued'the.attackat0750on^the
8thofinarchwithorderstoseizethecoastlineinits~ZofA. *
Mortarandartillerypreparationswerelaiddownonthehighground
inthenorthandsouthofTA219-^priortothejumpoff,andthe*
companiescontinuedtouse60mmMortarsonthosepointsinclose
supportuntilthetroopsvirtuallyoverranthem. Theattackwas
madewith'B-21&KCoabreast,KCo'ontherightmakingthomain
effort. An.intermediateobjective(the.lipofthehighgroundin
219-Q,,V.)waspointedouttothecompanycommandersontheground
fromthe"CO
1
s-OP. ICoandLCo(whenpassedthroughbyB-21)were
toregaininpositionpreparedtoprotecttherespectiveflanks
thebattalionortofillinanygapoccurringontheglanks.
ActionReport,IWOJIM (Cont'd)
WithaDDfiringintothedrawsat219-*R,W.theattack
jumpedoffatKhourandprogressedslowly,withICo(aslateror-
dered)following&Cobybounds,protectingtheopenrightflank,
and,by1600hadmovedtotheintermediateobjectiveagainstcontin-/,
uous"lastditch"fightingfromcavesandbunkersinthebrokeng
ground; Closesupportby60
f
saswell,astheusualshortrangefights
ingwithindividualweaponsplayedtheimportantrolesintheattafek^
;
.
Theleftcompany,whichwasincontactwiththe21stMarontheleft,
wasorderedtocontinuetheattaok^-downthedr&w,whichwasgently
sloping(ontherightit.wasaprecipitouscliff). Theri^htcom-
panywasheldupontliehighgroundanddirectedtocoverthead-* ;.
.vanceofB-21ontheleft; A,wide'gaphadoccurredontherightdue*
tothe
1
unitontherightbeingheldupby-fierceresistanceinits
zoneofactitmanditwasthoughtbeettoholdthecommandinggrounUl
intheareauntilthe'adjacent"'highgroundwasseizedbyburtfoops.
Iftheba.ttalionmovedovertheqliffsdowntothe'beach.itwould,
beopentofirefrom'the(highgroundatfA202-PjG- whichwouldthen
:
.
beaboveandtothje?right.rear,aridtherewas
v
nothingtoprevent *'>' ^
retreatingenemyfrb^thenoccupying" thetjommandinggroundgiven,
upbysuch.anadvance/whicfewouldcut,usofffromtherear(supply,
evacuation,communication)* ThesituationwasreportedtotheRegV-\
;
mentalCommanderwith'a-recommendationthatevery.effortbemadeto.
occupythe>frigk,groundonourrightbeforethebattalionwasmoved
tothebeach. ItVsrsdirectedthatthehighgroundnowheldwasto
beorganizedforthenight. BCo,21sthadmoveddownthedrawin
219-Q, towhereanyfurtheradvancewouldhavebrokencontactwith
the. unitontheleft,andtheywereorderedtoho14uptheadvance
anddiginforthenight. ThefrontlineranfromTA219-QlNC)to
Q,(SC)toQ(SS)toV(cT
s
toV(SC), ICowasbroughtupland/from,a
positionbehindKCo,attackedandseitedwith"littleresistancb^the
hillinV(s;2). TheytiedintoK"Co?.erightflandandorganizedthe
hillfacingsouth(right)andwest(rear)toprotectthebattalion
r
s
exposedrightflank. Duringtheday'sactionthebattalionkilled.
anestimated175Japsandhad65casualties* / " ""
On9March,thebattalionreceivedorderstoattackto
theseainitsZofA, OrderswereissuedforKCoandB-21(still
attached)tocontinuethe.attack,Kontheright.:.ICowasordered
tomaintainitspositiononthehillbuttoadjustitslinessoas
todeliversupportingfireforKCo
f
sadvance, luCowasorderedto
movetoandorganizetheforwardslopesofthespurin219-V(N)at"
V
Khour,andsupportbyfiretheadvanceofbothB-21andj. 81and
SOiaramortarpreparationswerelaidinthedrawsthroughwhfcfchthe
attackmustmovefromK-15toK^hour,anda15oiinuteNG-Fpfepara-
"tionwasfiredin- TA2l5^T,Y. fheattackjumpedoffonschedule,with
,thesupportingfiresfromthespursoneithersideoftherightdraw
aidingKCoconsiderably. Theinitialslopeleadihgdownthrough
thisdrawwas,inreality,abrokencliff,downwhichthetroops
hadtoinchtheirway,firingflamethrowerandplacingchargesinto
thecountlesscavesdugiritothecliffy-face* Nearlyallofthecaves
wereoccupiedbygroupsofJaps-andconsiderable,thoughindatermi-
' nate,numberweredestroyedintheaction. Themethodofattacking,
thisunusualpositionwaesimple^buttheactualworkwasdifficult.
x
Coveredbysmallarmsfromtheout^ttingspurs(wnichafforded
firingbackintotheclifffrom*forwardpositions)thesmallassault
groupsworkedtowardthecavesfromaboveorwitherside,hugging
N
thec.liff-faceandavoidingthemouthofthecave,untilrightnext.
totheopening. Theflamethrowerwouldopenup(perhapspreceeded
byacoupleoffragmentationorsmokegrenades)andcloseinbehind
. .. ~ ' ' ' - 1 2 - -' " ' .
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (ConUd)
hisburstuntilhecouldpouritdeepinto,thecave. Following
clo|ely,thedemolitionistwouldigniter.ndhurlhischargeas
deeplyintothecaveaspossible,whichaction,wouldbefollowed ^
by&generalassaultandclosecheckingofthecaveforpossible
furtheraction. Atapproximately1300^thelinehadmovedtoa.
ledgeoverlookingthesandystripofbea&habout100-150yardsfrom
thewater'sedgefromwhichitcouldcommencetheentirebeach.
IBinceB-21hadpulledleftinordertomaintaincontactwiththe
JBlst.'Aar,andbecausethebattalionrightflankwasstilldangling,
LCowascommittedontherighttoextendthelineandprotect
theflank. Patrolssweptthebeachforatleast200yardsoneither
sideofthebattalionzoneofactionwithoutcontact-, I'Cowas
heldinpositiononthehillin219-V(S)whereitcouldcoverthe
rearofthebattalionfromaboveandalsopreventenemytroopsfitbm.
occupyingthehighgroundjustevacuatedbytheassaultline. FGo
8-9*wasattachedforthepurposesofdefenseandwereutilized
inttyinginbetweenLCo,whichbentitsrightflanktotherear,and
ICo,whichextendeditslinetowardtheseatomeetFCo. The
troopsdug.inforthenightfairlysecure,;Japskilledforthedaywere
anestimated125,with36casualtiestothebattalion.
JapsfromTA201-Einpullingbackfromthepressureexert-
edthere,hadgottenintothebrokengroundbetweenKill362andthe'
battalionCPand.forwarddumpovernight,andwereseriouslyharassing
thesupply
1
andevacuationline(7menwerekilledthisday,the10th
carryingsuppliesorevacuatingwounded)* FCowasassignedthe
missionof.moppingupthearea~which,afteranall',day.fight,they
weresuccessfulindoing. Thebattalioncommanderwasorderedto
patroltotherightwithacompanytheshelfimmediatelybelot*the
cliffsofTA202~F,3infrontofthe1stn'szoneofaction.'Be-
causeofthefactthatthehighground(cliffs)commandingthe
shelfwasstillinthehandsoftheenemy,it wasstrenuouslyrecom*-
mendedthatthepatrolbeheldupuntiltheNoseinTA202-F,G-
captjuredbythe1stIn. Uponreceivingwordthattheordermust.
"becarriedout,
:
thepatrol(K\Co)moved,southfromthevicinityof
EJ230(TA219-^)coveredbyLandICondIGo'sownMG
f
s. Trouble
wasexpectedandreceived. Whenthepatrolre"Chedapointabout
halfwaytotheendofthenosefromtueirL/D,veryheavyMG-fire
brokeoutfromvariouswellconcealedpositionsinthefaceofthe
cliff. Thepatroltoodcoverinthenumerousshellholesathand
andwereliterallypinnedtothegroundbyfirefrom'above. Itcould
r.oveneitherforwardnorbackward-ifamembersomuch,aswiggled
s.toehedrewheavyautomaticfire. Alargevolumeoffirefrom
ourcoveringunitsdirectedatallpossibleenemypositionsinthe
clifffreehadlittleornoeffect-thepatrolstillcouldn't
move. OrderswereissuedtotheKCocommandertomovehiepatrol
bacito *theL/Dundercoverofthemortarconcentrationwhichwould
immediatelyfollow,andthe81mmmortarobserverthenwithICo
wesbroughttothebattalioncommander
1
sOPat219-V(SC)whichaf-
fordedexcellentobservationofthetarget.,cliff-line. Asteadyand
^oiazjinglyaccuratebarragewaslaiddownonthetarget(fromtheend
ofthenosebacktowithin75yardsofthepatuol)bythe81's,
firstwithsmoke,thenamixtureoflightandmeduimH-.E*,then'
smokeagain,whiletheentireclifffacewassubjectedtoanintense,
concentration,ofKGfirebyI>KandLCoguns,andwiththisex-
cellentcoveragethepatrolwasenabledto.
1
extricateitselfwith
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (Cont
!
d) ,
comparatively'fewcasualties* Itwasthesmokecoverage' ofthetar-
getwhichwasprimarilyresponsibleforthemovementofthepatrol*<_
Thewindwasgentleandinexactlytherightdirectionandthe,
accuracyofthemortarfireweasingularlyadmirable; Thabattalion
wasorderedtodiginanEast-Vestlinecoveringthebeachareafae4
ingsouthend,upon'adjustmentranfrom219-.(WC),whereaKGpa*
too)iwasplacedcoveringthebeach,toX(NW)- td,W(NW)toand, includ- /.
ingthehillin'V(S), E-21wasmovedtothehighgroundinV(N-)inre-
serve. F-9revertedbscktoitsparentorganization.' ,.. .:.
Nomovementofnotewasmadebythebattaliononthe11th
withtheexceptionthat'B-21attackedtndseized,withoutasingle
5
;
loss,thehillinTASQ2-A,organizeditandmadecontactwithICo>
whowasstilloccupyingthehillin219-V(S). IandB-21wereinex-
cellentpositiontosupportbyfiretheattackofthe1stBnwhich .
wasatthattimeattackingthenoseinTA202-*F,Gfromthesouth,and
betweenthem,killedabout25-30Japs*whomtheycaughtcrawlinginto
positiontomeetthe1stEn'sattacks Whentheleftflankcompany
of1-
T
9pinchedoutB-21'andmadecontactwithICo,B~2lreverted
toitsparentorganization.
Onthemorning.ofthellthjtankswererequestedforuse,
againstthepositibnsinthe* clifffacevhichhadpinned !CCodown
thedaybefore* Manycavesandacouple-ofpositions)whichseemedto
bewellcamouflagedpillboxeswerevisiblefromtheBnCommander's
OP. Aroutefromthe1stBn
!
s2ofA,wherethetanksthen>ere, '<
tothedesiredpasiti
N
onwasspecified(adistanceofabout500 .'yara#
alongaroad)andafterfiveorsixhoursthetanksappeared* Con-*,
siderabledifficultywasexperiencedmoving,t^hetanks,into,position
(aroutehadtobe.dozedaroundanimpaS;Sa
T
bleshellcrater)but,at
about1500theywerereadytofireatshortrangepointblankinto.
thewallofthenose-, Withthe.battalioncommanderdirectingthe
firefromhisOFbySCR300andIandKCo MU inpositioncovering'
thetarget,the.tanks(twoplatoons)did'-a/finejobofreducinga
formidableposition. Thecamouflagedpositionsproved,inr.ealifcy,
tobeheavyconcretepillboxeswithsmallaperturesand,bypersis-
tentfiringwithAPC,theywerebrokenwideapon* Japsattempting:
toescapefrom thevariouspositionsweremoveddownbythecover*- '
ingviG-'s, By176all'organizedresistancefromtheseasideofthe
bigspurhadbeenobliteratedand'thetanksretiredwiththemission
verysuccessfullycompleted, Persuanttoordersreceivedfromthe
F,
:
e2inientalCommander,IandKCo
1
sweremove'dtothevicii^yofHill
oS2'wheretheytookupalinefacingwestpreparatorytothemapping
upoperationwhichwas- carriedonnextday^,LCowasplacedonthe
high'groundin219-V(W)wiperstheycompletedthebattalionperimeter*
6* Onthe18thofMarch,thebattalionmovedtoanassembly
areatoTA201-J,P,KQ;andwasassignedasectorofthevacated4th
DivisionZofAtopatrol,daily. Thesectorwas.dividedintosub*,
seederseachofwhichwaspatrolleddailybyarifleplatoonwith
snMGsectionandademolitionsquadof'engineersattached(see
PartI-Bforresultsofpatrollingphase)untilthebattalion'
wastacticallyrelieved feyabattalionof147thInfantryoftheArmy :
at0700on4April,45
#
Duringthispatrollingphase,acompany
ofthebattalionwasforcedtomakeaconcertedattackonacenter
oforganizedresistancewhichhadbeenreferredtoas,the4thDivision
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (Cont'd)
Pocket"justpriortotheofficialsecuringoftheisland. ThisipB
actionisworthyofdetailednote,
AplatoonpatrolmovingthroughTA184-E,Jon20Mar45
wasfired,uponfromthevicinityof184-ETB),185A(W)and,inthe.
ensuingfirefight,sustainedafewcasualties. Itwasreportedby
thepatrolthattheenemyhadseveralM&positions*andaconsiderable
numbercfduginriflemeninthedrawandsurroundinggroundinthati
area. Accordingly,acompanypatrol(K)wassentagainstitfrom
northwesttosoutheastthenextday(21st)and,althoughitcleaned
outthewestsideofthedraw,tj^emaincenterofresistancestill
remained. Wellcamouflagedpositionsdug'intothewesternfaceof
ac."sugarloaf"hillontheeaslside'ofthe.draw(185-At-WC)}were
denyingtheuseoftheroadrunningacrossthenorthwestcomesof
184-J,andasectionoftankswasbroughtupthe'roadtodestroythese
positions. Thetanksdidagoodjob,coveringalloftheclifflike"
faceofthehillthatwasn'tmaskedfromtheirviewwithaheavy.
concentrationoffire* TwoemplacementshousingheavyMG's,and
numerousriflepositions,weredestroyed. Fromthattimeontheroa4
inquestionwasfreelyusedwithoutdanger. A>platoonofKCo,left
inambushguardingthe"pocket",receivedmortarfireduringthenight.
Fromtheprevioustwodaysactionthedefensesystemin
thepocketwasdefinitelyestablishedand,onthe22dofMarch,ICo,
withaplatoonoftanksplusoneflame-throwertankattachedwas
orderedtoattackandseizetheenemypositionfromthewestandsouth
coveredbyfirefffomthehighgroundonthewesternsideofthe
draw* ThesmallJapforceoccupiedatrenchsystemrunningalongthe
baseofthe"sugar-loaf
11
hillftom,thesouthernendofthehill.
northwesttotheheadofthedraw,withacoupleofMG-bunkers(still
in.operation)builtinto"thetrenchparapetaUkeypoints* Cavesran
(^hiswasassumedandestablishedlatertobeafact)fromthebottom,
oftrenchintoa-largeffiaincaveunderthehill,whichenabledthe
Japstovacatethetrenchandreturntoitatwill.-Duetothefact
thatthetanksrequestedwerelateinarrivingand'becauseapassage
throughmaskinggroundhadtobebulldozedforthetankstoreacha
positionfromwhichthemaintargetscouldbeengagedandcloseenough
foruseoftheflame-throwertank,theassaultbyICodidnotjump
offuntilabout1500.
Atabout1220th&tanks(withouttheflamethrowertank)
movedintopositionwithin50Tardsofthetargetandfiredsteadily
withAPCandHEfor20minutes,thefirebeingdirectedoverSCR
300bytheICocommanderandbyaMarine,whoknewthetargets'placed
insideoftheplatoonleader
1
stank. Theentiretrenchsystemwas.
thoroughlyandheavilyworkedover,allvisiblecavesinthehill,sico
firedinto,andthelastremainingM&bunkerscompletelydestroyed,'
Theflame-throwertankwasmovedintopositionabout40yardsfrom
thetrenchsystemandsprayedits.chargebackandforthalongthe
trenchuntilitsfuel.wasexhausted. 5or6Japswereshotdownat-r
temptingtoescapefromthetrenchastheflamediminished,and
otherswereseentoblowthemselvesupwithgrenades. Astheflame
throwertankceasedfiringthetwoassaultplatoonsclosedwiththe
objective(theL/Dwas
7
just75yardfr'umit)and,usingtheirown
flamethrowersontargetsthetankhadmissed,almostimmediately
occupiedit* Withtheplatoonwhichh?<denvelopedandcomeupalong
thespurfromthesouthcoveringthem
v
.^nlengthoftrench,thepla-
toonfromthewestmovedintothetrenchandsystematicallyclosed
r
"'^"'
:
' : :;*:\oi^ h i 1 5 ' l
t
b
ActionReport,IWOJIwA (Cont'd)
eachofthe "communication" caveswhichran intothelarge chamber
underthehillwithlarge demolition charges. Twomainentrancesto
thelarge cavewerefound, oneleading fromthe southendofthe:
trenchandone inthesouthsideofthehillitself., Fragmentation
and.smokegrenades,flame andlargeTFT chargeswerethrown intothese,
agreat cmount ofactivity andcommotion Inthe.c&veresulting* Engi*;
ns-erswere brought intocomp!e4ft-
/
b*iejobof sealingallthecaves -
;
and,where theyweretoolargetocompletely seal.withcharges,they
werebulldozed shut. Two81m:flmorWrs endagoodsupply ofammuni*-
tionwasremovedfromasection-of thetrench.
Oneplatoonwassenttothe topofthe sugar-loaf hilland
byworking fromthetopdownonthereverse sidewithflame thrower
anddemolitions, destroyedwhatprovedtobetheldsttwo emplacements
ofthe centerofresistance.
IV Comments
A. Administration
1. Inanoperation suchasIWO,errorsincasualty reports
arealmost suretooccur-.butthe system ofsubmittingthe reports
is,notfaulty. Itmayberecommended, however,thatnotonlythe
1st Sgtandaclerk,butthreeorfourmenineachCoHqbe familiar
withthepreparation andsubmission ofthosereportssothat casual-
ties tothekey administrative personnelwillnotdisrupt theflowof
casualty information,
* . *'
2, Itis,ofcourse, submittedthat themethodof absorbing
replacements inthisoperation canbedefinitely,improved
%
upon. The
idealtimetoreceivereplacements isprior todeparture forthe
projected operation ?.nd,ifpossible, intimetorunthemthrougha
shortperiodof smallunittraining. It ispersonally believed that
thereplacement personnel shouldnot beabsorbedatthistimeto
buildthebattalion,tooverstrength, but thatthey'shouldbe treated
inmuchthe sameway asrsser*#t..oaafootballteam* They shouldbe
organized into squadsandplatoons, "te.mtheir signals"anddoa
little "dummy scrimmanging". Provision,should-bemadetobalance the
training ofthe "reserves"sotiaat.all "positions"arecovered (some
mortarmen,machinegunners,flsm>throweroperators,rocket launcher
operators, deraolitionists,etc)'perhaps somemay
1
evenbetrainedin
the "signals"foracoupleof "positions". Afterthelanding ismade
bythe"first team",replacements(reserves)shouldbe ^substituted",
as
units,asthey becomenecessary. Aunitmay beanythingfrom"a
firegroup toaplatoon (lessthekey NCO's), Itisunderstood that
rninioradjustments within thesmallunitswilloftenhave tobemade
but, comparedtootheroperational derangements,tneywillbenegli-
giblein"scope. Replacements shouldbemade_astheunitsloseper-.
sonnel-not after acompany is'sodepleted tht theoldermenarenot-
ingreat enoughnumbertohaveasteadying effect onthenew, Re-
pla.cerii.entbysquadswould seem ideal.
$, C#uslUe*ofthinbstt^lion to1800,4April1945arean.
follow::T
OFF ENL TOTAL
KIA " 7& 139
WIA 19
v
'3P1' 400
MIA 0 ~O 0
DWRIA 1 18 19
TOTALS 27 531 558
1. Oontiaryt^^:onJ.eenable citedopinion^!t15 theopinion
ofthisreporting o f f ^ h .h^^
#;
.r*ma.pgandphotr^Baphs furniched,for
theoperationwereno',onlyS S u ^ e butgood. Tne scale1/10,000
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (Cont'd)
ofthebasicmapisjustaboutwhat'isneededforterrainusebycom-
panycommandersandplatoonleadersand,ingeneral,itwasasaccu-.;
rateascouldbeexpectedoraswas-required. Itisbelieved
th:t,wherediscrepancyoccurs,thefaultliesmainlywiththe
mapreaderandnotwiththemap* Onejustdoesn'tlook,atmaps.
andreadthemashewouldaprintedpage-theymustbestudied
carefullyand,yes*evenalittleoldtimeresectionmight
benecessary. Somefeaturesmustbereadintoamapbecause
oftheeffectof"outsideforces"upontheterrainsincethe
mapwascompiled;forinstance,cliffsappearwherethemap
mightshowa50degreeslop?butthemapcan'tbeblamed-NGF-
didit. Andyoujustdon't'findaprettyclosedcontouronthe'
onthemapforeverylittlehillyouseeontheground-andvice-
versa. The1/5,000verticalphotographseemstobeidealforuse
bycompanyandbattalioncommandersandtheultimateisreached
when-themapandphotographareusedtogethersupplementarily.
Drawingthetarget,squadgridsystemonthephotographhelpeda
greatdeal,
2; Theproceduresetupfortherecoveryofcapturedenemy
documentsandmaterielwas-evidentlysatisfactorybut,exceptby
wayofgeneraldissemination,thisbattalionneverheardwhether
ornotthestuffittooksuchpainstorecoverwasofanyvalueto
thegeneraleffort. Itisknownthatcertaindocumentsturnedin
bythebattalionwereofconsiderableintelligeiqevaluebutnoone
madenotificationtousofthefact, "Creditgivenwherecredit
isdue"will,ifnothingelsemaintainincentiveendaidmorale.
3. Itisknownthatvocalpropagandahadadegreeofsuc-
cess.However,coordinationwithattackingunitsiswanting. There
v;ereinstancesinwhichsoundequipmentwascallingtheJapsout
oftheircavestosurrenderinthesameimmediateareawhereunits
ofthisbattalionweredoingtheirdeadlevelbesttoexterminate
anyandallJapswhoshowedthemselves. Thissituationiscited
merelyforthesakeofproferringinformation,norecommendation
pro,orconisoffe"red* iUJaptothereportingofficerisananimal
tobehunteddownandkilledateveryavailableopportunity,
4. TheonlythingdistinctiveabouttheJapandhistac-
ticsisthelackofthatparticularquality. Heneveractsthe
samewaytwice(exceptdigbigcaves). DifferentJapsarediffer-
entpeople-theydon
T
tevenknowwhattoexpectof*eachother,
5. Asfar.asenemytacticsisconcerned,ontypowasused
withsingulareffectiveness. Outletcavesworedugalongthebs.se
ofatrenchsystem,intowhichtheJapscrawledwhenourtroops
assaultedthetrench. G-renades,flameanddemolitionsthrown*into
thetrenchhadlittleeffectontheJapswheretheyhad-takenre-
fugeandthetrenchappearedunoccupied* Uponmovingoverthe
trenchandpastit^ourtroopsweresubjectedtogrenadesthrown
oatofthetrenchattheirrearbytheJapswhohadcrawledback
into-thetrench. Heavyrocketswerealsoused-forthefirsttime
againstthisbattalion. .
C. OperationsandTraining
1. Nocriticismisofferedofthe'typeandmethodoftrain-
ingwhichwasundergonebeforetheoperation. Itwasgoodand
I
4
*
ActionReport,IWOJIMA (Cont'd)
provedItselfintheresultsshown. However,moreandclosertank-
infantrytrainingisrecommendedforthenexttrainingperiod. All
phasesoftank-infantryworkshouldbe.Included-guidingtanks
bySCR300,by536,,andbytelephone,directingfirebythesesame
communicationmeans,etc. Actualcombatfiringoftanks,directed
by-companycommandsand.platoonleadersatobscuretargetsisneeded
plentyofit. Too,moreemphasisandtimec/ouldhavebeenplacedon;
smallunittraining(squad,andPlatoon).. Finally,Itisbelieved
thatmoreextensiveusecouldhavebeenmadeoftheriflerange*
Therearebeingdevelopeda.largenumberof
H
intensefirers"andnot
enoughgoodshooters. Ithasbecomethefieldpolicytokillthe
enemywithsheervolumeoffireratherthanafewwellaimedshots,
anditisbelievedthatmorthoroughindoctrinationontherange'
willremedythisshortcoming,
2. Boththerocket-launcher(bazooka)andAT.riflegrenade
provedeffectiveagainstfortifiedpositionsofthelightertype
(logandsandstonebunkers). Themosteffectiveweaponusedbythis
battalionagainstfortifiedpositionswasthemediumtanks. Byfiring
tanksfromhull-downpositionsatobservedenemyemplacementsan
attackwasenabledtoadvanceWhereotherwiseitwouldhavebogged
down. TankswerealsoeffectivelyusedoutIntheopenfiringpoint
blankatpillboxesandcaveswhenitwasascertainedthatnoATwea-
ponswere^present,andtheyweresuccessfullyusedagainst"area"
targetswhenthevicinityoftheenemypositionsbutnotthepositions
themselveswereknown/ 'iheA-PCshellwasmoteteffectiveandwasable
topenetratemanythickconcreteemplacementsbycontinuousfiringat
thesamepointinagivenemplacement. Wheretwoorthreehitsshowed
noapparenteffect,tenortwelve*inthesameplacebrokeitwideopen,
3. Theflamethrowerwastheoneindispensibleinfantryweapon
us^dintheoperation, -Theiremployment,withdemolitionchargesfol-
lowing,intheassaultteamswas,throughout,theprincipalinfantry
tacticsusedindestroyingtheenemy. Thetankequippedtothrowflame
throughi.-tsmaingunshoulddevelopintotheprimeweaponforrqduc4ior
tionofenemyfortifiedpositionsinfutureoperations. Thisbattalion
hadonlyoneopportunitytousethistankandItsworthwasquickly
recognized; The^greatervolumeofflame,.thegreaterrange,andthe
longersustained'burstthanthepackflamethrower,aceexactlywhat
isneededtoeffectivelyreachthe.enemyinhisdeepandelaborate
cavepositions,
4. Thebazookawasusedquiteoftenbythebattalionwith
varyingsuccess. Onsmalltypepillboxesorbunkers,particularly
thoseconstructedofsandstone,theywerehighlyeffectiveatclose
range. Atrangesover100yardsthepercentageofhitswasvery
small,-therangeshouldbekeptdown. Moreintensivefiringprac-
ticeisheededwiththerocket-launchertoincreaseaccuracywhich
oouldonlybeclassedas*fair.
D. Supply
! Itistheopinionofthereportingofficerduringcom-
batfield.rationscouldbeadequatelysuppliedIntwotypesonly,
the"C*'rationforactivelyengagedtroopsvnd.the"10in1*ration
forthosein.reorganizationassemblyareas..Allotherrations,
withtheexceptionofsupplementarybread/fruit,fruit,juices,and
coffeecouldbedispensedwith"/In..bivouac,3rationissatisfac-
*t'U
t
ActionReport,IWOJItfA (Contd)
tdryandAishighlyappreciated.
2. Theinitialsupplyofallitemswas.foundadequatebut
theresupply/Df81mmmortarammunitionofalltypesand6Oaiaimortar
illuminating'ammunitionwaslacking; rioreilluminationammumition
ofallkindswasneeded- both;typesoftrip~flares.and.illuminating
grenades.
T
aterwasneveraproblem- thebattatlicnwasafforded
.allthewaterithadfacilitietodraw.
3. Thesupplyofclothingwaspoorlyhandled- wrongsizes
again. Nearlyalltrousersweresize36waistandallcoatssize
40whenthepopularsizeinsnyorganizationis30-32.fortrousers
and36coat* However,thiswasconsiderednodrawbackasitwas'ex-
pectedbyallhandsi '"''
x
. .
4. Palletsshould)bedispensedwithunlessthehatchesof
all-ships-areriggedtohandlethem- mencan't.
2 . A i r ' ' ./ ' ' . ' :
' 1. Thisbattalionhadoccasion.tousetwoorthreestrikes
whichittookhourstoget. Onestrikefttttoberun- ontarget
squarefqrwardoftheoriginaltargetsrequestedbecause,b
;
ythe
timethe-planeswereavailable,thetroopshadfoughttheirwayup
ontotheoriginaltargetarea* Therewasneveranyclosesupport
byplanesexceptoncewhentheygotaboutthreehundredyardsoffthe
designated-targetandstraffcd50yardsinfrontofourlines.
2-0'Theaccuracyof'theplaneswesverypoor,andtheydidn't
seemtobe
v
ableto feet onthedesignatedTA
!
sasassignedfromthe
map- Itisbelievedthatagriddedphotograph,withtheTAsystem
imposedwillaidtheflyerstofindthetargetsontheground. The-
purposeofdummyrunscontinuetobeamysteryto.thereportingofficer.
Throughaliaisonteam,theTAanddirectionofflightwillbedefinite.*
lyspecifiedtotheplanesandadummyrunrequested* Therunismade4
atrightanglestothedirectionrequestedandthreeorfourhundred f
yardsoffthetarget* Thefalaciesintherunarestremuouslypointed
outandnew'runsmadeuntiloneisexactlyasdesired.. Theplanes
aregiventhe"go
11
.aheadandtheliverunismade- atrightangles
tothe.direction,requested
;
.and three'orfourhundredyardsoff
thetarget. .
*
3. Arequestwasmadeforaheavyplanestrikeonthetip
ofthespuratTA2O2-H(W),the.typeoftargetwhichisevery
airman
1
edream~averyprominentnose^idealdirectionofflight,
apin-pointtarget- whichcouldn'tbemistakenbyeblindman-"and,
thoughplaneswereavailable,thestridewasturneddown. Quitea
fewmarineslosttheirlivesin.attackingthis.pointthenextday,,
astrongconcentratedcenterofresistancebeingencountered. When
.theplanesareavailable,itisrecommendedthatthebattalioncorn-
iudiiders"judgementinrequestingagivenfetrikeberelieduponmore
4. Itwasrepeatedlyrequested,thatairobserversbekept
overlikelyenemj
;v
,t.arge
y
t^
r
Friendlyobservationplanesoverthe
enemybringsaboutbneoftwoconditions,eachofwhicharehighly
ActionReport,IWOJIMA-(Cont'd)
beneficialtoattackinginfantry:(1}theenemyisobservedif
heopensfireandcanbethentakenunderfirehimselfor(Z)he
refrainsfromopeningfireforfearofbeingspotted. Attimes\
whentheseplaneswereintheairoverenemy'areas^Japartillery,
mortarandrocket-firewasnoticeablylighter,andamererapid
andlesscostlyadvancewasmadebyattackinginfantry,
F Engineers
1. Engineerswereusedextensivelyinthisoperationto
clearlanesfortanks,demolishcavesandemplacements,bulldoze
routesafsupplyandHassage.for.tanks,endtodestroydudsof
smallercaliber. Theyoperatedincloseoooperationwiththein-
fantryinclosingofcavesandemplacements,movingacoupleof
hundredyardsbehindtheattackingtroopsandworkingontheenemji
positionsbejaindthem. Thearmoredbulldozerisidealforclearing
awayfortanksorothercombatvehiclesandsuchsuperiorinthat
respecttothebulldozertanks,
0. Ammunition ..
1. The30caliberammunition|>oxes(rifleand^BAR)are
tooheavy. Allother,typesofinfantrybattalionammunitionnow
comesincontainerswjfrich,full,areaorremanload. Thisisnot
trueof,30caliberammunitionin8an<|i>roundclipsandsteps
shouldbe'takentoreducethesizeandwpightofthepullcontain-
ertoaloadthatcanbehand-carriedtoyoneindividualover
shortdistances. < ~
H,Signal .
1. Communicationaduringtheoperationwereal^:thatcould
beexpected. IntheoffensetheSCR3C0washeavilyreliedupon
andprovedhighlydependable. TheSCR536wasusedsuccessfully
inintra-companycommunicationduringtheattackminuimizingthe
employmentofrunners. AllFO
1
s(Artyand8lam)usedwirecommun-
icationbetweenobserverandgunascontinuouslyastheycould
keepitin, However,bothSCR's300and556wpgeemployedto
firemissionsbythe81mmmortarplatoonand300'sbytheartillery
whenwireconUBunicationwasdisrupted. Wirecommunicationwas
withinthebattalionateveryappreciabia
2. Interferenceinradionetswasnegligibleexceptin
thecaseofSCR536nets. Somanyradioswereontheonebattalion
channelatonetimethatinterferencewas.boundtooccur. Ifprae~
ticable,twochannelsettingshouldbeallowed,thebattalion. The
basicradiosystemfortheBLTwasotherwiseadequateexceptthat
the81mmmortarplatoonshouldbeallottedthreeSCR's300ona
separatechannel. ^
3. AllmainwiretrunksshouldbelaidwithW-110wire;
W-130willnotstandupunderanyappreciableharshtreatment.
V. ConclusionsandRecommendations
A* Quiteafew'conclusionsh?VGbeendrawnandrecommenda-
tUonsmadeinthecommentsin.PartTV, Thefollowingare,inbrief,
f
ActionReport,Itoo JIMA (Cont
:
&)
inadditiontothoseaboveor*emphasizingthemoreimportantof
them*
1. Inthenewtrainingperiod,thephasesshouldbegradual
anddefinitelyprogressive,eventotheextentofcommencingwith
alittlecloseandextendedorderdrill. ThesameoldFM
r
sstill*
heldgoodinspecifyingsequenceoftraining. Theindividual
skirmishermustlearnhis&signals''beforehecanperformwiththe
"little"teamX"firegroup). Thenschoolthefiregroupbeforesquad
trainingandonuptheline. Theprincipalunittrainingtoem-
phasizeistheassaultteam,composedofriflesquad,flame-thrower,
anddemolitionist. EverymaninthesquadshouldbeaBARmanand
knowwellhowtohandlebothpoleandsatchelcharges. Beforecom-
batfaringisundertaken,thoroughindoctrinationontherifle
rangeshouldbereceived-tosuchanextentthatthemen"squeeze'
l
emoff
!J
atthesilhouettesonthecombatrangefromhabit. It
workedbefore,itwillagain.
2* Bothflamethrowerandbazookashouldbecomeorganic
weaponsintheriflecompany-justasorganicastheBAR* Theper-
sonnel'manningKCo
!
sflamethrowersandbazookasshouldeKCo*s
personnel, Aflamethrowersectionof6flamethrowersand12
operatorsissuggestedforeachriflecompanyandonebazookateam
perrifle,platoon* Amaintenancesectionofthreeorfourmenshould
bekeptinBnHqCotorefuelflamethrowers,maintainandrepair
rocketlaunchersandcontinuallymakeuppoleandsatcheldemolition
charges. Itisrecommendedthattheallotmentsoftheseweapons
remainthesame,theextrastobemaintainedinreadinessbythe
maintenancesectionattheforwarddump.
3 Thepresentorganizationoftheriflesquadseems
soundanditrecommendedthatitremainasitis. Itisunderstpod
thatallthatisactually'neededisanassaultgroupandacovering
grouptoafl,.aoh,howrelievingitistohavefchatlittlemaneuvergroup
asanaceintheholewhenthesquadleader'sfirstdecisiondoesn
f
t
panout. Asamatteroffact,itistheworthsquadleaderwhocan
utilizethatthirdgrouptoadvantage. Theoldmaxium.wasnever
morepertinentthanwhenappliedtoorganizations(largeorsmall)
ofamilitaryunit: "Nevertwowithoutthree"*
ENCLOSURE D
21ST MARINES
ACTION REPORT
.
HeadduAHfer
#
21st
l&rine
la the f i el d.
3dMarDiv.
UNCLASSIFIED
4*
10 Ais*Si|
Subjects "Action Report,IWOJTJ'AOperation.
Inferences (a)3dMarDivGO#137(Confidential)/dated3
andmodification#Lthereto*
jSnclosuress (a)ActionReportof1stBn."1stMar.
(T>)ActionRepot*,of2dBn,21etMar.
(c)ActionReportof3&Bn,21etMar,
1. Inaccordancewithreference(a)thefollowingreportissubmitted:
*tiJdTX. Summary.
A. Periodcovered"bythisreport:23JanH5(timemissionwasassigned)
tol6Mar^5(endofoperation)*
B. ThisRegtlandedonthesoutheast coastofIWQJIM&2 2 3 ^ 5 ,
to^thMarDivandwascommitted22Feb,passingthroughelementsof2JJ4
southofAirfield&o2.Regtmadenegligibleprogress222"eb
t
continuedAtk
r_3feb^andby1J30hadreachedAirfieldHo2,Thefollowingmorning,2*1-JFeb,.
theAtkwascontinuedandby1100thesouthernjendoftheairfieldwa^su*w
roundedandthecentercrossed,byeveningthenorthsidewasfirmlyheldby
twoCosof3dBnan^onefromthe2dBn. ThisRegtreverted3&MarDivcontiroi
070025Febandwaspassedthroughby9thMarat0930andbecameDivRes from
2*j7ebtothemorningof2SFebconductedmoppingupoperationsinrearofBir
ZofA. At08152$FebUfcisRegtpassedthrough5thMarandcontinuedtheAtk
to'Q-3* AtI33O33FebMotayamaTownwastakenbytharightBn. TheAtkwa
continued00301Mar,employingoneBn9thMarontheleftflankoftheRegtl
:^ofA. Theri^htRegtl2ofApassedto9thMarcontrolat15HS By16^5the
westernpartofAirfieldJTo3wasoverrun. TheAtkwascontinuedat0S152Mar
#
0.71305Hill362(235*J)andmos^tofAirfieldITo3w-.sinourhands. TheAtk
vjrtinued3Mar,by1655thehi^hgroundnortheastofAirfieldfto3 ^ ssecured.
5eeligibleprogresswaamadehMar. 5Ito
Wa
^utilizedtoresupply,improve
iefensivepositions,andconductmoppingtipoperations. TheAtktoHill3
{>:19II)on6MarandJMarmadelittleairo^ain. TheAtkon &Marresulted
inthecaptureof0-3alongtherishtBnZofA.-9*hMarwasutilizedinmop-pin**
ipandpatrolling. Onepatrolreachedthecoastlinea'a1355withinRe^tl2oA.
c150010Marri^htRe^tlZofAwasdeclaredclearofallorganizedresistance*
i.1and12Marwereutilizedinmoppingupandpatrolling* TheentireRe^tl
TofLwasclearedoforganizedresistance12Mat*tfrom13Marto15Marthis
Regtprotectedthe5thDivrightflank,andconductedmoppingupoperationsin
SegtlZofA. AtOtOO16MarthieRegttookovertherightsectorof5thDiv
zoneandcontinuedtheAtktoKitanoPoint. ByI33Oourtroopsoccupied
EitanoPointinRegtlZofA. Prom17M&rto2^Marconductedmoppingup
operations,patrolling,salvagework,burijalofenemydeadandpolicewithin
assignedRegtlZofA. At07002UMarthis:Regtwasrelievedofresponsibility
ofpatrol.-sectorbyelementsofthel^?thInf. '
. *
II. Preliminaries.
A. ROT21.
21stMarines.
CoB,3dSngrBh, ,
CoB
#
3dH o nBn#%
CoB,3dMTln.
CoA
t
3^MedBn.
Bet|itUSCo. ",
Det2SthRepl$raft,
35et3toReplJfoaft.
3. ( l ) Planning; Prom the time the Div OpnOrder was received until
this Regt landed, frequent conferences were held vith Hegtl andBn Staff
officers 1 CO
1
s of al l attached units,, ship's 0ff1rrmgjKW*
HK!
(Cont'd)
^ Jach tnf Bnparticipated in a BnAtk p ^
close Arty ftupporteSdthB firing of al l Inf Vpn
#
$ * Jtegt participated In one
Mr and two Segtl CHCsand one Hegtl problem. All troopa received instruction
in the use of flame throwers, demolitions and methods of neutralising and di s-
arming of enemy land mines* All,units conducted some TkuXnf training;
* O) Rehearsals; Ifo rehearsals In ship-to-shore movement were con-
ducted*
C. ( l ) the mission of this Hegt was to land on order in Res (in various
formations on various beaches) and move to assigned assembly area. Vith the
above in mind a preferred plan and five (5) alternate plans were drawn upwhich
included landings on either the southeast or southwest coasts of TWOJ$M& 2d
Bn12th Marwas Atchd to this HOTfor embarkation only* However, plans were
perfected to land: ( l ) the Inf, (2j Inf and Arty simultaneously, or (5) the Arty
prior t^ the Inf i s necessary. ,
(3) It was assumed that this RCTvould land in reserve on a secured
beach andpass through* However, al l plans and details were perfected for
in assault. ' . . ' . ,
D. for ownforces, position, composition and disposition at the
of action see Atchd overlay,
3. Elements of following units were contacted In BKD51 ZofAl
9q
109th D4tM-Arty tfnlt.
UtB.1i6.-imu
2d MBArty
509th In
310th ind Inf Bn,
311th tad Inf Bxu
5lUth Ind Inf Bn.
1st Bn
#
>^5t^ Inf
Bn, ^5t h Inf
j t h Inf Itest Arty
3d Sn. 17th |nd Kixed
26th g?ank Hegt.
Sta Ind ATBn.
9th Ind ASBn.
Ut h Ind ASBxw
12th Ind A?Bn.
1st Ind KGBH.
2d Ind M5Bn,
20th Ind Arty Mortar Bn.
2d Medium Mortar Bn.
3d Medium Mortar Bn,
Socket TJ!alt (Army).
IVO JIMA.tTaval ttuard
Or^anlgation ^Army
DIV m
109th Piv AAArty TTnit; The 2A
f
Jdand one halt of the *Wx ( searchl ^t )
of the 109th AAunit were n.&$ 21 ZofA LTA ?lSne). K>Vhave indicated that
the 2dBtry had 90 menand operated nix *lm4A guns. The 3dBtry had 120m%
operating si x TeaAAguns, fh&UthBtry had ^p making, with a Hqof kz, ^
29O-.3OOmen and12 JcaAA^uns^ Also attached to this AAUnit were,,twoJJ(J
t s (^3*V
1 4
^ ^ consisting of SOand 66 men respectively with six
cannons In each unit. This makes the total of the 1091
l
Action Report, IWOJl^P^peration (Cont
f
d}
^^^^^^. . ^^^^^^^^^^ The l et Btry of the Bri^cade ArtyUnit which docw
uments indicated had 14s"^uS^Oflitiona around MEDOYAM/lwas the principal element
encountered in "RQT 21 ZofA, ha l st Btry originally consisted of five 75
Bfl
*~^
a
guns and around 120 men. Later, however, a platoon, of three 12cmhowitzers was
added to this battery, constituting the only noteworthy newdevelopment in the
organisation of the Brigade Arty Unit* The 3dBtry alsd had three 129m howitzers,
making a total of six for the entire unit*
310th Ind Inf Bnt This Inf Bn i s the principal tnf unit encountered in BfJJ 21/
ZofA. Captured maps indicate the positions of this Bn in IA 200 and 199ne*arid
documents andIW reports indicate that this unit formed the island second l i ne
oTdefense."* Initially RC2 21 was i s contact if1th elements of the 309th Ind Inf
Eu on22Peb. By the time the southern half of &>T0Y.<\KAAIHFISLDW 2 was over-
run, this ECSWas in contact with the main elements of the 310th Ind Inf Bn,
Documents have indicated, the organization of the 310th Ind Inf Bnwas approxi-
mately as follows at fLl strength: ' " ... t
Hq
istaCo 125
2dECo
i2g
3dRCo 125
HMGCo
136
InfGunCo SO
625
organization generally corresponds to the T/O strength of an Ind Inf Bn
which cal l s for 579 men*
1
, There were no:AJf ^uns in this Bn.
Ind Inf, Bn* SLements of
;
this Bn were contacted in HCT21 2ojfA in
21$
9
2191 235 and 251# Initially this Bndefended the t^eneral area around
:1GASHL, and POtf reports indicate that elements of this Bnwere withdrawn from
"he EKJASH2 sector and recommitted In TAs 235 and 251* Doctunentg indicate that
rhe organisation of the 31%h Ind tnf Bnt#as as follows: V
Hq (andAtchd elements) 00
, l s t ECo ' - X35
2 dE Co
3d RCo
MG Co 170
_ . j ^^
Co
1^5
^ - . /
ThisBnhasthestandard3rifleCos,KGCo,andInfGun.Co,butitscompanies
areagreatdeallargerthanthe5/0callsfor* Herea^in therewerenoASP
intheInfGunCo.
EdBa,17thIndMixedEegtt ThepresenceofthisunitonIWOJIMAwasnot
knownbefore 3%-day. Documents and maps indicate however, that i t s lines around
the TBSZSJS lector (!EA235 V) formed the third line of defense* This unit does
hot reflect any new changes in or.^anixation except that the usual, tnf GunCo <
not present* . '" . , -
Inf Hegtt 3leaentc of the 1st Bn l ^thl Ujft were contacted early in th
operation in TA1S2, "but according to POVs this 3n was withdrawn to TA21$,
Small elements of thej d Bh, l ^t i i Re^t were also contacted*
26th TankJBlegtt RCT21 contacted elements of the 26th Tank Begt in,the vicinity
of Kbtoyama aW in*.SKA?17se, .... . ^
th
t
11th. 12th Ind ATBnat Since their unit's Were"principally deployed to cover
\ ne proo&bie approacnes
u
or olue tanks particularly in TAs\ZZ*217se and 200
#
It i s believed that a lar^e portion of the ifire Ji^werof these A3?Bns was con*
centrated in ECT21 2ofA Of the-throe iff Bns contacted, the main elements of
the Uth ATwere deployed in TAB 20Oand 20i;
:
with th |JtkJ^TA^LSZ S Jl
, ii , I MI I I I I I I .11
Man (Cont'd)
of the 9th ATBn
^
a coagp^ny strength of 70 mon and indicating the number of ^
mm AT
These Ind i f Bns are tho f i r s t units of t hi s type encountered ty RCT21.
\>'.
vasreceivedllokposition*outsideof^EKJf
Ofthe3,000(approx)strictlyj
indicatepositionsforthefollowingprincipal^unainour
^ and.lt^--^st*aafcW^
acouaf^afli^
(an) im
mortars and dockets, mid lareje numVer of AT
not encountered l)y t hi s RCT. ' ' .
III. Chronological account <>f the acti on.
J
'
:
'''('feronces 'to
ation (Cont*d)
* 30 3teb The Rogt wae boated prepared to land on IWOJIMA, and proceeded
to rendezvous areas near control vessels, however dud to the congested beach
areas and limited space Inland* the Uegt reeobarked on respective ships in the
late afternoon., *
B. 23J5b The Regt was boated at OS0Oand etHnmoneed landing onB3ACS3S
TC0V Tand xfeawir 2!at 13**5 TheAdvance CPlanded at 1200 and established-
at 1225 in vicinity of l^g By 1J20 al l thrr> 3ns were ashore and In assembly
areas in iHg D
t
S,I,^. Awarning order was received at l00 mleasing the Regi
l
to the ^thDiv with expectation of passing i t through elorients of 23d and 2^th
Mar the following morning* JTecessary liaison was .Hnirdiately established with
the 23d Hap and supporting unite, however, dnly limited reconnaissance was con*
ducted due to ^nrlmess* Burin.* ^he night heavy enemy mortar and Arty fire f el l
in the vi cl . i i v of the assembly area bat caused no casualties*
C. J3JLS&. *tth Dir OpnOrder 3-^5 was received at 0001 ordering the
fter^t to relieve the 23d Mar"by0730 and to continue t-
-
o Atk at 0$35 The re~
i *'-f commenced under the cover of darkness with 1st and 2dBns, 1st 3n on the
right. 2dBn moved into/position anif'effected the relief by 06U5 with l i t t l e
w no difficulty under the cover of darkness* 1st Bn received heavy,enemy
mortar andArty fire during the early hour's of daylight causing many casualties
while camesing the eastern part of Airfield So 1, and i t wasdoubtful that the
v
1st Bnwould be able to effect the
/
relief and be in position to Jumpoff on time.
Bn wa 3
Ah0755
l 8 t
not in position and i t was requested that 2d Bn 2^thMar
('occupying right ZofA) be Atohd in order to attack on schedule. At 0825 the
above request was cancelled since the Eegt was prepared to attack on tiae* Ths
Atk to 0-1 jumped off on schedule from, a genera! l i ne (181 S,T; 162Vl 1&5AB
t
0}
:
precqeded by an Arty and 3TG9preparation. The Atk propressed slowly on-
g a series of heavily fortified emplacemonts alortT the entire front*
, JTC3Pand Arty were employed repeatedly with some results. Progress of
50 yards on the ri^xt and 250 yards on the l ef t was made during the. entire
However, many enemy, emplacements were reduced iri Regtl ZofA Ihrln^ the
the enemy placed Arty, mortar and rockets and some small arms fire along
the entire Regtl front,
l
Re
^i
wa s
^ ^ ?^*
J
^
e
* continue the *ltk to 0-1 at 07]P proceeded
an Arty, HG3T and tank preparation onknown enemy targets* C^e {1} Plat of
va3 Atchd to each assault Bn for demolition md mine clearing details* 1st Bn
Juaped off on tl ae, 2dBnbecame engau^ed in a *ha^p i"ire fight during the early
Lours of daylight and was unable to advance uatil 0335* By early afternoon 2d
nassault Cos reached the soithwc^t approaches of Airfield $0 2 w^th styae
advance,elements crossing the southwastern pori of the northeast-southwest run-
way, but later the few remaining!menwere driven back by very heavy US'and direct
A^fire which also prevented the other troops fro gaining the ground* Stegtl0$>
displaced to 1SUt at 1515* 3d Bnwas placed in an a--3e#ly area l6U 5J, 165A
at 1615." Assault Bns established contact ri^ht and l ef t and Consolidated
positions along the l i ne Iff2 Af?
t
Q,Q,R
v
S for the ni/?ht The enemy continued
to,place mortar, rocket and Arty fire along the entire front causing many
casualties* . ,
S
' 2Ugeb 2d Bn sighted a sriall number of japs in rear of their lines at
0630* they were hunted downand killed immediately The ftegt with two (2) Tk
Cog 4th Div in support continued the Atk at 0915 in assigned ZofAwith the 2d
Bn and 3dBnabreast* 3d Bn executed a passage of l i nes through the 1st Bn*
1st Bnassembled as Regtl Res In vicinity of 182 W, Excellent progress wasmade
aloVig the entire front with the 3dBn advancing approximately 600 yards against
well organised mutually supporting pillboxes* The Atk was continued at }33Q
At 1^5 twelve <12) blue tanks were operating ^ Airfield Ho 2 3nemy,mines and
direct ATfire caused many tankcasualties* 2dBnmadegood progress "around the
west side of the airfield, however due to heavy casualti*a3S*aaift and mortar,
- 5 - "
ActionUeport,
and conducted antt-sni|*e3P Itrol9 aad aoppin^up in rar of
bi coatrol at X73O. 1st aad 2dSns est^l i shed the
fi el d ^ . | ^
continvLedthe Atk
j .3T*
-theAtkduoto
and
of
inuedatOS35viththe^Bn
^jutmet
ofthe5thDivandover-er
at thi s time
it right and l ef t . At 15^5 control of ri^ht
3d Bn 21$% MarAtchd to 9
Continued the Atk with the % Bn9th Mar and the 2d
tion
1st Bn 21st Mapprotecting the fiegtl left fttt^j&$p the Dir boundary wasre*-
lieved by 3d Bn 26th Marand then occupied a BeJ$|ResLine alons 200 B
#
C,5. .
Byl6^5 the western;part of airfield JTo*3was o^abpun* OneCo1st Bnwas re-
leased to the SdBnfor tying in right and left* Iines fo?.the*night,were con-
solidated as follove? 217M,U,Oj 218P
f
tfi ..
1
'
:;
'
<
X. 2 Mar. One Co1st Bn released from 2dBn and reverted to parent
zation. The Regt continued the Atk at 0S00 with 3d Bn9th liar and 1st Bn 21st
Mar abreast. Little or no progress wasmadeby the 1st Bn21st Mar <iUeto heavy
enemyHOand direct. ATfire covering the etst-west runway of the Airfield Jfo
i
3*
3dBn9th Mar made steady process and after heavy continuous fighting reached
Hill 362 (335tT) At I525 the 2dBnwas placed in position at 218A
t
? andjumped
off in the Atk to Hill 357 (218 D) at 1530* Aftpr two hours of continuous f' i^t^
in* the 2dBnheld a line extending from 218Bto 210 %;contact with 3dBn 9th
Marwas
1
established on the l eft ; One Co1st Bn 21st Marwasutilised to t i e in
with the 9th Mar on the right. Remainder of 1st Bn21st Mar established HBXat
217X,T. Elements of Efith Mar in and alotog the left S^tl ZofA established contact
with 3dBn9th Mar. !The'following general line was held during the ni^hti 217
2; 2X0X**JtZJ& lAUftft* tJMprortar, M andiff fire WASrecairod
the aMf ftmt taM tilt *#!
% 4qp off in the Atk to seise 0*3 a*07%* 3*S$t*tfer
was ordered to hold Ul l 362 (235 13) ontil passod throu^i or relieved by element*
cf the 26th Mar, then protect the left flank of 3dBnwith one Co. 2dBn 21st
7
!ar made someprogress against heavy resistance* 3dSn 9thMar was relieved by
rlemente of the 26th Mar about 1^30 and assembled in vicinity of 218 % \1st Bn
21st liar was placed in position at 21SC
#
Hand Jumped off in the Atk southeast
to Hill 362 (219 TJ), Se-tl CPdisplaced to 200I*at l600. 1st Bnmade^ood
progress against stubborn enemy reeiet'ance Most of the hi^h ground northeast
of Airfield ITo3was taken and the beach area in Zfi could be observed from same*
Contact wasestablished rl^ht and left* The following line was held during the
M. k Kar
>
At O3IOan.unknownnumber of Japs infiltrated through the ri^ht
flank, these were hunted downand killed during the early hours pf daylight. 3d
Bn released to this Re^t at 06^$* King,hour scheduled at 0930waspostponed to
11^0 due to the movement of 3dBnfrom 9th tttr sector to line of departure in
21st MarZofA. 3dBn9th Mar (lees 1 Co) rdleasod to 9th Marat IC&5* At11H0
l-BoRe4t jumped off to 0-3 with the 2d and 3dBns abreast, 3dBnpassing through
Itt Bn.which occupied the right Sogil ?ofA, Homaining Co3dBn9th Knr rovertod
uoparent organisation, 2d Bnmadel i t t l e or noprogress while the 3dBnmanaged
to advance about 100yards against deadly enemy IS and direct ASfire* BiyBen
Jo Atend at 1^5. (Jiven mission reporting sources enemyfire and searching rear
areas for mastf documents and materiel. Positions were consolidated generally
along the same.line held the previous night, *
^* '?,,ffif*^
ho R e
^ resupplied, improved positions and conducted moppingup
operations inHe^tl ZofA. Moderate to heavy enemymdrtar Arty, rocket and email
arms fires were received alon^ the entire front during the ni^ht.
^Haap *Bn9th MarAteha at 060Gani placed in He^l Hes at 21SA
pirior to 0900. fhe Rect continued the Atk to 0-3 with two (2) Bns abreast
f
/the
2d BnJumping off at 0800 and.the 1st Bnpa^sin^ through the 3dBnat.0$b6* 2d
3n madenoprogress during the day
f
1st Bnadvanced about 150 yards against
stubborn enemy resistance. Positions were consolidated for the ni^ht alon^.the
hi^h ground north and east of Airfield So 3. 3dBn 21st Marwasreleased to Div
control for tfee'nl^ht*
4
* 7Ifetr* 3dBn9th Mar passed through ti^ht 6"f 1st Bnat O5OOand continued
the Atk to Hill 362{219t d, SdBnwas scheduled td
v
jump off to 0-J at 0800 but
vis>unable to advance due to'heavy enemy MJfire coming from the hi^h ground on
left in 5th Dir ZofA* 3d3n'$th Marrna^e,good progress | #i %i l Ae ^ef^ern jlopee
IFD
tion. (Contd)*
mm, mm f* .pr
Bn9th Marwas released to 9th Ifarand a new right H{jtl "botrndary, with
fdfcite9th J% became *fffaftfcto a$
I 'Little or no progress
heavy enoay fire froa the hi^h ^ound on
OCBestablished a Bfil. l a vicinity of 218H.
- . - ' ? . '
;
27thMar through thg u t i t t l e or
watmade Ifer'and
the
-roundinvicinityof l t t 3n e
flank to
continued to patrol "beach
1
area aid conduct moppingup operatloni In l
tJ. 12 Man lrb popping up
W
held out in caves and s alon the cHff area.
% '41
!WW.
continuedtopattol
Kitano Point orermnnin^al l or.^anised
tosampleattached*
higherechelons* ayttea of
on bulletins
staffAseotlonsshould
andforthesam
ime, an
~reportofunitur^on
8
shouldcoverthe
reportofcauslfsubmitted%yunitadjutants,
downofcasualsinthis
Ofc
Ol
en
hi
i
w
H
<
p
68
0
o
f
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cs?
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B
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t
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CA
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fir o
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o 8 fc
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8. I
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1
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o
s
9
t
ration (Cont'd)
XUt 17 - ?77
XXAt U5 - I0U5
DO\f: 0 57
MUi f> - 0
In addition to those shown above the following casualties were suffered
by menfrom replacement^drafts whowere subsequently detached from the regiment:
XUt 0 - 11
9 - 2 5 3
2. Themoraleofthisre^laeatwashighthroughouttheoperation, Supply
ofbeer,freshrationsandhotcoffeeormealsdailywereastrongcontributing
factorinmaintaininghighmorale. Iherapideracuationofwoundedpersonnel
andpersonnelkilledinthefioldwarealsocontributingfactors,
3. HethodofhandlingPOVat
DivisionSOPaswrittenwouldprovesatisfactoryiffollowed*In
thisoperation
#
particularlyinitsearlierstages*therewasinterferencewith
normalhandlingofPOWsV adjacentunitsandhigherauthority,andthisdie**
regardofproperchannelsandresponsibilityin2aofApreventedadequatein-
terrogationbythisROT*
Greateremphasisshouldbeplacedonloverecheloninterrogationin
futureoperations, TollquestioningofFOVsneartheirplaceofcaptureis
essentialiftheirinformationistoproveofvaluetofrontlineunits.It
cannotbeemphasizedtooouchthataPOWsgreatestvaluetofightingunitscomes
whenhecanpointtoahillandtellacompany,commanderorabattalionconw
Banderthattherearethreemachinegunsthere,a*thatacompanyofenemy
troopsisbehindthatridge* Oncea|0tflosesuls*orientation,itisdoubtful
thathecanregainitbylookingasamapinther^arareas* "
OnechangeinSOP,actuallycarriedoutduringtheoperation,isre-
commendedforcontinuance. WoundedPOVashouldberoutedthroughsuccessive
echelonaidstations,ratherthandirecttohosritals,inorderthatallpos-
sibleintelligenceinformationmaybegatheredbyunits.
Normalmethodsofinterrogationprovedsatisfactory*
S, Intelligence , -.. ..-,.'
, - , . . , . . ' , . . ' ' ; " .
1. (a)Mapsfurnishedbeforeoperation:
(1)SpecialAirandGunneryTargetJlap,1J5000.
(2) t*' !itiboOO.
(J) '' " * - V l|20000.
;"; {*)PhotoItep,lilO.OOO*
(5)EnemySituationMap,It10,000*
*(6)beliefMa|f
f
tairtm*,lt^.OOO*
it)BeliefHap
f
piasterofPaVis,It7,000.
(S)ifydrographiccharts,
(9)Japaneseplacenamemap,It30,000,
Shenumberofmapsreceivedwereadequate,althoughitwasnecessary
torequestasmallnumberofadditionalmapsduringth-operation* Themost
usefulmapreceivedwastheSpecialAirandGunneryTargetMap,lj10,000. This
mapwouldhavebeenevenmoreusefulhaditbeenmoreaccurate. Doetothe
factthatitwasmadefromphotoswhichweretakenmorethanfourmonthsprior
toDuday,agreatnumberofbuildinge,installationsandeventhenatureofthe
terrainhadbeenalteredorcompletelychanged* Thiswasparticularlytrueof
configurationofHOTOTAKAAIB^nXDNo*2,Insomeinstances,unitcommanders
whoweretoldtoguideonabuildingshownonthemap,foundnobuildingonthe
60
tion (Cont'd)*
of photos
Airand tomer
alytoits$
thatadditional
tranBlations ia Slavish of
r^i ef aap rocetrod wr cxcelX^t* It i *
#4
value
tvo to oae.
ft* J^pnaee plic aAffie map ^ p
adequat4 It wotad have boen more raXuable in orienting l"0* until rplaood
ty %captured Japanese maphad It beon contoured^ and had OTO plsu^ename*
been:ehown* /' . / .
1
'V-- - . ' ' - . ' - '
. -' ' - (*) photo fcirnlolied %*tt>ve-*&$mm^ifa\', '. ,/.-
tudea dovn to 5000 foot ver received In cuffici^nt quantatie. %i i s e-
timatod hovover
#
tnat apjffoximately fi fty percent of tii^photo received
vare uselea* duo to cloud interf6rence, oxtretto.altitudo, or iatorforenc of.
duet caused by bom^. Lowlevel obliques of the beaches wre excellent but
not Important
7
due to the f<ict that this RCIdid not land In the a98dti!lt
Vertic&lo at 000 feet were excellent when clear
#
It i s reconffiiended thnt a
larger amount of duplicate prints of clear photos at 5000 feet ot l ess be
supplied so that al l unit commanders down to and i nci t i ng coapany comnandors
aay *% use ti"aw*p&ot^apiw ^hen grtdded to f f ^ l ifck tfeilb^lit
jaap
#
these photos -Iwrlf-pi^m to bo of extteise vfl3Lue# ^Rdvcre twed
l y by tM Bdl when aiiii!ible
#
,
the "irait^eof M31photos would bo greatly. Sweated
estiiaobXe nunty&r of hourt of wtk saved If tne ne^atiiren,We ^ridded
respond with the "battle napprior to printing the photographs.
2. (a) Haps furnished during operation*
Maps received during the operation included copies of maps
previously distributed, captured mapshowing enemy units and uncaptured enr
emypositions, and the VACroad net mapwhich were accurate andproved useful*
Captured Japanese maps were;useful
#
but It i s felt'that a greater effort should
^a made in this vein, since adequate reproduction by lower ech&Xons l e difficult.
The following features ftre desired? Information from captured inap should be '- -
transferred to maps or overlays with blue grid coordinates, and the Japanese
map symbols should be translatedinto standard blue symbols* (A sample of
the type of mapneeded i s appended.) Instances occured during the operation
in which captured msps bf talue to this &3f wete onreildejiii V division ap-
parently because most of the area concerned l*y in the ZofA of adjacent
units* Since the enemy had excellent observation from thd flanks
4
particular*.
l y when this BCf was in the vicinity of HDWTAMAAI2FISU3!
T
o3, information
h
oftheenemyinadjacent2&ofAwasofvitalimportancetothisWE,inas
n-vichasagreatnumberofenemyflattrajactoryweaponsandmortarstookthis
RCTunderfirefrompositionsoutsideourZofA. Inanotherinstance,this
Kq{&-Z)wasinformedthatonecapturedmapcouldnotbeoriented, ShisHo.
(8-2)succeededinorientingthe,mapinquestionandreproducedtheappended
mapmentionedabove.
' / / ' - !
I
ActionSeport,IWOJXMATojperatioa (Cont
f
d)*
Mapsofminefieldsreported,firesweptrearareas,areas,
clearofminesshould"beprapare^."byhighestunitandwidelydistricted daily,
Itshouldcover,entirefriendlyarea"becauseoftheinterchangingofzonesdue
toattachmentsandmaneuvering.
(b)Photosfurnishedduringoperation!
Photosreceivedduringtheoperationwerenot satisfactory*
Themajorityofthem"were"blurred,gray,unclear,
1
anddidnotencompass the
desiredterrain, Thedirectionofflightwasreversed,"beingnorthtosouth
insteadofsouth'tonorth, Thetypedfphotosneededwerelowlevelobliques
downthecenterofthisRCTsZofAandinthedirectionofattack. Itissug-
gestedthatoneortwoOY-lsunderthedirectcontrolofQ~2wouldrectify.;
thissituationandwouldprovidethetypeofphotosrequestedbyregimental
commanders, , -
3 Intelligencefrom
IntelligencedisseminatedbyG*-2duringtheoperationwas
adequate,althoughdetailsoftheenemy-situationir?.ZaofAadjacenttothis
ROTweresomewhat Lacking* Plashreportsreachedthisheadquarterspromptly*
MoretranslatirurjofcapturacLdocumentsanddiariesaredesiredforgeneral
information ^d general interest*,ndwouldbeBdefinitemoralefactorto"
>fr
'
:
-"-
frentlinetroops,especiallydocumentswhichind
1
'ate%h&%theenemy isre-
ceivingheavycasualties, Frontlinetropa.h-irenowayofknowinghowthe
enemyfeelsorwhetherornotheistakingabeating* <InoneinstanceaPOVT .
t.dvealed'thatourartillerywasinflictingheVr/casualtiesontheenemywhere-
asmanymenbelieved.that ourartillerywasdoin^littlemorethanconfining
"^.senemytohiscaves. Moretranslationswonlaalsocontributetothegen-
eralknowledge^educationandeffectivenessofalltroops,'Manyshouldbe
miiDaographedanddistributeddowntoplatoons,
H, Recoveryofcapturedenemydocumentsandmateriel: ' ,
Iheproceduresetupfortherecoveryofcaptured memy documents
andmateriel.....was151tiemorethantheoretical,duetotheshortageofper
sonnet.' Thiswouldhavebeenfeltmorekeenlyhadtheenemyabandoned'more
documentsand.materiel. However,futureoperationsmayreealamuchlarger
Quantityofmateriel,andasystemshouldbeprovided* Thepresent systemof
intelligencetosmshasprovenunsatisfactory* Hadintelligenceteamsbeen
availableitisbelievedthattheywouldhavebeenabsorbedintolineunitsas
thpywereinsomeinstancesduringtheGR3AMoperationaswellasduringthe
currentone. Itisrecommended thatG--2organiseaspecialunit,attaching
approximately15-20mentoeachHOTfortemporarydutyduringanoperationto
recoverenemydocumentsandmateriel!enablingthisworktocontinuedespite
thenumberocasualtiesinlineunits* Personnelfromthe3&SenCo*,made
availabletothis&GT-2,renderedValuableadistance. Indoctrinationof
troog*inthevalueandimportanceofturningindocumentsprovedtohavebeen
>:
e*ffectiveianditisbelievodthat,inmostcases,documonoswere^e#^||5r*o-
coveredandsubmitted, . ^"
Itisgenerallyknownthatagreatdealofdifficultywas encountered
inthecollect}onofenemyrifles. Itwouldbeidea!ifenemyriflescouldbe
authbriaredaslegitiiaatesouvenirs,andquotasforsameabolished,
raisemoraleinmmasurablyanditisbelievedthatItwomld^rettult inthe
recoveryofmorematerielbyfrontlinetroops* Butaslongasquotas
tinuetobeordered,itIsbelievedthatles*difficultywouldResult ifall
riflesareturnedinuntilvquotasaremet* tti-%recommended thatresponsin
bilityfarcollectingenemyriflesduringcombatbeplacedInthesMvagesec**
'Ion,sincethatsectionrecoversalltypesofenemyordnance*
personnelf
officersweretemporarilyattachedtothisRCT* Their
werevaluableandwellused* Theirwillingnesstogoforwardtoia-
terregateprisonerswaa exemplary*
-1U
tion (Cont'd).
five enlistedpersonnelveretemporallyattachedtothisHOT,one
Ineach3fandtwoinregimental.headquarters. Twoofthesemenwerenot ^
qualifiedgraduatesoftheJapaneselanguageSchoolforenlistedmen,andhad
receivedonlymakeshifttrainingwhichdidnoteaable*^hemtocopewithsome
ofthelanguageproblems'encountered,althoughtheywereofgreat assistance
toBLTsasfarastheirknowledgeofJapaneseallowed* Itisrecommended
thatanenlisted$angoage'mfcabeassignedeachrifleCoandpromotionsfor.
certainenlistedpersonnel"bepositivelyconsidered. Itisalsorecommended
thatmorelanguagepersonnelbeprocuredfrojfatheSanIHegoLanguageSchool,
HoNiseiwereattachedtothisBC$,buttheirattachmentIsdesired*
6, Propagandas
Inlinewithpast.experience*propagandaprovedeffectivegenerally
onlyaftertheenemyhadbeenreducedtoadesperateandhopelesslydie*
organisedsituation*'InexceptiontothiswasthecaseoftheKoreanlabor
troops,whoshowedadesiretosurrenderwhonoverpossible. Itwasfoundthat
individualsweredisposedtosurrenderwhenisolatedincaves*although,,they
werealwaysfearfulthattheywouldthusmeeta.moredreadfulendthan*
qiuekdeathinpattie** . -.
Theeffectivenessofthevocalpropagandabythesoundtruckwas
extremelylimitedbytneshortcordattachedtothespeaker, Alongercord
;:MUenablethespeakertobecarriedtocavesinterrainwhichprecluded
theuseofvehicles. Itisbelievedthatthisphaseofpropagandashouldbe
e^rpiiasiaedevenmorestronglyinfutureoperations,togetherwiththeuseof
]&.Uei> ThisBlplanstocontinueschoolinpertinentJapanesephrasesfor
alltroops,sincethomereknowledgeof"kosan&e
N
tfasinstrumentalino.ne
instanceincoaxingAaemytroopsfromac^ve*
Writtenpropagandabroughtresultsinthefinalstageof.the
creation, Bnemjftroopswhohadseensurrenderleafletsbelievedthestate~
r.eittscontainedinthem,butseldomrespondedtotheir'appealuntilthe
situationhadbecomehopeless,andthenonlyinsmallnumbers* Thewounded
i*~reparticularlyvulnerabletopropagandaurgingsurrender.
-.? JICPOATeam*
:
Theonlycontact thisKCThadwiththeJICPOA,teamwasthesotiftd
truckpersonnel,consistingofoneArmyofficer-andseveralITisei
f
.Thesound
trackwasreadilyavailableexceptforoneoccasion"andoperatedwelluptoward
l-Lefront,renderingvaluableassistance, (See6
%
a>ove)
#
#
?
9 | l g
Pi-ior. to,the operati on/ i l l maps, photos and.,other,documents r**%
yarding,the,|W0 J|H%Qjfrltti^n wejre closely*gu^r$e<and w^fre lAck^d in chests*
V'bounot in use, Unlisted personnel whose work was necessary iiTtne planning
at?.ges-were-stHctJy s^ervisei-and
l
indoctrin&ted f#* security ineasureW" It
WtdlieVed tha security-was stri ctl y 4bs"erv4d in t hi r t(^
t
lut in ^he^case"
it
f -he relief maps'!* unfortunately prevented sftffifientv time,for-thorough:in-
fctifth ^
t Va&'erotfrviolationsofshacklingmassageswerenotedduringthe
operation*plrticularl^onthe$CH*3OOseV^
bersome"an&icauseddelayand"errors,Tmtinspiteofthisitis;believed-.
i>.tseriousconsiderationbegiventhispoini"sinceenemyradioequipment
b>8increasedboth\anumberandquality,*&will
r
probably continuetodoso
#
,.Xt^issuggestedth&tthenamfiofthetarget
v
beomittedfrom9*11
ooapaand^photos;an^ranumberbe,used."Thiswo^d>\iminate^manyhourswork
spoutinsisting jfeh^fjf.naaiji.^ '
>;fcv
^ * . . * . , .
H
I)spiter^id.s^urity.measures"]Ln inisR0T
f
informationinvariably
comesfromoihersourcespriortoan operatiba,
4
*Therearefewconcrete"
M'ggestibas-thatthis
;
RC!tcanofferwiththaOneexception'ofseveredi*^-
cxplinarymeasuresagainst*offenders,regardlessofrankorstatus,although
c:pularperiodicalsseem"tokeeptheenem^r!fairlywellposted*on'
ties,* '- -^' ^' . ' . * i*; ,
Ion(Cont'd).
9, SnemyTactics;
Theoutstandingfactaboutenemytacticswas'thatliefoughtthe
campaignaccordingtoourdefensiveprinciples,augmentedwithaninherentdcv-
eiretomaintainthisdefensetothelastman* ?heabsenceoftraditional
Banzaiattackswasunprecedented,* Littleelsocan"besaidaboutenemytactics
p.nditisgenerallyagreedthatthe>enemyshowedakeenappreciationofthe
useofterrainandofdefensiveprinciples,
Enemy
:
'rusesencounteredwereofthesamenatureaspreviouslyen*
jcouaf-erod* InoneinstanceanenemywearingMarineclothingpoppedanaa*,..-,
bu.1.^ eatnightandshottiiedriver. Oneenemyfakedsurrenderwhilecovered
by,4cM n e gunswhichfiredwhenourtroopstriedtocapturetheimposter,
I f e . is.enemyposingasdeadwerefoundcoveredwithsandaroundapillboxon
thr-northernbeach,andfledwhenconfrontedwithaflamethrower. Mines
/ivo:;::.*pillboxeshadpulltypeign3.tersattached,andcouldbedetonatedfrom
r"i^thepillboxwithawireattachedtotheIgniter. A small.unittfhich
r^ 'teredtoreinforceanoutpostduringthenightencounteredagroupof
s.:.6 ontheway,Jolliedsixofthem,andlaterfoundtwomorein'theircolumn*
Hewordnanceencountered,includedheavymortarsandrocketdevices
of'v-Viouscalibers*
10* EnemyIntelligence?
theenemyshowedamarkedincreaseInsecuritymeasures* Thefact
thatcomparativelyfewdocumentsandnolargedumpswereencountereduntil
the"laterstagesoftheoperationisunprecedented, ITnemycommaddpostswere
ajsparenvtlywi&llpolicedbeforetheywereoverrunbyBluetroops* r
\.. InstancesInwhichtheenemymayhaveanticipatedouractionwere
notentirelyduetohisintelligenceorganisation,butratherduetothefact
thatheinitiallyhadexcellentobservationandthatKinghoursweresetfor
approximatelythesamehourofthedayandwereprecededbyapproximatelythe
sametypeofpreparatoryfires* fhisdevelopedtoapointwheretheenemy
aayconceivablyhavewithdrawntohiscavesduringthenigktisleptsoundly
andwaitedforthemorningbarragetoawakehim. Blueattackswere8teretyped
andtelegraphed
11
, Korefakerollingbarrages,Bluenightactivity,flanking
action*andchangesin..thedirectionof31ueattacksmayservetoconfusethe
;aemyintelligenceofficers*
<
C. Operationsandtraining,
l
t
IJuringtheoperationthisHegtrequested5001bdelayedfusebomis*,
forbombingfortifiedpositions. Itwasdiscoveredt^hatnodelayedfusebombs
wereavailable* Whenattackingafortifiedpositionwheretheenemyhashad
theopportunitytobuildsheltersandpillboxes,delayedfusebombsaremuch
'moreeffective'* Itisrecommended thatvhenp
>
ansrequireanattackona
fortifiedpositionsimilartoIWt)JIMAdelayedfusebombsbemadeavailable*
? IntheeaseofplanesitisalsorecommendedthatInorderto
obtainmaximumsmallarmsfireeffect,.greaterpenetration,andnormalangle
OfImpactagainsttheenemyIndefilade,pitsandfoxholescoveredoropen,
theexperimentsbeconductedindevelopingaunitcomposedofanumberof-
30or50calibermachinegunstobemountedwithgunsfixedverticalinthe
t>ombbaystofireverlcal,straightdown,whiletheplaneflyshorisontally.
Itisbelievedthiswouldgiveacontinuousmovingpatternar.clbefarmore
effectivethia?tttelongrangeshort>urstnowu s M isstrafing, :
1 ' . . - ' . i
2. Shlp-to-ShoreMovementjTheHegtwithnormalattachmentsandalarge
numberofsmalldetachmentsofotherdivisionunitswereembarkedaboardships
ofTransWv32, Somedifficultywasencountered,inlandingthesmall'dotactw
ment8-fromcertainshipsduetothefactthatelementsof
1
thesesmalldetach-
A
mentswereembarkedonmorethanoneship* ItIs,recommendedthatallunite,
oneveryfhip,beg|reaaSerialnumberbyDivatthetimeofpreparingthe
^ OrganisationiirasxoftheEmbarkationOrder*
if
43. ----- -
tion(Cont'd)*
3* Tank*InfCoordinationj On2**#e*thisSectwasscheduledtooontinue
theAtk,supportedbytanktof"boththeUth^nd5thDivff. illtankswereplaced
wfc&erthecontrolofthe5th.Divtankofficer* Heavytankcasualtiesquickly
convincedhimtfcatalargenumberoftankscannotbecontrolledoroperated
effectivelyingeneralsupportagainstenemyinfantryprotectedbyminefields
andATguns,butmustoperateinsmallgroup*helpedby,controlledby,andin
<Ureetsupportofsmalluniteoffriendlytroops. ItIsrecommendedthatin
futureoperaiionttankunitebeattachedtoInfHegttforlandingandreassign-
mentt.osmallerunitsasthesituationrequires. Thisisalsotheonlyway
tankscanreceivetheproperreconnaissancedataoperatingagainstfortified
p o s i t i o n * * '
k* DemolitionsandHaseThroverst Demolitionsandflamethrowers
(portableandtankmounted).wereusedextensivelywithverygoodresults. The
casualtyrateofportableflamethrowerpersonnelvatextremelyhigfr, 39*tank
mountedflaaothrowercoveredbythe,infantrysucceededinreducingmanyforti-
fiedemplacementsunderconditionsthatwouldhavecostheavilyininfantry
casualties,hadthetankflagsthrowernotbeenu#c& Itisreomm#ndodthata
poolofdemolitionawaandportableflaethroweroperatorsbemadearailabie
toreplacecasualtiesasrequired^ otthoroughlytrainallinfantryIroopsift
thehandlingofdemolitionsandflamethrowers.
1. Adequacyofalltypesofmountingoutsupplies*
(a)Classt(Stations).
* ' " . ' ' " '
(%)Sheamountandtypeembarkedfortheoriginalmissionwas
sufficient. ,
(2)Itisbelievedthatthenecessityforhatfoodorahot
rationsupplementtothelandingtyperation,evenwhensupplyroutesareunder*
fire,hatnow>eenrecognised. IthasbeenthepolicyofthisHegttoserve'
atleastbyBplusU,andforeverydfljrthereafteir,hotCoffeeandsoae*fortt
ofpastryuntilBrationsbecomeavailable. Hotonlyinthisoperation,but
previously,lard,whichisessentialtobaking,hasnotbeenavailablein
sufficientquantity. ItisrecommendedthatacombatallowanceofSix(6)
poundsperonehundred(100)menbeembarked.
(3)fruitandfruitJuicewasmadeavailableinsufficient
quantitiesduringthisoperationforthefirsttime. Arecommendedcombat
allowanceisa*-fallowetForty(^0)poundsOfJuiceperonehundred(100)
andtwenty(20)poundsoffruitporonehundred(100).
(k)Allmenheartilyendorsedtheuseofassaultrations.
Theyarewllpackaged. Itisbelievedthatatwo(2)tofive(5)day
allowanceshouldbeembarkedandavailableforimmediateunlftadin^inaddition
toone(1)rationcarriedbytheindividual* .
(5)The10in1rationwasissuedtounitsastheyreturned
toreserveareas,andunderexistingconditions,servedasa>satisfactory
substitutefortheBration. *Duetothe.groupingofmenrequiredinthefront
linetoservethisration,however,itisnotrecognisedasdesirablefor
frontlinedistribution.
(6)Thesupplyofheat.tabsvsmoreadequateinthisoperation
thanpreviously. Hecommendamountstobeembarkedarethree(3)packagesper
individualandatwo(2)dayallowancetobeloadedbythe'HegtlQuartermaster.
(7)Thenewtype0rationwithitsvarietyandmoredesirable
cosponentswasadecidedimprovement.
(g)AspreviouslyrecommendedbythisRegt,thepostexchange
componentshouldbeeliminatedasanitemOfstandardissue* Thepercentage
ofshavingcreaminthepackageisfartoogreatincomparisontothe"recast
andactualconsumption* Hostmenwilluseonebarofsoapforbothwashingand
on,(Coat'dK
having. Iti*estimatedthatseven(7)ofeveryten(10)tube*ofshaving
cream,packedinPXcomponentsanddeliveredtothefront lines,werenever
opened* Ontheotherhand,theamountofsoapisnotsufficient. Itis
believedthatasamoresatisfactoryanswertodistributionanddemandfr
theseitemstheyshouldbepackagedinbulki Inthismannerarequestforany
oneoftheseitemscouldbefilledIndividually.
W) ClaesII.
(1) jortheactualmissiontfthisregimentthegeneral
suppliesandequipmentembarkedwassufficienttosupporttheoperation. The
'followingcommentsaresubmitted*however,forconsiderationJ
(2) theplywoodpackboardsissuedpriortoembarkationwere
notused* Itisbelievedhowever,thattheyareaworthyadditiontoMarine
Corpssupplybutwerenotusedduringthisoperationforthefollowingreasons:
(1)Terrainwasnotruggedinthesenseofhills,cliffs,etc.(2)Relatively
shortdistancesforhandcarry(ifhandcarrywagnecessary). (3)Menwerenot
educatedtotheuseofthisItemduetotheshorttimetheywereusedpriorto
theoperation. (*0Transportationwesreadilyavailable. (5)Roadswerere-
lativelyeasytoconstructthroughoutthe$ofc*
(3)\kytterbagswereembarkedandwereueedonlyinassembly
arg*t Itisrecommended thattheybedyedormanufactured Inablack,brewn
orgreendolor(outside).
(if) Mosquitonets*bothheadandcot,w^ranotrequired.
(5) Aten(10)ortwenty(20)daycompleteordnancecleaning
gearsupiyshouldbeissuedtotheRegtapproximately(10)dayspriorto
embarkation inorderthatitnaybemorereadilyavailabletotheRegt. This
supplyshouldinnomannerbeincludedintheallowanceissuednormallyfor
expenditureduringthedayspriortoembarkation*
x
(6) Hospitalcorpmanknivesshouldbedeletedasanintrench-
ingtool. ThistoolisoflittlevaluetoanInfantrymanasan intrenching
toolandisinvariablyexchangedforasalvagedshovelerpickinthecombat
area. Individualshovelsorpick-mattocks shouldbe substituted.
(7) Onthebasisofthepastthreeoperationsitisbelieved
thattheknapsackcouldbeleftinthebasecamp. Themenhaveneverbeen
abletoueethispieceofequipment,because6fthetacticalsituation,until
two(2)tothree(3)weeksaftertheoperationhasstarted. Totheseasoned
marine*itismerelyasourceofcleanclothes, tnviewofthepastfactthat
mencannot^etintoindividualpacks,itisrecommended thattheclothing
ordinarilypacked.intheknapsackandtneknapsackbo"loftinthebasecamp
intheteabag
4
(inthismanner*iffttUanilnXtkorMlAhisequipmentisall
inonepieceofbnggage). Oneuitofuiility,twe(2)pairof4oe)ts,one
pairofshoes,oneundershirt,andonedrawers,intherequoseedsizes,should
beissuedtotheEegt^rior toembarkation* Thisclothingwouldbepackaged
inWilsondrumsmarked,andloadedaRegtlquartermastercargo. Approximately
fortyfive(**$)drumswouldbersquiredtopackagethisamountofclothing.
Inthisconnection,asimilarmeansmightbedevisedonasmallerscaleto
insureproperoutfittingofcasualtiessentfromsnipstoduty* Themannerin
whichmarineswereclothedforroturntodutyduringtheXWPJlUkoperation
wasnotsatisfactory. Sufficientsalvagedequipmentisgenerallyavailable
inthecombatareaforissuebutcleanclothingisnot*
(&) Anewcamouflagehelraentcovershouldbeadoptedifitis
tobecontinuedasanitemofissuiu Thecoverisnotsatisfactorytoadjust
andcauseswearontheliner* Manylinersare'worn,outbycontinualremoval
ofthelines'inerderthatthehelmetcanbeusedforwashingpurposes.
(9) Itisrecommended thattheleggingshouldbecutdown
abouttwo(2)inches,ortheboot,armytype,besubstitutedforfielduse.,
Thepresentleggingbindsthemuscleof%holegandcausesnumerouscasesof
chaffing*, Itisbelievedthatistheloggingwascut,asmall,mediumandlarge
siseonlywouldberequiredtoadequatelymeetthedemandsforsixes.
tion (Coat'd)*
(10)ShenowtjpeCPteatprevedinvaluableandwas*very
neeesisaryand satisfactoryadditiontocemmandpottequipaent. folding b
areessentialfor efficientstaffwork. Xtisrecommendedthatthe3dSttgrBn
constructseven^(7)simlXfoldingtypetabletto,augmentthepresentTO
allowance, Thsarmytypefielddeskis aerysatisfactoryforwee inthe
combat w>ne* However,thosenow inuseare'rejpic:/becomingunserviceable
andshouldbereplaced* ' - '
(11)Thewaterdrumusedonthisoperationvatbyfar superior
toaay containerofitskindpreviouslyused* Todifficultiesofrutting,
;
badtaste,orleakagewereexperienced,. Inadditionthiscontainerwas ideal
*vosupplywashingwaterinquantitytounitsastheyreturnedtoreserveareas
forshortperiodsoftimeduringtheoperation* Inordertoreducetherate,
oflossintransferringthewaterfromdrumstovarioustypecontainers,it*is
recommended thattwentyfive(25) 3 Aiachfittingswithfauoetsbeisetted
eachEegtpriortoanotheroperation. (Jive(5)ofthesewillbeusedinfuel
drumsintheBBB). ,\
2, Adequacy $
(a) Ilefluprly was sufficient with the exception, noted in paragraph
1 above
r
. ' . ' .. ,
:
" , ^ ' '
;
'"
;
' ;.
3
#
Wilson Drums,
(a) It was found during this operation, that the WilsonDrum
provided an excellent means cf transporting certain bulk type cargo and afforded
a very satisfactory meant of storage andprotection from the weather in the
early stages of combat* It wasused as a crnte in vr*ichi ni t i al l y coffee and
sugar, clothes, blanket!* and medical supplies ware loaded. The drumWASeven
uead as an oven and set in a side-hill when field ranges wo,3 not available*
k Salvage.
_ < ' , ' . . . / ' , . , .
(a)Thisiiegtcarriedcut extensivesalvageoperations.A s a
matterofinfomation,approximately120#moref*i*.psie^tandproperty was
salvagedontheIWD JIMA.operationthanontheC A Moperation* Theseresults
wereobtainedlargelybecause(1)Openterrainratherthanwoodedterrain
allowedpropertytobeeasilyseen,(2VAreaoverwhichtrdopaoperated was
limitedand concentrated,(3)Transportations'alltypeswasavailable on
call,W Esplacementswereavailableasworkingparties*
(b) The TOdoes not provide for any salvage personnel in the
Inf Eegt ?mdas a result, i f salvage operations aro carried out theyar
accomplished by working parties, when and i f .available. This situation
provides that salvage wi l l be conductad only whenworking details ar available
or when other tasks In the supply plan will permit i t . In order to overcome
this i t i s recommended that a salvage section be provided in the Service Plat
(1+ ITCO8 and 20 men), While av-iting approval of this change i t i s recommended
that one (1) UCOand twelve (IS) men from the Division Savage Section be ad-
minlstratively attached to each Eegt prior to entry into a combat operation,
5, 'Transportation*
/ (a) The transportation embarkedproved more than adequate for the
assigned mission. In making future Y3HICL3S TOB3 LIPPSD charts, consideration
must be given to the fact that one (1) truck, i ton (wire Jeep), aat be sub-
tracted from any total deciaed upon te be l i fted by jach Inf Bnin order to
figure the total organic vahiclos available f^r supply and evacuation of that
ttatt* Shi* i s also true in the H&S Co Inf Hegt which has two (a) trucks, i ten
(wire Jeeps),
ActionlleT3orT,~iJ4
tt
iJiation (Cont'd).
(b) It i s believed that a ton trailer should be available and
*
on
be embarked behind every truck, J ton and ambulance, t of the Inf Hegt.
An increase nZ% ton trucks does not alleviate front line suroly as such
supply requires the use of ^ tra trucks and trailorsv-
(c) The cargo carrier M2'9Cproved an excellent vehicle for this
type terrain, 100$ of forward supply during the fi rst five ($) days was
via this carrier. Drivers have become better trained, tracs have nowhad
time to "stretch" and become readjusted so that r,-,difficulty w* found in
the functioning. It i s believed that"if advanced information on any operation
indicates there will "bono rivsr crossings, the pontoons should be removed
and left in the base camp. By actual experience, the Weazel with a one (1)
ton trailer operated throughout the average terrain ancountsred with very *
favorable results, however, i t i s believed t'hat the i ton trailer should bo
jnsidered i t s standard trailer load. If the Weazel i s to be equipped with
radio i t cannot be considered available as a vehicle for supply and evacuation.
- (d) The method of loading flame throwers and reserve machine guns
on one (1) ton trucks, weazels, and one (1) ton trailers worked most sati s-
factorily. It i s recommended, however, that separate weapons carriers (one
(1) ton trucks or*I-| ton 6x6 trucks) be added to Bn TOs rather than using
transportation belonging to another unit who maybe requirsd to revert them
for other tactical purposes. Until this change can be accomplished the
present method of assignment to Bns i s satisfactory,
(a) It i s recommended that the Inf Hegt be issued prior to the
next operation one (1) tow line for each weazel and ton truck to be embarked.
This tow line should be m\de of 3/8 inch cable with one (1) loop on each end,
(f) Ones again in thi's operation the athey trailer was invaluable
to this Inf Eegt in the oxocution of the plan of -su;;jiy and evacuation.
Except in salvage operations, when the campaign was over, this vehicle was
not used beyond tiie Regtl Train Bivouac, It was the only c^rgo carrying
vehicle in the ear^Ly stages that could negotiate -iifye terrain Jfrom the water
I>oint to the ETB, Onone o.f i t s trips, during x^e ;Mupaign, i t was loaded
with mortar ammunition, hitched behind one tanjk and pulled across the ai r-
field ITo2 when that sector was linlsr heavy mortar and small arms fire.
Throughout -tho first twelve (12) days i t was the ore vehicle which kept the
ilTB supplied with large quantities of ammunition, water, and rations from tHe
rear,
(g) The vehicles embarked and the numV.r of day's battle employe
ment are as follows: . . . . . . . .
ITo.
20
20
Vehicle.
Truck, -|t
Trailer,
on
i ton
HoDays Used.
22
22
20 Truck, 1 21
12 Trailer, 1 ton
23
6 Carrier,
C^rgo, H29C
23
Ik . Trailer.
vratar
20
5 Ambulance
*i ton
22
(h) No vehicles ware lest in this Hegt. 6ns (1) one (1) ton
trailer had Its axle pulled ofx the body while being towed across the beach
by a tractor. One (1) ambulance body^Wasdamagedbeyond repair by mortar
shell. One (1) one (1) ton'truck previously destined as a survey vehicles
was worn out in service*
-17-
ActionBeport,INDJJHAOperations(Cont'd).
( i ) It i s recommended that the body of the ten.trailer be rein-
forced to make It more sturdy. It l i further recommended that a t ai l gfite be
x
ovided in order that cargo may*e more easily loaded into the body of the
trailer rather than lifted or pushed over the Bide,
(j) Considerable work will be necessary to put the water trailer! in
good condition* If extensive work cannot be completed they mast be replaced prior
to another operation. Ho malfunctions or serious maintenance difficulties however,
wore experienced with any piece of equipment. Duo to the much improved overall
program established recently in the Division, al l equipment undoubtedly was
;
placed in bett'er condition than i t hadbeen prior to entry into any other operafci
6, Transport Quartermaster.
f
(a) Frompast experience and in the planning for the TWOJIKA opera-
tion, i t was found that ship's characteristics
1
and troop accomodations as far-,
nishad were inaccurate, This lack of accurate information results in unnecessary
changes in embarkation plans after the arrival of the ships. It i s recommended
that, every effort be madeby the "oigher echelon to injure that the ship
1
* charw
ac
J
;erifltics as proyided, ba checked for accuracy prior to delivery to assigned unit
(b) The TOfor an Irif Hegt does net provide for any trained enlisted
TqilPers for the actual preparation of ship
1
e piany* Previously, TQKPers h4
been provided by the division T:.inaport Quartermaster to assi st in this work*
Thepreparation of landing plane lor the tVOJIM. operation was unsatisfactory
and slow because of the lack of trained personnel ^assist in the mechanical
preparation of these plans. It i s raquestad tha-u in the future enlisted Pers
from the Division Transport Q^ttormaster Section be made available to assist
troop HQJtV* in the preparation of ship loading plans.
S. Medical, ^
* fc Smbarkation.
(a) TwoMedical Officers and one Dental pffieer plus eighteen Hospital
corpsmen comprised the E^t l Hc?:SMed Sec, One Medical Officer and ten Hospital
coxpsmen boarded the jPiWj^. OneDental Officer and seven Hospital corpsmen
botrded the AJ?Ar49, One Medical Officer and one Hospital corpsman boarded the
P 1 8 '
(b)AllIfedicalPerswereequippedwithHospitalCorpsTJnit#3,vhich
containedtherequiredomergeicymedicalsujnliestogetherwithanadditional
fourunitsofSerumAlbumin.
2, AboardShip,
t
(a) Onboard the iiPA-lS troop sick cal l s were conducted at OSJO'and -.
1530 daily by passenger Medical Officers and corpsmer., The majority of thie
troops were in good health and the sick calls %^re light*
/ . - . . -
* (t>)Sanitaryinspecionsoftheentireshipwareconducteddaily
atI03O. OneTroopMedicalOfficerwasincludedintheinspectingparty.San-
itaryconditionsingeneralwereexcellent,withtheexceptionofafewdrinking
fountainswhichonvariousocoar-icr.scouldnotbekeptfunctioning,waterwas
availablee-sewhere.
(1)HeadssDrainagewasinadequateatfirst,thuscausingan
overflowawaterondecks,th*uwascorrected.
X2)IdvingQcuorters:Adequate.
.- - I S -
ition(Coat's)*
(3)Messes: Adequate*
(k)Galleys: Satisfactory.
(5)CooksandHossmen: Satisfactory*
(c)SpecialPrecautions: Hone*
3* Debarkation.
t
(a)Personnel,
(1)Wave: Hotinassaultphase,
(2)Howboated: iiPA~19,allH&Slied?eradebarkedinonebeat,
togetherwithCollectingSecambulance. A^A~1O,SegtlSurgandChiefPharmacist
2'IateinseparateEegtl2raeBor,ts APA-3*K*H^
e<
iP^rs
in
-vegtlTreeBoats.
(3)Timeoflanding; APA-IS-Dplus2,.*P-rt.-l<M>plu^,APA-3
1
*-
3plus3,
.(b)Material.
(1)Howtransported: Inambulances,trailersandcratestogether
withquartermastergear.
(2)Timeoflanding:Oneambulance!Lplus3iotherambulances
andmaterialintermittently forseveraldaysthareafter.
(3)Howlanded:JeepsonLSH,othermaterialunderQuartermaster
-apervislon.
(c)LossesofPersandmaterial: Hone,
k, Ashore-*issaultPhase,
(a)MedicalInstallations.
(1)Whensetup:tfponlandingDplus2.
(2)Locationwithregardto:
(a)Eoadsortrails:BnandEegtlAidStationswarslocated
inareaswherejeepambulancescouldreachthem.
()CoverJBnandEegtlAidStationswerelocatedindug-*
outs,planerevetments,cavesorotheraccessablaareas,offeringbestpossible
protection fromshellfragmentsandobservation,
(jc)Dispersion:EachBnthemajorityofthetime,maintained
aforwardandreadAidStation. EegtlAidStationw<-3maintainedintheEegtlCP.
(d.)OtherMed'Installations*Uoattemptwasmadetoestab-
lishnearotherUed.TnstallatlonsduetothefactthnVeont'ctwasatalltimes
possiblebyjaepambulances.
ie)Proximitytocriticalpoints:T:egtlAidStationwasat
alltimesestablishedintheEegtlCP.
(jf)Haturallineofdriftofwalkingwounded:Atonelocation
walkingcasualtiesw,;raevacuatedfromtheBnAidStationtotheEegtlAid
Station. BnAidStationsweresetupinthenaturallineofdrift,whichfac-
ilitatedtheircareofwoundedfromtheirownunitsanddfromadjacentunitswhich
wereevacuatingalongthemostnaturalcoursetoiherear.
(3)Protectivemeasurestaken:
(a)Localsecurity:Adailywatchwasestablishedinthe
HegtlMedSecfrom1900to0600.
(b)Cover:Camouflagenetswerecarriedforbothjeep ,
ambulances. EegtlAidStationwasalways^establishedso,aatot^keadvantageof
allpossibleterraincoverage. , '
(c)Concealment; EegtlAidStationwasalwayslocatedinback
ofanembankmentorinadugout. ,
(d)Sheltersanddugouts:Thaprotectionofembankmentsor
bulldozerholesandconcretedugoutswasused.
Action Beport, IfflD JIMa.Operation (Cont' d),
(e)Blackout.precautions*A"blackoutteatwasusedmoatof
thetime.
Lightproofmaterialwasusedovertheentranceswhileindugouts*
(k)AnySpecialfeaturesorcomments:Hone
(1) Sect i oni ng: Ho nvallafcle f aci l i t i es at the Eegtl Aid Station
(2) Adequacy: All hospitalization -as adequately handled "by the
Medical Companies and higher echelons. '
. (3) Equipment, supplies and Pers: Hone .
(k) Humber of pat i ent s: Hone. * .
(5) Operations performed: Hone,
(c) Evacuation.
(1) Howeffected; By jeep airibulancd from 3n and Segtl Aid Station
to the Beach Evacuation Stations. Upon establishment of Medical Company, a l l
patients were evacuated there. .
(2) Adequate*
(d)Casualtiestreated,3&MarDiv
(l)Humber H&S 1st Bn 2d Bn 3d Bn Tot al
kl kOk 358 U55 1261*
(a)
(b)
detained
Evacuated
10
35
35
365
63
29**
45
1*07
153
1103
(e) Died of wounds
(2) Type.
2 k 7 3 16
(a) Chest
{%)Head
b
k
12
53
78
31
10
35
106
123
(jc) Abdomen
(cL) Lower extremities
3
18
11
98
7
91
25
i**3
kS
350
(jg.) Vpper extremities
(t) Concussion, Blast.
9
7
l]>99
91 57
117
125
359
280
A t HW 8 .
(3) Walking Wounded 16
177
119 221
533
(k) Stretcher Cases 26 18**
175
238
623
Casualties treated other than 3d MarDiv Pers.
(1) Huraber
9
83 186 101 1*71
(^) detained 0 18 20 8 1*6
(b) Evacuated
(c[) Died of Wounds
(2) Typo.
9
0
i$3
2
156
10
92
1
teo
X3
(a) Chest a? ik 58 11 8i*
(b) Head
(JB) Abdomen
@ Upper extremities
i
0
I
19
9
22
6
23
23
3
35
?5
X8
105
{o) Lower extremities
(t) Concussion, Blast
,
3
3
66
21*
**5
22
1**
Ik
128
63
"" Atraos
(3) Walking bounded 1 61 28 1*1
131
(k) Stretcher Cases 8 122 128 60 318
Totalnumberofcasualties treated,al 2191.
- 20-
Action Jteport, IWOJXU& derati on (Cont'd).
, (e)Sanitation,
(1) Special ifeasurefiit Gampareas, heads, galleys, andtents were
frequently sprayed with DDT solution.
(2) yood: Field rations, C,KD,and*10in1were used prior to
the last fewdays ofthecampaign,*when fi el d galleys were established. Boiling
water was available formess gear sterilisation. Hotcoffee wasserved twice
daily after Dplus 6. Doughnuts orturnovers that could beeaten without mess
3&?were served once daily.
(3) Water: Originally suppliedbyships until the2ngrs estab-
lished aWater Point along thebeach. Approximately 1gallon permanperday was
bai l abl e, Water was chlorinated atthesource, .
(f) Disposal ofDead*
(1) Oar: Handled byGraves Hegistration.
v
(2) Enemy: Working details from combat units inthearea, "buried
t'ie enemy dead. J
(3) Sanitary precautions taken: Before burial, bodies were sprayed
with DDTsolution orSodiumArSemite.
(g) Epidemics orunusual'diseases in t^rc-ps* None,
(h) Dental Service*
(l ) Howandbywhomfurnished: Begtl Dentist,- using Hel d lied
Unit #2* ' "
(2), Bumber of easest 9.
(3) $y*P
e
cases! Temporary f i l l i ngs.
00 Adequate.
(5) Additional duties of dentisti Temporary relief oflied Officers
and Mail Censor.
>
(1) Care of Civilians: None,
(j) Prisoners ofWar, care of,
(1) dumber cared fdr:12.
(2) Sow andbywhomcared for$Pirst aidtreatments byBegtl
Surgeon andassisting Corpsmen. /
(3) location: Begtl AidStation.
'{k) Type of,service rendered: jpirstaid.
. (5)Evacuation of:Evacuated byjeep ambulance toDivAidStation.
() Adequate.
(7) Diseases present: None noted,
(k) Medical Organization.
(l ) Suitability ofpresent type: Thepresent type of medical
organization i s well suited torender therequired medical aidunder combat
renditions. Theefficiency of theorganisation couldbeimprovedbymodifying
Hho status ofthecollecting section. ' "
\2) Suggested changes: Collecting section didgood worlcinevao-
v';lng wounded from theaidstations tothebeach ormedioal companies byjeep
ambulance. However thejeep driver"andacorpsman rider, didthework which
Left theremaining twelve corpamen with l i t t l e .todosince they couldnot be
used forward oftheaidstation. It i s suggested that thecollecting section
Cromthetied Cobereduced to three jeep drivers, with their rjabulcnces. The
remaining thirty-nine corpsmen could bedesignated asareplacement group under
B&gtl control tobeused asneeded whenanyof.theBegtl orBncorpsmen become
ration (Cont
f
d).
casualties, It i s further suggested that these corpeoen be made-available to
the Begt at least thirty days/before combat for training with the troops in any
dirties they might have to perform in combat. IPhiBwouldput them in "better
physical and mental condition andwould teach them how to care for casualties
while at the same time talcing advantage of the greatest possible protection for
themselves,
(l ) Medical Personnel* ^
(1)Adequate.
(2)Employments Satisfactory,
(3)bosses and replacements: Assistant Begtl Surgeon woundedand
evacuated* Beplacement furnished "by3^-th Bepl Draft, Bn Surgeon* 2d Bn 21st
jiegt remained on board ship andwas replaced by a lied Officer from CoA3d tied
.3n 3Venty-seven- replacement corpsmen were received from H&S3d lied Bn.
Stotal
'founded in Action
f i l l ed in Action
Concussion, Blast, Atmospheric
Miscellaneous
Total losses.
66
Losses, replacement corpsmen;
Losses,collectingsection:
Yfounded in Action
y
6 WoundedinAction 7
"Killed in Action , S Concussion*Blast*Atmospheric 2
(jncueeion, Blasts Atmospheric 2 Taecus 9
:d3cellane<jus 1
.'otallosses 17 TotalLosses*.15
(k)Stateoftraining:Satisfactory.
(5)Specialtiesneeded?JTone,
(m)PioldMedical"Squipmont.
(1)Proportionofallowancecarried;100^,
(2)PilferageandloesoBtHone*
(3) Adequate*inadequateandoverage:Adequateexceptforblankets
andlitters*
(k)Suitabilityofpresenttype?Satisfactory.
(5)Improvements:Hone* . -
(6)Sesupply:Adequatewhenexchangeofblanketsandlitterswas
carefullydonebyallhands*butthissystembrokedawnpartiallywhenair
evacuationreceivedthelitterswithoutreplacement.
(n)MedicalSupplies.
(1)Amountcarried:fieldlledicalUnitsv5-A(k),5-3(*06..($)
7(ID.6(k),9(10),10(k)
t
U-A(H)*11*.Bik\>12fr),13(1),Ik(k),15(5).
17(?),19(l).Inadditionthefollowingitemswerecarried:
Tendayreplenishments...^*,...*4-
Li t t e r s , Metal p o l e , . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 5 '
' Plasma ( u n i t s ) * . . ,
f
. . . . . . . . . . ^
Serum albumin ( uni t s ) *
(2) Pi l f erage and l o s s e s ; ITone
-.22-
Action Seport, lW$mmBp4r&toa. (Cont'd),
(3) Adequate, inadequato and overt^e; Adequate except for in-
sufficient amount of Serum Albumin and Brandy.
(k) Resupply: adequate from 3each 3vac Stations
f
with the
exception of Scrum Albumin and Brandy,
(5) Adequacy of "block shipments: Hone in 3egt.
. (0) Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock,
(1) Number and type carried: H&3Co two jeep ambulances and one
t r ai l er , Sach Bn carried one jeep aabulance and one t rai l er* Collecting Sec
carried three jeep ambulances.
(2) Losses! Two jeep ambulances*
(3) Howut i l i zed and maintained: 2vacuation of the wounded from
3n and Begtl Aid Stations. Maintenance under supervision of MTSec.
(k) Adeqtuacy: Adequate.
(5) Improvements: AWeazel could "be used to evacuato over terrain
which i s too rough for a jeep ambulance to travel over*
(p) Quartermaster Scuipment and Supplies.
(1) Allowance carried: One blackout tent and three water pur i f i -
cation unitsk ' .
(2) Availability of: Jeep t r ai l er .
(3) Sesupply; Hone,
$+) Heclothing of pat i ent s: Hone4
(5) Ade-uate or inade<-uate: Ader?uate1
(6) Sui t abi l i t y: Suitable, '
(q) lialaria and Spideiaic Control 3nuipment and Supplies.
(1) Amount and type carried. Sach 'r-dividual carried two bottlos
of insect repellent and l / 2 can of DB2?powder prior to combat,
v
(2) How usedt By*individual on clothing and body,
- (3) Availability of: General issue, plus resupply,
(5-) Losses: Hone.
v
(5) Sui t abi l i t y of present types; Suitable,
^.$ Ashore - After coopletion Assault Phase.
(a) Hospitalization: Established by higher echelon.
(b) Hedical aid Quartermaster supplies and eouipment: Adeouate,
(c) Sai i t at i on: Controlled by daily sanitary inspections*
(d) Food and water: Aderuate.
(e) Sickness-*Spidemic o^r unusual diseases in tx-oops or native popula-
t i on: Hone.
6# Secommendations: Change status of collecting section from the medical
company as suggested in paragraph l+(k)(2).
7m Signal, ...
1. CommunicationPlan,
,(a)SChecommunicationplanswereretdvedbylowerechelonsinsuffi-
cienttimetopermit study,criticismandmakenecessarychants. Thepolicy,of
freouentmeetingsofcommunication officersfordiscussionofSignalInstructions
priortofinalcompilationreducedgreatlythonecessityforlastminutechanges
intheorder,
2.SmbarkationandVoyage,
-23-
tion (Cont*d).
(a) All items of signal equipment, including vehicles, were loaded
according to plan,
(b) Noequipment wasdamaged during theprocess of loading,
(c) .All items such as storage "batteries \vcro checked prior to landing,
and al l communication vehicles were started pricr to debarkation to test ignition
system andoil pressure.
(d) School onthe enemy situation, terrain features of IWOJXM& and
information onflanking units as well as theproposed glans of Atkfor ROT21
was given to al l Pers. .Additional review onthe SOIandshackle cipherwas
given as needed. 'Jill Pors were "briefod oncall si^ns andfrequencies ofown
and adjacent uni t s. *
(e) Marine Pers wore of assistance to the 3hip
!
s communication officer.
i l l incoming messages for COtroops were routed anddistributed "by1CT21message
centers. .Marine radio pers manned voice circuits in the ship
!
s radio roomwhen
called^upon laythe-ship's communication officer. Code clerks aided in thede-
ciphering of coded messages addressed to COEmbarkation Group.
3. personnel* -
(a) !Ehenumber of wire andradio Pers in an Inf 3n should "boin-
creased. Thenumber of Pers in Hegt Kci s satisfactory.
(b) Uhonumber of wire Pors in an Inf 3nshould be increasedby
three to auguaent thepresent personnel in the Slmmmortar platoon. 2homuabor
of radio Pers in an Inf Bnshould be increased byfour to faci l i t at o
echeloning of aBnCPwith the additional f/Uequipment in the /
(c) Training of Pors w<as adequate.
(d) Kospecial training other than normal is necessary.
(e) HCT21embarked short tho follovring percentr^e of Pers: ilsgCen
- 10$,Wire Pers - 15& Hadio Pars - ^
(f) losses of Pers aboard ship before lending: One(l) B^.d Op(776)t
Ship^s Hospital.
pleted:
Loeees ofPers in pori<
XIA
*4after lpr:,iag mt i l
WIA
operation coa-
Officers 2
Msg Cen 1
Wire
1 20
Hadio
3
16 .
(h) Holoss of Pers in effecting landing.
(i) Hocommunication Pcrs were employed for duties other than
communications.
(j) Battle casualties vere reported toDivSig0whoarranged for
temporary attachment of communication Pers from Div, JASCo units, andCorps
separate wire platoons as needed..
U. IBquipment. .
(a) Overages andshortages of major items of
Action. Report,
ion (Cont
!
d).
2 Wire jeeps - short.
2 TCS (mounted in weazels) - over*
1 SCB.61O - over. .
5 SCR300 - over.
(b) $Toequipment was l ost aboard ship "before landing.
(c) Losses of equipment in effecting landing:
TSX - 2 .
BC-5 U . *
BL-27-B - 3
(d) losses of equipment in the period from after landing unt i l
operation completed?
SCR536 - 16
scs 3 0 0 - 3
. - 10
(e) The equipment (design and-nudity) was suitable' for the task
to "beperformed with the exception of the connection in the handset of the
SCR300.
(f) It i s roconmended that the cord to the 3CB3^0 handset "be
secured within the handset to' avoid strain and frifetion on the .lead-ins
which causes them to "break and short out.
(g) It i s recommended that each Inf Bn Communication Plat "be pro-
vided with one weazel (TCS equipped) as a ut i l i t y car^o barrying vehicle and
alsjo as a Mobile Hadio. In sanay or swampy t errai n tnese vehicles are i n-
valuable for moving signal supplies.
;*' (h) This organization made use of sevoral typos of equipment which
i t |?ad never used in action before. B/Mradios (SCH6OS-6IO) v/ere used from
Bn to Begt and Bogt to Div. These radios gave extremely.satisfactory operation
for 'the duration of the operation with a minimum of maintenance. SCR53^
radios were used for the f i r st time for platoon, to company communication and
though often blocked by unsuitable terrain and short range limitations they
did provide excellent communications at times. Switchboards B1&-9&an&3D-97
were also used by the organisation for the f i r s t time, and because of tho
extensive use of telephone communications on the operation greatly speeded
the handling of cal l s .
(i ) Ml radio vehicles* and radios not landed in waterproof rubber
bags were thorughly watprproofed.. The heavy duty generators were^removed
from the radio Jeeps and inserted in waterproof rubber bags and reinst ai l ed
on beach. !Shovehicles were waterproofed in the manner prescribed by Div WO.
The radios were completely waterproofed with asbestos grease, varnish
t
masking
tape and waterproof paper. This waterproofing was 100$ effpetive.
TCSradios^ mounted in weazels and switchboards 3D-96 fmd 3D-97
were used though not included in T/A. The radio weasels were used in
echeloning Bsgt CPforward over soft and undesireable terrain and to hasten
the delivery of communication gear to tho lower echelons. The BD-96-97 Swbd
was used in the Hegt communication platoon to speod"tho handling of phone cal l s.
Because of the short distances involved wire conounication was emphasized and
the added Swbd f aci l i t i es became a necessity.
tion (Oont'dK
(k) All signal equipment authorised by tho T/Awith the exception of
lineman's equipment K3SMLwas used to good advantage* Terrain features and
lack of vegetation prohibited the installation of estensivo overhead l i nes.
5* Supply.
(a) Complete allowance of signal equipment was taken into combat by
this organization.
(b) All.equipment taken with the exception of lineman
!
s equipment*
was used to good advantage and aided in the rapid installation and effective
maintenance?of the various channels.
(c) The inability of small boats to land i ni ti al replacement gear
immediately made the supply of batteries and combat wire critical in tho i ni ti al
stages of tho operation; however, this matter was rectified and supply then con-
tinued in a satisfactory manner.
(d) Nochanges in replenishments rated\axe necessary.
(e.) Bo-supply of items of signal equipment was handled through a
Eegt Com.dusip. Sach Inf Bncommunication storeroom keeper remained at this
dump and located and moved al l Bn gear arriving on the "beaches to this durapv
Bns would cal l on this dumpfor supplios as needed and
f
i f available, i t Would*
be Immediately dispatched. If not available efforts would bo made to procure
such.items from higher echelons to issue or store at tho I^gtl dump and issue
as called for. This system worked very effectively since a minimum of gear
i ni t i al l y w?.s distributed as needed to give the maximumuse in.Jtogt.
(f) ( l ) All Div repair f aci l i t i es were available to the Begt.
(2) Theywere used extensively whenever the need arose.
(3) All types of radios as well as telephones and Swbdswere
efficiently rcpairod by tho Div repair soction and rc-usod by the Begt.
(Q) Equipment spare'parts were not Carried with the equipment lEhcsc
items-wore pooled at the Div r^ai r soction and there used to their fullest
. advantage. . 1
(h) Those spares were presumably adequate sinco al l gear wn.s repaired
and re-issued,
1
(i ) Sufficient spare parts other than equipment spares were available.
(j) Though this JSegt was two (2) wire jeeps short tho use of wc^zcls
and a one (l ) ton trucfc as woll as jeep trailers and a ono (l ) ton trailer made
the transportation of signal equipment ontiroly adequate.
(k;) It i s recommended that a ono (l ) ton truck bo added to the
vohiele allowance 'Of each Itegtl communication platoon* and that each Bncommun-
icatibn platoon be issued one weazel equipped with TCSradio for transportation
of signal goar
v
and mobile CPuse,
6. Operation.
(a) All normal agencies of communication were established.
(b) Wire wf\s tho most overloaded agency of communication.
(c) To counteract this overload wire lines were duplicated as much as
possible. ABD-96 JI&97 was installed at Begtl C? and e^h Bnwas furnished an
*
-26-
Action Re por t X#tfraCi*C#erat5 on (Cont>&).
additional BD-72* Forward Switch Sta-tions were established to handle the addi-
tional company lines where necessary. Pertinent staff sections were informed
of the proper uso of the message center and available radio channels to relievo
the stress on wire communications.
(d) Thcro was no unnecessary duplication of agencies during this
operation.
(e) The Bn C \1frcruoncies assigned to this Begt wore not used, Ho
necessity for this channel of communication arose,*
(f) (l) Difficulties encountered in radio communication: Ini t i al l y
the supply of "batteries was very cri t i cal since the rough surf prevented rc-
eupply for a period of three days after landing* Lack of complete Signal
Operating Instructions for the ^th and 5th liar Divs also caused difficulty prior
to the attachment of this Begt to the 3d Mar Div. Vehicular radios were not
able to land immediately, and equipment was not available to change the crystal
settings of the SCR6lO radios to enter tho Corps and Uth Div 3T/Mnets. As eoon
as proper equipment was landed this situation Was rectified* At Various times
the F/H radios were "masked" by unsuitable terrain' features* but this situation
did not become cri t i cal due to the short range and the fact that a short move-
nont of the set would allow the incoming signal to be heard, With the three
Marino Divisions on the line the number of stations on each SCR536 frequency
restricted the handling of messages by this agency at many times,
(2) Difficulties encountered in wire communications: Wire
communication was disrupted often by tanks and bulldozers tearing out the linos
in the forward areas. Because of tho lack of vegetation, it was impossible .to
overhead al l lines, though lance poles were used whenever possiblo for this
purpose*
(3) Ho difficulties were encountered in visual communication,
(Q-) No difficult!os wore encountered in wire communication,
(g) Communication difficulties were encountered in this operation
that were not encountered in previous operations. These difficulties Can be
attributed "in the most part to the complete lack of vegetation on the island

r
hich would not allow for normal overloading of wire lines, >
(h) On'20 ?eb this Eegt was boated and prepared to land on order.
wTdcrs were received from LIPto reembark the Begt on respective ships, COof
this Regt experienced considerable difficulty in sending this order to his
subordinate units as his SCR3^0 frequency was being used by tho iiDC
l
s staff
Tor the,purpose of sending a very lengthy routine message encoded in p,code
not hold'by the Rcgt. It is recommended that in the future SCR300 frequencies
be used for tactical transmissions only.
(i) Ho officers wore roruircd to opera/be or maintain any agency of
communication because of enlisted casualties,
(j) Asmall number of enemy communication installations wore captured.
I'lifc eruipment from these was immediately turned in to Div Signal Company.
(k) This Rcgt wax not boated in amphibious tractors so communication
to them was not necessary*
(1) Methods used in this operation for Inf-Hk communications with
tanks from the 3d liar Div were as follows: An SCR300 w~s mounted in al l command
tanks for the purpose of entering the Inf Bn SCR300 nets to receive ordors and
pass information. The tank company sent a liaison SC3.510 jeep to the Bn CP to
which attached to provide direct contact with operating tanks. The tank telephone
was used whore possible, and arm and haad signals were also used on occasion.
' -27-
tion (Coat*d).
7. Oporation In Ifead-uartcrs Ship: This Bcgt was not ombr.rked on a
hoad uarters ship for t hi s operation, however
t
use was made of available* ships
communication to enter various retfuirod radio net s upon arrival in transport
area. The ship*s visu-1 system, and two SCR608
f
s wcro made available "by tho
ship' s communication officer and the Bogt furnished an additional TBXand two
$CR3QO
f
s* I*
10
commanding officer, executive officer and conuminication officer
were given accoss to al l the ship' s Ejossage f i l es and included on the routing
of al l pertinent messages. Pile oopioB wore furnished if desired. After do-^
barking of troops ah SCR300 was loft aboard th... ship to communicate direct to
.Bcgt unt i l unloading was completed.
6. Security and counter measures by tho enony.
(a) Oryptographic aids used were the Shackle-Humeral Cypher, tho
Joint Assault Aaphibious Code, and llavajo Talkors.
(b) Tho present cryptographic r?,ids'seem*sufficient to haadle al l
messages of the lower echelons.
(c) Tho shacklc-authcnticator was used and proved entirely offoctivo*
(d) Uo attempt, was made by tho enemy to uso our authonticator system.
(o) Communication personnel wore sufficiently trained in signal
security though other Pors having access to direct phono conmxrications or
voice r did*transmissions did not in al l cases exercise security in the proper
manner.
* . .
(f) I t i s rocommended that al l staff soctions be thoroughly trained
in signal security and that messages be roloasod by prodesignatcd officers only
whenever possible. ' ,
(g)OTiisBogt had a "Signal Socurity Plan" in accordance with 3d
Mar Div General Order ITo13^^5 and current SOD.
(h) though enemy transmissions were heard 't various times, few
attompts at actual counterEioaaiiroB occurred. Snemy did attenipt to transmit
messages in English on the Begtl SCR3OOnet on three differ^.it occasions.
(i ) Sncmy attempts to send false messages using other st at i on' s cal l s
caused no damago sinco station actually holding call imnodiatcly denied t rans-
mission* and use 01 station authonticators cleared net. These attempts to enter
not were reported to Div Sig 0 and Intelligence Section,
*
(j)ItisrecommendedthattheMarinoCorpsSnemyCounterMeasure
CoursebocontinuedandprescntodtoPcrsatleasteverysismonths. This
courseiscompleteenoughtoeifcctivolyinstructopervtorsonactiontobo
takenuponencounteringenemyinterferenceandhowtoovercomeit
9. Summary.
(a) This Segt embarked for tho operation from 10 to 15 porcent under
strength in Pors* It i s recommended that al l communication soctions be embarked
at least 10 percent ovorstrength in the future. This would provide replacements
for casualties onrouto,as well as trained replacements for key Pers injured in
combat. The failure to give ful l distribution of other Divisions Signal Orders
to t hi s Bogt caused difficulty when t hi s Bogt was landed as Corps Reserve pri or
to r-*attachmcnt to 3d Mar Div.
Ion (Cont'd)
(b) I ni t i al l y the rough surf made supply of communication gear
difficult "but upon arrival of the 3d Sig Cobecame efficient and worked ex-
ceptionally well for the duration of the operation,
The forward echelon of the Division repair section Imdod
shortly after t hi s Bcgt ?iid provided oxcollont repair f aci l i t i es to t hi s
ization subsequent to that time. It i s recommended that t hi s policy be contin-
ued in the future and if practicable a snail,ccholon of Div repair section with
sufficient gear bo landed with each 3CT to revert to parent organization upon
i t s arri val at "beach at a l at er time. Subbor bags BG-16O and 3G-l 6l were used
extensively by t hi s RCT r.nd proved invaluable for efficient hmdling of fragile
communication gear which was susceptible to moisture .datiago,
The apparent duplication of cal l signs between the radio cal l
of the'3<13Ei 28th Marines and tolcphono exchange code name of t hi s organization
caused some confusion and delay through inadvertant misaddressing of messages
by the sender.
It i s recommended that pers who carry SC3.300 radios be armed
with ITSGovt.^5 caliber pi st ol . It i s further recommended that 50$ of wire
Pers also be equipped with a US Govt.^5 caliber pi st ol to provide a maximum
of protection while engaged in climbing trees and telephone polos to overhead
wire lines* .
!Eho short distances involved in t hi s operation nado for particu-
l arl y,desireable communications to be affected in practically ni l instance s.
Badio content was n<?antainod constantly aid with but few exceptions i t was
possible to keep wire l i nes i nt act .
0, Additional Goaments.
1. Assignment of replacements during actual ongagoments in highly
desireablo, howcvcr
t
the system used in the recent operation leaves much to
be desired. It i s believed that bet t er resul t s would bo obtained if replace-
ments wore assigned to Inf Begts pri or to departure for an operation, piciked
up by such Hegts administratively, trrined by the Bcgts, and, prior to an
operation* formed into pioneer units on temporary duty, for shore party duty.
5his system would give-the man vi t al l y required training to prepare him for
strenuous operation, would eliminate the mass of administrative do flail which
i s extremely difficult under combat conditions, would f aci l i t at e and expedite
assignment of replacements in combat, md would eliminate the foreign feeling
which seriously detracts from a replacement
!
s combat efficiency.
BARTV, Conclusions and recommendations.
Stecommendations have been made as each subject was discussed, there are
none remaining fn conclusion, *
-T.29-
x
HEADQUARTERS,FIRSTBATTALION.
TWENTY.-FIRSTMARINES,3DMARINE DIVISION,
FLEETMARINEFORCE,INTHEFIELD,
6 Apri l , 1945.
ACTION REPORT 4MHASSIF
Map; Speci al Air and Gunnery -Target, i s l and of IWO JIMA,
Scal e 1:10,OOO.
PART I* SUMMARY *
A. Thi s report overs the a c t i v i t y of t hi s organi zat i on
from 29 Jan 1945 to 26 March 1945,
B,- Essenti al features of t hi s organization's part i ci -
pation in the Iwo Jlma operation are as follows:
1* Embarked aboard USS PRES, ADAMS (APA 19) on
IB F*b 1945.
2. Sai l ed from GUAMfor J-WO JIMA on 16 Feb 1945.
3. Boated qn 0 Feb 1945, but did not land* Re~
embarked aboard ADAMSon 20 Feb 1945,
4. Boated and landed (administratively) on Beach
YELLOW1 at 1230 on 21 Feb 1945 (E/2)*
5. Engaged in f i r s t action on 22 Feb&945.
Effected a passage of l i nes of 2'^d Bn 24th Jlar at 1205
and continued Atk through remaining daylight hotfrs of
22 Feb. Continued Atk at 0730, 23 Feb and fought
/ throughout the daylight hours. Passed throu^di by
3d Bn 21st Mar at 0915, 24 Feb. This Bn committed*to
Regtl Res on 24 Feb at 0915 and remained in the status
/ o f Regtl and Div Res unt i l 28 Feb* Anti-sniper patroi -
l i ng and mopplng-oip Opng conducted during t ni s period.
'Engaged in second action on 28 Feb. Effected a passage
of l i nes through 2nd Bn 9th Mar at 0815, afl& continued
the Atk throughout the daylight hours of 2& Feb and
1 March* A and B Cos withdrawn from l i nes and com~
mtttea to Regtl Res at 1700, 1 March* CCo remained
in posi ti on on l i nes during; night* Continued Atk
on 2 March, and fought throughout the daylight hours.
At 1745, A and B Cos committed to Hdgtl Res. C.Co
remained in posi ti on on front l i nes untij. 0530, 3 March,
when al so withdrawn to become part of Ref?tl Res. Bn
re-committed to Atk at 13OO 3 March and fou#it through-
out the regaining daylight hours of 3 March and through-*
out 4 March, ' Bn withdrawn from l i nes rat 0500, 5 March.
Replacement Pere received and reorganisation conducted
during remainder of day. Effected passage of l i nes
of 3d Bn 21s.t Mar at 0900, 6 fcarch and Attacked through.*
out daylight hours. Continued Atk throughout 7, 8
and 9 March. Patrol s reached water's edge on NE
Ccast at 1400 on 9 March. Acti vi ty throughout 10, .
11, 12, JL3, 14, and 15 March consisted of patrol
act i vi t y and j&opplng^up Opns along NE Coastal Area,
v Effected passage of l i nes of 3d Bn7th Mar at 0715
on 16 March, and attacked toward North Coast (KITANO
ST). Water's edge reached by 1130 by patrol s and in
strength by 1400, Hopping^up Opns conducted through-
out 17 March* Bn idthdrawn to rear area at 0800,
18 March, and coRuucted pat rol l i ng and pol i ci ng Opns
in ass.i^ne<3, patrol area throughout 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, and 25.March. Reembarked aboard ship on 26
March and sai l ed from IWOJIMA for GtfAM on 28 March
1045 at 1230. Arrived GUAM1 A$>rll, commenced un~.
loading and dla&abarking at 0800, 2 April. Completed
unloading troops and cargo at JLSOj
>.* ^age 1 of 27
SuigW<ntliil"#fTl.- ActionReport.
Pi*RT I I . PRELIMINARIES. \ . . . '
A. At time of engaging in f i r s t aotion
f
t hi sBn
consisted of a BnHqCoembracing an81mm Mort Plat,'Am
v and Pion Pl at , ComPl at , Med Sec, HqSec* andBnHq, and
f three Ri f l e Cos.each consi sti ng of a CoHqSec,3 Ri f l e
Pl at e, a MCTPl at, anda 60ma Mort Sec
Q
This Bnwas
organised andequipped i n accordance with MC.TOF6.
* . ' . '
B. Act i vi t i es of t hi s Bnaf t er mission Was assigned
(29 Jan1945) andthebeginningof thef i r s t acti on(22
Feb 1945) consi sted of a fi nal ; check of a l l equipment*
completion of plans forOpn, movement toTarget Area,and
subsequent landing at 1W0JI&A* Al lmajor trai ni nghad
been completed prior to 29 Jan.
C. ( l ) Copies of Unit Journal, Unit Reportsare
appended hereto.
(2) Refer to Overlay onMap attached for sequence
of posi t i ons occupied by t hi s Bnat cl ose of daywhen
committed to acti on with enemy. Dates arel i s t e d opposite
posi t i ons occupied.
PART III, CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THEACTION.
A* Herea&toy"#eai9AtfB &narrative ft hi s Bnl|S~ -
ac t i vi t i e s during theactlonYashore at IWO-JIMA./ Refer y
to MaporOverlay attached forsequence of posi t i ons
occupied bythxs Bnduring Opn*
21 FEB 1945 , ' /
At0930,alltroopsinfirsttripofboatshad
'I beenboated* ThisBnstartedlandingonBeac^YELLOW1
f at1230. By1600,allwaveswereashoreandBhwasin
AssemblyAreaat148-E (SeeMaporOverlay). Atapprox*
imately1600,warningorderwasreceivedtotheeffect
thatthisBnwoiildgxeouteapassageoflinesof2ndBn
24thMarthemorningof22Feb. Reconnaissancewasex-
ecutedbyBnC.O. inpreparationforthispassageof
lines. Anoralorderwasi^su'edbytheBnC O .toCo
ComdrsandStf uponhisreturntothe AssemblyArea,
andreconnaissancewasconductedbyCoComdrsinsofar
aspossible,priortodarkness. Surfconditionswere
favorabletothelanding,butrainfellduringtheafter-
noonandnltfhtt Thetemperaturewasconsiderablylower
duringthenlght|thanthetroops.wereaccustomedto.
22 FEB 1946
Bn moved from Assembly Area commencing at 0530.
Guides sent from 2ndBn24th Mar. At0830, GPl ocatedat
165-G in revetment #2 (from South). Troops moving into
posi t i on. A Coon..right, B Coonl e f t , CCoin Res.
Passed throughQnAi'^ g^th.^lar at 1205^ Atk-inove{L- ^,
extremely, slowly, due to;numerous pi l l boxes andemplace- ' /
ments encountered, Atls; halted andfront l i nes consolidated
for ni^ht at 1800. Front l i nes at 182^V,W Southwest to
Northeast cortferB. Noenemy acti vi ty' duri ng hoursof
darkness. , I
j I 23FED19 4^ ...
f Bn received ordersto Atkat 0430, orderstobe
v'
v
Page2of27Pages.
Subj ect : *ni Wi r, I I J p Action Report* ('Cont
f
d)
executed at 0730* Jumped off in Atk at 0730, but were
unable to advance due to extremely heavy resi st ance from
ri ght flank. At 1330, main resistance had been reduced
and Bn was able to advance slowly. At 1730, Atk was
halted and consolidation of positions was i ni t i at ed* ^
At 1830, consolidation was completed and Bn had t i ed in
on both flanks. Front l i nes at 182-K (center) > ft (south
center), R and S (sout h). No enemy act i vi t y during^the
hours of darkness.
24FE31945
3dBn21stMarexecutedapassageofourlines,
at0915. Ordersreceivedtoremaininpositionprepared
tosupport3d3n. MortPlatindirectsupportof3dBn,
EngineerPlatdetachedandreattachedto3dDn, Passage
oflinescompleted,at0915* Am,w^uer,andrations
carriedforwardbyACo*I3ncompletedresupplyby1330.
At1515,ordersreceivedtoalerttwoCos,onetostand
byatpresentlocation (3),onetjproceedtoRegtlOP
(C)immediately* Compliedwithat1546* ACoIssued
warningorderat1545tobepreparedtomanRegtlRes
Line. At1600,secondCo(B)orderedtoproceedto
182-L. At1730,bothBandCCosinAssemblyAreaat
18~Lpreparedtoresist oounter-attack. At1830,CCo
mannedsecondary (RRL)defensesatsouthendofAirfield
#2. Cosremainedinthesepositionsthroughoutthenight.
Noenemyactivityduringthehoursofdarkness* BandC
Cosattachedto3dBn.
25FEB1945 '
At 0600, Band CCos s t i l l attached to 3d Bn*
At 1145, orders received to i nst i t ut e anti^sniper patrols*
3 and CCos reverted to 1st Bn at t hi s time* A Co fur-
nished above pat r ol s. Pat rol s i ni t i at ed at 1210. Pat rol s,
secured at 1415 on receipt of orders to stand-by on 30
Mlns notice* At 1630, orders receive^ to*man Div Res Line*
Complied with by 1730* 3 Co on r i ght , ACo on l ef t , C
Co in Res. No enemy'act i vi t y throughout the hours of
darkness.
26FEB1945
At0730.allCosreturnedtoAssemblyArea*
CarryingPtyscarriedforwardtwouoaXe
n
Z*rations,tobe
putinpack. Coffeeservedat0800-In.AssemblyArea.No
otheractivityuntil),coffeecarried forwardat1500*Bn
alertedat0900to30Minsnotice, Ordersreceivedat
1000tohaveBnpreparedtomoveat1200. Bninstate
ofreadinesstomoveat1200* Notificationreceivedat
1400thatn.o-movement Indicatedafrthattime. Nofurther
ordersreceivedby1630. At1700,ordersreceivedto
establishDlv.ResLineonsamegroundasonthe25th*
At1815,BCo*-inpositiononDRL* AandCCosinAssembly
Area,dueto.3dBnoccupyingpositionofDRLassignedto
us. Noenemyactivitythroughoutthehoursofdarkness*
f
27FED1945
At0730,3CoorderedtoreturntoAssemblyArea*
At0830,BninAssemblyAreapreparedtosupporttheAtk
of9thMar,ifordered. At1045^the'"
Iage5of27Pages*
1
Su
Action Report
attached to 2nd Bn 9th ^ar. At 1900, Bn~6 and Bn~5
cal l ed to Duplex CP and issued warning order in pre-
paration for a passage of l i nes of 2nd Bn 9th Mar at
K-Hbur on 28 Feb. At 2130, Bn~6 and Bn-*5 returned to
Red GP and Bn-6 Issued orders to assemble Co Comdrs
and hnOSm No'further act i vi t y during hours of darkness.
28 FEB19'4&
Bn'started"movingintopositiontoeffect
passageoflinesof2nd 3n9thMarat0600. At O8O0
f
Bn
wasinposition. At0814,3nmovedforwardandeffected
apassageoflinesof2ndi3n9thMaratC815. After
movingforwardforonlyashortdiscanoe(approximately
100to150Yds)bothassaultCoswerestoppedandpinned
downbyextremelyaeavyfiresfromalltypesofJapanese
InfWpns. Thesefiresweredeliveredfromcaves,pill**/
boxes,trenchesanddugouts. Nofurtheradvancewas,
madepriorto1800,althoughconstantaggressiveaction
wastakentoeffectapenetrationofthesepositions.
At1800,theleftflankCowastiddinsolidlywith
theunittoitsleft,butagapexistedbetweenthisBn
andtheunittoourright(3dBn21stMar).BnRes
consistsofoneRiflePlat. By1845^thegapexisting
betweenthisBnandtheunittoourrightt3dDn21etMar)
hadbeenclosed,andthelinesweretiedinsolidly
#
Therewassporadicenemyfirereceivedduringthehours
\
ofdarkness,and
v
severalsmallskirmishes
\
1 MARCttl94&
At0830,the3dBn9thMarattackedfromthe
Vlghtacrossourfront. ThisBn,fistBn(ELstMar)con**,
ductedmopplng^upOpnpthroughouttheday,clearing
5
thosepockets,cfresistancewhichhadbeenby~passed
by3d3n9thMar. At1600,thisBnwasrelievedbythe
3dBn26thMaronthelines,andorderswevereceived
tobepreparedtomanR$gtlResLine0?thenight.
At1730,CGowasrelievedandorderedtotherear.
At"1800,confirmationoforderstomanRHLhadbeen
received,butBnhadnotyetmovefdintoposition.At
1900,Aand13Coswere'inpositiononRRL,withno
contacttoeitherflank. CCohadbeendetachedto
2ndDn21stMarandwascanningrightflankpositions
onfrontlines. Therewasnoenemyactivityduringthe
hoursofdarkness,butsporadicfieiyand'Mortfirewas
received.
2 MARCH1945 '
At 03001 orders were received for the continu-
ation of the Atk to 0-3,. with one Co in assaul t, others
echeloned to the right rear. At 0800, 3n jumpeel off
in Atk,but after advance of approximately 150 Yds was
held up by very heavy M, ATYln, and Mort f i re at
southern edge of Motoyama Field #3. All attempts to
cross t hi s f i el d were stopped;by t hi s same f i re. At
1530, the 2nd Bn21st Mar attacked from our l e f t 'front,
and across our front, and succeeded in pushing well
forward. This Bn conducted mopplng-up Opns behind
2nd Bn. At 1745, orders received to leave 0 Co in
posi ti on on southern edge of f i el d and place A arid 3
COB on RRL to the rear. Thes$ orders being complied
with at 1800> At 2030, A an&B Cos wer<
age 4 of 27 Iages.
ActionReport. (Cont'd).
onRRL(217~X,Y). Therewas
#
noenemyactivityduring
thehoursofdarkness,butsporadicMortandArtyfire
wasreceived, # ' . ' .
3MARCH1946
At2400,orders"receivedtowithdrawCCofrom
frontlinestoRRLpriortodaylights Orderscomplied
withby0530. At0330,EngineerPlati^elea^edtoCo
B3dEngineerBn. At0030,ordersreceivedtoholdBn
inAssemblyAreaat217~X,xasDivRes. BninAssembly
Areaandstandlng-byforfurtherordersat0800.At
1300(approximately)|orderswerereceivedtoAtk
towardHill862(219-U)andsecurethe'northern slope.
BnJumpedoffat1530inAtk. By1730,leftCohad
advancedapproximately350YdsandrightCoapproxi-
mately250Yds. At180O>Bnwasstartingtoconsolidate
positionsfornight. By2000,Bnhadtiedinleftflank
with2ndBn21stMar,butclldnothavecontactwith
3dBn9thMartoright. Agapofapproximately150Yds
existedbetweenthisBnand3dBn9thMar. Thisgap
wascoveredbyfire,, . .
x
' 4MARCH1946
At 0030, a l ocal Japanese counter-attack was
st art ed, and penetrated the l i nes as far as the Bn 0P
This Atk was stopped by 0430, but a nuiber of Japanese
Continued to harass our troops fmm positions within
our lines* At 0430, orders received effecting a passage
of our l i nes by 3d Bn 21st Mar, and committing t hi s Bn
to moppingw-up Opns in rear areas. This Bn held the ?.lnee
i t had established the nigl&t previous unt i l 1140 at which
time a passage of l i nes of our ri ght Co was effected.
The ri ght Co of 3d Bn 21st Mar was net by st i f f enemy
resistance and was unable to effect a passage of l i nes.
At 1400 (approximately), B Co was attached to 2nd Bn
21st Mar. At 180O
:
CCo was s t i l l .In position on the
front l i nes and orciers had been received from Regt .to
the effect -t hat C Co would cover the gap in the front
l i nes existing between the ri ght flank of 3d Bn 21st Mar
and the l ef t flank of the 9t h Regt. Sporadic small arms
fi re was received on the front l i nes between 1800 and 0500.
5MARCH1945
' . '
At0500,remnants*ofAandCCoswithdrewfrom
thefrontlines. AllCosreturnedtotherearAssembly
Areaandstartedreorganization. Reorganizationwas
continuedthroughoutthedaywithreplacementsbringing
thestrengthoftheIIifleCostoapproximately160men
andoffioers. At1800,reorganizationhadbeen completed
andBnwasawaitingfurtherorders. Noenemyactivity
duringthehoursof.darkness,
6MARCH1945
At,0500,Bnaef^Assembly Areatomoveinto
positionto.effectapassageoflines.of3dBn21stMar.
At0800,BandCCoswereinpositionbehindtheassault
Cosofthe34Bn. BCoontheright,CCoontheleft,
AGoinRes, At0900*,BandCCosmovedoutandeffected
apassageoflinesof3dBn21*61Mar. Processwas
slowthroughoutthedaywithheavysi
0
> tage5of27Xages!
ActionReport, (Cofct'd).
receivedandalsofirefromahlgfecaliberflat trajectory
Wpn,whichwasthoughttobelooted offxmrleftflank*
At1800,BandCCoshadstartedtoconsolidatetheir
positionsfornightdefenseandattemptswerebeingmade
v
togetvisualcontactbetweenourrightflankandthe
unittoourright*.OurleftflankWastiedinsolidly
with2ndBn21stMar. TheBnmadeadvancesoffrom
approximately100Ydsonourright flanktoapproximately
250-300Ydsonourleft flankdaringtheday* Also
capturedquantitiesofexplosives,Amandrations*By'
1930,thegaponourrightflankhadbeencoveredby
fire.^Enemyactivityduringthehoursofdarkness
consistedmainlyofsporadicsmallarmsfirewithsome
Mortfirebeingreceived,
~ . * ~ *
7MARCH194$
At0520,3dBn9thMarcoiiuoencedapassageof
lines'throughpositionsoocupiedbyBCo(ourrightCo).
Activity throughoutthedaywaslimitedtomovingAand
BCos,slightlyto/theSWofpositionsoccupiedduring
thenight,' Throughouttheday,enemy,activity consisted
ofharassingsmallarms firebysnipersandsporadic
Mortfirowhichattimeswasquiteheavy. At1800,our
leftCo(CCo)wastiedinsolidlywith2ndBn2JstMar
totheleftandwithBCototheright. 3Cowastied
insolidlywithLCo,3dBn9thMartotheright. A
CowascommittedtoRegtlRes, Enemyactivitythrough**
outthenightconsistedofharassingfirebysmallarms
andMorts.
8MARCH1945
At0730,BncontinuedtheAtk,withAGoonthe
lefteffectingapassage.oflinesthroughECc21stMar,
andCCoontheright. Enemyoppositionconsistedof.
receivingfirefr6mcavesforthemostpart,butvery
heavyfirewasreceived sporadically fromenemyMorts*
BCoWasdetachedatapproximatelyt)730to3d3n9thMar
At1800,AandCCosoccupiedpositionsasshownonnap
oroverlay.ACowastiedinsolidlytoitsleftwith
2ndBn21stMarandtoitsrightwithCCo,1stBn21st
Mar. CCowastiedinsolidlytoitsrightwithBCo
(attachedto3dBn9thMar), DuringthedaytheBn
madegainsaloni;itsfrontofapproximately300-400Yds
andreducedmanycavesandotheremplacements. Enemy
activityduringthehoursofdarknesswaslimitedto'
snailanasfireinoursector* Atapproximately 2200,
theenemyfirednumerousrocketsfromanareatoour
rightfronts -
9MARCH1946
At 0700, the Atk Was resun^d in our Z of A.
By 1400, a patrol from ACo had reached the waters edge
in our Zof A. Enemy activity throughout the day con-,
tinued to consist of heavy small arms fire against our
troops from caves, with heavy Mort fire being received
sporadically. At 1700, our troops were withdrawn from
positions attained during the day to positions as shown
on map or overlay. This withdrawal, and.subsequent
consolidation of positions on high ground to the. rear
was necessitated in part by exposure of our l ef t flank
and in par'tj by over-extension of our l i nes; also^ the
Page 6 of 27 Pages.
: S
^J Action Report,
fact that the high ground to the rear was more suitable
for defense was taken into consideration. At 1800,
our l ef t flank was t i ed in sp'lidly with 2nd Bn 21st Mar,
and our r^ght flank was tied in solidly with BCo
(attached to 3d Bn 9th Mar) This*Bn-'aade an advance
of 300-500 Yds in Z of A. Destruction of numerous caves
and many enemy troopb (estimated 300) Enemy act i vi t y
during the hours ci darkness consist d mainly of small
arms f i r s directed at our posi t i ons. There was some
act i vi t y' t o the front which seemed to consist mainly
of individuals, changing positions or moving from one-
cave to another, "*
10 MARCH1945
Shortly after K-Hour (0800) pat rol s from Aand
C Cos st art ed working toward the beach* These pat rol s
met resi st ance from pillboxes! but were able to reaoh
the beach,. Said pat rol s arrived on the beach at 1200
(approximately)* At approximately 1100, one pat rol from
CCo entered a mine fi el d, thought to be located in
219-N (West), and received casual t i es from exploding
mines. I t 1Bthought t hat these mines were exploded
el ect r i cal l y by the enemy, rather than by pressure
type fuses. The 3n conducted moping~up Opns through-,
ouj;. the'day and successfully closed many caves. At
1800, Aand CCos were located as shown on overlay,
and organized for all-around defense. A Co was t i e d.
In solidly with 2nd Bn 21st Mar, our right flank rested
on the beach. The Bn closed numerous caves, reduced
several pi l l boxes, and occupied ground to waters edge
during-the day' s act i vi t i es . Enemy resistance through**
out the hours of darn&ess consisted of small -arms fi re
being directed against our posi t i ons, and some act i vi t y
of personnel to our front, although no attempts at i n-
f i l t r at i on or penetration of our posi t i ons was made.
' 11 MARCH1945
Atapproximately0930,ouradvancewascon~
tinued* Verylittleenemyoppositionwasencountered,
exceptthatmanycaveswereencounteredandit/Was
foundnecessarytodestroythesecavesaswemoved
forward. At1800,ourpositions
:
wereas.shownon
overlaytoaccompany thisreport, Ourleftflankwas
tiedinsolidlyw;tthICo27thMar. TheBnmade
advancesofapproximately100Ydsontherightand300
Ydsontheleftandalsoreducednumerouscavesthrough-
outtheday* Limitedsmallarmsfirewasreceivedduring
thehoursofdarkness.
12MARCH1945
Atapproximately0430,agroupofabout30
oftheenemyattemptedapenetrationofAColelines*
Twenty(20)ofthesewerekilledandtheremainderare
believedto;havedisappearedIntocavestoourrear.
At0700,patrolsfromAand'CCb^weresentforward.
Thesepatrols,throughouttheday,metonlyslight
resistance'fromsniperis.,-andsucceededinsweepingall
remaininggroundwithinthisBn's2ofA,clearo"fthe
enemy, At.approximatelylt)OC,B>Obwascommittedtothe
assaultinthecenter;ofourlinea,andimmediately sent
patrolsforwardtoworkinconjunctionwiththoseof
AandCCos. Ingeneral,activity
tage/7of27Pages
ActionReport, *(Cont
f
d).
waslimitedtopatrollingandmop;in$-uprearareas. At
1800,ourposition'sWereasshownonnaporoverlay.
ACo,onourleft,wastiedinsolidlywiththe27thRegt,
topurleft. Enemy.activityduringthehours-ofdark-
nessconsistedofharassingsnailarmsfirebeingde-
liveredagainstourpositions,andanattemptbyasmall
'group'oftheenemy-topenetrateourpositions. This
attemptwasrepulsedwithnine(9)oftheeneuykilled.
AtHOC,orderswerereceivedtoprotecttheright
flarJtofthe5thPivinitscontinuationoftheAtkat
0730thefollowingnorning,andtomop^up"bsachareas
fromourpresentfrontlinesto51*0CInclusive;our
movementndrthwarddependingonthenorthwardmovement
oftherightflankofthe5thMarDlv.
. '.13MARCH1946 -
The expected movement of the Sth.Div f ai l i ng
to materi al i se, our posi t i ons Remained as previously
reported; the dajrlii^t nours bein^ spent "in mopping~up
al l remaining resi stance and enemy posi ti ons within
our Z of A. At 180Cv our l e f t flank was t i ed in
soli(31y with I.Co 27th Mar to o\ir l e f t , our ri ght flank
resti ng as shown on map or overlay. Approximately
f i f t y :\ 50) enemy *kllle&; approximately twelve (12;
pi l l boxes and caves destroyed; completion of destruction
of two 200 centimeter coaet defense gun emplacements*
which contained an unknown number of enemy, but thought
to be approximately 150, was the extent of t hi s Bn's
act i vi t y throughout the day. Bne^y act i vi t y during
the hours of darkness consisted of harassing small arms
f i re being delivered against our posi tions*
14 HAKCH 1945
At approximately 0430, ihree of the enemy were
ki l l ed attempting a penetration of our l i nes . Throughout
the day, t hi s Bn protected the ri ght flank of the 5th
Div in i t s continuation of the Atk, and oontinued mopping**
up in the beach areas. At 1800, B Co on our l e f t flank
was tifed in sol i dl y wltfc I Oo 27th Mar to our l e f t , our
ri ght flank rested as shown oh mgip or overlay. In ad~^
dl tl on, one Pl at combat? outpost was establishecl at
236^K (center-north) and one Sqd combat outpost .
established, at 236K (center^south), The eneay was acti ve
i n and about ourllnes during the hours of darknesst
These enemy apparently came from d^ves in and to the rear
of our l i ne s . No eoordin^t-ed Atk was made and enemy
t act i cs consi sted of appearing suddenly froo a cave,
throwing grenades into our posi t i ons, and attempting
to regain thei r caves. There wad a total of approxi-
mately thi rty (30) of the enemy ki l l ed during the night,
the majority by A Co and the remainder*by B Co.
15 MARCH1945
During the daylight hours* t hi s 3n continued to*
maintain contact on our right flank ( I Co 27th Regt)
as the 5th Div advanced northward. Approximately '
ton ( i o) of the enemy were ki l l ed during the day**
l i ght hours by A and D Cos. At 1800, warning orders
had been received that t hi s Bn would pass through
part, or a l l of the 27th Regt at some ttoe during the
s
Action Heport. .(Cont'd)-,
morning of Kerch 16, Fi nal di sposi t i on of Cos for
the- ni
(
;ht had.been made. Act i vi t y during the day con- .
s i s t ed' of fort y (40; of the enemy ueing ki l l ed; twenty-
si x (26) caves - dos el ; one (1) pi l l box destroyed; one
50 Calc (estimated) r.' ir-cooled liOr captured by A Co,
The enemy was act i ve in and about our l i nes duri ng the
hours of darkness,* iliese enemy apparent l y came,from
caves i n and to tfcr, x-jav of our l i n e s . No coordinated
Atk was made and ev.hi:\yt act i cs consi st ed of appearing
suddenly from a c&vs, throwing grenades i nt o our pos i t i ons ,
and attempting to regai n t hei r caves. There was a t ot a l
of twelve (12) of the enemy ki l l e d during the ni ght .
*16 MARCH1945 ' ' , .
At 0715, A and 3 Cos commenced effect i ng a r e -
l i e f of the 3d 3n 27th Mar on the l i n e s . -A Co was on
the l e f t , 3 Co on the r i ght . At 0830 (approxi mat el y),
Cos moved out in the Atk. 3y 1400. both Cos were on
the obj ect i ve (waters: edge Ncoast ) , having met but
s l i ght opposition in 1he form of Inf vvpns f i r e from
enemy in caves. From 1400 unt i l 1730, Both A and 3
Cos engaged in mopp
]
"g~up t a c t i c s , and at I?o0, com-
menced movement Into posi t i on for the ni ght . At 1800,
Cos were n-t yet in pos i t i on for the ni ght . The 3n
made ar advance of ap-c.roximatily 600 Yds to the "North
in Z ov 1} and destroyed, 24 caves, 2 pi l l boxes, and
36 of the enemy (i n addi t i on to tho^e ki l l ed duri ng the
night) during the day. ' 3y 1900, A and C Cos were in
an Assembly Area in 251-W ( sout h) . C Co was detached
to 2nd 3n 21st Mar. Enemy act i vi t y during the hours
of darkness was extremely l i mi t ed, and only typ (2)
of the enemy w^re ki l l e d throughout the ni ght . .
17 MARCH1945
At 0800 (approxi mat el y), t he 3n resumed mopping-
up Opns. These operat i ons were continued throughout
the day unt i l 1730. At 1545, C Co was rel eased by 2nd
3n 21st Mar and r et ur ned to 1st 3ri 21st Har. At 1730,
a l l Cos secured from mopping-up Opns and ret urned to
251-W (south) where a peri met er defense was est abl i shed
for the forthcoming ni ght . One ambush was est abl i shed
by each Co. This gnSki l l ed eighty (80) of the enemy
(i ncl udi ng two ki l l e d during t he ni ght ) and cl osed
twenty-five (25) caves during the day. 3y 1900, A,
3 and C Cos were cl osi ng the peri met er for the ni ght
i n area 251^W ( sout h) , 235-C (nort heast ) and 235-C
( nor t h- cent er ) . Enemy act i vi t y duri ng tbfe hours of
darkness Was l i mi t ed to harassi ng our posi t i ons and
t en (XO) of the enemy were killec~.
18 KARCH 1945
At 0800, a l l Cos,and",at t ached uni t s were
di r ect ed to pol i ce t hei r areas and r et ur n to Assembly
Area in 217-Vf (sout heast )>and 217-X (southwest) i n order
C, 3 and A Cos. Units' closed in Assembly Area at
approximately 0930. A Co was di r ect ed to pat r ol 3n
sect or . Three pat r ol s despatched consi st i ng of. 18
infantrymen, 7 engi neers^ 1 War Dog and handl er. 3
Co was di r ect ed to carry *mt salvage Opns in areas
2OO-3S, 201-A, 3, TXnortii hal f ) , 0 (nort h hal f ) ,
218-U, Y
9
Pat r ol s and salvage detail&to*MPe4 at
9 of 27'.
Report. (Oont'd)
approximately 1000^ Cfo remained in bivouac. All
patrols returned by approximate!/ 1^45. Patrols in
areas #1 and #3 encountered no enemy troops. Patrol
in area #2 encountered seemingly organized enemy
forces, possibly a Sv.i or more, in area bounded by
20I-B/C, T>tQ, ByI, Active sniping in areas 201~B,
218-Va Our patrolM 'suffered no casualties. One
enemy wounded^ bir; t;soaped; other casualties in-
flicted not observe!o Eight enemy dead (previously
killed) buried; 11 caves closed In patrol areas #
2 and #3#
:
No eneny activity during the hours of
darkness.
19ftARCH1945
BCodirectedtopatrolBnSector;CCodirected
tocarryout,salvageOpnsthroughout#1patrolarea;
ACoremainedInbivouac* ^%*eepatrolsfromBCo
departedassignedareaby0800. Eachpatrol consisted
of13infantrymen {approximately)
9
7engineers,and
1WarDogandhnrvilcr Onepatrolassignedtoeach
patrolareaintheBnpatrolsector. Thepatrols
returnedtobivouac .radmadereportsby1146* Thesame
patrolsdeparted from thebivouacareaat1300and
carriedoutmission*;inpatrolareaspreviously mentioned.
Patrolsreturnedtobivouacandmadereportsby1555.
CCocontinuedsalvageOpnsthroughouttheday,trans**
portingsalvagematerialstotheRT"Handmakingstacks
tobetransportedduringlatersalvageOpns* Noenemy
foroessightedatanytimeduringthedayj23oaves
clo.sedli^thdemolitions*7minesand5boobytrapsdis-
armed;quantitiesofenemyAmlocatedandalso caves
tobeclosedwerelocated. Ourpatrolssufferedno
casualties. Noenemyactivityduringthehoursof
darkness,
20MARCH1945
CCowasdirectedtopatrolBnsector;Aand
BCosdirectedtocarryoutsalvageOpnsthroughout
theBnsector. ThreepatrolsfromCCodepartedassigned
areaby0745* Eachpatrolconsistedof12(approximately)
infantrymen,7engineers,and1WarDogand.handler.
Thepatrolsreturnedtoassignedareaandmadereports
by1030. Thesamepatrolslefttheassignedareaat1300
andcarriedoutmissionsinpatrolarea. Thepatrols
returnedandmadereports-by1530. AandBCosoon~
tinuedsalvageOpnsthroughouttheday,transporting
salvagematerialstotheRTBandstackingothermaterials
tobetransported. Noenemyforcesworesightedat
anytimeduringtheday.
W
Atotalof13oaveswere
closedthroughouttheBnsector. Ourpatrols suffered
nocasualties. Noenemyactivityduring,thehoursof
darkness.
2 1 MARCH 194%
ACowas directed to patrol Bn sector; Band
CCos directed to carry out salvage Opns in Bn sector.
Three patrols' from ACo departed 3n bivouac by0745,"
each patrol consisting of 12 (approximately) infantry-
men, 7 engineers, and 1 War Dogand handler. The patrols
returned to assigned area and made reports by 1045
;
same patrols resumed patrol missions in
. Page'10 of 2? Pages.
ActionReport, (Cont'd),
*
1300, Patrolsreturnedandmadereportsby1560,3
andCCoscontinuedsalvageOpnsthroughout'theday*
Oneenemy,apparentlyNavy,killedInTAC9~N(north-
east)atapproximately1445. Onepillboxandonecave
destroyedduringtheday,alsofivewaterholesdes-
troyed. Ourpatrolssufferednocasualties. Hoenemy
activityduringthehoursofdarkness.
22 MARCH 1945
BCowasdirected to pat rol tL$I3n sector; A
and CCoswere directed to carry out salvage Opns
throughout tho Dnsect or. Three pat rol s f i : uD Co,
departed Dnbivouae by 0800. Each pntr-ol consisted
of 12 (approximately) infantrymen, and 5 engineers*
The pat rol s returned to t hei r assigned areas andmade
reports by 1100. Aand CCos continued salvage Opns
throughout the day, transporting sn?"aged material
* to the RT2. No enemy sighted, throughout theday;
four caves destroyed; mine field located in 200~L.
Our patrol3 suffered no casual t i es, -to enemy act i vi t y
during the hours of darkness,
23 MARCH1946
CCowasdirectedtopatroltheBnsector;
AandBCosweredirectedtocarryoutsalvageOpns
throughoutthe3nsector. ThreepatrolsfromCCo
departed3nbivouacby0800. Eachpatrolconsisted
of20(approximately)Infantrymenandfiveengineers*
Thepatrolsreturnedtotheirassignedareaandmade
reportsbyitCC. Thesamepatrolsleftaeoignedarea
at13C0andcarriedoutmissionsinpatroiarea.The
patrolsreturnedandmadereportsby1500, A*and13
'CoscontinuedsalvageOpnsthroughouttheday.One
cavewasclosedduringtheday. Ourpatrolssuffered
nocasualties. Noenemyactivityduringthehours
ofdarkness.
24MARCH1945
One11)ofth*eneaywaskilledat0545'ifc*
TA21?~S(CP).Band 0Co6conductedsalvageOpns
throughouttheday;ACoremainedinbivouac.No
enemyactivitythroughoutthehoursofdarkness,
25 MARCH 194S;
. Aand ft Cos conducted salvage Opns throughout
. the day; CCo remained lr>bivouac. No enemy a c t i vi t y
' throughout the hours of darkness,
PART IV, tJOMHENTS. .
< , '
A. Administration. ;
1 ) 1
* " \ i .
\* The system of casualty reporting was satis**
factory. It i s recommended that copies of the burial
bulletin and other casualty bulletins be distributed
as far down as indivudtial battalions. Much information
and many cases that remain unknown on personnel evao*
uated through other aid stations oould be obta'lned from
these bulletins. I t is believed thaJt_jjiajiY of the cases
::
Page 11 of 27Page
Subject:
w w
* i *WmU Action Report,
that clrag on tov months after a campaign could be cleared
up in a short period were these bulletins made available
to the battalions* . .\.
2* In general, the morale of the troops was good*, ,
The following was done to maintain morale throughout the
campaign,
. ' t . .' .
a. Hot chow was served when the situation per- *
mitted.
b. The new type
rt
C
M
ration was issued quite
regularly* These proved to be very popular.
c* Alimited amount of transportation wasmade
available for the purpose of taking troppfl to the mowies
itowards the end of the campaign. ,
d* Troops were taken to a construeted shower
and given the opportunity to take a good bath*
e* The Blv band performed at the Bn area one
afternoon.
3* In so far as was poBSlbJ.e, the Div SOP was
followed. POWtags and envelopes proved beneficial.
Herein, very close cooperation was aihorded by Regt*
Questioning of POW/s In Bn was eh.rt, oon~
cise, and pertained only to such enemy information as
would immediately effect the,Bn situation* POW
l
s were,
used as guides and friendly agents to.talk' fellow
Japanese into surrendering, but l i t t l e success was met*
Pertinent information was forwarded immediately
from higher echelon. Systen'qulte successful in 1-21
v
1% Xottlllgence.
1. The over-all coverage by maps and aerial
photoa of IWOJIMAprior to the Opn was excellent* *
Restrictions were,appreciable in the doubt of ade*
fi ni te beach designation, and the varied zories in which
this unit was to operate*
. ' ' * ' - . "
2. Mapand aerial photo coverage during the Opn
was inadequate* Due to heavy shelling, the terrain
visibly changed from day to day. Friendly situation*
front line8, enemy emplacements, and etc*, were reported
to higher echelon* Few attempts were made to pass con-
solidated information baoh down the line in the form of
maps* overlays, or recent aerial photos* Efforts to
gather any an&al l information were admirable, but here
the process seamed to cease, for i t seldom returned*
3* Hydrographic information furnished was adequate*
4. Intelligence information disseminated by_
might have been effective and sufficient, but i t seldom
arrived in time to be of any use. Herein, i t i s di f f i -
cult to place any blame> but i t waff invariably held up
along the line* " .
5* Five men were authorifco&vby a Dlv GOfor '
each Bni nt Sec as a collecting agency*" Detailed ln~
structions and rules concerning thi s s^S&ibns* concfcict
and training were put out. No enforcement or cooperation
% , . ' . . , ' . ' . '
\r'
r
{. .. Page 12 of 27 Pages.
Action Report, (Cont
!
d).
was noted from higher echelon* No collecting sections
were forced^; Recovery of captured documents and materiel
had to-be l ef t to front l i ne fighting troops, who were
usually preoccupied^
%
6, b* Offioer Language personnel temporarily
attached was quite' adequate.
d* Enlisted Language personnel temporarily
attached was also adequate.
7* The t errai n and type of Opn r est r i ct ed vocal
propaganda* Also considering these factors, pri nt ed pro-"
paganda was about as successful as possible*
8. JICPOA teams were more of a hindrmce than
an aid* The attached personnel of t hi s uni t was adequate
to handle al l occurrences*
9* In many cases, communication between the OP
and CP was out for hours* Information on the front l i nes,
etc*, was sadly lacking in the Bn, Regtl, and Div X2P
4
s.
Rather than wait for the l i nes to be repaired* why not
come forward or send someone forward to make personal
contact? Suggest keeping GP closer to OP*
10. Camouflage was ni l , but n-% impossible.
Blaokout was enforced. Password and counter**sign Was
effective. At times the Bn OP was cluttered up with
unnecessary personnel* With suoh scant cover as was
noted on IWO, three or four radio antennas, and personnel
streaming In and out are a dead give-away*
11. a* Use o? Marine Corps clothing by Japanese
for ambushes in two known cases In the 1st Bn eeotor.
b. Use of one Japanese apparently attempting
to surrender to draw a group of Marines into fi el ds of
fi re for automatic weapons* .
12* Destruction of manuals, mapa, and weapons
were,noted in many easels. Their schooling in such
matters seemed thorough and detailed. They were quite
successful.
G* Operations and
1. Three del i berat e exercises were held by t hi s
organization in preparation for possible employment ashore
at IWOJIMA. Although these exercises can not be classed
as Amphibious rehearsal exercises, i t i s f el t t hat they
proved to be of definite value in t hi s Bat t al i on^ oper**
ations after arri val ashore at IWOJIMA.
. (a) The fir
?
et exercise consisted of two
placements, mutually supporting, the redaction of which
was assigned as a plataon problem,* This exercise was
f3.red with l i ve ainraunitlon .and part i ci pat ed in by al l
r i f l e platoons in t hi s Bn, each r i f l e platoon having
one section of MGs attached* The exercise was deelgned>
to I l l ust r at e the coordination of employment of r i f l e '
squads against mutually supporting emplacements,, and
the actual use of f i r e, movement, flame thrower, de-
molitions, and final assaul t necessary to the reduction
of a heavily defended concrete empln>J6iin^r cave.
Page 13 *f 27 Pag
v
ActionReport*
:
(ConVa)*
(b)Thesecond,exercisewasatank**infantry
exerciseandwasparticipatedinbytheBnasaunit,
:
andbyeachRifleCoseparately, thisexercisewas
designedtoillustrate theemploymentofa-ssaultingtroops
withtanks,andtoexercisetank-infantryeotamunications*
Itwasheldoverterraincloselysimulating that6fIWO
(c)The\thirdexercisewasacombined Infantry-
Artillery-AirAttachexercise* andwasfiredwithlive
ammunition. Thisexerciseswasdesignedtoillustrate
theemploymentofinfantryin.assault,with,the-supporting
armsandWpnsthataBnComdrhasathisdisposal. The
exerciseconsistedoftheassaultandcaptureofsuccessive
objectiveswithintheBnZofAwithordersfortheco^*
ordinated continuationoftheAtkbeingissuedafterthe
captureofeachBnobjective, "
(d)Detailsofthe BorearOperatinwerenot
released,to troopsuntilafterdeparture<&6tntheharbor
at<3Uj&i. Alltroopswerebriefedafterdeparturefirst
bytheBnStaffingeneral,andthenbyUnit Comdrsin'
detail. Beliefandterrainmapswereused,andeach
0quadLeaderwasissuedasmall*scalemapoftheentire
islandofIWOJIMA.
2*. ThefollowingWpnswere,inorderoflisting,
foundmosteffectiveagainstfortified installations.
. (a)ShapeCharges{both10#and4O#depending
onsizeofposition). >
. (b)CompositionC.2(in18#Knapsackas
tt
SatchelCharge
11
). ,
(c> 2.36
11
Anti^-TkRockets(usedatcloserange
whereaccuratefirecouldbedirectedagainst embrasures)*-
(d)^8
M
Naval(kxntXvpandlarger;caliberand
MediumArtillerywaseffectivewhendirecthitswith
time-delay fuseweremad?onlightlyfortifiedpositions*
Inmanyinstances,nearmisseswerenotedbypersonnel
ofthisBnashavinglittleornaeffectagainst occupants
ofposition. .
(e)Airbombardment waseffectivDagainst
fortifiedpoeitonsonlywhendirecthitswe'remadewith
500#bombs^ ItIsfelt thatagainstpositionssuchas
encounteredonIVOJIUA,1000#orlargerbombswith
tlme^delay fusewouldhavebeenmuchmoreeffectivethan
the300#instantaneous fusebombs
$ TheportableflamethrowersusedbythisBn
werefoundtobeTo.ghly effioient andextremely effective
againstcaves,bunker8* andpillboxesencounteredduring
thisoperatipn* Normal employment consistedofmoving
theflamethroweroperatorintopositionfromaflank,
coveringhim themeanwhilewithrifleandBARfire*
Uponarrivalwithinrangeoftarget, theoperatorwould
shoothisflameacrossthecaveoremplacement entrance
orembrasure,andadvancingquicklyunder.cover ofhis
ownfire,,placehimself inposition todirecthis
1
fire
directly in^o.thecaveopeningorembrasure. When^o
directed,flamethrowerfirewasconsistently effective
insilencing,thecaveoremplacement to'theextent
necessary toallowtheplacingofademolitionscharge.
age14of27
Subject; ActionReport. (dont'd).
,4. Tanksweresuccessfullyusedby'thisBnin
therollofdirectclosesupportartilleryforthe
assaultandreductionofcavesandotheremplacements.
Normalusageconsistedofthetank(s)*beingdirected
bySCR-3OORadiotofireintoopeningsorembrasures,
whileundercoverofinfantryfire. Uponcompletionof
itsfiringmission,thetankCs)wouldwithdraw,and
infantrywouldmoveintocompl^Hthereductionofthe
emplacement. Itwasfoundiiapj&e^icabletohaveinfantry
closelyfollowtank's,duttotM^
r
terrainbeingshighly
condusivetoenemyobservationofourmovements,and
becausetheresultantfirethatwasdirectedagainst
ourtankscausednumerouscasualtiesamongfoottroops.
5, Coordinationbetweeniux'a#try'andtankswas
normallyeffectedbytheinfantryComdr'pointingoutto
thetankComdrthetargetorobjectiveontheground,and
thenfurtherdirectingthemovementofthetank(s)by
SCR-3OORadio*
6* Enemyanti-tankmeasuresconsistedmainlyof
theextensiveuseofAT1-iinesalongallarteriesoftraffic
andaroundmajoremplacementsorstrongpoints,theex*
tensiveuseofhighvelocity47and57mmWpnssitedto
coverallroads,trails,andopenareas,andalimited
useofaWpnsimilartoourATRocketdischarger.The
enemywasfoundtobefullyandheavilyequippedwith
magneticandyardstickmines,whichheattemptedtouse
insoeinstancesbydirectly-.attackingourtankswith
theintensionofplacingthesechargesbyhand'*His
mosteffectiveATWpnappearedtobehis47and57mm
highvelocityguns. TheseWpnswereextremelyaccurate
atrangesupto2000yards.
7. Wardogswe'reusedtacticallyinconjunction
withdayandnightpatrols,andonth?linesatnight.
Dogswerefoundtobeoflittle*alueduetotheirin~
abilitytodistinguishbetween^friendlyandunemytroops.
Dogswereofnovalueinsearchingcaves,astheirtraining
hadnotincludedenteringcaves.\It.'is.feltthatthe
tacticalvalueandusageofwardogsin'futureoperations
similartotheIWOJILAcampaignwillbeextremelylimited
if".cgscannotbetrainedtodifferentiate"betweenfriendly
andenemytroops.
8* The2.36
1
ATRocketwasvu^edprimarilyby
thisorganizationasananti-pillboxWpn. Satisfactory
resultswereobtainedwhenhitscouldbemadeinem-
brasures. Thisorganizationhadnocontactwithenemy
tankswhichrequiredtheuseofthisWpn. Barrage
rocket6werenotusedbythisorganization.
D. {Supply. - ' i
1. Adequacy of al l types
1
of mounting out supplies.
a. Adequate amounts of al l Class I items were
carried for the operation as planned. However, i t i s
recommended t hat -the"aildwance of l ar d or l ard substitute
be increased regardless of operation changes. During the
combat stage th $eed for tpore l ard i s necessary due to
the preparation of foods which necessari:
in preparation. Doughnuts, f r ui t pi es
ActionReport; (Cont
r
a),
wereservedfrontlineunitswhenevertactical situations
warranted* \
b.AdequateamountsofalltypesofClassII
itemswerecarriedexceptforclothing. Infutureoperations
itisdesiredthatoneVl)outfitofclothingforeach
individual embarkedbecarriedeitherbyBOMorBnQJi*
Thiswouldfacilitateissuetocombat troopsand,inpart,
doawaywithbaggagepacksnowcarried,byindividuals.
IthasJpeennotedinthisandpastoperations thatalarge
percentageof-baggagepackshavebeenlostintransitthus
makingissuebythe'Oilimperative. Itisfeltthatsome
satisfactoryplancoul4bemadewherebyindividualscould
exchangesoiledclothingforneworlaundered clothing
andthusbringaboutasmallerlossofclothingaswell
askeepthetroopsincleanclothing,
c.AdequateamountsofalltypesofClassIII
itemswerecarriedexceptforkerosene. Ifavailable,
keroseneshouldbemadeavailableforallcookingpurposes,
sincethetypeofburnersnowissueddonotfunctionwell
usingdieselorothermixedfuels* Also,lifeofcombustion
headsisincreasedabout100$andJthjui'irehflzarddepressecL.
:p ^ j p .n ^ l ^ ccyiLTT^i-i.iTvr"
d,Adequateamountsof
A
all typesofClassIV
itemswerecarried*.
e,Adequate amountsofalltypesofClassV
itemswere carriedexceptforthebelowlisted'Items:
1,60mmiiortar,III,M83,
(a)Itisrecommc-3dthat increased
amountsofthistypebemadeavailableforpombatoperations*
Frontline troopsfeelthatconstant illumination decreases
thepossibilityofenemynightattacks. Duetothelimited
supplyofthistypeduringtheoperationconstant illumi-
nationwasnotpossible.
2.81mmMortar,HE,M43A1..
(a)Itisrecommended that theunitof
fireofthistypebetripled. During theoperation the*
shortagewasacute* Attimes,there^wasnonein.gun
positionsorindumps. IfnoincreaseintheU/Fcanbe
made,itisrecommended thatall81mmammunitionbe
equippedwithanadjustablefusehavingbo*uhsuper-quick
anddelayedaction. '.,
2. AdequacyofResupply.
a.Resupply6X/ailv^Jkssesofsupplieswas
adequateexceptfortheitetoBpTevlouBiy discussed.
3. Fal l et f e^cf eg^a^l Vitson'druasQO
1
^
. a. Kuch difficulty was noted in *he use of pallets
for cargo fr^DK the loading stage throughout the unloading
stage* During the^eh^p loa&lrig^t was found Shat, eVehV;
though space was available, pallets couldn't be moved in
the holds without much difficulty and undue loss of time.
In unloading on the beach, ^ great percentage of pallets
were stuck in the sand and had to be broken and transported
by other means. Taking"this into consideration, i t is
felt tha^ much time and labor could be savedJs
supplies instead of palletizing.
e.16^ofg7.Pages*
ActionReport*
b.UseofWilsondrumsprovedtobeexcellent.
Suppliescarriedinthesewerefoundtobeinexcellent
condition,,Itisrecommendedthatallsuppliesofsuch
anatureaswouldberuinedbywaterormoisturebepacked
inWilsondrums,
4. Theefficiencyofallshorebasedsupply
facilitieswasgood* Hadtheoperationprogressedas
planned,itisfeltthatsupplywouldhavebeenexcellent
aswellasadequate.
5, Transportation
a.Wheeledandtrailertransportationembarked
wasadequateinallrespects,
b.TheCargoCarrierH29Cprovedtobeout-
standinginsandyandotherroughterrain. Thiswasthe
"onlyvehiclethatcouldbeusedtorsupplyofthisunit
untilfrontlineshadmovedwell'beyondthebeacharea.
Toomuchcannotbesaidastotheefficiencyofthistype
vehicleinsandyandotherdifficultterrain. However,
itisrecommendedthatthisvehiclebeusedonlywhenjeep
transportationcannotbeutilized.
c*The'onlyspecialpurposevehiclesembarked
bythisunitweretwo(2)trucks,1T,4x4andtwo(2)
trailers,1T,cargo,tobeusedasflamethrowerservicing
units. Thepurposewasdefeated,however,du^tobreak-
downsonthebeachwhichcould^tberepairedimmediately*
Hadthesedifficultiesnotcomeabout,itisfeltthat
excellentuseofsuchvehiclescouldhavebeenmade.
F. Alr .
,1. Preliminaryairstrikesagainstemplacements
onIWOJIMAinflictednegligibledamage.
2. AirLiasonforthisBnwasperformedbyJASCo
personnelandconductedinanexaei.1'. -.
;
rmanner*'
3. CommunicationsbetweenAGLtear.ASC,and
supportaircraftwatJatalltimesexcellent-
4/ Althoughnoairstrikeswerecalledbythis
Bn,resuitesofairstrikeswere-manytimesobserved.It
-isfeltthatthe onlv^"effectivefusingforuseagainst
fortificationssuchasencounteredonIWOJIMA,-istime-
delayfusing* It'isalsorecommendedthat100Q#orlarger
bombsbeusedinlieuof,500-!*bombs,:~ordestructivebom-
bardcient,
!
Ck NavalGunfire.
1. Shorefirecbntrolpersonnelattachedtothis
Bn<wereJASCopersonnelan4wereadequateinnumberand'
hadreachedahighdegreeoftraining. /
2. Nofailuresof.SFCPequipmentotherthanradi6
(TBX)werenoted. ,-
3 (a)Preparationfiresagainstbeachtargets
werehighlyeffectivewhendirecth&is.emadeonem-
placements. "
PageIr7.of 2
1
?Pag
ActionReport. (Cont'd)*
(b)Firesconductedagainsttargetsofoppor-
tunity consistedmainly ofplacingdirectfirefromclose
rangeincaveentrances,andwashighlyeffectiveinall
cases*
(c)Nightharassingfires,whenused,proved
effectiveinkeepingtheenemyundercover,andinall
probabilitypreventedmanynightattacksarainstour
positions*
(d)NGFwasrequestedby thisBnonapproxi- *
mately,twelve(12)occasions.
Xm TransportQuartermaster.
1, TheAPAforthisBLTwasloadedatthedockin
approximately 24|hours. Cargowashauledfrom a-cargo
assembly areathreemilesfrom.tir?dock,employing from
tentofifteentrucksthroughoutloading..Tuerewere"a
fewdelaysresultingfrom*abreakdownofthecraneat
assemblyareaandbecauseall.loadingintotheshipwas
doneononesideonly. Overall,exceptforthesein-
stances,theloadingwentsmoothly. Theshipcouldhandle
palletsonly in#5holdandafterthisholdwas filled,
itwasnecessarytobreak-downapproximately Zb%of
pallatizedammunitionand16adin#3hold. No.3hold
wasmadeupofsevenlockerswhichw#reidealforthe
stowingofammunition* however,palletized suppliescould
notbehandledbecauseoftheseparationinto compartments*
Theloadingofvehicleswasaccomplished inapproximately -
fourhourswithnodelays. Personnelwereembarked in
onehourandtwentyminuteswithnoconfusibnorholdups.
Unitsweremetatthegangplankbyunitguides.ofthe
advancebilletingdetailandwereconductedtotheirre-
spective compartments*
2. Theshipwascompletelyunloaded inapproxl-v
matelyninedays. Thiswasduetothetactical employment
oftheBLTandtotheunfavorablebeachconditions* Un-
loadingwasdoneon"call
w
forbothvehiclesandsupplies.
FewvehiclesandsupplieswentashoreaboardLCMsand
LCVPsbecauseofbroaching, therefore,itwasmecessary
touseLSTs,LSMsandLCTstoland thebulkofthecargo
andthiswasdoneastheselattercraftbecameavailable.
Continualroughseamade theunloadingofpersonneland
vehiclesdifficult, causingdamagetoafewvehicles.
3. Althoughheavyseawasthesourc oftrouble
inthetransportarea, thegreatestdifficultieswereen-
counteredonthebeach. Smallcraftbroacheddueto
heavy surfandtheconditionofthebeach. Palletized
suppliesbogged^pwninthesandandcouldnotbepulled
bytractors. Timewascpnsumedinbreakingdownpallets*
Theshipcouldunloadfromonlytheleewardsidethroughout*
4, Itisfelt thattheuseofpalletsdoesnot
saveanytimeintheover-allunloading and therefore
servestonoadvantage. Itwasfoundthatintheholds
palletstakeupextraspaceandcannotbeloadedmore
thantwohighwithoutdamagingsupplies0/1thelowerpallet*
Vehicleswere.loaded in#1and#hatches,heavy vehicles
beingin#2underthe Jumboboom* Vehicleslingswj
atthesetwohatches. Rations, ammunition,
gearwasunloadedfrom#3byuseofcargo
lUfl^veaslunloadedfrom#4-byemployment of
-withexceptionofpalletized suppliesinthisThoTd,whicfa.
directlyinthesquareofthehatchandplacedondrums*
Page18of27Pages. '
ActionReport. ACant'd).
Allpalletizedcargowasunloadedbyuseofvehicleslings*
Itisfeltthatslingsandcargohandlinggearaboardthis
shipwasadequate.
i
Duetothecircumstanceswhichgoverned
theunloading,itis-impossibletomakeanysuggestions
toreducethetimerequiredtounloadships*
J prdnance. '
'1*'Weapons.
e.Type,caliberandnumberofT~aponsembarked.
1.Carbine,cal.30, te-l ~453
2.Rifle,cal.30,Ml -451
3.Rifls,Auto,Browning,oal.30,
M1918A1&A2 ' ' ~81
4.Gun,machine,Broi-ing,cal.30,
..'111919A4&A5 , -18
5.Gun,machine,Browning,cal*30,
M1917A1 -18
'.. 6.Launcher,rocket,AT,2.36" - 9
7.Mortar,60mm . - 1 3
8...Mortar,81mm - 4.
9,Launcher,grenade,rifle,M7 -103
10.Launcher,grenade,carbine,MS -90
b.Weaponsofthisunitwereemployedinbattle
foraperiodoftwenty-four(24)days*
c.Type,caliberandnumberofweaponslost.<
1.Carbine,cal*30,Ml -350**
2.Rifle,cal.30,Ml , ' -150
3. Ri f l e, Auto, Browning, cal*30,
M1918A1 &A? ; - 38 *
4.Gun,machine,Browning,cal.30,
143919A4&A5 - 5
5.Gun,machine,Browni-.^,cal.30>
M1917A1 - 6
6.Launcher,rocket,AT,2.?^' - 0
7.Mortar,60mm - 3
8.Mortar,81mm 0
9.Launcher,grenade,rifle,M7i
;
*-103*'
10*Launcher,grenade,"carbine,M8 - 90"
**FiguresareorO "
r
approximatedueto
lackingconsolidaoed salvagereportsfrom
d.Manyreportswerereceivedconcerningmal-
functionoftheRifle,130cal,Ml.Atleastfifty(50J
percentofthistypeweaponfailedtofunctionproperly.
Meninterviewedstatedthattherewasinsufficientgasto
forcetheop.eratingrodtotherearandcompressthere-
turnsp'ringthusmakinghandoperationoftheoperating
rodnecessary. Most-weapons'were,foundtobecleanand
freeofexcessivecarboninthegascylinder* Mostmen
thoughtthatugeofAP-amiaunitiononlywasthereasonfor
thismalfunction,sinceweaponsoperatedwellwhenball
ammunitionwassubstituted. Perhapsthisisduetothe
extrapowderchargeinAPammunitionthuscausing>acol-
lectionofexcesscarboninthegasoylindermakingthe
weaponsluggishandfailingtofeedandmennotrecognizing
thisfact. Regardless,itwouldbe,^excellent idea
toruntestsandascertainthereal
-e19of27Page!!
Action Report/
malfunction. I t might also be suggested that more stress
be made of the oafie, cleaning and functioning of the in-
dividual weapon '
e* There was an adequate.supply of spare partB
and accessories available tat this operatlbn. Thou-gfa there
were few in the hands of troops operating crew served
weapons, no difficulty washad in the operation of such
weapons. Too, the Issue oi' complete sets of spare parts
and accessories i s unnecessary sinceraost are always lost
due to a feeling by troops that t:.3y are excess baggage*
However, the most essential ones should be issued. Re-
placement and repair of weapons by Piv Ordnance wasex*,
cellent* <
2. Combat Vehicles.
a* 'Type and number embarked.
! Truck, i*-T, cargo, 4x4 - 4
&i Truck, i ~T,TCS, 4x4 - 1
5i Ambulance, | ~T, 4x4 - 1
4i Cargo d a r r i e r , M290 \ - 2
5. Truck, l~Ticargo*4x,4 - 2
6. Trailer, i-T, cargo - 5
7. Trailer, 1~T, cargo - 4
b. Vehi cl es of t hi s uni t were employed i n
bat t l e for a peri od ^of twenty-four (2?)'days.
Cr Mai funeti ons occurred i n both 1~T, and 4x4
t rucks. Onetruck wasoverturned i n l andi ng craf t during
shi p unl oadi ng, causing damage to radi at or, bat t ery and
other minor parts. The other had a bad clutch andwas
of no use for pulling in the sancl, Later, this vehicle
was cannibalized for spare parts, slice i t wasup for i
survey before embarkation.
3. Ammunition.
a
f
Type* caliber and number of rounds expended.
1. Cartridge, caUSO, Carbine,111 44,730
2.
Cartridge, cal . 30, AP&bltfd ( al l
r a t i o s ; - . . , ' . 153,500
Cartridge, cal . 30i APbulk * 139,440
4. Cartridge, cal . 30, <A,8 rd c l i ps 172,080
5 60mm Mortar, jHE,K49A2, s / fM52 3,024
6. 60mm Mortar, 111,M83, s/f,M65 1,350
7, 81mm Mortar, HE,M43A1, w^f M62 2,212
8.. 81mm Mortar, HE,M56,w/f55 1,515
9. 81mm Mortal*, Smoke, Fhos, WO, M57 291
10.
Grenade, hand, f rag, MkllAl, w/f
M10A3 .* . 8,525
11. Grenade, hand, smoke, VP
#
M15 S95
12*
Grenade^ hand, smoke, col ored,
75
13. Grenade, handj ilium,MkX 30
14.
Grenade, ri f l ej AT,M9ia 1,070
15. Grenade, ri f l e, frag, ioipFct 0
16. Adapters, grenade, prop,Ml 96
17. Fyrotechriics, si g, grnd, asst
!
d*
30
18.
Pyrotechnics, f l are, tri p s>ara-
chute, M49 - . -<*-
, Page 20of 27 Pages.
ActionRepor*. tCbnt*d)r
19/botechnic, flare,trip,M49 125
20.Rocket,AT,M6A1, .36" 630
21Rocket,Smoke,2.36",W, T26 - 4
22* Torpedd,bangalore,Ml 70
23*Explosive,TNT
24.Explosive,CompC2 249cs
25.Primaoord, detonating 29rolls
26.Charge,shaped,*1O#,Ml,K2 8
27;,Charge,shaped,40#,T$ 28
28.Fuse,safety,time ISrolls
29.Cap8,nonelectric
902
30.Block,demolition, chain,Ml,
M3 M 4 - ' ; 314cS
b.Normally, thisunitestablished forward
dumpsasfarforwardasenemyfirewouldpermit safetyof
dumpsandvehicles* Fromthesefrwarddumpssupplywas
handledbycarryingpartieswhodistributedriamunitlonto-
frontlinecompan^s* Theonlyproblems'that confronted
thisunitwerelackofpersonnelforcarryingpartiesat
timesandtheintensityofenemyfiresothat carrying
partieshadtowaituntildusktosupplycompanies.
c.Theonlymethodsof storageweret
' 1.Establishingofdump indefiladedareas,
wellprotectedareasorrevetment:*
2.Segregationofsmallarms,highexplosives
anddemolitionsanddispersionofeachtypedump,sothat
leastdamagewouldoccurfromenemyfire.
d*Therewasanadequateamountofalltypes
except60mmMortar,Illuminatingarid81mmMortar,HE, -
M43A1. Thepackagingwas.foundtobegoodinalltypes*
However,therewereinstanceswheremetalcontainershad
been-stackedincorrectly (upsidedown),thuslettingwater
seepinandcauserustanddeteriorationofpowder charges
orincrements. ,
e.ItIs'recommended thatU/Ffor81mmMortar,
HE,M43A1betripledsincethistypeismostcommonlyused'
againstpersonnel. Themostcritical shortageofammunition
wasthistype, itisfurtherrecommended thatall81mm
ammunition beequippedwithacombinationfusehavingboth
super-qiilckanddelayedaction. Muchbetteruseofthe
Shell,U&6 couldhavebeenmade!".-thisoperationhadit
beenequipped'withsuchafuse*,Inpart,thiswouldhave-
alleviated thecritical shortageofM43A1foruseagainst
personnel. .
4.'MiscellaneousOrdnanceEquipment.*
a.Flamethrower.
1.tFlame throwersofthisunitwere employed
inbattleforaperiodoftwenty-four-(24)days.
2.Excellentuse-ofthef^amethrowerwas
madeinthisoperationandfunctioningWasverygood,
K. Chemical.
1
#
a.Personnelweretrainedindetectionand
characteristicsofvariouschemicalagents,px-inciples
otcollectiveandindividualprotect;
Page2>of27
Action Report*
(Cont
!
d).
-meansofdecomtajBinationY Eachcompanydetailedone,(l)
manaschemicalH00andhehadaseven(?)mandecon-
tamination quadunderhiscontrol/ .
b. A gas xaas^! prot ect i ve ointjnent, protective
cover and eye shad^were issued to each individual soon
after embarking. All chemical warfare supplies were
stowed in #3 hold With high pr i or i t y and were available
at any time for emergency use*
c. The collection of gas masks was authorised
when t hi s BLT reached the f i r st assembly area upon landing.
These masks were put into Codumpr
a
l at er to be consoli-
dated into a Bn dump* , < . ' '
- . .
d.Chemicalwarfare,suppliesandequipment
werekeptintheJITBastheunitmoved inlandandwere
availableoncall. ,
2*TheIntelligenceSectionreportsthatinat
leasttheinitialstagesofthecampaign,allenemy'dead
hadgasmasksandsnailamountsofdecoatanimatingppw&er,
indicatingthat"gasdisciplineoftheenemywasgood.
* ' , . - , '
3.TherewasnosalvageofgasmasksbythisBn
duetothefactthatthemasksweredumpedinthe4th
KarBivsectorandwere salvagedbythatorganization*
Duringthepolicingperiod,,allsalvagedgearwaspicked
upbyhigher echelon.
& Medical*,
1Embarkationwason15Feb45aboardfA19.
Personnelconsistedoftwo(2)MedicalOfficers,forty-
one(41)enlisted,personnelandthirteen(.13) enlisted
personnelattachedascollecting sectionfromCoA
3dMedicalBn.Materialconsistedofunits1t<j10
inclusive,exceptingunits2and,4,plus10daybackup.
i
2.Aboard:shiptherewerp18reported cases of
diarrheaofshortduration. Asearchfortheoriginwas*
unsuccessful*. Sanitary conditionsweresatisfactory.
exceptfoi*theexcessiveheatintr^oopcompartment.4B '
3* Personnel and material landed administratively
and without l oss by LCVP at 1400 on
4
#
ASsauXt p.hase.
a* Hedical i nst al l at i on' s were set up as follows;
' . > . . .
#1 TAi65-& revetment Feb 22
#2 ?A 165rG- tipper Fkb 22-27 i ncl usi ve
#3 TA165-B upper l ef t Feb 22-24
#4 TA199-X Feb ^- l l ar ch 2
#5 TA199-J March 1, March 2
#6*TA 200-D March 2, March 4 .
#7 TA218-V upper l ef t Karch Sear ch 4 . *
#8 1*A217-S.March oWMarch9
#9 TA218-H March 7^4larcJa 17
#10 TA251-W March 16-March 17
#11 TA2i7-S March l8-4iarch .27
** Page22of27Pages.
Subjeotr*"V(#f| I FIf Action Report/ <Cont
!
d),
Allinstallationsweresetupwithaccess-
abifkftyandeaseofevacuationastheprimary consideration.
GooddefiladewaspresentInalmost'allcases. Personal
andunitysecuritymeasuresweremaintainedatalltimes.
Sandbagstructuresandcaveswereutilizedwhenever,
possible* Inreferencetothelegationofaidstations,
thecoordinatesgivenaboverefertotheSpecialAir
andGurinery.Targetkapissuedpriortotheassault,All
datesareinclusive.'
b.Hospitallzationwasdoneinrearareasby
otherunits.
c.Aidstationswerelocatedaslosetothe
combatunitsasconditionswarrantedandambulanc#
wereworkeduptotheaidstationswithfewexception^ '
Evacuation fromthefrontlinestotheaidstationw#
performedbylitterteamsofMarinepersonnel* ^These\i
teamsweremade'availablebytheJointeffortsofthe
RegtlSurgeonandBnExecutiveOfficeranddid awonder-.
fulJob. Themostrapidevacuationwasachievedby
havinglitter teamsstancUbyinthe-CompanyCommandPost*
d.Casualtiestreated-3dMarDivPersonnel.
(1)dumber-404
(a)Retained -35
(b)Evacuated-36&
(Q)Pied m4.
(2)Type.
(a)Head -53
(b)Chest -12
(c)Abdomen -11
(d)UpperExtremities-*"139 '
(e)LowerExtremities-C$
(f} -ConcussionBlast,-
Atmospheric -9.
(3)WalkingWounded-177.
(4)StretcherCases~x84.
,Casualties treatedotherthan3dMa#
Personnel
(1) Number ~<183.
(a) Retained - 18
N
(b) Evacuated - 163
(c) Died \ 2*
(2) Type.
fa) Head , - 19
(b) Che^t - 14
(c) Abdomen 0
(d) Upper Ext remi t i es - 46
ie) Lower Ext remi t i es -' 6^
(f) Concus?i.on ' Bl ast ,
Atmospheric - 24.
(3) Walking Wounde<a 61.
(4)StretcherCases-122.
i
l^ageS3of27iages.
Repoi"';' . t Cont ' d),
e. Sanitation followed SO",- Water wasbrought
. upfrom
:
d-j;st'HJa
;
tiGrh-;- -glants onthebeach pr ?rom ships
in trbUera or ^^e^i t i ^nar y cftns.
v
Ppod w&spackaged*
Botil*water ;ax*3. fcod were adequate.
, . / . '
f. Qur&ea<i we*\i/collected bysani t at i on ,
personnel andbur:' ad.in the*Piv.C.emetk:.?* Enemy dead
were buried on' the spot as soon ; conditions warranted*
g. Noepidemics orunusual diseases were
encountered^ '''. -
h. Dental cases were referred totheRegtl
dental dfficer whpreferred,some cases to ships dental
officers whenhisfacilities wereno,tadequate forthe
care needed. . , [ '
, - ' - ' *
i . Nocivilians wore treated.
j. Ourfunded prisoner'was treated andtamed
over toBn-2for questioning.
k* Medical organization i s suitable.
* \ ' \ . - - ; ' (
1
#
Asani ni t i a l assignment theforty-one(41)
enlisted personnel'wer. e adequate, Theamenwereem-
ployed ascompany aidmeir; onet each platopn, and to
est abl i sh and.conduct theaidst at i ons, Ti.ilve (12) re-*
placements Were received from theHegel Surgeon andwere *
used intheaidstation and ascenpa^y aidmen* There
were 40casualt.las^ Themajority were among thecompany
aid mei'. Some oXthewourided company aidmenandmost
of tificfcG returned from thecompani^ becauee of combat
fatigue oranxiety neurosis were k.^t^on duty in the
aid station* HenRuf^ering from combat fatigue or
anxiety states^ whoreturned todaty"a; company aid men-
aft er r est andsedation, hadan
;
".nost immediate return '
of symptonis usually inanaggravated' form. Attimes,
only one or t wo menwere available foreach company as -
company aidmen* Even when thecol l ect i ng sectionwas
used to supply aidmeni t wasdif^ici^lt tp supply a
company aidmantoeach platoon. Theheavy casualties
suffered byMarine personnel wer^replaced and companies
. were brought upto strength* This aggravated theshortage
of corpsmen,, whose casualtlee hadnotbeen replaced,,
The replacement of corpsmen was.not adequate. Training
was adequate andthere wasnoneed formenwith speci al i st
training. . ' < ' -
m&n. .Equipment/ supply andresupply were generally
adequate rvseerecommendations, . .
; 0. OneJep ambulance with t r a i l e r constituted
th^ motoriadd equipment* Additional, anfoulanc&a, when .
needed, were 6tit^ined promptly from tl;.eRegtl Surgeon,
j>.
%
Nocbmment* '- -
'.' q..Adequate;DDTsprayfacilitiesweremade
availablebyKalarlaandEpidemicControlunit#
..5,Nocomment*. .
;
- ? * * - . ' . . - _ .
*''.-'-..6,Recommendations.
Page24of27II
7
ActionReport,. (Cont'd)*
a.Desifi,produceandissuea'blackouttent
whichwillpermit"easyaccessofapatientonalitter,
b*Makeabetterselection.-jofcorpsmenwho'
areassignedtoinfantryunitsoftheBIF. Thesemen,
especiallythoseassigneddutyas.companyaid-men,are
subjectedtogreatphysicalhardshipanddangers. They
shouldberuggedandabletomeetthestrainofthemany
emergencieswithwhichtheyarefaced. Meninthevery
young,ortheolderagebracket,shouldnotbeassigned
thistypeduty*
c.Weaselswerecapableogoingovermuddy
areasandupgradescoveredwithloosedirtwherejeep
ambulanceswereunabletotravel. Theyshould.beavails
ableforevacuationwheresuchterrainisencountered.
d.Hakemosreadequateprovisionforthere-
placementofcasualtinsamongthecorpsmen,
H* Signal*
"1*'Duetotjiefactthatthereisonly200kc
differencebetweenchannelsoftheSGR-300radio:there
isslightinferenceand"cutoff"whentherearetwo
netsoperatinginasmallareaonadjacentchannels.
TherewasnoinferenceontheSCR-610,SCR-536,TBX
andTCS. ".
2.There-wereadequatenetsandfrequencies
assignedfor!radiocommunication. .
4
5*Therewasnocommunicationbetweenshipsand'
thiscommunicationplatoon. * .
4.Theassaultforceandg?r^isonwbrkedtogether
inkeepingallequipmentoperationand.supplied. There
wereexchangesofwireand'oatteriesmadeveryfrequently./
PARTV. CONCLUSIONSANDRECOWiENDATICIS.
u
/
:
I.,
:
Thefollowingrecommendationsaremadeforconsideration.
1.Againstemplacementssuc.has:encounteredonIWO
JIMAonlytimedelayfusesshouldbeusedbyArtillery.
Itisrecommended'thatinfuture.similaroperationsthat*
themajorityofArtilleryainmu^tionlanded,besofused*
2. Comments and recb'nto^no^ations on Air Support rendered
f r ont l i ne, uni t s.o,n I:OiJlHA operation,
(l ) Comments:
Thesupportrenderedtotroopsduringthe
IWOJIKAoperationwasonthewhole,good. Strikescon-
ductedagainstenemypersonnelandemplacementsatpve,
thesurfaceofthegroundwasexcellent..' Howeverj/strikes
againstenemyemplacement'siin'oatfee'*^andBunkerswasnot
verygoodforthefollowingreaso.s: .. ,.
a
f
TBFswereusedasattackingaircraftagainst
pointtargets. \-..~" -"*;
*- V*Instantaneou-sftBQ&
:
%odb^^^^,Qm^oge6. when
delay',elementswei*enecessary. - *-
Page25of2?Pages.
ActionReport, (*Cont
!
d).
c#Munitionsusedwereoftoosmallacaliber*
ItmustbeborneinmindthataTBF,although
anexcellentplaneforattackingenemypositionsona
broadfront,,isnotsuitedforpoint-targets. Agilot
inaTBFdroppingabombmustcarefullyjudgehis""drop"
becauseatthatmomenthe"cannotseehistarget. For
thatreason,most"drops"madebyTBFsonpointtargets
wereeitherlongorshort.
Themunitionsusedwereinmostcasesim<~
properlyfusedandtoolightinweight. Itwasproven
in.theIWOJIMAoperationthatlargebombs(1OOO#,2000#",
or500#)withdelayelementsvaryingfrom1/10 to10
secondsweretheidealmunitions.
(2)Recofflnendations:
Itisrecommended thatinfutureoperations
SB2Caircraftbeincludedin-eachflightofsupportair-
crafttobeemployedagainstpointtargets. Itisalso
recommended thattheseplanesbearmedwithlargecaliber
bombswithdelayfuses. Itmustbeconsideredthatin
futureoperationstheenemywillnavesimllrremplace-
ments,cavesanddugouts.
AnotherinstancewhereSB2CsWouldprove
tobc'the
v
idealplaneiswhenasalienthasbeeneffected
intotheenemydefenses. Thisparticularsituationexisted
onIWOJIMAandthe.flankunitsoncithersideofthe
salientwererefusedairsupportforfearofdropping
bombsontroopsformingthesalient. Itisbelievedthat
theSB
n
Ccouldhaveeffectively supportedthoseflank
unitsbyreasonofitsaccuracyinbombingandthe
patternofthebombsdropped*
Itisfurtherrecommended,ifpossible,
theSB2CreplacetheTBFasaclosesupportplane,that
theSB2CbeusedforclosesupportsandtheTBFforgeneral
supportmissionsdeeper iftenemydefenses. Byreasonof
thebombloadtheTBFcarriesitwoulddoanexcellent
Jobagainstenemytargetsrangingfrom1000Ydsonup
fromthefrontlines,
3.Replacementpersonnelfihouldbeallowedtotrain,
ifpossible^'foraperiodofatleasttwo (2)'months
priortoanoperationwiththeorganizationtowhichthey
willbeassigned. Itisrecommended*thatsuchpersonnelbe
assignedInfantryBnsintimetoconductsuchtraining,
butuseduntilrequiredg&replacementsfordutysuchas
assignedforthisoperation.
4Itisrecommendedthat'the.UnitofFireforall
typesofboth60and81mmMortarammunitionoetripled.
. 5.It'isrecommendedthatthe81mmMortarPlatbe
issuedone(1)Carrier,cargo,amphibious-(Weasel)with
1tonTrailerasorganicequipment.
6.Itisrecommendedthatforfuturesimilaroperations
againstJapaneseforces,specificships(DDs)beassigned
a
snjghtilluminationships,,andc&rryilluminatingam-
munitiongniy^exceptingthatwhichisnecessary toits
I I A I I ' I im^
Page26of27Pages*
Action Report. (Cont'd).
own defense. Continuous night illumination was highly
desired and could be classed as rmndatox'y during the
IWOJBiA operation,
7, It is recommended that training be conducted at
al l recruit depots in flame thrower and rocket launcher
operating to the extent that all enlisted personnel have
at least a working knowledge i5T~these weapons in addition
to basic individual weapons,
ANNEX; "
A> Over l ay t o accompany Act i on Re por t .
ENCLOSURES:
A. Cons ol i da t i on of Uni t Re por t s from 21Feb45-25March45*
B Cons ol i da t i on of Uni t J o u r n a l s from 21Feb45--25March45.
IU '\ WILLIAMS',
LtCoX, Comdg.
Page 2?of 27 Pages,
Headquarters,2dBattalion,21st Marines,
3dfcarineDivision,FleetMarineForce,
InTheField,
I I f f 12 Apr i l , 1945.
If
CO, 21st Marines.
Subject; Action Report, Iwo Jima Operation.
Reference: 3d MarDiv Conf GO 137.
1. In accordance with r ef er ence, the report of t hi s
Bat t al i on' s action-on IWO JII1Ai s submitted herewi t h:
FARTI, SUMKAHY.
A. Thisreportcoverstheperiodfrom30'January, 1945
(dateofreceiptofHegtlOpnPlan2-45)to24liarch,1945(date
this3nt/asrelievedofresponsibilityofitsassigned,sector'oy
2d3n147thInf).
B
#
This3nwrsorderedtoIan:"on21Feb.45andx:c-
proceedtoassignedassemblyareaatTA146DOG-.3nlandedat-
1430,on35ACKY2LL01. Beforedawnoxthe22dthe3nmovedto
anas-semblyareatothe2?earofthe.3dBn,23dkarlines,pre-*-
paredtoeffectapassageoflinesatSIlTG-.Hour, The Atk,launched
oft*time', progressedslowlyagainstheavyenemyoppositionand by
duskourlineswerejustshortoftheofthesouthernedgeof
iaA1RPIZLDNo,,Z.
TheBncontinuedtheAtkontheleftoftheHegtl
ZofAon23Feb. TheAtit wasdelayedduetotardinessof Tks
attachedandtointensityofenemyArtyandMort.fire. 3yend ,
ofday'alleffortstoholdalineupontheField-.hadfailed \
andthelineswereweithdrawnfiftyyardstomoretenable
positionsontheembankmentatthesouthernedgeoftheField*
'' TheAtkonthemorningofthe.24th"wasdelayed
again,duetotardinessoftheTksreportingtotheBn."The Tks
wereunableto&etupontotheFieldinthemornrng,and the
assaultCoreceivedheavycasualties-wheneveritattemptedto
moveupontotheField. AsecondAtk,launchedupeitherside
of.the'"NE.stripat1330,carriedtheri^ht-ascaultCoacross
theeast-weststrip,buttheleftassaultCobecamedisorganized
afteranadvanceofbut200yardsupthewestedgeoftheField,
TheCowaswithdrawnunder-coveroftheResCo,whichinturnnao.
towithdrewatduskbecauseitcouldnotmoveout .acrossthe
theFieldtocontacttherightCo, Linesforthenightsnowea
n o g a i n o nl e f t , - ,.. . -'.;; .,/ ;',V
;
-'
:
...;- -
:
-'
r
'
'... The-2dBn,9thMarexecuteaapassageo? our
linesthemorningofthe25th,andlstHarrevertedtoDiv'
r:
,- -
Bes, Duringperiodfrom25Febthrough27Fe'btheBnremained
anelementofDivHes,provided.anti-sniperpatrolsin Div
ZofAandeffected-reorganization-^Jidresupply,
21stMarcontinued:Atk"acrossFidNo2on28
Feo,this3ninHegtlHes. .Bn.wascor;ittedat1530,toclose
gapcreatedbyunequal..advanceofassault3ns
f
3ydarkthe3n
lineswereconsolidatedin"areaHJ336,.I^TofSulpherIline
R e f i n e r y . . >". '
TheBncontinued..theAtk onthe leftofthe"'
HegtlZofAat0830,l.Kar*'DirectionofAtk was generallyIG
acrossIIOTOIAI-IAAIHFJiiLDNo,3. The Atkslopeddo^nbynoon
duetoheavyresistance,from, .thejfront
theleft front, .',.-.J-"..:';\;,;.
PW^^' of ; ^
1
? page
i
PERATION. (COHT
f
D)
DespiteexcellentSJffgntfromTks,thelinesbynightwereonly
one-thirdofthewayacrossthefieldandsoextendedthatitwas
necessarytoemployoneCoofthe1stBn21sttogaincontactwith
1st3n9thonourright* Casualties,officerandenlisted,were
heavyduringtheperiod.
On2MarthisBnwastoSpttheRegtlAtkbyfire
fromexistingpositionsuntilpinchedoutby3dBn9thonleftand
1stBn21stonright."3ynoonBnfiresweremaskedcompletely.
LateintheafternoontheBn,frompositionsbehindthe3d3n9th,
launchedanAtktowardHILL218DOG'inanefforttotaketheground
commandingtheeasternendoftheFieldandestablishcontactbe-
tweentheassault3nsintheRegtlZofAt TheBnwasstopped.400Yds
shortofRJ330andtherightflankwas...nabletopushouttocontac
therightassault3n. 3ythe..end.oftheday,thegapexistingwas
thewidth.oftheField* TheBnComdrbecejn;acasualtyat1730,
On3Marthis3ncontinuedtheAtktoseizeHILL
218DOG-inleftofRegtlZofA. Bymid-morningthe3nhadatenuous
holdonHILL218DOG* ResCoandoneCoof3dBn9thMarwere
committed,duetoextendedlinesandheavycasualties. Bydark
contactwasestablishedwith1stBn21stMarinvicinityofRJ322.
Nocontactonleftwith5thDiv,whoseelementsweretoourleft
rear.
On4MarthisBncontinuedtheAtkIn
^gtl^Zof&'itoseizeO
a
3*.No;gainsweremeJeduringday,though
extensivemoppingupwithDmlsandflamethrowerteamsfrom1stBn
21stliarwasconductedonHILL218DOG-. 3nunderheavyenemyfire
duringtheday.
5I-larpositionsweremaintained,asordered,and
mopping-upwasconductedinvicinityoffrontlines(HILL218DOG).
The3nwasorderedtocontinuetheAtkto0-3in
theleftoftheRegtlZofAon6Mar. 3nleftfl-nkmovedoutto
forwardslopesHILL218DOG. Despitefirefromliighergroundto
leftflank,linesweremaintainedandmopping-upconducted. At
dark,flankwithdrewtoformpositionsandconsolidatelines.
On7MarthisBncontinuedtheAtkintheleftof
theRegtlZofA,toseize0-3. Theleft.asaultComovedoutto
0-3,remainedthereduringdayconductingmoppitfg-upinTA218DOG,
Positionuntenableatnight,sinceunitonleftwasunabletomove
upwithBn,and3nlineswerereceivingheavyfireofalltypes
fromhighgroundtoleftflank. Linesfornightwereconsolidated
oncrestofHILL218DOG,toregaincontactandsecure3nleft
flank.
The3ncontinuedtheAtktocoastlineon8Mar,
havingbeenorderedtoadvanceinconjunctionwith5th3nonleft.
Byendofday,Bnabletoconsolidatelinesgenerrllyalong0-5,
tyinginwith5thDiv-onleft..Oppositiontofrontwasnegligible,
theheaviestfirecomingfromthehighgroundto3nleftflank*
TheBncontinuedtheAtkon9kar,attackingin
conjunctionwith5thDivonleft. Gainsduringdaywereslight,
duetoprogressofunitonleft. Noresistanceremainingin3n
#
ZofA.
Atnoonof10Marthe3nwasorderedtoswing
north,pivotingon5thDivrightflank. Byeveningthelines.had
movednorth,abreastofHILL218DOG,rheroheavyfireagain
stoppedtheunitontheleftandthicBn
l
sleftflankcompany.
Page2of27pages
OPERATION,
,^..
r
per i od from IXMar t o 15Mar,3nwas i n
Re gt l Res , conM*<fci%fe^salvage oper at i ons andef f ect i ng rssup-olyand
r e or ga ni z a t i on, RRLwas manned from dusk t o dawn.
.. . On15Mar 3npassed t hr ough EdBn26t h Mar l i n e s
t o Atknor t h t o ICITANO P t , Byendof dayr i ght f l ank .had r eached
coas t nor t h of HILL 165and- l ef t . flank wast i e d i n stf-th 5t h Div
sout h 01
s
HILL 165. . < ... **
On 17Mar l i n e s r e u a i md uncnanged andBn conduct ed
mbpping-up ope r a t i ons i n ZofA. -From 18Mar u n t i l r e l i e ve d by2d Bn
147t h . Jnf on24Mar,Bnconduct ed mop-up andsal vage ope r a t i ons i n
M part of island.
PARTII. PRELIMINARIES,
A, Compositionofreportingcommand.
BLT2-21 U ColEnglish
\ 2dBn21stMar
2dPlat^pnCo21st*Mar
. ,4thPlat(-2 Secs)*WpnCo21st-Mar.
'. 2dPlatCoB-3d Engr 3n
. 2dPlatCoB 3dPionBn
2dplatCoB3dMedBn
.. 2dCollSec CoA3dMed3n
NC-FTeamNo8 3dJASCO
..ALnTeamNo4 3dJASCO
Det28thReplDraft
Det34thReplDraft
B. BetweenthetimetheRegtlOpnplanwasreceived
andthe- beginningof.theaction,frequentconferenceswereheld
withstaffandCoofficersandofficersofattachedunits,A
combatfiringexercisewasheld,involvingthe3ninAtk andco-
ordinatedemploymentofallIfpns,bothorganicandsupporting,in
theAtk,TwoCPXswere^onducted,oneinvolvingjusttheBnstaff
andthe* otherbothstaffandCoComdr:andofficersofattached
andsupportingunits. OneTk-InfexercisewasrmductedandaJTk
demonstrationandlecturewasgiven. IntenseTnginDmls^ anc!^flame
throwerswas conductedand schooling^jas"givenall-handsinthe
disarmingandneutralizingofJapmines. Norehearsalwasoonauotst
onship-to-shoremovement,thoughCoofficerslecturedtheirmen
onAmphOpns.
C, ThemissionassignedthisBnwastolandonorder
inRes(variousalternateformationsandbeacheswerespecified)
and.movet-o.anassignedassembleyarea,
.D.Atthetimethe3nwas committedits composition
was1Platof37mmgunsRegflpn Co,2Sees75SPguns"Regtlrfpn
Co,BCo4thTkBn,2dColl; SecCo A'3dMedBh,andNQ-FandALn
Teams3dJASCO, StrengthofRCoswas:SCo,7 0- 192Enl;FCo
70<- 188Enl;GCo,7 0"-214Bnl,Forpositionanddisposition
seeoverlayattached,.
%
S, Snemyunitsencounteredbythis3nvereasfollows:
Unit OriginalStrength
145th/Indlnf Rqgt (46th Div) 3200-3400
310th Ind Inf'Bn 580 Approx
314th Ind InfBn.
8th Ind'AT Bn 450
Naval Guard Force (Sast Sector-AA)
Army Fortification 3ection
Page 3 of 27]
OPERATION._lCOHT
f
l>).
Theaboveinformationwasobtainedfromcaptured
documentsandPOs. Amorecompleteandreliablerecordwouldbe
foundintiae-RegtlIntelligenceSectionrecords. Thesameapplies
tothedispositionofenemyforcesWjichwehadnoopportunityof
discovering.
x
>
PARTIII. Chronologicalaccountoftheaction,
Note:.AlltimesstatedareKING ZoneTime (-10)
ThemissionassignedthisBnwastoland-onorder
andmovetoanassemblyareatobedesignatedpreparedtoexecute
apassageoflinestocontinuetheAtk,oroccupydefensive
positionsasordered. ,
A. 20Feb45. BLT2-21wasbo-, ?dby0930prepared- to
landonorder. At1700theBLTwasreembarked.
B
* 2lFeb45. BnGPlandedon-33ACHY3LL0W1at1430
andproceededtoassignedassemblyar^aatTA148DOG-. Alltroops
ashoreby1530.
C. 22Feb45. Receivedthe "":gtlAtkorderat0300
1
Renwaslimitedtorouteof approachtorearoflinesdutodark-
ness.'At0500theBnproceededtoassemblyareaatTA1S4"JASY,
CrossingAIRFIELD"NO.1undercoverofdarknesswithnocasualties*
Bninposition,preparedtoeffectpassageof3dBn23dHexlines
by0830:'Afewcasualtiesinflictedbysporadicmortfire. Atk\
orderissuedtoCoComdrsat0730;:FCoinassault,KING: Hourat
0835. Atkwaslaunchedat0840,butby1000assaultCohadpro-
gressedonly50'yardsunderintenseMort,MG- &small-armsfire.
FCobecamebadlydisorganizedatthistime,duetothelossofthe
CoCocidrandcriticalinterminglingofelementsofthe3d3n26th
liarwhichhadcrossedoverintothis3nZofA. Duetothisinter-
mingling,officersandNCOshadlittleornocontrolovertheir
respectiveunits. AttemptstouseTks(CoB4thTk3n)drewheavy
ArtyandI-IortfireontheInfwithoutanygainJVomtheiruse. All
attemptsatairSptfailedduetoweathercondttions. At1S15 G-Co
continuedtheAtkandFCorevertedtoRes. Therewasnoairor
NGFSptavailable. Tkswereblinded ^oytherainandcouldnotoe
employed. Perhapsbecauseoftheweather,however,C- Cocarried
theAtktothesouthernembankmentofAIRFI2LDNO.2by1700,when
theAtkwashaltedandlinesconsolidatedforthenight. TheCo
Comdrhadbecomeacasualty,andbothGendFCohadsuffered
heavycasualties.
25Feb45, RegtlAtkorderreceivedat0640.BnAtk
orderissuedtocontinueAtkto030i1onl.ftofRegtlZofA. One
Cofrontage,3Coinassault,KING--Hour0730. Cosinpositionby
KING- Hour,butAtknotlaunchedduetoheavyfireofalltypes,
lossofComand-.tardinessofattachedT
7
-% -AsecondArtyprepar-
ationcalledat0855. InfAtklaunchedat0935afterTkshad*
.neutralizedknowntargetsuponAIHFI2LDNO.2, At10052Cowas
heldupbyintenseAufco-WpnsfirefrompositionsvicinityofTAs
199XRAY,182A3LS,BAK3H,K0?7. Froid1000to1300,everyeffort
togettroppsupontofieldfailed,despitegoodsptbyNG-Fand
barragerockets. Infcasualtiesheavy, AsecondAtkwaslaunched
at1327followinganairstrike,buttheassault Cowasagainforce-
backofxtheField.by1350. Thelineswereconsolidatedforthe
nightontheembankment
:
atthesouthernedgeoftheField,showing
nogainforthe-day. .", '..,
Page4of27pa.
&. 24Feb45, RegtlAtkorderreceived0300. At0600a
EmailgroupofJapsinfiltrated,-attackedBnFvdSwitchboardand
inflicted3casualtieskilled* BnAtkorderissuedat0715:
TksattachedtounitonrightdrewintenseMortfireandArtyfireon
linesduringthisperiod* TksattachedtothisBnreportedto
theirAtkareas(TA182PETSR)at1000. Tksorderedtoworkup
ontoFieldandfireatknowntargets. Bynoonsituationhadbogged
downconsiderablyandat'1200asecondAtkorderwasissued. Eand
GCoinassault,2Coontheright. SCowastoworkupontoField
frompositonsinrearofunitonright,atTa182DOG-, GCowas
togoupundercoverofthewestembankmentoftheField,continue
attackto0-la. KingHour1330. Atklaunchedasscheduled. At
1400ECowashitbyarocketbarragefiredintoourZofAbysome
unitofthe5thDiv. ArtyFOteamwasamongthecasualties. At
1415G-CowashitheavilybyMortandsmall-armsfire(TA182BAX2R-;
North)andits*advancestopped. ActingCoComdrbecamecasualty
t
At.1500ECoproceededacrossstriptohigh
v
roundatTA199XRAX*
At1510FCowassentuptheleftoftheZofAtocoverG-Go'swith-
drawalandreorganization|andbecame'engagedinaclosedencounter
withtheenemyatshortrpngewhichcontinueduntildusk. 3nOP
displacedtoTA182PETERat1650. Duetoapproachingdarknessand
undiminishedenemyfire6talltypesitwasimpossiblefortheleft
andrightassaultCostom&kecontactupontheField. Asaresult-,
theleft.assaultCowaswithdrawnat1730tothesouthedgeofthe
Fieldandlineswereconsolidatedforthenight. Onlygainwason
theright,toTA199XRAY, TwoCOG1st3n21stMaremployedto
covercriticalpartofthogapfromsoutheredgeofFieldtoTA
182DOG-. ' . :
F25Feb45. AtkorderreceivedfromRegtat0605.
2dBn9thMartomakeapassageof2d3n21stMarline.sat0930,
thisBntoSptAtkfrompresentpositions,. At0730theorders
wereissuedtoCoComdrsandat0755theCO2dBn9thMararrived
atOPforRen, At09302dBn9thMareffectedthepassageoflines*
At1230thisBncompletedwithdrawaltoDivResassemblyarea. At
3.415anti-sniperpatrolsweredispatchedthroughrearareaofDiv
ZofA. At1715thepatrolsreturnedwithanegativereportandthe
8J.mmMortplatrevertedto3ncontrol,, At1915theBncompleted
erganizatiortafitssectoroftheDRL.
&26Feb45. At0645orderreceivedfromRegtthat
BnremaininassemblyareapreparedtoSptAtkasordered. 3y
0700CosreturnedtoassemblyareafromDRLandat0800anti-
sriperpatrolsdispatched Bncontinuedresupplyandreorganization.
At17453nestablisheditssectorofDHL.
H*.27Feb45..Bnremainedanelementof>ivRes. 3y
0805CoshadreturnedtoassemblyareafromDRLanlat0800anti-
sniperpatrolsdispatched,, &t1045vt^eoS1mm4Iortplat.detached.and:
attachedto9thMar.\$#t"1855BnestablisheditssectoroftheDRL.
!28Feb45.""EarningorderreceivedfromRegtat0130,
ThisBntobeinRegtlRes,followrearelementsassault3nsat
300Yds,conductextensivemoppingupOpusinZofA. FCofurnished
2litterteamsof1/2Costrengthto1stand3d3nsat0715. Bn
(less1Co$n&81mmMortPlat)movingoutbehindassault3nsat
1125. 3andC-CosorderedtofollowrihtassaultBn. At12002Co
orderedtomopupinTA200P2T2R* At1425Regtissuedawarning
orderto3nandat1500Coswereassembledat.TA200v?.>vvn
Page5of27pag
OrderfeeingissuedtcTCoCoindrs. Bn(LessFCoand81mmmMortplat)
toAtkindirectionofRJ338,throughgapcausedbyunequalAdv
ofassault3ns,-andgaincontactwithrightassaultBn. KingHour
setat1530,whichallowedinsufficienttimetpmoveCos600Ydsto
assignedLD. Asaconsequence,3nCome.!-setLDatRD200i:TC-*QU3N
andsacrificedArty,preparation. Cosattackedat1535,0Coonleft,
At1600,BnCPdisplacedtoTA199XHAY. At1650theBn81mmMort
Platrevertedto2dBncontrol. At1700ECocantactedrightassault
*ninTA200DOB(NW). Atkwashaltedat1730andBnwasincontact
withleftassault;3nat200BAK2R-(Central)andwith rightassault
EnatHJ217XRAY. OneRplatKCo9th'MarassignedtoGCo,and
Linesconsolidatedfornight. At1810,huCPcameunderrocket
barrage.
JV!Ma,r45. At013010JcxfjattackedaCosleftflank
200BAIC2R)andinflicted6casualties. At0400receivedRegtl
/VtkorderforthisBntocontinueAtkon60AzacrossAIRFIELD.Ho.
6,ontheleftoftheRegtlZqfA, KINGHourat0830. TheBn
attackedontime,two.Cosabreast,G-Coonlefta-ndFCoinRes.
Duetothefact'-thattheAtkorderrequiredachangeindirectionof
approximately150totheright,theleftassaultCodidn'tcomplete
itsswingandstartputtotheNEalongtheNedgeoftheFielduntil
0935. By1100theBnwaspinneddownonalineTA2170302-217'
YOKEbysmall-arms,Auto-WpnsendMortFi^efromfrontandleft
flank. Tks(CoB3dTkBn)werecommittedinTa217YOKEtoneutral-
izefire. By1155,5enemyTkshadbeendestroyedinEnrolswhere
theyworedugin. At1310apafcEOlsentouttotheleftdiscovered
enemyresistanceinSmplsinrisinggroundvicinityTA218FOX.
Activityforbalanceofthedaywasrestrictedtomoppingupon
leftflankandlocalTkactionsontherightflank. At1540theBn
CPwasdisplacedtoTA217.-WILLIAK(East). Ourlinesduringtheday
wereover-extendedandtherewasnophysicalcontactwithinr'theBn
orwitheitherflankingunic. Coeffectivestrengthswere80and
officercasualtieswerehigh. Soat1.00the'ResCo
w
~asplacedon
the,leftflankandcontactwithunitonleftwasestablished. At
18000Co1st3n21stMarwas-attachedandplacedonourrightflank
toestablishcontactwithunitonri
t
Jrc. 3y1900lineswereestab-
lishedatTA2170B02(Ssst),TARS,218UNCL3(SW), Betweenthe
hoursof2ooOand01302"ar,anenemyTkmaneuveredaimlessly200
Ydsinfrontof3nleftf.i.ank,finallymovingoffwithoutfiringa
round. At2300anATgunfiredseveral.oundsintolinesfrom
positionsestimatedatTA218HAI-!. SniperandMortfirewasrec-
eivedallduringthenignt, .
&2Mar5. ThisBnwasorc.eredtoSpttheRegtlAtk
from-existingTOOsitionsbyfire. Uponbeingpinchedout,itwas
torevertto"RegtlRes
d
At1145all3nfiresweremaskedbutthe
twoassault3nshadnotyetmadecontactwitheachother. At1400
receivedoralorderfromRegttoAtktowardHILL218DOC-from
positionsin.rearofleftassaultBn,andseizegroundcommanding
easternendofAIRFIELDNO.3andestablishcontactbetweenassault
BnsinRe^tlZoTA. Cosreachedpointinraarofleftassault3nby
1545andBnattackedat1600,GCoinassault. Theadvwastempor-
arilyhaltedat1645whentheassault-CocameunderintenseMort
andAuto~pnfire-fromTA218DOG-and235WILLIAM, OnoPlatof
assaultCoreached235VICTOR(South)and218BA&SR(North)atJ1700,
whereitx?ascommittedinaviolentcloseengagement'forahalfhour
Itwasunderconstantfireofalltypos,especiallyanumberofhigl.
velocityTfonsfrompositionsinTA235OTCL3.At1730the3nConor
became'acasualtyendtheSxOtookcommand. TheassaultCo*ms
orderedto.withdrawtotenablepositionsontherightflankof"die
unitonleft.
. "' Pr-ge6Of27pag
0P2RATI0N.
The other-two Cos were unable t o .push.ouV/onto Field, t o make contact
with uni t on t i g h t , due t o Int ense ^ r e of a l l t ypes ana t he l a t e -
ness of the hour-. At 1800 the l i nes yere consol i dat ed at-TA-s 218
BAKER (Southwest), FOX and 217 0 3 0 ^ f i % Contact l eft , , no contact
r i g h t , During ni ght l ef t Co r ece4rtne&'heavy f i r e from' high vel oci t y
Vons, small-arms and I-lorts. ' ' ->'
L. 3Mai*45* This' Bn.was ordered t o continue t he Atk
v i t a . 2 Cos abr east , main ef f or t . on the ri ght
;
s
sei ze 0-3 in .Regtl
;
T'.ofA, paying par t i cul ar at t ent i on t o HILL 218 DOG-. KING- Hour at
0745. Atk r as launched on t i me, Gf-.Co on t he l e f t , E Co i n Res,
At 0840 C- Co recei ved heavy f i r e from hi gh-vel oci t y !*pns in TA
35 UNCLE* By 0900 l i nes were i n TA 235 "ULLIAK (South) -218
HOW ( Cent r al ) , At 1000 I Co .9th ilex was at t ached t o G Co.t o secure
i t s exposed l ef t f l ank. . 3y 1100 l ef t and r i ^ht assaul t Cos had
made physi cal contact on HILL 218 DOCK Res Co committed on r i ght
t o pr ot ect exposed r i ght fl ank. No Adv w.as made during r es t of
day. 3xfcensive mopping up on HILL 218 DOG- conducted, supported
by flame throwers from I Co 9th 2<Iar. By 1800 l i nes were consol i -
dat ed, contact est abl i shed' . wi t h 1st Bn 21st ' Kar on r i ght . I Co
9t h Mar was s i t ed t o l ef t r ear of l eft , Co to' cover exposed fl ank.
Supply t o t he l i nes duri n day was ser i ousl y cur t ai l ed by heavy
enemy i nt er di ct or y f i r es on the Fi el d.
^ *** AHar45. This 3n was ordered t o continue Atk and
sei ze 0-3 on t he l ef t of the Eegt l 2bfA,, pr ot ect Regt l l ef t fl ank.
1 Co 9t h I-Iar. detached at 0730. KING- Hour 0616. At 0915 KIKG Hour
was i ndef i ni t el y delayed. By 0930 left- assaul t Co est abl i shed con-
t act with 3d Bn 27th Mar. Cos recei vi ng i nt ense sni per , Auto~
T
fpn.8
?
and hi gh- vel oci t y gun f i r e . Heavy gun i s f i r i ng from posi t i on
apparent l y vi ci ni t y TA 219 UNCLS i nt o 3n r i ght and cent er assaul t ' .
Cos. At 1155 word was recei ved t hat KING-Hour was set at 1140.
At 1330 center Co request ed permission t o withdraw SOYds out of
t r aj ect or y of the Wpn in T^ 219 UNCLS. No \dv had been made during
day, but i nt ensi ve mopping up was convicted throughout day i n ex-
t ensi ve enemy pos i t i ons on HILL 218 DOG-. At 134*/ 25 men fron-B*
Go 21st liar wore at t ached for flame thrower operc.tors and Dmls Per s
Contact with uni t s on both flanks was report ed at 1345
#
At 1645
B Co 21st liar was at t ached t o Bn and employed t o st rengt hen l i ne on
l ef t flank: At 1700 a<Gp-n;;~c up operat i ons were suspended and l i nes
consol i dat ed by 1730 on' i i ni TA 235 -
T
ILLIAM (S3), 218 DOG (West
Cent er l ) , RJ 322.
N* 5Mar45. Ordered at 0130
:
t c r el ease B Co 21st liar
at dawn* At 0630 recei ved order from. ?.egt t o maintain exi st i ng
pos i t i ons , continue mopping-up vi ci ni t y front l i ne s . Mopping-up
conducted throughout- day* Combrt effi ci ency of Bn report ed t o Regt
at 1100 as 20$. .At 1730 24 and 13 replacements were sent t o G- ana
2 Cos r espect i vel y. . /
" 0. 6Mar45. At.0345receivedordertocontinueAtk,
seize0-3inleftofRegtlAofA. KINGHoursetat0800,three
Cosonlino,GCoonleft,SOo.onright. Forthepreceeding3^
daysheavyenemyresistancebyfire
e
vasencounteredfromBnlefc
flankwheneverunitsmovedforward. Soit-wasdecidedthat^Bn
wouldAtkinconjunctionwith2&?*Bn''27th'Maronleft,assoonas
thatunithadmovedabreast..3y0820unitonleftwasabreast
ofleftassaultCo,butitsfurtheradvancewasdenied-barstrong
enemyresistsiiceindraw.betweei)HILL235-"7ILLIAMandHILL218
DOG. 2dBn27thliarand'2d3n21stMarplannedacoordinated&r,)a
at1245, At1245GCoattackedtdwardO-3',advancedtoeescern ^
slopesofHILL-218JDOG..2d,Bn27thMarfailedtoAdv,andconcacu
wasbroken* />
i
U-,r **--
:
' Page7of27p
Respitefirefromleftflank,assaultunits"jgaintataedpositions
andconductedmoppinguponHILL218,D 0 % At"1730GOowithdrew
toformerpositionsandestablishedcontacttotheleft,consol-
idatedlinesfornight. By1830rightflankwasconsolidated,with
contactwithunitonright. -
'
7
Mar45. 0055receivedRegtlorde'rtocontinue
Atk,seize0-3inleftofRegtlZofA* Atktobeinconjunction
vith5thDivonleft. KINGHour,0730, At0730theBnlaunched
itsAtk,andby0845theleftfleakhadreached-0-3. (Itisto
V- notedat'thispoint
t>
thatoncetheBnhadreachedthhighground
on3Mar,resistance-wit'.intheBnZof-.-wasscatteredandeasily
isolatedbyassaultteamsoperatingonmop-uppatrols. 3utdueto
ihenatureoftheterrain,theBn,depletedinstrengthasitwas,
wasunabletoAdvmorerapidlythantheleftflankunit,ortohoi :
holdlinesatnightin.Advofitsflankingunits^ Itwasevident ::
that/atanytimeafter,7MartheSricouldhaveadvancedtothesea'
withlittledifficulty,-butcouldholdthegroundgainedonlyif
unitonleftwereabletoAdvwiththeBn. Onlyresistanceexper*-
iehcedtrasfrom, anapparentlystubborncenter'ofresistancein235
VILLIAI<I~IBM and,initiallyfromahigh-velocityflattrajectory
ItfpnsomepalcenegrTA219UNCLSwhichcoulddenytoourtroops,-
groundinvicinityRJ322andsouthernslopesoiHILL218DOG.)
At1130aplatofSngrswasattachedandthroughoutdaymopping-up
wasconductedvicinityHILL218DOG. Morandsniperfirereceived
sporadicallyall.day,causingconsiderablecasualtiestoleft
assaultCo. 2d3h27thMar,leftflankunit
#
failedtomoveup
duringday. soat1500BnlinesworewithdrawntocrestofHILL
218DOG. AQq27thMarwasplacedonBnleftflanktotieback..
to2d3n27tivMar.
Q* 8M
f
\r45. OrderfromRegt.directedthis3ntoAdv .
inconjunctionwithAtkof5thDivon,left,seizecoastlinein
leftofRegtlZo^A Orderspecified"push-theAdvinZofAas
soonassituationon-.leftpermits." 2PlatsofCoA3dTkBn,
1PlatofHegtllilpnCo
t
and1platSngrswereattached. ACo21st
MarwastopassthroughthisBn
r
srightassaultCo,thusdecreasing
ourpreviouslyassignedZofA. Uniton_jrtdidnotmoveoutduring
morning. At12CQBnComerthis3nand3nComdr2dBn27th i-iar
arrangedacoordinated^ck,employingTk.s. KINGHourtobe1230,
At1230leftassaultComovedout,pr.neededbyTks..Unitonleft
cameunderIntenselightMortandMGfireandfailedtoAdva's
scheduled. At1245ACo21stMarcompletedapassageofright
assaultColines. OurlinesreceivingMortfire. About1230the
BnComdrwaswounded,butremainedforward. At1300rightCohad
contactwithAco21stMar. TksoperrtingwithleftassaultCo
stillfiringasdirectedbyCoComdrleftassaultCo, At1430Bn . .
ComdrandBnComdr2dBn27thMarcoordinatedaracketbarrage,
andleftassaultCowaswithdrawnS.0yards. At1500unitonleft
movedoutinAtkandby1555leftassaultCoandunitonleftwere
abreastonanother. At1635lineswereconsolidatedonO-3,con-
tactleft'andright* BnComdrwoundedasecondtime,returnedto .
H* 9Mar45. TheBn,-^as-orderedtocontinuetheAtk
tothecoastlineontheloftoftheRegtlZofA,attackingincon-
junctionwiththe5thDivontheleft. KINGHour0700. l^ochange
inattachedunits* 3y1350theTks.followedbycenterassaultCo.
wereonplateauabovebeacheast, of-HXLLHQ DOG, Enemyresistance
consiscQdofsnipor,Auto-IJpnsj:andrightkortfirefromnign
groundinTA235tflLLIAK(Sast). XRKI(est)
#
D-y
f
sactivitycon^
sistedof-mopping-up&ndplacingofTkneutralizinganades'cruetiv
firesinCLYGD inareapreviouslynqntiondd, Oppo^tiontofront;
/,:. '..'' '
;
Page8of
:
tf
ACTION.I
withinBnZofAwasnon-existent* At1615contactwasreported-
rightandleft* RightflankadvancedeastfromRJ322100yards
tomaintaincontactwithunitonright. At173Pcenterandleft
Goswithdrewto'highgroundtoavoidfirefroml,ighgroundto
leftandtomaintaincontactwithunitonleft,
s
lOHar45. Atkorderprovidedfor3dBn27thMar
executingapassageofthisBn
1
slinesatKING-Hour(0800)and
xaonswingingtothenorth. Uponcompletionofpassageoflines,
ofRegtlZofA. Bn81mmMortPlattoSptAtkof3dBn27thMar.
At09203dBn27thMarhadcompletedpassarnoflinesandhad
swungtothenorth. OnlycueCoofthatuiilzwasonplateaueast
ofHILLS218DOG-235XRAY. At121J5.his3nwas.orderedtochange
itsdirectionandAtktonorthinconjunctionwit,.3dBn27thMar.
At1347PandECos,Ponleft,attackedtothenorth. At1500F.
Cogainedcontactwithrightflankofcd3n27thMarinTA235
XRAY.(Southeast),BnwasunabletocontinueAtkthrough235YOKE
untilunitonleft-securedpluffsinTA235XRAY. Enemyfire'
fromcavesinthesebluffs.consistedof\.^o-^pns,lightMortj
sniperandgrenadefire. At1800rightCoofunitonleftwith-
drewfromfaceofbluffsandthis3nwithdrewtoconsolidatelines*
Contactleftandright. Linesof3natKIL_i218DOG--EASY
(South).
T
HMar45to15Mar45,Incl. On11liarthe3nwas
orderedtoRegtlRes. lst.Bri21stMarattackedacross3nleft
frontatKINGHour,andby0930thisBnwasdisengaged. At
1330RegtorderedtwoCostoreturntoRegtlResareaatTA217
"
r
ILLIAK~XRAYandat1510thethirdGowasorderedtothearea.
By1545theBnwasassembledintheResarea.
On12Mar,BnremainedinassemblyareaasregtlRes,con-
ductingsalvage,resupplyandreorganization. t1450Bnordered
toestablishaRRLonlineTAs217XRAY(SS>to217ROGER(SW).
Lineestablishedby1750.
On13MarBncontinuedasRegtlRes. CosreturnedfromRRL
toassemblyareaat0720
o
RHLreestablishedat1750.
On14Mar3ncontinuedasRegtlRes,.CosreturnedfromRRL
toassemblyareaat0500. At1650Bnorele:ecltoestablish-.RRL'
onlinefromRJ332toTA-219KING. LinoestablJshedat1915.
On15Mar3ncontinuedasRegtlRes,conductingmoppingup
andsalvageoperationsinvicinityofRRL(vicinityRJ322).
tf*16Mar45.v Au0100Bnorderedtoexecute,passage
oflinesof2dBn26thMaratKINGHour(:815).,Atkonleftof
RegtlZofAandseizecoastline.^2Plats.CoATksand.137mmPlat
TtfpnCoattached. At0715Cosmovingintopositionsbehindlines
(235ABLE(S3)
fc
~251VICTOR(SE)... ..Alsoat.07153nOP*displaced
toTA234YOKE,BnAtkdelayedtocoordinateAtkwithunitson
leftandright. BnlaunchedAtkat.0840,FandGCosinassault,
FCoonleft, 3y1000rightflankhadadvanced100yardsunder '
IntensesniperfireandindividualsuicideAtks* "(Enemyraninto
groupsofmenandTkswithDmlchargesandgrenades) Tksand
Tk-mountcdflamethrowersofferedexcellentSpt, Rightflank
advanced200yardsagainstlightopposition, At104581mmMorts
displacedtoTA217EASY. At1145.E.Comovedupbehindright
assaultCotocovergapcausedbyunevenAdvofassaultCos. By
13.10ri^htassaultCohadreachedcoastatjA,251KING*
Page9of27pages

AT;1400fourwar'dogsattachedtoBn. At1615frontlineswere
atTA251UNCLE (North),PSTZ&,KING,threeCosonline. At,
1630CCo21stMarattachedtoBntoSptlinesfornight* 3n
invisual.contactwithunitonleft. At1700leftflankwith*
drew50yardstocontactunitonleftandlines consolidated
fornight,
"V* 17Mar45. 3nordered tomaintainlinesandcon-
-Jinuemopping-upinassigned2ofA. At1535CCo'21stdetached,,
At1730twoambushesvereestablished,asdirected,atTAs251
KING-and$51PETER(West Central),
tf.!5Mar45to2#ter45jIncl. On18MarBnordered
towithdraw,to3npatrolbaseat~TA235HO?r,MIKEandconduct'
tensivepatrolling inassignedsector (generallyTAs251,235,
536),ests-blishandmaintainthreeoutpostsalongcoastlinein.,
assignedsector,andestablishambushesnightly. AllCosin
assignedarea,by0925. BnCP.established atTA235NIKEat1200*
Patrolling smartedandoutpostsestablishedatTA251KING-(South*,
wosty^235ITEM(Central)and219ABLE(Norhtvest). Salvageand
toppingupoperationswereconductedthroughoutperiod,asdirected.
Extensive'useofDmlswasmade,EngrPersbeingassignedtoevery
patrol, Wardogswereusedonlyassecurity, .Uoc-cextensive-
patrollingwasconducted inbeach-area*
At0700,
t
23Mar,twoCosof2dBn147thInf.weretactically '
attachedtothisBn,foremploymentinmopping-upoperations. At
1510wardogsandEngrPersdetached. . '
At0800,24Mar,2d3n147thInfassumedresponsibility of
BnpatrolsectorandBnstandingbytomoveto assigned.assembly
areapreparedtoembarkonorder,
PARTIV. COMMENTS. ..
A, Ad;JIiBJstvatlp.iu
1* Ourcasualtiesfrom1?ebthrough28Marare
asfollows:17officerstflAand7KIA;401SnlmenWIA,11DOW,
and101ICU-17NavyEnlVJIA,1.DOT,and-1KIA.
2, Concerningthemoraleofthetroops,every
possibleeffortwasmadetopromotegoodmoralethroughout theOpiu
Mail-was-brought ashoreontheseventhda^,aridatfrequent inter-
valsthereafter. Hotcoffeeandsome:-rarmchowwasbroughttothe
frontlinesafterthefirstfewdays* Asystemwas.workedout '
wherebythe3nwasechelonedtothebeachandgiven&chancetotals*
ahotshower,;and'a-changeofclothingwasgivetythem* Laterin
theOpnmovieswere.s.liawntothetroopsnightly. Beforeleaving.
theislandarragnomehtswerema'desothatthe*mencouldvisit.the
oemetary. Onthewhole,everythingwasdoneforthementhatwas
possibleunderthecircumstances. '.'
3# ThisBn.capturednineteenPOtfs. All
handledinthesamemanner. TheRCosbrought themintothe3n
CPandafterinforming theIntelsectionofthedetailsofcapture-
releasedthemtotheIntelsec* Theywerethengivencigarettes,
food,water,interrogated,andtakentoRegt. All'POWswere taken
whentheoperationsof theBnhad;reachedapatrolling stage'sothr
theonlyquestionsasked.More concerned,withthewhereabouts,num-
ber,arms,andconditionofotherenemyknowntobeintheBnsecto
bythePOlf. Inalmostall,.caspa-.t.heyhadverylittle-.information'
to give. '"
;!.*''' ' Page10of27
ICONT*D)_
B. Intelligence.
1. a. ThisBnreceived asufficient number of
maps for theOpnbut it isdoubtful that allwere inthe most
apposite scale. The officialOpnmap, scall:1:10,000, \:asex-
cellent forpurposes of the3n staffbutw-astoobulky a sheet
ofpaper for Coofficersand unsuitable'for the3nOP. The Bn
receivedonly2maps on ascale of 1:20,000. It is suggested
thatforfuture operationsthe3nbe supplieswitha sufficient
number of thelatter scalemaps to supply at'least the Co officers
of the3ii* The large numberof 1:5,000maps issuedproved to be
'-.greatwaste for their onlyvaluewas forVng aboard shiparid
asthattimewas sobrief the3n coulC not use them to advantage,
Themaps themselver wore excellent inthat they vjrevery read-
able. However, asregards to their ability toreproduce the,"
nature of the terrain, it isfelt thatmuch isdesired. They
v;ereadequate up toOpn around the AIRFIELD MO.2but did not
give atruepicture of the.terrainfrom thatpoint north. A
Kachuredmapwould have-been farbetter f
n
r ourpurposes. All
maps issued haveprcoperationenemy-installations.printed on
thornaridforgeneralpurposes 011157-confused ourmapr-reading. The
email"maps issued to theNCOsof theBnwere good for general
.indoctrination*"
b. Thephotos issued totheBnwere excel-
lent asfar as coverage butwere insufficient.innumber to'allow,
all troops to study them.
2. There were nomaps orphotos issued to this
Bnduring theoperation. Newphotoswould havebeenused to
advantage.
3. To ourknowledge,hydrographic information
was goodbut,itwas not necessary at any time for ustopossess
such information.
4. Intelligence disseminated to thisBni-ias \*
rarely, if ever,ofmuchvalue during theoperation.
Tr
e received
very little intheway of timely intelligence
f
and thatwas usually
concernedwith enemy installations atleast a thousand yards in
'frontof ourlines. Tor close-in enemy informationwe had to rely
on intelligence sourceswithin theBn. Intelligence mattor issued
prior to theoperationwas excellent..
5. This3nhad twomeans of collecting enemy
documents andmateriel. Onewas our own troops ontheline,
1
who
throughout the operationweremost helpful in collecting enemy
documents and informing the3nIntelligence section ofthe where-
abouts of enemymater-ielandinstallations. Theypassed this in-
formationbackbyanymeans of traffic-thathappened tobe avail- ,
able. The other collective agency we hadwithin the3nwas the
Bn Intelligence Section. Itmoved throughout the areabehind the
front lines and collected anyremaining intelligence material.
Itproved capable as acollecting agencybecause the enemy was
counter-intelligence conscious and leftrelatively little material
onany value inour sector.
6. a. Noofficerspermanently attached,
b. Noofficers.temporarilyat'cached.
'c.No enlisted permanently attached.
d Attached to theBn temporarily was one
enlisted interpreter. Thisman
1
s training seemed inadequate to -
the task ofpurposefully examining and questioning"POWs.
..>\\ * Page 11of 27
However,underthecircumstancesitisdoubtfulifabettertrained
manwouldhatfefunctionedmoreefficientlysincewecouldhavea
thoroughreportonanythingwemightwanttoknowfromRegtwithin
thirtyminuterofthePO!fsdeparturefromthe3nCP. Whileinthe
AtkitwasnotfeasibletointerrogateJ?O!fsbecauseexperience
showedthatthenatureoftheinformationgainedtherebywasvacil~
lativcandlong-ranged, Whilecommunicationsremaineffictivethere
seemstobenoneedforlanguagepersonnelina3n.
e
f
NoNiseiattached,
7. Vocalpropagandawasonlyemployedonceby
thisBnandatthattimetonoeffect. Twoenemywerediscovered
inacaveandwebroughtupasoundtruckandhadoutinterpreter
askthemtocomeout. Theydidnotandwewereforcedtoblowup
"hecave. T/rittenpropagandaprovedeffectivetwicebecausetwo
o-rthePOtJstakenbythe'Bncarriedth^m. 'Tefeelthatsurrender
joafletscouldbeeffectivebutinthisOpntheyTeredroppedonly
alongthebeachareatothenorthandsouth. Nopropagandaever
roa.ch.odtheenemydirectlytoourfront. Also,theonlytypeof
wvittenpropagandaencounteredbythisBnwasintheformofsur-
renderleaflets. Itissuggestedthat*aprogressiveapproachmight
bemoreefficacious. Thedroppingofcurrentnewsdispatchesmight
bothefirstsfcdjp. Anenemy'whosemoraleissohighnqedssoften-
ingupandsurrenderleafletsmightbecalled
v
afinalblowrather
thantheonlyone. ' . .
8. ThisBnhadnoJICPOAteamattachedtoi.
9. IntelligenceliaisonwithintheBnwasadequate
butsluggishandshowedaneedofmoreextensivetraining, !7ith
otherunitswithintheRegtwehadpracticallynointelligence
liaisonbecauseoflackofcommunication, WithRegtduringthe
firsttwoweeksliaisonwaspoorduetothedifficultyinreaching
theRegtlIntelligencesectionbyphone. Duringthehoursofday-
lightitusuallytookthirtyminutestogetacallthrough. Host
informationreceivedbythisBnfromRegtwasofnoimmediatevalue
zousbecauseitalwayspertainedtoenemypersonnelorinstallation?
toofartoourfront, 3estliaisonasfarasintelligenceiscon-
cernedwaswiththe'26thMar, Thiswasso,primarilybecausethe-
5thMarDivhadestablishedatwenty-fourhourintelligencenet
withintheDiv,.Thissuppliedaconstantflowofenemyinformation
toourleftandleftfront. The5thDivalsohasapolicyofmain-
tainingdirectlinesbetweenadjacent3ns, Itissuggested"that
thesetwopoliciesbeembodiedinourownSCr*
10* Thepasswordandcountersignx'orthisoperation,
was,perhaps,over-complicated,but.didfulfillitBfunction," The
shacklecodeusedincommunications,workedwhenused,'Attimesthe
(
situationdemanded.speedanditwasnecessarytoputmessagesout *
overradiounshackled. Theradiowaswheremostviolationsofsec-
uritywerecommitted. Theprobablereasonfor.theseviolationsis
thattheresponsibilityforsuchsecurityrestsuncertainlybetween\-
theBnCommunicationsandIntelligenceOfficers. Itwasobserved
thatmostofficerswithintheRegtwerecarelessinthisrespect.
Responsibilitiesforcounter-intelligenceshouldbemoreclearly
defined.
11, From^a3nstandpointtheenemytacticswhich
gaveusthemosttroublewas
;
theirconstantdefenseofreverse
slopes. Thismade.itdifficult,becauseoursupportingfireswere
useless* Theenemywasthoroughlyduginthroughouttheirentire
v Page12of27pages
IMAOPERATION
Defofthe1!
raunit inourcasethishappened"
severaltimes
tsflankstheywerequicktodirect
firesagainstit.
12. This3nhadlittleopportunitytostudyenemy
intelligenceOpnsormethods* Whfcnwemadeasalienttheenemywas
quicktodiscernitandwasalwaysreadytowithdrawtomoretenable
positions. Knowingthateventuallytheymustsuccumbtheychose
defensivepositionswhichwouldprovemostcostlyinthetaking.
jiiroughouttheOpnuntilwehadreachedthenortherncliffsabove
thoseatheenemyhadexcellentObsnandusedittoadvantagein
"iicplacingofhisfires. . ."
13. \!cencounterednocivilianpopulation.
14. Whilethehightyeofenemymetduringthis
Opnifascomparativelynewtous,therewasrelativelylittlenew
:,athewayoftacticsfoundhere. HehadscontheirDefindepth
boiorebutneversoextensivenorvicioucone. Thiswasasthor-
oughaDcfofselectedterrainastheycouldmakeit. 'Jhcrever
woturnedwewerehitbyfreshfire. Thedaythis3nadvancedto.
thenorthedgeofMotoyamaAirfieldNo.3wereceivedfire
t
from360
degrees. Attheend,whentheenemyhaulittlebcj'ondhastilycon--
i;rivedspidertrapstousetostopus,theystillmanagedtoemploy
theterraintoimpedeourAdv. Theabovefactors,plusthepatienco
oftheenemy,worked^togethersothatallourstrengthwasneededto
encompasseventhesmallestenemyposition.
C. OperationsandTraining,
! Norehearsalexercisewasconductedtoindoctri-
natetroopsindetailsofOpn.
2. NoTkswereattachedtothisBninlanding.
3. The37mmATgunandTk75mmgunwerethetwo
mosteffective'fpnsusedbythisunit*:againstfortifiedinstal-
lations. MosteffectiveAmwasfoundtobeacombination,ofAP
and'AP-HB
#
Forclose-inInfaction,therocket,AT,flame.thrower
andsatchelcharges,wereusedeffectively*
4. Flamethrowers,portableandTkmounted,were
used.withefficientresults"onnumerousoccasions,thoughpri-
marilyinmopping-upratherthanoffensiveOpns. Thecasualty
rateofportableflamethroweroperatorswas92$,butthereisno
questionthatthe'..pnisavaluableandnecessaryoneinthore-
ductionofSmplsandtheneutralizationofcaves. TheTkmounted
-lamethrowerwasusedwithexcellentresultsinthedifficult
terrainsouth-eastofKILL165, There,flamethrowerTkscovered
byInf,succeededinreducingindividualSmplsorflushingtho
onemyunderconditionsthatwouldhavecrntheavilyinInfcas-
ualtieshadtheTkmountedflamethrowernotbeenused.
5. ThisunitemployednoLVT(A)(4)
l
s. Tkswere
employedinaccordancewithcurrentdoctrine.
6. Inf-Tkcoordinationintheearlyphasesuas
poortonon-existant. On23and24Febelementsofthe4thTkBn
wereattachedtothisBn. NoopportunitytoconferwithTkPlat
LdrsorGoComdrswasaffordedpriortothetimotheTksactually
reportedto'theAtkarea,whichwasconsistantlyafter1CING-Hdlx
#
Page13of27pages
OPERATION^jCOU'D).
OnonemorningtheTkLnofficerreportedtotheBnComder.withno
radiocontacttohisTksandtheTksworenotinstructedtocome
uponthe3nSCR300channel. Initiallythere'wascontactbetween
TksandInfbyTk-tpJLophone,butasthesituationprogressedand
theInfbecamepinneddown,therewasnocontactwhatever. Sub-
sequentlythe3dTkBnlandedandelementswerenormallyattached
tothisBn..WiththelatterunitnodifficultyinTk-InfComwas
experiencedandconferences-andHenwithTk"officerswereheld
priortoactualemploymentof.Tks.
7. EnemyATmeasuresconsistedofhigh-velocity-
.ATguns,Artyfieldpiecesfiringdirectfire,.Tkswhichweredug
inandhencenotinaneuverabloandlandmineswhichwereoften
attachedtoaerialbombs'. Theminesencounteredwereplacedin
roadsandjustoffroadsinlogicaldetourroutes* MagneticAT
minesworefoundin4
um
PSinlargequantitiesbutnoATassault
ioamswereencountered. ATgunswerewellemplaccdinsucha
manner- thattheirfieldoffirewasrestrictedtoan'extremely,
narrowfirelanecoveringroadsorapproachedontoAIRFIELDN02.
/::-unsucroeitherinconcreteEmplsorthemcuthsofcaves.
8. Wardogstoreroofnovalueinpatrolling. This
unitemployedthemprimarilyassecurityinoutpostsandambushes
andfoundthemeffectiveinthisfunction,
9. ATRoeivotlaunchers,whilecarriedbytheR
PlatsintheAtkandsitedtacticallyon
#
nightDeflines,were
neverutilizedasanATWpn, Theyprovouquiteeffective/inre-
ductionofEmpls,however, Thisunitusedbarragerocketson
severaloccasionsforneutralizationfire. Duetotheircharact-
eristicsanddispersionpattern,considerablecarehadto'be
exercisedintheiremployment. Buttheyprovedeffective,duo
primarilytotheirgreatvolumeoffireinashortperiodoftime
andtotheirhigh-tangletrajectory. Inadditiontheyarcapparently-
quitcdemoralizingtotheenem;*.
D. Supply*
( x
'
#
1. Adequacyofalltypesofmountingoutsupplies;
ClassI.
Rationsweresufficient.,Thoten-in-oneoration
waspreferredbythetroopswheninastabilizedposition. Thenow
type"C"ration4.sfarsuperiortotheoldtype*
Vfatcrwasinsufficientquantity. Thenew
T
/aterdrumisan excellentcontainer. Spigotsshouldbeissued
priortoembarkationforusewiththedrur.i.
rations. Ifgalleyshp.c
1
beensetup.
beforeextracomponentswerelanded,thecoffee,sugarandmilk
Issuedpriortoembarkationwouldnothaveboonsufficient. Every
roodcontainershouldbefilledpriortoloading.
ClassII.
Allitemswereadequateforcombatpurposes
exceptthefollowing:
1.Ranges,field. Theseshouldbetakenonall
Opns.'
Page14of27
ACTICI'_REPCRT,_IW;OJ3$KOPERATION._/ (CCNT'D).
2* Thepresenttypecarrier,food,vacuum,
wasunwieldywhenlonghand-carriesweremade. Itisbelieved
thattheshortercarrierusedbythe'arraywouldbebetter.
3. Thecarrier,grenade,madeupbythe
salvagesection,wasanimprovementoveranypreviouslyused;-
butitshouldbebetterconstructedandmadesothatgrenades
fittedwithadapterswouldhaveseparatepocketsfromwhich
t
thegrenadecouldbeeasilyandrapidlywithdrawn. Itshouid
bedesignedtoaccoraodateeithergrenadesorrocket(bazooka)
ammunition,
4. Itisbelievedthatinrfutur'eoperations
theknapsackshouldbeleftinthebase'camp*. Seabagsshould
notbetaken. TheBnS~4.shouldcarry,inWilsonDrums,enough
clothingtoissueeachmanacompletechangeofclothing. The
Regtl,QMshouldcarryanadditionalchangeofclothing. (The
armytypeboot,wornbytwenty-fivemen,wasexcellent. The*sole
wearsmuchbetterthantheliarineQorposhoe.)
GlassIII.
.. Fuelwas.adequate.
ClassIV.
Not.applicable-.
ClassV.
AlltypesofAmwereadequateexcept ,81mm
IlortAmwhichisnecessarilylimitedbythenumberofAmbearers.
2* AdequacyofHesupply.
ClassI. .
Noproblemswerefacedinbeingresupplied
withtheexceptionofonedaywhenthedistillationunitswere
notingoodworkingcondition. ,
Rationsandwaterwerealwaysavailable. The .
problemwasinmovingthesuppliesfromthe3nFwdDpstothefront
lines. Carryingpartiessufferedmanycasualties. Airdrop;was
consideredbutnotusedduetothefactthatmostofthecasualties
occuredjustinrearofCoCPs. Wetookeveryadvantageofair
strikesandArtybarragesinmovingsuppliesupbutmanytimesthe
firewasfromATWpnslocatedonourflanks.
C l a s s .II.,.'\ ..
Nodifficultywasencounteredduetothefact,tr
thatequipmentof'casualtieswasavailable. I-lanymenreturningto
dutyfromshipswereissuednoshoes,exc^tcanvasssneakers,and
afewreturnedwithNavydungareesinsteadofliarclothing.
,ClassIII
. ..,1: I ,, } , " ! _...
Page15of27pages
IV.
(SeeParagraphH.)
ClassV.
Notapplicable*
3. PalletizedCargo.
WilsonDrumswereusedtocarryadditional
ClassIIequipment. Thedrumskeptthecontentsdryandalso
eliminatedanytendencytopilfering.
SomeDrumswereuseduomakeDutchovens
andservedthepurposeverysatisfactorily.
4. Thisunitexperiencenodifficultyinsecur-
ingneededequipmentfromtheRTB* TheRTBwasveryefficient/
5. Salvage*
Persgatheredsalvageataidstations/
andfromCosalvagedumpsandreturnedthesalvage,totheRTB,
Sometroublewasencounteredbyhavingsalvagedumpt>whichwere
locatednearroads,pickedupbytrucksofthisandotherDivs.
Menleftbehindto.guardthedumpswereinformedbythetruck
ridersthatthedumpwastobemovedbythetrue: . Thisresulted
intheBnlosingcreditforsome-salvage*
Insalvagingitwasnotedthatfieldglasses
andwatcheswereseldomdiscovered.,
Huohoftheequipmentsalvagedwasunservice-
ableandbeyondrepair. Thisunserviceableequipmentwasreported
tohavebeenburnedbytheivSalvageSection. Itisbelieved
thattheburningshouldnottakeplace
ri
ntiltroopsleavedueto
thefactthatsomecasualties^.occuredinsalvagecollection. The
burningtendedtomakementhinksalvagewas-unnecessaryand
causedsometofeelthatthecasualtieswereunnecessarilysuffered.
6, Capturedmaterielandcapturedmaterielcol-
lectionwasmainlyafunctionoftheBnS-2section. Largedumps
werereportedtotheRegtlS-4andDivti,.,-ckscollectedthemater-
ial. ,,
7. Transportation. .
Wheeledvehiclesembarkedbytheorgani-
zationweresufficienttofulfillallrequirements. Thetrailer
usedbytheambulancewasagreataid'inmovingLed'supplies.
/ ThecargocarriersliB9C(Weasels)embarked
wereidealforthefirstfev.daysoftheOpn. Theyweretheonly
Bnvehiclesabletocrossthebeaohandhaulsuppliestothe.Bn..
No/sparepartswereneededfortheiT.
trucksexceptbatterieswhichwereeasilysecured*
AfanbeltononeWeaselbrokeandthere
werenosparepartsavailable. ThterepairsectionofCoBHTBn
Improvisedabeltwhichwasusedthroughoutthecampaign.
Page16of7piges
OPERATION. (CCIJT'D).
Noworkwasnecessaryonthevehiclesof
thisunitexceptroutineservicingandgreasingwhichwasaccomp-
lishedintheRTB.
E* Trar.sportQuartermaster.
L Duetothefactthat,thetroopTQ1-Iwasacas-
ualty evacuated,anaccurateaccountcovering his-workcannotbe
given.
2. Some difficulties the Tvil-I experienced were as
follows:
(1)Thespaceallot^dforthestorageof
equipmentpriortoloadingwasnotlargeenough.
(2)Palletizedcargowasdifficulttoplace
inholdsandvery'hardfortheworkingpartiestohandle. Upon
unloadingthesamedifficultywasexperiencedinhandlingpallet-
izedcargo.
a F. Ordnance
1. Wpns
a. NoUsed Type Cal.
!
400
CarbineMl .30
20 Pistol,Auto. .45
81 Rifle,BAR .30
352 Rifle,Ml .30
9
18
1
Launcher,Rocket,
AT.
G-u
1
,.Machine,.10.91741.30
18 Gun,Machine,U1919A4.30
9 Ilortar,112 60ms
5 Ilortar,iJL. 81mm
' b, 1'Jpns were employed twenty-one (21) days.
c. IndeterminingthenumberofWpnslost
difficultyisencounteredduetothefactthatreplacements
joinedwithoutbeinginventoriedbythisunit. Wpnsturnedin
-JO'RTBandcreditedtothisunitincludethefollowing:
Type No
Carbine 48
U.S.Rifle,Cal, 177 .30,HI
BAR .' 38
Launcher,Rocket(Bazooka) 4
FlameThrower* 9
B.U.G.,1917A1
s
B.li.G.,1919A4 :.o
Mortar,60mm 4
AccuratestatementastolossofWpns
cannotbemadeuntilcomplete,accurate,inventoriesoforiginal
andreplacementtroopsaremade'.
Page17'of27pa^es
OPERATION.^ipUl'D) ;
d. Malfunctions. *"'*
Kanytroopscomplainedthatthe
IQ.failedtofunction:properlyinthattheboltfailedtolock
on,theforwardmotioncfthebolt. Allm
r
:~questionedstated
thatitwasduetosandandgritonthepiece.
SometroublewasexperiencedinBARfunct-
ioningproperlybutinvestigationsshow3dittobeduetosandand
dirtontheworkingparta. InterrainsuchasonIwoJimaitis
,:ostdifficulttokeepWpnsclean. \
v One81mmllorthadaleakyendcap.The
endcapwastightenedaswellaspossiblebutafterafewrounds
itwouldagainbeloose. DivOrdsolvedtheproblembywelding
theendcaptothetube.
e. SparePartsandAccessories.
\' SparepartsforBARswerenotadequate.,
-Nodifficultywasexperiencedinrepairduetothefactthatsal-
vagedBARs,whichwerebeyondrepair
t
wereutilizedtorepair
thosestillinfaircondition. ,
f. Recommendations.
BARbipodsandstock-eatsshouldbe
carriedasorganizationalequipment.
TheLauncher,rocket,!i9Al,den-ted
easilythusmakingitunserviceable. Troopsattainedahigh
degreeofaccuracywiththenewtypelauncher. Itiseasierto
carrythantneformermodel.
Theflamethrower,fuel,whichwasmixed
prior'*toembarkation,settledandmenpreferredamixtureofgas-
olineandoil'ratherthanthenapalmmixturebecauseitwould
carryfarther. Allfunctionedproperlyandnomisfireswerere-
ported. ",
OneCousedtheheavymachinegunona
lightmountandwaswellsatisfiedwiththeresults.
The5thDivusedthenewtypelight
machinegunandfromtalkingtomachinegunners,fromthatDiv
andthoseofthisunitandappraisingtheircommentswebelieve
thisunitshould-getthenewmodelwhichiseasiertocarry.
2, CombatVehicles.
a. N0, Types
4 iT4x4Trk*
, , -: 1 -fT4x4Ambulance.
1 i T 4x4TCSV
5 * T Tr a i l e r . 2 Ktti.
~;Z Carrier, Carro H29C (Weasel)
4 I T Trailer I vfh
b Vehicles employed twenty-one. (21) days,
combat use. . - . ' . . ' . ' '
Page 18of 27 page
OPERATION.
(&) i T ix4 Trks were damaged. One
(1) could, be operated and one (1)"could not be used or repaired*
x
' . One (1) 1 T t r ai l er 2W.hwas damaged
beyond repair on the first' day of combat* -
. . d. Nomalfunctions occurred.
4
e. . Tire and tulpe repairs wero one of our
biggest obstacles* However, no vehicle was out of operation for
this res.son for more than a few hours
f No difficulty was experienced except in
repairing a Weasel due to the lack of the -;:>roper type fan bel t .
g. Fo recommendations as to modification of
existing types of trucks. In the case of \ T2 Wht r ai l er s i t is
believed that if the-bed could be made of a stronger material and
a drop end gate installed they would,be better Amcarri ers.
In the case of carrier cargo 1129C (teasel)
i t is believed that if spare parts could be available and a better
track installed; i . e. , one Which itfould not become disengaged from
the Sprockets and bogy sheels, each Bn should be assigned two (2).
For every two jeeps an extra t i r e and
tube should be carried in addition to the spare t i r e.
3* Ammunition.
Type Expenditure
Car t , Ba l l , Car. Cal . . 3O, HI 34500
Car t , AP, Cal . . 3O, :*2, 5- cl i p 33000
Car t , AP, Cal . , 30, 1.12, 8- cl i p 76094
Car t , Ri f l e Grenade, Cal , . 3Q, li 250
Car t , AP 8cTr, (Bel t ed) Cal . . 3O 199000
Car t , Bal l , Ca l . , 45,K1911 310
Shel l , HEyH49A2, Isf/FusePB, 6092
Shel l , I3.1uminiiting;, H83A1, K65 1445
Shel l , HE, H43A1, W/Fufle1-152 6221
Shel l , HE-,H56 " 2086
Shel l , Smoke, WPH57 . 434
Grenade, Hand, f r ag*, 1-kl IAl 8850
Grenade, Hand, smoke, HC- 118 75
Grenade, Hand, sm^ke;ifefPl-i.~ 375
^Grenade, Hand, i ncendi ar y, 1114 25
Grenade, Hand, col or ed, 1116, Red 25
Grenade, Hand, col or ed, 1116,Yellow 25
Grenade, Hand, col or ed, 1116, Vi ol et 15
Grenade, Hand, i l l umi nat i ng, likX 450
Grenade, Ri f l e , AT, iR&l 140
Grenade, Ri f l e , Fr ag, Impact , 1117 10.0
Adapt er, Grenade, Pr oj ect i on, Ml 96
Fl a r e , Tr i p, Par achut e, 1148 40
Rocket, HE,AT, 2. 36", JI6A3 320
Cap, Blasting, Tetryl, lion-electric 600
Block, Dml, Chain, Ml 31 Cs.
Explosive, TNT, i l b, blocks 17 Cs.
Page 13 of 27 pages
Type
Expenditure
Torpedo,Bangalore,K1A1 10 (1 Box)
Explosive,CompositionC2 10 Cs
Fuse,Blasting 500 Ft .
Cylinder,Ignition,&* 10
Cylinder,Nitrogen 9 \
Lighters,Fuse 310
Napalm-,5galcans 10
b,Insupply,theBn8-4wculdrequestfroa
theRegtlOrdnanceOfficerandreceivethenecessaryAm,and
transportittotheBnDp, FromthisDptheCoswouldreceive,
bymeans
ix
ofcarryingparties.,theAmtheyneeded.
Oneproblemwhich..Jneverfullysolved
wasthepracticeofmenplacingseveralgrenadesintheirfox
holesatnightandthenhavingtomovecutt:*earlyinthemorning-
toreturnthegrenades,whichwouldnot^ecarried,toaDpfrom
whichthey"couldberetrieved. Thedepletionofmenthroughcas-
ualtiesmadeitimpossibletopoliceproperlyafterthetroops
movedout,
. c. Storagewasnottoodifficultduetothe
factthatshellholeswerereadilyavailableinwhichtostoreAm*
However,thesimilarityofthepackinginthecaseoS60mmIlort
111shell,andgrenades,rifle,frag,impactMl7causedsome
difficultiesinsecuringthedesiredAmafterdark.
d Themendidnotlikethenewmetalcon-'
tainerfortheshell,HE,81mml.ortduetothefactthatasmany
roundscannotbehandtransportedastheformercloverleafpacking*
ThepackingofmachinegunbeltedAmis
unsatisfactoryasthemetalchestisverypronetoadmitmoisture;
Ifanewouterpackingcouldbedeveloped-thatismoisture-proof,
butstillretainthemetalchest,itwouldbpmostsatisfactory*
e. TheU/Fforthe81mmTortshouldbein-
creasedatleaste,ixty(0)roundsonshell,HE,1I43A1W/Fuse1152,
Theu/Pforthe60mmKortshouldbein-
creasedatleastforty-five(45)rdsonshell,111,M83A1. All
otherU/FseemedtofittheIwoOpninasatisfactorymanner.
f. The81mmKc^tshellshouldbeashellof
uniformweightwithafusewhichwouldbesetforeitherdelayed
orinstantaneousaction. Duetothescrrcityofthelightshell,
equippedwiththeinstantaneousfuse,harrassingfirewasdone
withthemediumshell(delayedfuse),andintwoinstanceswhen
Lanzaichargeswereattempteditwasonlytheexcellenceofa
Superior81mmKortPlatwhichstoppedthechargebyquicklyre-
adjustingthej'ortsightstofirethelightshell. Anaverage
Platcouldnohaveaccomplishedthisasrapidly,thusendangering'
theBnzone.
Thenewgrenade,hand,T-13shouldbe
triedinTngforexperimentationandstudyforfuture'us*e
Page20of27pages
4
Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipggnt; .
a* This unit used "^-renty-seven (27) flame
throwers, portable, H2AS.
b. The flame throwers were used twenty-one*
(21) days.
c. There wr;no malfunctions*
-Vi.
d. No spare part s were required.
e No modification^ on tfpn. However, ei t her
the service unit should be equipped with a reduction nipple to f i t
the Navy type nitrogen cyl i nder / or the Army type nitrogen cylinder
be adopted- The service unit i s designed to f i l l the flame thrower
from the Arrny^ylinder, not the Navy cylinder.#
5. Enemy
a. Weapons. ,
ThisunitturnedovertoaDivSalvage
truckthree(5)heavymachineguns,typeandcalibernotknown.
b, Ammunition.
SeveralcavesofAmwereclearedandthe
AmstoredinDpsnearroadsandthelocationreportedtoRegtl
S-4. ThisAmwas;subsequentlypickedupbyDiv. Kanytypes,of
AmwerenotedbutduetolackofPersandtire,no
s
attemptwas,
madetoclassifythetypes.
Gk Chemical.
1, a. Trainingconductedinchemicalwarfare,
anddefenseagainstit,coveredlittlebuttheb&sicfundamentals.
EachCointhe2dBnwasgivenabox^tfivehours instructionin
chemicalwarfare
f
Ifthisperiodoftimeliacibeendevotedtoany
one ofthemanysubjects,whichcomeunderthegeneralsubjectof
ohemicalwarfare,theaverageindividualwouldhavehada;more
thoroughunderstandingofthatsubject- Asthefivehoursin-
structioncgareredchemicalwarfarefromitshistorytogasmask
drill,thefLmeallottedwasinsufficient. Althoughtheirtrain-
ingcouldhavebeenmoreextensive/themenhadaprettygood.
knowledgeofthetypesofchemicals,Itseffectsanditsremedies *
Theywereindoctrinatedinthegasalarmsand'theuseoftheir
gasmasks. ..,. .,
. * ' ' . '
b. Beforelandingalltroopswereissued
gasmasks,protectivecapes,andprotectiveointment.Add-
itionalprotectiveointment-,shoeimpregnite,impregnatedclothing,
anddecontaminatingapparatuswascarriedingeneralcargoaboard
shipB. Anyofthatgearcouldhavebeenmadeavailableoncall.
Eachvehiclewasequippedwith*aoneandone-half^quartdecontam-
inatingapparatus.
c* On25Feb45,Dpi6,thecollectionof
gasmasksw^sauthorised. EachCocollecteditsgasmasksand
placedthemin aGoDp."BnQtlP.ersusingEnvehlcleecollected
themasksfromtheCoDpsandplacedt^eminthe3nDps,
Page 21 of 27 Pages
OPERATION.
mmm
^ ""

* * W^ *"* ^
Chemicalwarfaresuppliesandequipment
werekeptintheBn.Dpsaftertheycameashore.
2. None*
* . .
3, None.
4. Gasdisciplineamongourtroopswasunobserved
exceptforthefactthatthe*troopsdidnot'droptheirgasmasks
untilauthorizedbytheBnCom&rtodoGO.
5, Takingtheterrainandnumberofcasualties
intoconsideration,thesalvageofgasmaskswasconductedvery.
successfully Therewerenoparticularorganizationorequip-
mentallottedforthesalvageofchemicalwarfareequipmentalone*
Salvageofallequipmentincludingchemicalwarfareequipment,was
donebyworkingpartiesfromeachCo
v
'Eachdaytrucksweremade
availabletousforsalvage. ThisBnturned*in538gasmasksfor
salvage. A thetimethose/maskswere'turned*.Inwewerenotgiven
creditforanysalvageequipment*; Thenumberofttiesegasmasks
whichwererepairedorfoundunserviceableisunknownasthey,were
turnedovertoRegtimmediatelyaftersalvage.
G. Medical -
1. *Embarkation.
a. Personnel. ThemedicalPers embarked
aboardtheUSS.PRESIDENTJACKSONon111ab45alongwiththetroops
oftheBn,theCoAidHenwiththeirrespective0
r
3, andthetwo
aidstationteamswithacollectingsectionfromCoA3dHedBn
with^HqCo. ^
b. Material. Immediatemedicalequipmentand
supplieswerecarriedaboardbythePers* TheJeepambulanceand
onetrailerofmedicalequipmentwasloadedandstoredinithehold
oftheship. Ourtendayback-upsuppliesandourheavycombat
fieldequipmentwasloadedasbulkcargoin cheholdoftheship.
2. AboardShip. .
. .
a, Sickness. Therewasnoincidenceofser-
ioussickness ~aboardsh'ip. Sickcallswereheldtwicedailyand
onlytheordinarymonorailmentswere encountered.
b. SanitaryConditions. Thesanitarycon-
ditionsaboardtheUSSPRESIDENT JACKSCNwerevery satisfactory..
Headswerekeptcleanatalltimesandthoroughlyscrubbeddown
daily. Livingquarterswereclean,althoughthe*
r
werecrowdedand
ventilationwaspoor. Themesses*galleys,cooksandmessmenwere
satisfactory* . ",. . .
c. SpecialPrecautions. Noneweretakenother
thangeneralsanitarymeasures~
3. Debarkation.
a. Personnel. KedioalPer6weredebarkedas
follows: CoAidHenwentashorewiththeirrespectiveunits. The
FwdechelonaidstationconsistingofoneKedicalOfficer,twelve
corpsmenandonhalfoftheat:tacHedcollectionsectionwasin
oneboat. Therearechelonaid
1
stationconsisting\ofoneMedical
Officpr,fourteencorpsmen?and
(
secondhalfofattached collecting
Page22of27Pages
ACTICJi.REFORT, IWC JII-IA OPERATION. (CGNT'D)
sect i on was in second boat . Both boat s were in the fourt h wave.
Remark*. Due t o unavoidable circumstances of act i on the Bn was in
LCVP's for seven (7) hours on 20Feb45 and were then brought back
and were reembarked on t he APA. Due t o t he exposure t her e was a
consi derabl e incidence of c hi l l s and fever and seasi ckness t hat
evening and ni ght , which was easi l y cont r ol l ed. The same pl an of
debarkation was followed on 21Feb45 and af t er fi ve hours in LCVP's
t he fourt h wave landed at approximately 1500
b Material. Theimmediatenedicalsupplies
werecarriedashorebytheBers. Thatportionpackedonourjeep
ambulanceandtrailer,cameashorewithoneCorpsmaninchargeof
supplyonDplusfour. Theten(10)dayback-upmedicalsupplies
werenotbroughtashoreuntilDplusfourteen(14).
c. LossesofPersa:...Material, None.
4, Ashore- AssaultPhase.
a* MedicalInstallations.
1. TheBnaidStationsweresetupas
soonasourBnwascommittedintheattackon22Fcb45,andwere
functioningatalltimesduringtheattackphase. Originally
theforwardandrearechelonsworkedasasingleunitinthe Bn
CParea,,andassoonaspossibleaforwarddressingstationwas
setupasclosebehindthelinesaspossible. Thisforwarddres-
singstationwouldgenerallymovebackandconsolidatewiththe
rearaidstationinthelateafternoonafterthelineCoshadtied
inforthenight,movingforwardagainthenextmorning. Therear
AidStationwouldmoveforwardwiththeBnCP
2. BoththeAidStationsweregenerally
setuponaroad,asclosetothecenteroftheZofAofthe'Bn,
ascoverandpassableroadswouldallow Coverwasgoodinmost
instances,awelldefiladedsitewasused. ThePerswerekeptas
welldispersedaspossible,particularstrcrsbeingplacedin
keepingmennotactuallytreatingcasualtiesinfox-holesaway
fromtheaidstationteam. Wheneverpossible,closecontactwas
keptwithotherBnAidStations,so,thatmutualassistancecould
begivenwhenneeded. Theforwarddressingstationwhichwas
quitemobilewasplaceda$closeto.criticalpointsandalongthe'
naturallineofdriftofthewalkingwoundedaswaspossibleand
stillnotbeundertooheavyenemyfire*' .
3. ProtectiveMeasuresTaken. Local
securitywasprovidedatall.timesby.havingguardsposted. In
therearAidstationthiswaspartoftheGPDr,f,while- in the
.forwarddressingstationtheHarineli'tter-bearersweredispersed
aroundthestationformingaperimeter. Coverandconcealmentwas
ntheformofdeepshellholesorbull-dozedexcavationsornatur-
alterrainfeaturesaffordingprotection. Black-outprecautions
werestrictlyenforced. AtnighttherearAidStationhadablack-
outtentinwhichcasualtiesgouldbetreated.
4. Thepurposeofmovingtheforward
dressingstationbacktotheBnCPwith.therearAidStationat
nightwastogivegreatersecurity,andtobeabletogoover
thenextdaysplanswiththeBnstaff. Alsotreatmentcouldbe
givenintheblack-out tent. :.-
Page23of27pages
jSm Hospitalization. Ifo hospitalization was
carried out by this activity,
c. Evacuation.
!/Evacuationofthewoundedfromthefront
lineswascarriedoutbymeansoflitter-bearers,mainlyMarinesand
especiallydesignatedCorpsmenwhoaccompaniedtheMarinelitter-
bearers. Theseteamsbroughtthestretchercasxjsandwalkingwoundec
backtothe-forwarddressingstation,andafteremergencytreatment
wasgiven,'thesecasualtieswereevacuatedbyjeepambulance. Some
ofthecaseswereevacuatedbacktotherearAidStationwherefur-
thertreatmentwasinstitutedbeforeevacuationtotheliedCo;
otherswereevacuateddirectlytotheKedCowithout'goingthrough
therearAidStation.
8. Evacuationofthscasualtiesonthe
wholewasadequateandalsowiththegreatestexpediencypossible,
,0noccasionslitter-partieswerepinneddownbyenemyfireforsome
timeandnotuntillateinthe.eveningsafter,thelineCoshadtied
%
inwasitpossibletogetthe*casualtiesout. Cnoneoccasion,it
wasimpossibletogetjeepambulances,up'totheforwardAidStation
becauseofmortarfirealongtheroad. TheCollectingSectionwas
thenusedtotakestretcherpartiesbackto apositionwherethey
couldbe.putontheambulance* Afterseveralhours,anewtrail
waslocatedand^madepassablefor'theambulanceandthiscondition
wasrelieved.
d. Casualtiestreated.
1,Totalnumber-648.IncludesSk,WIA, DGtf
VIA
SICK
Duty 83 Duty 3
Evaciiated: I^acuated:
Ambulatory 76 Ambvo.itory- 22
Stretcher 330 Stretcher 126
TV\T-f
DOW 8
o
TO&aL. "TBT
TOTAL
RECAP
WI*. 489
DO^ 8'
SICK 15J.,
GrandTotal648
2. Types^ofwounds:
Head 52
Trunk(Chest&Back)129
tipperExtremities .104
LowerExtremities 112
Abdomen 14
TOTAL 411
BlastConcussion 78
Page24of27Pages
ACTIONREPORTjTMb$*!/CPEHaTICN (CCOT'D)
2. Thetypesofcasualtiestreatedwere
varied. Woundsoftheextremmtiespredominated. Headinjuries
werealsoquitehigh* Theincidenceofpenetratingchestand
abdominalwoundswasnotextremelyhigh. BlastConcussioncases
wereextremelyhighforthefirstthreedaysoftheoperation.
Duringthelatterstagestherewerefewerofthesecases,and
manyofthesehadfragmentationwounds.
e. Sanitation. Theusualsanitarymeasures
inthefieldwerecarriedoatadequately,*;&nospecialpre-
cautionswerenecessar.y. WhentheBn*
T
asinanassemblyarea
closed-inheadswereused. Theseandallgarbageandtrashdis-
posalDpswereeitherburnedoutorsprayed'daily. Whenhotfood
wasbroughtuphotwaterforwashingmessgearwasfurnished*
TreatedwaterwassuppliedbyBnQM.
f. DisposalofDead,
1. Our("cadworeremovedassoonasit
waspossibletogettothem,byapartyofr.onfromtheBnBurial
andG-ravesDetail. Thebodieswerecollectedintooneareaand
pickedupbytruckfromthe,RegtlBurialandG-ravesDetail/and
transportedtotheDivCem '..
2. Enemydeadthatwereencounteredwere
buriedunderseveralfeetofearth. Theseburialplaceswere'
sprayed-whensprayingsolutionwasobtained. Afterthisthebodies
werefirstsprayedbeforebeingburied.
inthetroops*
g. Therewerenoepidemicsorunusualdiseases
h. DentalService. Nodentalservicegiven.
1. CareofCivilians. None
J. PrisonersofWar,careof. Therewereonly
two(2)PCWscaredforbythisactivity. On16Mar45whenthefor-
warddressingstationwaslocatedat235"HO".
r
(SW)thefirstPCW
wasbroughtinbyastretcherfrom0-Co,andwastreatedbythe3n
Surg, TheP'OVThadthree(3)badlyinfectedwounc
1
^aboutthehead.
andchinandaninfectedvoundoneachleg. .Ala^jewoodensplinter
wasextractedfromthechinwound* Thewoundsweredressedwith
sulfadressings. POWwasevacuatedtoRegtbyjeep-ambulaiace. On
21Har45,atBnAidStation,locatedat235I.IKE(WC),thesecond
PCWwastreatedbytheBnSurg. Hehaddetonatedagrenadeinhis
hand,andhadseverelylaceratedbothhi",uands. Asulfadressing
wasappliedandmorphinewasgiven. Howasevacuatedbyjeep-am-
bulancetoRegt.
kt'MedicalOrganization. Thepresenttypeof
organizationfortheBnwasveryadequateandsuitable. Theatt-
achedcollectingsection,however,wasusedverylittlebecause
theambulancewasabletoevacuatedirectlyfromtheforwarddres-
singstationexceptontwooccasions. Thecollectionsectiondoes
notworkforwardoftheAidStationthereforetheywerenotneeded.
Itissuggestedthatthecollectingsectionbedroppedfromthelied
OrganizationoftheBn,exceptpossiblytwo(2)orthree(3)men
whowouldbeusedtoaccompanytheambulanceonits
;
triptothe
FieldHospitaltogiveanytreatmentneeded''duringthatperiod.
Page25of27pages
OPERATION
1. IledlcalPersonnel* < -
1. TheMedicalPcrsoftheBnwasquite
adequategoingintotheassault.phase*.FiveAidlienwereassigned
toeachofi;hethroelineCos,oneAidKanwiththe1;rtPlat,one
maninchargeofresupply,andtheremain...igGorpsrnenwereassigned
toeachofthetwoAidStations."Acollectingsectionofthirteen
(13)menwasattachedtotheBn,butwereUJcdvery3-ittle. (See
paraK.)
2. Theto&alnumberofCorpsmen,whowore
originallywiththeBnonlanding,lostduringtheOpnwasW o (S)
KIAandtwenty-one(21)WIAorsick,andevacuated. Four(4)of
thosemenreturnedtodutyandfinishedtheOpn, .
3. WereceivedatotalofSIreplacement
CorpsmenduringtheCpn. Ofthosetwenty-one,three(3)wereKIA
andone(l)DOtf, Three(3)werewounded"andone(1)ofthesere-
turnedtoduty. Ten(10)weretransferredbacktotheirparent
organizationbeforetheendoftheassaultphase* Twomorere-*
turnedotheparentorganizationattheendoftheassaultphase.
4. ThestateoftrainingofalltheCorps-
menwasverygood,andtheyfunctionedwell*.
5. Therearenospecialtiesneededinthe#
BnliedOrg. >
"m. FieldKedicalEquipemnt. Nearlyallour
fullallowancesof.combat.fieldequipmentwascurled. Thisin-
cludedunits1and3/5to12,and14and15* Theseunitswere'
uptofullallownace.
Ouronlylosswasinlitters. Oneunit
9wasstolenandseverallitterswere1c; .>whenlitter-teamswere
hitbyenemy.fire.
Fieldequipmentxf<asveryadequateand
suitable. SomeofitwasunnecessaryinaBnliedset-up,the
mostnotableexamplesbeingunit12and15. Unit12isnot
practicabletoset.upandthelittersinunit15areawkwardfor
thementocarryanddonotfitwellonthejeepambulance.
.Resupplyfromthe"RegIfcdCo,andEvae
Hospwasverysatisfactoryexceptduringthelatterstagesofthe
Opn. Itwasdifficulttoobtainlittersbecauseairevacuation
wasbeingusedextensively,,andthelitterswereflownout,but
nonebroughtbacktotheisland.
n, MedicalSupplies. &fullallowanceofUed
Suppliesplusaton(10)dayback-upsupplywerecarriedintothe
OpnV However,theten(10)dayback-upsupplywasnotbrought
ashoreuntilDplusfourteen(14),andifresupplyfromrearech-
elonshadnotbeensosatisfactory,wewouldhavebeenin.dire
needofsupplies. Therewereno-appreciablelosses.
Thesupplyoflargebattledressingsin
theunit7isfarabovethatrequired,>anditwcnr.dbebetter,to
increasethequantiuyofc;mallbattledressings; Theallowance
ofserumalbuministoosmall. Anallowance.of2bOunitswould
bemoresatisfactory. Itisalsosuggestedthat500ccun-ifcsof
plasmabesuppliedratherthanthe250ccunit. Anallowanoeof100
unitsissuggested.
Page26of27pages L
Resupplyofmedicalsupplieswasquitegood,
exceptforanoccasionalshortageofserumalbumin. Therewasno
resupplyofbrandy, * '
o. MotorVehiclesandRollingstock. Onejeep
ambulanceandonetrailerweretakenashore. T/<.arcwasnoloss
exceptforthe-lossofthesparetireforthejeep.,Attachedjeep
ambulancesfromRegtandMcdCowereveryadequate
Thetrailerwasusedintransportinglied
suppliesandequipment, . ,
p. QuartermasterEquipmentandSupplies. No
quartermasterequipmentorsuppliesusede::jcptforblack-outtent.
q. KalariaandEpidemicCont-'olEquipmentand
Supplies*
AtabrineOr.Ii 2,000tabletscarried*
Noneused,
Quinine0-r.Ill 2,000tabletcarried.
Noneused.
5, Ashore-AftercompletionAssaultPhase*
a. Hospitalization, None-
' >
b. MedicalandQuartermastersuppliesand
Equipment. Adequate.
c. Sanitation. GeneralFieldSanitation
measurescarriedout,
d. FoodandWater, Adequate.
e. Sickness.*Epidemicorunusualdiseasesin
troopsornativepopulation. None.
6, Recommendations: Seeparagraphsk,m,andn.
PARTV* - 0CH01.USIGN'AND^ECOlil-iENDaTlONS.'
A. Noadditionalrecommendationstomake. Allrecom-
mendationsandconclusionsareembodiedinthep-^agraphso'fPART
J " -
C-* A, PERCY
Page 27 of 27 pages
HEADQUARTERS,IDSATTALIOIT,
2BT11VHIBBFORCE."IFTK81^.
11April,
From;
!rheCommandingOfficer.
fo:
TheCommandingOfficer.21stMarines,
Subject:
ActionReport.
References (a) Jd Marine Division General Order
>T
umber 137*
Enclosure: (A)SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMap1:10,000ofIwoJima*
VolcanoIslands.
PartI# Summary.
1. Missionofthisorganization,namelytobeembarkedaslanding
forcereserve,wasmadeknowntotheofficersofthiscommand.J)January, U
(a) 15 January, 19^5 to 12 February, I9H5 complete training
phase.
(b) 13 February,. 19^5 to 21 February embarked for passage
to target area.
(c) 21February, 19^5 to 16 March, 19^5 conducted active oper-
at i ons on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands.
*
2. Thisbattalionleadingteam("*-2i)->.r>artofRCT21arrivedat
thetransportareathemorningofIWayat1000isCorpslandingForceReserve.
OnD/litwasdebarked1:tosma*
1
"
1
boats,snentthod^yon
+
waterandw^.s
reembarkedwithoutlanding, OnU/2(February21)itwo,saebarkedagainin
accordancewiththedebarkation scheduleandwasla.r.ilodonbeachTellow2at1600
thaidateandproceededtoanassemblyarea^ Theregimentwasattachedthento;
theFourth!Division* Thisbattalionmadeonemajorattackduringthisphasein
whichitseizedthecenterofairfieldnumbertwo ttwasthenpassedthrough'.
byvabattalionofthe9tkMarinesandremainedinreserveattachedtothe9th
Marines. Itsnextmajorattachwasunder21stMarinescontrolwhenitseijsedthe
villageofMdtoyama. Itwasthenattached,tothe9thMarinesandremainedin
reserveforaday. Itrevertedagainto21stMarinescontrolandattackedagain
ontheleftoftheDivisionZofA* Uponrevertingtoreserveitwasagain
attachedtothe9*hMarinesandconcludedtheremainingd'aysoftheactiveoper-
ationinliquidatingtheareaknownas Cushman
f
sPocket* Uponconclusionofthe
organizedresistancethisbattalionwasassignedthepatrolareainthenorth
centralpartoftheisland(aroundHill362)andeliminatedal^.enemy resistance
there.
PartII. Preliminaries.
1. Compositionofreporting command*
(a)ThiscommandwascomposedofanInfantrybattalionwith
temporarilyattachedJointAssaultSignalCompanyunitsconsistingofanair
liaisongroupandanavalgunfiregroupandatVarioustimeshadaplatoonof
Company Engineers,aplatoonofWarDogsandaplatoonoftanksattached.
2* Inasmuchasthe.missionassigned thJ *unitplaceditasthe
reservebattalionof aregimentapartofadivision'incorps'reserve,nospecific
missibncouldbeassignedpriortoD-day* Thegeneralnatu:.^ofthe.attackwas
knownandextensivetimewasdevoted to.theassaultofpill"boxesanduseofpole
charges,flamethrowersanddemolitions* As'.for'rf^tGa^^^s^onedivisionC^Xwas
rt(Cont'd).
heldtoperfect communi#^jlrins
f
oneregimentalCMCwasheldtofurtherperfect
techniqueandonecombineaiHfantryartilleryfiringproblemwasheldforthe
battalioninwhichallinfantrybattalionweaponsplusoneplatoonofregimental
weaponsJ5mSelfPropelled,onepTatoonof 31MLAnti-tankwithonebattalionof
75
mm
PackHowitzersindirect supportparticipated.
3 Sincet^emissJonofthisbattalionwastolandonorderona
beachtobeannouncedasregimentalcombatteamreservenospecificmissionwas
assignedandnoplanscouldbemadeotherthantoembark,preparedtolandinthe
assaultifnecessaryandtoaxpecsanything. . ' ,
^. Forposition,anddispositionof*r^opaattheoutsetofthe
actionseeoverlaynumber(l). Composition* HeadquartersCompanyand3rifle
companies,attached:81mmKbrt*,-rplatoon1-21,Co"C*,*HhTankBattalion.
5 Inthefirstmajorattackofthisunitinthevicinityofair-
fieldnumbertwothefollowingenemyforceswereestimated(&-2)j
(a) 309 Ind Bn.
(b) Ind MSCo 2d ND3n.
(c) 3d Anti-Tank Co. 10 Ind 3n.
(d) Uaval Cruard Force (35O.men).
(e) ^Taval Construction Engineers (35O)fflen),
Approximate tota^ defending the entire se-.^or 1,750 men.
In the second major attack in
/v
the vicinity of the sulphur mine
and'the village of Motoyama thence north the following were estimated:
(a) 3d Bn i f Ind Regt. ' '.
(b) One (l ) Co of 1st Ind M(JBn* '
(c) One (l ) light mortar platoon* ' ~"'
(d) Naval Gaard Force' (250 men). . ' . *
(e) Naval Construction Bn (Par^u - 2^0 men)
n
"
(f) 26tix Tank I.-\>tl Hqs - lU tanks.
Ifoto; ThGGOforcesweresointermingled thatitisnotpossible
toindicatefrowmaterialnowathandtheircorrectdispositionontheground.In
someinstancesFavalGuardForceandArmyunitswerekilledinthesamepillbox
manningasinglemachinegun. . '
partIII. Chronologicalaccountoft
s
.eaction.
1. Alltimereferredtois2^10hours(Kingtime).
Mapreference: SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMaJ>1:10,000of
IwoJima
t
VolcanoIslands,SeeSnclosure(A).
B-Day. 19February,I9U5.
1000 Arrivedintransportare^offIwoJima,VolcanoIslands*
SmbarkedinUSSBolivar.
D/l. 20February,I9U5.
0S0O Disembarkedlandingteamandproceededtocontrolvessel
offBeachYellow2. Continuedtorendezvousvarea,awaitingorders.
IU30 OrderedtoreturntoBolivarandreembark.
1730 Alltroops^.nd.vehiclesofflr.^ttripofboatsreembarked.
Shipretiredforthenight*
Sained
CR2
-
/57J
iotj
ActionReport (Cont
f
d).
ruary,19U5
disembarkedlandingteamandproceededtocontrol
vesseloffBeach.Yellow
I63O Receivedorderstoproceedto3eacnYellowandlandtroops
thentoproceedtoregimentalassemblyareal^SHow.
1710 CPestablished, deceivingsporadicmortarandartillery
fire. Hocasualties. Rainedalldayaffordingsomeconcealment fordebarkation
andlandingwhich,duetodifficultbeachwasmadetwoboatsabreastat atime.
ReportedtoRegimentalCPasregiirentalreserve.
D/3. 22TVoruaiy,19^5.
Remaii^dinar^emblyareaasregimentalr;jrve. Receiving
occasionalmortarandart-1"
1
..Loryfire, 23stRCTattache/ic *;&hMarineDivision
executosapassageoflirojof3dR'.Uandattacksinitszoneofaction,1st
Battalionontheright,;.'.j3atteiionontheleft,3dBattalionremaininregimen-
talreserve..
SimmMortarPlatoonattaciiedinsupportof1stBattalion
21stMarines* Went ixitopos5;.-ic**1^'j
/ . Hascontinuedtorainwithli
o
*ntfogallday. Received inter-
mittentshellingalldayintheassemblyareawithonlyonecasualty,fortunately
Dfk, 232'ebruary,
Regiment continuesintheattack3-21 stillremainregimental
reserve.
1000 Receivedorderstoproceedtoassemblyarea16^Easyat
discretion.
IU15 Arrivedatassemblyareainl6USasy,receivingheavy
mortarfirewithconsiderablecasualties.
B/5. 2UFebruary,19U5.
0U3O Receivedwarningorc^.ertopassthrough1-21andattackin
zoneofactionat0915-tofoll-wthreebattalionsoftanksacrossairfield
number2.
0900 CompletedmovetoU )
#
Has i ^of
+
ks
' ' < * , * .
0310 Orders received to Jucrg p.xf on $im&tanks or no tanks.
0915 Jumpedoffon'time,receivingheavymortar,artillery
andanti-tankgunfire. (S00overlaynumber1)-'
0923 3nCP-OPandreservecom'panybeingheavily shelled.
Stillnosignofthetanks.
0930 Receivedwrittenattackorder(15minutesaftert.hour),
.Planfor3battalionsoftanksunderdivisioncontrolchanged. Onecompany
oftankstobeattached.
O9U5 TankliaisonofficerarrivedatOP. Co "C
11
,Uth$ank
Battalionreported6tanksoperationalandwereplacedinsupportof"I"
Companytoreducepillboxes. Bothcompaniesadvancingagainstheavyopposition
andsustainingextremelyheavycasualties.
IOI3 CompanyCommander
H
K
W
Companyhapbeenwounded. Executive
Officerdirectedtomoveforwardandassumecommartd/ .
1017 Company,Commander
H
I
W
Compaqhasbeenkilled. Executive
Officerdirectedtoassumecommand*
1057 Left'platoonof"K*Company"badlydisorganizedandswing-
ingfartotheleft.
w
I
fl
"K* Companyreorganizedandincontactwith Company,
leadtank^disabled"byanti-tankgun. Remainderorderedtowithdrawuntilgun
could"besilenced,
1120
tt
I
tt
-CompanysendingapatroltomakecontactwithUth
Divisionontheright.
OPheavilyshelledincludingairbursts.
platoonof"K
H
Companyhasbrokenacrossairfield
number2andisattackinghighgrindat199,Xray.
115Sleftplatoonof"K"Comp\yisacrossstrip,bothplatoons
attackinghillwithbaycotsanr
1
grenades,
n
X
n
1215 Ourartilleryhasdriven Companybackoffthehill.
2*21calledandtoldtolift, "K"Companyagainseizedhillbutwasdrivenback
b y J a p s . * . . - .
n
K
l!
Companyagainattackedandseizedhill199Xray,
butwasagaindrivenback. Bothcompaniesreceivingenfiladefirefromboth,
flanksduetofailureofunitsonrightandlefttokcpabreast,
1350 "I"Companyhasreachedtheairfield.
n
X?Companyhas
attachedandagainholdshill199"rayafterdesperatehandtohandstruggle.
Leftplatoonof"I*Companyhascrossedthefieldand
n
R
fr
isattackingtotieinwith Company.
1510 Bothcompaniesareacrossthefieldandholdtheline
199Xray,Yoke-receivingheavyfireofalltypes,casualtiesheavy,
1520 Moved?.$f.Companybattalionreserveto182William*
Orderedtomopupbehindfrontlines,
1S20 V Companylocatedanddestroyedcarefullyconcealed
anti-tankgunthathaddisabled3LTJEtankttismorning. Companiesorderedto
diginandhQldpositionsatallcosts*
2000 Ammunitiontakentofrontlinecompaniesintrailertied
totank, .* ,.
w
I
rt
2015 Cieplatanof"L
w
Companyattachedtr Companyto
affecttieinwithl}thDivisionontheright. :.::;:..,'*. ".'-.
2100.to2^00Bothcompaniesreceivedsmalllocalcounter-
attackseasilyrepfrlsed,.
! U/6..25February,19^5.
0100
n
K*Companyrepulsedaheavylocalcounterattack,regain*-
ingthepositionoccupiedbyonesquadwhichWarwipedout.
013O Three(3)sixinchor^largercoastaldefensegunsfiring
intoourlinesobserved, JTavalGun?iresilencedthembutnotknownwhether
theyarepermanentlyknockedout.
X. ,,
4
&P*
- . ; , * . * . '
^iActiojnReport (Cont
f
d)
receivedthat3-21wouldbepaHed throughby
1-9atO93Oand3-21wouldassemble in165Able,F
P700
tt
K" Company againrepulsedasharpcounterattack. Only
officerremainingwithcompanynowIstltArchambault.
O93O 1-9passedthroughourlines* CommandingOfficer,1st
Battalion,9thMarinestookcommandof;zoneofactionat0S00. 3-2131mm Mortar
platoonattachedto1-9. -, -
1000 BCT21nowpassedtocontrol"of3dMarineDivision*
1200 Commencedwithdrawal fromthelinesonesquadatatime
t
receivingmortarandartilleryfire.
l600 Battalionassembled in165Able,tfoauAttachedto9th
Marinesasregimental reserve. Alertedtobereadytoattackinnfiediately.
l6lO Receivedattackorder.
I63O Orderscancelled.
I63O Ordered tomovetonewassemblyarea.
I635 Orderscancelled. Receivedintermittent shelling through-
outthenight.
D/7. 26February,191*5.
Remainedinassemblyareaasregimentalrpp-*vereceiving
occasional shelling.
1530 ReceivedordersfromRegimentalExecutiveOfficer,9-th
Marinestocommitbattalionimmediatelyontherightofthelino- Commanding
OfficerreporttoCommandingOfficer9thMarinesf
n
- instruction.
Orderscancelled* Directedto-nutbattalionin12Hike,
ITunasregimentalreserve. Proceededtonewassemblyarea,receivinglight
eaellingontheway. Received 3heavymortarsiiollhits-believedtobe
orlarger* Sustainedlkcasualties*
Heavilyshelledatintervalsthroughout thenight.
27February,
Remained inassemblyarea,receivingoccasional shellingfrom
alargecalibermortar,probably 150mm.
1200 Revertedtocontrolofparent organisation.
5
tt
I
r
Companyobservedanenemysocketlauncherbearing
355fromtheirCP.
B/9. 2SFebruary,I9U5. .
0626 Two(2)100poundrocketbombslandedneartheCP
Stillreceivingoccasionalshellingbyartilleryusin^timefireandbyaheavy
mortar. Receivedorderstopassthrough1stBattalion,9thJ'irinestocontinue
att.acl^to0-1. tSeeoveilaynur"ber2). Moved
tt
I
n
'and"L
11
companiesacross,
airfieldnumber2. -Receivingsniperand-somemachine'gunfire.
0700-EstablishedOPat199Yoke.*Moved
ff
K
ft
Companytoreserve
araIo2How, ... -
0800 Bothcompanies,enragedinfirefighttryingtoreach
designatedL35on200Peterand199Oboe.
rt (Cont'd).
0S15 Xinghour. 3othcompaniesjumpedoffontime"L*on
theright
n
l
n
ontheleft. ProceedingforwardagainstheavyResistance.
V
t
n
O83O Companyright.beingcrowdedbyleftcompanyof
Division* RequestedCommandingOfficer,2dBattalion,23rdMarinesto
changehisdirectionofattackandstaywithinhis"boundaries.
0930 BattalionhasadvancedHoOyardsagainstheavyresist-*
ance. *!
w
Company,23rdMarinesStillcrowdingintoourone
t
foretrig"*%*
Companytotheleft.> > . -
1112 Situationnowyerydifficult;entiredirectionofattack
hasswung90totheleft. Ourfrontisnowonthelinewhichshould'indicate
our"boundary. Elementsof"E"Company,23rdHarinedorderedtobre^ccontact,
withdrawandassemblenearairfieldnumber2.(north c.~"*.)
#
.Ekvealerted reserve
(
n
K
fl
Company)tocoverthegapassoonasitis
1150 Committedreservecompanyon
ir
L
n
'Coispaay'srightto
rectifydirectionofattack.
M
ii"Companyorderedtocommitsupportplatoonon
itsright,pullleftplatoonbackinsupport,thencommit itontherightto
reorganizetheline*
n
I
fl
1200 Companyorderedin
<
batw
f
il*onreserve,continue
cleaninguppocket ofresistancein2004'ole
OPestablishedon200PeV~r.tfillresumetheattack
at1300.
1300
fl
K
w
Companyjumpedoffontime,
1305
l
%* Company jumped^off. , .
Attackisprogressingsteadilymeetingheavyresistance. ^
DisplacedCPtodefilade inrearof200Peter.
Bothassault companiesreceivinganunuaaallyheavy
shellingsustainingmanycasualties;leftcompanyhasreachedthe02line,
rightcompanyisfightingtheirw^y throughMotoyama.
1600 "I*Companyorderedtopassthrough
n
K* Company. "X
11
Companywithdrawnintoreserve,badlyshotupanddisorganized.
I63O Anewtypehighvelocityanti-tvikgunknockedoutat
HJ330Able.
Jourenemytanks(2mediumand2light)destroyed. Japs
reportedbyobserverplanetobefleeingtothenorth. Shelledtheiridieated
areawithunobservedresults. . .
1730 Issuedorderstodiginforthenight,leftflankbadly
exposed*
1900 .Soundofenemytanksheardinf..'ontof
n
I
H
Company.
Slightshellingthroughout the-night*
1March, ^
0015 "I"Companyrepulsed smalllocalcounterattack.
0700
tt
l
1
*Company capturedawoundedprisonerthefirsttaken
intheoperationbythisbattalion. Heceivedorderst<
0055* '"*'
'-6-
ort(Cont
r
d)
O85& Resumedtheattack
n
L
M
Companycntheleft,
R
I
W
onthe
right.
O9I+5 ^eftassaultcompanyhastakenthevillageofMotoyama,
capturingtwo(2)70mmguns. Courseofattackisswingingtoofartotheright
inendeavoringtommaintain
A
contactwith**thDivision.
1
ATBlspottingplanewas
shotdownwhichcrashedjust"behind
H
L
n
Companyinthevillage.
0950 OPandCPwereintensivelyshelled"byheavycaliber
mortars.
1120 DisplacedOPto200Jig. Thatar*.-."beingheavilyshelle*
"byseveralflattrajectorygunslaterlearnedto"beenemytankguns,thetanks
themselvesbeingcoveredwithrocksandcarefullycamouflaged.
1135 SVontiSnesnowat200Charlie,How.
1330 Commenceddisplacingo5*?to200Item.
HecaivedadirecthiiinthsCP"bya100poundrocket
bomb. CPtemporarilyinoperative,heavyca&urltiea.
l600 Battalionattachedto9thMarinesagain. Attackis
stalemated. Bothcompaniespinneddown"byheavyrifle,machinegunandmortar
firefromentrenchedpositionsinthearea201]3asy,JiglaterknownasOushman's
pocket. Duginforthenight,receivedsporadicshellingallnightandseveral
smallscalicounterattackswhichHereeasilyrepulsed.
*D/ll, 2March,I9I+5.,
0800 Passedthroughby1stand2dBattalions,9thMarines.'
1200 Completelydisengaged. Withdrewtoassemblyarea201
Able,Poxas Regimentalreserve. CPremainedinitsposition.
Eeceivedsporadicshellingofalltypesthroughout theday
andnight.
D/12 3MarcxL,
1stand2dBattalions,9*k^iarineshave"beenunabletoadvance
againstthe'^Pocket*. Orderedtoremainasbeforeasregiirantalreservebutnot
tobecommittedexceptwithO.K.fromDivision.
\
D/13 kMarch,19^5
0300 Revsrtedtocontrolof~latMarines. Orderedtoproceea
toDivisionleftflankandattack.Kinghourtobesetwheninposition. (See
overlaynumber3)
0*400 Commencedmovementin1,0position.
Heldupuntil0700becauseofthreatofcounterattackin9th
MarinesZofA,
0930 EstablishedCPat217<**Opat218Baker, Sxtremely
heavyfogandslightmistvisibility25yards,makingmovementintoposition
extremelyslowandhazardous. "I
w
Companyengagedinfirefighfcyattackingfour
largebunkerswhichmustbecleanedoutbeforereachingtheI*D.
1100 Battalionwillattackat1130,'
V
-I
n
Company0$theright,
Companyontheleft,"Z
iU
Companyinreserveat218Baker.
t
, 1110 Kinghourchangedto
ori (Cont*d)
Both companies jumped off on time*; right flank exposed*
122$ Left flank progressing slowly Wtright flank making
no headway.
3.335 HaveadvancedaboutIOC:ards,
n
I*Company*havingtd
destroymanypill"boxesandhunkers.
IJ
L
M
1500 Companyadvancestopped"byfirefromafieldpiece0:
heavycaliber. CompanyCommander,Captain3V.Stephensonkilled. Both
companiesorderedtoconsolidatepositions. "IC*Companymoveduptocoverexpose
rightflankgapof300 yardsacrossairfieldto9thMarinescovered"bymachine
gunandmortarfire, -
v
l600 "C"Company1-21orderedtoprolong
w
I
n
Companylinesto
edgeofairfieldhuttoremainunder1stBattalioncontrol.
Actionoftheentiredaywasseriouslyhandicappedhyheavyfc,
5March,
0600 Received orders' to maintain position throughout Ahe day.
Ordered companies to thoroughly reconnciter area which had not baen previously
possible due to heavy fog.
1200 Reconnaissance party led "byBattalion Ccmaanding Officer
located the fi el d piece that had halted the advance of
ff
L
lt
Company the day'before.
Commanding Officer of 2d Battalion, 12th Marines at^entpted to destroy i t with a
105 mission which failed due to angle of fall,, PJ*C. Me Clnre, glmm Mortar
ohserver/ fi nal l y got 1di rect hXi putting the gun out of -otion and ki l l i ng the
cfcew. ,
1600 Two anti-tank guns located in same strong point .firing
from concrete tunnels whose enuru^ces were "blocked at will"S^- concrete slabs.
Two ,50 caliber machine gui.i: were "brought up and -mplaced to fire into the
entrance
lf
'bottling
tt
them up
0
Request attack shi i t to ri ght of ridge along road
to RJ 322 on "basis of reconnaissance. Hocket st r i ke denied,
D/15 6 March, 19^5.
Severalattemptsatinfiltrationblockedduringthenight.
0930 1stBattalion,21stMarinesorderedtoexecutepassage
oflines. Uponbeingdisengagedtoassemblein200ible
t
Bakerasdivision <
reserve.
1500 Assembledin200Able,Bakerlightehallingduring
movement,sustainingseveralcasualties*
. 7 March, 19*6.'
0700 No contacts during night.
Revert to regimental control, commenced movement to
assembly area EJ 330 as regimental reserve; " '
1155 <3P set up 217 J i g. Receiving sporadic mortar f i r e.
Ordered to return to assembly a r : i 200 Able, Baker.
Againshelledenroute,
D/17 8March,

0300 Attached to 9*^.Marines*.. Ordered to pass through 1st

.Battalion, 9th, klarines and attack 0750. (See ove^laf
ort (CcntM).
0500 Commenced movement. .-
0700. CP established 200 Item.
ff
L 0750 Jumped off on time, *T
f<
on ri ght, "K
11
on l ef t , in
H
I
n tt
I
w
rBserve. Company right flank moving forward slowly; l ef t flank of
Ccmpany and
n
K
ff
Company making l i t t l e or no gain,
0810 "I" Co pinned down "byBlue planes bonbing and strafing
our l i nes in carrjring out a ^th Division strike* Requested strike cancelled.
0900 Strafed again by Blue pl anes. Reported requests made
to stop strike had no ef f ect .
* - - ~ " ,
n
l
n
1000 Company "badly shaken up by "bombing - suffered many
casualties teinly bl ast or consusion* Thb impetus of the attack has "been lost*
ir
K
n
1100 Attack has stalemated. Company pinned down, sustai n-
ing heavy casualties in the replacements received the night before* Blue tank
knocked out by satchel charge* Japs used time f i re to drive back our covering.
1700 Uo further gains made. Ordered.to dig in for the nig&i.
D/lS S March, I9U5.
0733 A l ocal counterattack against ""
r
ompany was repulsed*
0950 Resumed the attack. Terrain very di f f i cul t , unable to
maneuver tanks wel l . ' '
(
H13O
n
]p
f
^Company has destroy^; 17 p i l l bases and has gained
about 75 yards. Also destroyed 2 large caliber anti-tank guns.
CaughtalargegroupofJapsin amartarbarragekilling
agreatmany,estimatedat175"butthisfigureisprobablyover estimated,
D/19 10March,191*5.
0800 Passed *L
n
Company through
tt
K
ff
Company to continue attack.
Xing hour 0$10. ""
t
n
L
n
0900 ompany moving forward slowly against extremely heavy
resi stance,
1100 Japs manned the turret of Blue trnk destroyed the day
before and knocked out another Blu-e Tank in a defi l e which i s the only avenue ,
f approach for tanks to the center of resi stance.
- 1217 Received orders to disengage al l companies, bypass pocket
and push to the sea.
f
*
1230 Orders cancelled, resumed the attack though making no
progress.
Scored a hit on the Jap manned Blue tank and 'completely
destroyed it
1500 Attack i s stopped. Requested rocket sled ($*2) to be
brought up. 3>ag in for the night* . '
D/20 11 March,
Remainedinposition to, fi.re.'.rocks,,s. During^courseofday
fired200rockets intothearea
;
ipreparingto ^ t ""*"*"' ^"'"" "~
rt (Cont'd).
tt
L
tt
1500 Company Jumped off, "I*-Company ordered to maintain
posi ti on and Support
w
L
n
Company "by f i re, Made a gain of about 50 yards and
were immediatley piimed dtwn. Companies ordered to dig in for the night. Rec-
eived sporadic shel l i ng throughout the night but i s lessaning in volumn every
day. . . .
Vfel 12 March, 1^5
0600 Orderedtoholdpostionandsend"
n
Companyarouh&the
rightflanktotheseaandthenmove*"Companyuptheridgeinawesterly
fl
K
H
directiontoapproachthepocketfromtherear* Companywasthentofill
thegapfrom1-9to"I*Companyflank.
0830
n
K*Companyisfightingtheirwayuptheridgetocarry
outorders, *
H
K
W R
C
n
I315 Company using tanks as s i ^e d to Company, Jthr
Marines has knocked out 3 large bunkers and in making progress.
1800
n
t}
f
Company ordered to ba relieved by reserve company-
of 19* Heturned to former, reserve posi ti on*
D/32 13March,
07OO Hoactivityduringthe1
09*42 Receivedorderstomoveto~nassemblyarea200George,
How,revertto21stMarinescontrol.
1300 DesignatedCorpsResarye,
D/23.li*March,
i Ko act i vi t y. Remained in position* Held school for replace-
ments on use of flamethrowers and squad t act i cs.
15 March, 1 9 ^
N
1030 Set up C3Pin new assembly area* 2To act i vi t y.
B/25 16 March, 19^5*
0600 Battalion reverted to control 21st 14arines
0700 Ordered to proceed to vi ci ni t y RJ J30 and assemble as
regimental reserve.
0830 Battalion placed in assembly area in 218> Item.
05[00 One platoon Company
rt
K
tr
plus attached Engineers demoii.W
ions team ordered to patrol the beach behind the l i nes, Killed Ik Japs, no
casual ti es.
No further act i vi t y. Word received that organized resistance
on the island bad been eliminated* ;.;
4
. ,..
B/26. 17 March, 191+5.
Commenced active patrolling. in
;
assigned aector (See overlay
number 5) Dispatched 3 patrols consisting of reinforced platoons i n respective '
areas. " " .
Total tFaps.ki l l ed for the
sort(Cont'd).
March,I9U5/.'
ContinuedPatrolling,
1300 Displacedbattalionto new-assemblyareatn219Love.
l600 3sta&lishedutpostsat 219Tare,2022asy,202Toke.,
Providedforlocalsecurityby establishingcossackposts
aroundperimeter* BstablishedcoastwatchOP on Hill36*.* TotalJapskilled
fortheday- 2,
D/2& 19 March,l$k%
Continuedpartollinganddestroying#f caves,ftightv>asacti\
withmanysmallenemygroupsharrassingoutposts-. TotalJapskilled,- 25
t
.Blue**casualties, '
D/29 20March*I9I+5.
Continuedpatrollinganddestroyingof caves> Commenced.
salvageandpoliceofpatrolarea* TotalJapskilled-l4
#
D/30 21March,
Ccntinuedpafcfrtllin^andclosingof caves,salvagingandpollc
-Buried182deadJaps,
Killed'andburied17Japs
D/31 22 March,19^5, .
Continuedroutinepatrollingandsalvagework,
0S00 Xiaipongroupof 1stBattalion,Ikjtb.Infantry,tj.S;.
ArmyGarrisonforcearrivedcrreconnaissanceof sector.
Killedandburied2kJaps* /
Sustained^.casualties~ 1*#arDog, ..,
D/32 23March,
tt
&
n
' 0600 and ^"Companies, l^fth Infantry attached tb 5-21
for patrol purposes.
0600 Dispatched 6patrols "of ls^i^ad =ach (Reinforced) with
l^Iarine guides, radio operators*.War Dogs and demol i tions.men.
Total Japs ki l l ed - 18 ' ' "
. . ' D/332kMarch,
0700 Commanding Officer, 1stBattal i on, ll+7th Infantry assume
for patrol arsa. Continued salvage .nd pol i ce *fthearea.
D/3U 25March,
x . ( * ' . ' , v . -
Continued pol i ce vorfe awaiting orders to embark.
B&5 26March, 19%.
I7OO Smbarked inLST SOO, then
return touam.
ort (Cont'd)
J>art IV. Comment*
* . . . * ,
A* Administration.<
1. ., Eecommen4thatSOJP,forcasualtyreportingto"becarriedout*
Itisimperativet&atallunitleadersdowntoanctincludinggroupleaders"be
thoroughlyfamiliarwithallphasesofcasualtyreporting,
r
Aledgerwasusedby.thisbattalionvitheachcasualtybeing
enteredasverifiedreportseverereceivedfromcompaniesoncaausuLtyreportli
as follows;
;
'.
i i i i K t; i . i i t i ~~*~
t i . t i t t i i t i
I I r f t ' . t j i t i
This ledger served as the permanent record for refersnce thro/Ughdo&tthe combat
phase of the-operation. It i s a quick, easy reference in"* compact form.
The present Burial and Graves Begistration Section has proved
to be invaluable d*2rin the operation. It was experienced that when a man ^s
KIA or D01 the name of the man should be ttLrn,ed over to the section for their
action. They kept a l i s t of al l dead checking th'e names off when dead wkrea
found anddelivered to the cemetery* When <3ta(* a-e thus delivered; an entr| ris
made in the above mentionfed ledger as to ^rrave Humber, Row'Number, etc. This
information i s checked with the Division Burial Bulletin, It i s recommended '
that the distribution of this bulletin ba made down to and including the
#
battalion* It i s hi^hily recommended that the unit be indicated of each man on
this bul l eti n,
2. .. The mprale of troops of this organization continued .to be
high ihroughout the operation. The adequate distribution of the news sheets^
letters of appreciation, and l etters of commendation was an important factor in.
maintaining good morale. Publicity seems to be one of the Neatest morale
builders; the menwant to know that their_efforts are being recogniz&d.
Thr rations issued were adequate and of wider variety than
heretofore issued.
Distribution of mail when the tacti'cal situation permitted
was of great help*
, the immediate removal of own dead i s considered imperative
when tactical situation permits*
3 Recommend that SOP for, handling risoners be carried out*
B " I rt el l i gerce. '
1* The maps andphotos furnished before the operation were adecu-
and s at i s f act ori l y complete, but l ater were found not to be correct.
Z
m
The maps received during th@ operation were satisfactory in
numbers,"but somewhat incorrect. Although we received numerous photos (high in
number because of needless duplication) i t i s folt that they were not always sen
to us as proaptly as possible. It would be a help i f the photographing unit'
would place grid lines on the photos of sect rs ta coincide wjtth the mapbeing'
used. It i s suggested tjiat the higher echelon do this to assure uniformity
between units. ' *
3- ^had on enlisted manof Japanese language personnel
temporarily attached to the intelligence section. He was well qualified and
could converse with the PO
T
s very efficiently* The'language officers weworker'
with from regimental headquatters were very cooperative andpromptly gave us
' . . 1 2 ~ . - '
actionHeport (Cont'd)
edfromprisoners* TheirPOWinterrogationreport!were
always
to usetheloudspeCker forvocal propaganda,
AmongthePO#
f
s this bat^ftftlSn captured only onehada surrender leaflet with
him. Theother prisoners hadnot seen anyof the l eafl ets.
5,
ative.
TheJIGPOiv teamwehadca
f
lled uponwasvery -orompt andcooper-
6.
factory.
Intelligence liaison with thonext higher echelon wassati s-
, 7 Distinct enemy tactics observed;
(a) Infiltration tobooby trap ammodumps.
1
(b)Written orders found di"^cting Japs toputacid inwater
not taken with themwhrn they withdrew.
(c) Booby trapped saki bottles.
8. Hewenemy tactirs encountered;
(a) Palling inbehind andpro<-;cihg with ourtroops at night,
(b) While TVtrolling, Japs would d'scharge grenades in caves
#
simulating suicida, their objective being to ^o lourtroops soas to ki l l them
i f they carelessly approached theca,ve thinking the enem^tobedead.
C. Operations andTraining.
1. Forseveral, months prior to theoperation this battalion
has hadnorehearsal indebarking from jiP's inLCVP
!
s. Itwasimpossible to
conduct anydebarkation rehearsals because of a lack of ship?ing f aci l i t i es.
Two debarkation dri l l s were held daily while anroute to thetarget area andthese
proved sufficient. Theactual debarkation ransmoothly andwasreasonably'^ast.
2 Theflamethrower wasthemost effecti ve weapon against forti fi ed
i nst al l at i ons. Small andmedium si ze demolitions charges (upto twenty potyids)
were suffi ci ent forp i l l boxes butwere not sati sfactory when used on cave mouths.
Shape charges (forty pounds) were necessary to cl ose t hese. 81mmfobrtarsfi ri ng
the M56*shel l with theM53delayed action fuse didconsiderable damage to p i l l
boxes andwasespeci al l y good onopan gunemplacements which could notbe reached
byartillery fire. '
3* Portableflamethrowerswsreusedaxtensi^alyagainstalltypes
ofenemyemplacementst-ndwerp.fo-nndtobeverysatisfactory. Thetank-irounted
flamethrowerswereuselessbecauseoftheirshortrangeandthedifficultyof
changingtheirdirectionoffire. Inmanyinstancesthelargeflamethrowers
mountedinturretswouldhavebeeninvaluable.Itisurgedthattheybemade
availableinthisdivisionbeforethenextoperation.
h. AtonetimeintheoT>3ration,tankswereusedtohaulammunitioz.
acrossopenterrainwhichwasdeniedtonormaltransporttionbecauseofsmall
armsfire.
5* Infantry-TankCoordinationpresentedaveryminor-problemto
thisbattalionbecauselargegroupsoftankswareneverusd.Tankswereemployee
individuallyorbyplatoonsandnormalcommunicationprovedsatisfactory*
6. Theenemyemployedhighvelocityanti-tankgunswithdevastating
effectthroughouttheentirecampaign. *int*tankmineswereusedextensivelyand
slowedtheemploymentoftanksconsiderably. Itwasalwaysnecessarytoclear,
lanespriortocallinguptanks. Inatleastoneinstancetheenemyemployedan
infantryassaultteamtodemolishatank.The
ort(Cont^&K
andthendemolishedwithasatchelcharge. "*'
7,
T
farDogsworeusedonpatrolsduringmoppingupoperations,
' / ' .
$. Therocketlaun&herWasfoundsatisfactoryagainsttanksat
rangesuptoonehundredandfiftyyards, iiocket"barrageswereusedagainstwell
duginpositions. Theycausedappreciabledamage"butcouldnot"be"broughtclose
enoughtoourfrontlinestoknockouttheresistancetoourimmediatefront.
The7-2rocketsfiredfromtankpulledaled&arewellcontrolledandshouldbe
veryhelpfulinfutureoperations.
D. Supjcly. .
1. Adequacyofalltypes,ofmountingoutsupplies,
a*Hations10in1areinadequatewhenissuedonthe"basisof
onemenuservingthirty(30)menonemeal. Since Uieinfantryareconstantlyon
themove,theprescribedmenu6annotbefollowed?therefore1caseof10in1
should"beissuedtoinfantrytroopsonthe"basisofora(1)menuperseven(7)
menforone(1)meal.
bLardorshorteningfor"bakingpurposestosupplement(C)
n
K
tt
.and rationsshould"beincreasedatleast $
2. Thenewtypemetalcontainersfor60mmmortar ammunition-sweat
andcausetheshelltorust. Theoldtypeclovsr^leafispreferred. Smallarms
ammunition .30calibercasesshouldbehalftheirsiseandtf*i^htandequipped
withcarryinghandles.
3t Pdlletiaedcargo.
a.Wilsondrumsarelimitedtoactualusebytheirsizeand
shape, Awatertightaperturewouldincreasetheirvaluefortransportingsmall
itemsrequiringprotectionsuchascommunicationandmedicalsupplies*
*+. Capturedmaterial: Previoustoanoperationunitsshouldbe
informedastotheirquoteofweaponsetcitobeturnedintohigherechelons.
Thiswouldpreventtheembarrassii^confiscationof^ticiesfromthemeninthe
lastphaseofanoperation.
5, Transportati-. Organicplusthefreedomofregimentvehicles
solvedeverytransportationproblemonthepastoperation. Theavailabilityof
iruck1tonandtruck,2-Jtontobattalions'atalltimescutthewearandtear
of-ttontruckstoaminimum.
B. Air.
1, Duetoexten^ivaconstructionunder-^ound,preliminaryheavy
strikeswereineffectual. Thedesireddegreeofneutralizationwasnotattained.
2# Airliaisonpartyfunctionedextremelywell.
3* Communication'swereadequate.
^. Airsupportforthisbattalionwasatotalfailure. Onlythree
requestsweremade. Thosewereforstrikesagainstdefinitelylocatedenemygun
positionsandallthreewererefusedduetounavailabilityof.planes,
5* Itisbelievedthatmanystrikesweregrantedfortargetsof
lowpriorityandconsequentlyplaneswerenotadequatetogr?aitlaterrequests
forhighprioritytargets. Forexampleplaneswerenotavailable toattackthree
(3)definitelylocatedgunsfiringfromconcretetunnelpositions. A lowlevel
attackwi$hrocketswastheonlysolutionbutplaneswerenotavailablebecause
theywereorbitinginresponsetoarequest forageneralstrafingmission. The
responsibilityclearlylieswithbattalioncommanderswhomustconsiderthefact
,4
niReport (Cont'd)
thattheirrequestmaydejfiri^f,someoneelsewl:onayct.ll$0minuteslaterfora
strikethatmightmakethedifferencebetweensuccessandfailure. Theymust
also"beinstructedthattheirairstrikemaydenysomeoneelsetheuseof
artilleryandnavalgunfireandthatbeforethemattercouldberectified through
n
%
n
Corpscoordinatedacriticalsituationraaydevelop* OnMarch8,19^5
Company?sattackwasstoppedinitstracksat201Charliebyanairstrikecalled
forbytheU-th.Divisioninsquares201SugarandNan. fourtimestl*eattackwas
resumedbuteachtimeBluestrikespinneddown41.3assault companies. Sveryeffcr
wasmadet6havethestrikehaltedallpfwhichproved tonoavail* Howeverthis
is"theonlyinstanceknownbythisorganizationofl^>ckofexcellent control* ^
Toreducethenumberofstrikescalledjustbecause"planeswereoverheadand
l
-
:
mightaswellbeused"andtopreventbombingcfBluetroopswhohavebeenableto
forgeahead itisrecommended thatnorequestforastrikecloserthan1000yards
tothemostforwardelementbeapprovedunlesstherequestercanshowthatthe
target, hasbeendefinitlylocated,canbaaccuratelydesignatedandthatnoother
moans{artillery,navaiigunfireormortars}canneutralizo it.
P. :' JJavalGunfire*
1. TheShoreFireControlgroupwaswellorganized,adequatein
number.andveiltrained* .
u
'
2. .. Allequipmentfunctionedproperly,
3. Effectivenessoffires,
a.Firewasmosteffectiveagainst targetsofopportunity,
b.Fireswereineffectiveagainstthecoastalcavesforthe
caveswereconstructedwithtrajectoriesofnavalgr.ufirbinmind.
c*.""Ireswithairspotswereregular^,"iodduetothefacttha
mostofthefightingwasuphrilworkand enemyartillerypositionscouldnotbe
observed fromtheground. , ,
d.Itis,estimatedthatabout30firemissionswerecalled. ITo
countingniht illumination.
- ' . ' .
h
%
Thecoordinationbetweennavalgunfireandairsupport seemed
pooronoccasion. For' example;ononeocdasiontheairobserverlocatedah
enemyartilleryposition, thegunsjustgoinrintoaction. PlanItanprevented
theuseofnavalganfireduetoplanesorbiting-forageneralstrafingmission.
Thsnextdaywhenthespottingplanearrivedovertheareathegunscouldnot
befound.
5 Theoutstandingfeatureofnavalgunfire inthisoperation
seemedtobetheexcellenceofnightilluminationandsecondly,th.3greatamount
ofnavalganfireofalltypeswasused,
6. Thepresent systemofemployment ishighly satisfactory,
G. TransportQuartermaster. '
1. Twelve, hourswerenecessarytoleadAPA3*+with88vehiclesan
shorttonsoftotalcargo. Spottingofcargoatcargo-assemblyareasaved
time,butcouldhavesavedmoretimeifcajgodelivery toassemblyareahadbaen
arrangedothatwecouldhavespotted itwithregardtoindividualholdsand
withregard tothepriorityofthaspecificcargo..Loadingatreembarkation
wasdelayedbecauseofinsufficiant lighterage.
2, Titr.<3necessarytounloadtheshipwasfivedaysduetounfavor
abl$beachconditionsandrequestforspotcargorather thangeneralunloading.
Allrequestsforspecificcargowarepromptlyhandled. Unloadingafter reembarka
ionwasaccomplished infourandonehalfhours.under idealconditions* The
dockusedaffordedspaceenoughtounload fiveholds
ort(Cont
1
d)
H. Ordnance.
1. Weapons.
a. Below i s l i st ed nuttber, type and caliber or weapons taken
forward on the recent operation:
352 Carbine, caliber, 30, Ml,
92 Launcher* gtfenade, MS, This launcher was not used as noM6
cartridges were avai l abl e.
IS Gun, machine, caliber . 30, Brownings 9
81 Ri f l e, automatic, caliber..30, Browning, MI9I8A2.
lf33Hifle, -U..S, Caliber , 30, i d. .
20 Pi s t ol , automatic, caliber .^5* Ml?11.
9 launcherst rocket, M^Al.
13 Mortars, 60ramM2, Pour were held in reserve in Headquarters
Company.
k Mortar, 81mm
t
Ml.
b. I t i s impossible at the present time to know exactly how
many weapons were l os t . Inventories are now being taken.
c. .Tfyere was an adequate s
iv
oply ox spare parts. Battalion
armorer repa*ed numerous weapons from spare pafts taken forward. \
d. I t i s recommended an increased allowance of four
rocket, M9A1 for an infantry battal i on, Theso launchers should be carried as
reserve in Headquarters Company as are the four SOmraMortars.
2. . Combat vehi cl es.
a. This infantry battal i on used the following numbers and typot
of vehicles during combats ' -
1Ambulance,Jton,kxk.
5Trailers*t*
on
^vheel.
Trucks,1toncargoweredrawn.fromregimentalmotortransport
officerdailyasthesituationpermittedtheiruse. Battleemployment32days*
b.TAGone(1)ambulance,Jton,kxkwasdamagedbeyondrepair
Thisvehicleisnovrdeadlinedforbodyrepairs. Mechanicallythisvehicleis
serviceable.
c.Theshorttimethisinfantrybattalionwasinactualcombat
therewasnomaintenancedifficulty.
(
d*Hosparepartsoraccessoriesworerequiredotherthanone
(!)storagebattery,tireandtubepatchingequipment.
3. . Ammunition.
a. The following i s an expenditure of ammunition by thi s
battal i on on the recer-t operation:
36560 Cartridge, Bal l , carbine, caliber 30, ML
229OO Cartridge, AP&TH, (belted) caliber. , 30.
62OOO Cartridge,.AP-, caliber . 30, M2, 5 / cl i p. /
98268 Cartridge, At, caliber ^ 0 , M2, S / . c l i p/
, 7620 Shel l , HB, M^9A^
r
w/Puso PD-M52, 60mm.
gi+3 Shel l , illumiaating, U$3Al, w/Puse M65, 60mm.
1530 Shel l , HSJ, MU3A1, w/Jusa M3a, 81mm.
309^ Shel l , HE, 1456, w/i\i3 M5.2, 81ij%
#
313 Shel l , smoke, W, M57, w/Puse M52, 81mm.
7725 &renade, band fragmentation, MKIIA1.
I75 Grenade,, hand, smoke, HC~M8
#
rporfc (Cont
f
'd)
325 Grenade, hand* smoke, W, ML5
125 Grenade, hand, colored, 10.6.
275 Grenade, hand, illuminating*
130 Grenade, r i f l o, AT,M9A1
140 Grenade, r i f l e, saoko, W, Ml9*
603*1are, t r i p, parachute, J&8.
50 3!bare, t r i p, *&9
235 Eockot, H3,AT,'M6A1.
800 Caps, blasting, t ot ryl , n
900 Cord, detonating.
36 Black, dcmolition
t
chain, i&,
cs.
3 Explosive, 2NT, J pound blocks,
cs,
^00 Fuse, blasting, ft*
-. , 50 cylinder, ignition, Ml. ' '
b.Ammunition was drawn from regimental munitions dump and moved
forward principaly by truck, ton kxk and t r ai l or , J ton although SISiammortar
aa^munition whon the situation permitted was moved with truck, 1-ton, cargo.
During tho l ast operation this battalibn operated many t i r s without a forward
dump duo to the short supply l i nos.
c. Storage was no problem as only one (l ) unit of firo wae on
hand in rovctmonts or other places of protection against enemy fire*
d. It i s recommended tho tJ/lf bo increased for the Carbine,
caliber .30, ^H. According to the Tnblo of Allowance the present allowance of
magazines, carbine, caliber .30 i s five;(5) Beconaci-cl increase of ammunition
allowance to 7^ bal l and 1 t racer.
e. This battalion took forward on the recent Operation twenty
sovon (27) flamethrowers, portablo, K2-2*' Hine.vjcrc kept in ri fl o companies at
al l times, remainder was kopt in,HTBas roserve. .
!
Hiscellancqus .Ordnaacc Squipmont
a. Hone salvaged.
Snemy Katorial*
aW
17 Rifle,,Model 99.
1 Model 11 l i ght riiachine gun.
2 Model 97 tank machine gun.
1 Kodcl 3 heavy machine gun.
1 81mmHortar model 3*
b. Combat Vehicles.
Hone salvaged. '
c Ammunition.
225 Typo 91 Grenade.
150 Type 99 Grcr.adc,
2 Model 99 Magnetic' Anti-trnk mine
k Model 93
n
Tape measure"^mine,
1 Model 3 torra cotta land mine;
500 Cartridges, f^rm (.303 i n) .
200 Cartridges, 65mm (.2b Cal).
700-Cartridges, 12.7mm (,.50 i n) .
50 Shell,' 20mm (.780) rds.
75 Shell* 37mm (l.^S in) rds.
50 Sholl, 75mm (2.^5 in) rds.
ort (Cont' d),
-d-.MiscellaneousOrdnanceSquipnont
Nonesalvaged. ,
I. Chemical.
1. - Allmasks >gasworeloadedintroopcargospace,andissuedto
troopspriortodebarkation. .,
2. Remainderofchemicalwarcfaroo.quipmcntwasloadedinsuch,a
mannertoboavailableforunloadingquicklyincasecfanomorgencycall.
3. Allmasks*gaswerecollectedon22February,19^5^Yorderof
Commanding Officer,3^Battalionincompanydumps. Thesewerethenconsolidated
intobattaliondumpandturnedintoHegimentalQuartermasterforfurtherdis-
position. ThisbattalionsalvagedatotalofIOU7masks,^asontherecent
operation.
U.. Allchemicalwarfaresuppliesthatwereunloadedworeturned
intoBegimontalQuartermaster* Almostallofthisequipmentwasneverunloaded.

9
Medical. -
a. There wore two doctors aid forty-three corpsmon attached
to t hi s battalion at embarkation.
b. The doctors carried. Medical Units #1, aid the corpsmon carried
tfcdiCal Units 5*3 Additional Medical Units carried wore: ^5, 5a, 6, 7 8, 9t 10
l l a, 12, Plasma, and Scrum albumin.
2. Aboard Ship.
a.SickCallswerehelddailyatOS3Oand1530, SickCalls
werelightexceptforaDiarrheatlpidcmic* Aftergalleysweroproperlypollcod
thesocasesdecreased. ThereworealsoseveralcasosofOatarrhalPobcr.
b
#
Sanitaryinspectionsworeholddaily. Theinspectingparty
consistedofbothShipsCompanyandpassengerpersonnel* Onseveraloccasionsa,
passengerMedicalOfficoraccoEtnaniodtheinspectingparty
(1)Theheadswereadequateandwerepolicedbymarine
personnel,
(2)Theshipwasshort200bunkspacesvhichnecessitated
sleepingpersonnelinshifts*
(3)Thequantity,andqualityofthefoodwasadequate .
(k)Thegalleyswereinavorygoodcondition.
(5) $he cooks and messmon were marine personnel and wore
inspected daily by the senior medical officor of the ship.
3. Debarkation*
a. There were twelve Collecting section corpsmon attached for
the campaign and ^3,battalion corpamen of which four 1:>ro attached to each
company except Headquarters. The rest v/erc divided into two groups? one group
was with the forward aid station md the other, roar aid st at i on. '
b. forward aid station landed with the third and the rear
t t at i on landed with the fifth wave from our ship.
.ction Boport (Qont'd).
"modical personnel of t hi s battalion went ashore aboard
The four corpsiaefHifctached to the companies landed with same,
d Tho time of landing was approximately 1700 on 21 February
k* Anhorc .Assault Phaset '
a* Medical installations?
(l ) Medical i nst al l at i ons wore sot up immediately upon landing*
When t hi s battalion was in the assault tjic Forward Aid Station was set up with
tho observation post. (One doctor with attached corpsi-ion). The Bear Aid Station
was set UDwith the Command Post.
b. Location.
(l) Were sot up near roads and t r ai l s with Jeep Ambulances
available.
(2) Foxholes, cavos, and rovotnonts served as cover.
(3) The other nodical i nst al l at i ons near by wore the Aid
Stations of other bat t al i ons.
c. Protective measures taken:
(l) There were one-third of the personnel, which consisted of
corpamon and marine personnel, on watch at al l times," *
(2) Sand-bag;jod.revetiiionts and CP.VOS wore the best moans of
cover.
(3) Natural concealment was tho only menus of concealnent,
(*!)Blackout precautions wcro always taken. Caves with
black-out covering over entrance wero used, Tho aid station also had a black-out
tent which was used when caves wore not available.
d. Hoepitalization.
(1) In tho early part of the assruLt tho casualties wore
evacuated to the beach for further disposition. When Conpany "A", 3&iiedical .
Battalion, apt up the casualties wero sent to thoa for further disposition and
ireatoont.
(2) Hcsuoply of equipwnt .was adequate and satisfactory.
(3) Four hundred-*seven Ot-07) patients were eva-Cuated for
hospitalization.
0. Svacuation,
") l^arinc l i t t e r teams from tho lines to the Aid Station,
accompanied by a corpsraan, ambulances from the Md Station to Beach Svacuation
or Hospital wore the means of evacuation.
(2)Casualtiestreated.
Kanoftho3di'arSiv. i^i.otherthan3dli-rl)iv.
1. Humber 101
Betanned
Svacuated U07
92
Died
3
(Cont'd).
2.Typeofcasualtiestreated: - .
11
Chest 10
Head
35 23
Abdomen
2
5
" ' ' ? '
LowerSxtrcm
1H3
UpporExtrcm
117 ' 3 5
Con,BlastAtmos125
3. Walking wounded 221 ' ' kl
kmStretcher cases 23S >0
f. Sanitation. ' .
<l) 3111 trenches and Cat Holes were set up for human disposal*
Cans were flattened and bxiriod. .
tt
C
n
(2) , **", and "D" rations, with hot coffee occasionally
was tho only ncsus of food* .
(3) V/ator was hauled to the l i nes from tho ships and no Ideal
water was used.
. . ,. g. Disposal of the dead.
(1) Our dead were colloctod and sent to Division Cemetery
for buri al . '
r
(2) The enemy dead were sprayed with 33J3Tsolution and
Arsenitc and buried by a detail of marines, ,
h. There were no epidemics or unusual diseases of troopa.
1* Dental Service,
(1) Tho dontal work Was done by a temporarily attached denta-.
officer. The work was accomplished with Dental Officer Kit. Hedical Unit #2,
(2) The nimbcr of dental cases treated wero approximately
nine (9) extractions and a few temporary filling-s,
(3) The additional duty of tho ^cntal officcr attachod was
assi st i ng tho battalion surgepn,
(k) There wore no civilians found. , .
(5) Hoprisoners of wnrpassed through our aid st at i on,
(6) Medical Organization.
Itisouropinionthatthepresentmedicalorganizationis
adequateandsatisfactory. Hcsorvcplatodhsnndreplacementsactedas'letter
bearers, -
(7) i^odical Personnel,
(a5CorpsmonwereUsedascompanyaidmenandbattalion
aidstation'assistants. Theirworkundercombatconditionswa&verysatisfactory.
(b)Thereworetwenty,(26)corpsaonwoundedandscvon(7*
killedinaction* Thisnumberincludesthecorpsmentemporarilyattachedfrom,
H&Scollectingsection."
-20-
r t (Cont
!
&)
(c) Our battalion corpaiaon were viry well trained "both
in f i r s t aid and personnel fiold precautions, The replacement corpsmen sent to
us although well XrainQd. in f i r st aid had l i t t l e knowledge ot field work,
exposing thcnsclvcs to fi re onnumerous occasions*
j . Field iriodical Equipjacnt.-
(1) Although our o\m nodical resupplies wore not Imded, r e-
suppler wag adequately carried out. "byScgiiaent and Division PieId Hospital,
Our losses of medical supplies wore not ossoervc* though there Wore t i acs that
mortar and art i l l ery f5ro had destroyed our aodicrJ uni t s, vhich were immediately
replaced*
(2) The present type of nodical field equipment has provon
to bo very satisfactory and easy to trrmsport,
k, 14odieal Supplies.
( l ) The Bupplios carried were I dical Units #1 and 3 carried
"by the doctors and 5 5
a
6 ? 3 9 10* 11- 12 Plas;m and Scrum iilbunin
carried "by corpdiaen. The amount -carried w<os enough to supply two aid st at i ons,
and keep tho corpsmon on the linos well supplied, HesumLy was carried out
from oithcr Regimental Aid Station or Division Picld Hosi?itdl,
1, Hotor Vehicles and Boiling Stock,
( l ) There wuro two (2) Jpcp atabulances old ono (l ) t r ai l er .
Thcro were two (2) Jeep juibulrncos l ost , which wore destroyed "by oncny fire*
They were replaced "by regiment. The notor vehicles attached' to our unit were
used to evacuate patients and resupply nodical o^uipiaont
m, I&ilaria control and SpideQiology wac taken c;u*o of by
division %>ideiaiology Unit,
n, Ashore - After completion of assault phase,
( l ) All patients- that noeded ocdical attention wore taken en.
of in the Battalion Aid Station i r evacuatod to Division S'iold Hospital for
further disposition and troatwor.:, All field aanitr.r,/ precautions were ttf-kon.
Heads were now constructed of oil druns and "birhod out daily* Cans were ,
flat^enod and "buried. ?ood s t Ul consisted of "C", "K
fl
md "
tt
rations v/ith
hot coff00 occasionally, The l ast few days on the isl'nnd doughnuts and turnovers
wore scrved^with hot-coffee. Water was sent to tlic linos froEirthfl ocach,
troatracnt was available at al l tines during and after the assault,-
K.
(a) (1) In nets using Amplitude Modulated Hadio Hquipmont,
vory l i t t l e frequency interference occurred.
(2) Crystal controlled SfiB-53^ radio nets cscperionccd a
, groat deal of interference duo to the limited number of broadcasting channels
available and tho short range at which those sets were o-ocratod.
(3) Froqucncy Modulated Equipment proved highly sat i s-
factory. Some interference occurred on SC&-3OO channels due to inductive
blocking. Jhis was caused by the cj.oso proximity of radio sets on different
nets which was dictated by tho only terrain available which offorod some cover
and concealment.
(b) 3asic systonis of radio nots prove
except in the case of SCB-536 nets which were """*"
^ j ^ ^ ^ _
ActionBcportlOont
1
&}
(c)Nogroatcommunicationdelaysinspottingshipsfirowore
encountered*
,W.H..
-22-
ENCLOSURE E
3D MARINES
ACTION REPORT
HEADQUARTERS,32Mi&INES,
3DKAREIEDIVISION,RESTMARE'SFORCE,
C/OFLE2T.POSTOFFICE,SANFRANCISCO.
1?April,1945.
From: Commanding"Officer,3dMarines,
To : CommandingGeneral.3dMarineDivision.
Subject: Action-Report,'TWOJBIAOperation,
Reference:(a)DivGO137.
Inclosures:(A)ActionReport1stBn,3dMarines.
(B)ActionReport2dBn,3dMarines.
(C)ActionReport3dBn,3dMarines*
I. Summary. .
A. ThisreportcoversperiodNovember,1944,time
missionwasassignedto8Inarch,1945,timethisorganization
debarkedonGUAM,
B. RCT-3wasinfloatingreservefortheoperation.
Didnotland.
** Preliminaries.
A. RCT-3wascomposedofthe3dMarinesplusattached
units: CoC3dMTBn,CoC3dMedBn,CoC3dSngrBn,CoC
3d<PionBn,det3dJASCO.
B. Fromtimemissionwasassingedtothebeginning
oftheactionanintensivetrainingprogramwasconducted. Em-
phasisWasplacedontrainingofindividualsandsmallunitswith
manyhoursbeingdevotedtoreductionoffortifiedpositions.
Allpersonnelreceivedtrainingincombinedtaafc-infantryand
artillery-infantrytactics*
C. AssignedmissionofRCT-3: LandinitiallyinDiv
ResonorderonDogplus1dayorafteronbeachestobedesignated,
preparedtomovetoassignedassemblyareas*
D. AtoutsetofactionRCT-3wasaboardTransDiv33.
III. Chronologicalacpountoftheaction.
A. RCT-3arrivedinthetransportareafct-IWOJIMA27
February,1945. 3dand4thBns,12thMarinesdebarked28-29Feb.
KGFelements,3dJASCOdebarked28Feband3March, Replacements
andSPpersonneldebarked28Feb, Cargounloadingbegan2March.
Shipsplatoonsdebarked5March. RCT-3sailedforGUAM5March
andarrived*8March,1945. Alltroopsdebarkedandunloading
completedby10liarch,1945,.
IV. Comments,
i. administration.
1, Thisorganizationsufferednocasualities,
2. Moraleoftroopswasexcellent.
B* Intelligence.
1. Maps: Specialair*andGunneryTargetMap,
Scale: 1:6,000,1:10,000and1:20,000ofPfOJIM,,withtarget
areagrid{64thEngrTopBn1944).
-1-
eratlon. Cont*d.
SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMap,
.IWOJIKi
A
,Scale2inchesequal1nauticalmile,
Spe'cialAerial!
r
osiac,ITfOJIMA,Scale
1:20,000with" targetareagrid.
. Special-Aerialllosiac,IWCJIMA,Scale
1:10,000withtargetarea'grid.
Chart(H.O.)No.6101;1W0JBIiv.
Verticaloverlappingstripssutle,ble
forstereostudy,highand lowlevelobliques.
ReliefMaps~BfOJIKA1:7000.
. 1W.JIKA1:5000.
2* Kydrographic informationveryaccurate and
complete*
3, Intelligencedatafurnishedontime and
effective*
4, Procedureforrecoveryofcapturedenemy
documentsandmaterialgood,
5, JapaneselanguageOfficerseffectiveand
qualified. . : . .
(a) 8Officerspermenantlyattchd- none,
(b) Officers temporarily attchd - 1st I t ,
W. B, ViTVLlhM and 1st I t . K, K. HOFFAT.
(c) Unlisted permenantly attchd - none.
<d) Enlisted temporarily attchd - Oorfc.
J. P, -PATRICK, Corp, W. J, STSTINA, Pfc 3. A, PETERSON, Pfc T. I ,
(e) Nisei- none.
C. .Operationsand Training.
IV BCT-3heldnorehearsalexercises. Whileaboard
shiptoindoctrinatetroopsin detailsofthe operation,allwere
instructedontheRegtlOpn Order, AlsoregularPeriodswereset
asideto allovrtroopstostudyallavailableintelligencedata in-
cludingmapsandphotos,-
fit Supply.
1, Due tothefactthatthisorganizationdidnot.
landduringthe BIOJill*,operationitis difficultto comment
onthe.adequacyofsupplieslifted,,adequacyofresupply,Shore
Party,transportation,otherequipmentorsupplies. However,it
isbelievedthatthesuppliesand equipmentliftedfortheoper-
ationwereadequate,
2, Greatestdifficultyencounteredwith the
;>
l|E^i#1iize&eargoliftedwas the incorrectdatafurs
theexactpercentageofsuppliesthatcouldbepal
".10
Z''
ActionReport,1m) TnWirOperation. Cont*d.
thelastminutepalletizedsupplieshadtobebrokenopenin
order tomeetsquarefootrequirements. Inaddition/therewere
nptenoughcranesinthestagingareastohandlethepalletsand
notsufficientslingsaboardtheshipsto^handlethepallets,
3 NoWilsoncargodrumswereunloadedbythis
organization. Therewereapproximatelysixty(60)ofthedrums
lifted. Thedrumsloadedcontainedmedicalsupplies,chemical
supplies,motprtransportspareparts,andmiscellaneousquarter-
mastersupplies
f
Itisbelievedthatwoodencratesarebetter
forpackingofsupplies. Thedrumsarehard tohandleanddiff-
icult topack. Cratesaremadetosizeasneededandconservecargo
space .
!
.'.,
E Transportquartermaster. i
i .. >. . .
1, TimerequiredtoloadandembarkRCT-3was
twenty-two (22)hours. Nopersonnelshouldbeembarkedpriorto
thecompletion oftheloading. Troopslinedutogoaboard
crowdedthedoclcsandmade itdifficultforthetrucksbringing
ansuppliesfromthestagingareastopullalongsideofthe ships
forrapidunloading. i4$othedecksoXtheshipswerecrowded
withmencomingaboardandaffectedtheunloading.
2# Greatestdifficultyencounteredwasthein~
correctdatafurnished this-organizationbythe'DivisionTrans-,
portQuartermasterOffIceonthetonnage,cube!squarefootage,
andbillitingspace. Thediscrepancybetween thedatafurnished
bytheTQMandthedp.tagivenbyTransCivComdrrevealedman
changesthathadtobemadeatthelastminute. Cargohadtobe .
adjustedtomeetthetonnageandsquarefootallowanceandper-
sonnelhadtobechangedfromoneshiptoanother.
3. Difficultywasencounteredduringtheloadin
duetothelackofsufficientlightingfacilitiesonthedocks
andinthestagingareas.
F.'> Signal*
1. CommunicationPlan (SOI).
Communicationsplanwasreceived inample
timetopermitstudy,changes,and criticism.
2. EmbarkationandVoyage.
fa) Allequipment, wasloadedaccordingtoplan.
(b) Noequipmentsufferedanydamage inloading.
(c) Allbatterieswerecheckedatleastonce
duringthevoyage.
(<t)-Notrainingwasparriedonwhileaboard
ship. -
iq) Messagecenterpersonneloperatedjointl
withtheshipscommunicationsofficertofacilitatedeliveryof
totroopofficers.
3. Personnel*
- 3-
1
ActionRepor
Operation, Cont
r
d
(a).Presentallowance-ofpersonnelIs
sufficients - -
tb) Nochangesare recommended.
(c) Allpersonnelwas sufficientlytrained,'
(d) Nprecommendations forspecialtraining.
(e) Thisorganizationwasshort(14)fourteen
communicationpersonnel* '
(f) Nopersonnelwaslostaboardship.
NOTE: Sincethisregimentwasnotcommittedonlythepertinent
questionswereanswered.
Q-. He&lcal.
1, Embarkation.
(a) Personnel: Followingatrainingprogram
asoutlinedbytheRegimentalSurgeon,HeadquartersandServiceCo,
RegimentalWeaponsandthethreebattalionsmarchedtotheir
respectivestagingareasfromwhichtheywentaboardship. All
medicalpersonnelaccompanied theirrespectiveunitsonthemarch.
(b) Material: Medicalmaterialotherthan'the
units#1and#3wentaboardshix>byassignedvehicles. H&SCo's
equipmentwasdistributedbetweenthetwoJeet>ambulances,a
weaselandareconnaissancetruck,allofwhichwereondifferent
ships.thanthecompanypersonnel * - .
^ 2.,'Aboardship.
(a) Sickness: HASCopersonnelwereaboard
thesameshipasthe2dBattalion. Allproceduresandcareof
casualitieswerecarriedoutintheamemannerasthe2dBattal*
ion,3dl*arineRegiment.ActionReportsostates,. Ingeneral,
sickcallfortheMarinepersonnelaboardairships transporting
theRegiment
1
wasconductedbytheMedicalOfficerattachedtotheir
respectiveKarineunitsandpatientsrequiringhospltalizatlon
wereadmittedtotheship'ssickbayunderthesupervisionofthe
ship'sUedicalpersonnel. Alluchpatientsreceivedexcellent.
careandnoepidemicswereencountered;thegeneralhealthofthe,
troopsbeinggood. Dermatologlcalproblemssuchasfungusofthe
feetwereintensifiedduringtheearlydaysaboardshipdueto
themarchtothedocks * Therewasanincreaseintheincidence
ofcoldsaftertheshiparrivedinacooler,climate.
,
fc
(b) SanitaryConditions: Ingeneral^the
sanitaryconditionsweresatisfactoryandadailyinspectionof
theheads,livingquarters,messed,galleys,andthecooksand
messmenwereheldbybothship'sandMarineunitsMedicalpersonnel*
(c) SpecialPrecautions: All suspected
tagiousdiseaseswereImmediately Isolatedandn#i2J4emicswere
encountered,"
(d) Hostdtalization: All
requiringhospital!station-wereadmitted totheship'ss
andwereunderthesupervisionoftheShirksMedicalpersonnel.
Themanagementofthecaseswasexcellentand'theequipmentand
suppliesweremorethanadequate. TheaveragenumberofMarine
.jggrsonnelrequiredhospitalization;onlyonemajoroperatlyepro*
^ceSarewasnecq-ssary^orthe,entireRegimentduringitsstayaboard
- 4 -
ship.
(e) Casualitiestreated: Thenumberofcas-
ualitiesreceivedaboardthevariousshipsassignedtotheRegiment
varied,dependingonavailablespaceandLedicalpersonnelavail-
able. TheAPAVsreceivedfromtwohundredandfifty (250)tofour
hundredanafifty'(450)casualities,nearlyallofwhichwerere-
tained,afewseriouscasesweretransferredtoaHospitalShip
whichwasleavingthearea. Alldeathsoccuringbeforeshipsleft
thecombatareawerereturnedtothebeachforburialinMarine
Cemeteries! TherewerethreeburialsatseaintheRegimentand
severalbodieswerecarriedaboardshipuntilourarrivalatGUAM
whereburialintheMarineCemeterywasundertaken. Alltypesof
casualitieswerereceived,mostofthembeingofanorthet)e41c
nature Mostofthe,mentalcasesshowedmarked improvement within
forty-eight (48)hours. Theprpportionofhead,chest,abdomen,
andextremitywoundswasaboutthesameasusual.
(f) MedicalPersonnel: XXwastheopinion
ofnearlyalltheMedicalpersonnelattachedtotheMarineunits
stayingaboardship,thatship'sMedicalpersonnelwasnotade-
quate innumber.duringtheactualphaseofreceiving"casualities
aboardhip. AllMedicalpersonnelandCorpsmenattachedtoMarine
unitsaboardshipsreceivingcasualities*volunteeredtheirser-
vicesandworkedundertheShirksMedicalOfficer. Thecorpsmen
werewellutilisedincaringfortheminorwounds,plasmateams
andwardworkascasualitleecameaboardso'fast,agooddeal,of
responsibilitywasplacedintheirhands. Nolossesnorreplace-
mentswerenecessaryandallpersonneldidanexcellent job. While
mo$toftheworkwassurgicalinnature,itwastheopinionofmost
ofthestaffthatroughlyeightypercentofcaBualitiesreceived
didnotrequirethetrainingofaspecialisttogivepropermedical
care.
(g) FieldUedicalEquipment: Abouteighty
percentofallowancewascarriedandtherewasnopilferage.
However,severalof-theBattalionslostpartoftheirMedical
suppliesandequipmentwhenanA^Acarryingtheseitems,unloaded
onthebeachatIWOJIMAandmedicalunitswere-takenashoreby
mistake. SincetheRegimentdidnotgoashore,itisnotppsslble
todeterminetheadequacyorsuitabilityofthepresenttypes
available-
v
(h) Medicalsupplies: Nopilferagewasre-
portedbutsomesupplieswerelost inthesamemannerasmedical
equipment*
3. Debarkation*
Thisunitdid'nptdebarkuntiltheshipre-
turnedto'GUAM,vHariannasIslands.
4. Recommendations.
(a) AShasbeenstatedbythevariousBattalion
Surgeons,Itistheopinionofthe-MedicalStaffofthisRegiment
afterworkingaboardshipduringthecombatphaseofanoperation;
thatavailableMedicalpersonnelaboardshipsreceivingcasualities
isnotadequateinnumber. Thisistrueonlyfortheactualirtiase
ofreceivingcasualitiessinceInalargenumberofthecases,this
pointwasthefirstinthechainofevacuationthatthepatientwas
abletoreceiveanythingmorethanfirstaid. AllMedicalpersonnel
availablewerewellutilizedandsinceMarineattachedunitswould
L . : - ' - 6 -
Operation. Ooxit'd*
^beordinarilypresent*;itissuggestedthataMedicalpoolbe
availableforsuchshipsduringthephaseofreceivingcasualities
only. ShipsMedicalPersonnelismorethanadequateatallother.
times.
' N .
LieutenantColonel,USMCR,
Commanding.
-6-
HEADQUARTERS,
1ST BATTALION, 3D MARINES, -
3D MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE*,'
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAft FRANCISCO.
Witf) 21April, 1945*
From: thmaiiding ' Of f i c e r . .
To: The Contoiftding Of f i c e r , Thi r d Ma r i ne s .
Subject: Act i on Re por t , IWO MlUk Oper at i on.
Reference Div GO 137, dat ed 3 Fe br ua r y, 1945.
I.
SUMMARY
A,Thisreportcoverstheperiodfrom5November,
1944,to8March,194?,thedateonwhichthebattaliondisem-
barked^fromthetransportshipatGUAM,M.I.Includedinthere-
portare.thephasesoftraining,loadingaboardshiprfmovement
totargetarea,andreturn.
B
#
Asthisunitwaspartofareservewhichwasnot
committedintheaction,thereportcontainsnonarrativeofpar-
ticipation. ,
II.
PRELIMINARIES
A
#
ThiscommandwasorganizedasaBattalionLand-
ingTeamwhosecompositionwasasfollows:
!1stBn,3dMarines.
2.1stFlat,WpnsCo,3dMarines*
3.1stPlat,CoC
fl
,3dEngrBn.
4.1stPlat,Co
! I
C%3dPionBn.
5.CollectingSec,Co"C",3dMedBn.
6.Det,3dJASCO.
7.Det,28thReplDraft.
8.Det,34thReplDraft,
B
f
Duringtheperiod5November,1944,to10Febru-
ary,1945>thisbattalionengagedinintensivetrainingforthe
operation.Thetrainingincludedallphasesfrombasicweapons
trainingandtacticsofsmallunitstoregimentalproblems,theem*
ploymentofsupportingweapons,andone(1)DivisionCPX.Asit
wasplannedthatthisunitwouldbeapartofareserveduringthe
initialassaultlanding,stresswasplacedupoiitrainingintheex
ecutionofapassageoflines.
Duringtrainingonlystandarddoctrineswerefol-
lowedanditwasemphasizedthatacceptedpublicationsformedthe
basisonwhichthebattalionwouldoperate.Muchtimewasdevoted
toworkingwithattachedunits:i.e.artillery,tanks,navalgun-
fireliaisonandspotterteams;andallpersonnelwerefamiliar-
izedwiththefunctionoftheseorganizations.
Planningalqngspecificslineswasnecessarily
limitedduetothenatureofthemissionandthefactthatsec-
uritypreventeddesseminationofanydetailedinformation*Within
thelimitationsaboveplanningconsistedofmakingacomplete
studyofexistingmapsandreliefmodels.Suchstudycouldbemade
priortoembarkationonlybyalimitednumberofofficers*Several
alternateplanswereformulated,allquitegeneralinnature,for
theemploymentoftheBLT. -
Norehearsals,assuch,wereheld,althoughfield
problems,meanttosimulateactualconditions,were.run.
ActionReport,IWOJIM&Operation, Cont'd,
C Nodefinitemissionwasassignedtothisunit
initially.Severalalternateplanswerepresentedforthepossi-
bleemploymentofthereserve/Theoperationsplanpublishedcon-
tainednounusualfeatures,
D
#
AttheoutsetoftheactiontheBLTwaslocated
aboardshipwaitingtobecalledtothetransportarea.
III, Chronologicalaccountoftheaction,
A.ThebulkoftheBLTremainedaboardship
throughouttheaction.OnordersfromhigherauthoritytheEngr
Platoon,PionPlatoon,Det3dJASCQ,Dets28thand34thRepl
Draftsweresentashoreandsubsequentlyparticipatedintheac-
tionthere.ThereaainderoftheBLTwasreturnedto.GUAMprior
tothecompletionoftheaction, ,
IV. A.INTELLIGENCE
' 1,SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMaps;
1:5,000;1:10,000;1:20,000werefurnished.Enemysituationmap
1:10,00b,Reliefmodel1:7,000(approx).Verticalandoblique
photographswithvariousR,F.
f
swerefurnished.Mapsandphotos
weresufficientinnumberandapparentlyaccurateincoverageal-
thoughpracticalusewasnotrequired.
2.Sincenointelligenceinstructionswereput
intouseitisnotfeltthatcommentsontheadequacyorinade-
quacyareappropriate,inthisreport.
B. OPERATIONS
1
#
Aspreviouslystatednoactualrehearsals
fortheoperationwereheld.Afterloadingandpriortoarrival
inthetargetarea,aroomwassetasideaboardshipinwhichall
maps,operationsplansetc.weresetup.Officerswerefirstin-
structedinallphasesoftheoperationandtheyinturninstruct-
edthetroops.This'methodofindoctrination,inwhichsmall
groupsstudiedmapsandphotoswasfoundtobequitesatisfactory*
C.TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER
1.Loadingandembarkationwereaccomplished
separately.Loadingwascompletedwithinapproximatelyfifteen
(15)hoursandembarkationinaboutthree13)hours.Bothappeared
toproceedsmoothlywithoutunusualdifficultiesandwithoutthe
employmentofunusualmethods.
2.The*>onemajordifficultyinloadingwasin
thepreparationofpreliminaryplans.Muchofthisdifficulty
wasduetotheinaccuracyofinformationonship
f
scharacteristics
(particularlytroopcarryingcapacity)intheofficeroftheDivi-
sionTQM.Alsothereseemedtobeconsiderableindecisionjust
priortopreparingtheloadingplanastojustwhatwouldbecar-
riedandhowcertainitemswouldbestowed.
-2-
\
ActionRepor
Operation. Cont'd*
D.MEDICAL
1,Embarkation.
(a)Thirtynine(39)corpsmenandtwo(2)
doctorsmovedwiththebattalionfromthecampareatoembarkation
point.Pointwasreachedonfoot,coveringabouteleven(11)miles.
Greatincreaseinfungusinfectionofthefeetandacne,vulgaris
wasnoted*
(b)Allmedicalsuppliesforthebattalionex-
ceptindividualfirstaidunitsweretransportedbyvehicle.
2.AboardShip.
(a)Greatincreaseincommoncoldsamong
Marinepersonnelnotedduetochangeinclimateandcloseliving
quarters.Nooutbreakoffoodpoisdaingorepidemicsencountered;
generalhe&lthwasgood.
(b)TheSanitaryconditionswereallratedas
excellent.
(c)Allsuspectedcaseswereisolated immed-
iatelyasprecautionarymeasureseyenthoughnodefinitecontagi-
ousdiseaseswerediagnosed.
(d)Hospitalization.
(1)Troopsickcallswereheld1*ytroop
doctorsandcorpsmen,allcasesnecessitatinghospitalizationwere
admittedtothip'ssickbayandtreatedbyship'smedicalstaff.
1
(2)Facilitiesforhospitalizationwere
excellentintypeandadequate.
(3)Ship's-medicalsupplieswereusedin-
cludingthoseusedduringtroopsickcall.Ship*spersonnelwere
usedonlyforhospitalizedcases.
(4)Usualnumberofpatientsfromthe
battalion*atnotimeexceedingten(10)innumber,werehospit-
alized.
(e)Approximatelytwohundredandfifty
(250)casualtiesweretreatedaboardtheU.S.S.FredrickFunston.
Ofthisnumbereight (8)weretransferredtoU.S.S.Solacewhile
lyingoffshore. /
(1)Three(3>mendiedaboardshipand
wereburiedashore.
(2)Fromthetimecasualtieswerere-
ceiveduntilthebattaliondisembarkedatGUAM,M.I.themedical
departmentofthisactivityofferedtheirservicesandworked
withthemedicalstaffaboardtheU.S.S.FredrickFunston.All
thecorpsmenandbothdoctorswereusedtogoodadvantageand
workedharmonouslywiththestaffaboard.Thecorpsmendidawon-
derfulworkactingasbloodandplasmateams,assistingwiththe
surgery,andasindividualspecialwatclionparticularlyserious
cases.Allhandsturnedtoinaverysatisfactoryandeffective
manner.Themedicalgroupofthiscommandreffdff^^iejiighestof
ActionReport,IWOJIMA Operation, Cont'd,
praiseandmanythanksfortheirsplendidworkfromtheship's
medicalstaff.
(3)Alltypesofcasualtieswerehandled,
withmorestretchercasesthanwalkingwounded.Mostcaseswere
orthopedicinnature
t
butchestwounds,headandfacewoundsand
otherswerehandled.Afairproportionwerepsychiatriccases,a
greatmajorityofwhichshowedmarkedimprovementwithin.aperiod
offorty-eight (48)hours,
(f)MedicalPersonnel:
(1)Itistheopinionofthismedical
sectionthatthemedicalpersonneloftransportsreceivinglarge
numbersofcasualtiesduringaninvasionshouldbeaugmentedati
thattime.Temporaryadditionalmedicalpersonnel,bothdoctors
andcorpsmenwouldsavelivesandpermitmorerapidturnoverof
patients.Atonetimewereceivedonehundredten(110)casual-
tiesduringaperiodofaboutfour(4)hours.Eight(8)doctors,
three(3)ofwhomwereunassignedpassengerswere
o
keptextremely
busyandfifty(50)corpsmenwhohappenedtobeaboardweregiv-
ingimmediate service.Temporaryincreaseinstaffwouldundoubt-
edlybeagreathelpduringsuchperiods.
(2)Forthesimpletransportationof
troopsthecomplementofthemedicalstaffaboardshipwasquite
adequate,
(3)Allmedicalpersonnelwereusedto
goodadvantage.
*
(4)Allmedicalpersonnelseemedwell
trainedfortheirworkanddidanexcellentjob.
(5)Neurosurgeonsarethegreatestneed,
butneurosurgicalcasesaregenerallyeasytotransfertohospital
shipswhensuchareavailable.
(g)FieldMedicalEquipment:
(1)Nocommentcanbemadeatthistime
asitwasnotused. . , .
(h)MedicalSupplies:
(1)Nocommentcanbemadeatthistime
asitwasnotused.
3*Comments
Nocommentcanbemadeatthistimesince
wedidnotdisembarkintoaction.Howeverthefactmayberestated
thattheworkofallmedicalpersonnelconcernedwasoutstanding.
Theywereuntiringintheireffortsonbehalfofthewoundedand
unfaggingintheirdevotiontoduty.Theyshowednoletdownin
thestandardsoftheirworkanditwasalwaysofthehighestorder.
Also,themedicalpersonneloftransportsreceivinglargenumbers
ofcasualtiesduringaninvasionshouldbeaugmentedatthetime
ofsuchaninvasionbyhavingadditionalpersonneltemporarily
attached, "
;
*"
Action Report, IWO JIMA. Operation, Cont'd.
V. ppnc,3
r
u,sj
r
qflsafldRecommendations
A*Inviewofthefact thatthisunitdidnot
participateintheactionitisfeltthatopinionsandrecommen-
dationsfromunitswhodi<Jparticipatewouldhavemuch greater
practicalvalue.Thephasesoftrainingandloadingundergoneby
thisorganization seemddtobehandledin&satisfactorymanner.
m
THEODORE
(JEJARTERS,2D BATTALION, ...Vi**
ES,3DMARINEDIVISION,FM*
1
,
O/OFljET, POST,OFFICE.,SAN FRANCISCO.'
17April,1945.
From:
To:
TheCommandingOfficer.
TheCommandingOfficer,3d Marines,3d Marine
Division*
Subject: ActionReport,IwoJima.
References: (a)Headquarters,3d MarinesMemotoCO
!
s1st,
2d,and3dBn,dtd14Apr45\ '
(b)DivisionGeneralOrder#137,
1. Incompliancewithreferences(a)and (b),the
followinginformationissubmitted:
PARTI Summary. ' *
A. Periodcoveredbyrepdr'tdatesfrom5Nov44to
8Mar45.
B. ThisorganizationembarkedaboardUSSCallaway
10Feb45,arrivedatIwoJima,VolcanoIslandson 27Feb45,
butdidnotland,and sailedtherefrom5Mar45.
PAR?II Preliminaries:
A. $hereportingcommand'wasB.L.T.-2andwascom-
posedof 2dBattalion,3d Marines;,attached2dPlatoon
WeaponsCompany;2d PlatoonCompany
n
C
H
#
3d PioneerBat-
talion;collectingsectionCompany "C",3d MedicalBat-
talion;detachment3d JASCO;detachment28thReplacement;
Draffanddetachment
V
34thReplacementDraft.
BThereportingunitdevotedparticular emphasis
tothefollowingtypesoftraining: Tank-infantrycoor-
dination,attackofafortifiedposition,reductionof
apillboxbysmallassaultteams,and squadandplatoon
tactics. No rehearsalsfor thisoperationwereconducted,
C. BLT-2was to landonorder-onbeachestobe
designated/ Thisbattalionwas thereservebattalionof
1
thereservedivisionandwas to gointoassemblyareaif
landedandawaitfurtherorders.,
PARTIIIChronologicalaccountoftheaction,
A. EmbarkedaboardtheUSSGallaway,10Feb45at
Guam,MarianasIslands,aridsailedtherefromon 17Feb45/
ArrivedatIwoJima,VolcanoIslandson 27Feb45.andsail-
edtherefrom&Mar46,arrivedanddisembarkedatGuam^
MarianasIslandson 8Mar45
#
PARTIV Comments.
A. Administration*
1. Concerning morale of troops: Importance
of the operation to the final assault P^fmg
m
ofthe en-
tire Pacific War against Japan was streffttJWi^ejstures.
:0MREPORT*.IWOJTMA^
Physicalfrillsconductedaboardshipmaintainedhighbody
condition. FrequentChurchServiceswereheld,
B. Intelligence,
1. Maps* '
eu SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMapof
IwoJima,scale1:5,000withtargetareagrid.
c
"b.SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMapof
IwoJima,scaleIt10,000withtargetareagrid.
c, Same1;20,000.
d, SpecialAirandGunneryTargetMapof
IwoJima,scale2inchesequalnauticalmile.
e, SpecialAerialMosaic,IwoJima,scale
1:20,000withouttargetareagrid.
2. Photographs.
a. Verticaloverlappingstripssuitablefor
stereostudies,
b. Highandlowlevel,obliques.
3. ReliefMaps.
*a.IwoJima,scale1:7.,000*
b. IwoJima,scale1;5,000,rubber,
4,'-Iflafeltthatthenumberanddiversity
ofmapsand,photoswasadequate. Nocommentonaccuracy.
5. OneenlistedJapaneselanguageman,PFC/
J.P.PATRICK,JR.,(817284),USMCR,wastemporarilyat-
tachedtothisorganization* Nocommentonhiseffect-*
iv.ene'ssorqualifications. .'',
6- Counterintelligencemeasures.andprecau-
tionsincludedstrictcensorshipregulationsridgidly
.enforced,andwitholdlngofdestinationuntilshipwas
fullyloaded. Allmapsandsecretdocumentswereplaced,
underguardprecedingembarkationoftroops.
C* Operations and Training .
1-4NoRehearsalexerciseswereconducted.
Troopswere'indoctrinatedaboardshipindetailsof
operationb*yfrequentbriefingswithmapandphotoaids
andbylecturesonmiscellaneousinformation concerning
VolcanoIslands.
D. Supply. - . ' . . -
Adequacy of a l l types of mounting out Supplies,
ClassI(Rations-
Type. . . . 10 days.
* - 10- 1. . . .10 days,
Type C. 5 days.
Type K* 5>day8,
-*&.
Type D. 2 days.
"'Water- Incans,drums,water
trailersorotherorganiza-
tionalequipment-2galsper
manperday,for 5days..
ClassIIMaintenanceitemsofclothing,
equipmentandgeneralsupplies.30days.
ClassIIIFuelsatidlubricants,.........30 days.
ClassIVChemicalWarfareSupplies,..;..30days.
Note;TheChemicalWarfareSupplieswere
loadedwithhighprioritysothat
thej-werereadilyacces
Immediateuse.
-2-
!
*M#
ACTIONREPORT,
(Cont'd)
ClassV Ammunition! One(1)unitoffire
smallarmswasstoredinreadily
accessiblespacestoexpediteissue
toindividualspriortodebarkation;
fyortars-sevenunitsoffire;all
othertypesofweaponsfive(5)units
offire.
Note: Theabovequantitiesloadedwerebased
onthe3dMarinesAdministrativeOrder
number1-45,anddue.tothefactthat
wedidnotlanditisnotknownwhether
thequantitiesweresufficientfora
successfulcombatmission.
E Transportquartermaster, . '
1. Twenty*-five(25)hoursrequiredtoToadship;
twohourstoembarktroops. Nodifficultiesencountered
inembarkingtroopsorloadingcargo,
F. Chemical,
1. Chemical,aspectsof.
a. PlanningPhase,
1. Instructionoftroopsindefense
againstchemicalattack.
2, Distributionofgasmasks,protect-
iveointmentandprotective'covers,toalltroopsprior
toembarkation.
b. LoadingPhase.
x , 1. Chemical warfare supplies were loaded
with high priority classifications' so that they were readily
available for immediate use.
0. fcedloal.
1, 'Embarkation, ' . , , *
a. Personnel; MedicalTroopsattachedto
theBattalionmarchedfromthecampatBarrigadatothe
shipatSumay. ' ^
b. Material; Exceptforfieldmarching
^unifo?m,allother.medicalequipment"wastransportedby
vehicletotheship,
2. Aboardship.
a. Sickness: About20$oftheBattalion
personnelrequiredcareofthefeetduringthefirst
weekandahalfaboardship,duetofootai-lmentssus-
tainedonthemarchtothestagingareas. Aftertheship
leftthetropicalzones,about35$oftheBattalionper-
sonnelrequiredtreatmentforupperrespiratoryInfections.
MedicaltroopsattachedtotheMarineshelpedwithdaily
SickCall. Butallhospitalizedcaseswereturnedoverto
thecareoftheshipsdoctors.
b. SanitaryConditions: Dailyinspectionby
MedicalTroopsattachedtotheMarinesincooperationwith
theship'smedicalpersonnelwasmade,
,1. Heads; Sufficientinnumberand
cleanliness,butclosedtoolongforusebythetroopswhen
beinginspected. *
REPORT,IWOJIM, (Cont'd).
2v LivingQuarters! -Good,,except
scarcitiesoffreshwaterpreventedadequatebathing.
3. Mesees: Food,excellent.
4. (rallies: Ingoodrepairand
runningcondition* "'.'..
5. Cooksandhessmen: Bothshipand
Marinecooksandmesemencooperatedinpreparingthefood*
Upperrespiratoryinfectionsinthis,groupmadethemsome-
> whatofamenace*
c. SpecialPrecautions:/None.
* 'd.Hospitalization: Allpersonnelofthis
Battalionhospitalized,,wereadmittedtotheship*s-SickBay.
1. Adequacy: Sufficient** *. '
2. Equipment,Supplies,andPersonnel:
Ship'sequipmentandsupplieswereusedthroughoutandw$re
sufficient, MedicalPersonnelattachedtotheMarinescoop-
eratedwithship'sMedicalpersonnel.
3. NumberofPatients: Aboutthirty(30)
Marine*Personnelwerehospitalizedforperiodsoftwo(2)to
seven(?)days. . ,
4
#
OperationsPerformed* One(1)-append-
ectomy.
e. CasualtiesTreated: KedicalPersonnel *
attachedtotheMarineCorpscooperatedwithship
1
sper-
sonnelincareofcasualtiesreceived.
1. Number:,180.
(a) Retained:All.
(b) Evacuated:None.
. - (c) Died: F i v e ( >
6. Type: Allcasualtieswerethose
' woundedinactionagainstanorganizedenemyorCombat
Fatigue. - . .
3. WalkingWounded: About80.
4. Stretchercases: About80.
f.-kedicalPersonnel:
1. Adequate:Yes,
2. Employment: AssistedinMarineSick
CallandcareofCasualties.
3. Losses: None.
%
4. StateofTraining: Good.
5. SpecialtiesNeeded:None.
g FieldMedicalEquipment:
1* 10-^dayBackupasperscribedbyDiv-
isionOrder. (440SmallBattleDressings.)
(a) Tobecarriedinassault. Three
:
(3)Unit5-A. (sdfmade.)
One(1)Unit,?.
2. Pilferage,andlosses: None.
3. Adequate: Notknown.
4. Suitable:Yes.
.5. Improvements: None.
6. Resupply: Notnecessary, '
v
h. MedicalSupplies: ^
1. AmountCarried:
1
(a)Tobebeachsupply;
Ten(10)daybackupaspres-
cribedbyDivisionOrder.
Unit10. (440SmallBattleDress-
ings. )v
UnitCombatBe|
ORT,IWOJIKA, (Cont'd).
2. Pilferageandlosses; None.
Debarkation: None. '
3.
Ashore; None*
4.
Recommendations:
6.-
(a), Itisrecommendedthatnosuch
twenty (20)milehikepriorto
embarkationforcombatagainbe
ordered,formedicalcasualties,
particularly incareofthefeet
aswellasheatcollapsesincapa-
citatedagood20$offoarinePer-t
spnnelforoneandone-halfweeks
aboardship*
H Signal.
1. RefertoModificationNo.1toGeneralOrder
*.,.
Number1 3 %dated3April,1945,enclosure(A)Signal
Q,uestionaire,Notes1,2,and3.
PARTV* Conclusionsandrecommendations,
A* Dueto1jhefactthatthisunitdidnotpartici-
pate
s
intheCombatOperation,many topicswhichapply
solelytothecpmbatphaseareomitted*
. . - * \
r/"/-
-5-
3D BATTAUQN, 3D i--j*RItfES,
3DftARXNEDIVISION, FLSST
0 FL&CT POST OFFICE, SAW
17April,1945,
TheCommandingOfficer,
TheCommandingOffieer,3dMarines.
Subj ect :
ACTIONHeptrt,IWOJTl-iA'Operation.
Reference
Div0013?, "
PART I .
A. Theperiodcoveredbythisreportistheperiod
frm5November,1944,t#8naroh,1945.
3. ThisBnembarkedaboardtheUSSJi-hLSQ
l
H^-AAn
10February,1945etGUAM,fo.I.andsailed#n17Februaryfor
iv/aJII'iA. WearrivedatthetransportareaatIWOJIKAon21
February,1945* Vieremainedfloatingreservesuntil5liarch,
1945atwhichtimeweleftItfoJII-iAandsailedfirGUAM,11.1.
WearrivedatStfAH,M.I.#n8liarchanddisembarked.
PARTII. PESLIKIJU
A. Theoomptsltitntfthiscommandfrom10February,
45to8karch45wasone(1)B.LTcomposedof:
3d3n,5dUar.
3dPlat,'vpnsC.
3dPlat,Co.C,3di^ngr'Bn*
3dPlat,Co.C,3dPiAn3n.
CollectingSec,Co.C,3dhodBn.
'Jet3dJASCO.
Det28thReplacementi)raft.
Det34thReplercementDraft.
B. Up#nbeingassignedthismission,this3nbegan
anintensivetrainingschedule. Huohtimewasspentontank-
infantry-artillerycoordination,over-runningstronglyfortified
positionswithemphasisonover-runningpillboxesbytheproper
useofflamethrowersanddemolitltns. ThisBnalsoparticipated
inathroe(3)dayprAblemusingartillery,Navalgunfirv3(simul-
atedby1051-114HAW),andairsupport. ThisBndevotedconsider-
abletimetophysicalconditioning,ofthetroopsandparticipated
innumerousconditioninghikes.
C. The3d3n,3d1-iarwastolandonorderonDogplus
1dayorafteronbeachestbedesignated,preparedtomoveto
assignedassemblyarea.J>11companiesweretobepreparedfor
immediateoffensiveactiononlanding.
D. This3nwasnatlandedandsoencounteredno
enemyresistance.
- I'--
ACTIONr^POl-:T, Cont'd
III. CH^OLQ<>ICAL.
T
ACGOtfaT
Tj
OFTHE
A. ThisBnembarkedaboardUSSJAIIS8O'HARA on10Feb45,
and sailedfromGUAli,on17Feb45,
T
'
r
earrivedinthetransport
areaatV*OJIJ1Aan26Feb45. Artillery startedlandingon28th
Febandcompletedunloadingallartillerytn29Feb. Replace-
mentssndShorePartypersonnelwerelanded28Feb, Unloading
#fammoandpriorityvehiclesbegan28Feb. TheUSSJAhS;.Q
l
HAi"vA
begantakingcasualtiesaboardon1LarchandourBnmedical
sectiongavovaluableassistancetotheShip
1
8medicaldepart-
ment, 'Generalcargounloadingbeganon2i*arch Shipplatoon
waslandedon5karoh. U&8JAl-iESO'HArwAsailedfr*mIVOJIliAn
&MarchendarrivedatOUAIi,h.I* an8aarch,anddisembarkedall
tropsandremainingcargo.
A. Admlnlstratlan.
1. Wesufferedn#casualtiesduet#enemy
2, Themarale#fthetroopswas^excellent.
3, Intelligence.
1. hapsusedwereSpecialAirandGunneryTarget
hap. Scales1:5,000and1:10,000ofIWOJXhj*andAerialphoto-
graphs, ^'edidnttusestereoscopicpairs, ^ehadanadequate
supplymtmaps.
2. MQhad*ns(1)enlistedJaplanguagemanattach-
edtothe3n.
0. OperationsandTraining^
1, ThisBnintensivelytrainedinover-runninga
fortifiedpositionendconcentratedonthetacticpluseof3az-
otkps,flamethrowersanddemolitions.
2. Supply. *
I> ItisbelievedthatthisBnhadanadequate-
amountofmountingoutsupplies*
. TransportQuartermester.
1. Alltroopsandcargowereembarked inapp^tx-
imately22hours* Thecargoleadingwssnotasfastasit.
*^ should
Opnfd.
been owing to faulty rigging on the 'ship and the ship had no
faci l i t i es f~r handling large quantities of palletized cargo.
Ship unloading tools:place between 27Feb end bl^arch. personnel
end cargo vere unloaded on call,
F. Chemical.
1, Allhandscarried gasmasks,protective capes
andprotective ointment. Defensive chemicalwarfare supplies
end equipment veresoloaded aboard shipthatthey werereaS.ily
accessible for emergency use.
Or.IJedlcal.
1. 2mbarkation.
B
Personnel: Personnel embarked included
two (2)liedicalOfficers andforty (4Q)hospital corpsmen,who
hiked fromthecamp sitetothedockson9February, 1945 and
embarked thefollowingmorning aboard theUSSO'HAJFtA.
^*Material: ICedicalsuppliesvere loaded
onvehicles end loaded withthevehicleson7February,1945.
Someofthevehiclesvent aboard theUSSC
!
HARA and somevent
aboard theUSS ALHSKA.
2. Aboard Ship.
e
,* Sickness: Embarkedmedicalpersonnel held
sickcallfortroopstwicedailyBnC.patientsneeding hospital-
izationwereadmittedtothe ship
lc
sickbay. Therew&gvery
little sicknessand.noepidemics.
b Sanitary Conditions: Sanitary conditions
verevery satisfactoryinheads,livingquarters,messesand
galleys.
.6.Specie!Precautions:Adaily inspection
byamedicalofficer W smadeoftheheads,troop spaces,messes,
galleys,cooks, and messmen.
Hospitalization; Facilitiesvere adequate
Bfarasequipment and suppliesend sickbay spaceverecon-
cerned. "Whenasualties veretaken aboard,itwasobviousthat
themedicaldepartmentofthe shipcould nothave adequately
Cared forthem withouthelp. Themedicaldepartmentofthe ship
consisted,offour (4)medical officers andtwenty-nine (29)hos-
pital corpsmen. withtheTroopsvereourtwo (2)gpe^icalofficer
ACTIOK
andforty(40)corpeaenplustwo(2)medicalofficersandabout
fifteen(15)corpsmenfromattachedunits* Thenumberof
patient8onthesicklistaveragedaboutthirty(30)untilca-
sualtiesweretakenaboard* .Approximatelyfifty (50).major
surgicalproceduresweredone.
e
*pastt&l'fclesTreated:Atotalofaboutfour
hundredandsixty(460)casualtiesweretreated,ofwhichabout
thirty(30)werereturnedtodutyandtheremainderretained.
Six(6)patientsdied. Casualtieswereofvarioustypes.One
hundredand-twenty-five(125)verestretchercasesandthree
hundredandfive(305)werewalkingwounded.
f?fedlcalPersonnel:Medicalpersonnelwas
adequate Allthemedical
1
officersandhospitalcorpsmenworked
underthedirectionoftheseniormedicalofficeroftheship
anddidthesameworkastheshlp
!
smedicalpersonnel. There
werenolossesorreplacements. Allhandswerewelltrained
anddidsatisfactorywork/ Therewasnoneedforspecialists.
g.FieldMedicalSqulpment;Abouteightyf
cent(80$)ofourallowanceswasloadedaboardship, approx-
imatelytwo-thirdsofitwaslanded-on11-30JIKAfrbmthe"ALHZrU,
andwasusedbyotherunits, viehavebeenunabletoobtainany
ofthatequipment. Sincewedidnetuseanycftheotherthird
wehavenoopinionregardingitsadequacy,suitability,orim-
provementsneeded.
h.HedicalSupplies;Thesamestatementmade
regardingmedicalequipmentappliestomedicalsupplies*
3, Debarkation:
Wedidnotdebarkuntilwereach-
ed0U4M,H.I*on6Harch,1945* Onthatdatethetroopsdebark-
edandwentbacktocampintrucks. Thefollowingdaywereceiv
edwhatwasleftofourequipmentandsupplies,
4* Recommendations:
1. Thatapoolofmedical
personnelbemadeavailablefortemporarydutyaboardtrans-
portswhicheretotakecasualtiesduringanamphibiousoper-
ationtosupplementtheship^medicaldepartment.
"yAtTlA&u***
I&CHARDT; :IC
Lt^Col.,USHC*,
Commanding..
-4-
ENCLOSURE F
I 2TH MARINES
ACTI ON REPORT
. - * * <
RFC/peg
Headquarters
So*.No*3-02^45
12thMarines,3dMarine Division,
From: 12thMarines.
To : CommandingGeneral,3dMarineDivision.
Subject: ActionReportIWO JIMA Operation.
Reference: DivisionGeneralOrderNumber137.
Enclosures (A)actionReportIWO Operation,1stBattalion
12thMarines.
(B)ActionReportIWOJIMA Operation, 2d Battalion.
12thMarines.
(C)ActionReportIWOJIMA Operation, 3d Battalion
*12thMarines.
(D)actionReportIWO JIMA Operation,4thBattalion
12thMarines.
Sugary.
A. Themissionwasfirstassigned (tentatively)on7November
1944* 12thMarinesassumed tacticalcontrolofthe3dferineDivision
Artilleryashoreo*ntwoJIMA on25February,1945,andturnedtac-
ticalcontroloverto4thBattalion12thMarinesat1800onMarch16*
1945.
B. Theforwardobserversandliaisonofficersofthe2dBat-
talion12thMarineslandedwiththe21stMarinesontheafternoonof
21February. Theforwardobserversadjustedthefiresofthe14th
Marinesduring22,23,and24Februarywhenthe2l6tMarineswere
attachedtothe4thMarineDivision.
TheExecutiveOfficersReconnaissance Partywasorderedtoland
withtheAssistant DivisionCommanderon23Februarytomakeposit-
ionareareconnaissanceforthe12thMarines, Areportwasmadeto
v
thaCommanding Offleerrecommending thelandingoftheregaining
elementsof12thMarinesthenintheTransport^rea. TheExecutive
Officer recommended the2dBattalion12thMarineslandon24February.
TheCommandingOfficerandthe2dBattalion12thMarinesRecon-
naissancePartieslandedjustafternoonon24February, andproc-
eeded topositionareasselected. Because ofamisunderstanding
withtheCaptainoftheshiponwhichembarked,
M
B
H
Battery1st
Battalion12thMarineslandedlateintheafternoonthisday. 12th
Marineshadfour (4jpiecesinpositionduringthisperiod.
Theremainderof2dBattalion.12thMarinesand1stBattalion
12thMarineswereorderedtolandon25February. Duetolackof
boats,onlynine(9)piecesof2dBattalion12thMarinescameashore
thisday. Both1stand2dBattalions12thMarinespieceswerereg-
istered'during thedaybyAirSpotand1stBattalion12thMarines
assumed direct supportat1700.firingeight (8)piecesof2dBatt-
alion12thMarinesandfour(4)piecesof1stBattalion12th.Marines
1stBattalion12thMarinesand4thBattalion13thMarines reinf^ced
thefiresof1stbattalion12thMarines. /
During26February the1stBattalion12thMarinesmanagedto
gettheremaining two(2)Batteriesashore,butthe2dBattalion
12thMarines-otonlyone(1)morepieceashore. The1stBattaiion
12thMarinescontinued%ndirect supportofthe9thMarines,rein-
forcedbytheten(10)piecesofthe2dBattalion12thMarine*and
tha4tbBattalion13thMarines.
12thMarinesActionReportIWOJIMAOperation (Cont'd)
During27Februarythe2dBattalion12thMarineslandedthe
remainingtwo(2)piecesofthatBattalion,andthe4thBattalion
12thMarineslanded"K'
f
Battery;"the3dBattalion12thMarineslanded
three(3)gunseachfrom"(r
11
and"H"3atteries. Thefour(4)pieces
ofthe4thBattalion12thMarinesandthesix(6)piecesofthe3d
Battalion12thnarineswereregisteredbyAirSpotandwereput
underoperationalcontrolofthe3dBattalion12thmarines# The1st
Battalion12thMarinescontinuedindirectsupportofthe9thMarines,
reinforcedbythe2dBattalion12thMarines,provisional105mmBatt-
alioncontrolledby3dBattalion12thMarines,andthe4thBattalion
13thMarines*
During28Februarythe4thBattalion12thMarineslandedthe
remaininggunsofthatBattalionandone(1)sparegunwhichwas
giventothe3dBattalion12thMarines, The3dBattalion12thMari-
nes landedfour(4)morepiecesof"I"Batteryandwiththepiece
loanedbythe4thBattalion12thMarineshadeleven(11)pieces
firing. Duringthisperiodthe2dBattalion12thMarineswentinto
directsupportofthe21stMarines,reinforcedbythefiresof1st,
3dand4thBattalions%ZthMarinesand4thBattalion13thMarines.
4thBattalion13thMarineswasreleasedatmoonof28February.
During1Marchtheremainingtwo(2)piecesof3dBattalion
12thmarinescameashoreandthe12thMarinestacticalorganisation
wasnowentirelyashore. The2dBattalion12thMarinescontinued
indirectsupportofthe21stMarines,reinforcedbythefiresof
1st,3dand4thBattalions12thMarines.
On2^archboththe9thand21stMarineswentintothelineand
the1stBattalion12thMarineswasplacedindirectsupportofthe
9thMarines,reinforcedbythefiresof3dBattalion12thMarines;
the2dBattalion12thMarineswaa,placedindirectsupportofthe
21stMarines,reinforcedbythefiresof4th3attalion12thMarines.
From2Marchuntil15^archtheassignmentofBattalionsrem-
ainedthesame.
On16Marchat0700the3dBattalion12thMarineswasgiven
permissiontoclosestationpriortoembarkationthatday. The21st
Marineswereinthelineandthe2dBattalion12thMarineswerein
directsupportreinforcedby1stand4thBattalions12thMarines,
andCorpsArtilleryfiringingeneralsupport.
At1800on16March,1stand2d3attallonsandKegimentalHead-
quartersandServiceBattery12thMarinesweregivenpermissionto
closestationpriortoembarkationthefollowingday,leaving4th
Battalion12thMarinesinsupportofthe3dMarineDivision.
- 2-
#
rtIWOJ1MAOperation
PART,II, Prsllininar
A. Compositionofreportingcommand-1st,2d3d,4thBattal-
ionsAndRegimentalHeadquarters&ServiceBattery,12thMarines,
3dMarineDivision, *
B. Thenatureofthemissionassignedtothe12thMarinesmade
verylittledetailedplanningpossible Sincetheregimentwas
orderedtolandonorderonbeachestob$designated,nodetailed
studiesofbeaches,routes,orpositionareascouldbemade, A
generalstudy'oftheentiresouthernendoftheislandwasmade.
Promthetinethemissionwasassignedit\msobtiousthatthe
artilleryprobleminvolvedinthisoperationwouldbequitesimple.
Theislandwassosmallthatnodisplacementswerenecessaryduring
theoperation* Mospecializedtrainingwasindicatedorneeded*
Trainingforthisoperationincludedinfantry-artilleryprob-
lemsstressingclose-supportingfiresandpreparations,passageof
linosandproblemssupportingtanksandinfantry* Thesewerein
additiontobattalionandregimental (dayandnight)serviceprac~
tices,RSOF
f
a,*uidotherfieldexorcisenormalforfieldartillery,
6, Mission: 12thMarineslandonorderonbeachestobe
designated. Bepreparedtofurnishonebattalionindirectsupport
ofeachassaultregiment onorderandtosupporttheattacka,nyvhere
inthezoneofactionoftheVAmphibiousCorpsLandingForce*
1stBattalion,18thMarinesxmsorderedtobepreparedtobein
directsupportofthe9thMarinesonorderandwasloadedwiththis
regiment soprepared.
2dBattalidn12thMarineswas orderedtobepreparedtobeIn
directsupportofthe21stMarinesonorderandwasloadedwiththis
regiment soprepared*
Battalion*&a4thBattalion12thMarineswereorderedtoland
ingeneralsupport. AsdirectedbydispatchfromVAmphibicusCorps
thesebattalionswereloadedasfirstpriority cargoforunloading.
Bothbattalionswereloadedwith3dMarines,whoweretobein
DivisionReserve.
Sincedefinitebeachesandpositionareaswerenotassigned
priortoarrivalintheTransportAreaallstudiesweregeneraland
nospecificplansweremadeotherthannormaldispositionsofre-
connaissanceparties,etc.
D. See
E. See3dMarineDivisionOSPeriodicRepo
- 3
'.N
ACCOUNT OFTHE ACTION
Regimental Combat Team 21 (V Amphibious Corps f l oat i ng r eser ve)
put t o sea on t he mi ni ng of 16 February. Transport Di vi si on 32,
cons i s t i ng of si x (6) ahips (which were t r ans por t i ng t h i s combat
team) hadt he Regimental Executive Offi cer Reconnaissance Par$y of
12t h Marines and t he ent i r e 3dBat t al i on, 12thMarines (75mm Pack
Howitzers) on board* .At some time duri ng t he ni ght of 12 February
t hi s convoy passed POINT EQUITY andproceeded toward t he pr edes i g-
nat ed Transport Area,
At about 0830 on t he morning of 19 February t he convoy stood
off IWOJIMA and remained t her e u n t i l Regimental Combat Team 21
landed on 21 February.
Meanwhile, Transport Di vi si on 31 and 33, which was t r ans por t i ng
t he 1s t , 3d and 4t h Bat t al i ons , 12t hMarines andthe &M&4
Reconnaissance Part y of t he 12t hMarines, had r ecei ved or der s t o
proceed t o t he rendezvous ar ea. Ont he morning of 17 February t h i s
convoy put t o sea and20 February found t he shi ps at POINT EQUITY
some 80 mi l es off IWOJIMA.
Transport Division 31, transporting the 1st Battalion and
Headquarters &Service Battery, 12th Marines, remained in t hi s area
(POINT EQUITY) until the morning of 22 February at which time they
moved into the Transport Area. On the night of 22 February the shjps
put to sea and the morning of 23 February found them back in the
Transport Area where they remained. Debarkation began on the morn-
ing of 24 February,
Transport Division 33, transporting the 3d and 4th Battalions,
12th Marines, remained at POINT EQUITYuntil the night cf 26 February
at which time theyreceived orders to lay into the Transport Area.
Onthe morning of 27 February the 3d and 4th Battalions, 12th Marines
began debarkation.
The forward observers and liaison officers of the 2d Battalion,
12th Marines landed with the 21st 'Marines, on the afternoon of 21
February and adjusted the firss of the. 14th Marines during 22* 23,
and 24 February while the 21st Marines were attached to the 4th
Marine Division.
23 February: On or about 1700 orders were received aboard the
USSDOYENfor the Regimental Executive Officer Reconnaissance Party
to proceed ashore with the Assistant Division Commander, and to re-
peat to the Commanding Officer, 12th Marines aboard the Command Shij
ccmceming the advisability of landing the remaining elements of thf
12th Marines, then in the Transport Area,
The Regimental Executive Officer Reconnaissance Party consisted
of the Regimental Executive Officer, Assistant Communications Office
Assistant R-*3, one radio corporal with SCR-6J0 and five Sound Rang-
personnel to act as guides. "This Party landed at approximately ISCc
- 4 -
#
'ortIWOJIMAOperation(Cont
T
d)
t
andproceededtoVCorpsArtilleryCommandPostlocatedatTA147
ITEMwheretheyremainedforthenight.tTheRegimentalExecutive
OfficercontactedCorpsArtilleryExecutiveOfficer*ndwasgiven
definiteareastoreconnoiter,possibleroutesintopositionareas,
extentofaidtobeexpectedfromCorpsArtillery,andthegeneralt*?x
tacticalsituation.
, '" ' \ v \
24February: At0730'theRegimentalExecutiveOfficerRecon-
naissancePartyproceededtoTA163TflLLIAK,164and121 StK>AR
p
and
tentatively selectedpositionareasforallbattalions. Regimental
ExecutiveOfficer sentadispatchtoCommanding.Offleeradvising2d
Battalion12thMarinestocommencelanding. TheRegimental Executive
Officer.ReconnaissancePartythenproceededtoCorpsArtilleryto
awaitfurtherorders.
* At0910theremainderoftheRegimental ExecutiveOfficerRe-
connaissanceParty,consistingoftheAssistant R-2,SoundRanging
Officer,RegimentalDentist,with53enlistedlandedandproceeded
toCorpsArtilleryCommandPost. '>"''
- . **
At1330theCommandingOfficerAdvanceReconnaissance Party
landed, consistingoflommandingOfficer,R-2,R-3,Regimental
CommunicationsOfficer',andRegimentalSurvey Officer,-with33
enlisted,andwasguidedtothe.CoipsArtillery..CommandPost, After
conferencewiththeRegimentalExecutiveOfficer,theCommanding
OfficerwenttotheDivisionCommandpost locatedInTA164EASY,
andtheRegimentalExecutiveOfficerwithbothReconnaissanceParties
proceededtothepositionareaselectedfortheRegimentalCoaimand
Postin164GEORGE.
At1330theAdvanceReconnaissancePartyof2dBattalion12th
MarinaslandedandproceededwiththeCommandingOfficerReconnais-
sance'PartiestotheCorpsArtillery CommandPostandthenceonto*a
theirpositionarealocatedinTA164FOX(South). -
Becauseofamisunderstanding,theCaptainoftheship,on
which"B"Battery,1stBattalion12thMarineswasembarked,putthis
battery ashorelateintheafternoon, WhenBattery Commanderwas
guidedtotheRegimentalComiiiandPost,hewasshownhisbattery
positionareaandassoonashehadgivenallnecessary information
tohisExecutiveOfficerhewassentto2dBattalion14thMarines
toactasLiaisonOfficer, lptBattalion14thMarineswastoprovide
direct supportforthe9thMarinesthefollowingday.
At1530oneNCOand25enlisted, remainderoftheCommanding
OfficerReconnaissanceParty,landedandweredirectedtotheRegi-
mentalCommandPost. ': .
DuringtheafternoonRegiment,2dBattalion12thMarinesand
"B"Battery,surveyedinpositionareasandinstalledwire--communi-
cation.'2dBattalion,12thMarinesranwiretothe21stMarines
CommandPostandinstalledaforward switching central. Localin-
stallationsweremadeandlocalsecurityprovidedforthenight.
2d.Battalion14thMarineswasin'direct supportofthe21st
Marines.with4thBattalion13thMarinesreinforcing. Allfireswere
adjustedby2dBattalion12thMarinesforwardobservers. Corps
Artilleryprovidedgeneralsupporting fires. The12thMarinesex-
G-reisednotacticalcontroloffiredirectionduring,thisperiod.
.5.
UNCLASSiF
12thmarinesActionReportIWOJIJMAOperatidn (Cont'd)*
5February: iit0800theRegimentalFireDirectionenterwas
installedandtheUnitJournalopenedatthsitime. Shortlythere-
after,theCorps.artilleryLiaisonOfficerreportedtothishead-
quarters.
At0815the9thMarinesexecutedapassageoflinesofthe21st
karinesandcontinuedtheattack. 1stBattalion14thMarinesin
directsupport,4thBattalion13thMarinesreinforcing,aftdCorps
Artilleryfurnishinggeneralsupportingfires. 1stBattalion12th
MarinesforwardobserversandLiaisonOfficersrelievedtheforward
observersanaLiaisonOfficersof2dBattalion12thMarinesinthe
line.
The2dBattalion12thMarinesFireDirectionCenteropenedthe
UnitJournalat1015,butlackingequipmentandpieces,remainednon-
functionaluntil1130whenpiecesfrom
H
E"Batterybegantoarrive.
ThisBatterywasinpositionreadytofireat1230.
1stBattalion12thMarinesAdvanceReconnaissancePartylanded
atapproximately0800andarrivedattheRegimentalCommandPostand
weredirectedtotheirposition. "B"Batterywasinpositionready
tofireat1130,butduetothefactthat1stBattalion12thMarines
equipmenthadnotarrivedasyet,theRegimentalFireDirectionCenter
actedasFireDirectionCentertoregisterthatBattery.
Both"E
!t
and"B
11
Batteries,wereregisteredbyAirSpot
(borrowedfromCorpsArtillery)onCheckPoints7,9and10prior
to1400.
Three(3)piecesof
M
D"Batterywereinpositionreadytofire
at1500. Thefourthpieceof"D
lf
Batteryhadbeendamagedinlanding
Two(2)piecesof
n
F
lf
Batterywereinpositionat1700andoneof
thesewasgivento"D"BatterytocompletethatBattery, -at1700the
FireDirectionCenterofthe1stand2dBattalions12thMarineswere
n
D
M
directedtocombinetofire"B
11
Battery,
M
E
H
Batteryand Battery
asaprovisionalBattalionindirectsupportofthe9thMarines
1stBattalion,12thMarinestobeintacticalcontrol. Atthifetime
1stBattalion*14thMarineswasrelievedasdirectsupportBattalion,
butcontinuedtodeliverreinforcingfiresuntil0700thenext
morning. 4thBattalion13thMarinesalsoreinforcedthefiresof
1stBattalion12thMarines(ProvisionalBattalion).
The12thMarinesnowhadcompletetacticalcontrolandfire
direction. .
26February: At07001stBattalion14thMarineswasreleased
andrevertedbacktocontrolof14thMarines. TheProvisional
Battalionundercontrolof1stBattalion12thMarineswasindirect
supportofthe9thMarinesandfiredapreparationfortheattack
fromKminus45toKhour. 4thBattalion13thJaarinesprovidedre-
inforcingfiresandCorpsArtilleryfiredingeneralsupport. At
0800theLiaisonOfficerfrom"4thBattalion13thMarinesarrivedaZ
1stBattalion12thMarineswithdirectwirecommunicationfrom4th
Battalion13thMarinesFireDirectionCenter.
At0800"C
fl
Batterywasinpositionandreadytofireandat'.
0830"A"Batterywasinpositionreadytofire. "TheseBatteries'*
werecheckedbyAirSpotandfiredduringtheday.insupportofthe
attack.
- 6-
12thMarinesmotionReportIViOJIM*Operation (Cont'd).
At 1305thefireDirectionCenterof 2dBattalion12thMarines
assumedoperationalcontrolofthenine(9)piecesof SdBattalion
12thMarines,reinforcingthefiresof 1stBattalion12thMarines.
duringthedaytheRegimentalChemicalOfficerwitheleven(11)
enlisteddisembarkedfromtheUSSFELANDandarrivedat theRegimen-
talCommandPost. TheAirSpotcoordinatorlandedfromtheUSS
FREMONT. . '-
tf
F
w
At 1700 an additional piece of Battery went into position;
2d Battalion 12th Marines nowhad ten (10) guns firing.
Harassing fires and fires on call were fired during the night
by 1st and 2d Battalions 12th Marines, 4th Battalion 13th Marines
and Corps
Duringthedaythe12thMarinesAirSpot(basedon carriers)
checkedregistrations,flewscarch^missions,andfiredthe.Re^Jbment
ontargetsof opportunity*
27February: At 0210an additionalpieceof "F"Battery
arrived. Thisnowgave"F
u
Batteryfour(4)pieces,oneofwhich
waein
tt
D
M
Battery*
The9thMarinessupportedby anIntenseartillery,preparation
lastingfromKminus30 toKhour(0800)continuedtheattackwith
the0-2 lineas theobjective. 1stBattalion12thMarineswasin,
directsupportof the9thMarines,2dBattalion12thMarineswith'
eleven(11;pieces,and4thBattalion13thMarinesprovided"'" rein-
forcingfires. CorpsArtilleryfiredingeneral-support.
At1130theadvanceReconnaissancePartyof 4thBattalion12th
MarineslandedandproceededtoRegimentalCommandPostwherethey
weredirectedto the3attalionpositionareaselectedbytheExec-
utiveOfficer.
At1130theR-4,Rr-1, HeadquartersandServiceBattery
R-8,-assistantRr-4and'fiftytwo(52)enlistedfromUSSFUNSTER
arrivedatRegimentalCommandPost. .,.
At1230theadvanceReconnaiseancePartyof 3dBattalion ,12th
Marinesarrivedat theRegimentalGor^andPostandweredirected
totheBattalionpositionareaselectedby theExecutiveOfficer,
*At 1300the9thMarinesattackedsupportedby "*
w
and
H
3
V
Bat-
teriesfiringHE and"C
H
BatteryfiringWP. Preparationlasted
fromKminusten(10)toKhour.
Two(2)piecesof
H
K"Batteryarrivedinpositionat1358and
two(2)piecesof "G-"a-t,teryarrivedin:positionat1500* Regis- . .
tration<;Ofthesetwo(2)BatteriesbyAirSpotonCheckPoint's9
and10 wascompletedby1645. Thesparepieceof 2d3attalion12th
Marinesarrivedandtwelve(12)pieceswerefiringby1800.
Priorto1800one(1)morepieceof"G"Batteryandthree(3)
piecesof "H"Batteryarrivedinposition,.at2300two(2)more
gunsof"K
11
Batterywereinpositionandreadytofire.
- 7-
12thMarinesActionReportIQJlitaOperation (Cont
!
d).
theendofthisperiod1stBattalion12thMarinescontinued
indirectsupportofthe9thMarinesreinforcedby2dBattalion12th
Marines(complete),3dBattalion12thMarines(ProvisionalBattalion
consistingof"K"Battery,*three(3)piecesof"G
11
Battery,and
three(3)piecesof"H"Battery),4thBattalion13thMarines,and
CorpsArtillery-firingingeneralsupport.
From0700to181512thMarinesAirSpot(carrierborne)conduc-
tedregistration,searchmissions,andfiredontargetsofopportun-
ity, '
28February: The21stmarinespassedthroughtie9thMarines
at0815andcontinuedtheattack intheDivisionZoneofAction
supportedby.artilleryandNavaiG-unfire. .Athirty(30)minute
preparationwasfiredinsupportoftheattack'which'-^included2&
Battalion12thMarinesindirectsupport,1stBattalion12thMarines,
3dBattalion12thMarineetProvisionalBattalionconsistingof
M
K"
Battery,three(3)gunsfrom"G"Batteryandthree(3)gunsfrom
fl
H"
Battery),4thBattalion13thMarinesandCorpsArtilleryfiring
generalsupport* AtKhourarollingbarragewasplacedforwardof
eachassaultBattalionto lift100yardseveryseven(7)minutes
forfortynine-(49)minutes.
1300acoordinatedattacktyaslaunchedprecedacU.byafive'
(5)minute.artillery,preparation. Arollingbarragewaslaid
downandlifted100yardseveryseven(7)minutesfortwo(2)lifts.
Anothercoordinatedattackat1530waspreceded.byafive(5)minute
.artillerypreparationandarollingbarrageplacedforwardofthe
assaultBattalionsof21stMarines^
Duringthistimefour(4)piecesof"L
11
Batteryhadlandedand
wereinpositionreadytofireat1630. The4thBattalion12th
Marinessparepiecewaslandedandgiventothe3dBattalion12th
Marines; "I"Batteryhadalsolanded. At1830
M
MBatterywasin
positionreadytofire. At1645the4thBattalioft12thMarineshad
benorderedtoassumeoperationalcontroloftheirownpieces,so
a
ttheendofthe'period2dBattalion12th-Marinesindirectsupport
ofthe21stMarineswerereinforcedby1stBattalion12thMarines,
4thBattalion12thMarines,3d3attalion12thMarines;(firingeleven
(11)pieces,onesparefrom4thBattalion12thJ>iarines),andCorps
artilleryfiringingeneralsupport. 4thBattalion13thMarines
releasedto13thMarinesat1200.'
From0700to1815,12thMarinesAirSpot(carrierborne)conduc-
tedregistrationsfor3dand4thBattalidas12thMarines,search
missions,andfiredontargetsofopportunity.
i
1March: Two(2)gunscameintothe3dBattalion12thMarines
positionandthisBattalionnowhadtwelve(12)guns'firingin
supportoftheattack.:ThisBattalion'wasnowreinforcingthefir-r
of1stBattalion12thMarinesan#thetacticalset-upwa'sddmpl'ete.
The21stmarinescontinuedtheattackintheDivisionZoneof
Action. Afifteen(15)minutepreparationwasfiredin*'"supportof
theattackwhichincluded75mm,105mmand15*5Howitzers. AtK'Hour
arollingbarragewasplacedforwardofeachassaultBattalionto
lift100yardseveryeight(8)minutesfortwenty-four(24)minutes.*
At1645boththe9thand21stmarineslaunchedacoordinated
attackafterafiveC^)jfMfttt>^||p^rai^4l
1
^^attackwaspreceded
byarollingbarrage.* !^Wd|x*t|^\oi|Ifetn*2-mrineswasindirect
support-ofthe21stMarinesduring,both*attacksandwasreinforced
by4thBattalion2^hMarines.
% CONFIDENTIAL
-8-
v
.L.
12thMarines"ActionfteortIWOJlknOperation (Cont
l
d).
The1stBattalion12thMarinestook-overdirectsupportfiresofthe
9thMarinesandwasreinforcedby3dBattalion12thMarines.
AirSpotwasonstationfrom0700to1815andconductedregis-
tration,searchmissionsandfiredontargetsof n
The12thmarineswasnowacompletetacticalandfiringorgan-
izationwithRegimentalFireDirectionCentercoordinatingallfires.
2March: TheDivisioncontinuedtheattackwiththe9thand
21stMarinesabreast.Afifteen(15.0.minutepreparationwasfired
insupportoftheattackwhichincluded75mm,105mmand155mm
Howitzers* At KHourarollingbarragewasplaced'forwardofeach
assaultregimenttolift100yardseveryeight(8)minutesfor
twenty-four(24)minutes.
At1530acoordinatedattackwaslaunchedafteraten(10)
minuteartillerypreparationwhichwasfiredbyeight(8) battalions.
Arollingbarrageprecededtheattack, , .
The1stBattalion12thMarineswasindirectsupportofthe9th
Marinesreinforcedbythe3dBattalion12thMarines. The2dBattal-
ion12thMarineswasindirectsupportofthe21stMarinesreinforced
bythroe(3)battalionsofthe13thMarinesand.onebattalionof
155mmfromCorpsArtilleryfortheattackpreparationandtherolling
barrages.
AirSpotwasonstationfrom0700to1815andcondujct.cdregis-
trations,searchmissions,andfiredontargetsofopportunity.
5March: TheDivisioncontinuedtheattackwiththe9thMarines
and21stMarinesabreast. Aton(10)minutepreparationwasfired.j
insupportoftheattackwhich-included75mm,105mmand155mmHowit-
zers. AtKHourarollingbarrage-wasplacedforwardoftheDivision
fronttolift100yardseveryseven(7)minutesfor200yards.
At1500acoordinatedattackwas-launchedprecededbyafive
(5)minuteartillerypreparation*
The12thMarinessustainednochangeintheassignmentof
artillerybattalions.

AirSpotwasonstationfrom0700to1815carryingoutsearch
missionsandregisteringonpointscalledforbyR-3.
4March: TheDivisionattackedinitsDivisionZoneofaction
at1140. Atwenty(20)minut"preparationwasfiredinsupportof
theattackwhichincluded75mm
r
105mmand155mmHowitzers.At
KHourarollingbarragewasplacedforwardoftheDivisionfront
andlifted100yardseveryseven(7)-minutesfor200yards.
Nochangeinassignmentofbattalionsduringthisperiod.
NoAirSpotswereonstationduringthisperiod-inclement
weather.
5March: No attacks launched during this- period.
i
From 07uC>tto 1800 Air Spot registered the 2d Battalion 12th
Marines on Check Point 12 n:nd the 4th Battalion 12th Marines on ChecJ
Point 9. Search missions were also carried out.
12th Marines fi rM harassing fires throughc|a|*to}A^a^v and...nigh*.
12thkarIn&s"55Titfrr-KeportIWQJIMa.
g torch: TheDivisioncontinuedtheattachinechelon.
KHouftheleftbattalionofthe21stMarines.attackedsupportedby
artilleryfiringapreparationfromKminus10toKHour* AtKplus
onehourthefrightbattalionofthe21st-Marinesandthe9thMarines
attacked, fhisattackwassupportedbyanartillerypreparation
fromKjlus4toIL'&iua50andKplus55toKplus60, Thisattack
wapp|egdedbya.rollingbarragewhichliftedonehundred(100)
yardsev^ryseven(7)minutesforthreohundred(300)yards.
1440anothercoordinatedattackwaslaunchedprecededbyan
artillerypreparationfromKminus2toK8ourandthenlifting
onehundred(100)yardsandfiringforfivfe(5)minutes.
Spotterscameashorefromthecarrierandcontinuedsearch
missionsforthe12thMarinesfromOY-1aircraftfrom1300to1700,
Nochangeintheassignmentofartillerybattalions.
12thMarinesfiredpreparation^insupportoftheattackin
accordancewithCorpsorder.
7March: TheDivision'continuedtheattackwithapre-dawn
attackwhichjumpedoffat0500. Noartillerypreparationwas
employedpriortotheattack.
12thMarinesfiredharassingfireswithW.P.thenip:htof
6-7March, At0455asmokescreenWasplacedforwardofthe9th
and21stMarinestoscreentheattack*
*iirSpottersweregroundedduringthisperiod-inclement
weather,
Nochangeintheassignmentofbattalions.
$jiaych:
Tne
Divisioncontinuedtheattackat0750supported
Tp,y- a.trt
L
'"(10)minuteartillerypreparationintheZoneofactionof
StfoMarinesandfolloweditwitharollingbarragelifting100yardi
overyseven(?)minutesfor200yards.
NochangeintaeassigniaQntofartillerybattalionsduringtii
period.
From07^5toX63Q4ir^potcarriedoutsearch,missionsfor
the12thMarines,"
9March: Thedivisioncontinuedtheattackat07Opv?|ththe
9thand21stMarinesabreast, nton(10)4auteartili^^yprepar
tionwasfiredW thql^thbrinesinsupportoftfcoatt^cfc'|I'ai
9 t h m a r i n e s '". " '"'' " ''
m 10 -
12thMarinesAction*ReptfrtIWOJIMAOperation (Cont
f
d).
NochangeintheassignmentofArtilleryBattalions.
AirSpotregisteredthe4thBattalion12thMarinesonHONAHE
ROCKusinghigh-anglefireandalsocontinuedtocarryoutsearch
missionsduringthisperiod.
10March:' TheDivisioncontinuedtheattackwiththe9thand
21stMarinesabreast*
The1stBattalion12thMarineswasindirectsupportof9th
Marinesand2dBattalion12thMarineswasindirectsupportof21st
Marines* The3dHattalionand4thBattalion12thMarinesfireda
fifteen(15)minutepreparationfromKminus15toKhourinsupport
of5thMarineDivision,andfiredathirty(30)minutepreparation
fromKminus5toKplus25insuppprtof4thMarineDivision.
Fr6m0800to1630AirSpotcarriedoutsearchmissionsforthe
12thMarines.
Harassingfireswerecontinuedthroughoutthenightandearly
morninghours.
11March: The9thMarinesattackedat0730ontherightof
theDivisionZoneofAction* The21stMarinesattackedat0730.
Therewerenopreparationsfiredfortheattackbythe12th
Marines, The1st3attalion12thmarineswasavailabletounitsof
thisDivisionforcallfires.. The2d,3d,and4thBattalions12th
Marinesreinforcedthefiresofthe13thMarinesinthe5thMarine
DivisionZoneofAction.
Air Spotwasoncallfrom0900to1500todeterminedisposit-
ionoffriendlytroops.
12March; Divisioncontinuedmoppingupoperationsinthe
DiviBionZoneofaction* 12thMarinesreinforcedthefiresofthe
13thMarinesduringthisperiod.
Prom1430to1600AirSpotregisteredallfour(4)Battalions
of12thMarinesinthe5thMarineDivisionZoneofActionfor
harassingandpreparationfires.
13March: TheDivisioncontinuedmoppingupoperationswithin
^theDivisionZoneof.Acfcioxu 12thMarinesreinforcedthe"firesof
13thMarines.
x
MJ Divisioncontinuedmoppingupoperations ncontinuedmoppingupoperationswitfcj Diisio
M i i f d th f f 1
3of.action. 12thMarinesreinforcedthefiresofthe13th
in03 '
- 11-
12thMarinesActionMpoVt IWO JIMA Operation (Cont
l
d).
,15March: TheDivisioncontinuedmoppingupoperationsinthe
DivisionZoneofAction. NorequestsforfiresweremadefromuWie
12thMarines. 3d3attalion12thMarineswasgivenpermissiontoclose
stationat1800andpreparetoembark,
16inarch: The21stMarinesrelieved the26thand27thMarines
inthe5thDivisionsectorat0715andcontinuedtheattacktothe
0*3lineinthatsector.
A smokescreenwasfire,dby12thharia.esfrom0705to0734to
covertherelief. FromKmnus20toKhour(0815)anartillery-
preparationwasfiyedby24Battalion12thMarinesindirectsupport,
reinforcedby1stand4thBattalions12thMarines,andCorpsArtillery
AtKhourthepreparationJLiftedonehundred (100)yardsinthedire*-
ctionoftheattackandfireduntilKplus10. The12thMarines
firednoothermissionsduring the/day.
At1800the1stand2dBattalionsandRegimentalHeadquarters
closed stationleavingthe4thBattalion12thMarinespreparedto
furnishartillerysuppor-ttotheDivision..onrequest.
12thMarines
IWOJIM*Operation (Cont'd)
PARTIV. Comments.
A. Administration:
1.
KilledinAction - 2officersand12enlisted.
WoundedinAction - 13officers,1warrantofficer
and100enlisted.
HissinginAction - None.
DiedofWound - 2officersand5enlisted.
Effectivestrengthforthisunit6n16karch:
Officers WarrantOfficers Enlisted
USMC T
129 ~T4
4
1975
USN
TOTAL
T3F I?
2. Moralewasexcellentduringthisoperation. The
rapiddeliveryofmailandexcellentrationscontributedgreatly
tothis.
3.
Noprisoners,militaryorcivilian,werehandled
bythisunit.
1. Artillery.
1. Loading- RegimentalReconnaissancePartieshadin-
sufficientequipmentembarkedontheshipstheywereontosetup
andfunctionefficiently. Manyitemsofessentialequipmentwere
embarkedonshipswhichdidnotunloadforseveraldaysafterthe
CommandPostwasestablished. Forloadingofbattalions,&ee
attachedBattalionreports.
2. Landing- SeePARTIII,ChronologicalReport.
3. Survey Initialsurveycontrolonthebeachhead
wasestablishedbythe14thMarinesandcoordinatedbyCorpsArt-
illery. Uponarrivalofthe12thMarinesReconnaissancePartyon*
24February,theCorpsArtillerySurveyOfficerdesignatedanI.P.
withallnecessaryinformation. Thatafternoon2dBattalion12th.,
Marinesputintheirpositionareasurvey,andtheRegimentalteam
surveyedin"3
H
Battery1stBattalion12thmarines.
On7FebruarytheRegimentalSurveySectionestablished
anI.P.for3dBattalion12thMarinesand4thBattalion12thMarinet
andsurveyedinthebasepieceoftheadjustingBattery. TheSurvey
Sectionof3dand4thBattalions12thMarinescompletedtheirpos-
itionareasurveyuponarrival.
MarinesActionReportIWOJIMAOperation (Cont'd).
3. Survey (Cont'd).
On14MarchSoundand FlashOP's werelocatedandsurv^red.
InitialcontrolfortheseOP'swuretakenfromstationsestablished
bythe15thMarines. ControlwasoarriedtotheseI.P
f
sby
triangulation. ...-,.- -,*<
On15Marchn$w -battalionpositionareasweresurveyedinthe
VicinityofKOTOYAMA.0.*Thesewereestablishedforthepossible... .
forwarddisplacemeint-./pfthe 12thMarines*
4. FireAdjustment- Firewasadjustedduringtheoperation
byforwardobservation,soundadjustmentbyforwardobservers,.......
adjustmentbyAirSpotters,adjustmentbyDodar(SoundRanging),'...
adjustmentbyflashranging,andunobservedfires, . '
5. FireDirection- Firedirection(as describedinFM6-40)
wasnormal. Thisoperationpresentednonet-r problemsinfire
direction.
6* OrganizationforCombatand TacticalEmployment-
OrganizationforCombat- 1stBattalion12th Marinesprepared
tobeindirectsupportofthe 9th Marines;2d.Battalion 12th
Marinesprpearedtobeindirectsupportof21st.Marines;3d
Battalion12thMarinespreparedtobeingeneralsupport;4th
Battalion12th Marinespreparedtobeingeneralsupport.
TacticalEmployment- Tacticalemploymentdependeduponthe
dispositionoftheinfantryregiments. Duringthegreaterpartof
theoperationboththe9th and21st Marineswereinthelineandthe
1stBattalion12thMarinesvrasindirectsupportofthe.9th,Marines
reinforcedby3dBattalion12thMarines;2dBattalion12th Marines
vrasindirect supportofthe21stMarinesreinforcedby4thBattal-
ion12th Marines. Fordetails,secPARTIII,.ChronologicalReport.
7. Liaison-Command liaisonwasestablishedbetweenthe
12thMarinesand3dMarineDivisionbyCommandingOfficerwhowas
quarteredatDivision'Headquarters,andoperatedfromtheG3
office. Adirectlinowasmaintainedbetweenthe0-3officeand
theR-3office.
Aliaisonsectionwassenttothe12thMarinesfromCorps
Artillerytoprovideinformation'onairstrikesbesidesnormal
liaisonfunctions.
>* ~ ' * *
Aliaison officer f'rom"4tVr'feattalion 13th Marines was-sent to
the 12th Marines while that battalion was reinforcing the -flakes of
the 12th Marines. Later a direct line was laid between the 12th
Marines Fire Direction C'ent
i
er'
;
and the 13th Marines Fire Direction
Center, and no liaison Officer between these regiments was deemed
necessary. For liaison between the battalions of 12th Marines and
the 21st and 9th Marines see battalion reports attached.
- 14 -
wiyyt
12thMarinesActionimport IWOJltoa.Op*ration,..'.(Cant
1
&}
_ _ _ - _ , _ . '- - fj > * - - - < -- - - -
8 Observation-Groundobservationbyforward observers
wasprinciplemeansofobservationusedforfireadjustment. During
thelatterphasesofthecampaignsomeof.theobserverswereable
tooccupyOP'snearthefrontlinesfromwhichtheycouldadjust
fires,but,inthemain,thelowrollingcharacteroftheterrain
madeOP
l
simpossible.
Thenextbestobservationwasobtainedbyair* ThisDivision
vrasseverlyhandicappedbynothavingitsownVkOsquadronpresent.
Thecarrier-basedplanesflewtoohighandfasttopermitgood
observation,andlaterVkO'planeswereonlyavailableonloanfrom
otherunits. During theentireoperationthe12thkarineswereonly
allowedoneplaneonstationatatimeand thisdidnotallowsearch-,
ingandfiringtobedone simultaneously.
integratedflashandsoundrangingsystemwasbeing
operatedbyCorps,13thMarinesand14thMarineswhenthisregiment
landed. Thissystemprovideddataonactivitylocatedinthe3d
karineDivisionZoneofAction. Theflashrangingbasewassetup
onh?SURIRdCHI)thisbasewastooshortforaccurateresults* The-
se-undrangingsystemgavesatisfactoryresultsatnightwhenour
ownpieceswerenotfiring.
9. Personnel-Thefewo-asultiessustainedbythisunit
didnothamperoperations. Someofthespecialized replacements
receivedwerenotcapableofcarryingouttheirassignments. Radio
operatorswerereceivedwhohadreceivednotrainingforseven(7)
monthsandwerenotfamiliarwithsomeoftheradiomaterialbeing
used. . .
? 10. Trainingdeficiencies-Somefewforwardobservers
andairobserverswere-hotaswelltrainingastheyshouldhavebeen,
bothwithregardstoshootingandtargetdesignation. Targetdesig-
nationwasparticularlybad. Forwardobservershabituallyfailed
todescribethetargetsufficientlytopermit theFireDirection
Centerstoselectthepropertypeoffuze,ordecide thebestmeans
toattackthetarget (i.e.,singlegun,batteryconverged,or
battalionopenor"converged). Inordertoobtainthisinformation
muchtimewaslostandthecommunicationchannelswereoverloaded.
Therewerenoothertrainingdeficienciesnoted.
11. kapsandPhotos-1:10,000and1:20,000mapsandphotos
wereprovided* Theverticalcontrolinthenorternendofthe
island.provedtobewrongbyabout20feet. Thecliffswerenot
shownproperlynorweregroundcontourscorrectinthecoastal
areas. Thehorizontalcontrolhadafairlyconstant,map
lf
K"of
35yards/thousand. GridNorthwas30minutesfrom*TrueNorth.
-15-
l-2thkarinesaction"ReportIW JIk,Operation
41. iaapsandPhotos (Cont'd).
K.O.(6101)wasmoreaccurateinhorizontalcontroland
shouldhaveoe&nusedforbasichorizontalcontrol.
a Abookof1:1G,0QQgriddedphotoswereusedbytheforward
observersverysuccessfully.
Stereo-pairswerenotfurnishedinquantitiesgreatenough
toallowdistributionofagoodcoveragetoeachbattalion.
12. Communications-wirecommunicationswereestablished
uponlandingandweremaintainedas%heprimarymeansofcommunica-
tionthreughouttheentireoperation, kaintenanceofwirecontinued
uninterrupted. Inmanycases,poleswsrerequiredtooverheadlines
becauseofcongestionofgroundinstallationsandconstructionwork
onroads, xilllineslaidwerenormal* '
Radiodifficultieswereencounteredonthenetsestablished,
betweenforwardobserverteamsandtheresultingchainofcommuni-
cation-liaisonofficersandfiredirectioncenter.. Inthemain,
thceadifficultiesstemmedfromthefollowing:
(1)TheSCR610istooheavyandbulkyforusewith
forwardobserverteams.
(2)TheSCR610waseasilyjarredcutofalignment,
thusreducing theeffective,range. Relaystations
werefrequentlynecessarywhichhamperedoffcc-
tivetransmicsion. , . .;
(3)TheSCR610frequencyplanistooinflexible.
Initiallytheforwardobserversandliaison
officers(attachedtothe21stMarines)worked
withthefiredirectioncentersofthe14th
Marines. Thisnecessit&tedashift.inradios
whichpresentedmanydifficulties. Itwasnoted
almostimmediatelythatartilleryfrequencies
weretooclose. Similarityoftransmissions
causedgarbledfiremissionswhichdemanded
completecheck-upandre-heck-upgreatlyreduc-
ingthisunitsefficiency.
13.
!
Enemymotiongainstourartillery-Some-shelling,
rocketandmortarfirewasreceivedinthepositionar.oa..Slight
damagewasdonetomaterialandsomecasualtieswerecaused-.. This
enemyfirewassporadicandunstematic. Therewerc.no.attempts
reportedtoinfiltratepersonnelintotheposition-'areasanddirectly
attackthe n
-16-
12thMarines.actionReportr"0JI*iOpfiratiQnU(Coht)d)
14. EffectivenessofOwnartillery-Theeffectivenessof
ourartillery"waslimitedbythedispositionoftheznc^yinpill-
boxes,bunkersandcaveswhichhadoverheadcovertoothicktobe
destroyedbythelightcalibreofDivisionartillery. Fireby155
f
s
usingconcretepiercingshellwasnecessarytodestroythese
structures. Manyoftheenemyinstallationsweresodisposedthat
theywereinacceessibletolowangleartilleryfire. Itisfeltthat
manymoreinstallationsoouldhavebeenneutralizedordestroyedif
highanglefirehadbeenpermittedsooner.
Lackofinformationastothedispositionoftheenemyto
ourfrontalsolimitedtheeffectivenessofourartillery* Generally
artillerywasplacedunlformilyacrossthefront,andweveronet
abletomassfiresonanydefinitestrongpoint,
However,itwasdeterminedtha,tharassingfires,bothday
andnight,keptthee-nemydeepintheirholesandgreatlyreducedthe
mortar,rocket,andsmallariasfires. Duringthelastphasesof
theoperationwhentheenemynolongerhadpreparedemplacementsour
artilleryfireswereveryeffective.
15. TacticalEmploymentofEnemyartillery-Afterthe
enemywaspushedbackanddeprivedofobservationintoanyarea,the
effectivenessand-volumeoffirereceived"lessenedconsiderably.
.niltypesofweaponswereusedbytheenemytofiredirect
fireintoourtroops,andanyactivitybyourtroopsbroughtboth
mortarandartilleryfire. Extremelygood,camouflageoftenmade
theseweaponsverydifficulttolocated Frequently,these-gunswould
fireseveralroundsandthenretirebackintocavesandrevetments
whichwore"almostinacccssablctoourlightartillery. Concrete
pillboxesandsteeldoorsprovedtobeeffectiveprotectionfor-the
gunsandcrews-twelvedirecthitsusing155m^concretepiercing-
shellswererequiredtoknockoutonepillbox.
Thoenemymovedguns(bynight)intoapositiontoimpede
ouradvance,andgunsthoughttobeknockedoutwerere-mannedby
newcrews. Shootingintoourlineswhilefriendlyartillerywas
firingwasaco^mon^practicc. Oneforwardobserverofthe2d Bn,
12thmarinesreportedobservingsixpiecesfiringintothesamearea
simultaneously. However,OF
1
econtinuedtobeafavoritetargetfor
bothartilleryand^ortarfire.
Firing;intorearareasisbeetdescribedasharassing,fires,
apparentlytheenmeyhadlocatedmajorinstallationspriortoour
landingandwasabletoplacefireontheseatwill. Untilthelarg;
calibreweaponsworeknockedout,artilleryfirewascommonoverthe
entireisland.
-1?-
IWOJIMAOperation(Cont'd).
16. EffectivenessofEnemyArtillery-Thocongestionofin-
stationsmadetheenemyindirectfireeffective. Itisbestde-
scribedasharassingfireandthedamagedonewasnotimportant.
Thedirectfireusedbytheenemyagainstourtanksandinfantry
wasveryeffective. Thepositionsofthepieceswereverywell
camouflagedandprotected,whichoftenallowedthemtocontinuefire
untilourtroopswereveryclose.
OP'swereattackedassoonasestablishedandthishampered
ourobservation. Withobservationtheenemywasabletohamperthe
movementofourtroopsandsupplies. TheirprincipleOp'swere
locatedoutsidetheDivisionZoneofActionandthisrequiredgreat
coordinationwithotherunitstoneutralizethese.
17. MethodsusedtolocateArtilleryTargets-Groundobserv-
ationbyforwardobservers,airobservation,andflashandsound
OF'sweretheprimarymeansoflocatingenemyartillery. Until
14March,acoordinatedsystemofflashandsoundOptswasfunction-
ing. ThissystemwasmannedbypersonnelfromCorpsArtillery,
13thand14thMarines. On14Marchsuitablelocationswerefound
tooperatetheFlashandSoundRangingSectionofthisregiment.
Anyactivitylocatedin3dMarineDivisionZoneofActionwas
promptlyrelayedto12thMarinesRegimentalCommandPost.
Forwardobserversgavethelargestamountofaccuratedataon
enemyweapons. Oftenthesewerenotlocateduntiltheforwardob-
serverswerewithinafewhundredyardsfromtheemplacements.
ShellingReports-Thesewereoflittleusesincedirection
andcalibrewereverydifficulttodetermine, Thomultiplicityof
weaponsandlocationsmadethisinformationonlyofgeneralinter-
est,unlessitcouldbecombinedwithinformationfromothersources
18. MotorTransportation-Thenumberofvehicleswasadequate
fortlaemission. Alltruckswereusedconstantlytodeliverammuni-
tion. TheCargoCarrier,M-29c,wasofgreatvalueforreconnais-
sanceworkinthesandyterrainofIWOJIMA.
19. Materialused-ThisRegimentlandedtwo(2)Battalions
of?5mmPackHowitzersandtwo(2)Battalionsof105mmHowitzers.
Onlyminorrepairswereevernecessaryandtheseweremadeby
BattalionOrdarncesections.
-18-
12th karines Action Report IWOJliia $pspatton
20. fiuooaujy of AtiaunitiGn Expenditures by Type of Fire
ki ssi on.
pate Bn
Res Pren KF
CLSpt .GenSpt C.B. Total
24-25 1*12

68
2-12 38

140
25-26 1-12 42 1219 533 685 648
2-12 854 307 1076 82 5446
26-27 1-12 1321 2195 6 1450
2-12 2948 720 1208 273 110
3-12 25
4-12 36 10292
27-28 1-12 4255 1898 596 178
2-12 4916 442 284 114
3-12 15 1557 609 29 30
4-12 .1202 16125
28-1 1-12 36 2894
176 177 95
2-12 2535 200 527
3-12 15 2741 204 554
t
4-12 23 2990 399 13566
L
1,-2 1-12 65 2439
'116
"1315 261 345 '
2-12 2360 50 316 43

3-12 2379 77 116 93 285

4-12
2022 518 191 333
13324
2-3 1-12 311"1112
366 442 408
2-12 1487 509 625 92
3-12 827 99 174 172 328
4-12 983 99 229 102 .8365
3-4 1-12 1377 366 223 276
2-12 1760 344 502 70 !
3-12 989 181 414 226
4-12
1151 561 519 .9959
4-5 1-12 150 196 321 .:.....
30
2-12 24 380 113 * *
3-12 63 372 106 328
4-12 50 379 14 69 3895
5-6 1-12
2-12
2569
2450
12;
152
137
166
60
107
3-12 23 2707 365 88 90
4-12 38 2176 936 44 122
12242
6-7 1-12
26 303 285 5
209'
2-12 153 328 190 57 !
3-12 7
4-12
12 42 1617
7-6 i-l 19 1908 1058 156 61
5-J 2-12 1164 177 36
3-12
84
902 292 645
J4-12
?6
690 297 85 163, 7723
- 1 9 v-
;ft*
12th Karlnee' IWO (Cont
f
d).
Date Bn Reg Prep
8-9 1-12 4;
2-12 257
3-12
4-12 234
9-10 1-12
2-12
3-12 1014
4-12 950
10-11 1-12
2-12
977
11-12
3-12
4-12
1-12
72
1028
856
2-12
3-12 19
4-12
12-13 1-12
2-12
3-12
4-12
13-14 1-12
2-12
3-12
4-12
14-15
No
15-16 1-12 1421
2-12 1300
4-12 1503
HF
288]
988'
547
L
743
396
452
375
290
735
431
349
424
420
302
110
153
300-
le
ClSpt
105
27
30
-126
51
94
5
.199
55
5
93
80
108
G-enSpt C.B.
40
111
424
">-
355
194
83
114
72
296
Total
3952 ,
3826
4156
1665
1036
776
4224
- 20 -
ft**
12thMarinesActionReportIWOJIMAOperation(Cont'd)
21. Summaryofammunitionexpendituresby,itemfrom24
Februaryto17March.
75mm HE,M48,w/fM48 59557 Bounds
75mm HS,M48,w/fM54, 26957 Rounds
75mm Smoke,phos.,WP,M64 6446 Rounds
Total75mmHowitzerAmmunition 72960 Rounds
105mmHE,Ml,w/fM48 24802 Rounds
105mmHE,Ml,w/fM54
19021 Rounds
105mmSmoke,phos,,WPyM60
2883 Rounds
105mmHE,AT,M67,w/fM62
135 Rounds
Total105mmHowitzerAmmunition
46841 Rounds
TotalArtilleryAmmunition 119801 Rounds
22. Ammunitionsupply-Theseven(7)unitsoffireof
artilleryammunitioninitiallyembarkedweresatisfactory. The
arrivalofsubsequentblockloadedammunitionshipsreadilysupplied
theadditionalammunitiontomakeupthenineandone-half(94)units
offireexpended. (ForfurtheramplificationseePartIV,paragraph
"C% subparagrauh3,)
23. Supply-Noappreciablesupplyproblemwasencountered.
Withnodisplacementsrequired,theshortdistancesbetweenposition
areas-anddivisiondumpadidawaywiththenecessityforanybattal-
ion orregimentalsupplyInstallations.
C. Ordnance.
1* Weapons.
a. Number,typeandcaliberofweaponsused.
Carbines,}ll> caliber.30 2135
Pistols,&J1911,caliber.45 11
Rifles,automatic,Browning,M1918A2,caliber.3088
Launchers,rocket 34
Guns,machine,HB,AC,caliber,30 33
Guns,machine,HB,AC,caliber.50 . 4 2
Guns,machine,WC,caliber.50 12
Howitzers,105mm 26
Howitzers>pack,75mm 26
b* Oftheabovenotedweapons,practicallynosmall
armswereused. Battleemploymentforthe75mmPackHowitzerswas
twenty(20)days,forthe105mraHowitzers,sixteen(16)daysfor
onetlJtbattaallofl.iy^drtjiirty-six(36)daysfortheother.Noartill-
erypieceswerelostordestroyedandnomajormalfunctions occure'd.
Itwasfoundthateparfipartswereadequateformaintenancerequired.
2. CombatVehicles*
a. Numberandtypeofcombatvehiclesused.
Tractors,light,V/angledozer,TD-9
Trucks,24Ton,6x6,Dump
Truck,~%\Ton,6x6,Wrecker
Carrier^,cargo,K-29-C
*Trucks
#
1Ton,4x4,cargo
Trucks,iTon,4x4
12thMarinesActionReportIWOJIMAOperation(Cont'd).
Ambulances,iTon,4x4
5
Trucks,iTon,4x4,radio 36
^Trailer,:\Ton,2wh,cargo 38
Trailer,iTon,2wh,cargo 40
Trailer,1Ton,2wh,greasing 4
Trailer,1Ton,300gal.,water 10
Trailer,1Ton,2wh,spareparts 1
Trailer,Water-,improvised 7
#
One(l)damagedbeyondrepair.
b. Itisrecommendedthatdifferentialsidegear(w/18
teeth)forM24,.1TonTruck,4x4,Internationalbehardened. Itwas
foundthatoperatinginroughterrainorinsandthepresentgear
breakswithcomparativeease.
CargocarrierM29Cwasverysatisfactoryasprime
moverandcargocarrier* Thetracks,
t
however,werefoundtobetoo
lightandshouldbe,madeheavier,
3. Ammunition.
a. FornumberofroundsexpendedseePartIV,paragraph
B,subparagraph~2
b. Artilleryammunitionhada&ighunloadingpriority
andtheflowfromshiptoshorewasregulatedbythelandingcraft
available. Duet|>thebeachcondition(afairlysteepgradeofsoft
sand)itwasfounithatthemostrapidunloadingcouldbeaccomplished
bytransferringtheammunitionfromthelandingcrafttoamphibian'
tractorsatthebe&ch,retransferringthisatthePivJLsionAmmunition
Dumptoartilleryprimemovers. Althoughthisentailedadouble
handling,itexcludedtheotherwiseinevitableboggingoftheprime
moversinthesand,
Du$totheslowrateoflanding,aswellasthehigh
rateofexpenditureitwas,impossibletobuildtoandmaintaina
leveloftwounitsoffireasordered.
Itvasfoundthatinspiteofclearlyworded
dispatchescallingf$rthelandingof75mmHowitzerammunition,75mm
gunammunitionwasoftenlanded. Adefiniteneedwasdemonstrated
thatcompetantpersonnel,capableofdistinguishingbetweenvarious
typesofammunitions^beplacedoneachshipdischargingammunition
inordertoprecludethepossibilityoflandingundesiredtypesand
fuzes*
c. ThewtQdenammunitionboxcontainingtworoundsof
iO5mmHowitzerammunitionwasmostsatisfactory. Itfacilitated
handlingandoffereda&ighdegreeofprotectiontotheshellcasing.
Oftheammunitionreceivedonlytwelve(3.2)roundswerefoundtobe
damaged.
d. Thepresentunitoffireissatisfactory,however
itisrecommencedthat:twentypercent(2Q#)ofshellHE,Ml,w/f*M54
bedecavitate<Jandanallowanceoftwentypercent(2QJ#)ofVTfuze
shouldbeadded. Itierecommendedthatthisadditional^allowance
ofVTfuzet0beseparatelypackaged.
~22-
$mbarkation:
(a)Personnelconsisted oftheRegimentalSurgeon, Regimental
Dentist andten(lQ)oorpamen. Theyweredivided,proportionately
among troopsattached toBr-L Gotu^andingOfficerandthe Executive
Officer, embarking onthree (3)ships,, .
(b)Materialcarriedbypersonnelconsistedof.:.twelve (12)
fieldmedicalunitsof#1,2,and3withtwo (2)unitsofalbuminin
each;five (5)stretchers,one (1)plasma andone (1)battle dressing
unit (#7). Theremainderofequipmentwaspackedonatrailerand
the jeepambulance whichwereloadedonafourth(4)ship.. This
equipment consisted ofunits#5AandB 6,8,9,10 .11A,and3,
and102;one (1)blackout tent, one(1)fly,one(1)jpy.r^mldaltent,
camouflage netsand sandbags. v
v
.A.,.
2.Aboard ship:
ifosickness;Sanitationgoodinalldepartments, no special
precautions necessary.
3* Debarkation:
(a)Oncall
(b)Regimentaldentist andtwo(2)corpsmenlandedwitha
smallreconnaisance partyat0910,February 24, Regimental Surgeon
and two (2)corpsmenlandedwiththeCommanding Officerat1330,
February 24. Six (6)corpsmenwithR-l sectionlanded at1130Feb-
ruary27.
(c)Materialaccompanying personnelwasmanhandledandcar-
riedin. Vehicles andremalnder^of equipmentcameinonMarch2
Therewerenolosses.
4. Ashore (assaultphase notapplicable tothis activity.)
(a)Medical installationswere theusualdugouts, sandbagge
andcamouflaged. Thefour (4)battalions oftheregimentwere inth
immediatevicinity andtheiraidstations centrally located.
(b)Evacuatipneffectedviabeachevacuation centersuntil
February27,afterwhichtoBMedical'Companyofthe3dMedical
3attalion..Itwasrapid"andeffective,
(c)Casualties:
1.A %otzl02Bthree (3)(2fragment and1contusion)
were treatedinHeadquartersBattaryAid Station. Allwere returned
toduty. X
(d)Sanitationr * v
N
1.Routinefield sanitationmeasuresettkpbky&,,.,_.,.
7
2.Foo4consisted ofregulationfieldrations\and was
notcontaminated, galley setupforcoffee andrinsewateronly.
3.Waferwasnotcontaminated. Enoughwaslanded w i W
troops tolastunt|l theDivl6iGnnset upawaterpoint. Therewas
no shortage.
4.DDf spraymost effective ineliminating f^yhazard
(e)Deadwereimmediately transported totheDivisionCe^e
Noprecautionsbythisactivity necessary.
5. Recommendations:
(a)Thatone (1)medicalvehicle (Jeepambulance)-be inclui'
withtheessentialoperations equipment inorderthat adequate
sujppliescanacc|iupanythefirstofthepersonaaJLtoland.
- 23-
E. Signal
1.
Communication Plan (SOI)
(a) Werecommunication plans receivedbylover echelons
insufficient timetopermit study,criticism, and
necessary changes?
(A) Yes
2. Embarkation andVoyage
(a) U)Wasequipment loadedaccor&iagtoplan?
(A)Yes.
(b)
U)
Wasany equipment damaged in loading?
Ifyes,describe.
(A)
No.
Were suchitems*sStoragebatteries checked during
voyage?
(A)
Items suchasstoragebatterieswhichwere carried in
cargowerenot checked. Itemscarried insetBandthe
reconnaissance.party forimmediate usewere checked.
(d) What type oftraining wascarried outaboard ship?
(A)Briefirigoftroopson target.
(e)
Werepersonnel ofanyassistance toship's communication
officer? Ifyes,what didthey do?
(A) Message Centerthis organization operatedasan integral
part oftheTroopMessageCenterwhichwasoperatedby
the seniorsignalunitprese.itUfclvisA^i*Signal Company
3. Personnel
VI)
Areyousatisfied withpresent allowances ofpersonnel?
(a).
(A) Yes.
(b)
U)
What changes, ifany,are specifically recommended?
(A) None.
(o)
(1)
Wastraining ofpersonnel adequate?
(A) Yes.
(d) (0.)
What recommendations, ifany,aremade for special
training?
(A) None.
(e)
U)
List overages orshortages ofcommunication personnel
inyourunitembarked aboard ship forthe operations.
(A) Thisunitwas short 17wir*personnel; 42radio personne
( f )
' 1 )
List losses ofpersonnelaboard shipbefore landing.
(A) Two.wire men.
(g) U)
List lossesofpersonnel intheperiod fromafterland-
inguntiloperationwas completed.
(A) Radio
Killed inAction 6
Wounded inAction 14
DiedofWounds 1
Missing inAction None
-24-
>rationalReport (cont'd)
(h)(Q,)Listlossesofpersonnelineffectingthelanding.
(A)None "
(i)(Q,)Werecommunicationpersonnelemployedfordutiesother
thancommunications? Whatweretheirduties.
(A)No.
(j)(Q)H O Wwerebattlecasualtiesreplaced?
(A)From28thand34thReplacementDraftsforradiopersonnel
Noreplacementofwirepersonnelwasmade. Distribution
ofwirepersonnelwasmadewitninunitstooffsetshort-
agesinanyparticularunit. Basicprivateswereused,
insoiaecases.
4. Equipment
(a)(Q,)Listoveragesandshortagesofmajoritemsofequipment.
(A)Over:
2switchboards,3D-71
2switchboards,3D-72
13telephones,EE-8
1TCS,mounted intruck,cargo,4x4
2TC3,mountedincarrier,M-29 (weasel)
27RemoteControlUnit,RI4-29
Short:
4RadioT&Requipment,SCR-6O8
(b)(Q,)Listlossesofequipmentaboardshipbeforelanding.
(A)None
(c)(Q) Listlossesof.equipment ineffectingthelanding.
(A) None . .
(a)
Listlossesofeotftomentinther>eriodfromafterland-
inguntiloperationwascompleted.
U ) SCR-610 're-| TBXGen Wire,W l O B
9 5 1 - 40mi,
(e)(Q)Wasequipmentsuitable (designandquantity)forthe
particulartasktotte-oerforjned? Ifno,listequipment
andstatereason.
(A)No. TheSCR-610whiQhisprescribed forthisorganiza-
tionisnotsuitableforthetaskperformed.
(1)Thesetisnotaportable setandisnotconducive
tocontinuousoperationduringmovement,acharacter-
isticverynecessaryformostdesirablefunctionof
artillery forwardobserversandliaisonofficers.
(2)Thesatistoobulkyandtooheavyforusebyfor-
wardobserversandliaisonofficerswhomustpack
theirequipmentintheirmovemen};
tt
ja
T
iththeinfantry.
- 25
erationalReport (cont'd)
(3)Theopenterrainoverwhichthisorganizationopera-
tedandthedistinctive silhouetteofthe setand
Itsantennaareacriticaldangertoanyonewhomust
beneartheset (radiooperators). Concealment
whichisadefense inthelastcasewasverylimited.
(4)Thesemi-fixedfrequency selectionarrangement
limitstheuseoftheset. Thiswas-particularly
vitalwhensomeforwardobserversarecalleduponto
functionoutsideoftheirimmediateorganization.
(5)TheSCR-61Oiseasily Jarredofffrequency alignment
anditscombatefficiency (inrangeand selectivity)
isreduced.
(f)(Q)Inlightofthespecificoperation,whatchangesinequip-
mentarerecommended? Statereason?
(A)Aportable setsimilartothe^CR-300in.
H
weightandfre-
quency selectionisrecommended. Set-shouldcovera
separate frequencyrangeinordertominimize interfer-
*encewithinfantryunits.
(g)(Q)Whatnewequipment isrecommended? Explain specific
proposedemploymentandwhetherornotadditionalper-
sonnelwouldberequired tooperateit.
(A)None
(h)(Q)Didyourorganization employanyequipmentwhichithad
neverusedinactionbefore? Ifyes,stateitemsand
describeperformance. Giverecommendations fqrimprove-
ments.
.(A)Yes. SCR-61OandSCR-608. See(6)(6}and(g)above for
SCR-61O. SCR-608issatisfactoryandworkedwellwhen
itgotashore. Ineventany-change inportable setsis
contemplatedtocorrect SCR-61Odifficulties,portable
setsshouldbewithinSCR-608range.
Thisorganizationusedten (10)weaselsorCarriers,M-29,
six (6)ofT^hichwereequippedwithTCSradio equipment
andwirelayingequipment. Thiscarrierisescellent
equipmentfortheterraininwhichthisorganization
operated,butasthisorganizationwasnotintheassault
echelonoftheoperation,nocomment canbemadeother
thantostatethatitisbelievedthisequipmentwould
beinvaluable intheassault. Itisfelt,however,that
SCR-608
1
morSCR-610
!
swouldbeofmoreutilityandvalut
thanTCSandthose setswillprobablybeusedin-the
futurebythisorganization.
x
(i)(Q)Whatwaterproofingwasdoneandhoweffectivewasit?
(A)Allvehicleswerecompletelywaterproofed mechanically
usingMotorTransportmaterialswhichwerealsousedto
secureloosewireleadsto12-voltTCSandSCR-608gen-
erator. GeneratorswerepackedinMBG-159. Motor
Transporti*aterproofingwasusedaroundTCScases,and
metalopeningsofSCR-608. Telephone equipmentwas
broughtashoreincommunicationcarts,theboxofwhich
waswaterproofed. SCR-610'swerewaterproofedwithMotor*
Transportwaterproofingequipment.
OperationalReport (cont'd)
Allwaterproofing-provedveryeffective-evenwhenoneset
wassubjected toseawater. AlthoughthatSCR-6O8be-
camemoistandrequired3rdechelonrepair',^itwasplaced
inoperationwithin48hoursofitsarrivalashore.
(Q,)Wasthereanyeoulpmentusednot includedinT/A?If
yes,listandstatehowemployed. Make recommendations
forinclusioninT/A.
(A)No.
(k)(Q)WasallsignalequipmentauthorizedbyT/Aused? Ifnot,
shoulditbedeletedfromT/A? State reason.
(a)(1)MPA-1,two (2)ofwhichareauthorizedforH&S,
ArtilleryRegiment,wasnotusedandnousecanbe
foreseen forsuchanitemofequipment. Itisrecom-
mendedthat itbe deleted.
(2)TG-5wasnotused,but itisbelievedthatthisitem
ispotentiallyanitemthatwouldbeneededand
shouldnotbedeletedfromthe T/A.
(1)(Q,)Wasallyourequipmentunloaded fromtheshipduringthe
operation?
(A)Yes.
(m)(Q,)Wasyourequipment landedattheproperbeach? Ifnot,
whynot?
(A)Yes.
5. Supply
(a)(Q)What equipment couldnotbeloadedandwasleftbehind?
(A) None. '
(b)(Q)Didthiseffect theoperation inanyway? ^
(A)No.
(c)(Q,) What specific itemsplaced,thegreatest strainonsupply?
(A)BA-39's,BA-40's,andW-110Bintheinitialphases'be-
forecompleteunloadingofthisheadquarterswascom-
pleted. Thiswasduetothepiecemealcommittalofthe.,.
organization,andthestrainwasnotcriticalatanytime.
(d)(Q)What changesinreplenishment rated, ifany,arerecom-
mended?
(A)None.
(e)(Q)^Whatmethodwasemployedbyyourorganization forre-
supply? .
(A)Organizationalequipmentwassufficient.
(f)(Q)(1)Whatrepairfacilitiesdidyouhaveavailable?
(2)Weretheyused?
(3)Whatmajoritemsofequipment wer#J)|MDalre&?
(A)(1)(a)DivSigRepairSectionandp r i q H M H w arrival
ashore theivSigSo'sRadio
(b)Organizational repair
- 27-
iperationalReport (cont'cl)
(2)Yes
(3)3SCR-608radios
3SCR-610radios
4Units,ES-2C forswitchboards '
(g) (Q,)Wereequipment sparescarriedwithequipment? Ifnot,
statewhy?
(A)Yes.
(h) (Q)Wereequipment sioaresadequate?
(A)Yes.
(i)(Q)Were sufficient sparepartsavailableotherthanequip-
ment spares?
(A)Yes.
(j)(Q)Wasthere sufficient transportationavailable for
transporting equipment?
(A)Yes.
(k)(Q)Are thereanyrecommendations forchangesintranspor-
tation?
(A)No.
6. Operation
(a)(Q)Whatagencieswere establishedthatwerenot normal?
(A)None
(b)(Q,)Whatwasthemost overloadedagency?
(A)Radio
ic) (Q,)What stepsweretakentoovercome trouble experienced
in (b)above?
(A)Overloadwasrelievedassoonaswire couldbe installed,
whichinstallationwasnormaland unhindered.
(d) (Q)Wasthereanyunnecessary duplicationofagencies used?
(A)No.
(e)(Q,) Ofthe frequenciesassignedtoyourunit,were thereany
not used?.Ifyes,statewhy.
(A)No.
(f)(Q)List difficulties encountered in:
(1)Radio communication
(2)Wire communication
(3)Visual communication
(4)Messenger communication
(A) (1) (a)TheSCR-610asdescribed in4-e.
-28-
OperationalReport (cont'd)
(b)Frequency assignment insome cases caused inter-
ferencebetweenadjacent artillery units. This
wasparticularly confusingbecause of similarity
oftrafficbetweenallartillery FO
f
sand their
fire directionunits. '-.,
(c)VMO-5waspot equippedwiththe frequency crystal
oftheairspot ofthisorganization. Forthat
reason itwasnecessary toclear forusea
frequency the crystal forwhichthat unit had.
VMO-5wastheonly observationaBitwhich could
furnishair spot service tothisorganization as
VMO-4hadlimited supply ofplanesandVMO-1 did
notparticipate intheoperation. It is recom-
mended thatVMO unitsbeprovidedwiththeob-
servation frequencies ofallartillery units.
(2) (a)Necessary toobtainpoles foroverheadwire,
(b)Nootherabnormal difficulties.
(3)None
(4)None
(g) (Q)Wereany communication difficulties encountered inthis
operation thatwere not encountered intheprevious op-
erations? Ifyes,what doyouattribute the difficulties
to?
(A)Yes. Itwasnecessary toprocure oles inordertoover-
headwireroutes.
(h)(Q)Wasany communication improvement noticedbetween this
operationandprevious operations?
(A)Yes. Dueprimarily toshort linesel communication
and secondarily tomore experience personnel.
(i) (Q)List communication failures during the ship-to-shore
movement.
(A)None
Wereofficers required tooperate andeaintainany agen-
cyofcommunication because ofenlisted caaiaalties?
Ifyes,describe.
(A)No.
(Q)Wereany enemy communication installations captured? If
yes,what usewasmade of them?
(A)No.
7. Operation inHeadquarters Ship
(note) Thisheadquarters was embarked aboard the same shipas
Division Headquarters, andoperated directly underthat
headquarters.
- 29-
OperationalReport (cont'd)
v*> ' t
*.'* ' SecurelyandContermeasuresbytheEnemy
(a)(Q,),Whatcrotographicaidswereused?
(A)CombinedAssaultCode,CCBP-Q130-D2,HagelinandCSP-
1607;andNumeralCipherCode.
(b)(Q,)Areanycriticismmadeofpresentaids?
(A)No.
(c)(q)Whatauthenticatorsystemwasusedandhoweffectivewas
it?
(A)NumeralCit>herAuthenticatorsatisfactory.-
(d)(Q)Didtheenemyattempttouseourauthenticatorsystem?
Ifyes,describe* Howeffectiveweretheirattempts?
(A)No.
(e)(Q)Werepersonnelsufficientlytrainedinsignalsecurity?
(A)Yes.
(f)(Q)WhatspecificrecommendationsaremadetoInsureproper
security$
(A)None.
(g)(Q)Didyourorganizationhavea"SignalSecurityPlan?
11
(A)Yes.
(h)(Q)Didtheenemyuseradiocoutermeasures? Describe.
(A)No.
(i){)Whatmeasureswereemployedtoovercomeenemyinterfer-
ence? .
(A)None
(j)(0,)Whatrecommendationsdoyoumaketoaidintrainingper-
sonneltoovercomeenemyinterference?
(A)None. ;
9. .Summary
(a)(Q)Giveaccountofdifficultiesnotcoveredinprevious
questions?
(A)(1)Althoughthegeneralplanofrapidreplacementof
oersonnelisverysatisfactory,theradiooperator
replacementswhichwerereceivedbythisorgan!zatio
hadhadnoradioexperienceforthe-previousseven
(7)months,whichmadethesemenoflimitedvalue.
Inadditiontorefreshmentinradioprocedurethese
menmustbetaughtartilleryterminologyandproce-
durebeforetheyareofefficientuse.
(2)Asthisorganizationlandedfromareservestatusin
thisoperationaftertheinitialassaulthadbeen
made,thisreportsnouldbeinterpretedasnotgivir
thepictureofanoperation,ofanfaaatfltunit.
OperationalReport (cont'd)
(b) (Q,) Commentsand recommendations,
(A) (1)Itisrecommended that:
(a)Aportable set similar tothe SCR-300 inweight and
frequency selection beadopted. Set should covera
ket>arate frequency range inordertominimize inter-
ferencewithinfantryunits,
(b)Forty-five.(45) telephones,EE-8,beallowed anH&S
Btry,Artillery Regt instead oftwenty-nine (29).
(c)Pour (4)switchboards BD-72'sand two (2)BD-71's
beallowedanH&SBtry,Artillery Regiment instead of
three (3)andone (1) respectively.
(d)Three (3)RadioTBX
1
s beallowedanH&SBtry,Artil-
leryRegiment instead oftwo(2).
(e)Three (3)switchboards BD-?2'sbeallowed oach.H&S
Btry inArtillery Regmment Instead of two.(2).
(2)Thenecessity for. additional telephones and switch-
boardr equipment arisesoutofthe factthat two
switchboard., installations,aFireControl Boardand
Administrative Boardarenormalforallunitsof
thisorganization. Inaddition tothese requirements
whichhaveprovedadvantageous inthe threeot>era-
tionsofthisregiment,thenecessity fora forward
switchingcentral forallartillery battalions has
alsoprovedadvantageous. Thisorganization has
madeprevious recommendations forthe increase of
switchboards and telephones.
- 31-
12thMarinesActionReportIWOJIMAOperation(Cant'd).
PARTV ConclusionsandRecommendations
A FrontLineLocation: Itisessentialfordivisionalart-
illerytohaveaccurate,uptodate,frbntlineinformationifclose
supportistoberenderedeffectively* Firecontrolchannels,both
wireandradio,wereloadedwithtraffictosecurethisinformation
tothedetrimentoffiremissions. Aerialobserversgenerallywere
oflittleassistance,sincepanelswerenotusedbyourinfantry.
Itisfeltthattheuseofpanelsorasimilarsystem(i.e,pyro-
technics,smokegrenades)wouldgreatlyfacilitatethis. Some
definiteandsoundworkingagreementbetweeninfantryandartillery
i ULbeestablished.
B. UseofWP: ItwasnotedthatVflB provedtobeveryeffective
indrivingtheenemyfjipmdug-inpositions. WhereasHEwashaving
littleapparenteffect\ntheenemy,WPoftensucceededinreaching
downanddrivingtheenemyoutintotheopenwhereHEandsmallaras
firecoulddestroythem. Moredbphasisshouldbeplacedonthe
valueofWpasalethalweapon.
C. TrainingofSmallUnits: Duringtheoperationsomeofthe
forwardobserverteams,surveyandcommunicationspersonnelwere
foundtobeinadequatelypreparedforoperatingintheareasadjacent
tothefrontlines. TheseseotioneiauBtbe .thoroughlytrainedinthe
infantrytacticsiftheyaretocarryoutthfcirmissions. Itis
recommendedthatsurveysections,forwardobserverteamsandcom-
municationspersonneloperatingassmallunitsbegiventrainingin
infantrytacticsandsmallarmsfiring(specialized). Thiswill
keepthemfrominadvertantlyallowingthemselvestodrawenemyfire
andalsotodefendthemselveswheninisolatedOP
1
s,switching
centrals,andotherplaceswheretheymustrelyuponthemselvesfor
defense.
D. BattleSounds: Itisconsideredessentialforforward
observers toundergoacourseoftrainingonbattlesounds. This
willenablethemtodistinguishwithouthesitation.theirownfires
fromthoseoftheenemy. Ourfireswillnotbesubjecttosomany
interruptionswhileitisbeingdeterminedwhetherourfrontlines
areactuallyreceivingfirefromtheenemyor shorts"fromour
ownpieces. ThisshouldalsoassistInthelocationofenemypieces.
Itisfeltthatthiscouldbeaccomplishedbyconstructingaseries
ofdugoutsandfoxholesattheartilleryrangeandfiringvarious
weaponsoverpersonaeltoaccustomthemtobattlesounds. Thedug-
outscouldbeput tofurtheruseforbringingartilleryfire
(particularly105mm )closetotheobserverwhiletheyhavepro-
tectionfromfragmentation.
E. Observation: Theregimentalsurveysection,soundan4
flashsection,andmetrosectionshouldbeorganizedaeanobser-
vationplatoon. Thisplatoonshouldincludeasurveyofficer,ass'U
surveyofficer,(inchargeotflashranging)andasound i i
officer. lfl
12thMarinesActionReportIVOJIM*0p*pat4<m (Cont
!
dK
Thesurvey sectionshouldbelargeenoughtomakeallnecessary
surveys. Thesoundranging sectiontoinstallownlinesandassist
theregimentalcommunications sectionintheinstallationsand
maintenanceofflashranginglines* Thiswouldprovideanofficer
whocoulddirect theestablishment andmaintenanceofobservation
andwhosepresence isnotnecessaryintheCP, Itisbelievedthat
thisnecessarycoordinationofobservationactivitiescanbetterbe
accomplishedinthiswayratherthanbyastaffofficerintheCP.
F.CHIST.,JR..
~33 -
rtere,1stBattalion,12th
rineDivision,FleetMarine
IntheField.
27 Karch, 19U5,
From:
To;
Subject:
CommandingOfficer*12thMarines.
Xvo Jima Operation, Action Report of.
Reference: (a) 3d Marine Division General Order 137.
1. STftftAKX
(a)Theperiodcoveredbythisreportisfrom22January, 9 5
(dateof3*MarineDivisionOperationPlan1-1*5)to2100,21March,19^5,when
theadvanceechelondebarkedatGuam.
(b)The1stBattalion,12thMarineswascombatloadedwiththe
9thCombatTeamatGuam,beginning0IVbruary,19^5. Tiringbatterieswere
embarkedwithbattalionlandingteams,andHeadquartersandServiceBattery
wasdividedbetweentwoships,theCommandPostbeingonAPAHARRYLEB,where
theBattalionCommanderwasalsoCommandingOfficerofTroops.
H
B"Batterywas
landed24February,19^5byorderofCommandingOfficerAPAKNOX. Thesameday,
ForwardObserverteamsandLiaisonpartieslandedwith thebattalionlanding
teamsofthe$thCombatTeam. On25February,19U5,theremainingbatteries
andBattalionHeadquarterslandedandoccupiedpositionswestofMotoyamaAir-
fieldnumberone(l) By17001stBattalion,12thMarinesFireDirectionCenter
hadassumedcontrolofseven(7)packhowitsersof2ndBattalion,12thMarines
andhadbeenplacedindirectsupportofthe9thMarines, The4thBattalion,
13thMarineshadbeenorderedtoreinforce1stBattalion,12thMarines,butdid
notactuallybegintodoso untilthefollowingmorning. The1stBattalion,
lHthMarineshadbeenindirectsupportofthe9thMarines,withanofficerfrom
1stBattalion,12thMarinesservingasliaisonwith1stBattalion,lUthMarines.
The1stBattalion,l4thMarinesrevertedtolUthMarinescontrolat0730,26
February,19**5. By1315,26February,19H5,2ndBattalion,12thMarinesFire
DirectionCenterwasreadytooperate. The2ndBattalion,12thMarineshadbeen
releasedfrom1stBattalion,12thMarinescontrolandorderedtoreinforce
1stBattalion,12thMarines. The2ndBattalion,12thMarinescontinuedreinforcing
untilplacedindirectsupportof21stMarineson28February,19**5tAtwhich
time1stBattalion,12thMarineswasorderedtoreinforce2ndBattalion,12th
Marines. On2March,1945*ltBattalion,12thMarineswasplaced indirect
supportof9thMarines,with3dBattalion,12thMarinesreinforcing. During
theopecation1stBattalion,12thMarinesfiredapproximatelyfort/thousand
(Ho,000)roundsofammunition. Thelargestexpenditurewason preparations,as
manyasthree(3)beingfiredin asingleday. ForwardObserversfiredontar-
getsofopportunitybothduringthedayandatnight. Defensivefireswerere-
gisteredjustbeforedarknesswhenpossible! Harassingfireswerefirednearly
&r^rynight. At1500,16March,19^5*1stBattalion,12thMarineswasordered
topreparetoembarkanadvanceechelon* At17OO"CloseStation,MarchOrder*
wasreceivedfromCommandingOfficer,12thMarines. Twenty-five(25)officers
andthreehundredandninety-two(392)enlistedwereembarkedat1100,17March*
19^5ontheS.&.SantaIsabel,leaving&rearechelonoffive(5)officersand
fifty-two(52)enlistedon IwoJima. TheadvanceechelondebarkedatGuamat
2100,21March,19U5andreturnedtobasecamp.
2. FRELIKIHARISS
(a)CompositionofthisCommand: Threefiringbatteriesand
theHeadquartersandServicebattery.
(b)Whiletheplanscalledfornospecialplansandtraining
otherthanthedoctrinelaiddowninArtilleryFieldManuals,specialemphasi*
wasplacedonthefollowing:
(1)Infantry-Artillery-Tankfiringproblems.
<2)Infantry-Artilleryfiringexerciesstressingcl4*9
support,
(3)Flashrangingbyforwardobservers.
(4)Massingfires.
(c) O^r mission was, direct support of the 9th Marines,
(d) At out*** of acti on t hi s battal i on was aboard four
n
A* Battery *M *be*sd'th FAXSWX,
N
B" Battery was aboard the KHOX, f
"Ratter^ -'i*>h ono command group from Headquarters and S*&Hd*sSftttery * aboar4
riOL
on Heport, Cont*d
v.Orders to*3|ndwore received on D /
& t a ACCOTJHT0? THE ACTIOH
February, 19^5: At 1135 King minus ton (10) zome time, S"
Battery was ordered to land by Commanding Officer APAX&OX, and without the
knowledge of Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. The Battery
Commander of "3"Battery informed the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 12th
n
B
!l
Marines that he had been ordered to land* Battery landed on beach Bed two
(2) at 1300 and went into rendezvous off the beach. The Battery Commander,
W
B
M
Battery contacted Commanding Officer, 12th Marines andwas directed to go into
position at xGkF. Abivouac area was occupied at position area and local
security was posted by 1530 with four hundred (UOO) rounds of ammunition onhand.
At 1000, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines commenced to
land with Forward Observer teams andLiaison parties and at 1300, 3d Battalion,
9th Marines began landing with Forward Observer toam^andLiaison party. At l600
Commanding Officer, 1st 3attalion, 12th Marines received orders fromCommanding
Officer, 12th Marines to land Roconnaissanee parties end remaining battoriOB at
dawn on 25 February, 19ty> Commanding Officer, 1st Sattalion, 3.2th.Marines was
also informed that
tt
B
fl
Battery was in position at TA164 F. At 1800 Commending
Officer, 12th Marines ordered the Battery Commander,
M
B"Battery to 1st Battal-
ion, 14th Marines as Liaison Officer; 1st Battalion, l^th Marines.,vas to be in
direct support of the 9th Marines the following morning.
25 February, 19I+5: At 0930 with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on
the right, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines on the l ef t and 3&Battalion, 9th Marines
in reserve the 9th Marines passed through the 2lst Marines to continue the
attack. Apreparation was fired by 1st Battalion, l4th Marines. At 1130
M
B"
Battery was in position and ready to fi re. Undor Eogimental control "3
W
Battery
was registered on Check Points seven (7) nine (9) ten (10); registration
complete at 1300, 1st Battalion, 12th Mrrincs Reconnaissance party landed
on beach Hod two (2) at 1130* The remaining batteries were orderod to land by
CommandingOfficer, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines when Reconnaissance parties were
picked up from the FAYETTEandL3i)DST0WN. Position areas were selected in A
XSkl and position area survey was immediately instigated. Approximately four
hundred (400) rounds of ammunition on hand per battery. TheBattery Commander,
M
B
ir
Battery was orderod back to the battery at l&Xh 1st Battalion, 12th
kc.rincs CommandPost opened at 1600 andat l6lO 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
took over control of seven (7) pack howitzers of 2ndBattalion, 12th Marines
and at 1700 was placed in direct support of 9*&Marines. At 1700 ^th Battalion,
13th Marines was ordered to reinforce the fires of 1st Battalion, 12th Karinos.
From1700 to 18Q3 defensive firos were registered in front of 1st Battalion,
9th Marines "by1st Battalion, 12th Karinos and in front of 2nd Battalion,
9th Marines by 1st Battalion, l^th Marines. **thBattalion, 13th Marines did
W
A not actually start reinforcing our firos until the following morning. "
Battory landed at ifiOO andwas in rendezvous at position area by 2300. From
M
D
!I
1S20 to 1915 registrations of "2", and.
M
B
W
Batteries were checked on
CheckPoint ilumber seven (7) by
lf
A
M
Battery Forward Observer. Harassing
missions wore fired Airing the night and during the day two missions wore firod
by Forward Observers. The Battalion SxocutivQ Officer with tfco remainder of
Headquarters and Service Battery and "C*Battory landed at 2300 and were in
rendezvous at position area by 0100,
26 February, 19^: 1st Battalion, l^th Mrines reverted to
control of l^th ^iexinQS at O73O
f
In support of 9th liarines attack atO6C3O
a preparation was firod l|y "B",
M
D
M
, and "JS"under control Qt 1st Battalion,
12th Marines from O73Q tft 0815. At 0600 end 0S30 respectively "C*and
M
A
H
Batteries were in position rnd ready to fi re. From1008 to 1200 "A*Battery
registered by air spot I&ndaradverse weather conditions on Check Point !ftsaber
ten (10). Corrections, for "C
tt
Battery were trJcon from "A
M
Battery's regis-
tration. At 1305 who* the Fire Direction Center of 2ndBattalion, 12th Marines
was ready to operate, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines was released from 1st
Battalion, 12th Marines control, and at 1315 2ndBattalion, 12th Marines was .
ordered to reinforce the fires of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. Defensive firos
wero registered in faiont of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and 2nd Battalion,
9th Marines from 1001 to 2135. From20^5 to 2100 1st Battalion, 12th Marines
- 2-
firodonacounteratta&J?Ifr"A
M
BatteryForwardObserverHumberone(1).
Attackrepulsed.. (200Fno) Eighteen(IS)missionswerofired"byForward
Observersduringthoday, iloharassingfireswerefiredduringthedayor
night.
27February,1945: From0*63to0503"3"3atteryfirodBaker
emergencybarragedumbertwo(2)onacounterattackfor"A"BatteryForward
Observerdumbertwo(3). From0513to0520andfrom0530to0539"
3
"3attory
fired3akoremergencybarragedumbertwo(2)onpossiblecounterattacks.For
acontinuationofthoattackatQSQQby1stBattalion,9thMarinesand2d
Battalion,9thMarinas,1stBattalion*12thMarinesand4thBattalion,13th
Karinosfirodapreparationfrom0730to0S00, From12*40to1250apreparation
for1stBattalion,9thKarinosand2ndBattalion,9thKerineswasfirodby
1stBattalion,12thMarines. CBatteryfiredasmokemissionfron1250to
1300. From1250to1300"B"and
H
A
lf
Batteriesfiredarollingbarragoincon-
tinuationoftheproparationin frontof1stBattalion,9thMarinesand2nd
Battalion,9thKarinoe Anotherpreparationfortho9thKarinoswasfiredfron
1321to13^1, Defensivefiresworeregisteredfrom1710to1905. From1732
to19^+5
M
C
M
Batteryfirodasmokescreentoremovecasurlities. Anexcellent
scresnwasmaintained. Twenty-two(22)missionswerefirodbyForwardObservers
duringthedayandharassingfiresworefiredthroughoutthenight.
2SFebruary,1945s AblecudCharlienormalbarragesworefirod
onapossiblecounterattackfor"C
tt
BatteryForwardObservernumbertv/o(2)
from0550to0552andagainfrom0650to0651. At07^5whentho21stMarines
passedthroughtho9thKarinos2ndBattalion,12thLayineswasreleasedfron
itsreinforcingmissionsendassigneddirectsupportofthe21stKfrinos.1st
Battalion,12thHarinosand4thBattalion,13thliariao*.worethenorderedto
reinforcethofiresof2ndBattalion,12thKarincs, From0745toO9151st
Battalion,12thMarinesfiredapreparationreinforcing2ndBattalion,12th
Karinos,insupportofanattackbytho21stKerines. Anotherpreparation
wasfiredroinforcing2ndBattalion,12thK&rincsfrom1255to1310,andagain
from1525to15*40. Defensivefiresworeregisteredfrom1330to190*+, Eighteen
(IS)missions,worefirodduringthe&eyraidharassingmissionswerefiredduring
thedayandnight.
1liarch,1945: 1st3attalion 12thKarinosfirodinaDivision
preparationinsupportofanattackbytho21stMarinesfromOS25toOS'45and
thenfiredasmokemissionfromOS45to0905. Forthisattackthe9thHarinos
weroinDivisionresorvefollowingthe21stKarinosbybounds. Atl6451st
Battalion,9thHarinospassedthroughjdBattalion,2istKarinostocontinue
theattackandapreparationwasfirodfron16^5to173? Defensivefiros
woreregisteredfrom1S0Sto 20^4
#
Fourteen{lk)missionswcrofiredduring
thodaybyForwardObserversandharassingmissionsworofiredthroughoutthe
night.
2March,19^5:
lst
Battalion,12thKarinosfiredonacounter
attack(23^Tno)fromOOU7to0118for "C
11
BatteryForwardObserverNumberone
(l). At07501stBattalion,12thMarineswasplaced|ncliroctsupportoftho
9thMarinasend.3dBattalion,12thMarineswasorderedtoreinforcethofiros
firesof1stBattalion,12thKarinos, From0750to0S00apreparationwasfirod
forthe9thKarinosfollowedby arollingbarrageuntil0624. From09^6to
1024"B
M
Batterymaintainedesmokescreenonenemymachineguns, Apreparation
wasfiredfrom11*40toIl45andanotherfron1520to1535forattackby1st
Battalion,9thKarinesand2ndBattalion,9t&Harinos. Defensivefiroswere
rogistoredfromISO!to1903. Twenty-three(23)missionswerofiredduringthe
daybyForwardObserversandnoharassingfireswcrofirodduotoashortageof
ammunition.
3torch,1945:Insupportofanattackbythe9*kMarinesat
07451stBattalion,12thMarinesfiredasmokemissionfrom0735to0745and
thenapreparationwasfiredfrom0745to0755. Fron1030to10451st.Battalion,
12thMarinesfiredonacounterattack(235^)for"0"BatteryForwardObserver
"ijumberone(l). "B"Batteryregisteredsmokeatl4l5tomarktargetforair
strike. Apreparationwasfiredforthe9thKarinosfron14^*0to14*45.de-
fensivefiresworeregisteredfrom174Sto2030. Fron1920to1925Charlio
normalbarragowasfiredonacounterattackfor"."BatteryForwardObserver
lumberone(l). Slwolvomissionsworefiredduring-^*-*^*^ *---*--
Action Report, CGntd
night.
kMarch,19*45* Insupportofanattack"bythe9thMarinesa
preparationwasfiredfrom06^5to0710, Defensivefireewereregisteredfrom
iGkSto1S5^andharassingmissionswerefiredduringthenight. Eleven(11)
c&asionswore.firoddioringtheday.
5 March, 19^5 "A
11
, "B" and "C
11
Batteries were registered on
the new Base Point i n 219W b;f ai r spot from 1330 to 1*415. "B"Battery was
w
C
n
registered at 1*400 to mark target for an ai r stri ke. Battery was registered
on Check Point Number nine (90 (SJ^lnw) "byai r spot from 1^22 to 1*435. Defensive
fi res were registered from 17J5 to 1900. Ten (10) missions were fi red during the
day and harassing missions wef-e fi red throughout the night. Ho attack; by the
9th Marines,
6 March, 19^5: from 0750 to 0821 and from 08^5 to 0921 1st
Battalion, 12th Marines fired a preparation and rol l i ng barrage for Fifth
Amphibious Corps Landing Forc$; the l at t er In support of an attack by the
Fifth Amphibious Corps. Apreparation-was fired for the 9th Marines from1**38
to lkk5. Defensive f i res we*3 registered from 1605 to 1800. Three (3) missions
were fired during the day as well as {harassing missions. Throughout the night
smoke was used to ^arass.
7 'March, 1&5: The 9th Marines continued the attack at 0500
under cover <jf darkness #d the smoke screen resulting from harassing fires* At
0755 "A" Bat%Qfy Forward Observer Number one ( l ) registered "B
11
Battery to locate
front l i nes . From 12p5 | o 1300 a preparation was fired far the 9th Marines.
Defensive fi^es wero registered from 190^ to 1910, Seven (7) missions wore firod
during the ^jay and harafsing missions were* fired during the night. At 17^5 3&
Battalion, 9th Marinas was released from control of the 21st Marines and reverted
to 9th Marines control.
8 Marchi 19*45* In support of an attack by the 9th Marines at
0750 a preparation an# rol l i ng barrage was fi$ed from 07*40 to OSOU. "A
tt
Battery
fi red another preparation for the 9th Karines from 1625 to 16^0, Defensive
fi re? were regi storei from 16^8 to 1750. No missions were fi red for Forward
Observers but harassing missions wpre fi red during the day and night. At 0300
3d Battalion, 21st Marines was attached to the 9V
1
Marines*
9 Marh, 19^5? No preparations r e l a t e d by 9th Marines i n the
attack at 0700. Defensive fi res were registered fa&m 1 8 ^ to 19*40. Four {k)
missions were firod during the day for Forward Observers and during the night
harassing missions yfere fired.
10 M^rch, 1945: Ho preparations requeffcod by the 9th Marines in
the attack at 0800. At 1530 9th Marines patrols wore #ej>orted to be ofc^ths
beach. Two (2) miscions were fired during the day. N$ defensive f i res w
registered and no harassing missions were fi red.
11March,19**5J Nopreparationrequestedbythe9thMarines*
nomissionsfiredfeyforwardObservers,andnodefensivefiresregistered.
Harassingmissionsw^fefiredduringthenight.
12MaSch,19*+5: From0900to09101stBattalion,12thMarines
firedapreparationior13thMarinesinsupportofanattackbythe5thMarine
1
Division. NomissionsfiredbyForwardObserversandnodefensivefires
registered. Harassingmissionswerefiredduringthedayandnight.
13Ka3fch,19*45: ThreemissionswerefiredbytheForward
Observersduringtho'day. Nodefensivefiresweroregisteredbutharassing
:(
miscionswerefirediuring"hedayandnight.
1*4MaJrch,19*45: Two(2)missionsadjustedbyDO-H&B(13thMarine;
Section)werefiredongunflashesinTA219Xat1130and0215. Harassing
werefiredduringthenigh/j,.
Cont'd
15torch,19^5:Hofiringthisdata.
16March,19^1From06U0toO73U1stBattalion,12thMarines
firedasmokemissionunder2ndBattalion,12thMarinescontroltocoverpassage
oflinesof21stMarine*throughthe26thand27thMarines. From07*+0to0825
1stBattalion,12thMarinesfiredapreparationreinforcing2ndBattalion,12th
Marinesin-supportffinattack"bythe21stMarines, ThiBwasthelastmission
fired"by1stBattalion,12thMarinesonIwoJima. At1500,1stBattalion,12th
Marineswasordered,topreparetoembarkanadvanceechelon. At1700"Closo
Station,MarchQrde*"WasreceivedfromCommandingOfficer,12thMarines.
17March,19^5: At1100,twenty-five(25)officersandthree
hundredandninety-two(392)enlistedfrom1stBattalion,12thMarineswere
embarkedontheSSSantaIsabel,leavingarearechelonoffive(5)officers
andfifty-two(52)enlisted,witjaorganizationalequipment,onIwoJimato
awaittransportation.
IS,\%,20*iarch,1945* AboardSSSantaIsabel.
21March,19^5: TheadvanceechelondebarkedatGuamat2100
andreturnedtobasecamp.
k. COMMENTS
(a)
A $ I A $ V E
il)Casualtyreport:
KilledinAction-Seven(7)enlisted. .gfg
WoundedinAction-Bight(S)officersandthtfty-eight
(38)enlisted.
DiedoftyoundsReceivedinAction-One(1)officerand
one(1)enlisted.
TotalCasualties-Sine(9)officersandforty-six(46)
enlisted.
(b)ARTILLBHX"
(l)Loadingofthisunit,firingbatteriesunderdirection
ofandwiththebattalionlandingteamsofthe9*hMarinesandHeadquarters
andServiceBattefcyunderowncontrol-wasverysatisfactory. Headquarters
andServiceBatteryandotherunitsloadingaboardtheAPATen(10)experienced
difficultiesinthecargoarea,causedbyhavingtheircargoplacedinanarea
farremovedfromwheretheshipdocked. Thiscausedthetimeofloadingtobe
extendedseveralhours. Itisrecommended thattheshipsloadingofficerbe
allowedtobeginassemblingthecargoatthedock,where.i^Lsshipistoload,
-)itortothearrivaloftheship.
Dueto alackofLCMsandaToryhighsurfthisunit
requiredapproximatelyeighteen(18)hourstocompleteunloadingafterorders
todebarkonthemorningof25February,1945werereceived. "B
11
Batterylanded,
24February,1945onordersfromtheCaptainoftheAPAXNOX. TheBattalion<^5
Commanderhadreceivednporderstoeffectthelandingof
fl
B
M
Battery.The
equipmentofthebattalionwaslandedinasatisfactoryconditionandina
quantityadequatetofulfillourmission.
(3)Surveywaslimitedto apositionareasurvey. Itwas
notconsideredfeasibleornecessarytocarrysurveytothefrontlinos.
(4)fireadjustmentwasgenerallycon:trolledbyairspotters
andforwardobservers. 3hisunitwasadjustedbyDO-DASontwooccasionsand
oncebyflashranging. Airspotwasusedmainlyforregistrations,whichwore
consideredtoboverygood. Theforwardobserversconducted,byfar,the
majorityofourfireusingforwardobservermethods. Precisionadjustmentswere
usedonpointtargets,howeverexcellentcamouflagebytheenemycoupledwith
heavyenemyfiremadethelocationofenemytargetsquitsdifficult. Adjustment
bysoundwasfrequentlyusedwhenobservationwasLacking. Duetotheheavy
Action Report,
Oont'd
volvjne of pi
up his adjusting rounds was often encountered. This brought about the use of
smoke for registration on most targets.
ftWMLriaj|^|fry fire the problem of an observer being able to fire the problem of an observer being able to pick
(5) Fire direction technique was unchanged from that laid
downin field manual six (6) - forty (*4O)
(6) Organization for combat and tactical employment was normal.
(7) Liaison with the infantry regiment and infantry battalions
was normal and-carried out in an excellent manner. The supported infantry was
very cooperative in working with our liaison parties.
(8) Communications were carried out in normal manner, but due
to enemy fire, friendly tanks andbull dozers, i t was difficult to maintain wire
communications, Aforward switching central anda forward radio relay station
were used with good results, ?ive (5)'6lO radios were destroyed by enemy fire.
The telescopic antonna drew heavy enemy fi re. Ihis radio was not as portable as
was desired. The batteries (BJlUO'e)generally lasted for only one day of normal
operation. One instance of interference on our assigned frequency "bya friendly
nnit was noted and reported. The maximum distance at whic communication by 6lQ
radio could be maintained without relay was about two (2) miles. It i s believed
that the 300 radio would have been more satisfactory for Forward Observer use.
(9) Observation by forward observers was very limitedcduring
most of operation l>y rough terrain and scrub brush. Upon reaching the high ground
north of MotoyamaAirstrip Humber two (.2) observation was increased, Heav enemy
small arms fire and mortar fire covered the majority of positions favorable for
observation, making them untenable.
(J.Q) Personnel Replacement personnel, radio operators in
particular, were not qualified to carry out the duties to whichit was necessary
to assign them. Communication school was carried onat the battalion Command
Post for the replacements in order to alleviate the above situation,
(14) Ammunition supply was slow and the battalion was,never
able to build up to 1wo(2) units of fire $n hand. 'It i s believed that this was
due to the difficulty of getting 15w pack Jiowitzer ammunition from the ship to
the beach and in many cases it had to be sorted from 75cm gun ammunition after
it reached the beachefc.
(12) Motor transportation waa adequate. -
(13) The one to twenty thousand (l;20,000) gunnery mapgave
good horizontal contr<si,but tliis unit found the Vertical control to be consider-
ably off. It was fourid normal in time fire missions to raise the height of burst
&pprnyinately eighty (SO) yas0,s to get a zero height 6f burst.
{ action against this unit was confined to infrequent
artillery and mortar jshell^ng of short duration and light intensity.
Stajpply of all necessary items Vas satisfactory.
(1$) Stimmary of Ammunition expenditure by item: ,
K-57
20,239 15,382
3,627
Date
25 Feb
Eegis-
tration
U7)
Pr^ia-
Pr^ia-
4
t
ration
Harass-
4.2*;.
Close
Support
General
Swnport
Kortars MG- Arty
20
Eoc-
kets
26 2
27
" 627
Z.10
260
6g
1 Mar 30
29
. lUr 236 95
go
96
5 Mar
ActionSeport,
Cont*d
ass- Close General Mortar^ MG
ArtyHoc-
Date
Support Support kets
2569
6Mar
12 137 60 119
26
303 285 5 60
7Mar
gMar
190S
1058 156 61
288
9Mar
105
396
10Mar 51
11Mar
12Mar
1 3 M 302
Mar
1 4 to 300
Mar
15Mar
16Mar
Totals 687 20816 6216
2092 761 165^ 220
339
(18)DuringthisOperationthe75mmpackhowitzerprovedtobe
effective-againstonlythosetargetsforwhichitwasdesigned. Thefirewas
veryeffectiveagainsttroopsintheopen.eospeciallyclose-insupportduring
counterattacks*troopsentrenched,openmachinegunandmortarpositions,and
forharassingmissions. Againstpillboxesandundergroundinstallationsthe
effectwasnegligible* Itwasevidentthatinmanyinstrucesourtroopswere
heldupbyenemyinstallationsclosetoourownlineswhichcouldnotbetouched
byourpreparations. Inotherinstancestherewasnotsufficienttimepriorto
apreparationtoadjustourartilleryonthemostimportant targets-targets
knowntotheinfantryandforwardobservers.
K MEDICAL.
(a)Embarkation: Allmedicalpersonnelwereembarkedoftfour
(k)AP*son9February,19^5. Thisincludedeleven(11)hospitalcorpsmen,oaahca.
rylngaunitnumberthree(3)ancLtwo(2)unitsofserumalbumen,andone(1)
medicalofficerwhocarriedaunitnumberone(l).
MaterialconsistedofUnitsNumberfive(5)A,Numberfive
(5)B,Numberseven(7)Numberei^it(8),Numbereleven(11)A
t
Numbereleven
(11)B,andNumberfourteen(1*0. Mostoftheseunitswerecarriedinaone
(l)tontrailerandaJeepambulanceaboardtheU.b.o.EbBBXLES. Inaddition
asickbayunitandadditionalplasmaworcarriedaboardthreeotherAP'swith
thefiringbatterypersonnel.
(b)AboardShip: Duringtheperiodspentaboardshiptherewas
aminimumofdiseaseamongourtroops. Sanitaryconditionswereexcellenton
theUS.S.HAEBTLEE,theAPcarryingHeadquartersandServiceBattery.No
defectswerenotedwhichwerebelowNavystandardrequirements.
SpecialPrecautions-None,
(c)ThisorganizationwentashoreonDplus5&ndDplus6in
L.C.7.P
f
s. MedicalpersonnelWeredispersedwithnomorethanonetoanyboat.
MostofthematerialwentashoreonDpluB6;partofitwastransferredto
L.C.M
f
sandpartwentashoreonL.C.V.P
1
^. Therewerenolossesofpersonnel
ormaterialinthisphaseoftheoperation.
(d)Ashore-AssualtPhase:
(1)Thisorganizationwasnotashoreduringtheinitial
assualtphase. Medicalinstallationsweresetupinanarearelativelycloseto
allbatteriesandonamainroad. Sinceitwastobeasemi-permanentcamp,
littleregardwasgiventothefeaturessoimportanttoaninfantryorganization.
Localsecuritywasprovidedbythebattalion* Camouflagenetswereusedover
allvehiclesandtents. Personnelwerealldispersed. Ablackouttentwasset
upandduginaswasthesickbeytent. Blackoutwaspreserveduntiltheisland
wassecured,
(2)Nopatientswere'hospitalizedinouraidstation.
(3)Patientswereevacuatedwithfacilityb/ambulancejeep.
('-) 5.'iiareweretwenty-one(21)casualtiestreatedbyour
tickbay.
?0 "ji'j casualties were detained,
v'b) S'ourtucn (ik) of our casualties were evacuated,
(c) JTJLT *) cf our casual t i es died.
Contd
Iherewerefourteen(l^-)walkingwounded.
!hree(3)ofourcasualtieswerestretchercases.
(5)Sanitationpresentedlessprotxlomthananticipated. This
wasduetocoolweatherandthefactthatweremainedinonepositiontheentire
period. Hogalleysweresetup, SationsconsistedofCtypeandten(10)in
one(l)type. Theywereobtainedinsufficientquantityandinayopinionwere
idealforthistypeoperation. Waterwasobtainedfromthedistillationunit
whichwasoperated"bythedivision. Therewassufficientquantitiesfordrink-
ing"butneveranadequatequantityforbathingandwashingclothes.
(6)Allourdaadwere"buriedinthe3&MarineDivision
Cemetery.
(7)Therewerenoepidemicsorunusualdiseases*
(S)Adequatedentalservicewasprovided"bytheRegimental
DentalOfficer,
(9)Hociviliansorprisonersofwarwereceredfor"bjrthis
organisation
(10)Themedicalorganizationofthisbattalionwasentirely
adequateandsuitableonthisoperation. Personnelwerenorethanadequatein
numberandworkedefficiently,
(11)tiedlc^J.supplieswereentirelyadequate. Therewereno
losses throughpilferage.
(e)Recommendations: Inviewofthesmallnumberofcasualties
caredforbythisorganizationIdonotbelieverecommendationsforanychanges
arejustified. Theonlyappropriatecommentinthisregardisthatwewere
oquipedforcaringforseveraltimesasmanycasualtiesaswedidcarefor. At
notinewasthereanysty&inonourmedicalsection.
G.3.
-S-
* ; ;
3D
From:
To ;
Subject:
Enclosuro:
Reference:
JEADQUA3T2RS,
?TALIOK, TWELFTH kARINES,
'.VISION, FMF, IN THE FIELD,
GO.
CO,12thMarines.
ActionReport.
(A)ActionReport.
DivisonGeneralOrderNo.15?
1. Incompliancewithreference(a)
Enclosure(A)issubmitted.
W.T.FAIRBOURM
tartX Summary.
A. The mission vas assigned on 7 Hovember, 19*&, at a conference of
battalion commanders and was completed on l6 Maroh, ^
B. At1J00on21Februarytheforwardobserversandliaisonofficers
of2dbattalion12thMarines,beganlandingwiththe21stMarinesontwo
Jima,preparedtoconductfireforthe2dbattalionl^thMarines,until
suchtimeasthe2dbattalion12th'Marines,waspreparedtogointodirect
supportofthe21stMarines. Thereconnaissanceelementsofthe2dbattalion
12thMarines,were*landedonZkFebruary19^5.&n&theremainderQfthe
battalionwasorderedtolandonthemorningof25February* Prom25Feb-
ruary19^5to27February19^5inclusive2dbattalion12thMarinesreinforced
thefiresof1stbattalion12thMarines, On2SFebruary,2dbattalion
12thMarines,wasassigneddirect supportof21stMarineswhichcontinued
until1500*16March19*4-5,atwhichtimethe4thbattalion12thMarines*
relievedthisbattalionofitsmissionandpreparationsworomadetorcembarl
fordeparturefrom.IwoJimaon17March19^5*
tartII treliminariest
A. Tbuecommandwascomposedasproscribedby3dMarineBivision
AdministrativeOrder1-^5.
B. SincetheDivisonwaslandinginreservenofixedplancouldbo
prescribed. Observersandliaisonpartieswereloadedwiththe21stMarines.
Roconnaissancopartiestoselectpositionareaswereprovided. Firing
batterieswcrogivenunloadingprioritiesfollowingthoinfantryelements
ofthe21stMarines
Daringthetrainingperiodending10February19^5thefollowing
wasstressed:
(1)ServicePractice(dayandnight)
(2)FiringKSQt's
(3)Camouflage
) Field Fortifications
Tho rehearsals consisted of participation in a "Division CtX end a
21st Marines CtX "based On tho type of operation indicated by the character
of tho terrain and enemy dispositions on Iwo Jima.
Firing oxerciscs stressing the use of al l infantry and ar t i l l er y
weapons in a passage of linos suc+i as was indicated by tho Iwo Jima operation
were conducted in conjunction with
1
;tho 21st Marines and 1st battalion 3d
Marines. '
t
0* This battalion was assigned the mission of landing on call on
"beaches to bo designated prepared for direct support of tho 21st Marines
on order.
D. Sec t ar t I, Section B. -
E. Sec intelligence reports of higher ocholons.
i ' art I I I Chronological account of tho action.
Tho forward observers and liaison officer boated with the 1st batta
21st Marines began to land on Iwo Jima at approximately 13OO (K *40 timo)
21 February 19H5# and were soon followed by the forward observer and
part i es boated with other battalions and the headquarters of the 21st
The forward observer teams and liaison part i es proceeded with the 21st n
to an Assigned assembly area whore they were to await further orders, fy
I63O the ar t i l l er y liaison officer, normally with tho headquarters of#1$
21et Mariiics, reported to tho Commanding Officer, lUth Marines, where bowas
infvisaed that the 2d battalion i t o Marines had been assigned direct saj^
of tho 21st Marines. The liaison officer completed plans with the l^ih
Kor^a l b ^ f f t ^ ^ 2d battalion 12th tiariaos conducted tip
performodliasonfunctionswiththe21ttMarines. The2d"battalion
Mr.rinosassignedaliaisonofficertoreporttotheCommandingOfficer,
21stKarinos.
At0730on22Februarythe2d"battalion12thMarines
1
liaisonoffices
reportedtotheCommandingOfficer,2d"battalionl^thMarines,toperform,
liaisonduties,whichdutiesheperformeduntil1200,2*+February13^5.at
whichtimeharesumedhisnormaldutiesattho21stMarines
1
commandpost.
The2d"battalionl^thMarineswasindirect aa^ortoftho21stMarinesfrom
0730,22February,whenthe21stMarinesvorcommittedinthe^thMerino
I&visionzoneofactionuntilthe9thMarinesoxecutcdapassageoflinos
throughthe21stMarinoson25February 9^
TheCommandingOfficer,12thMarines,orderedashorethoreconnaissance
elementsofthe2dbattalion12thMarineson2UFobruary19^5>andtheseclo-
nontslandedat1325thatdate. Hiereconnaissancepartyproceededfromthe
beachareatoVJrhibCorpsArtilleryHeadquarterswherearepresentativeoffee
CommandingOfficer,12thMarinos,assignedpositionstothobattalioninthe
vicinityofTAl6^K. Abattalioncommandpostwasestablishedinthevicinity
ofS?Al6HKat1U3Oon2*+February. At1830theremainderofthebattalionwas
orderedtolandatdawnon25February19^5*
Thoremainderofthebattalionbeganlandingat093^on25February
andatirregularintervals,continuedtolandthroughouttheday* At1^10
n
3"
batterycompletedairspotregistrationonthree(3)checkpoints. 3y1^52
seven(73gunsworeashoroandinpositionreadytofirowith807roundsof
finmunitioji(67Sroundsofhighexplosiveand129roundsofsmoke), daotothe
lackofsomenecessaryequipmentandporsonnolontho^artofboththe1stand
2dbattalions,theCommandingOfficer,12thMarinos,directedthotwobatta-
lionscombinedforpurposesoffiredirectionundejrthe1stbattalionfiro
directioncenter. Atthattimothe1stbattalion12thMarineswasindiroct
supportofthe9thMarines. Hie1stbattalionfirodirectioncenter,augnonted
bypersonnelandequipmentofthe2dbattalion,assumedcontrolofthefires
atlSlO.
Withtheadditionalpersonnelandequipmentlandedduring,themorning
of26February,boththe1stand2dbattalionsbouldoperateasseparate
battalions. Asaresulttho2dbattalionwasdirectedtoestablishaseparate
firedirectioncenter,andatI3O5thisWasaccomplished. At1315the2d
battalionwasassignedthoutissionofreinforcingthefiresoftho1stbattrv-
lion. Ton(10)gunsworeinthebattalionpositionby1835; however,onp(l)
gunof"D
8
batteryhadbeendamagedinunloadingandaouldnotbefired.
Withthe21stMarinespassage-ofthe9thMarineslinoson2SFebruary,
the2dbattalion12thMarinoswasassigneddiroctsupportofthe21stMarines,
whohadorderstocontinuetheattack. KinghourwassetatO815. Thoprepa-
rationfortheattack;beganatO7*+5andcontinueduntilKinghour,atwhich
timoarollingbarragpandharrassingfiros,whichlasteduntil0922,wero
fired. At1300acoordinatedattack,procodedbyafive(5)minuteprcparatlafci
waslaunched. AtKinghpurartillerygiftedandfiredarollingbarrageand
harassing firesuntil1J35 At152Jafive(5)minutopreparationwasfired
foranattackn,t1530* 4rollingbarrageandharrassingfiresworofircin
supportofthoattackun^il1600. Duringthedayandnight-thereweresix(6J
callmissionsbyforwardobservers.-Harrassinganddefensiveiircsyoro
firedthroughoutthonigtyb.
x
On2March,thepreparationfortheattackbeganat0750andcontinued
untilKinghour(0300),atwhichtimoarollingbarrage,whiohlatto'4u
032^,wasfired. At1530ftcoordinatedattackwasJaunohodaftera f
on
miautopreparation. AtKinghourarolling*barragewasfirodwntil i*frK
Thorcworoth*00(3)ocXXmissionsduringtheporiodr th6usualnightttivoa
On3March,thopreparationfor U f ^
untilKinghour.(073^),atwhichtimijaroliihg
vcrofiroduafcil0&X). At1025thobettalio&yviib
-2-
reinforcing,firedonp8ilRc>attaclcin$A23fftJ. Atihk^afive(5)minute
preparationwasfiredfortheattackat1500. Therewereten(10)callm
duringtheporiod* Earraesingcuddefensivefireswerefiredduringthenight.
OnkMarch,the*preparationfortheattackbeganat1120andcontinued
untilKinshour(11*40),atwhichtimearollingbarragewasfireduntil1201,
Shoreworefour(h)cr.llmissionsduringtheperiod. Harrassiiycfires-were
firodthroughoutthedayonsuspectedmortarlocations. Defensiveand
harrassingfireswerefiredduringthenight*
On5Harch,*])",*%*,and
n
l
n
"batterieswereregistered'oncheckpoint
#12(&Tat219W)"byairspot. Therewasone(l)callmissionduringthe
poriod* Defensiveandharrassingfireswerefirodthroughoutthenight.
On6March,aton(10)minutepreparation-wasfirodinsupportofthe
left"battalionofthe21stMarinesliftingatSinghour(0600)tosuspected
gunpositionsin-frontoftheright"battalionofthe2lstMarines. AtKing
plus^5*Kingpljis50&*>&Kingplus55toKingplus60apreparationwas
firodinsupportoftherightbattalionof^the,21stMarines. AtKingplus60
thopreparationwasliftedandarollingbarragewasfireduntilKinsplusS5*
At1H3Satwo(2)minutepreparationwasfiroduntilKinghour(1*+HO)andthen
liftedonehundred(100)yardsandfireduntil1500. Therewerethreo(3)call
missionsduringtheperiod; harrassinganddefensivefireswerefiredthrough-
outthenidrt.
On7Harch,thereworefour(4)callmissions. Defensiveandharrassiiv:
firesworefireddurincthenight, from0^55to0500snokowasfiredtoscreen
thoni^htattackofthe3^"battalion9thMarines.
OnSMarch,thopreparationfortheattack"bo^onat07^-0andcontinued
untilKin.'-;hour(0750),atwhichtimearollingbarragewasfireduntil0S05.
Defensiveandharrassingfireswerefiredthroughouttheni^ht.
OnSMarch,thopreparationforthoattack"bewailat0 6 ^andcontinued
until0710. ICinrchourwassetat0700. Harrassingfireswerefiredthroughout
thedayonsugpoctedmortarandartillerylocations. Iherewasono(l)call
missionduringtheporiod. Dcfon&ivoandharrassingfireswerefiredthrourihr-
outtheynight.
On10M&rch,nofiresworeplacedintho3^MarinoDivisionsector.
5?hebattalion,firedono(l)callmissionreinforcingthefiresofthe13th
Karines.
.Allfireswerereinforcingthe13thMarineson11March, Apreparation
fortho5^hMarineDivisionwasfiredfrom0820to0S50* Harrassiilgfires
werefirediurinr;thenightforthe5t^MarinoDivision.
On12March,onlyharrassingfiresfortho5thMarineDivisionwerefixc\.
On13March,thobattalionwasdirectedtoreinforcethe13thMarines
insupportofthe5thMarineDivision* Harrassingfiresforthe5thliarinc
Divisionwerefired.
On1^March,onlyharrassingfiresforthe5thMarineJ&visionworo
firel.
Homissionswerefiredon15March.
On16Marchthebattalion,reinforcedbythe1standUtJabattalions,
firedasmokemissionfrom0705to0725toscreentho21stMarineswhile
relievedtwo(2)rogimontsoftho5*&MarineDivision. Apreparationwae
firedforthe21stMarinesfromKingminus20toXingplus10* Kinghour
setat0S15. 1standkthbattalionsandone(l)corpsartillerybattalion
weroreinforcing. At1500orderswcroreceivedrelievingthebattajionof
diroctsupportoftho21stMarinesassoonasthoreliefoouldboexc<Jtttod
trytho te bAttolion J2th Kajrince. At1700thpreliefwascompJUstedandth
21"battalion was ordered to closo station to makepreparations for doparturc
from twoJima on 17 March19^5,,
Jart IV Comments.
W
A
B
Administration.
1, Killed in action ~ two'(2) officers and sovon (7) enlistee!..
Wounded in action - two (2) offiocrs and tliirty five (35) onlistcl
2 Morale Of troops throughout operation was excellent, Hi$x
morale was maintained by reaion of hot food, excellent mail service, and
general esprit do
3'Moprisoners, natives or civilians wore handled by this
"battalion.
* loading of the firing "batteries was correct. The headquarters
"batters' \ms s^lit "between two (2) shi*s, either element boin/i; enable of
oxcrcisiiVC firo direction once established ashore. !Ihis was a mistako since
i t was impossible to kec^ "both cloments of the hoadquartors a^rised of a
chfijvjinr: situation; once ^lans wore male they could not "be chanced with
facility to suit the local situation.
2
fc-ndin^. There i s a docided need of nore instruction for all'
officers as to the echelons of command during a shi^-to-shoro movement, Ujho
reconnaissance elements of this battalion were ordered ashore direct without
roferonco to the Transport division Coiimian^er who controlled the "boct allo-
cation and unloading pri ori t i es. Jhc'leading of the remainder of the "batta-
lion was accomplished as ox^editiously as was cofianensurate with availability
of boat-s since i t was handled throwdi naval channels*
3 ^iyo AdJListment. J:111 adjustnents, except i ni t i al registrations,
wore by forward observers. Observers fiiowoi. a,tendency to fire for effect
before a positive a^Justncnt was obtained. This was excusable when observers
could not ascertain the exact location of the target but adjuster! on an area
which hostile fire was coming or in which hostile elements were believed to be
located.
*K giro direction. The /gunnery tochniquo was excellent, but a
^ro^.er appreciation of the tacticvl use of artillery fire was lacking.
rolling barra-^o ty^-o of preparation was effective Uirin
f
": the advaiice fron
nujabor two airfield to number throe airfield but was not effective
tho advance from nuobor throo airfield to the coast, &"bcxxcAo ty^e
atlon i s wasteful of ammunition and does not ^lacc sufficient firo at
j^riato tiacs onkiaownand suspected onony installations, routes of
etc, in do^th. $hi is evidonced ^ the fact that troops mado only limited
advances behind tho barrage and wore st ored by firo froa encay strong
to the flanks and rear of the area covered by tho preparation.
Had a short intense preparation immeliatoly in front af ou?
troops (for the ^.ur^oso of establishing firo su^erioritsO witliout tho
barrp/i:c boon used, aoro ammunition would have boon available to delivor ^
supportin~ firos following Klar,hour in order to ostablisli and maintain
neutralization onknown or suspected enemy installations dco^or in our *ono of
action but capable of delaying the ^ro^ress of our infantry. It i s bolicvod th
insufficient emphasis waex-laced on deep fires: hpAsuch boon done the cnony'fi
conmunication an1 su^ly lines would havo been disru^tel, at an earlier time pw
was cccoq^lishod. Thero was l i t t l e attempt male to coordinato and make avajl-*
able to those ^jn^i^iLOr firing #reparations sufficient data on enemy instal-
lations
i n
>
c
^^^j t t | W' Ji
r o
f
f l
v J*w3?oda^\pns rarely had a complete
of tho enemy ^ v f W^ f f fj ^font in tintf'to act u^on i t . M a
h l squ&rlit| Jk(JK v$7>otx
t
oqual 'attention during; ^roi/aratory
Wirecommunicationwasexcellent. Thepolicy
ofkec^infta"forwardswitch
11
wollforwardwithtost,stations"betweenswltchr*
boardsf;avoaveryflexibleanddependablecommunication system,
1
Therewas
atendencyto"party*toomanyforwardobserverlinesthroughtheswitchboard*
Ihoforwardswitchesofboth direct su^ort battalionsweretrunkod^ivin^
additionalflexibilitytothe"forwardswitch*system. Laterallinosbotwoon
directsu^*ortbattalionsadjacenttodivisionboundariesshouldboadopted
asstandard^rocoduscthroughouttheCor^s. Manydifficultiesarising;from
artilleryfirealon^thodivisionboundariescouldhavobeensolvediftho
twofircrdirectioncentershadbeenconnectedbylaterallinos.
Radiocommunicationsworoveryi.oor. TheSOB6lOisdefinitely
asto^.backwardfromthoSCR30Qforthefollowingreasons:
(a) Too hoavy <5^ l"bs vs 38 l bs).
(b) Will not stay in ali/?nmcnt.
(c) No fl exi bi l i t y in shifting frequencies. Two frequencies
arc not enough. Cannot shift to infantry frequencies
or to adjacent ar t i l l er y froquoncies when tho occasion
requires.
(d) Will not "bend
11
over hi l l masses as woll as SCR 30.
(0) 4*ntQnna i s too conspicuous. I t draws too much fj.ro.
(f) Short l i fo of bat t eri es.
6* Observation. ISfo uso of sound and flash personnel by Regiment.
? iasmunition. Tho su^l y was adoquato, but thoro was l i t t l e
coordination by hi
f
^h6r echelons. The "Oomo and sort it
M
system was used.
*i.8a result ammunition was not ko^t equally divided amoiv: battalions, neccs^
sitatin/i; a rohraiilinio; which was ontirely unnecessary. A system of marking
75&ft howitzer, lmmmortar, and 75m *-nn rjnmunition with different colors of
i-aint should be adopted, iftich time and effort was wasted by the necessity for
sorting howitzer, rcun, and mortar amiaunition in the ar t i l l er y position areas.
8. Transportation. The numbor.of vehicles was adequate, and al l
were?needed for handling amraunition throwchout the operation.
9 Materiol Used. The 75^^i-aok howitzer i s much too li
(
~ht a
weapon for the ty^c of operation oncountcroi, and every effort should have been
na-io to"convert to 105mmhowitzers boforo^tho operation. Ho howitzers wore
rloiw^cl beyond repair by tlie enemy action; the front t r ai l of ono was damped
beyond repair in landing by caroloss handling while i t was boiiy; unloaded from^
an LCMundor difficult surf conditions.
10. Training Doficioncios.
f
(a) Additional training for forward observer teams in the
^ro^cr uso of cover i s nocdod.
(b) Forward observer tosms need more indoctrination in the
i-roivor mothod of loa^ fro,T forward from observation to
observation. A system wherein the forward observer
remained on his observation while the scout sergeant
and two men from the wire team moved forward behind
the infantry maintaining contact with the infantry
and Booking new observation was finally used. Whon
tho scout sor^oant found new observation ho chockod in
by telephone, ox\took over tho observation whilo tho
forward observer, with hi s radio and the remainder of
hi s team, movod forward. This system ^avo continuous
observation, permitted tho observer to study the terrain
in front of tho infantry, and search out and destroy
(or noutralizo) onomy elements that could inx-odo $ho
pro^ross of our infantry.
H ^ - 9?&$. Photos.
(a) Tlio 1/20,000 Aorial and Qunnory Target llc^ was ao as
a fir^Atf^^ap-ndii-rovod very accurate. AvCr&SQ K
T
s
deflectioncorrectionof loft*evon(7)ails
andaran
c
-;ocorrectionof^lus.twenty-two(22)yards
#QT thousand. !Eho
?
crt>atostdifference"botwocn cor-
rectionson difforontcheckpointswastwonty~fivo (25)
yardsin rcn^oordeflection.
("b) Ihol/lQ
f
OQO^hotom % sin"bookletfomprovide!for
forwardobserversworoexcellent* Theyshouldbo made
standardforf\xturooperations"butshould"bopecurod
withrlnfts or
Bnomy
Bnomy
action
our artillory* Two rounds of eneny
*
artillery
5
n
^)
received in t&ioposition area during the operation*
wore
one wounded rjid no to inatoriol.
of oiamnition o^ondituros ]>y iten;
Bate 1-P-KI &-5** ^57 Total all ty^o
36
2319
5259
57-96-
3262
2713
2676
.517
2S75
728!
1377
1272
5^
^6
9Y9
355
*3.
296
9
1503
35321
Summaryofaraaunitionexpendituresby ty^-o of firemission:
Dati Close Countor-*Battery
ration
20rd* yield
62mortars
71nortars;
39Mr^lB
rockets
nortars
field
Marl
Harl-2
3 jaortars
7/ nortars
Har2-3 15 field
Mar3-
70
Mart-5
Har5-o
107 nortars
Mar6-7
'kmortars
3 rockets
Marll-U
Karl2~l
rounds firod: 35321.
15. ^ffoctivencss f Artillery.
(a) The 75mn^ck howitzer ^rovod effective only for neutrali-
sation fires fcn targets of opportunity, that wore not lur,
in. I t neutralized enemy machine sun and mortar fire "by
harrassin^ firos during darkness and observed fires during
daylight. It s effectiveness against ^re^arod
x
ositions
was nc-'l
16. Tactical employment _of enemy artillery. Hat trajectory field
i-ieccs were frequently employed close to the front where direct fire could bo
used rvcainst our forces. Often these enemy field pieces were skillfully
concealed in well camouflaged i-ositi-ons covered "byautomatic weapons' fire.
They were not fired until our troops were so close to the ^iocc that our
artillery could not briii--; down counter battery fire. Q scvoral occasions
,?,direct firing field ^iocc had "been,moved v* under cover of darkness and
employed in an effort to chock our attacks...
In indirect fire the onony.made -,'ood adjustments on his targets
"but st i l l frailed to mass his fires. Onone occasion a forward observer re-
ported observing what a^-oared to "be six (6) pieces firing in the same area
(i t was im
x
ossiblc to dctcmine whether i t wasnortar or artillery fire)j
i t is ^ossiblo that this was the fire of two y-f&xibattories massed on one
area,
Snony artillery or nortar firo was frequently placed on our obser-
vation },osts forward observers found that the lon^ antenna of the SCR6lO
attracted firo from "both artillery and mortars.
17. Ijnoiny Matoriel. In the sector of advance of the 21st iiarinos
few artillory pieces were encountered. Host of the firo received was fron
artillery located in sectors of adjacent organizations. Two (2) 75^ field
x
.ioccs were overrun in the vicinity of liotoyama. Those wore the standard
i:9^nountain
f
;^uns. Anunber of ^7nm anti-tank
f
'^inswore encountorod.
a?our (k) 12cn dual-irur^osc anti-aircraft ^-unswore overrun in the vicinity
of Hotoyama airfield number two. It i s believed that onony matoriol has
been buried by the cnony riid by our own cave-sealing dotails.
IS. JSffoctivonoss of enemy art i l l ery. Only two (2) rounds of onony
rxtillory fire fell in the battalion aroa. This resulted in the wouniinr: of
one manrjad no donate to natoriol. The enemy's indiroct fire was ineffective,
but his direct firo ^iocos, used to slow the advance of our forces, wr^s very
effective. Tho enemy obtained ^ood effect fron the ^7^m anti-tank ^un that
ho employed against our tallies.
Tine firo fron a twin-mount, ijOmn, hi^h velocity -~unwas
cn^loycd against our troo
x
.s; i t inflicted .some casualties but the general
effect was only harrasain^. The enemy's anti-aircraft and,anti-tank ^uns
covered the a^i.roaches to the airfields. Effective direct fire fron both
tfoOB of riuns was cnaountorcd by the 21st H^rinos when alvancin
r
r fron Hotoynir
airfield number one to Kotoyana airfield number two.
19. I'iothods employed jt locate art i l l ery targets. Host tar-cots
in our zone of action were located by forward observers. Air s^ot was of
l i t t l e value in locating tar
;
;*ots to our innodiato front.
Medical.
1. Smbarlcation
(a) Battalion Surgeon with six (6) cor,-anon with Headquarter
and Service battery. Two (2) cor^anon with each of the
throe (3) firing batterios.
(b) Battalion aid station oar on a ono-ton trailer >nd
one (l) -ton jce^ ambulance. Individual battory -voar
b ono-ton trucks with respective ba
2. Ajbbarft Shi
A
. ' .
(a) Ho lidcnoss.
(b) Sanitation <^ood in.al l departments,
(c) Ho asocial ^recautions necessary.,
3 So'frarkation. ,
(a) torsound with respective bat t eri es on J)*lus six (6)
day (25tfoTDmary19^5). On qal l . Landed 0930.
(I?) I'iatorial: Pi rst aid, plasma, albiunin, sick cal l ,
stretcher, lalonkot, and 8i>lint uni t s. Landed. 1000,
26 Po"bruary 19U5.
(c) Pour (h) stretchers l ost .
k. Ashore (Assault ^iiase not e^l i caMo to t hi s act i vi t y),
(a) 25ntiro ro^iaont centrally located as was the battalion
aid station.
(*b) Evacuation via l^cach evacuation centers for two (2) days,
?JTterv;ards to "it" and
lf
3
tt
Hodical Companies. Entirely
adoquato.
(c) Casualties troatodi Sholl frar^iontft and sdall arms.
. Bunker* Z .
Betainod! 2 .
Svacuatodi 6
JMlod: 0
(d) Hout i no, f i el d s ani t at i on moasuros e nt i r e l y adoquato.
Be^al at i on f i el d r a t i ons , Gtelloy set ui> for coffoc
and r i ns e water onl y. Kedical per sonnel , oqui^nent,
and s Ut i l i cs adequate,
D.J).J s^ray offectivo gai ns t f l i cs.
5 Ashore - after conviction of assault ^haso (Sco ^rcvious notes).
6. Recommendations -
Mutt
HEADQUARTERS
3dBATTALION,TWELFTH.KARIESS
3dMARIASDIVISION,IMP,IETHEFIELD
From: TheCommandingOfficer.
To : T&eCSmmahding^Gffieer, TwelfthMarines.
Subject: OperationanIvrotXlwa,reportof.
Reference: (a)DivisionGeneralOrderHo.137.
1, Incompliancewithreference(a)thefollowing
report issubmitted.
Part1Summary.
A. Theperiodcoveredbythissummaryisfrom72'ovember,19^+,
whentheplanofattackonIwoJimawasfirstmadeknowntothecommanding
officerofthebattalion,tol6Iifcrch,19*4-5,whenthisunitdepartedfrom
theisland.
B. Intensivetrainingwasfsarriedoutbythisunitinpreparation
forthelanding. Prior$0embarkation, on9February,19U5,all officers
hadfamiliarizedthemselvesvitJLallorders,photos,andmapsinvolvedin
theoperation.
Themissionassignedt{>theThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarines
wastolandoncallonbeacht$bedesignated,ingeneral support. On
27February,19^5 at1215,fchfcbattalionreconnaissanceparty.landedon
BeachBlack. Thebattalionwa*assignedanareaintarget squaresl6Up.
and104-1, ThefirstgunlaMeftandwasinpositionby1500;by10+0this
piecehadcoupletedregistration. Axl twelvegunsinthebattalionwere
inpositionandfiringby113JD1March,
Duringthetimethism & t wasonIwoJimaitwasassignedre-
inforcingmissionsfortheFirstBattalion,Twelfth'.iarineaandthe
SecondBattalion,TwelfthMarinesaswellasitsoriginally assigned
missionofgeneralsupport. Forwardobserversfromthisbattalionwere
temporarilyassignedtothedirect supportbattalionsfromtimetotime
inordertorotatetheir-forwardobserversonthelineandalsotore-
placetheircasualties.
Thisbattalionfired23,^31roundsduringtheoperation.
GeorgeandHowbatteriesdisplacedtonewpositions intarget
areas16UGand16UKon5^arch,19^5. Thisdisplacement started'at0635
andwascompletedby1000ofthesameday. Therewasnoother displacement
juadeuntilreembarkation tookplace.
Thelastmissionfiredwason13March,19^5at1315. The
battalionremainedinpositionreadytofireuntil151-arch,19^5* At
1635onthatdayallammunitionwasdelivered tothefourthBattalion,
TwelfthMarinesandthoThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineshad completed
itsparticipation intheIvroJimaoperation. Onthefollowingdaythis
battaliondepartedfromtheisland.
-1.
Part11Preliminaries.
A. Compositionofreportingcommand. Thisbattalioniscomposed
ofaHeadquartersandServiceBatteryandthreefiringbatteries,"G-eorge
11
,
and"Item".
B. PreliminaryplanningbythisbattalionfortheoperationatIwp
JimabeganonreceiptofverbalinstructionsfromtheCommandingOfficer,
TwelfthMarinesonNovember7,19U^. Immediately,plansweremadeforan
intensivetrainingprogramtoconsistofconditioningoftroops;tocon-
tinuetoimproveartillerytechnique;toparticipateinInfantry-Artillery
fieldexercises. *
Thehighlightsoftrainingaccomplishedbythebattalionwereas
follows;battalionservicepracticeoffieldexercisestwiceweekly;
participatedinonefieldexercisewiththeinfantryandianks;forward
observersandliaisonsectionparticipatedinoneInfantry-Artilleryfield
exercise;T3articipatedintwoEegimentalfieldexercises;participatedin
oneDivisionCommandPostSxerclso. ocalsecurity,camouflageandcomplete
occupationofposition,werestressed.
Thisbattaliondidnotparticipateinarehearsalpriortothe
landingonIwoJiaa.
C. Themissionassignedtothebattalionwastolandoncall,on
beachtobedesignated,ingeneralsupr>ort
fi
ThwplanwasfortheBattalion
Commanderandhisreconnaissancepartytolandassoonaspossibleonthe
designatedbeachandmakethereconnaissanceforabattalionpositionarea.
Inthemeantimetheremainderofthebattalionwuuldgointoarendezvous
areaundercontrolofthe'BattalionExecutiveOfficerandawaitordersto
land. Badiocommunicationwasto-bemaintainedbetweentheBattalion
CommanderandBattalionExecutiveOfficer. Acompleteorganisationof
positionwastobeaccomplishedassoonaspossible.
Athoroughstudyofmaps,photosandstereo-photosweremade
ofalllandingbeachesandlikelypositionareasbyallofficersandby
noncoimnissionedofficerspriortothelanding.
D. ThisbattalionwasaboardshipsattheoutsetofactiononIwo
Jima. Alltroopswerekepfuptodateonthesituationandcontinual
studyoftheterrainfeatureswasconducted.
JS..0enemyforceswereencounteredbythisbattalion,inthe
battalionpositionarea.
Part111Chronologicalaccountoftheaction.
26February,
At2230,Kingzonetime,adispatchwasreceive^aboardthe
APTTSSCALLAWAYtobepreparedtolandtheremainingelementsofthe
TwelfthMarinescommencingsit0730,27February,19^5. Orderswere
issuedtootherelementsoftheThirdandFourthBattalions,Twelfth
Marinestobepreparedtolandreconnaissancepartiesafter0730
o n
orderandbepreparedtolandremainingpersonnelandmaterielasboats
becameavailable.
27February,195
At1215thebattalionreconnaissancepartylandedonBeachBlack
andarrivedattheregimentalcommandpostat1230. TheRegimental
Executiveassignedabattalionpositionasrgaintargetareasl6UH&. Pattery
positionswr:eassignedi:.'.thisare?,andthebatterycommandersdispatched
guidesto3ear.iBlackto:guidetLematerielandpersonneltotheposition
area. Thefirstpiecelandeda 1335andwasinPositionat1500. Regis-
trationwasbegunat1515onCheckPoints$ and$L0byairspotandwas
completedatl6U0, Priorto1800three(3)piecesofGeorgeBatteryand
three(3)piecesofHowBatterywereinpositionreadytofire.JTo
missionsotherthanregistrationwerefiredduringtheday.
28February,19U5
DuringthisperiodtheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarinesreinforced
thefiresoftheSecondBattalion,TwelfthMarines* Atthistimethe
battalionconsistedofGeorgeandHowBatteriesandKingBatteryofthe
FourthBattalionwerefired. Priorto1800allofItemBatteryandan
additionalpieceattachedtoGeorgeBatteryontemporaryloanfromthe
FourthBattalion,Twelfthr.arinesworeinpositionandKingBatterywas
releasedtotheFourthBattalion.
1Ifcrch,
TheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarinesreinforcedthefiresofthe
SecondBattalion,TwelfthMarinesuntil1800. Six(6)missionswerefired.
At1800theThirdBattalionwasgiventhemissionofreinforcingthefires
oftheFirstBattalion,TwelfthMarines. Theremainingtwopiecesarrived
inthtspositionareaandbyJl600the0^rational set-upwascomplete.
BarrageswereadjustedinftfontoftheNintehhMarines. HowHormalBarrage
wasfiredtwiceduringthefcigitof1-2Msxch* Harassingfireswerefired
duringthenight.
2March,19U5
TheThirdBattal^n,TwelfthMarinescontinuedtoreinforcethe
FirstBattalion,Twelfthbrines. Eleven(11)missionswerefiredduring
theperiod. FormalbarrageswereadjustedinfrontoftheHinthMarines
butwerenotfired. Harassingfirewasfiredduringthenightof2-3:
r
arch.
3March,19U5
TheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarinescontinuedtoreinforcethe
FirstBattalion,TwelfthKarinesduringtheperiod. Fourteen(lU)missions
werefiredduringtheperiod. Normalandemergencybarrageswereadjusted
infrontoftheftinthbrines. BothHowandItememergencybarragesware
calledforduringthonight. Eaarassingfireswerefiredduringthenight
of3-lJ-March.
kMarch,
TileThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarinescontinuedtoreinforcethe
FirstBattalion,TwelfthMarines'fir^s. Twelvemissionswerefiredduring
theperiod. Formalandemergencybarrageswereadjustedinfrontofthe
2'inthMarines. Harassingfireswerefiredduringthenight.
5 March, 9 5
George and FewBatteries displaced to new positions at Earget
area l6^. George and Mike at 0635. The displacement was conrolet^d at
1000 and the battalion registered oh check point # 1 at 1225. The mission
of the Third Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged during the period.
nineteen (19) missions vere fired during the period. Haurassing fires
were fired during the n$ght.
6March, 9 5
ThemissionoftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod. Two(2)missionswerefiredduringtheperiod.
7March,
ThemissionoftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod. One(!)infusionwasfired. Haffrapsingfireswerefired
duringthe
SMarch,
Themission$ftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod, rite(5)missionswerefiredandharassingfirewas
firedduringthenight* Twoofthesemissionswerefiredforthefourth
Division.
9Karch,
ThemissionoftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod. Five(5)missionswerefired. Harassingfireswere
firedduringthenight. OnemissionwasfiredfortheFourthDivision.
10torch,
ThemissionoftheThirdBattali6n,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod, F$ve($)missionswerefiredduringtheperiod.Har-
assingfireswerefiredduringthenight. Threeofthesemissionswere
fortheFourthDivisionandtwofortheFifthDivision.
11March,
ThemissionoftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod. Five(5)missionswerefiredduringtheperiod.Har-
assingfireswerefiredduringthenight*
12March,
ThemissionoftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod, jtwo(2)missionswerefiredfortheFifthDivision.
Harassingfireswerefiredduringthonight.
13March,
ThemissionoftheThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod. Two(2)missionswerefiredfortheFifthDivision.
Ik March, 9 5
The iid8sion. of %heThird Battalion, Twelfth Marines was unchanged
during the p^ridd. l?o missions were fi red.
15March,
ThemissionofthaThirdBattalion,TwelfthMarineswasunchanged
duringtheperiod. Nomissionswerefired. Thebattalionwasorderedto
secureat1300anddeliverflllammunitiontotheFourthBattalion,Twelfth
Marinesandembarkthenextdaywithallpersonnelandmaterielaboardthe
s.s. sm
PartIVComments.
A. Administration.
1. Casualties.
Woundedinaction.
One(l)officerandseven(7)enlisted.
Killedinaction. Fone
2. Themoraleofthisunitisexcellent. (Therapiddeliveryof
incomingmailandtheexpeditingofcensorshipSniforwardingofoutgoing
mailduringtheoperationwasagreatfactorinmaintaininganexcellent
stateofmorale. Theestablishmentofa"battaliongalleyandtheserving
ofhotmealsasearlyafterarrivalonthe"beachaspossiblefurtheraided
inmaintaininganexcellentstateofmorale.
B. Artillery.
1.Theloadingofthisbattalionwassatisfactory. 2achfiring
"batterywasloadedwiththeinfantry"battaliontheynormallysupported.
HeadquartersandServiceBatterywasdividedintotwosectionswhichwere
loadedwithtwoofthefiring"batteries.
2. Landingofthebattalionwasmadeunderdifficultconditions.
TheBattalionComir&nderandhispartyhadto"hitch-hike"fromtheshit)to
thebeachinordertomakethereconnaissanceforthebattalionposition
area. Onebatteryreconnaissancepartyhadtowaitandlandwiththe
batterybecausenoboatswereavailable, Thelandingofvehiclesandguns
wasveryslowduetothefactthenumberofboatsavailablewerenotprop-
erlyallocatedtotheshipsandalsosurfconditionswerebad,necessitating
useofLSTs,LSMsandXCTs. TheS-J+andBattalionMotorTransportOfficer
withguidesremainedonthebeachuntilallequipmenthadbeenlanded,and
wasreportedpresentinthe"battalionpositionarea. Hoequipmentwaslost
inthelanding.
3. Surveyforthoperationwassimple. HowandItemBattery
positionswerelocatedbyveryshorttraversefromGeorgeBattery, George
BatterywaslocatedbyRegiuentp.1surveypriortothearrivalofthe
battalionsurveyteam. Separateorientationlineswerelocatedforeach
battery.
h. Fireadjustmentswerebyairspotsandforwardobservers. All
basepointandcheckpointadjustmentswerebyairs^ot,howeverthiswas
nottosatisfactoryduetothedifficultyinidentificationofthecorrect
targetbytheairobserver,onth.eground. Inmostcasesadjustmentswere
slowduetothealtitudeatwhichtheobserverhadtoflyinordertore-
mainoutofrangeofanti-aircraft fire. Goodobservationpostswerenot
tobefoundinmostcasesuntilthelatterphases.
5. FiredirectionprocedureastaughtatFortSillandMarine
CorpsSchoolswasusedbythisbattalionandfoundadequatefortheoperation.
^
%
Organizationforcombatandtacticalemployment. Thisbattalion
wasorganizedforeither'directsupportorgeneralsup>ort. Theoperation
ordercalledforthisbattaliontogointogeneralsupportinitiallybecause
theTliirdMarineswereHireserve. Tacticalemployment forthisbattalion
wastoreinforcethefi*e$oftheFirstBattalion. However,generalsupport
missionswerefiredfrequently. Forwardobserverteamswerefurnishedto
theFirstandSecondPattalions,toreplacecasualtiesandoroviderelief
forthoseteams. *
7. Liaisonvftsmaintainedbyadirecttelephonelinefromthe
FireDirectionCenterpfthisbattaliontotheFire.DirectionCenterofthe
supportedbattalion, thissystemofliaisonwassatisfactory.
8 Communications. TheS.C.E.6lOradioisundesirableforfor-
wardobserversbecauseofitsbulk. Khencarriedbytwomen(twomanload)
theuseoftheradioisimpaired. Whencarriedonapack-board(oneman
load)itispracticallyimpossiblefortheradiooperatortokeepupwith
theforwardobserverforanydistanceatmorethanawalk. Thesetis
excellentsofarasoperationandoerformanceisconcerned. TheS.C.fc,
300,whichwasusedatGuam,provedtobetheidealforwardobserverset
consideringmobilityaswellasperformance. Aminimumofthree(3)fire
directionchannelsforforwardobserversisdesirable* Onefrequencydoes
notpermitsimultaneousshootingbyradio.
TheS.C.l,60Swasusedforairgroundcommunicationsandwas
satisfactory.
9* Observation.wasbyairspotandforwardobservers. Thisbat-
talionwasnotcalledontoestablishanobservationpost.
10.Personnel. Thisbattalion broughtforwardatotalofthirty-
four(3)officersandfourhundredandfifty-one(U5D enlistedforthe
operation. Thesefiguresrepresentatableoforganizationstrengthof
99$&officersand89$enlisted,whichincludestwo(2)officersontemporary
detacheddutywiththefleet,(airspot)andfive(5)enlistedpersonnel
temporarilyattachedtothisbattalion.
Thisorganizationsufferedatotalofeight(8)casualties,
consistingofone(l)officerandseven(7)enlisted,woundedinaction.
Moraleoftroopsenrouteandinactionwasexcellent. The
settingupofbatteriesgalleysasearlyaspossibleandpreparationand
servingofhotchowwasagreatfactorinestablishingandmaintaining
excellentmorale. Themoraleoftroopswasfurtherretainedinanexcellent
statebythespeedydeliveryofincomingmailandcensorshipofoutgoing
mail,bothbythemostexpeditiousmethods,throughouttheoperation.
TheBattalionCommandermadefrequentvisitstoeachbatteryandtalkedto
eachsectionaboutthesituationandtheeffectoftheartillery. TheS-2
periodicallygaveinformationtotheBattery3-xecutiveOfficervrhopassed
itontothecannoneers.
Personnelwasadequatetoachievethemissionassignedtothe
battalion,,however,ifthebattalionhadbeenplacedindirectsupport
therewouldhavebeenaseriousshortageofpersonnel. Personnelnormally
usedformaintaininginfantryartillerycomrminications,liaisonetc.,were
usedtoaugmentammunitionsections.
11.Ammunitionsupplywasgoodthroughouttheentireoperation
andtherewasnodelayingettingtheammunitionfromthebeachtothe
positionarea. Onseveraloccasionsthisbattalionwasorderedtode-
liverammunitiontootherdivisionartilleryregimentswhichmadeit
apoearthatcontrolonthebeachwasnotasefficientasitshouldhave
"been. Thisrequiresdoublehandlingbyammunitionsectionsandshouldbe
avoided. Ifthismustbedone,atleasttheorganizationreceivingthe
ammunitionshoulddoitsownhandling.
y transportationwasadequatefortheoperationalthough
onlyaboutho%ofthebattalionsvehicleswerecarriedintocombat.IMO
vehicleswereuriservicseblrforaperiodoflongerthantwenty-fourhours.
The6x6dumptruck,whichwasusedasaprime-mover,waenot
verysatisfactoryonthesandyterrainencounteredatIwoJima. Thesmall
bedlimitstheamountofammunitionthatcanbehauled. Byreplacingthe
smalltiresonthistruckwithalargerballoontypetire,itisbelieved
theperformance'"illbemuchimprovedineand.
TheT.D.-9bulldozer isnotheavyenoughfortheworkrequired
ina105howitzerbattalion, AT.D.-lU orT.D.-18wouldbemuchmore
satisfactory,
13. The.materielusedbythebattalionwasinexcellent condition
beforeenteringcombatandwasstillinexcellent conditionattheendofthe
operation. Minorrepairshadtobemadeonthegunswhichbattalionordnance
rectifiedinaveryshorttime. Careandupkeepofallmaterielwas stressed
dailyandcheckedbythebatteryandordnancepersonnel. Theslingforthe
105howitzerwassatisfactoryexceptwhenadjustedbytheshipscrew* Unless
carewastakentheon-carriagerangequadrantwasdamaged. Theguncrews
shoulddoallthenecessaryadjustment'softheseslingsandthespreaderbar
shouldbetwoincheslongertoreducethisdifficulty,
lU, Trainingdeficiencies,Jorthemissionassigned;none,
15 Mapsandphotosweresuppliedtothisbattalioninsufficient
quantitytofulfillourmission. However,tofunctionproperlyasadirect .^^
supportbattalionatleastIdmore1:20,000mapsand5more1:10,000photo
bookletswouldhavebeenneeded, 1:20,000mapsandseven1:10,000photobook-
letswerefurnishedthebattalion. Thephotobookletwasfound exceptionally
willsuitedfortheforwardobserverandshouldbeusedforallfuture
operations.
The1:20,000mapwasusedforthefiringchartandwassatis-
factory. Thecorrectionsforthemapwerefairlyconstantrange
U
K"of-f55
yardsper100anddef&iction"K
If
ofaboutleft10mils.
^* Enemyactionagainst ourartillery, None.
17# Supplyofallcommoditieswasgoodontheoperation, Thenew
"C"rationprovedaverysatisfactoryvariety, especiallywhenitwas suplement-
edbyfruitsandjuices. Withtheadditionofenoughlardfordoughnutsand
pastries,themenuwouldhavebeenascompleteaspossibleundercombat opera-
tions. Atleastonecabinetrangeperbatteryshouldbecarried,
18. Summaryofammunitionexpendituresbyitem,
Date M-l+8 M-5*+ M-57 M-62 Totalalltypes
27 FeSJ+5
1
23 2 25
28 Feb '1+5' U67 IO67 6 221+0
1 Mar 1+5' 1318 1200 150 2668
2 Mar 1+5
1
1300 1+19 127 18U6
3 Mar 1+5' 760 6ll+ 267 161+1
k Mar 1+5' 679 57U 223 IU76
5 Mar 1+5 120U 108U 7I+ 67 2U29
6 Mar 1+5
1
Ul+9 299 77 38 863
7 Mar U5
1
1807 12W+ 20 9 3080
8 Mar-1+5' 89*+ 862 17 1773
9 Mar 1+5
1
338 >+3 8 689
10 Mar 1+5
f
lUOl 1^33 115 31^9
11 Mar 1+5 I&+7 206 8 66l
12 Mar U5 ;+!+ 196 3 , -9+3
13 Mar 1+5' 209 1-3+ 5 3^+8
19. Summaryofammunition expendedbytypeoffiremission.
19. Firemissionsbytypesoofmission.
(Note:Dateindicatestimeperiodfrom1800-1800e.g.,26Febindicates
timeperiodfrom1800,26Febto1800,27Feb.)
Date Regist Prep Haras. Close General CounterBattery
ration Mission Supt. Supt. Missions
26Feb 25
27Feb
15 1557 609 29 30
28Feb
15 27UL, 20^ 55^
1Har
2379 77
116
93
285
2Mar 827
99
172 328
^Mar
989
181 226
UMax 372 106 328
63
3Mar
23 2707 365
88 90
6Mar
7
7Mar 902 292
6U5
8Mar
5^7 30
111
9Mar 101*1-
375 5
10Mar 72 1028
735
11Mar
19 k2k
12Mar 110
13Mar
T. R.
lUMar 1". T. R.
20* Effectivenessofartilleryfortheoperationwaspoc
ingthenumberofroundsexpendedonthenumberoftargets. Thenatureofthe
majorityofthetargetsfiredweresuchthatthe105had-verylittle
destructivevalue,however,itisbelievedthatexcellentresultswerereceived
fromastandpointofneutralizationandmoralefactors, (SeePart5,ParaA).
21. Tacticalemploymentofenemyartillery, Nocomment,
22
*ffypesfmaterielusedbyenemyartillery. Nocomment,
23. Effectivenessoenemyartillery. Nocomments.
2k. Methodsusedjlocateartillerytargetswereforwardobservers,
airspots,andtheuseofdo-darwhichwasoperatedbyhigherechelon.
C. Medical
1, Embarkation,
a. PersonnelconsistedoftheBattalionSurgeonand11corpsmen.
Thecorpsmenweredividedamongthebatteriesandwereaboardkships.
Personnelembarkedon10February,
b. MaterialconsistedofUnits5A,6,8,9,11A,Pharmacybox,
Plasma,andwateronajeepambulance;Units5B,6,7310,11B,lU,10day
supplies,Plasma,tentandnet,
2 AboardShip,
a. Sanitaryconsitionsaboardshipweresatisfactory. Ho
specialprecautionswerenecessary, Afewrecurrentmalariacasesoccurred,
requiredevacuation.QifaCABB dkSpontaneousPneumothoraxwasevacuated.
-g-.
Bebarka,'
3. Debarkation,
a. Personnel^
V
(1) On caU.
(2) Landedon2?Februaryandproceededtoapreviously-
assignedarea. 20men,onecorpsmanand2vehiclestoa"boat. Personne1
debarkedinLCM
1
SandLSM'S, Onecorpsmanwasinjuredwhiledescendingcargo
net, evacuated.
(3)Materiel:Bothvehi&lescameashoreon28Februaryin
goodcondition. Hosupplieswerelostorpilfered.
U, Ashore,
Thisbattalionwasnotintheassaultphase.
a. Battalion&idstationwassetupon28February,centrally
locatedincloseproximitytoaroad, Asmallaidstationand3corpsmen .
wereassignedtoeachfiringbattery, Apyrdmidal tentwasduginandsand
baggedandblackedoutatnight. Itwascoveredbyacamouflagenet,
b. Nopatientswerehospitalizedintheaid station.
c. Evacuation.wasaccomplishedbyambulanceto"E
f!
Medical
Company, 3dMedicalBattalion. Itwasrapidandefficient.
d. Casualties;Btreated,
1. Number: (8)
(a)Retained; (5)
(b)Bracuated:(3)
(c)Died: (0)
2. Type? 6shellfragmentand2gunshotwounds,
3. Walkingwounded: (6)
k. Stretchercases: (2)
e. Sanitationwasexcellent. Flieswereataminimum,
Dichloro-diphenyl-prichloroethane (DDT)waseffectiveinsprayingtheisland,
(l)Regularfieldrationswereadequateandthenewtype
rationwasanimprovement. WaterwasobtainedfromtheDivisiontfgcte,rPoint*
v
\ f. Therewerenoepidemics,nocasesofgastro-enteritis,
g. Themedicalorganizationofthebattalionwasadequateand
functionedefficiently. -
h. Medical,supplieswereadequate. However,therewasashout-
ageofmediaalBrandy.
5, Recommendations: Nochangesaredeemednecessaryinthem
organizationofthisbattalion.
PartVConclusionsa$drecommendations.
A,Conclusions,
1, Violationofrecognizedartillerymassedfireprinciples,
a. Onmanyoccassions,preparationswerefiredbythisunit ^
whicheachwasfiredonadiffereat targetarea,overarelativelylongp
oftime{15 to2Oninutea),ataslowrateoffire(2to3roundsperg&h
PartV.
A*1.a.Cont'd.
Thisisaviolationofawellestablishedartilleryprincipleofvolumeand
massof<fire. Such,artillerysupportingfiresshouldemploythemaximumrate
offire,themaximumnumberofguns,allmassedonaspecifictargetorarea.
Then,themassoffirenaybeshiftedsuccessivelytoeachtargetinits
relativeimportancetotheschemeofmaneuverofthesupportedtroops. This
maymeanconcentratedfiresupportinoneinfantrybattalionorregiment's
zoneofaction,tofurtheritsownattack,andnofiresupportorsubsequent
supportinanotherzone. However,itwillproducethemaximumeffectof
destruction,neutralization,shockandmpraleeffectonthatparticulartarget.
Thetwoeffectsmaybelikenedtowoundingamaninmanyplaceslightlywitha
"scatter"shotgun,orhittinghimsquarelyinthechestandkillinghim,with
afullchokeshotgun.
2, Organizationforcombat.
a. Attimes,somedoubtexistedinthisunitastoexactlywhat
ourmissionwas. Thatis,whetherwewereingeneralsupportorinare-
enforcingmission,subjecttofiredirectionbyanotherbattalion.-
b. Reliefforwardobserverteamswerecalledfordirectlyby
otherartillerybattalions,ra&herthanatthedirectionofahighercoord-
inatingagency,theartilleryregiment.
3. Thelargestfieldpieceusedagainsttheenemywasthe155
millimeterhowitzerofVCorpsArtillery. Itisbelievedthatalarger
fieldpiecewithmoreweightofprojectileandhigherterminalvelocity
isnecessarytobreachanddestroythetypesoffortificationsencountered
atIwoJima.
B.Eecommendations.
1. Itisrecommendedthatartilleryfirebeplacedontheenemyby
themassingofallpossiblefires,forshorterperiodsoftimeandathigher
ratesoffire,inonearea,and,ifnecessaryshiftingtootherareasin
succession,ratherthan"scattering"artilleryfireacrossawideanddeep
area,ataslowrateoffire. Thatisparticularlyapplicablewhereenemy
troopsarenotintheopen,andeffectoflightartilleryfiremustbeshock
andmoraleeffectproducedbymassandvolume,ratherthanphysicaldestruci
tion,
2. Itisrecommendedthatspecificmissionsandtimeextentofsame
beassignedbyartilleryregimentstobattalionsnotindirectsupport,and,
thatforwardobserverteamsofartillerybattalionsnotindirectsup-oort
beemployedunderthedirectionoftheartilleryregiment,andnotby
agreementbetweentwoorthreebattalioncommanders.
3. Itisrecommendedthat,whereverJapanesefortificationsofthe
typeencounteredatIwoJimamustbebreachedratherthanby-passed,field
niecesofsuitablestrikingpowerbeincludedinthelandingforce. The8-
inchHowitzer,8-inchGain,or$4-0millimeterHowitzershouldbeconsidered
forspecifictasks. Thisdoesnotconstitutearecommendationthatthis
typeofweaponbeadoptedasorganicartillery,but.onlywhereitisknown
aheadoftimethatheavyfortificationsmustbedestroyedorrenderedin-
operativebylargecaliberweaponswithheavyhittingpower.
A.1.B0W53R,Jr.
-10-
n
t
12thMar,3dMarDiv,
oFPO,SanFrancisco.
k.April,
From: TheCommandingOfficer.
To: TheCommandingOfficer,,12thMarines.
Subject; ActionSeport,IwoJimaoperation.
Reference: (a)DivisionGeneralOrdgr#137.
I* Summary
A. TheUthBattalion,12thMarines,on22January,19**5tre-
ceivedtheoperationorderforIwoJima. Theoperationwascompletedon1
3,'The^thBattalion,12thMarineswasassignedthemission
ofageneralsuppprtartillerybattalionforthe3
d
MarineDivision. TheUth
Battalionwasembarkedaspartofthe3&EmbarkationG-roup,TransportDivision
33,on10February,19*+5, ThebattaliondebarkedatIwoJimaat1130on27
February119ty? *ebattalionpositionareawasselectedimmediatelyandreg-
istrationwascompletedby1715* On28February,19^5twelvehowitzerswere
ashoreandfiringasgeneralsupportforthe3&Marine^Division. On28Febnt*
ary,X9^5tliebattalionwas.assignedthemissionofreinforcingthe2dBat-
talion,12thMarines, Daringtheoperationthisbattalionexpended23,^13
rounds.
II* Preliminaries
A. Compositionofcommand* .
(1)H($ServBattery,105nunhowitzerbattalion,
(2)Battery
n
|C
n
,105mmhowitzerbattalion,
(3)Battery "L
n
,105mmhowitzerbattalion,
W Battery"M
11
,105mmhowitzerbattalion.
B. Thetrainingprogramforthe^thBattalion,12thMarineswas
plannedbythe.battalionandhigherechelonsothatthenecessarytrainingfor
combatwasaccomplished. Thisincluded:
(1)Tworegimentalfiringproblems.
(2)Two"battalionfiringproblemsperweek.
(3)Onedivisioncommandpostexercise,
(4)Threeconditioningmarchesoffive,seven,andtenmiles.
(5)Instructionofcommunicationpersonnelonnewlyacquired
SCft-6lOandSCB-6O8radios.
(S)Preparationofunitpersonnelandtonnagetables,
(7)Indoctrinationofessentialpersonnelonpending'oper-
ationofIwoJima.
(S)practicecombatloadingofvehiclesuntildesiredloa-
dingwasattained.
(9)Instruction.onandwaterproofingofvehiclesandradios.
C.- Themissionoftheh%hBattalion,12thMarineswastoland
oncallonabeachtobedesignated,ingeneralsupportofthe3&MarineDi-
vision.
D. _Oncallfromthe12thMarineHegimontitwasplannedtoland
tworeconnaissanceparties,eitherofwhichwas_capableofexecutingacomplete
reconnaissancemission. ThisincludedsettinguptheJ^jsJDirectionCenter,
IwoJimaOperation (continued)
v
surveyandcommunicationsfor.the"battalion* Thesetworeconnaissanceparties
wereembarkedpndifferentships. Radiocommunicationwastobeestablished
"betweenreconnaissancepartiesandthefiringbatteriesuponentranceintothe
transportarea. Itwasplannedthatthefiringbatterieswouldlandoncall
bythebattalioncommanderandbemetatthebeachbyguideswhowouldconduct
themtosurveyedpositions. Registrationwastobecompletedbyairspoton
requesttoregiment. Thefiringbatteriesweretolandwithfiftyroundsper
gunintheprimemovers'andammunitionwastobebuiltandmaintainedattwo
unitsoffire,
*** Chronologicalaccountoftheaction (timezoneKing-10)
26February,19U5
2300-TheBattalionCommanderoftheUthBattalion,12thMarinesreceiveda
copyoftheordertoTransportDivision33whichstatedthatTransport
Division33
w
astobepreparedtodebarkallelementsofthe12thK
rinesonorderafterO73Oon#7February,19^5
27February,19U5
HeavyseasmadeitimpossibletouseLCVPs,andonlyICMscouldbeused
tolandthebattalion,
OS3O*Radiocommunicationwasestablishedwithregimentandwith,allunitsof
theUthBattalion.
1130-TheBattalionCommanderandhisreconnaissanceparty,accompaniedby
thebatterycommandersandtheirreconnaissanceparties,landedon
beachblackandweremetattheShorePartyCornmand.Postbyaregimen-
talguide, ThepartywasdirectedtotheRegimentalCommandPost,
TheExecutiveOfficerfthe12thMarinesthenshowedtheBattalion
Commanderhispositionareainwhichsurveycontrolhadbeenestablish
edbytheregimentalsurveysection.
135*3-KingBatteryreportedtwohowitzersinpositionreadytofire,
I5U5-Airspotbeganregistration.
1715rRegistrationcompleteonthreecheckpoints.
23OO-KingBatteryreportedremainderofhowitzersinpositionreadytofire.
Nofiremissionswereassignedthebattalionforthenight. Ammunition
washauledallnightand1000roundswerebroughtin. Also5^0rounds
werGhauledtothe13thMarines,5thMarineDivision,
Throughoutthedayenemyshellsfellinthearea. Thefirwasspor-
adicandno.damagewasdone,
.MikeandLoveBatterieswereunabletoland, Therewasahighsurf
;>whichmadeitimpossibletouseLCVPsandsufficientLCHsworenot
available. Radiocommunicationwasmaintainedbetweenbattalionand
MikeandLoveBatteries, , .
Attheendofthedaythebattalionhadthefollowingequipmentashore?
UHowitzers,105mm
UTruck,2^-ton,6x6,dump
1Tractor,Tfr*9,w/ad
Truck,^-ton,radio
3Truck,l~ton*cargo
t
1Trailer,1-ton,2wheel,3^0gallon,water
2Trailer,1-ton,2wheel,cargo .
1Trailer,-J^ton,2-wheel,cargo
28February,
y g
Tiremissionswereassignedthisbattalionbythe3&3attalion,12th
,'Marinesuntil1300, .
0715-KingBatteryfiredpreparationreinforcingthefiresofthe2dBattalion,
12thMarinesforanattackbythe3&MarinoDivision, 7^9roundswere
expended.
1200-KingBatteryfiredpreparationforanattackbythe3&MarinoDivision.
196roundswereexpended.
f l
- 2 -
rt,IwoJimaOperation (continued)
1300-2JheBattaliontookoveritsownfiredirectionandwasassignedthe
missionofreinforcingthe2dBattalion,12thMarines,
-Onehowitzerwasloanedtothe3dBattalion,12thMarinestocomplete.
oneoftheirbatteries.,
1500-KingBatteryfiredapreparationinsupportof*anattack"bythe3dMa-
rineDivision, 217roundswereexpended,
1710-LoveBatteryreportedinpositionreadytofire.
1800-Ammunitiononhand12^2rounds* 12C2roundsexpended.
IS30-MikeBatteryreportedinpositionreadytofire.
1915-Fourrocket"bombsfellinfrontofposition. Therewasnodamage.
2100-2U00-Battalionfiredharassingfire. *
Organizationofthebattalionpositionwascompleted"bytheendofthe
day.
1March, 9^
0000^0600iHarassingfirebybattalion. From2100to0600,100roundsexpended.
0700-RegisteredLoveBatteryonCheckPoint10byairspot; "Registrationcom-
pletedatO726, 19roundsoxpendod.
0731~RegisteredMikeBatteryonCheckPoint10byairspot. Registrationcom-
pletedat0750 ^roundsexpended,
0820-Battalionfiredpreparationfor3&MarineDivision, Preparationcom-
pletedat0559
1
II3Uro'undsexpendod.
O925.-Battalionassignedharassingfires. Harassingfirescompletedat
2V7roundsexpended.
102S-OnassignmentbyB~3firedonenemymortarsinTA23^-U. Missioncom-
pletedat1O33 26roundsexpensed.
-Fire,mission.Concentration70*2,enemymortarsinTA21S-G-andH,fired
battalion. Missioncompletedat10U6 60roundsexpended,
1130-AmmunitiononhandU672rounds. 160Sroundsexpended.
1223-BattalionfiredpreparationinTA217-C. Preparationcompletedat1255*
571roundsexpanded.
1305-Battalionfiredharassingfirein$&2 3 M L HarassingfirecompletedaV-
1^30 52roundsexpended*
v
I6U5~Battalionfiredpreparationin235-W*Xiandfy.preparationcompleted
at1600. ^36roundsexpended,
3-T55*.Towenemyshellslandedinarea. Estimatedtobe75caliber, Nodamage*
1800-Ammunitiononhand^-197rounds, 3U97roundsexpended.
18*4-0-.BattalionfiredharassingfireinA21S-3andG-onConcentrations
and70^. Harassingfirecompletedat1900* IZkroundsexpended.
19Q0-Handirectwireto2d.Battalion,12thl.'arines.
1910-RegisteredKingBatteryonnormalbarrageinTA21S-I. Registration
Completedat1915* 16roundscccponded.
1920-2U00-Mike-Battpryfiredharnssingfiresin!CA210-D,H,O,andK.
2Marchj
0000-0600-Harassingfires. 160roundsexpended, \
O1H5-Firemissionassignedby2dBat^lion,12thMarines, EnemytanksInTA
2l9-L(Ff). Missioncompletedat0153. 171roundsoxpended.
O75O-BattalionfiredonpreparationinU?A21S-0,H,andCatmaximumrateof
fire. Preparationcompletedat.0Sl5. 1073rotoidsexpended,
.0905-HarassingfireLoveBatteryon3?A2^.S-D*Harassingfirecompletedat
10*47, 9^roundsexpended* .
HarassingfireKingBatteryon93A235-U. HarassingfirecompletedatIO56
S2roundsexpended. '
v
-IoveBatteryfiredonenemymortarsin5?A218-0. Missioncompileted'at
1050. 39roundsexpended.
1050-BattalionfiredonenemyfieldpiecesinTA235-X,S,and'-f
m
Mission
completedat1110, 3^roundsexpended.
1200-BattalionfiredonentrenchedenemyinTA219-rP Missionwasnotcom-
/ pletedandbattalionwasshiftedtoanothermission, kroundsexpended.
ort , Ivro Jima Opcraton (continued)
1230- Battalionfiredon enemyartillerypiecesinTA 235~tfMissioncom-*
" pletedat 12^7
#
fO roundsexpended,
I323- Battalionfired'harassingfireinTA 219~(r. Harassingfirecompleted
at1325* 67 roundsexpended, .
I3U0- Battalionfiredon rocketlaunchers. Missioncompletedat IU07.32
roundsexpended.
- BattalionfiredpreparationinTA 21.9-P,tf,anV.Preparationcom-
pletedat IU5U, gHUroundsexpended.
1500*Howitzer,loanedto 3&Battalion,12thMarinesi*asreturned,
I615- Threeenemyartilleryshellslandedon rightflankofposition,Ho
damage.
1800- Ammunitiononhand3055rounds* 2902roundsexpended.
190^- RegisteredKingBatteryonnormal"barrageinHA 235~P. Registration
completedat 193^* 3-5roundsexpended,
1935- RegisteredKingBatteryon emergency"barrageinTA 23^-R. Registration
completedat 1937 7roundsexpended.
1938- RegisteredLoveBatteryonnormalbarrageinTA 235-R.,Registration
completedat 2002. jj>roundsexpended.
2003~RegisteredloveBatteryon emergency"barrageinTA235-X. Registration
completedat 2008. 5roundsexpended.
2009- RegisteredHikeBatteryon normal"barrageinTA 218-3), Registration
complete^at 2010, 5roundsexpended.
2127- HashRed.
2151- PlashtMte.
2210-2^00- HarassingfiresinTA 235-P,TA 21S-II,"byKingandMikeBatteries,
3 March,
0000-0600- Harassingfire. !+5rounds,smoke,expended,
0215~lipvoBatteryfiredon enemymortarsmountedon-tankinTA35
\'*.Missioncompletedat 0220, 7^roundsexpended. Forwardobservers
laterobservedtankshad"beendestroyed,
0227rWikbBattery.fifodon enemymortarsinTA 21S-D, Missioncompletedat
0232. 23 roundsexpended,
02^+5**LoveBatteryfiredon enemymortarsin TA 235^^(S). Missioncompleted,
at'0259* 7^roundsexpended.-
0259^KingBatteryfiredon enemymortarsinTA 235~? Missioncomplct6dat
O315..20roundsexpended.
0300- IfQVeBatteryfiredon encnyfieldpieceinTA235^^(S). Missioncom-
pletedat 0312, 7^- roundsdepended.
03IS- KingBatteryfiredon enemymortarsinTA 23M?(KB). Missioncompleted
atO33O, 6roundsexpended, ' . ,
0U05- LoveBatteryfired.onencny. mortarsinTA 235-X(S),Missioncompleted
at0^15.77 roundsexpended,
0^+05- MikeBatteryfiredon enemymortarsinTA 21S-D. Missioncompletedat
0^15* 2^roundsexpended.
O63O- Battalionfiredpreparationon TA 21S~S
#
T, andM. Preparationcom>-
pletcdat O7^5 933roundsexpended,
O&55*LoveBatteryfiredatenemyfieldpieceinTA 23^-R. Missioncompleted
atP9O0, 26 rounds/expended. -
0855- KingBatteryfiredharassingfirein TA 235-*RandQ,Missioncompleted
atO926. HUroundsexpended,
1010- RadiooperatoronLoveBatteryforwardobservationteam"badlywounded
andevacuated.
1010- LoveBatteryfiredon enemyfieldpieco. Missioncomnletodat1015.
Zrounds,smoke,expend6cL '' .
1029- Love3attcryfiredon enemycounter-attackinTA 235-P(^ Mission
completed, 119roundsexpended.
I33O- OnemanLoveBatteryforwardobservationteamseriouslywounded and
evacuated.
- BattalionfiredpreparationinTA 219-K,P, andT* preparationcompleted
at1500, 25Oroundse'xpended.
,-A
ort,IwoCTimaOperation(continued)
1S00- Ammunitiononhand2l6lrounds. 1^62round?expended.
IS30- AsergeantonKingBatteryforwardobservationteamwasinjured
slightly.
1923*2^00- BattalionfiredharassingfireinTA 219-PandIT.
LoveBatteryfurnishedaninemanforwardobservationteamto the2d
Battalion,12thMarinesas areliefteam.
kMarch,
OOOO-06OO- Harassingfire. 137roundsexpended*
02^6- Battalionfiredat rocketlaunchersinTA 235-1, Missioncompleted
atO2J5O. 50roundsexpended. . .
0S15..*- SergeantonKingBatteryforv/ardobservationteamwoundedajidevacua-
ted. Anotherman slightly'wounded.
1130- Battalionfiredpreparationin TA 202-A,TA 219-UandP. Preparation
completedat 1200. 10^1roundsexpended.
1230- BattalionfiredpreparationinTA 219-U,Vandty.Preparationcompleted
at125S, U^9roundsexpended,
1320- Forwardobservationpartyreturningin truckhitlandmine. Onlyminor
injuries.
1620- Battalionfiredharassingfirein TA 219-^,P, andR, Missioncompleted
at1700. k2kroundsexpended.
1S00- Ammunitiononhand2719rounds, 23^0roundsexpended.
1S00- LoveBatteryfirednormal"barrageinTA 235-5,S,andW. Barragecom-
pletedat 1S01. 6roundsexpended.
- KingandMikeBatteriesfiredharassingfiroin TA-219-U,
DuringthedaytwoforwardobserverteamsweresentforwardfromMike-
andKingBatteriesto relieveourotherforwardobservers.
5March, ^
0000-0600- Harassingfire, 322roundsexpended,
0120~Love^'BatteryfirednormalbarrageinTA 235-T(SW),Missioncompleted
at0125-. Sroundsexpended,
O915- BattalionfiredonTA 219-W. Missioncompletedat 095^, 23 rounds
expended,
1220- Afieldpiecelocatedin TA 21S
T
O,"
1237- KingBatteryfiredon enemyfieldpiecein TA 218-0, Missioncompleted
at1320. 22roundsexpended*
12^5- LoveBatteryfiredon enemyfieldpieceinTA 21S-0(8). Missioncom-
pletedat lU^O. 37 roundsexpended. ,
1H20-*MikeBatteryfiredharassingfireinTA.219-U, Missioncompletedat
1^5- 7roundsexpended.
lkk$- KingBatteryregisteredon Checkoint12 inTA 219-W, Registration
completedat 1500, 9' roundsexpended,
1700- BattalionregisteredinTA_219-P. Registrationcompletedat 1715.-
15roundsexpended.
1720- Battalionregisteredin-TA219-0. Registrationcompletedat 1755*
3roundsexpended,
1S00- AmmunitiononhandkOSk. 567roundsexpended.'
Ical5- LoveBatteryregisterednormalbarrageinTA 21S-T. Registrationcom-
pletedat IS30, 13 roundsexpended. "
;
i :(
IS30- MikeBatteryregisteredon normalbarrageinTA 21>-K(Stf). Registration
completedat 1S55 9roundsexpended. .
1915/KingBatteryregisteredforharassingfirein TA 219-U. Registration
completedat 192O. 19-roundsexpended,
1920- lioveandMikeBatteriesfiredonrocketsinTA 21S-T. Missioncompleted
at1955* ^3 roundsexpended.
2O3O-2UOO- KingandLoveBatteries'firedharassingfireonTA219-U("0),
TA21S-T .{m) andTA21S-P. , . ' '
Duringthe *dayLoveBatteryforwardobservertearnrelievedbynew
forwardobserverteam.
6March, .3
OOOO-O6OO- Harassing f i r e . 3S2 rounds expended.
ort,IwoJimaOperation (continued)
0800- Battalion fired preparation in $AZl^V* "SIV <4,and/wV Preparation
completed at 093^* 17.^2rounds.expended, - . "
O9HO- King Battery fired harassing fi re in IA219-T(W)
#
-Harassing fi re
completed at-I3U0*. 513rounds expended; *
1030- Love Battery fired on enemy field piece in IA2lS-! (SB). Mission com-*
pleted atlO^S.
k
13rounds expended*
1050- love Battery ired on enemy activity in 5A219-K($0 Mission-completed
at 11Q5 22 rounds escpended,
H30 ~ Mike Battery registered on Check Point 12using high angle fi re inTA
2 1 9 ^ kegistration completed at 1230.13rounds expended-.
IUI40- Battalion fired preparation in $A, 219-L(tf), EA219-P(B), and$A219-7
00. , preparation Completed at 1*4*? 33^rounds expended.
1515- King i at t ery fired harassing f i r e' i n 5?A219^7and tf. Harassing fire
completed at 1533* 72rounds- expended^
1600- Mike Battery registered on CheckPoint 12 in TA219~TJ
#
Registration
completed at l658 25rounds expended, -
l60b - Love Battery fired on enemy mortars in $A219-P( ^ ) using high angle
fire. . Mission, completed at 1630, 23rounds expended.
1655- Love Battery fired onmortars in ISA219-(i
t
Mission completed at 165S. '
3.rounds expended,
1706 - King Battery fire4 harassing fi re in TA219-TT(iTlf).^ Harassing fire com-
pleted at 1710* Urounds expended,
1800- Love Battery registered, normal "barrage in tA 21&-E(SB). Registration
completed at 1330. IS rounds expended
1O0^Ammunition onhand kO"J%
m
2227 rounds expended,
I8 -^Mike Battery registered normal "barrage in TA21?rP (It). Hegistration
completed at 1846
#
7.rounds expended.
- King Battery registered normal "barrage in T&218~C 'Eeg^stration conw-
pleted at 195^. 17 rounds expended.
During the dayMike Battery relieved forward o"bseryer teams withnow
teams. * - . ' , ' . '
0010- King Battery fired harassing fi re in UA219-L( ^ . Harassing fi re com-
pleted at 0012, 12 rounds expended,
1800-Ammunition onhand U277 rounds, 5^ rounds expended.
1800* Love Battery registered normal "barrage in TA219r^# Registration coin-
ploted at 1820. 11 rounds expended
1820 Mike Battery registered on normal "barrage in H?A?1.9*L
tration completed at 1830* 29 rounds expended,
I83O King Battery registorcd on normal "barrage in TA219-F. Registration
completed at 18H0. Uorounds expended,
1900- King Battery registered emergency "barrage in $A219-3P (W), Segis*-
tration completed at 193O 5 rounds.expended.
SO0-2l*00- Mike Battery fired harassing fi re in EA2J6-W, Til219-CT, H, andS
#
8 March>
3 -Harassingfire, '297roundsexpended,
w
07^0-BattalionfiredpreparationintDA219-I*iRandV, Preparationcom-
pletedat0800. 69Oroundsexpended,
O83O-KingSattcryregistcited"byairspotonCheckPoint12in.TA219-Wwith
highanglefire. RegistrationcompletedatlOOQ* 2kroundsexpended,
1100-LoveBatteryregistered"byairspotonChockPoint12, Registration
completedat1222, 12rounds
1
expended,.
1300-KingBatteryfiredonenemymortarsin$A21SMT, Missioncompletedat
13O5,"USroundsexpendpd. '
1321KingBatteryfiredonenemymortarsinTA219-H, Missioncompletedat
1325, 12roundsexpended,
-BattalionfiredonenemymortarsinTA219-D. Missioncompletedat
1^30, 73roundsexpended, ,
^^womenwerekilledandonewoundedonMikeBatteryforwardobservation
team.
1500- Love Battery fired on suspect rocket launcher onKamaRock. Mission
completed at 153^* 20 rounds expended,
- - b
ort,IwoJimaOperation (continued)
17^3-loveBatteryregisteredonnormal"barrageinTA219~B(S),Regis-
trationcompletedatI9U8. 6Sroundsexpended,
1800-Ammunitiononhand2393rounds. 12U5roundsexpended.
X95S--MikeBatteryregisteredonnormal"barrageinTA219-3(S),Regis-
trationcompletedat^SllO. hroundsexpended,
2030-BattalionfiredonenemyrocketsinTA219-S, Missioncompletedat
20^5. ^0roundsexpended.
2656.-KingBatteryregisteredonnormal"barrageinTA219-V(B),Regis-
trationcompletedat2100. 2kroundsexpended.
-KingandloveBatteriesfiredharassingfireinTA219~S,C,and
.'H.' .
-KingandloveBatteriesreportrocketsfallinginare#. Hodamageas
rocketsdidnotexplode.
DuringthedayloveBatteryforwardobservationteamwasrelieved"by
2dBattalion,12thMarines.
9March,
0000-0600 -Harassing f i r e. 227 rounds expended,
OHIO- Slash Red.
0^56 ~ Hash Blue* Condition reen.
0510 *'Hash ^ i t e ,
O7OO-BattalionfiredpreparationinTA236-U,TA219-G-and3.Preparation
completedat0710. 33^roundsexpended.
O736-BattalionfiredonrocketinTA219-0. Missioncompletedat0807. 33I4.
roundsexpended.
09^5-MessagefromloveBattery, 'fiverocket"bombswhichfellinareaat
containednoexplosive;justfiringmechanism,
1125-loveBatteryfiredonrocketinT*i219-'^. Missioncompletedat
63roundsexpended.
1330-KingBatteryfiredonenemymortarsinTil21S-T(3). Missioncompleted
at13^0. 73roundscxpended,
l'33O-MikeBatteryfiredonenemymortarsinTA236-I. Missioncompletedat
13^0. 58roundsexpended,
llfOO-KingBatteryfiredonenemymortarsinTA219-2)andB, Hissioncom-
pletedat1U3O. 28roundsexpended.
lUOO.loveBatteryfiredharassingfireTA236-A. Harassingfirecompleted
at1S00, Ul2roundsexpended.
1^15-MikeBatteryfiredharassingfireinTA ?51
W
P. Harassingfirecom- -
' pletedat1500..Uroundsexpended.
IU30-MikeBatteryregisteredinTA219-0. Registrationcompletedat1500.
26roundsexpended.
I63O-MikeBatteryregisteredonnormal"barrageinTA219-0. Registration
completedat1700, 10roundsexpended,
1702MikeBattoryregisteredonemergency"barrp.geinTAvjG-'U*Registration
completedat1717* 7roundsexpended.
1730-King'Batteryregisteredonnormal"barrageinTA2^6-X(S^O, Registra-
tioncompletedat.I7U5. 13roundsexpended.
1S00-Ammunitiononhand2926rounds. 1252roundsexpended.
1SOO-*2UQO-BattalionfiredharassingfireinTA219-D,Tii235-?,TA236-A,0,
1,U
t
-WandX. .' . . " . ' ' " '
Tworemainingforwardobservationteamsrelievedby2dBattalion,12th
Marines.
10 March,
T
0000^0600 - Harassing f i r e. U21 rounds expended.
O75O-'Battalion fired preparation in TA235~C
r
-
n
&$ "Preparation completed
at 0S20. U73 rounds expended.
0805 - Battalion fired preparation in TA202-tf (SB) and (IE), and TA1S5-E.
Preparation completed at 0S20. ^77 rounds expend.ed.
0S50 -*King Battery fired normal barrage In TA236-X^and TA,219^-. Mission
-completed at OS55* 11 rounds expended.
#JHeport,IwoJimaOperation(continued)
O915- KingBatteryfire'demergency"barrageinTA219~B. Missioncompleted
at0932* 37roundsexpended*
I6U9- LoveBatteryfirednormal"barrageinTA235~^ Missioncompletedat
1709. 10roundsexpended.
1800- Ammunitiononhand2^03rounds. 1U39roundsexpended,
2200-2U00- KingBatteryfiredharassingfireinTA235-BandC.
2223-2U00- LoveBatteryfiredharassingfireandnormal"barrageinTA235-2.
11March,19U5
0000-0600- Harassingfire. US2roundsexpended.
0S20- Battalionfiredpreparation"in5?A235-C,D,H,I,L,!
r
,andIT.Prepar
tioncompletedat0855 85Sroundsexpended.
OS5S~KingBatteryfiredharassinginTA235-A. Harassingfirecompletedat
0920. 101roundsexpended.
1730- KingBatteryfired, normalbarrageinTA236-G. Missioncompletedat
1800. 76roundsexpended. '
1800- Ammunitiononhand2055rounds. 1UU3roundsexpended,
20U5-2U00- MikeBatteryfiredharassingfireinTA
12March,19U5
0000-0600~Harassingfire. 35
1
roundsexpended.
O63O- Love3atteryfiredharassingfireinTA250-'^ Harrassingfirecompleted
atIO3O. 69roundsexpended.
1635- LoveBatteryfirednormal"barrageinTA251-K. Missioncompletedat
16U0, Uroundsexpended.
I70U- KingBatteryregisteredfordefensivefireinTA23&-G. Registration
completedat1720. 13roundsexpended.
1SO0- Ammunitiononhand12W+rounds. 53-3roundsexpended.
1SU0- KingandLoveBatteriesfire* harassingfireinTA251-KandTA236-L.
Harassingfirescompletedat2215. 110roundsexpended.
2100- KingBatter:- firedonenemyactivityinT^236-L(ITW), Missioncompleted
at2103 8roundsexpended.
13
3
March,I9U5
0130- LoveBatteryfiredonenemyactivityinTA2^1~ICandTA2^6-L, Mission
completedat0137 2Uroundsexpended.
lUOO- MikeBatteryfiredharassingfireinTA?51~0
u
. Harassingfirescompleted
at1700, U3roundsexpended.
1710- KingBatteryregisterednormal"barrageinTA236-L. Registration
pletcdat1725. l6roundsexpended.
1730** LoveBatteryregisteredonnormalbarrageinTA219-D. Registration
completedatlfU5- 5roundsexpended.
1S00- Ammunitiononhand1?UUrounds, 206remdsexpended.
1900-2U0O- KingandLoveBatteriesfiredharassingfireinTA219-D.
lUB-larch,I9U5
OOOO-O63O- Harassingfire. 10Sroundsexpended,
1300Battalioncommanderandreconnaissancepartyonreconnaissancein
TA199, T A200
f
and.TA217fornewbattalionpositionrvrca.
1S00- AmmunitiononhandII3Srounds. 100roundsexpended,
15March,
1S00- Ammunitiononhand3^5^rounds. IToroundserpendec
1
.,
20^8- IslandofIwoJimaofficiallydeclaredsecurent1200,lUMarch,19U5:
16March,I9U5
0710~3attalionfirepreparationin3JA_251-^. Preparationcompletedat0825,
I3OOroundsexpended, .
I73O- Thisbattalionwasorderedtorelievothe2dBattalion,12thMarines
ofdirectsupportof21stMarines. Liaisonwasestablishedwith
?lstMarinesbythebattalionliaisonofficer. Oneforwardobser-
verandoneliaisonofficerwasassignedtoGm)mmLi^mtTy^battalion.
ort, IwoJiraaOperation(continued)
Communicationofthe?dBattalion,12thKarinestothe21st!'nrinos
wastakenover"bythis"battalion.
1S00--dBurranitiononhandUi^orounds. 1300.roundsexpended.
IS55~Registrationofnormal"barrageinTA51~E 3roundsexpended. Regis-
trationcancel;led, - , *,
1,7March,19U5
OSOO-Threeofficersand100enlistedmenofthis"battalionembarkedforGuam.
Therewerenofiremissionsassignedthis"battalionduringthe.period.
ISMarch,
OSOO-Liaisonofficerswiththeinfantrybattalionswerereleased"by21st
Marines, 21stiarinesbeganpatroloperations.Oneforwardobserver
wasattachedtoeach"battalion.
Therewerenofiremissionsassignedthisbattalionduringtheperidd.
19March,I9U5
There were no fire missions assigned this "battalion during the period.
20March, 1ftIff . . .
There were no fire missions assigned this battalion during the period.
21 harch, 19U5 . <
1550Thisbattalionreleasedofdirectsupportof21stMarines,revertingto
generalsupportforthedivision. Allforwardobserversandliaison
officersweresecured* Trunklinetothe21stMarinesrelayedto
the9^hMarinesswitchboard. . .
Therewerenofiremissionsassi/nedthisbattalionduringtheperiod.
22March,I9U5-ggMarch,
Battalioningeneralsupportofthedivision.Hofiremissionsassigned.
26March,I9U5
1500-Receiveddivisionoperationorder,31-^5directing"thisbattaliontoor-
ganizea?00manmobilereservetobeemnloyedasinfantryincaseof
enemybreakthrough, !5achbatteryorganiseda50nanplatoonwithan
officerincharge. KingbatteryCommanderwasassignedasofficerin
charge. Reconnaissancewasmadetoroutesintoforwardareas,
Battalioningeneralsup-oortofdivision.Hefiremissionsassigned.
27March,
ff
Bat t al i on in general support of di vi si on, Fo f i r e missions assigned.
28 March,. I9U5 .
Bat t al i on in'general sup-nort of . division, l
T
o f i r e missions assigned,
2005 - Plash Red; " .
201U ^ Plash '"Elite, .
29Karch,
Battalioninposition,
30March,.19U5
Battalioninposition,
2000-PlashRed.
2010-PlashWhite.
31, liarch,
2100-ReceivednessasgefromCO,2dEchelon,3&MarineDivisionreleasingthis
battalionfromtacticalartillerysup-portofgrounddefenseforce,and
tobegin preparationforembarkation. KoT^ilereservewasmaintained.
Battalioninposition. '"'
Report,IwoJimaOperation(continued.)
0800-BeganembarkationofequipmentforreturntoGuam.
IV. Comments
A. Administration
(1) This"battalionsuffered23casualtiesduringtheoperation
Threepersonswerekilledandtwentywounded. CasualtiesHerereportedtothe
R-l"bytheBn-1astheyoccurred,andpersonnelstrengthreportsweresubritted
dailywiththeUnitReport. Initialdispatcheswere,preparedby(r-landampli-
fyingairmailgramsprepared"bytherearechelon.
(2) Moraleoftroopswasexcellantthroughouttheoperation.
Mailwasreceivedshortlyafterlandingandcontinuedtobereceivedeverysecond
orthirdday. Anumberofbooks,playingcards,candy,etc,wasreceivedfrom
theDivisionAthleticandMoraleSectionandtheAmericanRedCross,anddistri-
butedtopersonnelofthebattalion. Themoviesfurnishedinthelaterphases
oftheoperationprovidedneededentertainmentandwerecertainlyappreciated.
(3) ^"oprisoners,nativesorcivilianswerehandledbythis
battalion.
B. Intelligence
(1) Mapsandphotosfurnishedbeforetheoperation.
(a) Specialairandgunnerytargetmap,1:20,000,2
sheets,10copies.
(b) Specialairandgunnerytargetmap,1*10,000,10
;
"", copies.
(c) Situationmap,1:10,000,5Copies.
(d) SpecialM r.andgunnerytargetmap,2
n
1nautical
mile2copies*
(<$)0-2specialmat>: Areassuitableforvehicular
r v - * operation. 5"copies.
(f) Enemyinstallationsmap,l?10000,3sheets* Photos
'"' < 'tiy10February,19^5. 10copies,
(g) MosaicwithTAgrid,1:20,000,1Uconies,
(h) Hosaicw/oTAgrid,1:20,000,10copies.
(i) MosaicwithTAgrid,1:10,^00,9copies,
(j) Mosaicw/oTAgrid,1:7,000,2copies.
(k) Verticals,SortieCV9-5Y,33photos,
(1) Verticals,SortieVD5-3E,10photos,
(ra) Verticals,SortieS19BS^A67^-^3CVS6,Uphotos.
(n) Highobliques,SortieCVIO-35,8photos.
(0) Highobliques,FoSortieonprints,UUphotos(Land-
*. ingbeaches).
(p) Rubberreliefmap*
(q) Plasterreliefmap,
(r) Airandgunnerytargetfolder,1:10,000,3copies.
(2) Thisbattalionwasnotfurnishedenough1:20,000mapsto
supplyfiringchartsforbattalionandbatteryfiredirectionandmapsforfor-
wardobservers. $enmore-copies,fortotaloftwenty,wouldhavebeenmuch
better. Othermapsandphotoswereadequateinamount,
(3) A1:^0,000TAmap,inabinding,oraseveralsheetsmall
bound1:20,000TAmapwouldhavebe,enbestforforwardobservers, The1:20,000
TAmapwassatisfactoryasafiringchartbothhorizontallyandvertically.
(h) The1:20,000mosaicsweretoodarkforgooddetails.
Theywerenotsuitableforfireadjustment.
(5) Theairand'gunnerytargetfolder,thoughawkwardforfor-
wardobserverstohandlebecauseofitslackofbinding,wasausefulphotomap
withitsconvenientsizeandlargescale,
(6) Someforwardobservers,complainedthatenemyinstallations
overprintedinblackmadethemax>sdifficulttoread.
-10-
rt,twoJimaOperation (continued)
(7)$o n^psor"photoswerefurnishthisbattalionduring the
operation,
(S) Intelligencedissemination.
(a) Theregimentaltwo sectionfurnishedthebattalion
withlocationof ourownfrontlines, /thelocationof enemyweaponsandtroop
movements,enemycapabilities,andotherinformation*
(b) Thesedatawerebothtimelyandsufficientforbat-
talionrequirementswiththeexceptionofinformationon ourownfrontlines
duringtheday,
(9) Captureddocumentsandmaterial,
(a) Oneintelligencemanin eachbatteryprovedsuffic-
ientto gathercaptureddocumentsandmaterial,. ItemsrecoveredweremarkedinW.
thebattaliontwosectionandsentto theregimentaltwo section. In thisoper-
ationthebattalionrecoveredfewenemy'documentsandlittlemateriel.
C, Operationsandtraining.
(1) It wasnecessarybeforegoingaboardshipto familiarize
keypersonnelwiththedetailsof theoperation. Ifwasalsonecessarytodraw
upthebattalionplanforlandingas thebattalionwasembarkedon fourdiffer-
entships.
(2) Onceaboardthemenwereindoctrinatedby lectures,using
themaps,aerialphotosandintelligencesummariesfurnishedby theregimental
twosection,
D. Supply,
(1) Adequacyof mountingoutsupplies,
(a)ClassI *
(1) Two rations per man were sufficient.
(2) Two gallons of water per man was sufficient.
(3) Stetra components.of "3"rations for coffee was
sufficient.
(ty) Hospital rations were sufficient.
(b)ClassII.
(1)field-rangesandextraequipmentforsettingup
galleysshouldhavebeenincludedforanoper-
ationthatlastedas longas thisone.
(2)Theremainderof theorganizationalequipmentwas
adequate,
(c)ClassIII. .... .
(1)|*uelcarriedwasadequate.
(d)ClassIT,
(l)ClassIVgearwas.adequate.
(e)ClassV,
(l)Ammunitioncarriedwasadequatesinceagoodsource
ofsupplywasestablisheduponlanding.
(2) Resupplyof allclassesofsupplieswasadequateforthis
battalion. Palletizedammunitionfacilitatedthehandling,
battalion.
(3) Ho palletizedcargoexceptammunitionwasusedbythis
.
(k) Shorebasedsupplyfabilitieswereefficient.
(5) ConsiderableclothingandJB2gearwassalvagedin this
battalion'sposition. Mostofthisgearhadbeenabandonedbyunitswhohad
previouslyoccupiedthearea,
(6) Oneenemy37
m m
fieldpiecehadbeenabandonedinthe
position. It wasbadlydamagedandregimentorderedthebattalionto bury it.
(7) Transportation. '
(a) Transportation for t hi s battalion was adequate.
(b).The H29C carrier (teasel) was most efficient for oper-
ating in the loose sand Vfgre improvements were made
on the roads.
- 11-
Report,IwoJimaOperation (continued)
wasanadequatesupplyofsparepartsandaccest
oriesfor"ellwheeledvehicles. Therewasagreat
lackofallclassesofpartsfortheM29Ccarrier-.-
(d)Maintenancefacilitieswereexcellent.
E. Artillery.
(1)Loading.
(a)ThepersonnelandequipmentoftheUthbattalion,l?th
Marineswereloadedaboardfourtransports,theUSS
Feland,USSO'Hara,TTSSAlhena,andtheUSSHercules.
Theprincipleofdispersionwasfollowed"byputting
thefiring"batteriesonseparatetransportsanddivi-
dingHeadquartersandServiceBatteryintotwocommand
groups,eachloadedondifferenttransports.
(b)Thepersonnelandequipmentwereloadedasfollows:
USS
Officers Men 3try Junction
"52 H&S Commandgroupanddrivers
Firing"battery,drivers,and
117
reconnaissanceparty.
2 MS "Ii" Reconnaissancepartyandextra
personnel .
3 kk "M" Reconnaissancepar t y and ext ra
- _^^ personnel .
17 271 Tot al
Iquipment
1 T&-9, t r act or , iir/ad
h Truck, 2l-tori, 6x6, dump
h Howitzers, 105mm
1 Truck, -^-ton, radio
3 Truck, 1-ton, ^teU, cargo
2 Tr ai l er s , 1-ton, 2 wheel, cargo
1 Tr ai l er , 1-ton, 2 wheel, water
USS O'HARA
Officers Men Function
Biz
Command group.
H&S
USS
Officers
Kon Bt r
Function
12
Drivers and mechanics.
Firing "battery and drivers
* S3 Total
Equipment 3t ry
1 Tractor, #!D~9, w/ad
1 Tractor, TB-9, w/ad
"L"
11
L
tyTruck, 2|*-ton, 6x6, dump
"
k Howitzers, 105mm
"L"
1 Howitzer, 105mm
E&S
2 Truck, 1-ton, kxk
t
rfedio
H&S
2Truck,3-ton,kxk, radio
"I, "
3Trailer,1-ton,cargo
H&S
2Trailer,J-ton,cargo
" I "
1Trailer,1-ton,2wheel,water
"L
"L"
1Truck,1-ton,hxk,cargo
2Carrier,cargo,M29C(Tfeasel)
H&S
1Trailer,1-ton,2wheel,grease
H&S
1Ambulance,-J-ton
H&S
2Trailer,1-ton,2wheel,cargo
1Truck,|-ton,cargo
2Truck,-J-ton,cargo
- 1 2 -
IwoJinaOperation (continued)
USSHMCULSS
Officers Men 3t Function
3
Tiring"batteryanddrivers.
0 2
E&S
Drivers,
0 driv J
rs
SO Total
3
Equipment Btry
1Tractor,TD-9,w/ad ~~ffft*
UTruck,2^*ton
f
6x6,dump
UHowitzers,105mm "M"
2Truck,iton,radio
1Truck,^-ton, di radio
1Truck, ^~ton,cargo "X"
1Truck,-J-ton,cargo
1Truck,1-ton,cargo
1Truck,1-ton,cargo "X"
2Trailer,1-ton,.2wheel,-cargo
turn
1Trailer,1-ton,2whe.el,cargo
1Trailer,1-ton,2whoel,water
1Trailer,1-ton,2wheel,water
2Trailer,i~ton
f
cargo
2Trailer,-J-ton,cargo
(c) All battalion gear was loaded aboard the vehicles-,ex-*
cept the seabags for the men aboard the USS0
!
H?>ra
and USSPeland, which were put into cargo spaces.
These seabags were transported from the battalion
area to the ship' s cargo area and loaded aboard ship
by loading part i es.
(d) All vehicles and t rai l ers were moved to their respec-
tive ship's vehicle parks. There was no particular
trouble experienced in loading the vehicles.
(e) Personnel of the battalion were marched to the staging
areas and then to their respective ships.
(2) Landing.
(a) The landing of the battalion was not satisfactory as
i t took a total of four days before al l vehicles
were ashore. This was largely due to, the unavail-
ability of landing craft and the rough surf. The per-
sonnel raid eqTiipment were unloaded from the transports
into LCI's, LCTs, and LSTs, and landed from them,
(b) All of the equipment from the USSFeland came in the
fi rst d.&y. -?ho equipment from the USSAlhena and
USSHercules came in very slowly. Thepersonnel from
the USSO'Hara came in the first day,
(c) It was planned and generally followed to have the.TD-9
tractor land fi rst with one howitzer. The firing
batteries, fire direction gear, and essential com*-
munication gear was given highest priority. The
priority of debarkation was not st ri ct l y followed
but no serious consequences resulted.
(d) Noparticular difficulty was experienced at the beach.
: The prime movers could not be loaded with a howitzer
in an.LCM. All ships managed to get one or more
prime movers ashore before the howitzers so that
prime,movers were usually available when the howitzers
came ashore.
(e) The availability of the shore party tractors,made i t
possible to get all equipment off the beach and on
the road-quickly-, ., . . . .
(f) The,efficiency of the shoratiftrfc&.J.SL to_be commended.
t,IwoJimaOperation (continued)
(g)Theavailableprimemoversofthebattalionshuttled
backandforthfromthebeachtothepositiongetting
thetrailersandhowitzersoffthebeachquickly.
(h)Hoequipmentwaslostduetopilferageaboardshinor
toaccidentsorenemyactioninlanding.
(i)LoadedLCMswereheldupbythecontrolboatsforsev-
eralhoursthefirstdaywhilearraygarrisonequi-o-
mentwaslandedonblackbeach. Thiscontributed
tofurtherdelayingthelandingofthebattalionand
tothefactthatsomematerialremained
1
inLCMsall
night.
(j)Onehowitzerhadthetraversinghandwheelbentand. a
sightbracketbentbytheroughsurfwhileitre-
mainedinanLCMovernight. Onejeepframewas
crackedintheunloading. One6x6,2j?-tontruck,
hadthefrontdriveshaftbentwhenthesurftossed
theLCMjustasthetruckwasdrivingoff. Noother
damagewasexperienced"oythisbattalion.
(3) Survey.
(a)Thebattalionsurveysectionwasdividedintwopartic
onegoingwitheachreconnaissanceparty. Eachteam
carriedoneaimingcircle,twotapes,onesetof
arrows,andoneaimingstake. Onreachingthebat-
talionpositionitwasfoundthatsurveycontrolhad
beenestablished"bytheregimentalsurveysection.
Thecontrolwasgoodandthebattalionpositionarea
surveywasquicklyestablished. Theaimingcircles
weredeclinated,andfoundtobeabout20milsless
thanwhatwascomputedbeforelanding.
(U) Fireadjustment.
(a)Adjustmentsweremadebybothairandgroundobservers
Theinitialregistrationsweremadebyairobserver
onthreecheckpointsontheafternoonof2JFebru-
ary,19^5 Checkregistrationsweremadefrequently
throughouttheoperationbyaerialobservers. C-round
observersmadethemajorityoftheadjustmentson
mortar,artillery,androcketpositions*however,
groundobservationwasdifficultduetotheirregular
terrainfeaturesinthedivisionzoneofaction. The
majorityoftheroundsexpendedbythisbattalion
werefiredbypreparationsandwereforthemost
partZtransfers;however,whenpossibletheprepar-
ationswereadjustedbyforwardobservers.
(5) Firedirection.
(a)Standardfiredirectionprocedureasoutlinedin IT'
'6-UOwasusedthroughouttheoperation. Thereare
norecommendedchangesinthisprocedure.
(b)Allmissionsfiredbythisbattalionwerefired
throughthefiredirectioncenter. Thefiredirec-
tionequipmentdidnotarriveatthebattalionposi-
tionuntillatethefirstday. Thefiredirection
centerwasabletooperatewithmakeshiftequipment
whichvascarriedindispatchcasesbymembersof
thesection.
(c)Themajorityofthemissionsfiredbythisbattalion
werefiredwithmixedfuses(delayedandsuperquick),
thenatureofthetargetbeing"preparedpositions".
(d)Inanumberofinstancesammunitionwaswastedbyfi-
ringmassedfiresoncnplacedartilleryand-oill
boxes. Thistypetargetshouldbebroughtunderfire
^birprecisionmethods;however,oftentimesthiswas
impossiblebecauseoflackofobservation.
or.t, wo iTijna Operation (continued).
(o)tightartillerywas misusedin.somecasesagainstcon-
creteemplacementswhich'could.have"beenhandledwith
betterresultsbyheavyartillery.
(6) Organizationandtacticalemplo:,*ment
f
(a)TheUth Battalion,12thMarineswasembarkedaboard
fourtransports,Qhonetransportwas placedare-
connaissancegrottoheadedbythe battalioncommander
andonefiringbattery, ^ ebatterycommandersand
theirreconnaissancepartieswerealsoaboardthis
ship.. Twotransportscarriedafiringbatteryapiece,
Thefourthtransportcarriedanotherreconnaissance
partyheadedbytheexecutiveofficer. Inthisman-
nermaximumdispersionwas obtainedwithoutsacri-
ficingcontrol,
(7) liaison.
(a)Thisbattalionasageneralsupportbattalion,hadno
liaison, '..lien placedindirectsupportof"the 21st
Marinesaliaisonofficerwassenttothe21st regi-
ment,
(S) Communications.
(a)Wirecommunicationswerenormalandnogreatdifficult
tywasexperiencedinmaintainingthem* Messenger
servicewithregimentwas maintainedandwas adequate.
Normalradionetswereestablishedandnodifficulty
wasexperiencedingupjrdingthe net. Asa-general
supportbattalionitwas necessaryforthisbattalion
tofurnishforwardobserverteamstothe directsup-
portbattalions. TheSCB-SlOsweresetonthebat*-
talionchannelandtheemergencychannel. Thismade.
itnecessarytotakeoverthe radiosofthe battalion
whose'forwardobserverswererelieved. Itisfelt
that.thegeneralsupportbattalionshouldcarrythe
crystalsforthechannelsofthedirect.support bat-
talionssinceitisfrequentlycalledupontofurnish
reliefforwardobservationteams.
(9) Observation.
(a)Theobservationonthisoperationwas very'difficult.
Theforwardobserversfoundlittlehighgroundfrom
whichtoshoot. Inmanycasestheyadvancedwiththe
companycommanderswithoutobservationinhopeof
findinganOP.Thisseriouslylimits- the useand
effectivenessofartillery,butunderthe"circumstances
itwas necessary,
(10) personnel,
(a)Theforwardechelonofthisbattalionconsistedofthe
followingpersonnel:
."'Officers WarrantOfficers Snlisted
= USMC
US1T ;
~pS
1
""
.
: C"
0 , 11
(11) Ammunition supply.
(a)See.paragraph?(2).
(12) Motor transportation. .'
;
(a)The numberand-typeofvehiclesusedby thisbattalion
during thisoperationwereasfollows? - .
NUMBER '
1
J-ton,
kxh, ambulance;"
5 ^-ton, kxk, cargo
- -g |**ton, kx^
f
radio
6 1-ton, kxh
t
cargo
". 12 2^-rton, 6x6 (prime mover)'
IPL
- 15 - lf||C
(1/
iport, IwoJima Operation (continued)
OTffiER TITO
2 Carrier,cargo,i'29C
9 J-ton,'2wheel*trailer
7 1-ton
8
2wheel

trailer
k 1-ton,2wheeljwater,300gal,trailer,
(b)Thevehiclesofthisunitwereloadedintothree
shi-DSo Fourdayswerereojiiredforunloading"be-
causeofheavysurfanddifficultyinobtaininglan-
dingcraft.
(c)Thebeachwassoftcoarsesandandtractorswerenece-
ssaryforpullingvehiclesofflandingcraftandon
totheimprovised"beachroad*
(d)Anassignedareaforthetruckparkwasorganizedinto
separatebatteryareas. Bach"batterywasresponsible
forthedispersinganddigging-inofvehicleswithin
itsarea. Vehiclepitswereaboutsevenfeetdeep
andwideenoughtoaccomodatethevehicle. Theve-
hicleswerethencamouflagedbjrnets.
(e)Allwaterproofingmaterialandtirechainswerere-
movedfromthevehiclesassoonastheywereunloaded,
Toaidthe2j-ton,6x6,durcp,andthel-ton*UxH,
cargotrucksinovercomingtheloosesand,tirepres-
suresweredecreased,therebygivingmoreflotation
tothetires.
(f)Throughouttheoperationthe2^-ton,6x6,dump(prime
mover)wasemployedforhaulingammunitionandwork-
ingparties. Untilimprovementsweremadeonthe
roads,thetractorsandtheH29Ccarrierswereused
forpullingwatertrailersand2wheelcargotrailers.
Thel-*ton,HxU,cargotruckswereusedlaterinplace
ofthetrackequipment. The1-tontruckswerealso
dispatchedforcarryingforwardobservationteamsto
andfromtheforwardelementsofcombat. The-|-ton
UxU,trucks(jeeps)weresentonlyonshorttrips;
however,itwa.sfoundthattheyperformedveryeffi-
cientlyinthesand.
(g)Kbvehicleswerelostor
1
damagedbeyondrepair. One
1-tontruckstruckwhatwasbelievedtobeananti-
personnelminewhichdestroyedatire,fender,and
hood. Thistruckwasrepaired,.
(13)
Materialused.
(a)Allmaterialloadedandlandedbythisbattalionwas
usedto.advantage,
(b)Particularmentionshouldbemadeofthefactthat
insufficientgalleyequromentwasbroughtforthe
lengthofthisoperation. Aneffortwasmadeto
operateabattalionbakerywithwhatequipmentwas
available,
(c)TheM29C,carrier,wasthemostreliabletranspor-
tationinthesandduringthefirstfewdays.after
landing,
(d)Thethirteenthhowitzerwasusedtoreplacetheone
damagedinlandingaswellasbeinganexcellent
sourceofsurylyformiscellaneousordnancespare
parts.
(e)Thefiveextra1-tontrailerswithoutprimemovers
werenecessaryfordisplacingandmoving,
(f)The1-tontruckperbatterywaskeptbusytransporting
forwardobservationteamstoandfromthefrontand
makingthemiscellaneousbatteryruns.
-16-
(15)
(16)
(17)
(IS)
(19)
IwoJimaOperation (continued)
(g)Thebulldozerswereindispensablefordigginginand
makingwaternanswiththetrailers.
(h)Allprimemoverswerekept"busyhaulingammunition.
(i)Thetwentythousandsand"bagscarriedashoreonthe
vehicleswereampleforonebattalionposition.
Trainingdeficiencies.
(a)Itisfeltthatthecommunicationsectionandforward
observersofthisbattalionneedfurthertrainingin
theestablishmentandmaintenanceofthecommunica-
tionsofadirectsupportartillerybattalion.
Mapsandphotos,
(a)SeeparagraphI?B.
Enemyactionagainstourartillery.
(a)Theenemyfirednoeffectivecounter-batteryagainst
thisbattalion. Thefewharassingroundsandrockets
whichfellinandaroundtheareaWereineffective.
Therewasnootherenemyactionagainstthisbat-
talion.
Supply,
(a)Ammunitionsupplyhasbeencommentedoninparagraph
1(2). '
(b)Rationswereautomaticallydrawnonthebasisofthe
strengthofthebattalion. Baringthefirstthree
n
C
h
weeksonIwoJima rationsand"10in1"rations
weresupplementedby
f
'3'
f
componentsoffruitand
fruitjuices,aswellasingredientsformaking
pastriesinthebattalionbakery. Oldtype"C"
rationsand"K"rationsweresupplementedby"B"
rationsduringthelastfewweeks. Severalmeals
offreshchowwasreceivedfromthedivisioncom-
missary. Theinadequancyofthelardsupplyimpaired
thefunctioningofthebakery.
(c)Waterwasadequatemainlybecauseitwaspossiblefor
thementobatheandwashclothingatthebeach. The
battalionwaslimitedtoapproximatelytwogallons
permanperday. Considerationshouldbegivento
thefactthatitrequiresabout100gallonsofwater
perdayforcleaningthehowitzersofthebattalion.
Thisrationofwaterwouldhave''oeeninsufficientif
thegalleyshadbeensetup.
(d)Extraclothingwasavailableforthosemenwhoneeded
it.
(e)Saltwatersoapandcandlesweredrawnwithautomatic
suppliesandwereadequateduringthefirstthree
weeksafterwhichtimesaltwatersoapwasnotavail-
able.
(f)Sufficientpostexchangesupplies,weredrawnsothat
therewasnoshortageofcigarettesortoiletarticles
initially. Theaccessorycomponentswereveryclosifey
rationedduringthelasttwoweeks.
Summaryofammunitionexpendituresbyitemandtypeof
ofmission.
(a)Seeannex"A".
Effectivenessofartillery.
(a)Roughrockyterrainlimitedtheeffectivenessof
lightcaliberartilleryfirebyaffordingtheenemy
coveredandconcealedcavesandcrevices,andby
restrictingtheobservationoftheforwardobservers.
(b)Themanystrongpillboxeswerevirtuallyunharmedby
directhitswiththe105mmM^JSshellusingthe.05
seconddelayfuze. While wasshockandharas-
singeffectonthe
~17~
t,IwoJimaOperatio.n (continued)
.therewaslittlecasualty,effect. Thosetimeswhen
theenemywasinrelativelyopenpositions,thecasu-
altyeffectwasgood,
(d.) liveadjustedcitherdayornightatthesoundofan
.unseenenemynortarorfieldpiecenearlyalwayssue*
.qeededinsilencingitforaslongasourfirecon-
?
..:tinued. ?henormalbarrageswereparticularlyeffec-
tiveastheinfantrywasmostcooperativeindesiring
s
them,close-tothelines. ItisRelievedthatnight
harassingfirehadamaterialeffect<5nrestricting
theenemy*snightmovement.
(d)Thelackoi
?
exactknowledgeduringthedayastothe
locationofthefrontlinesoftheunitsdirectly
supportedandofadjacentunitsrestrictedfirizg.
(e)forwardobserversreportedthattheinfantry'sfailure
tomoveoutunderpreparationslostmuchoftheir
1
effect.
(f)Inthistypoofterrainandwiththeenemyinelabor-
atelyprepareddefensivepositions,ashortintensive
preparationhasamaximumeffectforthe.105and
lightercalibers.
(g)Aconcretepiercingshellwithalongerdelaymight
increaseeffectivenessofthe105againstthekind._
ofpillboxesfoundonIwoJima,
(h)Shelargenumberof.forwardobserversshootingintoa
smallareamadeitdifficulttofollowaparticular
adjustment. Coloredsmokewouldhaveaidedthefor-
wardobserverinidentifyinghisownrounds.
(2.0) Effectivenessofenemyartillery.'
(a).Intheoneinstancewhereforwardobserverssawmassed
timefire,theheightorburstwasaboutfifteen
yardsandthefirewasveryeffective. 7iredsingly
/bydirectorindirectlaying,enemyartilleryfire
wasaccurateanddifficulttoLocate,
(b)!5nemyharassingfireinrearareaswastoo- sporadic
tobeeffectiveinsectorsobservedbythisbat-
talion.
(2l)-Tacticalemploymentofenemyartillery.
(a)Generally,theenemyusedhisartillerysinglyfrom
prepared'defensiveloositionsandmadelittleattempt
: tomassfires. InonecasetheUthbattalionfor-
wardobserversam whatwasapparentl:
r
abattalion
ofenemylightcalibergunsmassingtimedfireona
hill..
(b)"..iT.ilefiringnoorganizedcounter-preparation,the
enemyfrequentlyopenedfireonourlineswhenour
preparationlifted.
(c)Intherearareasaroundthebattalionposition,the
onlyharassingfirowassporadicandineffective.
?herewasnoeffectivecounter-batter;/fire.
Ordnance . '
(l)Weapons. ' ,' '
(a)Number,; typeandcaliberofweapons,used:
10Howitzer*,and;carriage,1.2,105mm
3Hovdtser,andcarriage,!J2*i2,105mm:
'.".....S.Gun,machine,caliber.50(H3)
,.',. 0Launcher, 'rocket,2.3b,If9 .
,. - 'U91Carbine,caliber,30, Ml

:
"-' 22browningautomaticrifle-, 15191-3 '"'
2Pistol",caliW".%, ,!:1911
^
!A
-"L,-machine
0
,caliber.30'
- IS-
1
IwoJima Operation (continued)
(b)Humberofdaysbattleemployment: 3^
(c)Fumber,typeandcaliberofweaponslost: Hone
(d)Malfunctions.
(l)Mostmalfunctionsoccurredimnediatelyaftera
longperiodofsustainedrapidfire(threeto
fiveroundsperminute). Fromamaterialstand-
pointthefollowingscheduleisconsideredtobe
"themaximumrateoffirewithinthecapabilities
ofthepresent105mmhowitzer:
5roundsperminutefor3minutes
Uroundsperminutefor5minutes
3roundsperminutefor3Ominutes
2roundsperminutefor60minutes
Firinginexcessoftheabovescheduleshouldbe
punctuatedbycoolingperiodsinwhichwatermay
boused.
MALSJWCglON REASON AC?IOH
Traversi ng shaft
Failureofset 1/8
n
holedrilledthroughtraversing
col l ar U screwtohold shaftandcollar. Improvisedpinmade
frozen. afterrepeated from12dnailanddriveninhole.
tightening. (Thishadhappenedinoneothercase
duringpracticefiring.)
Breechblock developed Unknown. Firingcasereplacedbyonefroms-nare
excessive drag ( f a i l - gun. l
T
ofurthertrouble.
ure to close with
round i n chamber af-
t e r si x rounds had
"been f i r ed, )
Operating handle Unknown Stubdrilledoutandscrewreplaced
cat ch screw AS128 froms"oarefun. Secondscrewreplaced
sheared off (t wi ce bystoveboltandedgesofcatchre-
on same gun). cesswereslightlypeenedoverthetop
ofcatch.
Operating handle Unknown Replacementpartmadefrompieceof
sleeve pi n SEDX6US weldingrod.
sheared off.
Piston stop AI5762 Believeddueto Re-olacedUypartfrom,s-oaregun.
cracked and parts excessiveheat
found in cradle. fromfiring.
Vertical level Brokeninlanding.Replacedbybubblefromsparegun.
bubble on i-121sight
mount broken.
Difficultyindepress-Unknown ICquilibratorspringsadjusted.
ingfromhighangle
fire(twohandsrequired).
FoursightspanH12A2 JToriaalwearand Sparesightissuedwhileoriginal
becametemporarily combatconditions,sightswerecleanedandadjusted,
unserviceabledueto
moistureonprisms,
dirtandwear,
Sixteardropbiilbs
T
?ornoutinservice. Replacedbysparebulbs.
innightlighting
devicesonrange
quadrantburnedout.
nReport,IwoJinaOperation (continued)
Alloftheaforementionedmalfunctionsoccurred
togunswhichhadseenservicein aprevious
operation. Fotroublewasexperiencedwiththe
threenewH2A2howitzersdrawnpriortocombat,
(e)Onesparegun_andtwosparesightsK12A2areanab-
solutenecessityonanyoperationwherelongperiods
offirearedesiredfromallgunsofthe"battalion.
Sparepartsarenotavailableinthemselves,and
muchtimeissavedbyhavingasparegunreadily
accessableatthebattalion.
(f)Recommendations;
(l)Aiming,stakelightsshouldbeequippedwithacen-
tralcontrolswitchforeachbattery,thuselimi-
natingthedangerofpersonnelmovingfromthe
guntotheaimingstakeforeachfiremissionat
night,andresultinginasavingofthealltoo
'scarceflashlightbatteries,
(2),Theteardropbulbinthevariousnightlighting
devicesshould,beredesignedon amorerugged
patternoragreaterquantityoftheexisting
typeshouldbeissuedeachunitforreplacements.
(3)Amoredurableandeffectiveshieldshouldbepro-
videdfortheprotectionofthecrosslevelbub-
blesonthesightmountandrangequadrantof
thehowitzer. 3ubbleshavebeenbrokenineach
ofthethreeamphibiousoperationsthisunit
hasparticipatedin,andneverhavesufficient
sparebubblesbeenavailable,
(2) Ammunition.
(a)Roundsexpended:
12,506 rounds Shell, HE, Ml, w/f MHS-M^-SAI & VM$A2
9,275 rounds Shell, H3, HI, w/f H5^
1,611 rounds,Shell, Smoke, $>H60, w/f !
T
57
21 rounds Shell, EVA?, K67, w/f H6R
(b) Methods and problems of supply.
(1) ?he problem of ammunition sup-oly from shi-o to
position xiras very slow and enn hardly be con-
sidered adequate. Many times the supply on hand
at the firing batteries was so low that had an
an emergency arisen, no sustained fire fron the
howitzers would have been available. In t hi s,
as in the two other operations in which this bat-
talion has participated, the majority of the how-
itzer ammunition was unloaded vn.d.hauled at night
which in i t sel f tends to slow up sup-ply. I t is
suggested that whenever possible ammunition' ac-
tually be given fi rst pri ori t y in daylight hours,
(2) During the fi rst week of the operation ammunition
was hauled from the beach to the division dump,
a distance of about one thousand yards, in am-
phibious tractors. IThere i t was reloaded on
trucks and hauled another thousand yards to the
battery positions, resulting in a great loss of
time and much unnecessary labor.
(3) Amore easily discernablo method of marking how-
itzer ammunition boxes should be used. Frequent-
ly the hauling from shore to position is under-
taken at night
ir
hen no lights of any king maybe
used and fr.ilure to identify the t".*pe of ammu-
nition being handled often resulted in large
- 20-
pr t , Iwo Jima Operation (continued)
quantitiesofA?shell"being-hauledtothe
battalionpositionwhenE3wasmostneeded.
lihogreymarkingontheendofboxesofsmoke
shellwaseasilyidentifiedbystarlightand
asimilarsystemforallhowitzerammunition
issuggested.
(c) Hethodsandprob1emsofstorage,
(I
s
- .ammunitionwasstoredintrenchesdugbyabull-
dozer. Therewasexcellentdrainagebecauseof
sandysoilandnostorageproblemdeveloped,
(d) Adequacy,typos'andpackaging.
(1)Jfanyroundsoftheammunitionpackedintheindi-
vidualsteelcontainerrequiredasmuchascan
hoursworkpershellinordertoremovethe-pro-
jectile* Thiswasbecausethesteelcontainers
hadbeendocolydentedandinsomecasesitwas
.necessarytocutthecontainerinhalfwitha
hacksaw, Aremovablecaponeachendofthe
containerissuggestedasaremedy,
(2)Allaranunitionpackedtwo-roundsperboxwasin
excellentcondition. Onlytwelve.unserviceable
roundswerefoundinthetwenty-threethousand
roundsfired,
(c) Recommendedchangesin TX/5
1
.
(l)AlargerproportionofShell,HE,w/fI'USis
suggestedintheunitoffirebecauseofthe
demandforafuzedelaysetting. Thishasalso
beenthecaseinthetwootheroperations,
(f) Fewtypesdesired,
(l)Anincorporationofafuzedelaysettingonthe
<K5^fuzewouldresultinamuchmoreversatile'.*
shell. I?ootherdemandsfornewtypeshave
.arisen.
Medical
(1) Embarkation.-
(a) Personnel,
(l)Onemedicalofficerandelevenenlistedmedical .
corpsmenwerecarriedintheforwardechelon,
2h?.yweretransportedbyfourdifferentships,
Material.
(l ) Material was divided into two duplicate compon-
ents and 'transported by two ships,
(2) Aboardship,
(a) Sickness..
(1)0-eneralrecurrenceofchronicdermatologiefungus
infections.
(2)Highincidence'ofupperrespiratoryinfections.
(3)ITonaalmalarialrecurrencerate,
(b) Sanitary.conditionsxfereexcellent,
(3) Debarkation, ''.:"..
T
-"'-^
(a)personnelwaslandedinvariousgroupsinLCHsfrom
cargonets,on27and23February,I9U5,
MaterialwaslandedfromICIIsbymeansoftruckson
27and29February,19U5.
(c)llolossesofpersonnelormaterialoccurredduring
landing.
-21-
Hcport, Ivro Jima Operation (continued)
ore.
(a)Hodicalinstallations.
(1)The"battalionaidstationwassetupon28?ebru-_
a
ry,19^5>andwaslocatedperipherallyinthe
battalionarea"becausethesitechosenwaslo-
catedonamaintrafficarteryand"becauseit
,wasingooddefiladeposition. Thepersonnel
ofthe"battalionaidstationwerepoorlydis-
persed. Sheaidstationwasclosetothefire
directioncenter,commandpost,andothercriti-
calpoints.. Itwasdowngradefrommostofthe
"battalionarea.
(2)Thebattalionaidstationwaslocatednexttoan
embankment. Severalguardandmachinegunposts
overlookedthearea. Theareawasopentothe
sky,butwasduginaboutthreeorfourfeet.
Dugoutstwotothreefeetd.Qiypwere"builtwithin
thepyramidaltentwhichhousedtheaidstation.
Theywerelargoenoughtoaccomodateallattached
personnelincaseofemergency. Th^tent,ambu-
lance,andsmallmedicalsupplydumpwerecamou-
flagedwithnets.
(3)
T
'?henblackoutprecautionsarenecessaryablacked
outvestibuletothetentshouldbeconstructed
largeenoughtoaccomodatealitter.
(b)Hospitalization.
( l ) Cases requiring hospitalization were transferred
to one of several hospitals in the general vicin?-
i t y. "3"Medical Company, 3d Fedical battalion,
"S
n
and "C
n
Com-oanies, ? iiinphibious Corps hos-
pi t al , "3" Company, 5
t n
Medical ^t t a l i on and
Corps Evacuation Hospital ft were al l available. -
Disposition was made according to type of case.
(c)Evacuation.
(l)Casesrequiringevacuationweretransferredto
"3"MedicalCompany,3dMedicalBattalionwhere
furtherdispositionwasmade, facilitiesfor
evacuationwereentirelyadequate. Gaseswere
transportedbyambulancejeep.
(d)Casualtiestreated:
(1)Retained - 13
(2)Evacuated- 0
(3)Died - 0
(U)Type:
(a)Hemorrhagic,orrupturedtympanicmembrane7*
(b)*'
r
ound,fragment ' 7
(c)Blastconcussion 3
(*hcaseswithmultiplediagnoses)
(5)Walkingwounded<-13
(6)Stretchercases- 0
(e)Sanitation.
(l)Eeadswereconstructedfromoildrumsandpre-
fabricatedcovers. Theywereadequateforthe
battalion,locatedawayfromcentersofactivity,
andnotmalodrous. Theyweremovedtwiceaweek,
limed,andburnedouteveryotherday. Theywere
sprayedoncewithasolutionofDDT. Urinals
weremadefromammunitioncasesandlimedevery
otherday. Soakagepitswerenotnecessarybe-
causeofloose,sandysoil.
-22-
.
(5)
';
-
ort, Iwo Jima Operation (continued)'
(2) Pood:
(a) Canned and packaged rations were eaten through-
out the battalion. Galleys made only coffee
and pastry.
(b) quantity of food was adequate to sustain men
in combat.
(c)Garbageandotherrefusewasthrowninbomb
craters,covereddaily,andmarked.
(3)Vfater;
(a)ChlorinatedatcentralwaterDointanddis-
tributed,
(b)Adequatefordrinkingpurposes,butlimited
forwashingofbody. Foneforwashingclo-
thing,butsaltwatersoapwas-providedfor
bathingandwashingclothesinocean.
(f)Disposalofdead.
(1)Own: Fone.
(2)Snemyj Eleven. ?h,eenemydeadwereburiedbe-
fore-wearrivedin.thearea.
(g)!jpidemicsor-tinusualdiseasesintroops:"Fone.
(h)Dentalservice.
(1)Onemanwastreatedfordentalcariesat"3"!
r
edi-
calCompany,
rr
AmphibiousCorps
T
-
T
osr>ital. Dental
facilitiesappearedtobeadequatefordentalre-
quirements.
(i)Medicalorganizationwassuitable.
(j)Hedicalpersonnel.
(1)Hore'-thanadequate.
(2)Folosses.
(3)HatesvaryfromPhilietoHAlc. Theyareindiffer-
entphasesoftrainingdependingonrates,but
allarefairlywelltrainedforcombatemergen-
cies,
(k)Pieldmedicalequipment.
(1)50$ofallowancecarriedintocombat.
(2)Folosses.
(3)Adequateandsuitable.
(1)11ediGalsupplie s.
(1)75/' ofallowancecarriedintocombat.
(2)Folosses. .
.(3)Adequate.
(U)Resupplyadequate. .
(m)Iiotorvehicles. . ...
.-(l)Onejeepambulance.
.(2)Foloss,
(3)Usedforevacuationofwoundedandtransferof
sicktohospital. .-
(k)The..ambulance.isunserviceable.
;
(n)Malariaandepidemiccontrolequipment.andsu-oplies.
,(iiAllof.allowancecarried. . ..
(2)TTsedinconstructingheadsandarrayingarea.
(3)Folosses.
; :(^)Suitable*.
Hecommendations.
(a)Blackoutpyramidaltentbeprovidedforbattalionaid
.;station.., . , .
(b)?hatroadsbesprayedindustyareas.
(c)DimethylphtholatenndDD^Jbeprovidedinquantity
forsprayingheadsand.area,
nReport,IwoJimaOperation(continued)
(1) This"battalionencounterednofrequencyinterference.
(2) Theradiocircuitswereadequate,
I* Communicationsduringoperation.
(1) TheradiosusedvreroT"BX,SCR-6OS,SGR-61OandTCS.
(2) The-SCR-60Swassatisfactory. TheSCR-61Owasnotsat-
isfactory'. ThoSCR-61Odidnothavesufficientrangeandwas,inparticular,
adifficultradiotocarry. TheBA~39hasaveryshortoperationallife,last-
ingaboutsixhours. Theonelongantennamadetil*'radioaconspicuoustarget
anddrewenemyfireassoonasitwasputup.
(3) TCSandSCR-6lOsworowaterproofedwithwaterproofing
compoundandshellac. Thisprovedeffectivein^11"butonecase. Inthis
casetheca"blc(thcoraticallynotinneedofwatorproffing)rustedthrough,.
(U) SCR~6OSswerewaterproofcdwithwaxedpaperandshellac,
Thiswaseffectiveinallcases.
(5) Othercomrunicationsusedworowireandmessagecenter.
Theywereadequateandnodifficultieswereencountered,
J. Motor,transport.
(l) Organicnotortransportwasadequate. (Secparagraph
E(12))
K. Personnelcasualties.
(1) This"battalionsufferedthefollowingcasualtiesduring
theoperation:
KILLEDINACTION V/OI3NDEBDINACJION MISSING1STACTION
Off I/O Bnl Off Bnl Off VJO Bnl
USKC
1 0 2 2 1
17
0 0 0
USN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL
17
0
L. Comments,o-pinionsandrecommendations:
(l)Itisrecommendedthattheconcretepiercingfuse"bein-
corporatedintheunitoffirefor105mnhowitzer. Inthisoperation,thetype
oftargetwasoftenconcretepill"boxesandthepresenttypesoffuseswerein-
effectiveagainstthesetargets. ISuchammunitionwaswastedinattackingsuch
targets.
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373
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o

ENCLOSURE G
SERVICETROOPS
ACTION REPORT
,3DI^ARINSDIVISION,FMF,
C/OFL33T*OST0FFIC2,SAMFRAHCISCO.
21April,1945,
Serial:328-45
From: TheCommandingOfficer,
To- :
TheCommandingGeneral,3dMarineDivision,
Subject:
Actionreport
#
Reference: 3dMarDlvGeneralOrder'No137dated
3Feb45.
Enclosures: (A)Actionreportof3dServiceBattalion.
(B)Actionreportpf3dMotorTransportBn
(C)Actionreport6t3dMedicalBattalion,
1 Inaccordancewithinstructionscontained
inthereferenceenclosuresA,BandCaresubmitted
herewith,.
h.A.HOHN.
3D SERVICE BATTALION/
.OOPS, 3D KARINE DIVISION, P1IP,
POSTorriCE,SANFRANCISCO.
4April,1945,
From: CO.
To:
CO,SerTrs,.
Subject; Actionreport,IwoJimaOperation.
Reference: (a)3dKarDiv00#137,dtd3February,1945.
Enclosures (A)CapturedJapaneseordnance equipment.
(B)Ordnancesalvagereport.
(C)Ordnancerepairworkcompleted.
(D)SalvageSectionreport.
1* Incompliancewithreference(a),thefollowing
reportissubmitted.
PartIiSummaryt
A.Thisreportcoversthe-periodfrom7November,1944,
to16March,1945whentheislandwasofficiallyannouncedas
secured.
B.Duringthepastoperationthisunitcarriedoutits
normaltasksofsupply,salvage,andordnancerepair. Dueto
thefactthatthe3dKarineDivisionwasinreserveandashort
operationcontemplatedthebakerysectionanditsheavyequipment
wasleftbehindwiththerearechelon. NineOfficersandsixty-
three'enlistedmenofthisbattalionwereinitallyassignedto
theDivisionShoreParty"Organization,oneofficerandseven
enlistedmenoperatedwitheachbattalionlandingteamshoreparty.
Inthisoperationallwater\;aseitherbroughtalongwiththetroop*
indrums,cans,andtrailersorwasdistilledonIwoJlma. Dueto
thisfactallwaterwasissuedthroughtheDivisionQuartermaster.
TheDivisionQuartermasterdelegatedthisspeGialjobtothe
BattalionQuartermaster,3dServiceBattalion,andhisstaff.
PartII.Preliminaries.- ,
A,Thecompositionandstrengthofthiscommandupon
leavingGuamwasasfollows:
1.HeadquartersCompany
a.CoKa 2off -13enl
b.DivQKSec 3off - 0enl
c.BnQKsec 1off - 4enl
d.BnHa 2off 5enl

BnKed Sec 1Off'

Toff
9
22
_enl
"enl
(USN)
2offUS!" m3 enl
-1-
JvlceandSupplyCompany
ICoHq.
frSer&SupSec
2
2
off
off
~16
-70
enl
enl
c.ChemSec 1off -13enl
d.GraveRegSec 1off -52enl
0off -10
enl(USN)
e.SalvSec 1off -100enl
f.
ComsyS?c 1off
-16enl
8off -267enl
-10
enlUSN
OrdnanceCompany
a.
CoHq 4off -11enl
b.AmmoSec 2off -.-14enl
c.SupSec 1off -15enl
d.SmallArmsSec 1off -21enl
e.TKHaintPlat 2off -38enl
t.
HTransSec 1off -16enl
ArtySec 1off -22enl
12off -137enl
*Includesthreewatchrepairmenandthree
opticalinstrumentmen.
Note:Pourammunitiontechnicianswere
temporarilyattachedtoeachinfantryregiment
fordutythroughouttheoperation.
B.Theactivitiesoftiiisunitduringtheplanningand
trainingstageconsistedmainlyofcarryingoutsupply-,maint-
enance,andrepairworkinpreparationfortheconingoperation.
Themovementof'suppliesfromthedivisiondumpsatYonatothe
equipmentstagingareasatCabrasIslandandSumaywassuper-
visedbythedivisionquartermasterpersonnelofthisbattalion*
Limitedtrainingwascarriedoutastimeanddivisionworkper-
mitted. Asidefromspecialized-training,suchasordnance
repair,salvage,baking,etc.,trainingwscarriedoutinlocal
security,protectionofdumps,camouflage,shiptoshoremove-
ment,andprotectionoftheindividual!
r
arine. Uineofficers
andsixty-three enlistedmenfromthisbattalionparticipated .
inallrehearsalsandtrainingproblemsofthevariousbattalion
landingteamshQreparties.
C.Ouriuissioninthepastoperationwasessentially
thesameasitisinarestareaonlyunderlessfavorable
circumstancesandconditions. Jtisfourfold: (1)Toestablish
adivisiondump,ordumpsifneedbe,ashore,soastocontrol
theissuesofalltypesofsuppliestorearandfrontlineunits
andtoprovideadequateprotectionforthesevitalsupplies
ashore;(2)Tosetupordnancerepairshopsashore,sothatan
adequateamountoffirstcl^ssordnance equipment,'fromoptical
instrumentstomediumtanks,canbekeptinthehandsofthe
fightingtroopsatalltimes;(3)Toestablishasalvagecollect-
ingpointashore,capableoftakinginandhandlingalltyposof
clothingandequipment;(4)ToestablishandoiJolSiibe^adivision
2
)as cemeteryashore,soTs toprovideprbperregistrotionandburial
forourdead. Missionnumberor*eishandledbothin-therear
andforwardareasbythepersonnelofHeadquartersCompanyand
ServiceandSupplyCompanyundewthedirectsupervi ofthe
DivisionQuartermaster. Missionnumbertwoishan ' the
personneloftheOrdnanceCompanyunderthedirec
oftheDivisionOrdnanceOfficer, Missionnumbert
bythepersonneloftheSalvageSection,Serviceand
Company,underthesupervisionoftheDivisionQuarterma
andG-4. Missionnumberfourishandledbythepersonnelof
theGravesRegistrationSection,ServiceandSupplyCompany,
underthesupervisionofG1.
D#OnD-day,19February,1945,thisbattalionwas
boatedoffIwoJirnaasfollows:
Co:
0 0
.OT-.
1
7
0
0
0
31
UBSDoyen
USSCapeJohnson
1
0 0 USSFreemont
9 0 31 Total.
S&SCo:
0 I/O
EHL
0 0 3 US8Freemont
1 0 7 USSJackson
1 .0 7 USSFayette
1 0 95 USSCapeJohnson
0 1 81 USSFeland
1 0 7 USSKnox
0 1 7
1
USSAdams
0 0 35 USSDoyen
0 1 7 USSBolivar
0 1 21 USSCalloway
0 0 7 USSLeedstown
4 4 267 Total
;
OrdCo:
0 WO
ENL
3
1
1
0
107
0
USSJferryLee
USSLeedstoxm
2 2 30 USSHarrick
2 0 0 USSCalloway
8 137
PARTIII, Chronologicalaccountofactionfrom19February,to
16March,1945.
19and20Feb45Allpersonnelofthisunitwereehrouteto
oroffI\foJimaawaitingorderstogoashore.
21Feb.45 S&SCo.1stLt,BaxterdebarkedfromtheUSS
Pres.Jacksonat1500andcameashore,attachedto
the2ndBn,21stMar.withsixS&Si^tionmenand
' '-3-
alSectionman.
Corp*TurpinandtwomenlefttheCape
|y asboatridersforLCH#4.taking
Q11PAMortarammunitionashore. Motortroubleon
returntripcausedLCHtodriftallnightinheavy
sea.
S&SCo. 1 s t Lt.Baxterandhissevenshoreparty
personnelassistedthebeachunloadingparties,
2ndBn,21stMar. CWOMcBeedebarkedfromtheUSS
Bolivar,withsixS&SSectionmenandoneChemical
Sectionmanattachedtothe3dBn,21stliar,and
reportedtothe3-BLTshorepartycommanderon
beach. SevenenlistedfurtherreportedtotheBn-
4attheBndumpandassistedinhandlingsupplies.
CWOMcBeeassistedshorepartycommanderincleaning
beachandsupervisedbeachanddumpunloadingparties
from22ndto24thinclusive. WOLanhamdebarkedfrom
USSPre8.AdamswithsixS&SSectionmenandone
ChemicalSectionmanandreportedtothe1stBn,
21stMar.shorepartyforwork.
OrdQo.-<-Fourmen(ammopersonnelw/21stMar)
disembarkedandwentashoreatbeachRed1,remain-
ing*withthe21stMar.throughoutoperation.
23Feb.45 HqCo. PCpickedupCorp.Turpinand
twomenfromdriftingLCM#4fourteenmilessouth
of-Mt.Suribachiat0600andreturnedthemtoCape
Johnsonat1100, MajorCullencameashoreat0915
andreportedtoDiv.CP. Lt.Col-Chandlercame
ashore,madereconnaissancefordivisiondumpsite
andthenstayeda*cdivisionshorepartyCP,
S&SCo. Lt,Baxter'ssevenshorepartypersonnel
reportedto21stMar.RTBforx^orkinregimental
dumps,Lt.Baxterremainingonbeach.
24Feb.45 HqCo DivisionSupplyDumpestablished
at148-ItemandHOT*byLt.Col.ChandlerandMajor
Cullen.
S&SCo. 1stLt.NilandebarkedfromtheUSSKnox
withsixS&SSectionmenandoneChemicalSection
manandreportedtoregimentalshortpartycommander,
9thMar. Workedonbeachthenightofthe24thand
themorningofthe25th. 2ndLt.Hatcherdebarked
fromtheUSSFayettewithsixS&SSectionmenand
oneChemicalSectionmanandreportedtotheregi-
mentalshorepartycommander,9thMar. Duringthe
nighttheenlistedpersonnelworkedunderthesuper-
visionoftheBn-4.ist'Bn.9thMar. Lt.Hatcher
servedonthebeach. Sgt.Careyandfivemenfrom
WOLanham'sshorepartydetailreportedtotheDi-
visionQuartermasterattheDivisionSupplyDump.
OrdCo Fourmen(Ammopersonnelw/9thMar)de-
barked,fromtheUSSKnoxandwentashoreatbeach
-4-
remainingwithth<9thliar.tTIroughoutthe
2ndLt.'SovadebarkedfromtheUSS
wentashoreatbeachR^d2, Ship's
p3at0on,USSHarryLee,comiPen'-jedunloadingship,
170Dennoandfivemen,hatchoheckereUSSVarrick,
commencedunloadingship.
25Feb45 S&SCo. 2ndLt.Bros'coffdebarkedfromthe
CapeJohnsonat1130andlandedonbeachyellow2
withLt.C.F,McCreary(DCUSl^frT;andsixty-threemen
fromtheG-ravesRegistrationSection. Lt,Brostoff
reportedtoDivisionCPandreoe3vedInstructions
fromG1tosetup3dliarDivCemeteryalongpresent
located4thllai-Divcemeteryintargetarea165-Victor.
ArrangementsmadethroughX51tohavetwotrucks,2j$
tonandonebulldozerreportdailyatcemeteryfor
xjork* Corp,OviedobroughtG-.R*Sectionfrombeach
yellow2to165-Victorandbivouacareasetup. G-.B.
truck,containingequipment,notyetashore. Lt.Nilan
wasreleasedfromregimentalshoreparty,9thliar,and
reportedwithhissevenshorepartymentothebat-
talioncommanderattheDivisionSupplyDump. Lt
Hatcherandhissevenshorepartymenreportedtothe
battalioncommander*attheDivisionSupplyDump.
Lt.HatchertookoverhisnormaldutiesasDivision
Fuel,Officerandmadearrangementsforfuelpitsand
lurkingparties, CIJOKcBeereleasedfrom3-BLT
shorepartyandreportedtothebattalioncommander
attheDivisionSupplyDump. WOLanhamandone'
runnerreportedtothebattalioncommanderatthe
DivisionSupplyBumpandpreparedtocommencehis
normaldutiesasDivisionSalvageOfficer.
OrdCo. MajorCarlson,ls\;Lt,Broderick,andfour
men(ammopersonnelw/division)debarkedfromthe
USSHarryLeeandwentashoreatbeachRed1, Officers
proceededtoTargetarealS4~Dogto'spotcompany
b,ivouacandworkarea. Ammunitionmenproceededto
3dMarDivAmmunitionDumpat164-Tareand165Peter.
MajorCarlsonreturnedtoUSSHarryLeeandLt.
Broderickremainedat164-Dog.
26Feb.45 HqCo. Jeepdriverbroughtjeepashoreand
"reportedtobattalioncommanderatDivisionSupply
Dump.
S&SCo. Lt.BaxterassistedDivisionQuartermaster
inDivisionDumpandalsoservedasbattalionsani*-
tatlonofficer. Lt.Uilanservedasofficerin
chargeofthetemporaryrationdump. CWOHcBeetook
over-hisnormaldutiesasDivisionCemeteryOfficer.
Sgt.Cruzatandthirty-fourmenfromtheSalvage
SectioncameashorefromtheUSSDoyenandsetup
thedivisionsalvagecollectingpointattheDivision
SupplyDump. TheG.R.Sectionsurveyedtheceme-
teryareaandbull-dozercommenceddlJfiliriK
-
j?i.ts
"**O***
commonfoundationforburialoftwenty-
arow* Thistypeofburialnecessary
theloosesandyterrainincapableofbeing
handdug
1
!"*Twotruckssentouttocollectingstations
of9thand21stHar; Bodiesbroughtbackandremained
exposedovernightascemeteryrexvsnot;^eadyfor
burial,
OrdCo. 2ndLt.Reedand-forby-onemen(ammoand
tankmaintenancepersonnel'*debarkedfrouUSSHarry
LeoandsentashoreatbeachHe-i1, Ammunitionmen
proceededto3dKarDivAmmunitionDumpandTank
1'aintenanoemenproceededtccompanyarea'164-Dog.
Seventeenmen(TankMaintenancee-.nd.I
T
otorTransport
personnel.)werr+;ashoreatbeachBed.1.'.andproceeded
tocompanyarea.
27Feb,45 HqCo. At1200MajorWorledge,Capt.Smith,
Capt,Harter,Capt.Wright,DrPoote,Chaplain
UoffsingerandtwentymenlandedonBlackBeachand
reportedtothebattalioncommanderattheDivision
SupplyDump*'Sgt.Scarpaceandtenmenremained
aboardtheCapeJohnsontohelpunloadtheship. At
1500thebattalionCPwassetupat148-1tem. PhK3/c
Schuraatereportedto2ndLt.Bartozekatthe3dllarDiv
Ammunitionforduty. .'
S&SCo.G,R.Sectiondividedintox^rorkinggroups,
consistingofcollectingdetailsandprocessing
groups..Dailyrecordsbeingkeptofeachburialand.
FHFPACform9executedinduplicate;alsoanalpha-
beticalcrossindexfileinstitued. Seventy-five
Bodiesburiedandseventeenbodiesexposed,
OrdCo. MajorCarlson,CW-0Whitaker,0.Draperand
sixty-twomen(CoHqs,SmallArms,Supply,Instru-
mentandWatchRepairSections;debarkedfromthe
USSKarryLeeandTvrenta'shorc- atLeachRed1andpro-
ceededtothecompanyarea, 1stLtKennedy,2ndLt.
Starck,CWO^orseyandsevenmenfromthemotiortrans-
portsectiondebarkedfromtheUSSWarrickan,dwent
ashoreatboachRed1andproceededtothecompany
area. Workshopssetupand- routinerepair,supply,
andMaintenanceworkstarted, ^ourammunitionmen
wounded(twowhileontemporarydutywith9thMar.).
28Feb45 HqCo.MajorWorledgeandthebattalion
quartermasterpersonneltookoverthecontrol,
issuing,andre-supplyofwatertothedivision.
Chapla'inNoffsingerandonemanbeganworkingat
theevacuationstation,BlackBeachandalsoheld
servicesat3dliarDivCemetery.
S&SCo, Routine'supplyandsalvagework*G-.R.
Sectionburied120bodies. WOCoulsondebarked
fromtheUSS Felandat1000andreportedtothe
battalioncommanderattheDivisionSupplyDump,
OrdCo. WorkshopscompletedandroutineOrdnance
workcarriedout.'
1March45 HqCo. Routine.work. Sgt.Scarpacecame
ashoreandsetupthebattalionpostoffice* Sgt.
Cos.teatookovershipunloadingdetailonCape
Johnson.
S&SGo. Fifteencommissaryandthirty-seven
salvagepersonnelunderSupSgt.RotJjffifeipArkedfrom
at0530landlandedonBlackBoach.
ficdtotheDivision-SupplyDunp,the
eftstartingworkwith uho-SalvageSection
an:"
1
,thecommissarypersonn:.T
peraonnela
;
:therationdu:n,:v, y'c-cGip^sand
1&SU33cfrationscontinued Section sent
tenmento':hedivisionvs'.:woirp; Lt. illJ.an
designatedaspersonaleffect:- e "csr. G-,"*.<,Section
buriedthircybodies,twenty-foa reposed, Lt. i
Brostoffwoundedbutreturnedto .uty
#
OrdCo. Routineordnancework. 1stLt..E.Foster
and1stLt*G*.FosterdebarkedfromtheUSSGalloway
andwentashoreatbeachRed1andproceededtothe
companyarea. Onetruckdriverdebarkedfromthe
USSWarrickandwentashoreatBeachRed1and
proceededtothecompanyarea.
2March45--HqCo.-Routine\fork. QMSgt.Block,Sgt
RobinsonandtenmandetailfromSalvageSection
establishedawatersupplydumponPurplebeach.
S&SCo. Routinesupplyandsalvagework* G.R.
Sectionburiedsixty-threebodies,fivebodies
exposed. Regimentshandlingidentificationofde-
ceasedefficientlyandaccurately.
OrdCo. RoutineOrdnancework. Oneammunitionman
woundedandevacuated. Relievedfrom^temporaryduty
with9thMap,
3March45--HqCo.-Routinework. 3dMarDivevacuation
stationatBlackBeachsecuredtemporarilydueto
surfconditions. ChaplainNoffsingerandenlisted
helpermovedtoPurpleBeachandassistedatCoi*ps
evacuationstation.
S&SCo, Routinesupplyand.salvagework. G%H.
Sectionburiedforty-sevenbodies,twenty-sevenex-
posed. Cemeterybeingplannedtohavearockfence .
aroundtheflanksandaMarineemblemmadeoflarge
roundbouldersatfront,tipwithaflagpoleinthe
centeroftheemblem. Capt
#
Nutting,4thHar'Div.
G.R.Officerhasbeengivingperfectassistanceand
cooperation. *
OrdCo Movedpersonnelandequipment-tohew. -
bivouacandworkarealocatedat165-Able, Tank
maintenanceplatoon(2ndLt.Reed,WODraperand
thirty-eightmen)totemporarydutywith3dTankBn.
Onemanevacuated (sick),
4March45 H q Co. Routinework. Sgt.Costeaandship
unloadingdetailofninemencameashoreatpurple
beachandreport-cdtothecompanyattheDivision
SupplyDump. Wenttoworkonthewatersupply
detailunderMajorWorledge. ChaplainNoffsinger
movedto.Co"B",3dMedicalBn.andassistedinthe
evacuationstationsat"A
W
and"B
M
MedicalCompanies.
ChaplainNoffsingercontinuedtowoifrjikereuntil
19March,1945. " f
Routinesupplyandsalvagework* Capt.
dthirty-threemendebarkedfromtheUSS
sonan,dreportedtothebattalioncommander
y.attheDivisionSupplyDump. G-.R.Section
burIecfseventy-onebodies,fourbodiesexposed* The
DivisionChemicalDumpwassetup\irithintheDivision
SupplyDumpandoperatedaspartofsame. Chemical
warfaresupplieswerecheckedandcountedbythe
ChemicalSectionastheycameashore. Whennot
occupiedwithchemicalduties,menworkedwithother
supplydetails,includingrations,fuel,clothing,etc,
OrdCo, +RoutineOrdnancework. Fourammunitionmen,:
temporarilyattachedtothe3dMar.debarkedfromthe
USSFunstonandwentashoreatbeachRed1andpro-
ceededtothe3dHarDivAmmunitionDump. Hennolonger
attachedtoSdllar,WODennoandfivemen(assistant
loadingOfficerandhatchcheckers)debarkedfrom
theUSSWarrickandoameashoreatbeachRed1and
proceededtotheCompanyarea.
5March-,45 HqCo* Routinework*
S&SCo,<!Routinesupplyandsalvagework, G-.R.
Sectionburiedtwentybodies,twentysevenbodies
exposed* G.R
#
truckcameashorewithequipment.
Crossesbeingrepaintedandassembled,stencilscut,
containingnames,etc,ofmenburied*
OrdCo. RoutineOrdnancex/ork.
6March45'HqCo. Routinework.
S&SCo. Routinesupplyandsalvagework* G-.R.
Sectionburiedthirty-sixbodies,noneexposed.
Detailassisting4thitarDivinlandscapingcemetery,
bringinginrocksandbrownclayfromquarry,
paintingstonesmakingupMarineemblem, Detail
alsooutburyingJapdead.
OrdCo.*RoutineOrdnancework. Onemanfromsick
evacuationreturnedtoduty.
7March45 HqCo*~Routinework.
S&SCo..Routinesupplyandsalvagework. (KR*
Sectionburiedseventeenbodies,noneexposed.
Thoseexposedhavebeensprayedwithpennite. Also
sprayedarethepitsandthegroundareawhere
v
the
deadhadbeenprocessed. Twentyunfitstretchersn'
burned.
OrdCo* Routineordnancework.
8March45 HqCo, Routinework.
S&SCo. Routinesupplyandsalvagework. G.R.
Sectionburiedthirtybodies,ninebodiesexposed.
Twomenfromsectiontemporarilyassignedto*Slst
Marforduty. Becauseoftheincreasedburial's,
morethancontemplated,theG.R.bivouacareahas
twicebee
s
naltered. Workingfacilitiesaredifficult
andbulldozingstymiedattimes.
ft

ftgutineordnancework..
qCo, Routinework.
- Routinesupplyandsalvagework, G.R.
Sectionburiedfortybodies,sevenbodi-esexposed.
Moundsnowbeingerectedoneverygraveinfront
ofcross.
OrdCo,Routineordnancework.
10March45 HqCo*- Routinework,
S&SCo* Routinesupplyandsalvagework*G-*R#
Sectionburiedtenbodies,noneexposed.
OrdCo.Routineordnancework. Oneammunitionman
returnedtocompanyfordutyfromtemporarydutywith
9thMar. Onemanto3dKarDivFldHosp.(sick)
11March45 HqCo.--Routinework,
S&SCo.. Routinesupplyandsalvagework,"G-.R.
Sectionburiedtwenty-onebodies,noneexposed.
OrdCo*Routineordnancework* Onemansentto
3dliarDivFldHosp.(sick).
12March45 HqCo Routinework. MajorCullenleft
Iwo. JimaforG-uambyairtransport.
S&SCo. Routinesupplyandsalvagework. WO
CoulsonleftforIwoJimaforGuambyairtransport.
G.R,Sectionburiedseventeenbodies,twenty-six
exposed. Onesalvagemanwoundedandevacuated.
0Lanhamwoundedbutremainedonduty.
OrdGo. Routineordnancework. Onemansentto
3dHarDivFldHosp.(sick).
13March45 HqCol Routinework.
S&SCo. Routinesupplyandsalvageworjt. G-.R.
Sectionburiedfifty-tx^obodies,noneexposed.
.Fiftyunfitstretchersburied.
OrdCo. Routineordnancex^ork. Onemansentto
3dHarDivFldHosp.andevacuatedsamedate.
14March45 HqCo. Routinework.
S&SCo. Routinesupplyandsalvagework,G.R.
Sectionburiedelevenbodies,noneexposed.
Fifteenrowsofcrosseserectedsofarandten *
rowsofmoundscompleted*
OrdCo. Routineordnancework. Onemansentto
3dKarDivFl-dHosp.(sick)
15March45 HqCo. Routinework,
S&SCo, Routinesupplyandsalvage-work, ,*
OrdCo, Routineordnancework.
-
16March45 HqCo. Routinework.
S&SCp.-- Routine-supplyandsalvagework.
OrdCo.-- Routineordnancework.
1800Islandsecured.
.- 9~ . .. . .
reportsweresubmittedinaccordance
withinst?cfifl&#tfcontainedinGeneral.OrderNo.133,dated
25Jan45. Casualties"sufferedbythisBattalionto16March
wereasfolloi\rs
27Feb.2Enl.WIA
1Mar.1Off.WIA
12Mar.1WO. WtA
"12Mar.'1Enl.
Therewereno'personnelkilledinactiojiin
thisbattalion.
2, Themorslfcofthisbattalionduringthis
operationwasverygood* Contributingfactorswere:
1. Theuseofoutfit,cooking,packwhichenabledthemess
officertoprovidehotcoffeeandsomehotfoodatevery
meal. 2 Theearlyarrivalandrapiddistributionof
arrivingmailplusavailabilityofV-Mailblakstoall
personnelforoutgoingletters. '3. Thedistributionof
freshstoresinthelaterstag.esoftheoperation.
3. Thisbattalionhandlednoprisoners,natives
orciviliansduringtheoperation*
B.Intelligence,
1. Thetypesofmap.sandphotosandtheamounts
issuedtothisunitbeforetheoperationwereadequatefor
allneeds.
C.OperationsandTraining. ' .."
1. TheindoctrinationoftroopsInthe.details
oftheIwoJimaoperationyaeleftuptothevariousofficers
inchargeofeachgroupofmenaboardship. Thishadtobe
donedue,tothefact$hat-thisunitwas*embarkedaboard
thirteendifferentships. TroopsaboardtheCapeJohnson
werebrie.edbytheIndividualcompanycommandersandalso
bythestaffofthetroopcommander. Officerswhohadsmall>
detachmentsaboardotherships-were.abletoobtain fi6m.
s
the
troopcommandersadequate
;
.materialforbriefingofalltheir
personnel. '
Supply*
1. Mountingoutsupplies,loadedinquantities
prescribedbyAdministrative'Plan1-45,wereadequateforthe
operation,withtheexceptionofClassII. Supplieswere
loadedonsixAK
f
s,asequallydistributedaspracticable.
AsonlytwooftheAK'Swereunloaded,onlyanapproximate
tendaysofClassIIsupplieswereavailable. Thisfigure,
wasfurtherreducedbydiversionofsuppliestootherthan
3dMarineDivisionDumpswhileunloadingwhichwerenotwholly
recovered. Noparticularhardshipresultedexceptinthe
caseofclothing. AllClassIIIsuppliesbelongingtoother
unitsunloadingoverthesamebeachesasthe3dMarineDi-
visionwereapparentlydivertedtothe3dDivisionDump,which
hasactedasthedistributingpointthroughout'theoperation
forpracticallyallunitsontheeastcoastofthisisland,
lessthe4thMarineDivision.
-10-
IIT
1
tacticallynoresupplyofclothingwas
t^division. Onliarch12,1945arequisition
x^as'subMffe3^td
:
the8thFieldDepot,butfieldshoeswasthe
onlyitemaxt^lableforsupply. Tenthousandpairsofcotton
socks,fivehundredutilitycoatsandonethousandutility
trouserswereobtainedfromthe5thllarineDivision.
Stockoflandingrationsvasaugmentedby
salvageofabandonedrationdumps. Practically noissueof
nexjindividual equipmentx*asnecessary,all requirements
b^ingmetfromsalvagedstock, ResupplyofClassIIIitems
hasnotbeennecessary.
3. Palletizedcargo,particularlyofrationsand
clothing,xtfasparticularly difficult tohandleindivision
dumpsduetolackofproperunloading equipment,necessi*
tatingbreakingofpalletsontrucksinordertounload. At
night,xtforkingunderblack-out conditions,thisprocedure
seriouslydelayedreturnoftruckstothebeach. Serious
losses,duetodiversionoftruckstootherdumpsandnon~
recoveryofcargo,alsoocturredingreateramountsinthecase
ofcriticalitemsandchoicecomponentsoftheBaker ration
thanx/ouldhavebeenexperiencediftheseitemshadnotbeen
palletized. Atruckcontainingtwopalletsoflardsub-
stitute,aparticularly criticalitemonthisoperation,pre-
sentsamuchgreatertemptationfactorfordiversionfromits
properdestination,thandoesatruckloadedwithassorted
casesofvariouscomponents*
\ Wilsondrumswerenotusedfordivision;cargo,
butexaminationofseveraldrumsbroughtbyvariousunitsof
thedivisiondisclosedthattheircontentswereperfectly dry
andundamagedafterseveral'daysofexposure.
4. The3dliarineDivisionSalvagegroup,con-
sistingofonexrarrantofficer,15Salvagemen,and85shoe
andtextilepersonnel embarkedfortheIwoJimaoperation.
a Salvageoperationsbeganonthe28thof
February,1945.
b* FifteenmenwereemployedintheDivision
Salvagedumptoreceive,andsortequip-
ment.
c. Allserviceable itemswereretainedfor
reissue,allunserviceableitemsx;ere
scrapped.
d. Salvagegroupsx/eretakenintothefield
asrequiredtoassistregimental salvage
teamsinthecollectionofitemsof
specialinterest. .
e. !!ennotengagedinsalvageoperations
wereusedforworkingpartiesbythe
DivisionQuartermasterandtheDivision
CommissaryOfficer.
E; Engineer.
1. General
a,Uatersupplyandequipment.
(1)Theinitialsupplyofwatercon-
sistedof100,000gallonsbrought
-11-
ashoreindrums. Distilling
apparatuswassetupasfollows?
SixBadgerunitsonyellowbeaicfi
onFebruary24ancltwentyBadget*
unitsandtwoCleavebrookunits"
onPurpleBeachMarch2nd. DuV
tosurfconditionsfulluse,o$th
unitsonPurpleBeachwasnotp^s
bleuntilMarch15thanduntil/'.
thatdateanaverageofonlyfour
teentosixteenthousandgallons-
w*sdistilleddailyagainstand''
:
f
penditureoftwentythreethousar.
gallons,butsincethe15thour ':
distillationratehas-increased
toapproximately25,000gallons
perday. Ofthesixunitsonthe
eastcoast,fourwereinoperatic
a
ndofthe20Badgerunitsonthe
westcoast,fourwereunserviceaf
andfourweretakenapartandc
cleaneddailyleavingtwelvesmal
unitsandtwolargeunitstocarf?
theload.
(2). Sincethe16thofMarch,approxi-
mately10,000gallonsperdaywer
distilledinexcessofdivision
requirementswhichwasstoredin.
drumsasareservesupplyfor
futureuse.
(3). Waterwasissuedintrailersat
thedistillationplants. Twowat
pointswereestablishedfordrums
and5galloncanissue,oneat
theDivisionSupplyandoneattfc
topofroadfromPurpleBeach,ea'
ofwhichusedtenmenforfilling
andexchangingcansanddrums,at
YellowBeach. * >
(4). Additionalwater(about2,000
gallonsperday)wasobtainedaft
March12fromthe8thFieldDepot
waterpointastheydidnothave
needforthefullcapacityof
theirplant,andwhenthe4thDi-
visionembarkedtheyturnedover
tousonMarch18thapproximately
25,000gallonsofwater,which
washauledtotheQuartermaster
F,Ordnance
Dumpforissue.
1.Thesupplysectionhandledandissued,from
:
replenishment,allordnancematerialRequiredbythevariov
organizationsthroughoutthedivision. DfriiLxcontactwas
-12-
:htheseorgaBzationsastotheirneeds^hordnancematerial
andalsoastotheavailablesalvagedequipmenttobeturnedin
tothesu-pplysection.
a. Thesupplysectionalsoreceivedallenemy
ordnanceequipment.
Ordnancereplenishmentwassufficientto
meetalldemandsofthedivision,
"From
u
D
il
daytosecuritydate,theammunition
section'sprimarydutywasthestorageandissueofalltypes
ofammunitionneededthroughoutthedivision. Fourammunition
personnelwereattachedtoeachinfantryregimenttomaintain-
theforwardammunitiondumpsfortheregimentconcerned. TheY
balanceofthesectionsetupthedivisionammunitiondump,re-
ceivedallammunitionfromthebeach,andissueditoutt.oths
regimentalammunitiondumps,whichinturnissuedtheamraunitic
totheindividualcompanies,
G-. Medical. . -
1. Embarkation .
a. Personnelembarked12February,1945.
b. Materialwasloaded10February,1945.
2. AboardShip - .
a. Therewaspracticallynosicknessaboard
ship. Therewerenocommunicablediseases.
SkindiseaseswereMinimal duetocool
weatherandadequate-washingfacilities.
b. SanitaryConditions.
(1) Adequateinnumberandwellpoliced,
(2) Livingquarterswerenotcrowdedbut
wellventilatedandclean.
(3) Messes. Troopsateincrew'smess.
Itwasadequateinsize,cleanliness
andfacilitiesforwashingmessgear
satisfactory,
(4) Galleys. Onlyonelargegalleyifas
usedforbothshipscompanyand
troops. Itwaskeptcleanandsani-
' tary.
(5) CooksandMessmen. Marinecooksand"
messmenwereassignedtoworkwith
thellavychiefcooks. This,wasa
satisfactoryarrangement.
3. Debarkation.
a. Personnel. Allweredebarked27February,
1945inoneLCMabout1400..
b, Materialcameashore5dayslaterwith
organizationalgear,exceptforonemed-
icalchest.
4. Ashore-AssaultPhase,
a. Medical'Installation.
(1) Aidstationwassetuponlandingat
theDivisionRationDump. .
r
(2) ProtectiveMeasuresincludedlocation
atsideofahillwithinBn. Defenc
perimeter,withliberaluseofsand-
bags,
'i-
c.
d.
e.
Evacuation.
(1) Allpatients VTQTQ evacuatedtoDiv.
FidiHospital,
(2) Adequate*
CasualtiesTreated.
(1) Nu'mber
(a)retained-tx^o
(b)evacuated- nonp
(c)died-none
(2) Type.Wound,fragment-two
(3) Walkingwounded'-txro
(4) Stretchercases-none
Sanitation.
(1) Nospecialmeasure's'-werenecessary.
(2) Food. Usuallandingrations.Type"C"
and
!l
K
lf
also "10inone"Rationswere
usedfortwoweeks. Eachmanre-
sponsiblefordisposalofrefuse.
Afterbeingashore.abouttwoweeks
agalleywassetupandhot"B"
rationswereservedthreetimesa
day. Galleyandmesshallscon-,
sistedofstoragetents. Tables
wereconstructedofplanksonup-
endedbarrels. Allfoodxvasserved
assoonasitwasopenedand;.
prepared.-Norefrigerationwasavail-
able. Onebarrelofboilingwater
wasavailableattheheadofthechoxj
lin.eandthreebarrels (onesoapy,
tworinse)forx^rashingmessgear. All
garbagewasburied.
(3) AllwaterWasdraxvnfromDivision
waterpoints,whereitwasdistilled
andchlorinatedfromsalt-water.
Disposalofdead.
(1)OferDoad.
(a)Attheoutsetofthecampaignfor
thisunit (Dplus6),onetruck
wasdispatchedtoeachofthetw
regimentalcollectingstations.
An.averageofeighttotwelve
bodieswerecarriedonone2Q
ton (6X6), Thetrucks returned
totheDivisioncemetery,and
afterthebodieswereplaced
uponthedeck,adetailcon-
sistingocorpsmenandMarines,
processed eachbodypriorto
burial.
Byprocessing ismeant,first
theidentifications tagswere
soughtforandiftwowerefound
onewasremovedaadtheother
leftaroundthewSkxif thede~
^ceased. nfo: Informationwasthen'
relayedfromtheI.D.tagto
totwocopiesofFMFPacForm
9andalsoontheseforms,when
possible,onefingerprint
(preferablyrightindexfinger)
wastaken. . M
(c)Personaleffectswereremoved
andplacedinapersonaleffect
bagalongwithacardcon- -
tainingtheidentityofits
owner. Atthesametime,a
shippingtagwasentwined
aroundtheshoestring.orthere
aboutsofthedeceased,which
tagcontainedtheman'sname
andgraveandrox<rtobeburied.
Thestretcherdetailthenbroup
thebodyintothearrangedpit
atwhichtheNCOinchargein-
structedthedetailastothe
~exactlocationforburialof
thatbody.
(d)IfabodydidnotcontainI.D.
tagsorperfectmeansofident.1
fication,regardlessofseem-
ingidentificationbyletters,
stencilmarks,etc.,allfinger
printsweretaken,andother
identifyingmarksrecorded.
Inthiscase,acopyofForm9
(thirdcopy)wasburledwith
thebody,
(c)Becauseofthesandyterrain,
commonexcavationforburials
wasnecessary. Theareawas'
surveyedandmarkersplaced
north-southandeast-west.
I/henapitwascompletely
filledwithburials,'theearth
wouldbebulldozedoverthe
bodiesallowingadepthofove-i
sixfeotfrompersontotop
side,
(f)Eachgravehadapersonalcross
(orStarofDavid)affixedjust
tother%arofthehead,had
thebodybeenplacedontopside
Amoundwasalsomade,indi- ;
vidually,infrontofeach
gravemarker,
(g)Notonlywerebodiespickedup
fromregimentalcollecting,
stations,butatanyputofthe
-15-
waylocationwherecalledupon
todosoi
(h)Priortoburial,militaryecuip-
ment (782)andammunitionwas
removed,stackedandthendeliver^
edtotheDivisionSalvageor
DivisionOrdnanceOfficers.
(2)Enemy, ,
(a)ThisunitdidsendforthtwoJap
buryingdetails,underthesupers
visionofthemedicalauthority,
andtheenemydeadwereburied
atorneartheplacewherefound,
(3)Sanitaryprecautionstaken.
(a)Allmenwerefurnishedapairof
rubber (medical)gloves.
(b)Bodieswereburiedandcovered
withdirtassoonaspossible.
(c)Wherebodieswereinacontaminated
condition,suchwereimmediately
sprayedwithPennite,
(d)Whenbodieshadtoremainexposed
overnight,allbodieswerethen
sprayedand,tightlycovered.
(o)Eachnight,fiiedeckuponwhich
thebodieshadlainwassprayed
aswellastheareawithinthe
openpit,
(f)Contaminatedstretcherswere
destroyedbyfire,
lledicalOrganization.
(1) Thepresenttypeofmedicalorgan-
izationissatisfactory.
(2) Nochangesarerecommended.
1'edicalpersonnel.
(1)adequate(22^overstrengthofcorps-
men).
(2)TwoassignedtoOrd.Co*,oneassigned
toAmmo,^ump. SixCorpsmenwith
lledicalOfficeroperatedsickbay
forHqCo.andS&SCo.atthe,
DivisionDump.
(3)Nolosses,
(4)Adequate.
(5)Nospecialitiesneeded.
h.FieldHedicalEquipment.
(1)Ninetypercentcarried.
(2)Onecasebrokenopenbutnothingmiss-
ing.
(NoLosses).
(3)OnlyUnits#5A,#5Bandachestof
miscellaneousgearwereused. All
otherunitswereunnecessaryunder
thecircumstancesofthiscampaign.
(4) PresdnttypeentSely suitable.
(5) Noimprovements recommended*
(6) Equipmentcarriedwassufficient. No
resupplywasnecessary*
MedicalSupplies.
(1) Amountcarriedwasthatallowedfor
Bn.AidStationplus10daysBack '
up. '
(2) Nopilferageandnolosses,
(3) Suppliescarriedwerefarmorethan
adequate.
(4) Moresupplyneeded.
(5) NoBlockshipmentsreceivedbythis
unit.
PARTV, Recommendations.
1. ItisstronglyrecommendedthatpersonneloftheSer-
viceBattalionnotbeassignedtoship'sunloadingplatoons
ortotheShoreParty. Threeoperationshavedemonstrated
thatlackofservicepersonnelintheinitialstagesofthe
operationhaveseriouslyhandicappedtheefficient operation
ofdumps,ordnancerepairshopsandgravesregistration.
Sufficientpersonnelfromtheshorepartymustbeprovided
fordumplabortoinsureunloadingandsafeguardingof
supplies,anditiscontendedthattheassignment ofService
Battalionpersonneltotheirregulardutiesattheoutsetof
theoperationwill-greatlyincreasetheefficiencyofthe
shorepartyaswellasprovide"trainedpersonneltosegregatea
issuesupplies.
2. ThatallmembersofthisdivisionhavetheDiamond
insignia*withtheregimental,battalionandcompanynumbers
withinsuchdiamond,stencilledondungareesjacket,leggings,
andanyotherouterclothing.
3. ThattheGravesRegistration Sectionbe supplied
withtwo(2)artilleryaimingdevicespriortoanoperation,
foruseinalligninggraves.
4. Thatamedicalofficer (besidesthedentalofficer)
beassigned'totheGraves.Registration SectiontomakeForm
N o n allmenabouttobeburiedwhohavenoFormNdisplayed
ontheirperson.
5. ThatallmenofthisDivisionbeinstructedastothe
necessityofdescriptionbynotesthatshouldaccompanyeach
bodywhereitcanbeseenthatsuchbodyisincapableof
physicalidentity;i.e.,charredbodiesremovedfromatank,
descriptionshouldfollowastowhatbodywasremovedfrom
whatpartofthetank,etc*,tanknane,number,etc.
P.Gr.Chandler.
-17-
HO* RC>TV^D
29
10
13
12
5
4
3
3
2
1
1
7
3
8
1.
1
DNANCiJ COHPAKY* 3D SilRVJCS. BATTALIpW,
PS, 3D LAHIi^ DIVISION, F&F,
s T&S FI JLD.
JA?AuSJ
(During"period19Feb45toI6Mar45incl)
Rifles,cal.503 5
LightIlachinegun
;>
Cal. ,303 4
HeavyMachinegun.Cal. ,303 5
HeavyMachinegun,Cal, ,51,AA/AT5
Gun,20mm,AA/AT
1
Gun,47mm,A/T o
Grenadedischargers
0
hortar,81mra 1
Gun,70mm 0
Gun,75mm 1
Howitzer,105mm 0
Cannon,automatic,25mm,AA/AT '0
Rocketlaunchers,8inch 0
Lewismachinegun,Cal,,303 4
Flamethrower* 0
Li^'htMachine^xin.Cal.503,f/tank1
(fiNCLOSUM "A")
L A T Z
28Feb45
lMar45
2Mar45
- '
ORDANCECOMPANY ,
3DSERVICEBATTALION,
00P3,3DMARINEDIVISION,FMF.
INTHEFIELD.
SALVAGE
ITEM
Carbine,Cal.30,Ml 139
BAR, Cal,30,M1918A2. 31
Rifles, Cal.30,hi 220
Bayonets,M1905 139
BMG, Cal30,M19A4 2
Mounts,tripod,3K0,Cal,30,M2 2
Magazineassemblyf/carbine 41
Magazineassembly T/BAR 258
Scabbard,Bayonet 160
Launcher,rocketAT,K9A1 3
Mortar,80mm,M2 3
Mounts,mortar,60mm 3
Belts,magazine,M193? 12
Pockets',magazine,doublewebf/carbine 70
BMG, Cal.30,M1917A1 1
Mbunt,tripod,BMS,Cal,30,P1917A1 1
Rifle,,cal./30,M1903,fittedfor
telescopiceight. 1
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 55
BAH, Cal.30,M1918A2 . 23
Rifles, Cal.30,Ml 94
Bayonets,M1905 ' 55
BMG, Cal.30,M19A4 , 1
Mounts,tripod,BM,Cal.30,M2 2
Magazineassembly f/carbine 18
Magazineassemblyf/BAR 261
Scabbarct,"bayonet 66
Launcher,,rocketAT,' ;
v
iAl 2
Mortar,60mm.M2 ' 1
Mounts,mortar,SOmm 1
Sight,telescope;sniper 1
Carbines,Cal.30,'Ml 49
3AR, Cal.30,Ml918A2 14
Rifles, Cal.30,Kl 89
Bayonets,M19O5 56
3M0,Cal;30,M19A4 . 3
Mounts,tripod,BMG,Cal-,30^M2 3
Magazine,assembly f/carbine- 9
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR 286
Scabbard,bayonet 51
Launcher,rocketAT',\-M9Al . 2
(ENCLOSURE
tf
B")
X*.
SALVAGE(Cont'&J
2Mar45 Mortar,60mm,M2
Mounts,mortar,60mm
Pockets,magazine,doubleweb
3MG, Cal.30,M1918A1
Mouttt,trinod,3MG,Cal.30,M1917A1 1
Barrels,saare,BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4 5
Case,.carrying,M14 1
Launcher,grenadeM7 1
Chest,waterMl ' 5
Chest,steelM5
v
5
Sight,M4 1
Clinometer,Ma,Ml91? 5
Flamethrower,portableM2-2 6
Launcher,grenadeM8 4
3Mar45, Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 4
BA?., Cal.30,M1918A2 3
Aifles,Cal.30,Ml 7
Bayonets,M1905 18
3Ma, Cal.30,M19A4 3
Mounts,tripod,3M&,Cal.30,M2 2
* Magazine,assemblyf/carbine 70
Magazine,assemblyf/3AH 90
Scabbard,bayonet 35
Belts,magazine,.iU.937,BAH 16
Pockets,magazine,douolewebf/carbine 56
Barrel,spare,BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4 1
Chest,water,Ml 1
Chest,steel,M5 1
Clinometer,MG,Ml917 1
Launcher,grenade,M8 5
Cover,'tripod,MountM2 1
Sling,carrying,MG,&Ammo 5
Bandoleer,BAH .. '3
Compass,lensatic , 1
,Device,steamcondensingf/3MG,M1917Al 12
Case,f/device,steamcondensingf/BMG
M1917A1. 14
fellers,Oval,3ounce 20
Oilers,rectangular,1,ounce 4
Pliers,sidecutting 2
Roll,tool,M12 5
Roll,spareparts,Ml3 5
Case,cleaningrod,JOL 3
(SNCL03URS"B")
2
SALVAaElGdntld)
NO
3Mar45
4Mar45
5Mar45
5Mar45
7Mar45
Rod,cleaning,Ml 1
Bag,ammunition,M2 8
Pad,shoulder,M2 9
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 1
BAR,Cal*30,M1S18A2 1
Rifle,Cal.30,Ml 1
Flamethrower,portableM2-2 1
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 57
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2 27
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml 133
Bayonets,Ml905 91
BMG,Cal.30,M19A4 4
Mounts,tripod,3MG-,Cal,30,M2 3
Magazineassemblyf/carbine 20
Magazineassemblyf/BAR 348
Scabbard,bayonet 100
Launcher,rocketAT,M9ip. 4
Pocket,magazine,doubleweb,f/carbine 28
Case,carrying,M14 1
Launcher,grenade,M7
2
Sight,M4
1
Launcher,M8
4
Mortar,81mm,Ml
1
Carbines,Cal,30,Ml
35
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml
140
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2 12
3arrel,spare,BMG,Cal.5O,M2KB 1
Bayonets,M1905 52
Scabbard,bayonet 77
Barrels,spare,BM3-,Cal.30,M1919A4 2
Launcher,grenade,M8 2
Case,carryingsight,Ml4 1
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR 84
Flamethrower,portable,M2-2 2
Launoher,"rocketAT,M9A1 1
Pockets,magazine,doublewebf/carbine
Cal.30,Ml
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 13
1
Case,carryingsight,Ml4
1
BMG,Cal.50,M2,M14
1
Mount,mortar,81mm,Ml
4
Barrels,spare,BMG,Cal.30,Ml919A4
225
Magazine,assembly,f/3AR
55
Magazine,assembly,f/carbine
1
Rifle,Cal.30,M1903
(ENCLOSURE"B
n
)
-3-
3 ' " V ''
8Kar45
9Har45
10Mar45
ITS!
Launcher,grenade,M8
Bayonet,111905 *
87
Scabbard* bayonet
36
Rifle,Cal;3Q>HI
3
BAR,Cal.3Q> H1918A2
1
Sight,H4
Mount,tripod,BMG,Cal.30,K1917A1
1
Flamethrower,portable\H2-2
1
Mortar,60mm,H2
1
Launcher,grenade,
2
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR 30
TSMG,Cal.45,M1928A1 1
Bayonets,M1905 17
Scabbard,bayonets 29
Rifles,Cal.30,HI 51
Hounts,tripod,BMG,Cal,30,H2 3
Carbines,Cal.30,HI 18
BMG,Cal.30,H1917A1 1
BAR,Cal.30,H1918A2 8
TSMiG,Cal.45,?I1928Al 1
Carbines,Cal.30,Kl 25
Bayonets,3*1905 86
Scabbard,bayonets 97
Rifles,Cal.30,HI 86
Magazine,assembly f/carbine 6
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR 130
Flamethrower,protable,M2-2 1
Mortar,60mm,112 2
Mounts,mortar,60mm 2
Mounts,tripod,BMG,Cal.30,H2 10
BHG,Cal.30,M1919A4 8
Barrels,spare, BHG,Cal.30,M1919A4 7
Sights,H4 3
Case,carrying,sight,H14 3
Sight,telescope,sniper 1
Launcher,grenade,II? 1
Mortar,81mm,Ml 1
Mount,mortar,81mm,Ml 1
Bayonets,M1905 40
Scabbard,bayonets 45
Shotgun,riot,12gauge 1
Flamethrower,portable,.M2-2 2
Mounts,tripod,BMG,Cal.30,112 7
Barrels,spare,BHG,Cal.30,M1919A4 3
, p ,
62
Rifles^C';1.30,HI
16
Carbines,Cal.30,HI
11
BAR,Cnl.30,K1918A2
Magazine,
1
assembly,F'BAR
32
3
BMG,Cal.30,H1919A4
2
BMG,Cal.30,K1917A1
Ilkar45
12Mar45
13Mar45
SALVAGS(ContU)
Case,carrying)sight,hi4
Clinometer,MG,M1917
Chest,water,hi
Rifles,Cal.30,Kl
Carbines,Cal.30241
Belts,magazine,M1937,f/BAR
Bandoleer,BAR
Cover,tripod,MountM2
Case,cleaningrod,Ml
Pad,shoulder,M2
Case,f/device,steam condensing
f/BMG,Cal.30,.M1917A1
Bag,ammunition,M2
Carrier,grenade,hand,M1S18
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2 .
Shot,gun,riot,12guage
Launcher,grenade,M8
.Bayonets,M1905
Scabbard,bayonets
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml
Carbines,Cal,30,Ml
Flamethrower,portable,M2-2-
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2
BMG,Cal.30,-M1919A4
Mounts,tripod,BMG,Cal.30,M2
Launcher,rocketAT,M9A1
Bayonets,M1905
Scabbard,bayonats
Magazine,ass.embly,f/BAR
Belts,magazine,M1937,f/BAR
Bag,ammunition,M2
Sl i ng, car r yi ng, fclG &Ammo
Pad,shoulder,M2
Roll,tool,M12
Launcher,grenade,M8
Sight,M4
Case,carrying,sight,M14
Barrel,spare,BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4
Mortar,60mm,M2
Mounts,SOmmmortar,H2
Rifles,Cal.50,Ml
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2
Mortar,60mni,M2
Mounts.,mortar,60mm,M2
BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4
Mounts,tripod,JBMG,Cal.30,M2
3
3
2
6
36
16
7
2
1
2
1
1
.1
2
1
1
2
13
19
88
27
1
20
3
4
2
44
50
77
8
9
15
1
1
3
1
1
1
3
3
190
22
23
5
5
4
3
SiiLViGE(Cont
f
fl)
ITEM WO.RECEIVED
Sight,M4 - 2
Case\carrying,84-ght^Ml4 2
Launcher,rocket,AT,M9A1 4
Pockets,magazine,double web,f/carbine 17
Extension, sight,f/60mra, mortar 3
Clinometer,MG,Cal.30,M1917
1
Launcher,grenade,M8
19
Bayonets,M1905
74
Scabbard, bayonet
85
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR
404
Magazine,assemblyf/carbine
65
Launcher,grenade,M7
1
Chest,steel,M5
2
Grease,gun,alemite,6ounce
1
iJling,gunleather,M1907
500
Flamethrower,portable,M2-*2
8
Filler,magazine,f/BAR
5
BUG,Cal.30,141917^1
1
1
Mount,tripod,BMG, Cal.30
?
K1917Al
1
Chest,water,M4
65
Case,oiler& thong
2
Quadrant,gunners,Ml (Mils)
14Mar45 Rifles,Cal
#
30,Ml 22
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 12
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2 6
Launcher,grenade,M8 1
Barrel,spare,BIiG,Cal.3O, M1919A4 3
Bayonet,M1905
13
Scabbard, bayonet
11
15Mar45 Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 4
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml 32
BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4 1
Mount,tripod,BMG,Cal.30,M2 1
BAR,.Cal.30,M1918A2 1
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR 41
Barrel,spare,f/BMG,Cal.30,M1917A1 1
Launcher,grenade,M8 4
Bayonets,M1905 17
Scabbard, bayonet 16
Flamethrower,portable, M2-2 2
Bipod,assembly,f/BAR 1
Belts,magazine,M-1937
12
Bag,ammunition,M2
1
Machine link,.loading,Cal.50,M2
2
(ENCLOSURE"B")
6
NO.RECEIVED
16Mar45 Rifles,Cal
#
30,Ml
Carbines,Cal
#
3Q,Ml
41
BAR; Cal3O, M1918A2
29
BUG, Cal.3Q, K1919A4
5
Mortar,81mm,Ml
Magazine,assemblyf/BAR
Magazine,"assemblyf/carbine 17
Bayonets,K1905 .
Scabbard,bayonet
Launcher,grenade,M8
Mount,tripod,BMG,Oal.,30,K2
Launcher,rocket
t
AT,M9A1
4
11
1
6
2
Barrel; spare f/3MG,Cal.30,K1919A4
Flamethrower
l
portable,M2<-
Mortar,6Omn5,M2
5
2
1
Mount,mortar,60mm 1
Includedintheabovefiguresareitemsthatwill
bedeclaredunserviceable. Serviceabilitywillbedetermined
byphysicalinventoryandinspection.
!
(ENCLOSURE"B")
-.7-
3D 3^RVI CI - BATTALION,
OP3, 3D toARIAeJ DIV13I0H,
Itf TH FI^LD,
'FK
DATE wO.
ARTILLERY SECTION
27Feb45
Gun, 37mmAT,(Strippedforsalvaged
parts)
TAUK SSOTION
27Feb45 Tanks (Repaired)
ARMS ' '
28Feb45 Carbines,Cal.30,Ml
Rifles,Gal,30,HI
BKG,Cal.30,K1919A4
Mounts,tripod,BUG-,Cal.$0,142
2
18
1
1
ARTILUIRX
28Feb45 Howitzer,105mm, (Repaired)
KOTORTRANSPORTS;CTlOxl
28Feb45 |ton,4x4
2|ton,6x6
aSECTION
28Feb45 Tank (Repaired)
SI^ALLARKS30TI0H'
lKar45
-
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml
Rifles,Cal.30^Kl
BAR,Cal,30,ia918A2
BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4
Mortar,60mm,H2
founts,mortar,60mm
Kortar,81mm,M2
57
62
19
2
2
2
1
OPTICALIHSTRUM^T 55CTI0H -
Iliar45 Quadrant,range,K4
KOTORTRANSPORT-SECTION
H'Iar45 tton,4x4
2kton,,6x6
HORK COKP
W.REPAIRED
SECTION
Ihar45 Tank(Repaired)
ARI43.SECTION
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 54
50
Rifles,Cal,30,Mi
9
BiiR,Gal.30,M1918A2
4
BMG,Cal.30,M1919A4
1
BI'iG-.Cal.30,J41917A1
2
Mounts,tripod,BUG,Cal.30,M2
AFCELECTICN
Tank(Repaired)
3aar45
Setupworkshopsinnewarea.
bECTIOK
4nar45 Ca r bi ne s , Gal *30, Ml
42
Rifles, Cal.30, kl
66
Bi,R, Cal.30, hl918ii2
4
hort ar, 81iiim,M2
1
Launcher, rocket, i<i9ivl
3
MOTOR TR^NbPOKT SECTION
4i-iar45 . Half t r a c k
Hixlik i^iUHTEii/U^CE SECTION
4Msr 45 Tanks(&trippingforsalvageparts)2
DiiALL
5i-iar45 Carbines, Cal.30,, 111 19
Rifles, Cal.30, Ml * '.29
3iiR, Cal.30, M1918iv2 21
B14G, Cal.30, Ml9l9i,4 3
aounts, t ri pod, BwG, Cal.30, t\Z 4
lieohanisrn, elevating 'a traversing
BMG, Cal.30 . 3
MOTOR TRANSPORT SECTION
1 ton, 4x4
1
t ton, 4x4
1
(ENCLOSURE "C")
WORKCQKPLTD
HO,.REPAIRED
TANKMAINTENANCESECTION
5kar45 Tanks(Continuedstrippingforparts) 2
Tanks,(Underrepair) 2
SHALLARHBSECTION
6Har45 Carbines,Cal.30,kl 19
BAH;Gal.30,M1918A2. 18
BMG,Cal.30,kl9l9A4 4
Mortar,60mia
A
M2 1
kounts,mortar,.60mm 4
'Launcher,rocket,K9A1 4
Kechanism,elevating<ktraversing
BMG>Cal.30
ABTILLSRY30TION
6Ilar45 Howitzer,105mm,(Repa.ired)
l^OTORTRANSPORTSC?IQ^
6Kar45 2jton,6x6
6kar45 Tanks,(Continuedstrippingforparts) 2
Tanks,(Continuedunderrepair) 2
ARI43 3ECT10N
?I:ar45 Carbines, Cal,30, Ml 16
Ri f l es, Cal.30, 1O.
93
BAR, Cal. 30; K1918A2
1
Hount, tripod,BMG, Cal. 30, k2 1
Pi s t ol , automatic, Cal. 45, fcQ.911Al
1
ARTILLERY 5ECTI0II
71iar45
Howitzer,75mmj(Repaired)
J^CJitiCTION
7Mar45 Tanks,(Continuedstrippingforparts)
Tanks,(Completedrepairjob)
Tanks,(Experimentalarmorplate)
UQRKCOMPLETED(CO^-T'D)
BATE HO,REPAIRED
SMALLARKSSECTION
\
Carbines,Cal.30,Ml
8Mar45
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml
BMB, Cal.3O,M1919A4 "
Mortar,60mm,M2
Mounts,tripod,BMG,Cal.30,M2
Mechanism,elevatingandtraversing
Cal.30-
TANKKAIHTSNAIK&SECTION
8Mar45 Tanks.,(Continuedstrippingforparts)
Tanks,(Strippingforsalvage)
Tanks,(Continuedrepairwork)
SMALLARMSSECTION
9Mar45 . Carbines,Cal.30,Mi
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2
BMC-, Cal.30,M1919A4
Mounts,tripod,BHO,Cal.30,M2
Launcher.,rocket,M9A1
Kechanism,elevatingandtraversing
BMG-, Cal.30
N

Pistol,automatic,Cal.45,M1911A1
MOTORTRAI^SPORTSECTION
9Mar45 1ton,4x4
TAI^KMAINTENANCE SECTION
91fe,r45 Tanks,(ContinuedstrippingforParts)
Tanks,(Completedrepairwork)
SMALLARKSSECTION
10Mar45 Carbines,Cal.30,Ml
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml
.BM&, Cal.30,M1919A4
Mounts,tripod,BMG-,Cal.30,M2
Tube,mortar,81mm,Ml
Mechanism,elevatingandtraversing
BUG-, Cal.30
Launcher,grenade,M7
Flamethrower,portable,M2-2
(ENCLOSURE
55
53
1
2
2
1
1
11
38
23
12
7
7
1
3
2
1
53
2
7
1
1
6
1
COMPLETED(COHT'D)
NO.REPAIRED
TANKMAINTENANCESECTION
10Har45
Tanks, (Continuedstrippingforparts)
o
Tank,(Strippingforsalvage)
1
Tanks, (Repairing)
2
SMALLARMSSECTION ' .
llMar45 Carbines,Cal.30,Ml
1
Rifleo,Cal.30HI 47
BMG,Cal.30,K1919A4
1
Mechanism,elevating&traversing
Bi-ia,Cal.30 2
Launcher,rocket,M9A1 2
ARTILLERYSECTION
HMar45 Gun,37mmAT,(Strippedfor.salvage)
WorkedonJapanesefielgpieces.
OPTICALINSTRUMENTSECTION
ilMar45 Sights,M4
MOTORTRANSPORTSECTION
HMar45 ton, 4x4
TAI^IC aSECTION
Illiar45 Tanks,(Continuedstrippingforparts) 4
Tanks, (Repairing) 2
SMALLARliS3ECTI0N . * r
12Mar45 - Carbines,Cal.30,Ml 2
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml
89
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2
1
3M&,Cal.30,K1919A4
1
ARTILLERYSECTION
12Mar45 WorkedonJapanesefieldpieces.
TANKMAINTENANCESECTION
12Mar45 Tanks,(Repaired)
Tank,(Continuedrepairing)
Tanks, (Continuedstrippingforparts)
Tank,(CompletedstrippingfoVparts)
LSURS"C")
-5-
2
1
3
1
WORK.COiffLSTEP (CONT'.rQ
^ NO, REPAIRED
SMALL ARMSSECTION
13Mar45 Carbines, Cal. 30, Ml
Ri f l es , Cal. 30.
BAR, Cal. 30, M1918A2
3MG, Cal. 30, M1919A4
Pi s t ol , automatic, Cal4
ARTILLERY SECTION
ffi
5.M1911Al
3
83
1
1
1
13Mar45 Worked on Japanese field, piecefey ; ' { "'<
TANK I-IAINT^NMCE SECTION
13Har45 Tank,(Completedsalvagingforparts) 1
Tanks,(Salvagingforparts) 3
Tank,(Completedrepairjob) 1
SHALLARMS.SECTION
14Mar45 Carbines,Cal.30,Kl 1
Rifles,Cal.30,ia 93
BAR,Cal.30,M1918A2 3
ARTILLERYSECTION
14Mar45 WorkedonJapanesefieldpieces.
TANKI^AIHTENAHCESECTION
14Mar45 Tanks,(Continuedstrippingforparts) 3
Tank,(Completedrepairjob) 1
Overhaulingenginesets 2
SHALL ARI13 SECTION
1
' ' "" ' m HIM ! > I I I I .
15Mar45 Carbines,Cal,30,HI 1
Rifles,Cal.30,Ml 73
BAR,Cal.30,H1918A2 SI
TAN2CHAINTENANCESECTION
15Har45 Tank,(Completedstrippingforparts) 1
Tanks,(Continuedstrippingforparts) 2
Tank,(Completedrepairjob) 1
Completedoverhaulingengineset 1
Overhaulingengineset 1
-6- (ENCLOSURE"C")
y
UQBK 001-gIgTgD
NQ>
16Mar45
16Uar45
Oarbines, Cal. 30, Ml
Ri fl es.
r
Gal.30, HI
3^R, Cal, 30, ia918A2
91
9
1?
Launcii3rs, rocket , 1-19A
4
3IOTI0H
Tanks,(Continuedstrippingforparts)
Z
Overhaulingenginesot
1
P
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tJoocaofeEg
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MOTOH 2!BAHSH>RT *#^ *.*w,
, 3D KABI3O DIVISIO1I,
UTTKS ^I 3LD.
13 April,
ACTION K3PQET Off 32 110203 THAHSPQBT
^ fOR IW J I l i i QPSRAJIOHi
PAR3J.I* Suiiimary
A TheperiodcovorodV thisreportisfron15Doccnbcr,
^, to7April,IU5
B# Socp/iS5?Ill,Paragra^iA*below*
PARTII* Preliminaries*
4
V. ThisbattalionisorganizedinaccordancewithT*0#F60*.
withthoadditionofthe-Sr^ator^TrnAlorPlatoon* $hisplatoonconsist's
ofeightoon(18)lighttractorsraidcightocn(IB)Athoytrailersofsix
(6)toncapacity* Allofthoabovopintdonwr.semployedonthesubject
ox>oration#
fiftyporeont(50^)ofthobattalion
1
strans*
portationandropairandnaiateanncounitswereliftsdfortheoporationt
Seventy-eightpercent(78$)ofthojkcrooanolworoonbarfcod*'
B Theperiod,fron15Opoc^ibor,13-M
t
to20January,19^5,was
spentinpreparationandplanning Iliafirsttr.skconfrontingthisunit
wasthenovementofellsupplies.^.ridoquipnontfortheDivisiontotho
variouseargoassemblynyoas Thisrequiredm.ivcragoroundtripof
approxijhatolytwenty(20)nilos,-."bouthrlfofitbeingoveravarypoor
r*4 'Duringthispho.sealltrucksoftwora&DIIGhrlf(2j)toncapacity
oroverintheDivisionfunctionedunderthodiroctcontroloftheBOTO.
Movenontof-supplies'"wasconneacodon20January,19^5
n
-adby6February,
19^5 allbulk
1
suppliesa^doouiviaont-/oreinthecnjrgo\assenblyareas*,
:
, ' - throughouttheaoovoperiodr.plairicdsystenofcomplete
ovorhauiv/asinstitutedforallvoMeloatobolif.to.d* Thoabovowas
accomplishedbyplacinginthoshopdailyapercentageofthevehicles
whichhadboonselectedforonbarkatioii, Iv/p(2)vehiclewator-*proofing
schoolsv;orcheldwhichworoattoadddbyrapronontativesofallunitsof
thoDivision*
OnSFebruary
#
19^5,shiploadingv/asconnoncedandagain
largotransportationdonandsworoplaceduponthebattalion* However,as
theloadingoutwasaccomplishedbyStOTts,itwaspossibletodeadlinein
successionthevehiclesofthorpspoctivoconpaniosintimetopernit
afinalnechanicalchockandwator*-j?roofinopriortoloading. On15
Fobruafy,19^5,theDivisionconplctoclloading.
0*,Hocoment* . . . '
D OneconpanywasattachedtoandoabarlsodwitheachBCOV
BattalionHeadquartersandHeadquarterscziS.SorvicoGompanyeobarkod
andfunctionedunderDivisioncontrol*
E Ho connent. , '.
PASTIII. Chronologicalacoountofthoaction.
A Thelettercorrprjiies,logs^Ooripaiiy"0*,landedaspartof
theirrespectiveEOTand..-functionodintao*nornrCLnannor-insupportof
theoperation. On28fobrunxy,1^5,t;\oSwf.v.^coechelonofBattalion
Headquarterslandedandestablishedits0#?ashore. Unloadingof
personnel.fti&equipmentprococdodsiowiythvou^ioutthenextfewdays*
On3March,
1
19*+5,theropair;aadr.iaintotxr^cooouipmentofHeadquarters
andServiceCompanyandQbapany*A*weroconsolidatedinonearea.
SP02T3&nALI0F,DATED13APRIL,
B
3
tt
On6Karch,19H5,Companies"A
11
and revertedtobatt-lioncontrol.
Attillstinea"battalionmaintenanceandrcroairshopw<asestablished
undertliecontrolofthe"battalionmaintenanceofficer,
OHiroushoutthoronaindoroftheoperationthis"battalion
provided.transportationandmaintenanceandrepairfacilitiesascalled
uponin'supportoftheDivision* Duringtheperiodoftheoperation
tills"battalioneffectedrepairs'toovertwohundred(200)vehicles* On
26"Karch,19^5,Company"A
11
wasattaches.*totheSecondEchelonofthe
divisionandthe"battalion,lessCompanies"A"and"C","commencedloading
aboardship. On29Marchf19^5|HeadquartersandSorviceConpanjrand
ConpnnyB*loftthetargetaroaaspartoftheFirstEchelon. Qonpany
''A*aspartoftheSecond3cholonem"barkcdandsn.iledon7April,19^-5
17, Cor
4
inonts. - .
A Vlhoelcdandtrailertransportationonbarkedwasadequate*
TheCargoCarrier,M29G(Woasol),provedaveryefficientvehicle
throughoutthe;operationandfunctionedparticularlywellovertho
terrainencountered*: IhisvehicloprovedinvpJLua"blointheevacuation
ofthe
Sparepartsenbarkedv;eroadequatewiththeexceptionof
thoserequiredfortheCargoCarrier
f
1290(Weasel).,Adequatespare
partsforthisvehiclewerenotavailabletothisunit.
PAREV* Conclusionandrecoiiiiondations.
A. Asstateda"bovothisunithasinitatractor-trailer
platoonconsistingofeighteen(!&)'li^ittractorsandeighteen(IS)"
4
Atheytrailersofsix(6)toncapacity, la-throeoperations(Bougain*-
ville,G-uan,rndIwoJina)overtotallydifferenttypesofterrain,this
platoonhasproveninvaluable* Inviewofthoabove,itisreconnonded
thatthe5!.O.forMotorTransportBattalionbechangedtoincludea
tractor-trailerplatoonofeighteen(lo)units. Hpwovor,itis
odthattractor,heavy,beauthorizedasprinonovcri:ilieuof
'tractor,liglit^ Itisfurtherrecommendedthataleastthree(3)ofthe
nbovotractorsbeequippedvithanglodozbr* .
t .
OJD/dbm 3DMEDICALBATTALION
rial
1
045174 3DMARINEDI^ION,FMF.
INTHEFIELD
L7April196.5
From: TheComraancHM^Officer.
To : TheCommandingOfficer,ServiceTroops,
Subject: Actionreport, ,
Reference: (a).Cf*G*#137
PARTI.Summary*
A. Periodcovered:2November1944toapproximately16April194S
B, TheMedicalBattalioniscomposedofMedicalCompaniesand
H&SCompany,Medical:CompanieswereattachedtoRCT'sasfollows:
"A
11
Company,3<fflfed~--' -21stRCT
B"Company;3dliod- 9thRCT
CCompany,3dMed~- 3d RCT
"D
n
Company,3dMed> - AttachedtoAmph,Corpsforth:
1
.?
. operation.
u
E
!f
Company,3dMed- IntendedforDivisionHospital
H&SCompany,3dMed-~ ~ IntendedforDivision
"A"Company,3dMedicalBattaliondepartedGuam16February.
1945withTransportDivision32andarrivedoffIwoJima19February,
1945.Disembarked24 February1945andstartedreceivingcaualties
26February1945.
. "B"Company,3dMedicalBattaliondepartedGuam17February,
1945withTransportDivision31andarrivedoffIwoJima20February,
1945*Disembarked24February,1945andstartedreceivingcasualties
26February1945. ^:
, ,- "C"Company,3dMedicalBattaliondepartedGuam17February,
1945WithTransportDivision33
a
n~r:.ivedoffIwoJima26February,
1945and,r,e
/
mainedaboardship,
"D
M
Company,3dMedicalBattalionwasattachedtoVAmphibious
Corpsforthisoperation,, ' ' . ' .
- "E"Company,3d.MedicalBattaliondepartedGuam17February,
1945withTransportDivision31andarrivedoffIwoJima20February,
1945andremainedaboard-ship.
H&SCompany,3dMedicalBattaliondepartedGuam16February,
1945withTransportDivision32andarriedoffIwoJima19February,
1945*Disembarked26February1945andassumedcontrolofevacuation27
February1945*
TheMedicalCompaniesoftheMedicalBattalionashorefunctioned
asaidstationsUntillateinthecampaign.Casualtieswere&ivenaddition-
alattentionandimmediatelyevacuatedtoHospitalShipsorAP's,TheMed-
icalCompaniesbegansurgicalworkapproximately15MarchwhenHospital
Shipswereno^longeravailable.
-H&SCompanyfunctionedasevacuationcontrolandasapoolfor
hospitalcorpsmenreplacements.
DuringmostofthecombatphasetheunitsoftheMedicalBatta-
lionashorewereperiodicallyunderenemymortor,artilleryandrocket
fire. .;-.
PARTII.Preliminaries.
A. ,^TheMedicalCompaniesacecomposedofahospitalsection(6officer
36enlistedcorpsmen,2Qmarines,en?;'sted)and3collectingsections(13
:;*enlistedcorpsraenand1enlistedmarinel
Page1of9.-ag<
Sub
H&SCompanyiscomposedof14officers,54enlistedcorpsmenand
36enlistedmarines.ThisCompanywasreinforcedwith29enlistedhospita.,.
corpsmenand15enlistedmarinesfrom"D"Company,3dMedicalBattalion,
ThemenwereusedasreplacementsonIwoJima
B. Atthetimethemi'ssionu?asassignedaTrainingOrderwaspiib
lishedandweeklytrainingperiodswerecarriedoutuntilembarkation I.-
turesweregivenonCombatMedicineandCombatTechnique.Physicaltr:1.,",;.
andfieldexerciseswerecarriedout.
C* ThemissionoftheMedicalBattalionwastoadministertothe ;
andwoundedandtoaccomplishtheirevacuation.
D. .TheMedicalBattalionwasembarkedonTransportDivision31 J'^
and*33.
PARTIII, Chronologicalaccountoftiiuaction.
A. "A"and
n
B
Yt
Companies,3dMedicalBattalionrevertedtoMedical
Battalioncontrolon26February1945andbeganreceivingpatientsthesane
date. "A
11
Companywas"sot
U
P-^TargetArea165F,
fl
B
lf
Companywassetup
atTargetArea181XandmovedtoTargetAreaI63Jon20March1945and
tookoverthefunctionsof"B"MedicalCo.VACHospital. "A"Medical
Companyfunctioneduntil25March1945whencampwasstruckforreembark
ation,
n
B"Company,3dMedicalBattalionfunctioneduntil31Mardh1945
whencampwasstruckforreembarkation.
PARTIV.Medical.
A. MedicalCompaniesworeattachedtoRCT
!
SfortheIwoJimacamp-
aignthereforecompleteconsolidationsofthisreportisnotpracticable-,
1.EmbarkationJ
:. A.Personnel:
H&SCompany,10,11,and12thFebruary,1945*
U.SS.CapeJohnson:
5officers.
1A.R.C.
80Enlistedmen.
U.S.S.Bolivar:
5Officers*
U.S.S*Jupiter?
1officer*
10enlistedmen.
n
A
n
Company*11February1945.
U.S.S*Cape Johnson?
2officers
. ... 38enlistedmen
U.S.S..PresidentAdams:
1 officer
15'enlistedmen.
U.S-S.PresidentJackson:
0-officers
14enlistedmen.
U.S.S*.Bolivar:
5officers
30enlistedmen.
UNCLASSIFIEI
Page2of9
BCompany,9February1945
U.S.S.Fayette:
6officers
53enlistedmen.
U.S.S.Know:
0officers
15enlistedmen.
U.S.S.Leedstovm:
0 officers
14enlistedmen
U.S.S,Warrick:
1officer,
10enlistedr;.3n.
"C"Company,9February1945
U.S.S.Calloway:
4officers,
54enlistedmen,
U.S.S.Funston:
2Officers
15enlistedmen.
U.S.S.O'Hara:
1officer
15enlistedmen.
U.S.S.Hercules:
0officers
11enlistedmen.
"D"Company,7Februr:71945(AttachedtoVACforthis
campaign)
U.S.S.Ozark:
7officers
50enlistedmen.
fJ
E"Company,9February1945.
U.S.S.HarryLee:
4officers
73enlistedmen.
U.S.S..Uarrick:
3officer's*
20enlistedmen*
b.Material:
H&SCompany:
U.S.S.Jupiteri
90$ofmat;:-ials,suppliesandcombatloadedvehicles
USS.S.CapeJon.:on*
1Q%,ofmaterials,suppliesandcombatloadedvehicles,
: . Note-H&SCompanyliftedall
ff
D
u
Companyvehicles,
"A"Company:
U.S
#
S
#
Bolivar:
- Allmaterials,supplies,includingcombatloaded
vehiclesofhospitalsectionwereloadedfromthe
loadingassemblyareaexceptone-Jton4x4
ambulance,comb.tloadedaccompaniedeachBatt-
alionaboardtheirrespecijittiahips,
Pass3-
Subject: ActionRep
"B"Company:
U.S.S,Warrick:
"Allmedicalsupplies,equipmentandvehicles,
loaded,"wereliftedaboardthisvessel,
C"Company:.
U.S.S,Hercules:
Allmedicalsupplies,equipmentand vehicles
5
co'!.
1
leaded,were .iffeedaboardthisvessel.
"D"Company:
U.S*.Ozark:
Allmedicalsuppliesandequipmentwereloadedabor.r-
J
.
fbruseonthe-shipby"D"Company,3dMedicalBait-
aliono Novehicleswereloaded,
fl
E
n
Company?
U,S.S
C
Warrick: v
Allmedialsupplies,equipmentandvehicles,combj..v
loaded,wereliftedaboardthisvessel.
2, AboardShip:
a*Sickness:
Therewerenoepidemicsaboardship Thehealth./'
theMedicalBattalionpersonnelwasexcellent* SL<k
bayfacilitieswereadequate.
b.Sanitaryconditions:
(1)Heads: Adequateforallpersonnelandwellcles.-:ic\
(2)Livingquarters:Ingeneralgood. Afewinstances
ofovercrowdingandinadequate
ventilationwereencountered,
(3)Messes:Verysatisfactoryastoquanityandquality
(4)Galleys:Excellent.
(5)Cooksnr.'Hessmen: Cleanwithallsanitarypre-
cautionscompliedwithin
preparationoffood,
3. Debarkation:
a.Personnel:
LledicalBattalionless"E
11
Companyanddetachments
landedon DPlus7(26February1945.)
b.Material:
(1)TransportedotheTargetAreabyAP
f
sandAK's*
(2)Timeoflanding:MedicalBattalionSuppliesbegan
landingon Dplus6(25February1945)andcon-
tinuedtolandperiodicallyuntil26March,, Some
medicalequipmentfor
rt
B"Companyneverlanded
butequipmentof"C
n
and
lf
E
n
thatreachedthebea?.h
wasutilized*
(3)LandedonDIMES,'LCVP'S,LCM'S,ANDLSM'S.
cLossesofpersonnelandmaterial:
(1)Personnel:1\.arineenlisted-Fracturedfoot,
1Navyenlisted-Dislocatedelbow.
(2)Material:"A"Company^3dlled.-Allbio^ogicalsc
"B"Company,3dMed.-Holdloadedcargo
wasnotunloaded,.
1 teorb".?al compan^s at t irhea t ?
revertedtoMedicalBattalioncontrol26,
February1945 "
A
"and"B
u
companies,,
3dMedicalBattalionevolvedfromanair
1
.
stationtoaCompanyhospital. Thegr?.
;
.-ja.'
:
evolutionwasduetodifferenttimesr>i Lu- i
ingofpersonnelandmaterial. Thefi^co
casualtieswerereceived26Feb45*
(2)Locationwithregardtoj
aRoadsortrail~ji
H
" CompanyTargetArea16fj "
?
'-\
revetmentwestofN~SrunwayoffJ-y..y>/ -.
#.]. Itwasacessiblebyroad.C
v
'c.a,. ..
!I
B
M
andsouth, CompanyIniti-.117
TargetArea181Z.directlyonsuypl/
roodandalongnaturallineofari../"
Onr.CMarch1945movedtoTarget arfT
16.3Jjustoffthemainsupplyread.-.
b*Cove:,?
1
?
K
^
r
'Company- Situatedina'revetmentandutilised
twoconciitewaterstoragetanksforcoversof'.i^
treatment station
"B"Company- Situatedsouthwest ofhighcr-hrr^'
mentwhichaffordedgoodcoverfromflattiai--
oryweapons. 9thand21stevacuationatai-ics:
utilizedtrenchesandsandbagsforcover.
c.Dispersions
w
A
lf
and
n
B"Companydispersionwaslimiteddu
totheconfinesoftheareaassigned.
dOtherMedicalInstallations:
"B
ff
Company,3dMedicalBattalionwas situate
apnroximately500yardsduewestofHA"Ccn:.p::..
r
;,
3d.MedicalBr.ttalicn.,RegimentalAidStations
variedfrom100yarristo3milesnorth-ofthe
MedicalComj ^niesasthecampaignprogressed.,
e.Proximitytocriticalpoints': .",;*
Areaswere
r
: -11chosenbecauseofthedirect
flowofcasualtiesandfromthestandpbintof
cover.
Naturallineofdriftofwalkingwounded:
Themedicalcompanieswerewelllocatedalong
naturallineofdrift.Veryfewwalkingwounded
wereencounteredbecauseoftheavailabilityof
ambulances.
(3)Protectivemeasurestaken:
a.Localsecurity:
Outpostswereestablishedbythemedicalcompandor
inconjunctionwithothernearbyunits
bCover:
Thelocationofthemedicalcompaniesplusfox
holesprovidedadequatecover.~ ".''
c.Concealment:
Thelocatinofnodicalcompaniesafforded good
concealment.
d.Sheltersanddugouts:
Foxholesweretheonlysheltersavailable,
e.BlackOutprecautions:
Medicalcompanieswereadequatelyblackedout.?.:;...
disciplinewasgo
Subject:ActionReport;
b,Hospitalization:
(1)Fuhctinning:
7JfU*and,"B
n
medicalcompaniesfunctionedu."iad
andscreeningstationsduringtheassaultphase.
Majorsurgerywasfirstundertakenon16March,
1945by"A
11
MedicalCompanyand21March1945
by
n
B*MedicalCompany."C"CompanyaboardanAP
offIwoJinaassistedtheshipsmedicalofficers
care,for2$0icasualties"E"Companyassisied
theshipsmedicalofficercarefor170cauraltio-
andcontinuedtocareforthewoundedupon"."rival
atQuarn.
(2)Adequacy:^capitalizationwasconsideredadequate:
(3)Numberofpatients:
"*"Company-
--925
U
BCompany-
- 1741
(4)Equipment:Equipmentwasconsideredadequate.
(5)Operationsperformed:
GeneralsurgerywasperformedbytheMedicalL
alionafter15March1945
cEvacuation:
(1) How affected:
ByDivisionEvacuationOfficerl
(2)Adequateorinadequate:
Evacuationwasconsideredadequate.
d.Casualtiestreated:
(l)Number: 2064
(a)Retained 92
(b)Evacuated:
"A"and"B"Companies 1947
(c)Died "25.
(2)Type:MedicalandSurgical.
(3)Walkingwounded 1117
(4)Stretchercases:
947
e.
Sanitation: .
(l)Specialmeasures:
Localpolicing,barrestypeheadsandtube
urinalswerehelpfulincontrulingflies.The
MalariaControlUnitsprayedallflybreeding
areaswithDDT.
(2)Food:
Duringthegreaterpartofthecampaignthe
MedicalBattalionsubsistedonindividualcanned
rations.Althoughthiswasprimarilyamatterof
militaryexpediency,it,alsoactedasafactor
inpreventingtheonsetoffood-bornedisease.
Galleyswereoperatedthelasttwoweeksofthe
campaign.Thesewereinspecteddaily.
(3)Water:
Drinkingwaterwasderivedinsufficient
quanityfromthefollowingsorces:
a.Ships:ThiswaterwasobtainedfromtheIsland?
ofGuamandSaipinandtransportedinsuitable
containerstothesceneofactionbyships,5
gallonexpiditionarycanswererefilledfrom
beachedLST's.
b.Distil"
1
|tionUnits:Wereavailableapprox
imate"; w.['..us10,,.;Wateri^fe|furnishedtothe:
MedicalBattalion}:y^C. H
f.DisposalofDeads
(1)Our:To3<*DivisionGravesRegistrationSection.
(2)Enemy:None, . .
(3)Sanitaryprecautionstaken:
AssoonasForm"N"wasaccomplishedbodieswere
removediv:DivisionCemetery.
g.Epidemicsorunusualdiseasesintroops;
(1)OurTroops:
There,werenoepidemicsorunusualprevalence
ofanydiseaseamongtheMedicalBattalion
personnel.
(2)Civilian:None.
(3)Enemyforces:None.
(4)Insects:
ByfT f mostimportantinsectsencountered
wereflies,(severalspecies).Theywerecon-
trolledsatisfactorilybypolicingareasandspray-
ingDDT.
h.DentalService:
TherewasnodentalserviceotherthanEmer-
gencies.Eachmedicalcompanydentalofficerdid
occassiT.alemergencydentaltreatment.
i.CareofCivilians: -.
Hocivilianswereencountered.
j.PrisonersofWar:
Nonewerecaredforby-thisMedicalBattalion.
k.MedicalOrganizations
r
-.-
(1)Suitabilityof.presenttype:
Itisrecommendedthatmedicalcompaniesnot
beattachedtoRCT
f
sfor-'combatbutremainunder
controlcitheCommandingOfficer,MedicalBatt-
alionwiththeadviceoftheDivisionSurgeon.
(2)Suggestchanges:
Themobilityofthemedicalcompanieswould
begreatlyincreasedbytheadditionofjeep
trailersandamphibioustrailerswith'thenecess-
aryprimemovers.
1.MedicalPersonnel:
(1)Adequateorinrv
1
equate:
Adequate**
(2)Employment:
TheMedicalpersonnelweredividedinto4
groups,HospitalSection(6officers,36corps-
men,and20marines)and3collectingsections
(13corpsmenand1marine).,
(3)Lossesandreplacements:
n
k
n
Company:35casualties,18wereevacuated.
25replacementsreceivedformedicalcompanyand
collectingsection."B
11
15casualties,9'evac.
(4)Stateoftraining:
Consideredgood.
(5)Specialtiesneeded:
None.
m.FieldMedicalEquipment: . ,
(1)Proportionofallowancecarried. '.
Allfieldmedicalequipmentwaslifted,
(2)Pilferageandlosses:
. . 2Unit#5.
of -
Subject:Action
(3)Adequate,inadequateandoverage; ,
Adequate,exceptforblanketsandlitters*
(4)Resupply.: . . .
VerygoodfromdivisionMedicalSupplyofficer,
n.MedicalSupplies:
(1)Amountcarried:
Athirtydaysupplyforeachmedicalcompanywas
carried.Onlycombatloadedsupplieswerelanded
withexceptionofAmedicalcompanywhichlanded
allmedicalsupplies. 2D%ofthesupplieswere
used,by'*"and
W
B
M
medicalcompanies. Themedical
Suppliesof
M
C
lf
Companywerelandedbutnotused,
(2)Pilferageandlosses:
Nopilferagewasnoted,howeverH&SCompany's
blankets,littersandplasmawasnotreceived
ashore.-
(3)Adequate,inadequateandoverage:
Adequate
(
(4)Resupplyfrc*..DivisionMedicalSupplyOfficer:
Blanketswereobtainedfromsalvageandthe
DivisionQuartermaster* Othersupplieswere
readilysuppliedbySthFieldDepot*
oiMotorVehiclesandRollingStock:
(1)Numberandtypecarried:
30iton4x4Ambulances
6.Jton4x4Ambulances
35ton4x4Cargo
61ton4x4Cargo
62jton6x6Cargo
51ton2wheeltrailers,300galvwater
53ton2wheeltrailers,sterilizer,shower.
5Generators,9.4KVA,Trailermounted.
(2)Losses:
Iiton4 x 4 ambulance,'enemyaction.
II ton4 x 4 Truck,enemyaction.
(3)Howutilizedandmaintained:
Vehicleswereallcombatloaded. Wheninthe
targetareatheywereusedfortheevacuation
ofpatientsandtheprocurementoffoodandwater.
Maintenancewasaccomplishedbypersonnelofthe
Medicalcompanieswiththeexceptionoflubri-
cationandmajorrepairdonebytheDivision
Motortransportrepairsection.
(4)Adequacy:
Vehiclesandrollingstockavailableforthe
operationwasadequate. Theadditionof6ne
jeeptrrHertoeachCompanywouldfacilitate
movement.
p.QuartermasterEquipment'andSupplies:
(1)AllowanceCarried:
OnlyclassIIequipmentintheamountnecessary
fortheoperationofthefieldhospitaland
evacuationstationswastakenforward. 4portable
O.R.
f
swerecarriedbutonlyonewasutilized.
(Only2companieslanded).
(2)Availability^of:
Mostoftheequipmentwascombatloaded. Field
cotsandpadswerepalletizedandeasilyobtain-
. .ableonthebeach.
e8of 9
Subje
y
Noequipmentwasreplacedduringtheoperation
Automaticsuppliesandclothingwereobtained
fromtheDivisionQuartermaster.
(4)Re-clothingofpatients:
Adequatequanitieswereonhandandavailable.
(5)Adequateorinadequate:
(6)Suitability:
q.MalariaandEpidemicControlEquipmentandApplies:
(1)None.
5. Ashore-AftercompletionofAssaultPhases
a.Hospitalization:
Adequate;the3dMedicalBattalionremainedinthetarget
areaonlyashorttimeaftertheIslandwasofficially
secured.
b. MedicalSuppliesandQMSuppliesandequipment:
Adequate.
c.FoodandWater:
Adequate. Galleyfacilitiesandsomefreshfoodwas
available.
d.Sanitation:
Improvementwasnotedinthelatterpartofthecampaign.
e.SicknessEpidemicorunusualdiseasesinMedicalBattalion.
TherewasnoepidemicorunusualdiseasesintheMedical
Battalion.-
6. Recommendations: '
(a)Amedicalcompanybeembarkedintactwithallequipment
aboardasingleship.
(b)Priorityberaisedonmedicalgear.
(c)6amphibioustrailersbeassignedtotheMedical
Battalionforoperations.
A.E.
Page9of9pages.
ENCLOSURE H
3DTANK BATTALION
ACTION REPORT
1975 QIJia^AS, 3D T*uK BATTALION,
G-rtL:mls 3D liaaifcE" DIVIblOi , FUST I.ilfc3 FORCE,
C/O PL^ET POST OPF^G^, I
Seri al 9 Apri l , 1945.
Prom:
To : The Commanding General, 3d Karine Division.
Subject: Action Report.
Reference: (a) 3dliarDiv General Order No. 137.
Enclosure: (A) 5d Tank Bn Action Report for. the IWO JIliA
Operation.
i* Inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofreference
(a),enclosurein)issubmittedherewith.
,33 mm. BATTALION,
iVISIOl!, iLBHD MARIHE FORCE,
OST OFFICE, SA1T FBAHCISCO.

y>y
- < 2April
ACTIOIIREPORT-IWOJIKA '
I. SUMMARY:7Kovembor,1 9 ^-27March,
&i I* Thisreportcoversthe3&TankBattalion^activitiesinplanning,
training,logisticalpreparation,andembarkationrelativetotheXWOJIMA.
ri3?S&ATIQlTfortheperiod7November,Vjkk to12February,I9U5.
2 Thisreportincludesanarrativeresumeofthisunit'sactivities
enrouteto,andwhileontheobjectivefortheperiod12February,I9U5to
22March, ^
3. Thisreportfurther containsa
ff
playbyplay*narrativeof important
eventsfromthebeginningofthisbattalion.
1
sactiontorecmbarkation-for
theperiod23February, 19^5to27March, ^
$* NarrativeSummary (fordetailed.account seePart III)
1'The3&TankBattalion,havingbegunembarkation on12February,19^5*
wascompletely embarkedupon2LST
!
sand2AKA'sby16February. All
convoyssailedthatdate. .
Mapswereissuedandofficersandmenwerebriefedas thoroughly
aspossibleonallaspectsoftheoperation,
>... On21FebruarytheLSTconvoywasattackedbyasquadron o f "
*suicidebombers"justofflIIltAtil-IWO,andLST#^77\^as'rammed
11
about
fiftoonfeetaftofthestarboardmagazine,bombandplanepenetratingiJito
thetankdeck. Thisunit sufferedthreemenkilled,tonwoundedandvar-
ioustankequipment damages. ,
ElementsofthisBattalion(
tt
B
M
company,partsof*Q*-8tanks,and
oneretriever-andB&Scompanies)worelandedon23February, 19^5-* Tieso
twenty-fivetanksreported totheFourthTankBattalion,butwere subsequently
attachedtoCO,|*ifthTankBattalionasReserveforaunifiedtankattack
tobemadeonHo.2Airfield on2kFebruary. Actuallyonlytwo
n
0
11
company
platoonsandone"B
11
companydozertankwereemployed, andlate2^4February
!t
B
lf
companywasattachedtothe21stMarines(attached^thMar3)iv).
TheabovetanksworedebarkedfromLST6^6; "A*company,remainder
ofB&Sand
n
C
tr
companiesdebarkedLST%77late2^Februaryand eventually
reportedtoCO,3dM&rDiv, Onthenight2k-25FebruaryallunitsAshore
revorted toBattalionControl,assemb|od in21stRCT zoneofaction.
On25February,JdTankBattalionS^asattachedto9thECTforan
attackon,andnorthof,AirfieldITo.2. Thiswastheonlyoccasionthat
thisbattalionwasemployedasabattalion, "A*and
H
B
lf
companiespreceded
theSecondBattalionacrosstheairfieldafteraconcentratedair,HGF,and
artillprystrike.
Thebattalionremainedattachedtothe9^hRCTfora continuation
ofthoattackon2(?February,butonly*$*company (attachedFirst Battalion)
wasemployed. 27February,
n
B
B
companyreplaced
n
G" company(attachedFirst
Battalion).
Asaresultoftheseactions,thecompaniesweregreatlydepleted
(see2,bolow). Consequently,whentheRCTsubsequentlyattachod "companies
11
totwoormoreassaultbattalions,theywereactuallytwoormore"platoons
11
*
Thooutstanding characteristic oftheseactionswasthattankswore
boingthrownagainstartilleryandAT:fireinanefforttoroachthehigh
groundbeyond theairfield. Undoubtedly, thebulkofthotankweapons
accomplishedmuch* Butitisquestionablethattheyaccomplishedasmuch,
orsavedenoughinfantrymen towarrant suchtacticsagainstknownAT
emplacements*
On28Februarythetankactionbc^antoresolveintothetypoof
warfareinwhichMarineTankUnits,haVoprovenmost effective. The tanks
woreusedinsmallbut sufficientnumbers indirect support ofinfantrf^
Wherepossiblethetanksprecededthoinfantryagainstlimitedaaddofinod'
objectives;wherethiswasimpractical theinfantrytookthoload. There
wprecountlesssituationswhorethetankra^chine-gunsand flamethrowers
wereemployedtodestroystrong,thoughsnail,pocketsof^jresistance(caves,
mounds,etc). "
4
c
oftankswasattachedto aplatoonofinfantry
to ers,and etherstrongpoints.,V
and
ff
A
n
companiesrespectivelygavedirect
overhead7 5 ^**resupportto the21stZQT*tfheseweretheonly'concentra-
ted" torx^es thatthetankslaiddownas such. Oncethehighgroundin
thenorthernpartof theislandwasattained,tankswereplacedon the
cliffsfiring&ownintothedepress!oneleadingto thenorthern"bache/
%
..*Thremainingphaseof theIWOJE-IAOperationgavethetanks.limited,
"butessentialopportunities. Hostofthe"specialweapons*- smalland
largecapacityflamethrowers,rocketlaunchers,75miaHEammunitionwith
2-105fuses- wereusedcontinuouslyand effectivelyonisolatedpocketsof
r e s i s t a n c e . .' . ' ,.,-.- , .-. ,
The"battalion,less"A*company,reembarkedon22March,,X$k5and
sailedforGuam.
f
*A*companyremainedattachedtothe9thEOT(Hone:One
platoon"A*companyregainedwith21st BC$untilHthKarch),
2. Thefollowingchartisareportoftanksrused,available,and
operativethroughoutthecampaign:
01 >2HAirini riTB IITCEE
HI:
(Maintenance) tSestroyed
A B 0 A B 0 A 3 A B C
c
2k 11
15 3
0 0 1 0 0 0
x
6
5 11
*5
0
6 ,
1 1
o
U lk<
0
I
0 26
6 0
3
0 g
k 15
27 0 11
7 5
1 3 11 3 .3 k
k
5
l
ZZ
l i 1 0 0 6 3 3
3
l
g
c
r
v
g
11
1llarch
11 2 it 0
3 6
3
7 3
2llarch
10
3 13
2 2
3
g 0
3 3
12
k
3March
10 2 0 12
5 12 3 3
3
7
o
3
kMarch
10 6 2
k 3 7
1
3
0
3
xo
10
5llarch
10
7
2 l .2
3 7 3
0 0
o
0
s
6llarch 10
7
1
r
-
l
2
7
2 0
6
7March
10 7
10 1 1 1
7
2 0 0 0
4
gllarch** 10
7 7 1
3
2
7 6 3 3 0
9i'larcn
l
10
g g 3
2 1 2"
7 9
0 6
10Iferch
11
7
r
2
3
1 2
3
1 0
7
7
I
5
11March
11
9
2 2 1 2 g 5 . 3
6
3
.,
12March
11
13llarch 11
2
3
1 2 1
9
g
5 3
10 2 0 2 g
5
0 0 0
0 2 g
5
1 l 1
k
2
2
12
7
10 14Inarch 1
15March 12
7
10 0 2 g 0
5
1 10 6
2
loMarch 12
9 2 1 0 2 2 . 0
5 9 g
17March 10
9 9 3
0 1 2 0
5
g g
2 ISMarch 12
9
l 0 2 2 g
5 "
0 0
19March 12
9
10 l 0 0 2 g
5
0 0 0
20March 12
9
10 1 0
:
0 2 g
5
0 0 0
21March 12
9
10 1 0 0 2 g
5
0 0
3
22March*** 12 2 2
7
.2}March 12 2 2 0
2kMarch"
13
1 2 0
25March
13
1 2 0
26March 13
1 2 0
13
1 2 0
27March
"A* Company's tanks were damaged enroute as a result of enemy
acti on,
!** H3& tank plus ono di esel tank acquired from *4-th 3k Bn was attached
(
to "B
1
* company*
* One flamethrowing tank acquired from l*th 3?k Bn was attached to "A*
- company.
PAET II,
A, The Preferred Operation Plan (22 January, 19*f5 2J0PSSCRSff) assigned this
oattalion the following mission: liand on order on 'baches to Tiedesi^na^ed
prepared to support the Division as directed^ This was no departure from the
mission that had been assigned this*"unit in the i)iv
,
w < r
JSreceivedtheirmissionintheBnOpnPlan
1-45(29.January
r
,'
r
1945,%3pfp3GRET)and,sincetheDivisionwasinReserve,
nothingmorespecificwasassignedasanorder.
TwoLST*shadbeenallottedforthetransportationofthetanks(andfive
4x4radiotrucks). Itwaspossibletoembarkapproximatelyoneandone-half
tankcompaniesoneachLSI. Sincethe9*kaa<*21stRCT'sweretolandfirst,
ff
A
ff
and
lf
B
ff
companies(respectivenormalsupporttankcompanies)*woreeach
assignedoneI>ST,and''0*companywasdivided,elements'oneachLSI. The
otherequipmentwasassignedtoAKA's(SeePartIT,E,"TransportQuarter-
master). .
B
#
Itwasdecidedthatthisunitwouldbecomposedofthefollowingper-
sonnelandequipmentfortheassaultphasesoftheIWOJIMA.Operations
Personnel
USKC USE
. * OFF WO 2SJL OFF mL
B&S 11
T ~25
2
"TT*
"A"
7
0 154 2.

i r
B
f f
0 160- ' 2
b Q
If5
2
OTAL
31 5 553
~ , 10
'(2Officers
>>39
Marine replacements
joinedduring13-16March)
Equipment
B&SCo. A
ir
C o . "BCo. *CCo.
TAKE,M4A2 1
15 15 15
SANK,retriever 1 1 1
TRUCK,',cargo,6x6 2 4 4 4.
TRUCK,1ton,4x4 1
TRUCK,1/4ton,4x4 2 .1 1 1
TRUCK,1/4ton,4x4, w/radio
3 5 5 6
TRUCK,2l/2ton,6x6,water 1
AMHJLAttCS.1/4ton,4x4 1
TRAILERS
1ton,cargo 1
3
2 2
1/4ton,cargo 1 1 1 l
1ton,water 1 1 1 1
ARCWELDER,1ton 0. l 1 1
2tbn,stockroom 1 :
1ton,Lubor 1
1ton,stockroom 0 1 1 1
C. Thefollowing:isabriefaccountofallactivitiesofthisunitinpre-
parationfortheoporation.
1. S-l. Althoughthe
If
rear
H
and
w
forward
0
echelonsofpersonnelwere^
assignedinJanuary,theactualpreparationbeganon2February. A*that
timecompaniesbegancompilingpersonneldatasheets. Concurrently,tho'S-l.
preparesbriefsofSOP
r
sandembarkationrosters. TheRearEchelonwas
activatedon12FebruaryasthePorw<?.rdBchclbnembarked. Billeting,,ad-
ministrativeorders,andcasualtyrep#rts(sooAirAttack,above)wer.e
effectivelyhandledaboardship.
2* S-2. Havingbecm.assignedthemission,Intelligencematerialwas
immediatelyassembled,andbriefingconductedforStaffOfficersand
CompanyCommanders..AerialPhotographswore"grid&od'
1
.tofacilitatestudy.
Aboardship,S-2conductedschoolonIntelligenceMaterial(sooIV,3).
3r S-3. Havingbeenalertedbythe.tentativeplan,mostofthenecess-
arytraininghadbeenconductedbeforetheactualmissionwasassigned(see
IV,C,OperationsandTraining). OperationsandEmbarkationorderswere
immediatelyformulatedafterconferencesamong,Battalion^andCompanyComtiand-
ers, StaffOfficors,andSpecialStaffOfficors.
4. S-4. Furnishedindividualequipmentandclothing,asavailable,to
personnelofthebattalion;requisitionedsuppliesto ifor
j
^^J nces* <$!personnel were briefed
on combat supply prbbleSsT^ Administer,.vo Plans wero drawn up to accompany
Bn SnB 0 and Opn 0 {see IV, 35, below). '
K
t
5* Transport Quartermaster - After shipping space had toon assigned ^
the Battalion, allotments wore*given to the companies in accordance with
exi sti ng Division orders. Submitted UP.& TO?
1
6,. loading plans and manifests
to Dlv T($4. Made changes as advised, i l l material was moved to staging
area as per instructions (see IV, E, "below), i l l loading completed,"by l 6
February, X^l+5. ,
6. Ordnance.
A. CombatVehicles-Immediatelyfollowingthe.GuamOperation,all
vehicleswerecompletely inspectedandnecessarymaintenanceperformed.
Battalionweldingmachinesandmaintenancepersonnel,augmented3&Crdnanco
Company'sTankMaintenancePlatoonvftileaddingextraturretandeponsonarmor,
andinstallingDeepWaterFordingKits. Operationoffirstandsecond
echelonmaintenanceWascontinuousduringthetrainingperiod. Preventive
maintenance schoolwas^conductedregularlyforalltankcrews.
B** Weapons-AlltanksWoreinspectedtoascertainthecondition
of7 5 ^gunc,machineguns.Gyro-stabilizers,andHydraulic traverseunits*
Allnecessaryrepairsandadjustmentsweremade. Thirteen(13)3ftB
Flamethrowersworeinstalledintanksandintensivetrainingwasgiven
operatorsandassistant operatorsonfilling,charging,andfiring.
perimentswereconductedinmixingHaPalnfuol. AllCO-2fire extinguishers
werecheckedandrefilled. Tankswereissuedorganizational spareparts.
C. Ammunition-Thefollowingisanapproximateresumeofall
typosofammunition embarkedineachtank:
.30Cal.(tracerl-in~5) . 9,000rds.
75mm
APCM6lw/fuzeBDK66A1w/traccr *K)rds.
HSUkSw/fuzePD1&8suporquick---*---.-.- 50rds.
SmokeWPX-OCIIw/fuzoPDUk6 10rds.
G-rqnados,incendiary- . - - - - - - -- 2
Grenades ifragmentation-- . - . - - - - - - - - h
Grenades,smoke,HC^ - ^ ^ - -. ^
7 ChemicalVforfare-Training coiisistedofschoolingforallpersonnel
-inrecognitionofvariouschemicalagents,protectivemeasures,firstaid,
m
dpcont&aination,anduseofGraphicAid
ir
3-2card", llaskswerefitted,
tested,andro~cratodfortransportation. * .v *
S. Medical-Tetanus,typhoid,cholera,plague,andtyphusinnoculations
worecompletedforallpersonnel,includingreplacements,priortoembarka-
tion.-ClothingwasimpregnatedwithJDinethylphthalatoan*dDDTasaprotect-
ionagainstTsutsugamushiandTyphusCovers. Two(2)percentofthe
Battalionporsonnelweroinstructedaslitterbearers.
SI. Signal-SCR-50H,528radioswereinstalledduringtheperiod19
ITovember- 3Docember,19*4i. DuringthistimemountingsforthoSCR300
radiosworopreparedandinstallationsoftheTanto-Infantrytelephoneswore
made. SCR-300installationswereCompletodandrealignedintimetoaid
Tank-Infantry training. SCR5^0radiosworomadeavailablejustpriorto
January19^5 Waterproofingofradiogearwascompletedpriortoembarkation.
Porsonnelhadparticipated in.allCPX
f
sandTank-Infantrytraining.In-
tensivestudywasdevotedtoSOI,SOP,andallaspectsoftheoperation.
10, BattalionChaplain-Arrangedfor initialwelfareandmoraleequip-
mentwhichwasembarkedwithtroops. Communionserviceswereconducted
aboardship,andchaplainlandedwithunit.
JII CHRONOLOGICALACCOUNTOfTH3ACTIOH
minusten(k)time,Sf.stlongitudetime).
entembarkedaboardUSSLI3RAandUSSJUPITER
12February1945
Troops,tanks,andfiveradiokxk%-tontrucksembarkedaboard
LST#^77. . '
13February
TroopsandTanksembarkedaboardLST&4-6.Embarkationcomplete.
16February,
Convoysailed. Mapsissuedtopersonnel.
2QFebruary
Threeandone-half(3#)milesoffshoreIWOJIKA.
21February-
Convoysailedaboutthirtyfivo(35)milesoffshore. 1720
EnemyairattaciclaunchedagainstConvoy. OneenemyplanehitLST#^
(seeI,B,above).
23February
ReceivedorderstobeachandunloadelementsaboardLST#Uj7(tJ
r
-0
li
pmy "A
n
tGoixpMiy lesstwoplatoons,Stafftank). Duetodamagefromthe
airattacktiiswasimpossible* Thetankswereneededforacoordinatedtank
att'ackon2kFebruary. CO,5thTk3nwastocoordinatealltank.,inadrive
acrossairfield#2* SinceLST$4?7couldnotbeach,theordersweretrans-
mittedtoLST#646. Company"3"andtv/oplatoonsplustwoCompanyHeadquart-
erstanksofCompany"C'
f
disembarkedaccordingly,andTank3attalionExecutive
OfficerreportedtoCO,5thTankBattalion.
RemainedaboardLST# f 7
fl
3"
ReceivedorderstolandonIWO-JIMA. Companylandedatapprox-
imately1500. OrderedtoreporttoFifth(5th)TankBattalion. Trackson
threetankswerebrokenastheyattemptedtoexecutesharpturnsonthesandy
beach. CompanyMvouacodatTAl6UQueen.
LST#646beachedon"BeachYellow". Thetrackof-onetank
wasbrokenwhilemakingaturnin'theloosesand. Theequipmentlandedfrom
thisLSTwasasfollows: eight(8)tanksandono(l)retriever, "Uponlanding
.theretricVerwastalienoverbytheBn-XtobeusedasaBattalionCommand
Post.
1700-Reportedtoandattachedto5thTankBattalion,5**1Marino
Division. Movedtanksfrom"BeachYellow"toassemblyareaatTA-16UQon
SWedgeofairstrip#1.
183Q-Receivedheavyenemyartilleryfirethroughoutthenight.
1930-Condition"Jled".

2*1February
TankBattalion(lessCompany"B"andtwoplatoonsofCompany
U
C")
disembarkedat13^-50*1BeachGreenandreportedtoFourthMarineDivision
accordingtoinstructionsfromCC-,3diiarDiv. 3nassembledTAlUSC. Received
orderstoreporttoCG-,3
cl
MarDivat1200. Atthistimeorderswerereceived
attachingTankBattalionto9thMarino forattackon25Februarypassing
through21st.Ilarines. Inthemeantimethoseelementsattachedto5^hTank
BattalionwereemployedintheattackonAirfieldHo.2. Company"3"loss
bulldozer
r
washeldinReserve,whileone-platoonofCompany
n
C"wasfurther
attachedtothe21sti-iarinos,andanotherplatoonwasattachedto27thIlarines,
, . Allunitsassenbledvicinity16^3by2^00preparedtorevertto3n
controlatO7OO,25February, ^
"A*
Landedat1330,movedimmediatelytoTAl^S0(SEendofAirfield
llo.X)and"dugin
tt
forthenight. At2230recoivodo
D(ITend.ofAirfieldHo.l);arrivedat2^00andremained
ofnight,soastobeavailableforsupportof9th.CTonj
Conpany?B
r
^Id^i4f<3)platoonsofConj&ny"C*wereattachedto
Jifth(5th)TankBattaliontoboemployedinsupportofthe21stRoginontin
adriveacrossairstrip-#2, Conpany
ff
B
rf
washeldinreserve, Thebulldozer '
wasemployedwiththoleadingplenehtsofthe5thTankBattalion, Thist&nk
washitbyanortarshollcausingthattanktorunintoahole. Crowevacuated
safelyandrovumedtocanp. ThisoccurredinvicinityofTA181Tare, At
I63Otheconpanvwasdetachedfronthe5thTankBattalionandattachedtotho
21stRegiment.- ;
"C"
0730TheIbcocutivoOfficer,Conpany
<r
C
ff
reportedtoCO,5thTank
Battalion. SheunitsofConpany
fl
0
u
wereplacedinreserve,*
1530-'?hc3dPlatoonwiththoSxccut.ivoOfficer*stank,uponorder
ofC0|5thTankBattalion,nov.oduptotheedgeofAirstrip#2
}
wherethey
worenetbythe00,2ndBn,21stMarinesandordersissuedfortheir
enploynent*. lilieseunitswereto.boinsupportofCo
?r
JP
ir
f
2nd3n21st
Marines*butthoinfantrywasableto rnrcoDotheresistanceholdingupthe
advanceandttjfc.weronotemployed. Whilestandingbyin.thisareathotanks
drewoxtr.cnely.heavyartilleryfire
t
,
15^5~he4thPlatoonwasusedinsupportofCo
fr
B",2ndBn,27th
Marinesin-TA-19&
1
ifi&W..Theyattackedinthisarea-withcloseinfantrysupport
dnddestroyednur.crouscavesa.ndbunkers,
2jjFebruary
TheBattalionwasattachedtothe9thMarines, Company
ff
A
r
'(11tanks)
andConpany'
ff
]B
ir
(13tanks)werefurtherattachedtothe2dBn,9thMarines
fortheattackacrossAirfield#2,Conpany"C
ff
renaincdinB.eminental
Reserve. '
"A"
0800-11tankssentinsupportof2dBn,9thMarinesin$ittack
acrossSendofAirfieldITo,2. Targetsofopportunitywereengaged, Pour
inoperativetankswererepairedandsent*tojoinothers. Theheavyfires
encounteredresultedins twotanksbeingburnedup;1boggeddowninloose
sand,brokeatrack,andwastcnporarily.abandoned;5ethershadtowithdraw,
allofwhichhadreceivedhitsonthesuspensionsysten, 1hadapunctured
radiatoralso, I
;1
lanethroworsnountodin"tanksprovedinvaluableagainst
pillboxeswhich^QTOindefiladefronourflattrajectory.fire,,
Conpany
lr
3
:J
wasattachedtothe2ndBn,9thMartnes. This"battalion
waeto.continuetheattackinanortherlydiroctionpassingthroughthe
2d3n,21stwith- +,anl"CompaniesAbleand3akorattachodtotho9thRoginont.
ConpanyBakervjasonplo;"odintherightzoneofaction, Theloadingolononts
oftheinfantryworo~heldup"byterrificartilleryfireinTA19533AY,
0910-Conpany
U
I>''tarJ^sworotoprecedetheinfantryinanefforttoneutralize
thegunfirethatwasholdinguptheadvance. 1010~Onefourthplatoontank
washitbyartilleryfire. Thecrowwassafelyevacuatedbyanothertank. **r
10^0-Afirst-platoontankwashitontheturretbutnoseriousdanagc
wasdone. 10^5~larksthathadexpendedalloftheirammunitionreturn-
edtobivouacareafornoreannunition, 1300-Conpany
lf
B"wasrelievedby
CQnpany
0700>TheConpanywasattachedto9thMarinesandheldItiReserve./
26February
TheBattalionremainedattachedtothe9^
n
MarinesandConpany"0"(15
tanks)wasfurtherattachedtothe1stBattalion,9^*1brinesfortho
norningattackacrossthenortheasternendofairfield#2.,J>
r
t12^+5Conpany
"A"(11tanks).wasattachedtothe2ndBn,9thMarines, Conpany"3"was
heldinReginentalReserve*
f 9th Marines for close-in support mission;
returned at 1500 i f f c l f f S more tanks to 2d Bn, 9th marines; returned at
1630. Total of 6 tanks inacTion* 2 of which were part i al l y disabled byAT
and arty fire* 3645 - 15 minute enemy ar t i l l er y concentration was layed on
tank assy ares at jtf end of Airfield #1; 1 tank was part i al l y disabled.
v- ;Company """was held in Re^iciental Reserve*
f f
C
t t
0630 - Company
n
C
u
was attached to 1st Bn, 9-b Marines far the day*s
attack*
0730 - Company
w
B
tf
requested a platoon or tanks to cssi st them in seizing
the hi l l and high ground jn vi ci ni t y of TA-300P*
0750 - Conpany OoFE^rd ta.uk and one platoon raovsri out to report to CP&pany
W
B
M
AttccTc coordinated with the infantry MD! coi:arer,!ed<f ?hofcar>ksand infant-
ry moved arcnind the hi l l firing into caves anl de.itrc7.u1p; pillboxes and bunkers*
A flamethrowing tank
T>
ias used to burn out a cive ^rom7mich enemy infantry
were emerging or. the base of the reverse side. The flamethrower exploded the
ammunition in tiie cave*.
0815 - The tv^c\ of one of the tanks was broken by an ar t i l l er y shftll
believed to be a friendly short round I t was requested that our ar t i l l er y
barrage be iiftec! soo yards which was done. The crew remained in the tank
and continued firing at the enemy fortifications*
>
3? February
The Battalion was attached to the 9th Marines. The Battalion (loss Com-
pany
tf
B
sf
) remained in RegimentalReserve. Company
W
B
W
(11 tanks) was further
attached to 1st Bn, 9th Marines and preceded the infantry attack across the
northeastern end of Ai rst ri p No. 2.
"A"
Attached to 9-:;h M-rines. No tanks committed.
Coiupany "B" <"s attached to the 1st Bn, 9th Marines and VILS.to precede
tt
L
ff
advacolng in a NEdirection* The line of departure was in the
vi ci ni t y of TASCO0,
0730 - Elevca (1A)tanks moved out in the advance*
0750 - Third ;ola':oon leader' s tank was disabled by a m?.ne, Three (3) nore
tanks were disabled b^ mines in an attempt to maneuver around tanks that had
been hi t and knock-ad out.. Only throo (3) tanks were successful .in passing the
line of departure and t-wc (S) of these v;ere immediately knocked jut by M! fire*
0822 - Al l tanks F^r-e ordered to withdraw'by the CO, l ^t Bn, 9th Marines.
During t hi s bried ac^'cLi of approximately twenty (2^'
;
ai nut es, si:: (6) tanks
were knocked out and feu: msn ^ers killed* Ton (,".C) non and tLree crffiaers
were wounded and o:*e i^~ai s missing in action* Bscelidnt work waa 'ioce by the
tank crews in evaeurt!r>:3 the woundedmen*
0630 - Coopany
{f
C'
:
in regimental Rcsorvo
^6 February
The Battalion wat. attached to the Slst Marines cffoc.tivo ylyin that
ment prepared to pass through the 9th Marines* Company
ft
A" (8 tanks) and com-
tt
C
rt
pany (11 tanks) nor-Q attached to the 1st and 3rd Bns. 21st Marines* resi>oct
w
A
tt
ively. The Tank Battalion (loes Comj?anies k
rt
G*ffvias in Regimental
Attached to 1st Bn, 21st Marines* 3 tanks cor*r<uttcd against heave concen
t rat i on of oaves and.bunkers with'excellent resul t s obtained., using 75ttmHE
APHSto blow up and seal caves at 200-A, B&217-3T.
Company
tt
B
w
was not employed*
0700- C3on58yH^jM^IAiPcli#d to 3d Battalion, 21st Marines and r e f i n -
ed in the assembly OTfaJjfeJgb. to support the Infantry as ordered*
1530 - The eleven (11) opeSSftoijal tanks displaced forward to target area
199 X& J #hero they had the mission of covering bott. r-unvrays of ai r -
st ri p #2 ' .
1 March
The Battalion was attached tb the 21st Regiment, company "A
M
(11
) was further attached to the 1st Bn
#
and Company
w
B
t?
(7) tanks) was
attached to t he2d Bn, 21st Marines* The Battalion (less companies
rt
A
w
and ^B*) remined in Regimental Reserve. However, at 1500 one platoon
of Company
tf
C
w
reinforced Company
w
B
{ff
s tanks.
' "A* .
Attachedto21stMarines. Three(3)tankscommittedwith1st
Battulion* Fairresultsnorcobtainedon*cavesbyusingT-105(armored)
fuseswith75mmHEshells* Thesefusespenetratedtoodeepinearth
fortifications,however,theirperformancewas'excellentagainst
stoneandconcrete* Onemanwoundedinactionbymortarburstnear
CompanyCP. * ' <
0630 - COof company
n
B* &n&platoon leaders reported to COof
2d Battalion 21st Marines at TJ200 potor.
The direction of attack was in a northerly direction in the vic-r-
inity of l a 217W The infantry was encountering machine ^unand
mortar fire and the tanks were called to aid the advance at TA217W
and X.
1030 "-The second platoon moved out to support Company "E*, 2d
Battalion 21st Marines. The Company Comnia.nder of Comixmy
n
B
rt
used the
pack set (SCR 510) carried by Reconnaissance aen to direct the tanks.'
1100 - Second platoon of tanks received hi t s from a un of un-
1
kriown caliber but were unable to spot the gun. All tanks were receiving
heavy fire from rockets and mortar.
1102 - Jap tanks wore spotted beinr, used as emplacements. Tho
infantry save our tanks*close support in keeping the enemy away from
our. units. ,
1115 - The tanks effectively attacked Jap tanks and infantry.
v
1255 -vTtoc t^ird platoon vras brought up to aicl the second platoon
which was running. Ion on arinunition.
1355 - The tJiird platoon leader
1
s tank was hi t . After the crevj
had evacuated the Japs attempted to blow up the tank by placinc dynamito
under i t . Thpy\vere cut dovm bymachine &un f i r e. M
1510-Six(6)tankswereemployedinthisaction. Threeofthem
wereknockedout"byenemyfireandremainedonthefrontlines. During
thenighttwo(2)-ofthesetankswere"burned"bytheJaps? Thethreere-
mainingtanksreturnedsafelytothebivouacarea.
Asaresultofthisactioneight(8)oftheenemy'stankswerede-
stroyedandone(l)truck,andnumerouspillboxesandemplacements. One
officerandthreeofourmenwerewounded.
0700-Company"C"stoodbyinassemblyareapreparedtosupportthe
infantryasordered.
1500-One(l)platoonwasdetachedfromtheReserveandwasattached
ff
B
w
toCompany ,3d.TankBattalion, WhilemovinguptojoinCompany"B",
3dTankBattalion,inTA217-WandpassingthroughthedefileatTA-2OOD,
one(1)tankwashitbyahighexplosiveprojectilepresumablyfiredfrom
adualpurposeAA.gun. Thetraversingnechanisiuofthistank'sturretwas
slightlydamaged*
n
C
n
^ -Company wasattachedto9thMarines.
2March
BattalionrevertedtoDivisionControl;Company"3"wasattachedtothe
21stuarinosandCompany
n
C
M
wasattachedto'tho9thRcgincntiforattack
thismorning. Company'
W
3
n
wasfurtherattached,to3&Battalion,9*hMar-
ines(alsoattachedtothe21st), Company
W
C"attachedplatoonstoboth
the1stand2d3attalions,9th.
"A"
Ccnpany
M
A
W
tanksWQTC notemployedthisdate. Thobulldozerwas
calledbythe2dBn,28thRegiment,5thDivision. ThisBattalionwasheld
up.bytheJapsbecausethetanksworkingwiththe"battalionwereunable
tocrosstheA.T.ditchlocatedatTA2l6iTan. The"bulldozersuccess-
fullyfilledinthisditch,underfire,end:theinfantryv/asabletoad-
vance.
"B"
attachedtothe21stRegiment. 5tanksinactionwith3d3n,9thMarines
usingbothclose-inJ 5
m
firoon"bunkersandcaves,andmediumrangeover-
headfiresinareaofAirfield17o.3#at217Jm&
o n
highgroundat235V.
Infantryreportedexcellentresults. 2tankshitlandninesandwerea-
bandonedatTA217X. 11-iAOjeepputoutofaction.
it
c
n
O63O-Company"C"attachedto9thMarines.
1100-Two(2)tanksmoveduptoassistCotipany&*,2dBn,9thi-iar-
incsinTA-218U. Byfiringonridgeat218M&R,theydestroyedagunof
unidentifiedcaliberandseveralpillboxesandcaves.
1300-Thesetwo(2)tanksexpendedtheirunitoffireandwerere-
placedbytwo(2)moretanks,whoagainsupportedCompany"G-",2d3n,9th
Marines. Theyassistedtheinfantrybyknockingoutseveralpillboxesand
automaticweaponsinTA-21SV. Thc^ctwo(2)tankscompletedtheirmission
andreturnedtotheassemblyarea.
1600-The3rdplatoonmovedouttosupportCompany"A",lstBn,9^h
Marines. Theplatoonleadercontactedthecompanycommanderandthetanks
wereemployedtoplacefireonseveralenemync.ciiincgunpositionsandcaves
atTA-201C.
3March
The3dTankBattalion(losstwocompanies)rcnaincdinDivisionReserve.
Company
M
3
W
wasattachedtothe21stRegimentandheldinReserve;ono
platoonwasusedforadirectoverheadfirenisoionagainstEill3&2
(TA219U). Company"C"wasattachedtothe9thMarinesandtheCompany
(losstwoplatoons)wasfurtherattachedtothe2cD:i, Twoplatoonsof
Company"C"wereattachedtothe1stBattalion,
, ' "A"
DivisionRoscrvo. ITotankscomnitt
TheCompanywasattachedtpthe21stRegiment, Thisregimentwas
advancinginaneasterlydirectiontowardKillJ62,locatedinTA219Unit.
Thesecondplatoonfiredonthehillasthe21stadvanced.
O63O-Company"C"attachedto9thMarines.
O725-The4thFlatoonmoveduptosupportCompany"A
11
,lstBn,9th
Marines,inTA-201D.. There,byfiringintoTA-2O2J\&3,theydestroyedseveral
bunkersandcaves."* '
0815-One(l)tankwashitlayagunofunidentifiedcaliber,wound-
ingonecrewmember. Allothercrewmemberssafelyevacuatedthe.knockedout
tank.
O73O-The2dPlatoonmoveduptosupport'tJcfepanloG*
M
&
n
afarf**^*Jo,
2nd3n,9^hMarinesinTA-21SR. Theretheydestroyednumerouscaves,pillboxes,
andbunkers.
1050-TheHeadquartersPlatoonmoveduptoassist^fepe&jr^E'
1
!2dBrj.,
9thMarinesinTA-21SW. *dhilopassingthroughthedefileat200Dourtank ;
dozerlessbladesustainedahit^fromagunofunidentifiedcaliberwiththe
resultthatatrackwas-"broken, Thedisabledtankcontinuedtofire. The
%
two(2)remainingtankscontinuedontheirmissionandassistedtfo
nn
3^,2nd3n,'
9thMarines,byfiringonridgeat218G&M. Two(2)emplacodenemytanks,one
pillboxandnumerousenemyinfantry
1
weredestroyed,
11^5-The1stPlatoonmoveduptoassist'Sfr^W,lstBn,9thMarines
inTA-201C. Theretheyassistedourinfantrybyfiringintotheridgeat
202D. Theydestroyed,onepillboxandseveralautomaticweapons. One(l)of.
jfcifotanks(knockedout"in2A-201C)wasdestroyedbyoneofthetanks,ofthe-
2ndPlatoonafterfriendlyinfantryhadreportedseeingJapsgettinginside.
kMarch
TheBattalion(losstwocompanies)wasinDivisionReservepre*
paredtosupporteitherassaultRegimentonorder. Company
tt
jL
H
(10tanks)
wasattachedtothe21stMarines,andCompany"C"(10tanks)wasattached
tothe9"k
n
Marines(furtherattachedto2ndBattalion)
"A"
Attachedto21stMarinesfordirectoverheadfiremissiononHill
362TA219-U. Unobservedresultsduetoextremelylowcloudformation,
B"
Company"3"wasnotemployed.
O63O-Company"C"attachedto9*hMarines*
O725-TheUthPlatoonmovedouttoassistCompany"G",2d3n,9th
MarinesinTA-21SRW.
^825-Whilemovingintoattack,positionsone(l)tankofthis pla-s-
toonwas#itbyanenemyATgun. Three(^ membersofthistankwereableto
safelyovacuateeventhougl).oneof.thosewasslightlywounded.
5 March ^
Bat t al i on ( l ess SwbpftnloB-^A^.an'a'^C*)
i n
Division Reserve. ITo
cliango i n attachments* . ,
' " "A"
Attachedto21stMarines, l
T
otanks'committed.
Company"3"wasnotemployed. RemainedinBattalionReserve,
O63O**Hooperations. Attachedto9thRegiment
6March
Battalion(lessCompanies"A"and
H
C")inDivisionReserve.ITo
changeinattachments.
rr
A
n
Attachedto2lstRegiment, Hotankscommitted.
Company"B
tt
wasnotemployed. BattalionReserve,
"C"
O63O-Company
n
C"attachedto9thMarinas.
0S00-The1stPlatoonmovedouttosupportthe1stbn,9*hKarines
illTA-201C, Theywereusedtofireonridgeat2011andassisttheadvances
oftheinfantrybydestroyingseveral"bunkers,pillboxes,andautomaticweap-
ons.
O915-
(
0ne(l)tankhitaminewitlitheresultthatatrackwas
"broken. Jour(h)ofthecrewmembersweresafelyevacuatedfromthetankbut
thefifthcrewmemberwaskilledbyenemysniperfireasheattemptedtocome
upoutoftheturret.
1015-Anothertankofthisplatoonhitamineandbrokeatrack.
Allcrewmembersofthistankwereabletosafelyevacuateit.
0S15-The3dPlatoonmovedouttosupport Co'W 2dBn,9thMar-
inesinTA-21S2, There,byoverheadfireplacedonridgeat21SSXtheysup-
portedtheattackofour infantry.
0900-One(l)tankwashitintherightsponsonwithanATgun..
Twocrewmemberswerekilledandtheotherthreewounded'inthistank,
7March .
Battalion"(lessCompanies"A"and
n
C
n
)InDivisionReserve.ITo
changeinattachments,
Attachedto21stHarinos, ITotankscommitted.
"3"
Company was not employed. Battalion Reserve.
"C"
0630-Company"C"attachedto9thMarines.
0655-The2dPlatoonmovedouttosupportCompany"3
W
,2dBn,
Marinesin,TA.-218B.WSk Thisplatoonwasemployedtoblastcavesinthisarea.
TheydestroyedagunofunidentifiedcaliberinTA-218T*
1^-02-ThisplatoonmovedouttosupportCompany"P
1
',;2dBn,Jillb r -
ines-andwasreleasedbyCompany
n/
3
n
* Inmovingupthroughanarrowdefileone
(l)tankhitaminebreakingatrack. Allofthecrewsafelyevacuatedthe
tank. Thistankblockedtheapproachfortheothertwotanksoftheplatoon
totjonpany.."3
111
* AsaresulttheywereorderedtoreturntoCompany"3".
I6OO-DuetothefactthatCompany"7"whssurroundedandpinned
downanothertwo(2)tanksofthe1stPlatoonworeorderedtonnkctheirwc.y
tothe"company.
1700-Thisplatoonwasunabletofindanavenueofapproachinto,
"P"Companyduetotheextremelyruggedterrain.
g>Harch
Battalion(lessCompanies"A"and"C"InDivisionReserve.ITo
changeinattachments.
" A " ' '
Attachedto21stRegiment. 9tankscommitted*inbcac.'isectorof2d3n,
21stMarinesagainstcavesandpillboxeswhichworeholdingupadvancetobeach
at219A. ; .
Company
M
3"wasnotemployed. Battalion~oserve.
0700-Company*C"attached9thMarines. 2To wJ^SWW^
ttod
^
3attalioiffliN.l3fcppiiics"A
1
*riul
n
C
M
)inDivisionReserve. Ho
changeinattachments;hoi^ever,.Company
n
G"wasfurtherattachedtotho3rd
Battalion,21stMarineswhichwasalsoattachedtothe9thRegiment. At1100
n
B
n
twoplatoonofCompany werereleasedfromDivisionReserveandattachedto
the9thMarinesto"befurtherattachedtothe3rdBattalion,9thMarines,
"A*
Attachedto21stMarines. 6tanks,corxiitted,3ofwhichfireda
missionfor2dBn;theothertowedarocketsledtofiringpoint,thenfired
20
(
rocketswithfairresultsat235T. ' .
Edq'splatoonworkedwithConpaniesGrddg6&nd2Jasy,3
d
-
Bn
> 9th
inTA-219Xray. Theinfantrypointedouttargetsforthe.tankstofireon.
Inthiswaynumerousemplacementsthatwereholdingupthetidvanceofthein-
fantrywereolimine/ted. Itwasfoundthat"o'ytakingtheinfantrymanintothe
tankturretbetterresultsweredetainedtlian"byanyothermethodoftarget
designation. The2dPlatoonworkedwiththe3d3n,9thandknockedoutmor-
tarsandpillboxesinthesametypework;-
O63O-Onetanksectionequippedwithflamethrowersmovedoutto
rt
K
n
support Company,3&Bn,21stMarinsagainst.Hippocketof.resistance
inTA-201D.
0900-Thetanksandinfantryjumpedoffin'acoordinatedattack
andmovedaheadabout225yards. Atthispointtheenemyemployedsmokea-
gainstourtanks,apparentlyinpreparationforattackinguswithdemolitions.
Thisdisorganized-the^replacementinfantrymenandcausedthemtobeata-hasty
withdrawal. Aftertheinfantrywithdrew,some50yards,theentiregroundpro*
viouslyheldbecameactive. Itwasnecessarytoestablishanewr-.dioobser-
vationpostandindoingthisareconnaissancemanwaskilledbysniperfire.
Thetanksectionwasforcedtowithdrawtothelinesoftheinfantry,where
theyexpendedtheirremainingammunitioninanefforttocoverthereorganiza-
tion.
1330-Thissectionwasreplacedbythe2dPlatoon.
10March
Battalion(lossCompanies"A"and"B")inDivisionReserve* Company
W
B
U
(Stanks)relievedCompany
M
C"whichwasattachedtotho9thMarines..
n
B"wasfurtherattachedtothe2ndBattalion,9thMarines.
"A"
Attached to 21st Regiment.. 6
;
tanks committed with 1st and 2nd Bn.'s
agai nst heavy rock and concrete emplacements along beach, Ithcccllent r es ul t s
were obtained from use of T-105 fuzes*
"3"
Hdq'splatoonworkedinsupportofCompanies'Gsor^eOandHasy
f
9tfr
Marines. ThesecondplatoonworkedwithConpanyI'L'*,.3d3n,21stMarines
at201D. Duringthomorningbothplatoonsfired*intoemplacements,pillboxes,
etc. The2dPlatoonloader'stankwasfiredonbyanunknowngunwhich"later
wasdiscoveredtobeaCompany"C"tankmannedbyaJapy Thegunner,inthe
assaulttankwaskilled, AbazookawascalledandknockedouttheCompany.
n
C
lr
tank. , - . . '
"C
n
O63O-Company"C"inDivision"oscrvewithTankBattalion'inass-
emblyareainTA-199X.
11March
Battalion(lessCompanies"A"raid"3"andoneplatoonofCompany*C
ir
)
wasattachedto2ndBattalion,9thMarinesinDivisionReserve. Company"A
w
wasattachedtothe21stRegiment.
%
Company"3"wasattachedtothe9thRegi-
mentwithplatoonsfurtherattachedtotho1stand3rd3attalions. Onepla-
toonofCompany""C"wasattachedtothe9thIlrrinosandfurtherattachedto
the3rdBattalion,lstMarines(alsoattachedto9thMa]
Attachedto" 1'm\jg 3 Tanksinaction-inbeachsectorof21st
CTat219Awith2nd
1
Battalion, ' .
"B" '
HdoJsand2dplatoonsupported9thregiment.
0905-Hdq'splatoonlaiddownfireonridgeinTA-202CTHinpre-
parationforattackbyAbleCompany,1stBn,9thMarines,
O935- ^Q infantrymovc-doutacrossanopenfieldtowardtheridge,
movinginanortherlydirection. Thetanksprecededtheinfantryabouttwenty
fiveyards. Asuccessfulcrossingofthefieldwasmadeinthat,manner, Hone
oftheinfantrywaswoundedinmovingacrossthefield,
1*030-AbleCompany'infantrywasheldupbyfirefro:;;theridge. The
tanicsfiredataljcavesandsuspectedsniperpositions.
1200-TheSecondplatoonmovedouttoaidthe3&3iii9th. Inorder
togetinto-apositiontoaidthenitv~snecessarythatanarmoredbulldozer
beusedtobuildaroadforthetanks. Thiswassuccessfullyaccomplishedand
the2dPlatoonmovedintoposition..Theyfiredintotheothersideoftheridge
onwhichtheK&q.
f
splatoonwasfiring.
1550-Hdq
T
splatoonjoinedthe2dPlatoonandbothplatoonslaid
downabarrageontheridgeinorderthattho3^Bn,9 ^ couldadvanceand
taketheridge.' \
v
.l62O-Alltanksceasedfiringandtheinfantrymovedoutintheat-
tack. ThoHdq
f
splatoonreturnedtoAbleCompany,1st3n,S'thandshielded
thiscompanywiththeirtanks-inorderthatthewoundedcouldbeevacuatedan.3
therestofthecompanycouldwithdraw,
1900~Alltankswerereleasedandsafelyreturnedtothebivouac
area.
n
c
.i
0600
r
Company"C
n
inDivisionReserve.
O63O
/
~The1stPlatoonmovedouttosupportthe~$a.3
n
21stmarines.
Onlyone(l)tankofthisplatoonwasemployedanditwasusedtotowarocket
launcherintopositionwhereitcouldeliminateITipresistancelocatedinTA-
201P. iTearly20ofthe7-2"rocketswerethrownintothispocketandstillour
infantrywasunabletogoinandoccupytheground.
12March _ '
Battalion(lessCompany"A"and"3"andoneplatoonofCompany"C")
attachedto2dBn,9thMarinesinDivisionReserve. Company
t!
A"attachedto
21stMarines,Company
|;
3"attchodto9thMarineswithplatoonsfurtheratt-
achedtothe1stand3&3ns. OneplatoonCompany"C
ff
wasusedasRcginental
Reservefortho9^h.
"A"
Attachedto21stRegiiront. I
T
oaction.
0730Hdq/splatoonmovedouttosupportCompany"C",1st3n,9th,
locatedinT^-20llJ* Thetankswei-oguidedtoCo:.ipaiiyC
W
V
Sc ?
^
in:f
antrynon.
,.Duringthe morningandafternoonilippositionswereaccuratelypointedout.by
heinfantryandsuccessfulworkin.clininatingtho.sepositionswasdonebythe
tanks. Theterrainwascxtrenclyrou/vhcausinggroatdifficultyinmaneuvering
thetanlcsr
1255-The2dplatoonmovedouttosupport"I"Co,3d3n,9th. The
tanksnovedoutapproxinateleyonethousandyardsfromTA-21SCtoTA-21SXto
meettheinfantrywhowereattackinginawesterlydirection. Theirmission-
wastoknockoutamachinegunthatwasholdinguptheadvanceoftheinfantry.
Thetankaweremoving"crossgroundthatwass-tilloccupiedbyJapsandextreme
difficulty^wasexperiencedincrossingtheverysoftterrain. Itwasalsovery
difficulttomaintain'directionbecausetljetanks,werebeingdirectedbyremote
controythroughtheir'radios.
HQtt
O63O-Co"C
n
leesone(1)platooninDivisionReserve.
O7OO-One(l)platooninreservewiththe9thi-i.
13March
Battalion(lossConpanyics"A"and"3"andoneplatoonofCompany
n
C")attachedto2d3n,9thMarinesinDivisionHcsorve. Conpany"A"ro-
nainedwiththe21stMarines;thedozertankwasattachedtothe$lh*aak
Battalion, Company"3"plusoneplatoonofCompany"C'
f
wasattachedtothe
9thMarines. AtO73OtwoConpany
ff
C"tanksreinforcedConpany
n
3".
"A"
Attachedto21stMarines, Bulldozertanksentto5thDivisionto
"buildaroadfortheflamethrowertan^s. Resultsweregood.
Kdq'sand3dplatoonworkedinsupportofthe1stIn,Jth. The
enemywasstronglyentrenchedina"pocket"locatedinTA-201DformedTbya
stonewallraidenplacenentsdugintoridges. Thispocketwasholdingupthe
advanceoftheinfantry,whowereattackinginawesterlydirection. The
tankshadtooperateoverterrainthatwasveryrough. Theywereat>letomove
onlyshortdistancesatatineandthenwiththeaidofanarmored"bulldozer.
Whencertainpositionsprovedtoo"hot"fortheJapstheywouldthrowagren-r
adeandchangepositions,
1500-Becauseofricochetsfromthe75mmgunitbecamenecessary
tosecurepermissiontofirethe75mnfrontheCOofthe1stSn,9th.
0600-One(l)platoonoff.lamothrowingtanksmovedouttoreport
toCompany
rr
3",3
<
Wk3:i,towhomtheywereattachedinTA-201D. Oneofthose
tanlcswasemployedtoturnoutanenenysniperposition*
O73O-TwotanksmovedouttoassistCompany"3",2-rlSn,9^hi-Iar**
ines"byknockingoutamachinegunposition. Duotothefactthatthefire
ofthetankswasmaskedbyourfriendlytroops,theywereunabletofire?
Thesetanksreturnedtotheassemblyareaat1030.
IkMarch
Battalion(lessCompany"A","13"andoneplatoonof"C")inDivision
Reserve. Attachmentsnochange. TwoConpany"C
:r
traitsreinforcedthe-Conpany
"C"platoonattachedtoCompany"3".
"A"
Attachedto21stP.egiuent. bulldozerattachedto5thDivisionon
sanemissionason13th. 31r.dehitr.r.iir.candbrokethehydraulicjack. The
bladewasbeckedoutofrangeofflattrajectoryfireandreleased,tobe
retrievedLiter. Hodamagewasdonetotank,whichreturnedtotheassembly
area. ,
"3"
O7OO~Kdq's2dand3&platoonsagainsupportedthe1st3n,9th
Karinesintiicattempttoclearthe
!f
pocl.ct"(TA-201D)ofJaps. Theuseof
ourflamethrowertanks,provedsuccessful0:1thisoccasion. Onetr.nkwashit
byariflogrenade. Th.'.ccauseda&.alieirplosioninthetank,slightly
woundingthodriver-^.idassistantdriver.
17^5 ^-
10
infantrymovedouttoattack.
C"
0600-Co"C
n
lessone(l)platooninDivisionHeserve.
O63O-Five(3)tanksattachedtoCo"B",3dTk2n.
O9OO-ThesetanksassistedCompany"3"inmoppingupoperations.
15Harch
'Jochange* Thereserveconpany(C)v/asemployedby2d'3n,
Marinesinattackagainstenemypicketi:iTA201D.
"A"
Attachedto21stMarines. 'Joaction.
Company"3"attached9thMarines. Hotemploy^
0530-Co"C
11
H^Eflto2d3n,9thLarinos,tosupportattack
against enemypocketinTA-201D.
0545- ^on(10)tanksaccompaniedbyone(l)armoredbulldozerof
theengineersmovedoutofassemblyareato2dB:i,9thMarines.
0720-Whilemovinguptotheinfantrylinesone(l)tank-hita
landninebreakingthetrack. Thocrewsafelyevcuatedand,theCompany
Commandermovedintoanothertank.
0S00-One(l)platoonoftanksplusthotank-dozerandthear-
moredBulldozormoveduptotheInfantrylines. Thetank-dozorwasusedto
breachasto-nev/all.behindwhichtheITipswerefiringatourtroopsonchtine
theytriedtoscalethewall. After"broachingthowallatanksectionmoved
throughandwithflamethrowersandtankgunsdestroyednumerouspillboxes'and
cavesinthearea. Astheterrainprohibitednovingthetanksmorethan
twentyfive(25)yardsthroughthewallthearmoredbulldozerwasusedto
buildtrjakapproachesandcoverandfillthemcuiycaves,trenchesandbunkers.
1300-Thearmoredbulldozerwasattackedwithasatchel charge
whichcaused,aleakyradiator..Itwaspulled"backtofilltheradiatorat
whichtimetheoperatorwaskilledbysniperfire. Thisdeprivedusofits
further employment thatday.
1500-Thetankscontinuedfiringontheenemypositionsand\Mhcn
theirammunitionwasexpendedtheyworereplacedbyanotherplatoon.
1600- AlargecapacityfIanothrowing tankwassecuredfromthe5th
Tank.Battalionandusedagainstthepocketwithgoodresults. Manyenemy
infantrywerecaughtbyourgunsrunningrwr.yfromthofirewithcartridge
beltsexplodingabouttheirwaists.
16March
Battalion(lessCompanies"A"and
n
C")ronr.inedinDivisionPucservo
preparedtosupport21st"Regiment (whichhadrelieved elementsofthe5til
MarineDivitr.on) Conpony
U
A
I!
wasattachedto21stl.'r.rinesfortheattack,
whileCompany
ir
C"vas.attached-tothe9thIIrincsrodfurtherattachedtotho
2dBn,9%hR.gircnt,for"aeppingup":.n
A"jtachelto2J.stBo^inent. 9truiks-committgdonterracesandcliffs
overlookingbeachin21stsccbor. Excellentresultswereobtainedondug-in
enemystrongroints"bythoneutralizingfiresof7 5
m
'
n
-
n
^flamethrowers.
Company
i;
j3'
;
wasnotemployed.
if
C
n
OGOO-Co
|:
C",attachedto2dEn,9thiMarinestocontinueattack
against encaypocketinTA-2OI3.
064-5-One(l)platoonoft"."iksplusthearmoredbulldozer,ofthe
Engineersmovedcut.f.t.hcasaenbiyareaandintopositionshortlybehindour
linesinTA-HG.'D, "
*0'/^5-xtcr.rmorcc*.bulldogorcoverec.byr
u
suctionoftanksandin-
fantrybreaLtioc.?.2t1.rotnl]c-.i'dv.ddciioditirvtoat^.nk,approach,
06'CO-.ax?.c.r^ozr.r.p.^ityfLanothrowing tr:.ii-:fromhthTankBattalion
Wcisemploy.d, Thefl^ziethrowingtankmovedr, shortdistancothroughthowall
andburnedthjenemydefensesinthodraw.
0^?13-Theflariothrowingt^.nk\i/ithclrewandv/-ssentbacktobere
charged. Oneofcurtanksectionsmovedthroughthewallanddownthedraw
blastingthecharredpositionsandtheregainingdofonposthr.tweronotaffect-
edbytheflamethrower.
tfow 93O -Tlio5thTankBattalionflanethrowingtankreturnedandwas
enpToyedthistinointhoaroawhorewomadeourdeepest J
yesterday. It'"bumedoutthoononytrenchesandcavesint h i ^ ^
firetothoru^iunitioiior.thegroundandexplosivecharges,ot'e.
1100-Anotherplatoonoftanks"movedfromassemblyareatosupport
Company
u
G
;i
ontheright'of-Company
H
?
H
.
TOTAL
OFFICERS
SLTLISTED
KIA -
0 KIA -
19
WIA - g WIA -
MIA - 0
MIA -
DOW - 0
Total g Total llg
A* mumi
1* Theessentialfunctionofthissectionwasthereportingofcasual-
ties* Eachcompany,attheendofeachday,submittedacasualtyreport
fortheproceeding2khourperiod,"basedonfrontlineinformationsubmitted
bycompanycommanders,platoonleadersandtankcommanders* Inaddition,
thecompanyfirstsergeantsandcorpsmenoftencontactedinfantrybattalion
aidstationstoascertaintheidentityandnatureofwoundsofourcasual-
tiesevacuatedbythem* liveryeffortwasmadetolearnthetypeofwound
andprognosisintimetoincludesuchinformationontheinitialreports*
Shi*procedurefacilitatedmorepromptpreparationofairmailbriefsbythe
rearechelonadministrativesection*
2. Casualtyreportsweresubmittedinaccordancewithdivisioninstruct-
ions. Theupperhalfof$erspnneldatasheetscontainedadministrative
information,thelowerhalf(mimeographedcasualtyreportfora)contained
thefollowinginformation: name,rank,serialnumber,organization,type
fcasualty(VIA,KIA,KIA,DOtf),spaceforremarks,thedateforwarded,
specificationnumber,theIdentifyingnumberofthereport,andaspacefr
thesignatureoftheauthenticatingdffleer* Theoriginal,orinitialcas-
ualtyreportwasdetachedandsubmittedtodivision,asecondcopywasre-
tained,andthethirddispatchedtotnerearechelonadministrativesection.
Therearechelonforwardedamplifyingairmailbriefsandpreparedstaffre-
turnsoncasualties*
3 The5-1sectionarrangedforthedisplacementofbattalionhead-
quartersandwasalsochargedwiththesecurityof headquarter
1
sarea*
Thestaffsectionswereplacedinapositiontofacilitatestafffunction-
ing.
km MailservicewasexecutedatbattalionheadquartersbytheSTavy
mailclerk. Incomingmailwasdeliveredtothecompanyaailorderlieseach
evening,andoutgoingmailwassubmittedeachmorning. V44ailandstamped
envelopeswereobtainedforpersonnelofthisunit*
5* Postexchangesuppliesweremadeavailabletoallpersonnel* Candy,
athleticmaterialandmagazineswereobtainedfromtheDivisionAthletic
andMoraleofficeanddistributed* Additionalreadingmaterialandstation-
erywereavailabletoallhandsatthenearbydivisionlibrary. Hews
broadcastsandlatestbattlenewsandinformationwereadailyfeature*
Hotfoodfacilitiesweresetupassoonasconditionsallowed/andhot
coffeewasavailablethroughouttheday.
6. Thissectionandthemedicalsectionco-operatedonallsanitation
measures. Adequateheadsweredug,utilisingdiscardedoildrumsandpre-
viously'preparedseats. Sanitarymeasures,includingDDTsprayingofthe
areaandthesprinklingoflimearoundandinheads,wereeffecteddaily*
Dailyinspectionswereheld,
7* BurialprocedurewasinaccordancewithDivisionordersand.SCP's.
PriortotheinaugurationofDivisionravesService,fatalcasualtiesof
thisunitweredeliveredtotheareadesignatedfortfreDivisionCemetery.
Marinedeadfoundino\j.rareaweredeliveredtothecemeterybydirection
ofthissection. Severalenemydeadwereburied. Uponactivationof
DivisionBurialParty,thissectionco-operatedin
collectionanddeliveryofourowncasualties*
1, AeraTMi|t^|lMotO8,varjrijagfrom1:5,000 >to1:20,OOp,wore
furnishedbeforethis%fi&tion* Mosaicsandlowangleobliqueswerealso
providedaswellasofficialmapsofthe1:10,000scale. Inallcases,an
adequatesupplywasprovided, Thecompletenessofboththephotosandthe
mapsloftalottobedesired* Sheaerialphotos,ofcourse,weretakenbe*
foretheintenseaerialandnaval"bombardment,and,consequently,couldnot
showroadnets,etc.exactlyastheyw^eroatthetimeoflanding* The.maps
wereinaccurateintheirterrainfeatures*andtheirroadnets* Contour
linesshowedlevelareasandplateaus,-where*actually,verycut-upand
irregularareasexisted* Koadnets,showndidnotconformtothoseexisting
whenwelanded.
& Hydrographicinformationfurnishedbeforethocampaign,provedaccurate
andsufficientforourneeds. Plansforlandingourequipment,whichwas
basedonthisinformation,provedtobeaccurate.
3. IntelligencedisseminatedtothisunitbyG-2provedtobetimely
inallcases. Inquiteafewcases,it.provedtobequiteeffective,namely
ingivingusinformationastoprobableminefields. Someofthesewe
knewofinadvanceandwereabletomakeplansaccordingly* Underthe
existingconditions,itwasfeltthat<J~2disseminatedsufficientintellig-
encematerialduringthocampaigntofillallofourneeds*
. k* Inthisbattalion,thofollowingprocedurewassetupforthere-
coveryofcapturedenemydocumentsandmaterial. Anintelligenceteamof
threemenwasdesignatedineach, ofthethreelinecompanies* Thesewere
generaldutymen,andhadtobegivenspecialintelligenceschooling."before
thecampaign* Daringthocampaign,theyhandledallonemymaterialand.-
documentsfoundbymenofthocompany* Thisprovedtoboveryexcellent,
astheywerealwaysatthocompanyGPandavailabletocollectthismaterial*
thismaterialwasthonturnodintotheS-2eachevening- oritslocation
reportedtohim*
5 PresentJ/OdoosnotgivetheBattalionIntelligence,Sectionany
enlist04personnel. Heedlesstosay,withonlyonopoxioninthesection,
thisdidnotallowcloserliaisonbetweentheS-2an^G-2. Provisions
foratleasttwoenlistedpersonnelasassistantsinthesectionwouldmake
foramuchcloserliaison,andalsopermittheS-2togetaorefirsthand
observation.
6. Beforothocampaign,allofficersinthebattalionworeaddressed
bythebattalioncommanderonthoquosiionofsecurityofclassified
materialconnectedwiththeoperation* Theofficersthenaddressedtho00*
listedmonundertheircommand,andthisapparentlys toppedthe"loosetalk
1
*
whichhadboonquiteprevalentbeforethistime* Incombat,onlythe
official1:10,000mapwastakenforwardofcompanyOP'aintanksandthen
onlybyplatoonsergeantsandabove*andbyofficer!*
7* Duringthiscampaign,tanksreceivedthoheaviestmortarfireyet.
encounteredby3dDivisionTanksinPacificfighting* Hitsweresustained
byourtanksfrommortarsestimatedtobeupto90mmwithoutserious
damage* Inothercases;theenemyattemptedtohitourtankswithevenlar-
gorcalibermortars,butwasneversuccessfulindoingso. Duringtho
earlystagosofthocampaign*thetanksalwaysArowheavyconcentrationsof
mortarandartilleryfirewhenevertheyapproachedorwithdrewfromthe
frontlinos* Thisfir0wassointensethataccompanyinginfantryoften
askedthetankstowithdrawtemporarily* Inotherwords,thoenemysocmod
toregardhismortarsandartilleryaseffectiveanti-tankweaponsatthe
earlystagosofthocampaign*
Anothertacticcnployodbytheonomywasthouseof<airbursts
againstadvancingtankandinfantryteamstoeliminatetheinfantryand'
allowthetankstoprocoedintoATguntrapsalone* Whonthoadvancewould
start,enemyartillerywould"adjust*afowairbursts,sothattheywore
explodingfromtentofiftyfeetabovethetanks* Asthoadvancecontinued,
thisair-burstbarragegrewinintensityuntilithadallthoaccompanying
infantrypinnedtothogroundandunabletosupportthotanksinanyway.
Thetankswouldkeepmovingforwardtryingtoeliminateonemv^resistance,
andwouldsoonfindthomsolvosforwardofourinfantry
Atthistime',thedflky^7mmATgunswouldoponupaHj-proceodtoknockout
anyinterferencefrominfantrywhowouldstillbepinneddown
tgthocampaign,enemysuicidesquadsattemptedto
^ fbFnglargechargesofexplosivesonandunderthe
vehicles* This"~waT*cT6newithoutanycoverofsmokeorscreeningdevice.
Thesquadsoffourorfivemenwouldjumpupfromholesandattempttorush
thetanksBeforebeingcutdownbyourfire.
Inonearea,smokewasusedextensivelyagainstourtanks asenemy
tankdestroyersquadsrushedforwardunderthisscreenanddestroyedthe
tank. Inthisinstance,thetankhadtoenteranarrowdefile,andeach
timeitattemptedtodoso,theenemywouldthrottfoutsmokegrenadesandthe
tankwouldwithdraw. Finally,thetankpushedintothedefilewithoutany
smokeappearing,bu,t,assoonasitgotwellwithinthedefile,theenemy
smokeditagainveryheavily,anditstoppedmomentarily. Atthistime,
agroupoftheenemy,estimatedtobeabouttwentyfive,swarmedoutofholes
andattackedthotankwith,polechargesand"MolotovCocktails".
Inoneinstance,enemytroopsenteredoneofourcrippledand
abandonedtanksaheadofourlinesatnight,andb*ecamefamiliarwiththe
firingmechanismofthetank. Inthemorning,asourtanksagainadvanced,
theenemyfiredthe"J^mncannoninthisabandonedtankandsucceededin
knockingoutoneofour'.tanksbeforebeingknockedoutbybazookas.
'Enemymediumandlighttanks,mountingh~limand5"fm&cannon,were
encountered. Thesewereburiedinthesandandusedaspillboxes,primarily.
However,theyoperatedasATgunstoo:theywereextremelydifficultto
locate.
Minosofvarioustypeswereencountered,andwereusuallylocated
asanti-tankweapons. The"YardstickMine"placedovera130lb.bombwas
themostcommontypo. "TerraCotta"minesofthe6m d9lb.varietywere
found. Coveringtheseminefieldsworek~(miaA3!gunswhichattackedthetank
oncethemineshadstoppedit. ThoseATgunsworogenerallyplacedonthe
flanksofthelimitedavenues.ofapproachthatthetankcoulduseandfired
intothesponson(side)ofthotank,penetratinguptofourinchesofarmor.
Onecoastaldefensegunandemplacementhadseveralringsofwoodenboxmines
aroundit,apparentlytopreventthetanksfromoverrunningandcrushing
theposition. Quiteafewsingleanddoublehornkettlemineswerealso
encountered,aswereafewtype97magneticminesjbutnoneworunusual
useofthemwa'semployed.
Japaneseartilleryattemptedtoregisteronourtanksnumeroustimes
butnevercausedextensivedamage,n;idobtainedfewdirecthits.
C. OPS3ATIOITS
1, RehearsalBxercises
A* Traininginpreparationfortheoperationwascoveredina
littlemorethanthree.months. Thetimeelementwasconsideredtoboado-,
quatc. Itwasthepracticetoholdclassroomstudyonmaterialpertinent
toailoperation,thoafielddemonstrations. Ofimmediateconcernwere
lessonslearnedduringtheGuamOperation. Eachcompanycriticizedthe
campaigninclassroom*discussingtacticsrndorganization;onCX
f
s
following,tankswereconsideredclose"supportinfantryweapons"untilthe
firsttank-artiliery-infantryproblem. Thofollowingsubjectswerecovered
satisfactorilybeforethooperation!
Passageoftanksthroughminefields.
StudyofenemyATweapons. .
Camouflageofvehiclesandequipment.
Employmentanduseof.flamethrowers.
Tacticsofplatoonandcompany.
Intelligencereviews*
Passivechoaicaldefense.
Armoredreconnaissance.
Smallarmsfiring.
Careandwaterproofingofvehicles.
Preventivemaintenance.
Gyrostabilizerandhydraulic'traverse.
Communications(radio,telephone)
Gasdecontamination*
Airdefense.
itry-artillery-tankproblemwasconducted. Tanks
movedtothe liT&^ffi^j&faJoked,severalhundredyardsbyinfantry. Time
firewasplacedover*im$&$$.swhentheywereontheobjective.,
C.Whenitwasatfinitelyknowntheoperationwouldbeoveropen
terraineveryeffortwasmadetogettanksinopenareastotrain. Thiswas
possibleaftertheBattalionmovedtoYona. Armoredforcetacticswereused
thereafterinTankManeuverAreaITumberOnewiththeHinthMarines. AllTank
Personnelwerespecifically.schooledonthefollowing:
Assistancebetweentanksbyfire.
Employmentofplatoonand.companyoverfavorabletankterrain.
Assaultandreductionofafortifiedposition.
Over-runninganddefendingafortifiedposition.
Coveringreorganizationofattackinginfantry*
Assemblingonrallyingoralternaterallyingpoints.
D.ThemajorityofHeadquarterspersonnelwereschooledontho
followingintholatterpartofthetrainingphase:
;. . CPdisplacement
Camouflagediscipline
Reconnaissance -
E.Eachofficerconductedclasses^whilcenroutetotheobjective.
Eachman-wasthoroughlyinstructedastodetailsoftheoperatic:*,pertaining
totheTankBattalion.
2. Methodsusedtoguidetank,acrossreeftobeach.
(Sincothe3^DivisionwasinCorpsReserve,therev/asnoproblem.
ofship*-to~shoremovement. Landingsweremadeonwell-establishedbeach-
headsfromLST's).
3 Weapons(includingamaunitionandfuzesetting)mosteffectiveagainst
fortifications;
'A.TiyrrctInstalledTankiTlamoth.rowers(CB-H-l).Thisflamethrower
nadcitpossibletocoverlargeareaswhoretherewerenumerouscavesanddo-.
prcssions. Theweaponwasveryoffectiycagainstlarge,undergroundcaves,and
whenspecial75mmgunammunitionwasnotavailable,thoflamethrowergained .
goodresultsagainsttholargestpillboxesandbunkers.
3. 7*2"Rockets.Rocketswereusedagainstpocketsofresistance
consistingofnumerousenemy"spidertraps". Oftenthorocketlauncherwasthi
onlyweaponthatcouldboused'effectively. Indirectfirevsnecessitated
byahighmask. Effectwassustainedagainstfortifiedpositionssuchas
blockhouses. .
C T105concretefuzesfor7 5 ^H.3.Thesefuzeswereuseda-
gainstpillboxeswithsatisfactoryeffect. Pillboxesthatwerefiredonby
tankscouldnotwithstandthisfire. Alltankpersonnelwerehighlyimpressed
withres-tilts.
h. EfficiencyandEmploymentofFlamethrower(tankmounted).
A.The(sfe2-5Rl)flamethrowerVsinstalledinourtankswereupp&
effectivelyinsomeinstances gainstenemypersonnel,pillboxes,andcaves.
Thoirefficiencyisunderminedbythoshortrangeandthenarrowfieldof
fire. . . . .
3.AturretinstalledflamethrowertankwasborrowedfromthoUfch
Division. Zxtcnriveareascouldbecoveredbythisweaponandthegreatrange
mademaneuvereasierforthetanks.
C.ThepolicyofthisBattalionwastoreservetheflamethrowers
fortargetsthatcouldnotboreducedeffectivelybyanyotherncans.
I).Themechanicalefficiencywasconsideredadequate.
)ccialU'seofTank(i.e.assupportingartillery,assaultguns).
;cusedassupportingartilleryonproblemsheldpreceding
mtthispracticewasnotencouraged.
[woJimaOperationonetankwasequippedwithspaced
armoronbothsldc^andsandbagsprotected.,thofinalc.rivcandtheturret*
TherewerenoATgunsencounteredaftercompletionofthis/tank,soeffective-
nessisundetoTmind^fcHoweveritis-believed47mmA^S&rewillnot,penetrate*
6.
A. While-subjectsenumeratedInparagraph1werebeingstudied,
numerousproblemswereconductedwiththeinfantryteams. Orientation
coursesweregiven,acquaintingthetroopswithpotentialitiesandlimit-
ationsofourtanksinmaneuvering
t
firing,andcommunications,
3. Closeinfantry-tanksupportproblemswereexecutedovervaried
terrain. Enoughtimewasgiven,tothemajorityoftheinfantrysquad*toimparts*
themijlththeimportance6fclosesupportinclosedterrain,
C. Therewasnotenoughfiringdoneonproblemstoacquaintin-
fantryteamswithourfiringlimitations.
D. Communicationbetweentankandinfantrywasstressedoneach
problem. Telephoneswereinstalledineachtankforusebytheinfantry*
SCR300*8wereusedbetween,commandtanksandinfantrycompanycommanders*
Ifcommunicationfailedentirely,tankcrewsandfireteamsreliedonhand
signals.
E. Coordinationbetweentanksand.infantrywashighlydeveloped
(usingArmoredPorcetactics).
7# EnemyAnti-tankMeasures(seeB,Intelligence,above).
9- SDHPLY y ,
1..Adequacyofalltyposofmountingoutsupplies:
ClassX TheavailabilityofClassIsupplieswassufficient.
Rationsandwaterwerereadilyfurnishedandissuedascalledfor. The
systemoffillingemptywaterdrumsfrom5thFieldDepotlocationsnearerto
Sumayembarkationpointswasveryefficientandavoidedlossoftimothat
wouldhavebeennecessaryifwaterdrumshadbeenfilledfrompointsnearer
DivisionareaandtransportedtoSumay. '....'
ClassII. Acontinuedshortageofcertainitemsofindividualequip**
mentwasineffectforquitesometimeandworehurriedlyfurnishedjust
priortomovementtostagingareas. Clothingothorthanservicesunmorre-
quiredforcombatw*sinthehandsofpersonnelinamountsnecessarybefore
embarking* Generallyclothingneededforcombathasboenavailable. How-*
ovor,therehasboonapersistent shortageofsmalloroddsizoservice
summertrousers,garrisoncaps,andchevrons. Transportationusedfor
movementtodockareaswasorganicandsufficient. Rollingstocktobeem-
barkedwasingoodcondition,aswasprovedinconbat. Vehicleshortagesin
thisbattalionwore;l-2jton6x6,75gallon,gasolinetruck,2-1ton* W car^o
trucks,1-Jtonambulance,2rJ;toncargotrailers,5"*lt
n
cargotrailers*
1-K16A1machineshoptruck,3greasetrailers,2watertrailers*
ClassIII. Alltypesoffuelwereavailablewhenmountingoutand
woredrawnandmovodtodockareasIngoodorderandbeforetroopandorganic
equipmentmovementstarted* Thisavoidedoongostionofvehiclesindockareas*
ClassIT. Allitemswereavailableasrequiredandwerepreloaded
intovehicles.
ClassY. Anapproximate5additionalunitsoffiroofcaliber.30
AP&Tbeltedwasdrawnfortanksandwasavailable. Allothortype.sof
ammunitionwasavailableandfurnishedwhenrequired.
2. Adequacyofresupply*
Class! Rationswereavailableinsufficientamountsandsupplyof
sameappearedtobegrcatorthanthatforthe:Guauoporatlon, Watersupply
wasverylimited,manytinojstoamaximumof1gallonporman. Waterfron
drumswasdrinkable. Limitedamountsoffroshfoodsw^i^eavailableforth$
last5
0
*6daysoftheoperation*
ClassII. Clothingreplenishmentswereavailableinlimitedamounts*
Plannclshirts andutilityjackets"woreinsufficientlyfurnished.
ClassIII. Estimatedfuelallowancefortankswasoverconsumption
becausetanknovenontwasnotasgroatasestimated. G-asolinowasnotused
inasgreatamountsasanticipated* Specialweightoils,othorthatSAJ50,
availablewhenneeded*
3 Jifficicttcyofallshorebasedsupplyfacilities.
Ingeneral,supplyfacilitiesworetavorabj^jtfithafewexceptions*
Initially,I^nn*BE,SuperCharge,w/lHisoM^SoxHj
needed 1i f f ITl t f | j i i j IjfyiiijfJ to locate in established dunps because al l
types of atL
r
iiwtiitio^fe4^(j&jpxhGr One specific type of oi l , SAU5O
not available after iMdays and i t was aiocoesary to drew same from 4th
Division dm3p3~ 3*\D?. was difficnl,b to load Into trucks, >v.o to the fact
that i t was i*i sxicil holes and i t w~.s r.ocoss'.try to l i r s t get druns on
ground level and *;ho:\ load into tvu&s. i. c.:ano would 3i?,vc expedited
nishing fuel to al l uni t s.
H. Salvage and salvage collection*
i l l organizational and individual oqulpnuit found in CPareas of
this "battalion were collected and t.u^nod.into the Division Salvage Section,.
Gas nasks wcr,o picked up by Division Salvage truck. All uj^scbXe aiiErunit-*
ion (75fl&i cal.3^ "b^ltod-danaged rounds, rusted snail arras JMUEIO) was turnod
into Corps Annunition Bump as directed t y G-4.
5 Transportation. '
Avery narked shortage in track laying oquipnont was the TD-1S-
Tractor that this organization i s authorized, "but was nob allowed to take
on the XMO JIM**operation. ' illl other transportation enbarked was sufficient,
with the exception of one ^ton nabulanec. Sparc part s and naintonanco
f aci l i t i es were always available and were called for and used as required*
I ni t i al l y, repair work on tanks
r
ras acconpiished by Tank Bnttalion personnel
as Ordnance Conprx.y i^is not established for maintenance.
1. The t i ne required to load LST ^77 and 6^6 was two hours each* four
norc hours wero needed to secure tanks. This
1
was done underway- "ino r e-
quired to load A2A-12 was approxinatoly twenty^two (22) hours. This ship
was attached to Transport Division 32 and carried lty pieces of Tank
lion wheeled oquipaont, in addition to 21st ilr-rines ECT equipnont and
supplies.
2* Ti:ne required to unload IiST^ U77and 646 was one hour each. LS2
646 used an L8T beach oat to expedite unloading of tanks on the beach*
This was vory helpful. AEAr-12 unloaded Irak Battalion vciaiclcs irregularly*
duo to lack of appropriate landing craft . Last vehicle of Tank Battalion
disonbarked 27 February, ^
3 Snail land crr^t wore very di ffi cul t to load into fron transport
area, Eough seas and strong winds shifted landing craft position very
often and, in sone cases, caused danagc to landing craft and qquipnent
"being lowered. The nain difficulty Was insufficient large landing craft
such as LCT*s or LSI' s, Theso could "betiod up to the larger ship in a
way that afforded st abi l i t y to a certain extent and could hold nore equipment
The LStf was the nost favorable type of landing craft used. I t s length poraits
an A&or APA to discharge froxi oorq that one hr.tch at a tino and thui
oxpodito delivery ashore.
k* One inrprovqaent would have "been to have each piece of whoolod
nont nount i t s own sling or neane of l i f t i ng fron the ship into landing craft
so that ship*s slings would not have to "bo recoverod fron each l i ft *
5, A chart, showing t hi s uni t ' s vehicles embarked, follows:
5 a>
o
n
o
I
o
u
bQ
o
0
a
-o
8
u
o.
r*4
OJ
CM
o
1 i s
LST477
29
25
USS-LIEHA
X3 3 H9
0SS-J0PITSR
XI
S09WS
is
3.
? , 0RD1IAITCE
p
, aad the foXXowing
A. $hisunitlnndodwitli
weaponswerenountod:
X70 3Omchinc
X3 ftancthroyer*
Iho folXowing
anas
carried:
2XS Q MX
313 Cal,
5
3 . 5?he ocXow Xii9te<i weapons wer Xost i n conbat;
, . ; * ' . .
X5 HJ 7 5 ^ guns
ft i^ 5
SO MI919A.Uaaeiineguns
7
20
guns
15 Cal.
63 CaX^^agXXiX pistols
C GencraXly, there wcro vory few naifunctions of any type*
OccasionalXy thoro woro loading difficulties with tho
r
7$m gun which wore
characterized "bybroken rounds in the tube* Actually, this can be attribut-
ed to unclean tubes rather than faulty acinunition* . . - - . .-.
Hm3>ue to eneny ar\ti-tank eiffectivenoss, thO.battalion ordnance
section had to porforn third* fourth, and fi fth echelons of maintenance
upon landing, , '.-,- ';. ..
S
#
The weapons this unit us'oU were effective and presented few
difficult!oi* Xt i s arcconraonded that"twenty-four (2*) ^R2^5R1 flaste throw-
ers be mounted in the Tank Battalion
1
s tank?- It i s further r,ec.oi3nndcd ^
that this battalion be equipped wiih': . *
Aplatoon of pi ^
X sufficient nuobor of T*2.* rocxpt launchers* (See 7 below for detailed
rcco:xioridations)#
' fI f I f l lC(
tnSeciioa nasaed andfired t*e f#fp reckete
twice duriag the operation* there was difficulty in. getting the launcher
into pesitioa, eincc i t was neuatod oa ft elod with fixed elevation ofM$
lo&oon* Sue to the rua-*do*a fc*ttorio
r
ihere wore severe^n%m^it***
t efecl fc
tfunber ead t ype used <oe* f t , % *%***)*
1 . J t o * * of day* ba t t l e cqpl tjtoeal ( f l
DM*
9
6
15
Q repairs 15 t*akt
KalfuactUo^ nad
e andfiro
oi l
aid
dutciiof on mt tnnk,
2 Ton.track* Ijrokoa - tw
troyed Bogie wheels 4cstroyd oa - fiv# cae* whr fsroat
andfi nal driro vat* ooapletqly off V hittiaj;
3*
Ono
t
8
^ ixit laad nino loft fwat f teu^cT>lowtog final drivt,
front 'bogie bracket nadBvral toctio^a of trackf completely off, ?pre
of axploioa uadr floor nrb\iad oairollod differpniial tlew in floor of
tctnk conrplotoly dostroying power train -unit, trtmaaisgion, driver> controls
JUplftcod fivo support
propollo*
f9
throe fiaft! drlro hibi vitA drJvo
t i x radiftto* uniti dostroyod >y tHoll frn^aeoti
carat *ira#
loplnccd four oofio gudgooaftraa*
p htctt pi
5. Iq^ioilon froa ninot destroyed two
Tloor aroor hcatM and
flow: of tank witU cso^po hatchiw\ad aot ftt*
Thyottlo linjca^o and
i h d ofeapo hatch repaired and refitted,
clutch eroM shaft raaligaod.
Uaot out.
6 3 a*9dttary gonorators or,rTmxtorf
park ?lufc cleaned and adjutoA, turiacd iap*
7* Jifiht la^lS volt Vittoriot charged aad rohar<&od,
$ Ontank on1ST^7f ^| t | ^ divo ooabejr - plajio hit tank on
right rp*nson nenr oontw of tiirrot riai
#
inr.toly clx inch hole in earner plating* roiulting in fi re centering around
tho tank. Tank had "beenthoroughly vaterproofod; tnit salt water ued to
oxtin^uiih fi re entered texk through hole ta amer
f
f i l l i ng tank approxioatoly
i x inehof aoovo turret paekct floe?. Domtraction of tho Dattcriet, rq^ula-
tore, wiring and aceoctorlos in lower fighting coapartncat# 5ank wa# thorough-
ly cloanod and ropairod aud oack in action fivo days *&%**landing,
9 4k %Jfcreh, 15U5, one dicsol task acquired frep
n
C*
\\h Sank 3attallcnf elutchott were ropairod, cnginot tuaat**&
radio installed frm destroyed tank m&put in operational use on 10March,
10, Whcoled Vehicle* - Ali -vohielof coarpletely cheekod and ser-
viced * two radiator* roplacod m ^*Ua 4x^ duo to fhrapnel, 3 tiro$, tubot,
andvheoli 600x1^deefrayod by hrpnl and ghell firoj Z"battorio xecharged,
5-ton ^ whool
t
totally doitroyod *y fi
endntions(aooV"below)
"mM~MM>-w-mmmH>9iF
e
Squipaont*
A. f^mJfffoM^Mec IV",2, I, above andVbelow),
3. Rockot Lof t t ^p (See IV, T, I, above* andV below)*
C. Tank nountod bul l doz e r s - >$hrce wore usod on several occasions
and proved to bo ef f ect i ve i n cl osi ng caVcs and f i l l i ng shel l hol es to permit
other tanks to pass through* There wore no mechanical f ai l ures .
km Enemy Materiel .. .
A. Weapons Uonc salvaged,
B* Combat Vehi cl es * One Japanese Light Tank, Model 95
w
^s salvaged*
I t i s i n excel l ent condition and runs very well*
0. Ammunition - XTonp salvaged.
D* Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment - Itfoae salvaged.
G> CHEMICAL
1, A. Planning Phase - Individuals wore given trai ni ng i n recogni ti on .
of oneny agents, i n protecti on (both individual and c ol l e c t i ve ) , and i n
decontamination. Orders for the gas sentry wero discussed and momorizod*
Masks wore f i t t od ?md t est ed f6r each- i ndi vi dual .
B* Loading Pfcaso Al l gas masks were crated raid carried aboard g&ip
on tho rear of the tanks. Here they wero immediately avai l abl e at a l l ti nes*
decontamination oquipnont was loaded l as t aboard trucks and was avai l abl o at
any ti ne* .
$ Landing Phase* - Masks were Issued to the troops and t est ed tho
day before debarkation. Consequently, everyone had hi s mask when ho de-
barked, and i t was i n excel l ent condi ti on. Instructi ons were i ssued to each
individual to retai n hi s nask unt i l not i f i ed otherwise.
J>. Island Phase - In accordance with ordors issued by the Di vi si on
Chemical Officer a l l ciaslcs.yrotp turned in< The individual turned hi s i n to
hi s Company Chemical HCO, who i n turn gave then t o the
2* BnemyuseofCncaicals-Theencnyusodsnokoagainstourtanksonco
duringthecanpaiga* Atthattineourtankswereondoavoringtoforcea
defile,andeachtineatankattemptedtoenterthedefile,theoneny
snokodthotankwithsnokc.grenades. (Tankcrowboliovodtheyworesnolco
grenndoqandnotsnokcpots). Thetajikwithdreweachtine,andfinally
wasabletoenterthedefilewithoutbeingsnokod. Assoonasthotank
gotwellwithinthedefiletheenonysnokeditagainandhalteditnonon-
tarily* Atthistlnoanostinatod2J
of
^ oenenyswarnodonthetankand
destroyeditwith*MolotovCocktails
11
andpolocharges* Thesnokcfrontho
grcaadoswasdescribedbythetankcrowasbeingcxtronelythickandofa
"ntlky,grey,whitecolor*.
3* Salvage- Acrcv/ofthroenonwasdetailedlaeachcompanyasIn-
telligencetoans* Thesenenworetohandleallcrgpturedoacnynatorial,
andifanyenqnychemicalgearappeared,theywerototurnitovertothe
CompanyChemical2TC0,vhowastoforwarditontothe3nChemicalOfficer*
Hochonicalgearwasfound. ^
H. "
1. MedicaldepartmentpersonnelwhoboardedthetTSSLST^77consisted
oftheBattalionSurgeonandfivecorpsmon. AbonrdtheUSSLS3J6U6wore
fivecorpsmon.
2. Unit8 #*hk and 1^-5 with l i t t e r s were crjrried aboard tho two LST
f
s.
Tho remi nder -of tho nodi cal suppl i es and equipment and the ambulance
jeep wore cibdftjrd th USS Jupi ter and the USS Xibra* 3ach eorpsnan carr
a uni t ^3 with hin and tho Battal i on Surgeon carried hi s uni t #1*
3* Sanitary conditions of both ships worevery good. Other than a
colds and one crisp of Catarr^alJevort Acute, health of al l theporsoanc
was excellent* Thoheads wero cleanand sanitary ASwere livingquart<
and galleys* Koat of the cooks andnossmonwere detailedfrom ships . __^
company with a few menfrou the battalion helping out* C^9
U. Eoutine sick call washeld nt 0900 eachmorning onboth LST's, ^^^^
5 0the 17th of yebruaryorderswero roeoived to havo
clothing rinsedwithfresh or salt water* Ordorswordcomplied
oro hold daily aboard both L$T
f
8*
7. At i?l5 21st of foFruary there was a suicide tanning, of the hip
by Japanese airplane. Alargo firo resulted cad part of tho tfQpn ecnuai-
tion cxplodod. Kino ncn, throo Marines nnd six ship% conpany enlisted nen
nagazine and disonbowelcd, killing hin instantly. The remainder of the
cnsur.ltics consisted of one Diagnosis TJndotdraiiiGdt (fracture, skull),
onoDiagnosis Undetoninod, (fracturo, vortobrn), ono Diagnosis Undotcrnined,
(fracture, l eft shoulder), and one nultiplc fragmentation wounds. JPhofro
four noxxwore transferred on February 22nd to thetfSSSiblsy, ta addition
thoro wero seven anbulatory cases, including such injuries as abrasions,
contusion*, and lacerations. There wore also nany ainor casualties of
ships conpany of which we havo no record. All dead wore buried at sea in-
cluding two Japanese.
S, After landing, there wore two corpsnen with o4sh cocipany oi tanks*
Pour corpsnon wero at the Battalion Aid Station with tho Battalion Surgoon*
Thenodical equipnont, other than nedical units #5-^ and #5-3 wore not land-
ed until two to four days later. '
;
-
9 Iho Br.ttalion Aid Station wsa$ got up in tho Battalion CPand con-
sisted of a large fox holo reinforced by sand bags. JCtwas well protected
and had good cover*. Medical unit* wore scattered ovef the area in fox
holes. Our Battalion Aid Station was located about eight hundred yards to
tho north of *B
M
Medical Conpany to whon were sent al l evacuation cases*
In tho early stage critical cases were sent to tho Spach Bmcuatlon Station.
Wowero on tho nain road to the evacuation points cihd because of our
proxinity to then, walking cases did not stop at o\ar Battalion Aid Station*
10. Casualties troatpdi Jtabor kZ . Retained 19 *Svacuated 2^*
Pied 0 . Type-fragncntation wounds, abrasions> cohtuslona, lacerations,
h T V d and burns* talking wowidod 21 . fcitt of. cases Vy .
11. After canp area w
v
as established, heads were iixiediaioly nado frou
l i i ^^^J-P^^f
1
^!!*$9
Q
&consisted of canned rations andthe wntor supply
was adequate. Agalley vas sot up in a gun onplaceiiont on the third day
after our establishment of canp. Water wafi rationed to one gallon per day
per nan. Upon arrival in the aroa i t was policed 'and nine dead Japanese
were found nndburied. Our own dond wor$ innodiatoly ronoved to tho 3dIfetrine
Division Conetory after identification *ft established. Jl l os wore rather
plentiful in the beginning but after the liland was sprayed with #DT
#
they
soon disappeared*
12* Ihoro wore several cases of Jaundice, Acute, Infective which wero
evacuated. Afew colds were present anong the nan, but prophylactic ther*
apy with sulfadiazino cut down tho incidence.
13. "B"Medical Conpany handled onorgoncy denial treatnont.
1^. fhoro wore no lossos Or roplacononts of ncoUcal personnel, Tho
nuraber was adequat-o .and they wero always in a stato^of readiness*
15. yield Medical equipnont was adequate* tfhere-was no pilferage or
losses. However al l units should bo
1
replaced, /including tho anbulaneo#
bocauso they have been through thrde ckipaigns ai>daro in,poor condition*
In addition a fly and a pyranidal tent.should bo carr4od in al l future
operations* The sinbulanco and al l oquipnpnt should be brought ashoro no
later -than thirty-siz hours after landing. The systen of rosupplying was
satisfactory*
I. SIGNAL
1. Sone intorforenc'o on our assigned radio frequencies was encounterod.
It occurred principally on the 37kBn Cond ffet (26*2 i xs) by -Anbition"
C^i,fe?A ^^?a fe) and rejiuirqd repetitions thdt would otherwise not
havo boon necessary*. The aseigned no wore xnEdoquate to controx conoat
traffic within the separate conpanles**Tank platoons should b^ assigned
separato frequencies that-con bo used. Thevolune of conbat traffic
loaded the assigned channels and platoon eontrol and f
thoreby.
wereusedaswellaaradio. ire
facilitiescarriedabout30^othecommunicationbetweentheTkBnCP*s,
theTkBnliaisonofficers(atinfantrybattalionCP's),thecompanyoffi-
cersinthefield,andtheinfantryregiments,withtheTkBnCPitself.
Manydirectinstallationswererequiredthatbridged;'existingswitching
centralsandduplicatedfacilitiespreviouslyinstalledbyotherunits. The
TkBnhasnopersonneltrainingintheinstallation,maintenance,and
operationofwirecommunicationfacilities. Thusanaddedloadwasborne
byradioandgeneraldutypersonnel. Thisconditionwasremediedonlyin .
partbythe"loan"oftwotofourqualifiedlinemenfromtheDivSigCo.
3# Intheearlyphasesoftheoperationcommunicationdelaysresulted
fromthefactthat
v
wiremenwereinexperiencedandtoofewinnumbersto
maintainthesystem,whichwasunderheavyartilleryandmortarfire*
CombatexperienceshowedthattherangeoftheSGR-509,510islessthan
hadbeenoriginallythought. Thisnecessitatedtheestablishmentof
relaystationsandsloweddownradiocommunicationtosomeextent. The
SC31-5O9*510ispronetogooutofalignmentwhentransportedoverrough
terrain.
x
hiscausedelayinthatradiossituatedon'thefrontlines
had$0besenttotherearforrealignmentandanothersethadtobedis-
patchedasareplacement. The'lackofremotecontrolequipmentfrequently
madeitnecessarytosetuptheSCH-5O9,510radioinpositionsunfavorable
forofficientoperation. Delaywasoftenencounteredinfindingsuitable
locations, (seeVconclusionsandEecommendations).
PAE5V CQITCLUSIOrSAED
A. Coordination.
1.ItistheresponsibilityoftheTank3attalionand(r~3
toindoctrinateallinfantryUnitCommandersiviththeinherent
capabilitiesandlimitationsoftanks. Oneoftheoutstanding
doctrinestobeconsideredisthatthistheatreofoperations-
recognizingterrainandJapanesetactics-doesnotfoster
sustained^panzerattacks",ffventhoughthe,occasiondoes^not
denyanechelonedtankdrive,asufficientreservemustbe
maintainedtosupporttheinfantryintheclose-in,inch-by-
inchadvanceintoyhicheveryMarineCorpsAmphibiousOperation
inthePacifichasultimatelyresolveditself*
2, ItwouldbeatacticalimprovementifInfantryCommanders
wereimbuedwiththedoctrineofemployingthetankplatoon
asaunitwithwhichtoteamaninfantrycompany,ratherthan
acceptingthetankcompanyasthesmallestcombattankelement*
Thiswillnotonlymakeforeconomyofforce,butwillincrease
effectivecoordination. Unitcommandersmustconsulttankunit
commandersonmattersoftacticalemployment,reconnaissance,
andcoordination. '
3"Xtisreconaondedthatcommunicationrepresentatives
fromeachtankbattalion,SignalCompany,andinfantryRegiment
'combineeffortstoincreasetheeffectivenessofTank-Infantry
communication.techniquesandequipment.
i+.Itis.suggestedthatTankcompaniesborotatedintraining
withRCT
l
sratherthanbeattachedasabnormalcompliment"toa
specificRegiment*
5.ItisrecommendedthatatleastthreeMarinesfromeach
infantryplatoonreceivetrainingas"tankguides*tofacilitate
passageoflinos.
6*ItisrccoiEiendedthatmuchclosercoordinationbedevelop-
edbetweenTaiiksand(A)Artillery,(3)Aircraft,and(C)
A.Itissuggestedthattanksandartillerybeassigned
adirectradiochannel* Tanksdrawingheavycalibre
firenowmustremainatthemercyoftheseweapons-
withorwithoutaccompanyinginfantry-untilsufficient
channelsarenegotiatedfordirectartillerysupport.
furthertrainingshouldbeconductedusingForward
ObserversinAssaultTanks.
B. Itwouldbeadvantageoustoassignatleastoneair-
craft^spotter*toobservetanksduringtrainingand
atta,cks
t
therebylocatingthesourceofthelargo
, calibrefirethattanksinevite.bl
;tentionshouldbegiventke.studyoftoch-
methodsofninedetectionandremoval,*
lovalofminesatnightand>undersmoke
screen,
7ItissuggestedthatthoUJhird.JSngiaocrBattalionBe
equippedwiththreearmoredbulldozerssimilartothetwo
"bythatunitduringthelastoperation. Hoy/ever,itisrecom- -~
mendedthatthese"bulldozershaveperiscopesandmounts,addit-
:Ili
*
ionalarmorprotection,andmdios(SCR-51O)toprotectthe
operatorandincreasetacticalefficiency,
8.,Itisrecommendedthatagreaternumberofpersonnel
inthisBattalionbeallowedTransportQuartermasterTraining
conducted'byDivTQJI-i. - .''-.
B. .Cbmmiinications-TrainingandEquipment.
1.Itisrecommendedt'hatthefrequenciesassignedtothis
Battalionbe.increasedtoeighteen(IS)innumber. Iftheallo-
cationofchannelsbeasfollow,itis'anticipatedthatanim-
proyementinchannelload,platooncontrol,andflexibilitywill
bemade:-DivComd,DivSmerg,TkBnCmd,"A
1
*CoComd,
R
B
W
Co
"C"CoComd,andtwelve,(12)otherfrequenciestobeassignedto,
platoons."
2.ItwasfoundthattheSGR-51Oradiodidnothavethe
transmissiondistanceanticipated, numerousrelaystationswere
necessarythereby. Itisstronglysuggestedthatfive(5)SGH-52
radios,mountedinjeops(truck,iton,kxk)or"weasels"beadded
toourallowanceandthatfive(5/M&0radiosbosubtractedthere-
from. .
3*AremotecontrolunitsuchastheRM-29(operateswith
SCEW6lO)wouldhavebeenofinvaluableserviceinthelastoperation
ItisrecoYamondodthatthepossibilityofadoptingitforusewith
theSCR-509,510beinvestigatedwiththoviewofaddingittoour
allowance. Advantageoustacticalemplymcntcouldfrequentlyhave
beenmadeofthisunitduringthelastoperation
h.Thetank-infantryradiSCH-300(nowmodelAn/VRC-3)=
shouldbeinstalledineachtank. .
5.ItissuggestedthattheSCR-522radiobeconsideredfor
installation,witlithoviewofestablishingtank-aircommunica
6.Itisreoommendedthatamobiletruck-mountodrepair
andmaintenanceunit,equippedwitha110-voltpowersource,be
addedtotheT/A.
7.Awiresectionofseven(7)toten(10)trainedpersonnel
includingawirechiefisneededtoinstall,maintain,andoperate,
suchwirefacilitiesashaveproventobenecessary. Itisrecom-
mendedthatthissectionbeaddedtotheT/0.
8.Itisrccoa^endedthattheTankBattalionboassigneda
channelforthoSCE-300duringeachoperationtherebyincreasing
themobilityandeffectivenessofliaisonteams,anddecreasing
trafficontheInfantrychannels.
C.Ordnance.
1.Becausetankmaintenancecannotbedivorcedfromeffective
tankoperation,itisrecommendedthatTheTankOrdnancePlatoonof
theThirdOrdnanceCompanybecome:
""* {a)AnorganicpartoftheihirdTankBattalion,or
(b)PermanentlyattachedtotheThirdTankBattalion.
Suchanarrangementwouldfostermoreeffectivetankmaintenance
inthisDivisionby:
(a)Centralizingcontrolandrcsponsibilityinthe
TankBattalionwhereitbelongs:
(b)Allowingacoordinatedtankmaintenance-tank
trainingprogramduringpreparatoryphases
(maintenanceandtrainingshouldhavediffer-
entschedules); *
(c)GivingtheOrdnancePlatoona.higherlanding
prioritybecausetheplatoonshouldlandwith
thetankcompanymaintenance
canhelpmaintaintank
(d)Promotinggreaterinterestinthetanksofth
v
e
personnelwhoaresupposedtoworkonthe
vehicles,
(e)AllowingtheBattalionMaintenanceOfficerthe
perogativetoshiftcompanymaintenancesections;
(thus,thebest>mechanicsaredoinghigher
skiH o d work).
Thepresent(DankOrdnancesystemistheresultofthemis-
conceptionthattankmaintenancecanarbitrarily"besegregated
intofirst,'second,third,andfourthechelonsduringcombat.
Ithas"boontheexperienceofthis,"battalionduringthroe
operations,thatinordertokeepthemaximumnumboroftanks
inthelineatalltimes,echelons'ofmaintenancemust"bedis-
regarded'toagreatextent. Everyavailablemanandtoolmust
"bekeptworkingcontinuouslywhethertheyareperforming second
orfourthechelonofinainteiuvaco. Incombattheprimequestion
eachdayis
tr
howmanytanksdoyouhavereadytogo?*
1
These
divisionsareusefulonlyinarelativedegree. Xtshould"be
therasponsibilityoftheTank3a.ttalionMaintenanceOfficer
todecidewhatmaintenanceisto"bedoneandwhoirtodoit.
Thiswillresultin1)eliminationofduplication.ofwork,
and2)peakoperatingefficiency. Atpresent,theOrdnance
companyisresponsibleforthemovementforwr.rdoftankspare
.parts, ithourtransportation,itis"believedthatwith
coordinationwecouldhavet;mkreplacementpartsashoreon
Dplus1day. TheOrdnanceCompanycannot,
2.ItisfurtherrecommendedthattheTablesofOrgan- /
izationforcithertheH&SCompanyortheOrdnancePic.toon
berevised.toallowanadditionalTrnkRecoveryVehiclefor
useofTankOrdnance. Thecompanies
1
recoveryvehiclesare
usuallyinactionorwellforward. Consequently,whenitis
necessarytorecoveradisabledtank,pullaturret,orre-
placeenginesthereisanunnecessaryshortageordelay.
3*Intheeventthatthesubsequent.recouaendationsre-
gardingreorganizationand
u
re-equipment
11
forthisBattalion
beconsideredinexpedientorimpracticable,itwillbenec-
essarytoimaedictolyderis?increasedaraorprotectionfor
theK^A2MediumTank(i.e.,additonalspacedarmor,welded
trackblocks). Also,itwouldbeexpedienttolinethefighting
compartmentwithwhiteabestostoreducethefirehazard.
D.OrganizationalEquipment.
Itisobviousfromourpreviousoperationsthatthepresent
MarineCorpcTanI:Battalionisinsufficientlyarmored,equipped,
andmanned, Iti'srocommoiiuodthattheIlarinoCorpsorganizean
"ArmoredBattalion",usingthepresent"TankBattalion
fr
asafound-
ationwiththofollowingorganization:
1. Three(3)i-iodiumTankCompaniesofeighteen(IS)M26(l+5ton)
tankspercompany.. *
'2*One(l)LightTankCompanyofeighteen-M2Utanks.
3.Six(b)Ii2otanksinBattalionHeadquartersandService,
Company. Pour(k)ofthesewillbelargecapacityflame-
.throwingtanks,andthreeofthesefourwillhavejett .
isonable RocketL'vx..cher(7.2
lf
)mounts. Theremainingtwo
tankswilibeforstaffpersonnel.
U,Two (2)tank-dozermountsandbladespercompany.
5.Sight (o)smallcapacityflamethrowerspertank
companyberetainedr.sperpresentT/A.
ENCLOSURE I
3DENGINEER BATTALION
ACTION REPORT
^ 3D ENGINEER BATTALION, 3D^LAHINH!DI
FMF, c/o FLSSTT POST omc s , SAN FHAJJCISCO.
17 April, IH5.
ing Officer.
The Commanding General, 3d Marine Division.
Subject: Action Report*
ftef erence: (a) 3dMarDlv Confidential G0#107*
1. In compliance with reference (a), the action
Report for the Iwo Jima operation i s submitted:
: PARTI ~ SUMMARY;
(A) The fferiod, covered by this report i s from
? November, 1944 to 16 March, 1945. Zone minus tert.(10)
(k) time, east longitude date, was in effect
(B) The 3d Sngineer Battalion participated in the
Iwo Jima operation with Headquarters and Service Company-
attached to Division Headquarters, Company "A" attached to
the 9th Marines, Company "B* attached to the 21st Marines,
and Company C" attached to the 3d Marines. H&S, "A"and
"B
11
Companies landed with the units they were attache^ to
and carried out engineer missions. Sixty (60) men from
Company "C"landed with about half of the company's heavy
equipment, although the 3d Marines did not land* The
detachment from Company
rt
C
rt
assisted H&SCompany to perform,
engineer missions for the Division, All other units, of th
Battalion remained attached to the organizations to which
they were originally assigned throughout the operation with
the exception 6f Company
V
C
H
PiiHT II P33LIMINABI3S:
(A) .... ^he reporting Commandwas composed of the 3d
Engineer 3attalion only. No other troops were attached
for the operation.
(B) At the time the mission was assigned, the 3d
Engineer Battalion was involved in the construction of the
Division's 3ase Camp* Due to the fact that units of the
Division were occupying camps outside the Division area,
very l i t t l e curtailment of the camp construction was possible.
All the Battalion's personnel and equipment were needed
on camp constructlpn in order to complete the camp ao that
units could move in by the time specified. Essential train-
ing in technical subjects such as mine detection and removal ,
and demolitions we're given priority. The Engineer Battalion
conducted a school in demolitions, mine detection and removal
for other units of the'.Division* Ademonstration was held
on the removal of mine fi el ds for al l 'Division officers*
Companies participated in training exercises with the infantry
regiment to which they were attached.
(C) The mission of the. Engineer Battalion w^s to support
the three HCT
!
s by the performance o engineer missions and
to produce water for the.Division. I t was assumed that
no source of fresh water would be found on Iwo Jima, conse-
quently sufficient distillation/eauipffl.ent was made r^ady
and personnel trained to supply'water by di st i l l at i on of
salt water.
CD) At the outset of the action' the platoons of the
lattersd companies were aboard ti^uiSBLQrAs with eachBLT,
- 1 -
Subject: Action Report. (Cont'd)
The H&SCompany was embarked on ships with
4
the **}vision
Headquarters and the 9th ^CT/ 3ach engineer unit landed with
the fcit i t supported except Company
H
0
n
"which landed wltjiiut
the 3d &CT'as set forth in Part I , paragraph (B).
FART I I I CH-ONOLI&CAL>CCOl
T
NT OFTF3ACffiON:
(A) Company "B
tf
landed with the gi st HCT on Zl February,
1945 andproceeded to execute eneineej* missions. On%
February, the Battalion Command Poet waelanded and setup
adjapent to the division (JP. On26 February, the "ngineer
Battalion CPwasdisplaced 200yarda west to allpw more room
for expansion. Qn tb February, Company "A"landed and poved
to the assembly area with the 9th KC7prepared to execvts
engineer mi s s i e s . Theremainder of n&$Company landed 6n
6 February-and made a reconnaissance for a water ppint s i t e .
Company "3"placed a water point in operation on 2^ February,
This consisted of six Badger Di st i l l at i on Unit* and0n$
portable puri fi cat i on uni t . 21events of Coivipa-ay
H
C began
landing on 1 March and sixty (60) men from fife different
ships were landed on 1, 2,4pd 3 karch. On %ilarch, M3
Company completed i nst al l at i on of a wafer point on the west
side of the island consisting of nineteen \19) BadgerDis-
t i l l a t i on Units andoneportable purification unit (for
chlorination only). Another Badgar Unit was added to the
water point on 3 March and two (2) 5000 gpd Clever-Brook
di s t i l l at i on Uriitd were added on 9 Ilarch. Lements of the
Engineer Battalion remained attached to the HCT's unt i l the
i sl and was secured*
ft IV ' CCIS.-33NTS*
(A)Administration:
(1)Thefollowingcasualtiesoccurred!
K1A:*.-9
DO'^HlA:^4
T
flAi4*81
(2) Ths Division administrative plan of reporting
casual t i es andpersonnel ki l l ed or missing proved tobe
far more effective than in any previous operations. I t
was par t i cul ar l y noted by administrative personnel in the
Rear Echelon that such report s were more accurate andmuch
fast er than in previous experiences.
(3) Themorale of troops throughout the Battalion
was high. Items of fresh, foods obtained were extremely
welcomed by al l personnel andHere of great value to high
morale*
(B) I nt el l i gence:
(1) Maps and photographs furnished the Engineer
Battalion before the operation were very complete and adequate
for al l engineer purposes.
)MapswerefurnishedtotheSngineerBattalion
VyVACengineersduringtheoperation showingroadsand.mine
fieldsinthesectorsofall
f
threedivisions*
ationdisseminatedtothisBaittalionby
ofsufficientintelligencevalue.
wimar
. that more eaaoufl&lge personnel
"be trained and that camouflage aieciplinejae enforced on future
operations. J^ . - k
V o , -v. m*. -*. 1 r .
(1)Sec PartII,paragraph(3)above
#
.
S u p p l y : . . .
(1)Thisunitconsidersthatanadequateamountof
ClassI,II,ill,IV,V supplies-wereembarked, *
(2)The3dEngineerBattalionexperience'dnodiffi-
cultyinthere-supplyofClassI,II,III,IV>andVitems.
A
(3)Distillationunitsinoperation" producedanav'v
:
*
averagedailyoutputof21,000gallons*
(4)liomobilewaterpurificationunitsweretaken
onthe operation:twoofthe portableunitsembayedWjSre--'
usedforchlorinationonly. . ...--
(5)Thiifiunitfurnishedequipment;to.theDivision
ShorePartyrasspecifledinAnnex
n
&
n
to3dMarineDivision
AdministrativePlan#1-46*
(6),n.mplewheeledandtractortransportationwas
availableat-alltimes.'Sparepartsforminorrepairs'on
motorvehiclesandengineerequipmentwereavailableon-
Dplus13. . ' .
(E) .Engineer:
l
(1)TacticalEmployment.-
a.The.3dEngineerBattalipnwasemployed
withtheletteredcojupanicsattached-to,theinfantryr^gimtmts.
Company
tt
A"wasattachedtothe9th Marines,Company
fl
B"tothe
21stMarinesandCompany"C
11
tothe
t
3&, liarines.The "
companiesworefurtherbroken.4own
;
,and one.platoonattached
toeachbattalionoftheinf^ntry-regiment/the-Companyhoad-,,
quartersremainingwiththoinfant^regimentalhindquarters. ,
HeadquartersendServiceCompanyWas attachedtoDivision
Headquarters ..; *- - - "
. * - , * . * '
(2)Principal aissiojia'assignedto'thuEngine ors.
a.Location, removalordestructionofenemy
minesandbooby traps* -..;..
b.demolitionof^tiemycaves,pilltjoxos;-and
other installations, , '_**'
-c.Productionofwater;'. " .
d.Construction, repair'andmaintenance
ofsupplyroads. "...-
eAssistanceinthe constructionofthe
Division Cemetery. ..
v
-
f.Operationofbulldozers,tractors, trucks
andcranesfor the ShoreParty . -r-;.
.g.^ssistancointheburialof'enemydee,d# *
h,Coiapilationofcompleto informationon
enemy installations, including loc^.tionoftheistallatidns
ontho map,detailsanddimensionswith photograph.
i.assistancein-theremovalofour wounded
fromforwardtoreararea6 ."..
j..assistance, intheconstruction-of fiold
fortifications.
A
''"' . ,_-.-..;
v
"''
k;assistanceintheiremovalo-f onemy- -
animunition?
s
add-explosivos
Subject: ActionReport* (Cont'd)
(3)Adequacyof equipment parried,
a.Companies."A",
W
B
W
and
ff
C"eachcarried
tte.following
One(1) 3/8 cu.yd. shorel.
Two (2) TD-18 t ract ors
Four (4) bulldozers (all heavy except two
T)..
14)
.
Seven (7) dump trucks.
One (1) TD-9 tractor crane.
Seven (?) Badger distillation unite. .
Throe (3) portable water,purification unite*
Other items of smaller equipment*
b. H<&8Company carried the following
One (l) 3/4 c'u.yd. shovel.
Three (3) TD~18bull dozers.
One (1) TD-9 tractor crafte,
lline (9) dump p trucks, ( )
(1) (1) ) . &ir compressor. One ( 105 cu.ft.
O One (1) (1) Mh ^ Machine
OneflpParts ^
Othoritojasofamallqr equipment.
c.Basedonexpericwnue gainedin this
operation,certainadditionstoandchangeinthe
TablesofOrganizaionandTableofBasicAllowances'
arerecommended,^herecoramendations arecontainedf.
InEartVof thisreport.
(4)Quantityofexplosives,ATandAPmines,taken
andused.
a.Exploeives,ATandA?weretakenbythe
LandingTeams,CombatTeamsandDivision.Followingisa
listof thetotalamountofexplosives,takenontheoperat*.
ionlistof thetotalamountofexplosives trkenonthe
operation: .
1711. ..Mine,A?,M2*l&-.M3 .
1 9 2 1 . . . ....'.Mino
r
A T . M 1 A 1 - 4 C- </,
;
-
10500...,,..Cap,Blasting,spec*olec,
40000.......Gap,blasting,spec,nonelec*
155000..,...Cord,detonating,ft.
#
1100..*.....Detonator,15,.sec.delay',
7150........Device,firing,Ml,pull*
1940........Device,firing,Ml,push,
3670,.......Pevice,firing,Ml,release,
115..........Charge*demolition, 55,lb.
13804,&+%\
m
Explosive, comp*C2
t
lb.
31000 ...... islxplo sive TI^,lb"
f
1648. *.Block,demolition,M3
1162..;.....Block,demolition,chain.Ml.
346...,.....Charge,shapedT3, ..
,8 Charge,shapedIIJS.
108000 .Fuae,.blasting,time,ft.
25036* Lighter,fuze.
2000....*.;.Torpedo,,bangalqre..
b. Thisamount,of.exjflosivesprovedadiquate
tomeetallneeds.Honeofheminestakenwereplacedby
^UfcSomeanti-personnelmineswereusedby thein-
sfDoobytrapstoprotectout^ostsatnight.Pract-
K
"*oftheexplosivesotherthanmines,wereused.The
attalionaloneexpendedapproximatelytwenty-five
UHCLAS
-.4 ^

Subject: Ration Report. A COont*d)
(5)Typesofunderwaterandbeachobstacle
a TheDivisionlandedinreserveoverbeaches
peration, consequentlynounderwaterorbeach
obstacles"wereencountered.
(6)Newandunusualbeachandinlanddefenses
encountered. '
a# Mostofthedefenseaencounteredwereof
typesingeneralusebytheenemyandverysimilarto*
installationsobservedonpreviousoperations* Thecaves
weregenerallymoreelaborateandmuchlargerthanthose
previouslyobserved. Thebunkersandpillboxeswerebuilt
low,almostlevelwith-theground,andcoveredwithvolcanic
sand# Keepingtheinstallationslowandcoveredwithsand
effectddanalmostperfectcamouflage. Theearthcovering
ofenemydefensesblendedperfectlywiththesurrounding;
groundbecauseofthealmosttotalabsenceofvegetation/
b. Timberwasusedtoaslightextent-only,
probablyduetothescarcityoftreesontheisland.
Thesmallamountoftimberusedwas\generallyemployedas
asupportforthetopoftheinstallation. Thetimber
wascoveredwithsheetmetalandthiscoveredbyfouror
morefeetofearth.
c. Stoneblockswereextensivelyusedas
sidewallsfortheenemyemplacements. Thebifcekswere
cutfromlavarocktoanaveragesizeofsixteenby
sixteenbytwenty-fourinches. Thestoneorconcreteside
wallsworecoveredbyeithertimberandearfchorconcrete
slabsuptofourfeetthick.
T
Jhereconcreteroofslabs
wereusedtheconcretewascoveredwithearth..'....
' . ' ' ' . - , ' - . . '
d. Onetypeofdefense;wasobservedthat
thisDivisionhadnotpreviouslyencountered. Thiswas'
ananti-tankbarrierformedbvstonewallsabout throe
feetwidebythreefeethighandfortyfeet"long,>These
wallswerestaggeredand;placedacrpssdrawsoreasyslppes
wherethenaturalte^raStt^waafavorablefortankmovement
Thestonewallbarrierswerecoveredbyanti~tankguns. -*
;
' , * ' ' . . ' , ' ' - . ? . [
e. Manyof the enemypositions were cut" .;
into solid rock.* ,Underground living quarters were generally
adjacent to gun positions and concrete or stone cisterns were
built ciose by for catching rain ,tfate*.
<7) Enemy mine fields; effectiveness.and methods.
used to neutralize them.
a. The enemy made mu,eh more extensive useof
mines on IwoJima than in any other operation in-which.this
Division has part i ci pat ed. Themine" fi el ds encountered
indicated t hat the'enemy forces there hada f ul l knowledge
of mine t act i cs and adequate t rai ni ng in placing them for
the feest effect. The fpllowingnexj" types of mines and
methods of placing them were observed: .* . . , *
(1) Terre cotta minxes were ^encountered* '
They had a case of viiJlftfied cl,ay or"terra cotta rat her
than the conventional metal case*.:' 'Our\SCR^625F.mine detectors
vi l l not indicate the presence,of a,mittejunless the mine ^ .
ts made of metal* -,*! .'"** " .-
*~).Boxmines"frore'%ifeeav> The explosive
***w of Hhis mine i s a-wood box so t hat the absence of metal
Prevents our SCK-685F mine detector from indicating i t *s .presence.
Subject; Action Report (Cont'd)
.J)Terracottamineswithpulltype?
ignitorswerefoundincontrolledfields,usuallyaround
thesidesandrearofemplacements... Themineswereinter-
connectedwithpullwiresleadingintotheinstallationsso
thattheentirefieldcouldbeexplodedincaseofattack.
(4) Yardstick mines irn combination
1
"
aeri al bombs were widely used by the enemy. The bomtys were
planted in a fi el d according to a regular pattern and the
yardstick minass were placed over the nose of the bogb to act as
'adetonator.
(5)Thecharacterofthesoil&ndthe
presenceofanextremelylargeamountofbombandshellfrag-
mentsmadethedetectionofmines-very/difficulty Rocksin
thewoilcausedtheAN/Prs-1niin#etectortollitdicatethelr
presenceandalsogavefalseindicationstoprobing* Metal
fragemtnsalsdcouse^dminedstectdj^togivefalseindicatione
andwereahindrancetoprobing* Veryeasefulprpblngwas
theonlysuccessfulmethodnaddirilocatingainea* ThePresence
ofracksandfragmentsmadeprobingarievenftoreslowand
painstakingprocessbutnootherraethddcouldbereliedupon*
(6)Inpracticallyallcaseswheremines,
werefoundtheengineersdisarmedandremovedthem. Onlywhen
theminesweredamagedweretheyexplodedinplace.\
(8)Availabilityofspareparts.
a. Considerabledifficultywasexperiencedby
theplatoonsandcompaniesingettingspareparts. Allspare
partswerecarriedbyHeadquartersandServiceComfanyinthe
onlypartstrailertakenont^eoperation; Thefactthat
higherechelonslandedafterthecompaniesmadeitevenmore
difficultforthemtogetsparepartsbecausepartswereneeded
beforethetrailerwasdisembarkedfromtheship.
b. Intheconfusionoftheinitialstagesof
alandingespecially,andadvantagewouldbegainedbyhaving
partsforthefirstand'.secondechelonmaintencecarried
bytheplatoonsorcompanies*Itisrecommendedthata
smallsupplyof'muchusedpartssuchassparkplugs,fuel
andoilfilters,becarriedoneachpieceofequipment.
(9)'fatersupplyandwatersupplyequipment.
. a . Therewerenostreamsorothersourcesof
freshwateronthe-island. TheDivisionwassuppliedwith.
waterproducedfromseawaterbydistillation.:.Twowter
pointsweresetup,oneontheeastsideandanotheronthe
westsideoftheisland. The.water-pointontheeastside
consistedofsix(6)Badgerdistillation.unitsandone(1)
portablewaterpurificationunit.",ThQ
r
.pQintonthewestdide
consistedoftwenty(20)Badger&s^ili-atio.nunits, t w(2)
fivethousand(500|)gpdClever-Brook,distillationunitsand
one(1)portablewaterpurification'.uriit> * "
.b. Bothofthesewaterpointsproducedanaverage
ofabouttwenty-onothousand (21,000)gallonsofwaterperday*
Theprincipaldifficultyencounteredintheproductionofwater
tfasingettingasaltwater-intakeinstalledsothattheintake
pipewould,notfillupwithsand. Theheavysurfanderosive
actionofthewavescarriedawayseveralintakelinesbeforea
SpendableonewassetupV ._.
-6 -
1
Subject: Option Report. (Cont' d).
. c. Asump was dug In the sand about fifty
froin the water
1
8 edge in an attempt to get -a
'rest water that would not be inte'rfersed wjth
by wave action. Brackish 6ulphur water was found in%he
sump but due""to geological conditions on the island th^ water
was too hot and the sulphur content too high to be rufl
through the di st i l l at i on units. The hot water was fresh
enough to be'used for bathing and showery were set up and
supplied frofu a convae tank, fi l l ed from thevsump, by a two
inch booster pump. The water was retained in the. t&*& Idng
enough to cool down to suitable temperature for showers, ' . . . ' ,
In t hi s manner showers w^re provided for the Division. There
was no other water available on the island for bailing purposes'.
d. The water supply equipment was adequate
and no unusual di ffi cul t i es were experienced wlt& i t . t
i s believed that a one ton, two wheel t r ai l er ahould be
provided with every'three (3) di st i l l at i on unit6 for t rans-
, portation of hose, canvas tanks and other "accessories; The
5,000 gpd -Cleaver-Brook di st i l l at i on units should be mounted
on wheels to faci l i t at e movement*
material,
(16) Use made of enemy equipment and construction
a. The only captured equipment or material of
any value to the engineers was nai l s.
(F) Medical:
(1) Embarkation.
a. Embarkedone(1)medicalofficerandseven
(7)corpsmenon8February,1945. . ... .
b. Twenty(20)prescribedmedic-4,unitswere
carried. r '
(2)AboardShip,
* a. Sickness aboard ship was njagligable. '
b. Sanitary- conditions were as follows:
Heads were adequate.
Living quarters were crowded but. adequate
for a short period of time. '
Ilesses were very good. .
Galleys were adequate.
Cooks and messmen met sanitary requirements.
. , c. Special.^precautions consisted of daily
sick call and sanitary inspections.
(3) Debarkation.-
a. Personnel-. . "
(1). liadical personnel landed ori 26 February,
(2) Medical Personnel landed from LGll's
with elements of H&SGompany.' '
b. Hat eri al .
(1)' Medical material was carried aboard
H&SCompany dump trucks and ambulance.
(2V Material-was
1
landed about 1500 on
7 February.
- 7^
Subject:
ActionReport* (Oont'd)
encountered"
(4)
27February.
BattalionCP
sees of-personnel or oaaterial were not
Ashore - AsSualt Phase.
a.MedicalInstallations.
(1)Medicalinstallationsweresetupon
(2JTheaidstationwassetupinthe
area.
(a)Adequateroadnetinthevicinity*
(b)Coverwaslimitedtofoxholes$.
andcraters.
(c)Personnelweredispersedingrougs
ofthree.
(d)VAChospitalandCo
U
B",3dMedBn
werelocatedwithin300yardsof
aidstation,
(e)Proximitytocriticalpointsvaried
from600yardstothreemiles.
(3)Protectivemeasureswereasfollows;
Medicalpersonneldependedupon
securitysetupbytheBattalionCP.Cover
limitedtofdxholesandcraters. Very
littleconcealment,somecamouflagents
wereused. Supplyofsandbagswasinadequate
forconstructionofshelters. Blackout
%
precautionswereobserveddur?ngthehours
ofdarknese*
(4)Specialfeaturesorcomments*
(a)ThemedicalpersonnelofthisorganQ
izationfunctionedas aBattalionAidStation,
Thisarrangementwasquiteadequate.The
equipment,suppliesandpersonnelwereadequate
forthemission.
(b)Tenpatientsweretreated,nineill*
nessesandoneminorcasualty. Nooperations
wereperformed. .-
x
.'
(c)EvacuationwaseffectedbyJeepam-
bulancetoanevacutationhospital. This
methodwasadequate.
(d)Thereweretwo(2)casualtiestreated,
oneofwhichwasevacuated. Nocasualties
died*-Onecasewasacontusionofbackdue
tospentbullet;theothermultiplecon-
tusionsandabrasionsofface. Therewere
nostretchercases.
< '
(e)Sanitationwasadequate,nospecial
measuresweretaken. Nodeadwereencountered.
There-werenoepidemicsorunusualdiseases
amongthetroops.
(f)DentalservicewasobtainedatCo"B
n
,
3dMe&Bn," 0n<$caseofimpactedmolarwas
treated. ', v .
(g) There were no civile
risoners
of war to
c a l
M^W| |
- a-
Subject: nReport* (Confr'd
r~
r
h)Itisbelievedthatthepresent
typeoforganization,isnotsuitablein
regardstotheEngineerbattalions. During
combatthisorganizationisbrokeninto
somanysmallindependentunitsthatit
isimpossibleforthemedicalofficeFrto
Keepiricontactwith/themanditisnot;
practical%osendpatientsfromtheseUnits
tohim. Heis-incontactonlywithH&5
Company,whichxisuallyseesupclose,toPivision
Headquarters.
(i)It%suggested$ t ^ ^ g , ^ ^ ^
themedicalpfficer
:
be";temporarilytransferred
totheMedical3attalion,orberetainedin
therearechelontotreatreturningpatients.
(jjMedicalPersonnelfi^readequatewhila*
inbasecampbutoveradequateforcombat.
Theyarenotemployedenoughtowarranta
medicalofficer* Weexperiencednolosses
andnospecialitiesneeded,
(k)Thisorganizationcarried.afull
allowanceofFieldMedicalEquipmenton
theoperation, Therewerenolosses,or
pilferageencountered. TheFesupply^was
ampleforaursmallrequirements.
* . ^
(l)Units#1-2.0wereoarriedinthe
Mediealsupplies. NOlossesweresustained
frompilferageand>iheresupplywasadequate-
forourneeds..
;
"'
;
(m)One^^ton
ri
4x4.ambulancewascarried
bytheBattalion.'"!Itwasusedforthe '
transportati.on^of- meQ.i
f
d,algearandpatients
andwasmaintainedoyH&S,Company.-*,This
vehicleprovedadequateforallneedsex-
perienced. ........
'"(n)The^li allwn&W;^
supplied^werecarriedand.jfchis.unitmet"no
necessitytore-clothe ii%p*
(o)Oneunitof ^ % (
equipmentandsupplywascarried,"'but-itwas..
notnecessarytousethia. Thesupplyof
DDTwasinadequateforourneeds! "*"
(5)Ashore-Aftercompletion"6fAssualfcphase,
v
(a)Hospi-talizationwasadequateanda
sufficientsupplyofmedicaland.quartermaster
.equipmentwasavailable..*Foodarid-waterwere
adequateandsanitationfa^iliti-es-were.good.
PARTV CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATION:
(A) Itisrecommendedthatthefollowingadditional
equipmentbefurnishedthefehgineerBattalionand.bein-
cludedintheTablesofOrganisation*.
*9-
- 10-
ubject: ActionReport, (Cont'd)'
(1)One(1)selfpropelledroadgraderfor the-MB
Companymakingatotaloffour(4)intheBattalion.
(2)One (I)leaningwheelroadferaderfortiieH&S
Companymakingatotaloffour(4)intheBattalion*
(3)One (1)lowbed/nachineryseml-trailef of
tonscapacitywith tractor truckforH&SCompanymakingatotal
ofone(1)intheBattalion* ,
(4)One(1)Fiveton,4wheelmachineshop trailer
foreachlettered company, 'the presentallowanceoftwoi2
machineshoptrailersforH&SCompanycould VhenbecutTO'
one (1)makingatotalo.ffour(4)fortheBattalion*
(6)One(1)Qnfcton,twowheelgt-easingtrailerfor
eachlettered company, f'hepresentallowanceofthree(3
greasing trailersperH&SCompanycould thenbecut totwo
12)makingatotaloffive (5)inthe3attalion*
(6)One(1)batterycharger,SCR169foreach
companyincludingH&S,makingatotaloffour(4)forthe
Battalion, .,
(7)'.-One(1).heavydutycabloperatedripperfor
eachlettered,company* 'linepresentallowanceofone (1
ripperforH&SCompanywouldbringthetotal "Cofour (#),
fortheBattalion; fberipperfurnished infcftepast
(Bucyrus-arieModelCR-1)hasoeentoolightf*>r.theclass
ofworkdoneand'it isrecommended thatthene^onesfurnished
bpheavyduty (Gar*ood
C
~8G
or
equal)andcapableofwith-
standingtheheaviestpullbyaTI>-18tractorwithout damage.
"(6)#our (4)oneton,-twowheelcargotrailersper
company, includingH&BCompany. Xhis-wouldbring thetotal
t
fortheBattalion tosixteen (1<S). Thepresentallowance is
eight;(3)forthe3at tilloh*.
(9)'Two-(2)floodlights,trailermounted, cvmpLete
withfive{&)200wattfloodlight-sand2KWgasoline engine
drifengenerator'(Engineer Uo,f^-^271 >..''Noequipmenta|this
classisnowcarriedbytheEngineerBattalion,
(
" (10)'One^i)/4firepump completewith suction
hose,perH&S";Comp&ny, -Jofirepumpsarecarriedbythe
EngineerBattalionatpresent. . ?
'(11) TwelVe' (12)3rowfiJ.ngjautjOmatic,Riflesper
companymaking.a totalof- fortyeight (48)fortheBattalion.
HoBAR
1
sare-npwcarried in'the organization.
i3).t t.ojfi,-4x4, trucksforH&SCompanyfor
usebytheComiftunica^ibnd'ndrefrigeration sections. The.se
twoinaddition*to-tiitwenty-four (24)allowedatpresent would
bringthetotalofths-|at.talicito twenty-six'(26).
(B) Recommendations for.changesin-tractorsheldby
E n g i n e e r B a t t a l i o n ! .[].*".*..
;

(1)T&ble" of^'Grgarjization" >P
tt
providesthefollow-
_.- ^, -^-v
A
L.i.,.B^itailon,Marine'Division.
tractorswithangledozers:
companyandthree(3)perH&SCompany,
Heavy'tractorswithdo^Dle' dumpowercon*
liroluntt;ti^fa)perH&SCompanyand- S -(2-1P
er
lettered
company.
tern*
(CoM' d).
c. "TWSvyt ract ors with angledozers and SJ
cu.yd. back dump&ng scraper; Two (2) per H&S Company and
one (1) per l et t ered company,
d. Heavy t ract or with 2.wheel 15-20 ton crane;
One (1) per H&SCompany.
(2) I t Is recommended t hat al l of the above tractors
be deleted and the following heavy t ract ors (TD-18) be
furnished:
a. Heavy t ract ors with hydraulic operated angle-
dozer and double drum power control uni t s; Three (3) per
company includingfi&3Company. (One t ract or for H&SCompany
to be equipped with two wheel 15-20 ton crane).
(3) If t hi s recommendation i s carried out, the
Engineer Battalion will have a t ot al of twenty-eight (28)
JI
F
rt
heavy (TD-18) t ract ors. The present Tables of Organ-
i sat i on provides for a t ot al of twenty-five (25) heavy
t ract ors.
(4) I t i s recommended that two of the TD-18 angle
dozers with single drum winches per company, including H&S
Company, be proveded with an improved type of armor that
wi l l allow the driver maxium vi si bi l i t y and protection. The '
armor should be detachable* If armored t ract ors are provided,
i t i s imperative that the operators t rai n with infantry and
tank teams so that projection may be given by infantry and
tank troops when the t ract ors are working in close proximity
to enemy forces* A two way radio should be provided for the
armored dozer so^that the operator may receive instructions
without exposing himself by getting outside the*armor.
(C) I t i s recommended that the foilowing^equipment
be eliminated from the Engineer Battaliont
(1) Five (5) 54 cu*ydi back dumping scrapers*
(2) Six (6) portable gasoline hammers.
(D) The 15-18 ton machinery t r ai l er furnished th&
Engineer Battalion i s too l i ght . The t i r es are too small,
the hi t ch and tongue assembly too l i ght , and the frame con-
struction too l i ght for Carrying the 3/4 cu.yd. shovel, TD-18
t ract ors, and other heavy pieces of equipment. I t i s recom-
mended that t r ai l er s of twenty (20) tons rated capacity be
furnished in place of the 15-18 ton t r ai l er . If the t r ai l er s
are not replaced by t r ai l er s of more capacity; the size of
the t i r es and rims on the present t r ai l er s should be increased
to 8.25: 20.
(E) I t i s recommended that twelve (12)
}
demolition
snaked be released to the Engineer Battalion per year for
training purposes, with a view to using them in combat
operations*
(F) The following increases in personnel over, the pro-
Visions of the Table of Organ!zati'oii
U
F'* are recommended:
- 11 -
'Subject: ActionReport, (Corit'd*
(1) Ifadditionalequipmentisproveded,a
mendedabove*twooperatorsforeachpieceofheavyequipment
jjhouldbeauthorized*
(2)Thepresentauthorizationallowsnine(9
privatesorprivatedfirstvlpssforheavytruckdriversfor
eachletteredcompany* Itisrecommendedthatthenumber
beincreasedtofourteen (14j*. Thepresentallowanceofheavy
truckdriversintheH&SCompanyiseighteen (18),andit
isrecommendedthattheallowancebeincreasedtotwenty-seven
(27). Thl$recommendationiamadeinorder toprovidedrivers
foreachheavytr&ek
0
Th3totalincreaseintruckdriversfo3?
thebattalionwouldbetwenty-four(24)4
_(3)ThenumberofCcrpotals,Mechanic/General(31$
intheiJngineercompaniesshouldbeincreasedbytwo(2)ar:&
intheH&SCompanyincreasedbythree(3), Thisincrease
wouldaddatotalofnine(9)mentotheBattalionanditis
recommendedinordertoprovidemechanicsforwaterequip-
mentandtoprovidemechanicsintheapproximateratio ofone
toe,achfour(4)piecesofmotorizedequipment,
(4)Thepresentauthorizationforwatersupplymen
intheEngineerBattalionisasfollows:
EngineerCo* H&S'(&.
StaffSergeant 0 X
S e r g e a n t .1 i '
Corporal 3 I
:
PPCorPvt,
t
v 3 3 .. ;.-
:r
" .
Itisrecommendedthattheaboveauthorization
bechangedtothefollowing: -
EngineerCo .H&S Co-.
StaffSergeant 0 1
Sergeant 1 1
Corpoayal 3 5
PFCorPvt. 12 . 11
Theaboveincreaseinwaterpersonnelwouldtotal*'
thirty*seven(37)menfor*theBattalion.
(5)Thetotalincreaseinpersonnelrecommendedin
paragraphs2,3,and4aboveisseventy(70)menforthe
Battalion. " -
S.CM^PBSLL.
/
%'.*.< --:^ '
' *
ENCLOSURE J
3D PIONEER BATTALION
ACTION REPORT
3D
3D I-kHlUE DIVISION,
MaRISB.FCKCJ5
#
0/0
.POSJT amen,
10 Apr i l , I9U5.
Officer.
(Co : TheCommandingGeneral,3dMarineDivision*
Subject: actionEeportforIwoJimaOperation,
Beference: (a)3dMarineDivisioaConfidentialGeneralOrder137
Enclosures: (A)AnnexAbleto3dMarineDivisionadministrativePlan
1-1*5-ShorePartyPlan.
(B)3dMarineDivisionShorePartySituationMap*
1, Th.Qperiodcoveredbythisreportisfromtimemissionwas
assigned,JNovember,I9I&,toendt.ofoperation,16March,19*+5 Zone
minusten(k)time,eastlongitudedatewasineffectfortheIwoJima
operation.
BCT21ShoreParfrylandedoaIwoJiaaDplus2andwas
usedtosupplementthe^thMarineDivisionShoreParty, The3
d
&nlne
DivisionShorePartyHeadquartersandBGT9ShorePartywerecommittedon
Dplus5. EOT9
a n
&SOT21ShorePartieswereunderthecontrolof3d
MarineDivisionShorePartyHeadquartersT>y1600onDplus5 ^ e ^
s
^
lt
C
11
and3dplatoonsofCo ,3dPioneerBattalionlandedandjoinedthe
3di^iarineDivisionShorePartyonDplus10# OnDplus13the3^Marine
DivisionShorePartywasdesignatedaslandingForceShoreParty. The
IwoJimaoperationwasdeclaredsecuredonDplus25,andthe3&Marine
DivisionSliorePartycontinuedtooperateasLandingTerceShoreParty.
2*
Thecompositionofthe3&MarineDivisionShorePartywas
asfollows;
3&PioneerBattalion,
attached1
Detachment3dJASCO*
28thEmplacementDraft.
3^thEeplaesmentDraft.
Hoinforcingelements:
Detachment3dhotcrTransportBattalion.
Detachment3dEngineerBattalion.
Detachment3dMilitaryPoliceOompaay*
DetachmentHeadquartersCompany
t
HeadquartersBattalion,
3dKari&eDivision*
Detachmentsupervisoryandlaborelements,3
d
-Marine
Division.
Detachment*JJavy("beachmastera).
Betweentimemissionwasassignedi*n.&thebeginningofthe
action;shorep^rtytraining,procurementandpreparationofshoreparty
equipmentandsupplieswereaccomplished. Shorepartytrainingwas
ConductedforallpersonnelcomprisingtheDivisionShoreParty(less
navalplatoons)bycommencingwithlecturesonorganization,fuaetioning
anddutiesoftheshoreparty,fallowed"byBltfshorepartydemonstrations.
Aftertheabovetraininghad"beencompletedshoreparty
exereiseswereconductedforeachBXIshorepartyoftheDivisionusing
simulatedTeachesandactuallandingsoa>eaehesfromDUKWs,ICMand
Tokenloadswereusedforallexercitesexceptfor-thelastwhichwasa
completelogisticalproblem.
PageXof10Pages
SubjectT
1
" Mi %4 i i
l
^ i o r Ivo Jima Operation, (Continued)
One(1)CPXwasheldforeachEOThorepartyinvolving
landingover"beachesfrom'LCHs* TheDivisionShorePartyparti* >ted
inaDivisionCPX, ..-. *
jporms,recordsandotherdatanecessary.foradministration
andoperationoftheshore&rtywereaccumulated. Thecomposition,and
dutiesoftheBear3chelonweredetermined* TheDivisionShoreParty
plan,UnitPersonnelandTonnageTablesandunloadingprioritieswere
prepared.
. ' *
The training period was concluded on 3 February,
Embarkation began on 7 February, ^
Formission,plansandassumptionsrefertoEnclosure ( A ) *
Blfl?andHOTaliorepartiesembarkedwithunitstheywere
reinforcing* Theshorepartieswerecomposedofattachedunitsand
reinforcingelementsasstatedabove. Dispositionofforceswereas
shownaboveandonEnclosure*B",
3. At1130,Dplus2(ZlZebtyj),theshorepartyofBlfl?,2
ofBCT21landedandsupplementedtheUthMarineDivisionShoreParty
"byoperatingBoadhTollow1*..
By1100,Dplus3approximately^40^ofSOT21Shore
Partywasashoreunderthecontrolofthe^thMarineDivisionShore
Party,andw^sreassignedtooperateBeachYellow2 6o#ofEC!T21
ShorePartywasashoreandfunctioningby1800,
OnDplusU
t
200menfrombeachunloadingdetailsofSOT
21ShorePartywerewithdrawnby^thMarineDivisionShorePartyforuse
onBeachBlue* Comparatively smallamountsofsupplieswerelandedover
BeachYellow2until1200whenmorelighteragewasmadeavailable* Due'
tothenature,ofthebeach
r
amphibiantractorswereusedexclusivelyfor
movementofsuppliesfromlightersto^thferineDivisiondumps* Wheeled
vehicleswhenlanded,weretowedbytractorsapproximately^0feettoa
beachmattingroad* Salvagematerialanddeadwore-collectedtoalleviate
theextentofcongestiononthebeach* Thefirstterracenearthewater- .
linewaseliminatedbybull-dozersinordertoconstructalateralroad*
Furthercongestionwascausedbyartilleryinstallationswhichprevented
theconstructionofalateralbeachroadfurtherinland.
InthemorningofDplus5#BCT9ShorePartyand3d
MarineDivisionShorePartyHeadquarterslandedon$each-Yellow1.The.
northernhalfofBeachBed2andthesouthernhalf- tfYellow1wereassigned
as3dMarineDivisionbeachesandredesignatedasBeachesBlack1and2*
SOT21ShorePartywasdirectedtorevertto3dMarineDivisioncontrol
andtoestablishashorepartyonBoachBlack2*Byl600,HOT9Shore
PartyandEOT21ShorePartywereestablished,consolidatedandfunctioning
onBeachesBlack1andBlack2respectivelyunderthecontrolofthe3d
&arineDivisionShorePartyHeadquarters, .amphibiantractorswere
obtainedfromIandingl*orceShorePartyformovementofsuppliesfrom
lighterstodumps*
OnthemorningofDplus6,;theDivisiondumpswereunder
thecontroloftheDivisionQuartermasterandtheDivisionOrdnance Officer,
UnloadingofDivisionsupplieswasprogressingoverBlackBeachesona2^
hourbasis* J^mmhowitzer,105mmhowitzerand31mmmortarammunitionwas
givenhighestpriority. (Thissituationcontinuedforentiredurationof
theoperation). Surfconditionspermittedunloadingwithcraftnosmaller
thanXCMsandasextremelyrapidunloadingofJUJMawas'necessary,only
vehicleswerecarriedbytjaem. ^11materialsother M b
Page2of10Pages
t
Subject; actionSeportforKoJim Operation,(Continued).
XgDs. -it1SOOthree(3)LSTsandone(l)LOT-*'
Squadron11(3&inlineDivisionships).... for
shiptoshore* Thisamountoflighteragewas
inuousfie- ofsupplies.
UntilDplus7BeachBlack2didnotpossessa"beach-master,
therefore,comparativelylittleunloadingcouldbeaccomplishedoverthis
beach.
ThelighteragesituationvasfurtheraggravatedonDplusS
whenonlyone(l)LCTandone(l)LSIwerefurnishedforunloadingTransport
Squadron11. DuringthisperiodalateralbeachroadofMarstonbattinghad
beenlayedapproximately50yardsinlandbyV.amphibiousCorpsengineers,
whichfacilitatedtheuseofwheeledvehiclesalongthebeachSowever,
itwasstillnecessarytouseamphibiantractorsforthemovementofa
greaterpartofthesuppliesfromlighteragetodumpsduetodeepvolcanic
sandandsteepgradientencounteredthroughoutentirebeacharea.
PersonneloftheReplacementBattalions,lessshipplatoons,werelanded
u s a s
fromTransportDivision33o
r
s battl*replacements.
ConditionsremainedthesamethroughoutDplus9
lackofasufficientnumberoflandingcraftlargerthanICMsstill
impededrapidunloadingoverBladeBeaches* Theflowofsupplyhad
increasedbutnottothedesireddecreewhichwouldutilizetheentire
efficiencyoftheshoreparty.
OnDplus10allperroanelandequipmentofthe3^- Pioneer
Battalionwereashore,lesscompanyheadquartersandone(l)platoonof
Company"0
rt
whichremainedembarkedwithHCT3onTyanspOrtDivision33,
PersonnelandequipmentofthetwoplatoonslandedfromCompany
tt
C",3&
PioneerBattalionwereassignedequallytotheshorepartiesofBCT.9and
&GT21 Bythistimelateraltrafficonthesandwaspossibleforwheeled
Vehicles 50yardsinlandfromthebeach.
A
_ Unloadingoperationscontinuedona2khourbasisthroughr-
outDplus11.
OnDplus12a315?shore-partywasassignedthemissionof
unloadingLCTsonPurpleBeacft. Slmmmortar,f^mn.andlO^mmhowitzer
ammunitionstillreceivedhighestpriority. UnloadingcontinuedonBeach
Black*
At0700Dplus13one(l)officerandfifty(50)menwere
assignedtoPurpleBeachtocontroldioembarkationofpersonnelfromUSS
Jupiter* AllofBeachesHed2andlellow1weredesignatedBeachBlack
foroperationby3dliarineDivisionShorePartyandredividedintoBeaches
Black1,Black2andBlack3 However,BeachBlack1wasnotutilizedclue
toobstructionscausedbywreckedLCHsandLVTs# ReplacementBattalion
w e r e
personnelfunctioningasship,platoonsfromTransportDivision33
landedoverPurpleBeach, ^it1800,Dplus13the3d.iiUrineDivision
ShorePartywasdesignatedasLandingporceShorePartyandcommenced
unloadingsuppliesforV^jnphibiousCorpsandgarrisonforcesoverBlade
Beach. 3four(4)generatorsandeight(S)floodlightsweresuppliedby
LandingForceShorePartytoaidinnightunloading.
DpluslkTransportDivisions31and32weregiven
priorityinunloading.
DuringtheperiodDplus13toDplusVJ,the3dMarine
DivisionShorePartycontinuedgeneralunloadingofsuppliesforV
.amphibiousCorpsandgarrisonforces. TransportSquadron11wasunderway
Page3of10Pages
forXvoJ i mOperation,(Continued).
Subject:
forthoMarianasIslands"byplus15. TransportDivision33hadunloaded
allsupplieslossorganizationalequipmentoftroopsstillembarkedand
sailedoni)pluslk, TransportDivisions31and32hadunloadedalltroops
andsuppliesroquirodashoreandsailedonDplus15*
-it1S30,DplusIfithe3dPioneerBattalion,lossreinforcing
andattachedunits,wasplacedonathirtyminutecalltoformaDivision
Heserveline,. <
SVomDplusISto Dplus25the3dliirineDivisionShore
PartyoperatedBeachBlackfortheunloadingof 7^japhiljiousCorpsand
garrisonforcesupplies*
Intermittentenemymortarandartilleryfirefellinthe
areaofBeachBlackduringtheperiodfromDplus5to Dplus9 Several
"beachedISTswerehitcausingslightdamagetoshipsandcasualtiesto
personnel* OnDplus11onelargecalibershellfellonBeachBladk
causingslightdamageto"beachmattingroad, Numerousminesandduds
werelocatedandmarkedbyshorepartypersonnelthroughouttheperiod
covered"bythis report;removal"beingaccomplishedby"bombdisposalunits.
UnloadingpercentagesofTransport Squadron.11:
Date Time TransDiv31 TransDiv32 Trans,Div33
mm*mmmmm
Dplus 5. 1500 20*
Of.
Dplus 6 0*00 20$
oi
1330 2U$
2O/o 0$
1500 32^
20/S 0^
1800 0$
23
Dplus 7*', 0800 41$
26 of,
1000 27^ 05J
I63O
HS
0^
Dplus 6 1200 0 ^0
1700 5S$ ' 0*$
Dplus 9 l600
^9/^
09^
6o#
Dplus10 1000 6l# 52^ 23^
Dplus12 1S00 10$ 51)9
Dplus 13 1S00 72/J in
Dplus1^ 1800
v$ in
Sailed
Dplus15 Sailed Sailed
^. iipproximatelysix(6)weekspriortothooperationtwo(2)
HeplacementHraftscontaining115officersand2575
m
^
w
ereattachedtothe
3dPioneerBattalionforadministration, supply'andtraining.
InconjunctionwitharepresentativefromtheDivision
ClassificationSection,thePioneerS-linventoriedallpersonnelfor
availableengineer,pioneerandordnanceskills. Thosepersonshaving
specialskillsweretemporarilyassignedtothePioneer,Engineerand
Ordnanceunits.
Theremainingr>ersonnelofthedraftswereorganizedinto
nine(3)BLTshorepartylaborteamsandtheseteamsweregivenextensive
trainingas aunitwiththePioneerBattalion. Noneofthepersonnelwere
allowedtobepermanentlyassignedtoanyunitoftheDivision,thegeneral
policybeingtohavebothdraftsasintactaspossibleinorderthatthey
.b*...availableto.thewholeDivisionasbattlereple
priortotheembarkationallpersonnel"ontemporaryduty
EngineeringunitsrevertedbacktotheirBLiPshoreparty
kof00Pages,
Subject; actionHeportforIwoJimaOperation,(Continued);
groupattachedtoituponitsorganizaTion, Bfo'feiiFWfcfiaceBent Draft
madeupanadministrative groupfromqualifiedpersonnelwithinthat
draft.
purposesofhandlingpersonaleffect3.administrative
recordsand report3,aforwardadministrative groupandi\rearadministrative
groupwereestablishedundertilesupervisionoftheP:loneerBattalion* During
theoper/at-ionthe.forward,sectionwasconcernedwi*;hsubmit*ingchange
sheet-lata,casualt;/
1
dataandotherinformationtotherearechelonandalso
handledthedistributionofmailtoforwardtracpe^
1
Theie<.\x echelontook
careofthemlk oftheadministrativework* .allrecords.propertyand
verchandledbytherearadministrative gsoup*
"UpcatiTiding,theReplacement- Zro.fzsworeus'vd;:>s-shore
pazvryelementnur.tilj)plus10,whenpersonnel,werewit-idrawr.andassigned
tounit.aofthe!Jiririot5
a
Fromthenuntil3p".;.'-s??<?personnelwere
withdrawndailyon:lassignedtovariousunit3oitl*eDivision, Thiswas
handled"bydirectivesfrontheG~ltotheClassificationOfficerassigned
tothePioneerBattalionwhosubmittedalistofpersonnelby.ISilstothe
PioneerS~l* TheS~lwithdrewthepersonnelfromthevariousshoreparty
details,assembledthemand sentthemtotheunitsdesignated,
TransferordersonreplacementpersonnelwerewrittenT>ythe
DivisionAdjutantfrominformationsuppliedbytheclassification section
attachedtothePioneerBattalion*
Intheforwardarea2277officersandenlisted replacement
personnelwereassignedtotheDivision*
Uponreturntothereararea,thosereplacementswhohad
notbeenassignedintheforwardareawereallocatedtounitsofthe
Divisionandthedraftswereclosedout*
Hodifficultieswereexperiencedinreporting casualties
onthisoperation* ^11casualtieswerereportedtoBattalionHeadquarters
andfromtheredirecttoDivisionHeadquartersbymeansofCasualtyData
Sheets. Theseclatasheetswerepreparedinduplicateinadvanceofthe
Operationandretainedbycompany1st sergeants* Theyshovedeachman's
name,rank,serialnumber,organisation,SSNandadate entrywasmade
intheappropriate WLA, KI.V, M I AorD W X A columnaccordingtotheman's
status..Acombatcard-wasmadeoneachmancontainingallinformation
likelytobeneededbytheBattalionintheforwardarea. Thiscard
wasretainedinBattalionHeadquarters, A Scasualtiesoccurred,the1st
sergeantsfilledouttheduplicatecasualtydatasheets,keptone.,copy
forrecordpurposesandsenttheothertoBattalionHeadquarters,
BattalionHeadquartersrecordedtheinformationandsentallcasualty
slipsreceivedtoDivision,
IntheHeplacoaentDrafts,casualtydatasheetsweremade
upforeachman. Thisdatasheetaccompaniedhimtotheunittowhiehhe
wasassigned* Thiswasa simplemethodofJoiningpersonneltotheinfantry
battalionsandexpeditedcasualtyreportingasnoadditionalpaperworkwas
requiredofunitsreportingthecasualties*
DivisionmadetheInitialreporttotheSecretaryoftheKavy
fromthecasualtydatasheets. Amplifying reportsweremadebytherear
echelonadministrative section. Tnissystemwasexcellentandmadequick,
accuratecasualtyreportingwithanabsoluteminimumofrecordkeeping*
Page5of10Pages
Iwo Jima Operation, (Continued),
Korale \*as no problem daring tho operation as many of .the
troops had boon in action before. 4,8 soon as the tactical situation
permitted, galleys were set up to serve hot B rations, Drinking and wash
water was adequate. Mail service throughout was prompt and frequent.
Hoprisoners, natives or civilians were encountered by this
unit* .. ..
Seaoh "studies of east and west beaches with the beach profiles
were excellent for,this unit which i s primarily interested in beach
conditions. The pliotos furnished were valuable for orientation of al l
personnel and the beach obliques wore found to be nost effective. 3y far
the most valuable map received for briefing of personnel was the Terrain
Model relief iaap
f
however, i t was found that this nap must be studied in
conjunction with-a contoured military map otherwise a distorted idea of
terrain say exist.
ftomaps or photos were received during the operation, .A
nap of the beach ^rca, scale 1/2500 was drawn by the Jd.Pioneer Battalion
intelligence section for use on the beaches as a situation nap. This
scale was more suitable for shore party situation mapwork thaS the
l/lO,000 nap which was furnished.
Sydrographic maps received prior to embarkation were quite
adequate.
'G~2 information received by this unit was excellent.
Personnel of this unit turned-in many valuable documents.
It i s suggested that the system of quotas for collecting enemy material
.be modified to include al l material of the type needed as personnel are
able to withhold enemy material until restrictions are l i fted.
Intelligence liaison was excellent.
Enemy counter-intelligence measures were neglected as to
destruction of maps and documents many of vrhich were marked top secret.
Mines onbeach areas were buried in manyplaces an deep as'
three (3) feet. Whether this was a deliberate attempt by th enemy to
destroy our heavy earth moving equipment, the result of shifting sand^, or
naval gunfire could not be.determined.
The allowance of Plorescent Satin,
tt
Conti->Grlo"was
entirely inadequate. This unit requires a minimum of nine (9) complete
sets, plus sufficient cloth to make up al l colors of beach flank and
center markers.
The supply of mesh type beach matting was adequate but this
type proved highly unsatisfactory. The deep sandy soil oh Iwo Jima offered
no means of tying thi s type mat down. Bundles of hinged type HarstonMat
or equal i s recommended for future operations of this unit*
Shore party,labor was organized into labor units of one (l)
officer and twanty-f-ive (25) men including two (2) HCOs. al l . labor
elements pax'ticipatod in five (5) shore party exercises before embarkation.
Control^and efficiency of labor elements was stressed in this training.
Disembarkation of shore party labor letoents was'nade In groups no smaller
than one shore party labor unit or multiples thereof. Previous training
stressed necessity for the offiaer in charge of a labor uj^ to^repprt to
Shore Party CommandPost upon laiid^ng. .all units of the
6 of 10 Pages
IwoJimaOperation,(Continued)*
assigned"bivouacsin.thebeacharea"bytheShorePartyCommander,and
instructedtoremainthereoncall. Labor"wasdividedintotwelve(12)
hourshiftsasthesituationpermitted. Controlofshorepartylabor
throughouttheoperationwasexcellent*
PersonnelandweaponsofthePioneerBattalionplustwanty-
four(,2k)laborteamsconsistingofone(l)officerandtwenty-five(25)
meneachwereemployedbytheDivisionSiorePartyfor"beachdefense.
Eighteen(IS)similardumpunloadingteamswereavailableasreserveand
wereassignedassemblyareas,

Masterbrid2.esfortowingofpalletswereefficiently employed.
Slingsandchokersforhoistingpallets,50gallondruffiaandmiscellaneous
cargowereusedextensively* Previouslypreparedlengthsofwireropeup
toone(1)inchindiameterandfifty(50)feetlongwereusedeffectively
astowlines,andwereattachedtotractorsinordertoholdLOTa,LSMs
andLOTsonthesteeplyinclinedbeach* Theselengthswerealsoutilized
forothertowsasrequired* One(\)riggingtrailerwasavailableineach
PioneerCompanyformaintenance,repairandreplenishmentofslings,bridles
andtowlines. Traversingcraneswithboomsuptothirty(30)feetwere
usedextensivelybut shouldnot*beconsideredasasubstituteformanp$wer
.*tapproximatelyDplus20,twenty(20)ton^IiToumeau
tt
craneswere
necessaryinordertounloadheavycargobelongingtogarrisonforces*
Tractorswithbladeswereadequateandextensivelyused. Tractorswithout
bladeswereusedastemporaryprimemoversinunloading.
BouipmentandpersonnelfurnishedtheDivisionShoreParty
wereadequate. 3dMarineDivisionShorePartyandequipmentemployedwere
aslistedin.annex.%bletoGeneralOrder116-3dMarineDivisionSOPon
ShorePartyand**jmex.ableto3&MarineDivisionAdministrativePlan1-ty)~
ShorePartyPlan(Enclosure
B
&").
Replacementflraftslumbers28*and3^weretrainedaslabor
elementsforBLTandHOTshorepartiesandwerehighlysatisfactory. See
aboveforuse
1
asbattlereplacements*
Dumpsandthedistributionofsappliestherefrom,were
placedunderthesupervisionoftheDivision^aartermastorandDivision
OrdnanceOfficerwhentheDivisionShorePartywasactivated* Thisprocedure
placestheresponsibilityupontheofficersbestqualifiedandhas
repeatedlyprovensuccessful.
Militarypoliceandguideswerepostedatstrategicpoints
forproperdirectionoftraffic. Properlyplannedtrafficroutesanddump
organizationreducedcongestiontoaminimum. (SeeEnclosure*3
a
fortraffic
diagram).
DivisionT<$remainedaboardtheflagshipofTransport Squadron
11andcontroledprioritiesofship^to-shoremovementofcargoasrequested*
Deliveryofhighpriorityitemsrequestedashoregenerallyrequiredtwslve
(12)hoursfromreceiptofrequest,duetotheshortageofnecessarylighterage.
Insomecasescargodesignatedfor3&^rineDivisionbeaches
waslandedelsewhereduetomisunderstandingsbetweenbeachmastersandcontrol
vessels.
Cargoticketsshowingtheamountandtypeofcargoloaded
fromtheshipintolandingcraftWeremadeoutintriplicatebytheTroop
ofeachship,one(l)copyofwhichheretained,one\X)ofwhichwas
designatedfor,
t
thecontrolvessel,andone(l)tobedeliveredtotheshore
partycommander, actuallyinmostcasesthecog^o-lvesselnoveraccepted
Page7of10Pages
Iwo Jima Operation, (Continued)
and/or received i t s copy
f
and two (2) copies arrived at the-beach. Cargo
ticketa in some cases were made,out improperly and nore training in this
procedure i s necessary* ASthis Division landed in reserve, the use of
floating dumps ana. the procedure of placing a
M
U
tt
section representative
on the control Vessel was not inagurated.
Wheeledtransportationembarkedwasadequateforshore
use. However,onlylimitedusewasmadeofwheeledvehicles"bytheshore
partyinitially"becauseofthesoftsand. DOKWswerenotassignedto this
Division exceptforcasualtyevacuationfromshore-to-ship. Sometrouble
wasencounteredin negotiatingsoftsandnearthewater'sedge,"butothers-
wisetheDUKtfprovedto"bean'excellentvehicleforcasualtyevacuation.
LVT(l+)sallocated.totheDivisionShorePartywereexcellentandtheiruse
greatlysimplifiedmovementof cargofromlandingcraft,todumpareas.
TransportationsuppliedwasasspecifiedinEnclosure"A".Inaddition
approximatelyforty(^40)amphibiantractorswerefurnishedtheDivision
ShoreParty"byLandingJorceShoreParty,
Inmanycasespalletswereloadedin landingcraftathwart
shipinsteadof foreandaftmakingitdifficultto towpalletsfrom
lighters.
SomeshipsofTransport Squadronll didnothaveslingsfor
properhandlingofsledtypepallets* *isaresult Bornepalletswere
receivedonthe'oeaciidamagedtosuchan extentthatit wasimpossibleto
movethorn"bymechanicalmeans.
Ineonecasesvehiclesandengineerequipmentweredamaged
inunloadingfromshipto lighterageso thattheywereunserviceablewhen
receivedashore,i.e.,a,"bulldozer"beingimproperlyslungso thathydraulic
'linesweredamagedprohibitingtheuseof theblade;anew3/Scubicyard
BayCitycranebeingdroppedapproximatelyfour(k)feetintoanLOT
damagingthecraneto theextentthatit wasinoperatablewhenreceived
ashore* Someofthesedifficultiesmight"beeliminatedif equipment
operatorsaboardshipwouldseethattheirequipmentisproperlyslung
beforeitisunloadedintolandingcraft.
Thechemicalwarfaredefenseof thisunitconsistedof
individualprotectiveequipmentinthepossessionof troops;trained
decontaminationsquadsand-gasalarms, alltroopswerewellindoctrinated
inchemicalwarfaredefense. Thisunitwasreadyto andcapableOf
decontaminatingitsownequipmentandarea.
Decontaminationequipmentwascarriedwithcompanyshore
partypropertywhichwashighprioritygear.
Gasmaskswerecollectedby8~konDplus6, 1095g
a e
masks
werecollectedduringassaultphaseandnoservicingwasundertakenat
thistime.
Chemicalwarfareequipmentwasstoredin companyproperty
dumps. . .
Salvageof chemicalwarfareequipmentwasconductedbyunit
n
k
tt
sectionandchemicalwarfareUCOs.
Medicalpersonnelandmaterialwereembarkedwithrespective
BLTandROTshore-parties. . * .
Sanitiationwasgoodaboardship.
Pago''**f- 10-Pages
onIwoJimaOperation.4(Continued)*
giiombarkedwithrespectiveBLTandRCTshore
es;three(3)corpemenperBLTshorepartyandone(1)doctorand
corpsmenper&d$shoreparty*
RCT21SP-1doctor,1dentist,11oorpsmenlandedDplus3*
RCT9S?-1doctor,1dentist,12corpsmenlandedDplus5*
RCT3SP-6corpsmenlandedDplus10.
Therewerenolossesofpersonnelormaterial*
ROT21ShoreParty-one(1)doctor,oae(1)dentist and
eleven(ll)corpsmenlandedat0800,Pplus3onBeachYellow2* Setup
andassistedtheHthMarineDivisionevacuationstationonBeachYellow2*
^tI6OO,Dplus5movedtonorthendofBeachBlackunder3dMarine
DivisionShorePartycontrolandestablishedevacuationstation* This
stationwaslocatedonlateralbeachroad,100feetfrommaininland
roadtofirstairfield* Beachexitsandunloadingpointswereadequate*
Thestationconsistedofonelargereceivingtentdirectlyontheseaward
iideofthelateralroad;ashocktentwassetupontheterracenearest
thewater
1
edge*andaholdingandtreatmenttentsetupontheinboard
sideofthelateralroad* Alllocationswereadequatelyduginwithbull-
dozereandsandbagprotectionwasusedatentranceandsides* Cotsand
stretcherswereusedforpatients* Bedlightswereusedforillumination
atnightwhennecessary*
0$9ShoreP*rty-one(1)doctor,oae(1)dentistand
twelve(12)corpsmenlandedat1^00,Dplus5oasouthernendofBeach
Blackandestablishedanevacuationstationonthelateralbeachroad*
TentssimilartoRCT21,consistingofreceiving,shockandholdingtents
weresetupandproperlyprotectedwithsandbagrevetments*
RCT3Shoreparty-Six(&)corpsmenlandedat1000,
Dplus10andassistedtheRCT21EvacuationStation*
OnDplus17RCT9EvacuationStationsecuredandjoined
HOT21* RCT21securedallevacuationonDplus26at1J06*
RCT21SvacuationStationevacuated3196casualties*
RGT9SvacuationStationevacuated597* Personnelevacuatedwerefrom
the3d,kthand5thMarineDivisionsandVAmphibiousCorps* Atotal .
often(10)&ibdatevacuationstations* Approximately65fSofall
patientswerestretchercases* CasualtieswereevacuatedbyLCMs,BUXWs,
LSTsandLSiisdependinguponsurfconditions* Shisprovedtobeadequate
transportation*
Sanitationwasmaintainedbyconstantpolicingofthearea,
Waterwassuppliedby50gallondrumsand5gallonexpeditionarycans*
Deadweretakentocemeteryareaforburial* Dentalservicewasadequate*
, Thereweretwenty-two(22)enemyprisonersevacuated*
Medicalorganisationofevaouationstaffwassuitable*
Medicalpersonnelwasadequate*
Therewasnopilferageofsuppliesorlosses* Supplies
wereadequateexceptforblanketsandstretchers*
Page9of10Pages
Subject: Action Heport for Iwo Jiaa Operation,
It i s recommended that larger and more adequate supplies-
of "blankets and stretchers "beassigned to evacuation stations as they
tend to act as medical depots in the i ni ti al phase of assault.
Communication personnel and equipment'supplied were
adequate for operation.
shore party was organized and equipped fotf this operation
in accordance with 3&Marine Division general Order 116 - SOP, Shore Party
and -innex Able-to 3^Marine"Division uidministrative Plan 1-^5 {Enclosure
"A*
1
)* This organization and equipment was considered adequate with the
exception that a minimum of ten (10) (Bay City type.) cranes with thirty
(30) foot "boomsand twelve (12) tractor cranes with traversing"booms
should "befurnished for future shore party operations involving landing
in the assault, .
One (1),cargo oarrier M29C(weasel) per letter company
and one ( l ) per H&SCompany, Pioneer Battalion would "beuseful as
commandvehicles for the purpose of rapid transportation to assist in
coordination of acti vi ti es in beach and dumpareas.
Bundles of hinged HfcrSton imtting (50* sections) should
be substituted for the typo of beach matting now furaiehecL the Pioneer.
Battalion. Steel toboggan type cargo sleds approximately 5
f
* H
1
should
be added to shore party equipment in the number of twenty-seven (27) per.
Pioneer Battalion.
It i s further rocoomonded that in the event this Division
i s assigned a&assault landing at least two (2) complete l ogi sti cal
shore party relaov
;
-rs^ls..be!held.
JEDiiUKD M.'VXLLLOtS
Page 10 of 10 Pages
\
JDH-sjw
Ser.^OOOUU
M FORCE,
Iff THE 7I2LD.
23 January,
go
1.
a,Directivesfromhigherauthorityrequirethatthis
Divisionbe,prepared,inCorpsReserve,tolandinrearofassaultunits
andexecuteapassageoflinesandalsotobepreparedtoexecutean
assaultlandingonCorpsorder,
2.
a, In the event of an assault landing, Division Shore
Party wi l l be organized and wi l l function as prescribed by General Order ~
116 - SOP Shore Party, In the event t hi s Division lands over "beaches on
which shore party units are functioning, the 3&Division SP wi l l rel i eve
or augment established shore party unit's as ordered.
3
#
SHOflB
a. In the event t hi s Division lands over previously
established beaches:
(l)Initialsupplieswillbeobtainedfromestablished
supplyinstallations,
(2)EC3!swillnotestablishfloatingdumps.
(3)BI#andHC!PSPswillbelandedonbeachesprescribed
byDivisionSPCommander,
b.IntheeventthisDivisionlandsinassault:
(1)Initialsupplyinstallationswillbeestablishedin
accordancewithGeneralOrde*11$-SOP-ShoreParty.
(2)3VHSPswillbelandedasorderedbyBITCommanders,
(3)HoatingdumpswillbeestablishedbyBKPsforthe
emergencysupplyofcriticalitemsduringtheinitiallandingphase,
(a)!Ehefloatingdumpwillbemaintainedinthe
vicinityofeachSegimentalcontrolVessel. Arepresentativeofthe
regimentalkSectionwill"beoneachRegimentalcontrolvesselandwillmake'
requestfordispatchofboatsfromfloatingdumpstoappropriatebeach.
(b)Bequestsforsuppliesfromfloatingdumpswillbe
routedthroughSPCommanderstotheRegimentalcontrolvessel* JSaeh503?
floatingdumpwillconsistofthefollowing:,
1I>OVP-lOJmja..1.,.,110rounds
1LCTP- 75mm
M
.*
#
,.225rounds
Page1of5Pages
3HCL0SUHB*A*
in
aBLS to AdJninfsiSiwM Plan I-U5. 5H0H3P^BTY PLaE. (Contd).
1 LCVP- Carbine . . . 6, 900 rounds
M~l , . . . . 7.500 rounds
Machine (ton . . 12, 000 rounds
Grenades 325 each
37mm . , . . ' IHO rounds
75mmtank , . . . * . . . I3S rounds
1 LCVP- 60mmmortar . , . . , . . . . hlk rounds
81mmmortar . 306 rounds
Bazooka . . . . . . . . . . . . * 1 2 0 rounds
1 LOVP- Water v 1^*0 expeditionary
. cans (700 gals)
1 LCVP- Fuel, flame thrower,
gasoline 97 cans
(U65 gals)
Juel, flame thrower,
Napalm , , lU6 pounds
Nitrogen cylinders **. 16
Ignition cylinders . . 108
(<S) Ploating dumps to be maintained at the l evel
prescribed in the above sub-paragraph unti l ordered discontinued bySCT
Commanders, at which time supplies remaining in the fl oati ng dump wi l l
be landed as directed by HOTCommanders. . .
(d) ASthe necessary number of LCTPs return from
the f i rst tri p to the beach they wi l l be ut i l i zed for the fl oati ng dumr>s.
(k) Trip Tickets.
(a) Transport Quartermasters onboard al l ships
embarking t hi s Division wi l l dispatch cargo ashore andv/ill maintain record
thereof, as follows:
f
!* i* tri p ticket wi l l be orepared in t r i -
pl i cat e, showing nature and quantity of cargo and unit for which loaded.
Tickets wi l l not show destination. Two(2) copies ui l l . be furnished the
Coxswain, whowi l l then proceed to the Begimer
A
tal control vessel . *vtthe
Begimental control vessel , one ( l ) copy wi l l be delivered t o the Regimental
ll
U" representative, whop,thfrcOntroX oftioo* di rects the craft to a designated
beach." The,remaining cot>y wi l l be given to a SP representative upon arrival
At tae Deacii ox- ..
(b),The Division Transport v-),i.v.rtermaster will
prepare and distribute the necessary trip tickets prior to embarkation,
(5) 12th i-Iarines will transport artillery ammunition
from beach.and wi l l unload artillery ammunition at inland dumps,
(6) DIOTBand LVTs, i f assigned for ship-to-shore
movement of supplies, will operate as direct6d by Division Shore Party
Commander.
(7) Division wotor Transport Officer will establish
a vehicle refueling point (gas and diesel) on eachECO?
Page 2 of 5 Pages
2LTCL0SUBE
A 1-45. SH0H2SP^IST PLaH, (Cont'd),
a. Sach BLT SP wi l l be equipped HLth:
1 - Athey Tractor-trailer, (lurnished "by3&
Motor Transport Bn)
2 - t ract ors , l i ght or medium, with angledozers.
(Furnished by 3d Pioneer Bn),
1 - 2jt*ton, 6x6 truck, dump, (burnished by 3d
Pioneer Bn).
2 - 2|*-ton, 6x6 trucks, dunrp. (Famished by 3d
Engineer 3n).
5 - 2j*-ton, 6x6 trucks, cargo, (burnished by
Motor Transport Bn).
b. The following equipment wi l l be assigned to each BC$ SP
Headquarters and wi l l be i nAddition to that prescribed for the Biff Shore
Parti es:
2 - Tractors, hea-ry (TD-18) with angledoaer
(Jpurnished by 3d 3ingineer 3n).
1 - Tractor, heayy, with DD/PTO. (Furnsihed by
3^ Engineer Bn) ,
2-Tractors,heavy,with360degreetraversing
crane(Furnishedby3dPioneer.3n).
1 - Tractor, l i ght , with TY-9 crane attachment.
(3\irnished "by 3d Sagineor Bn).

1 - Shovel, gasoline, motorized, 3'/8 * 3/^"

cu
*T&*
capacity, with attachments, {lurnished by
3d Engineer Bn),
1 - Tractor, medium, w/dozer a'lovel. (Furnished by
3^- Pioneer Bn).
ton, UxU. (Furnished by respective
RGTs).
2 (Generators and l i ghti ng equipment per beach, i f
available, (Furnishocl by 3d Pioneer Bn).
Cranes are to be rigged with boom attachment, prior to
landing.
c. The following wi l l be assigned to Division SP Headquarters;
1 - Trailer, l*-toa, 2-wheel
f
greasing. (Furnished
by 3d Pioneer Bn).
1 - Set, equipment* welding, el ectri c* (Furnished
by 3d Pioneer Ba)
Page3of5Pages
ENCLOSURE
ABLEto administrative Plan 1 - ^ . SH0H2P--2ET PLdN, ' (C*4t
!
d).
dMiscellaneousequipment:
(1)[Removablepallettowingbridlesvill"bedistributed
onthefollowingbasis:
1-EachAtheytractor,underRCTcontrol.
1-2a,chtrackedsharepartyvehicle*
1-Bachshorepartywheeledvehicle,'
1-Bachartilleryprimemover.
10-PerROT,tobedistributedasdirectedbyECUCommander.
unitswillinstitutenecessarymeasurestopreventloss
ofassignedremovabletowingbridles. BridleswillbeprocuredfromDivSP
CommanderpriortoEmbarkation.
(2) ^11 uni t s will moke necessary distribution of
bolt cutters for use in cutting steel straps on pal l et s.
5.
a. Division (Quartermaster and Division Ordnance Officer be
prepared to assume direction of dumps on order.
b. Beach matting will be landed prior to landing of wheeled
vehicles.
c. Units will promptly return al l cargo nets to SP.
d. ALIvehicle tolling-hitches will be inspected and lubricated
pri or to embarkation.,
e. All SP vehicles will be water-proofed. Water-proofing
materials will be removed from al l vehicles promptly after landing.
f. AI Ipal l et 8 will be placed in lending craft in a fore-
and-aft position, with bri dl es forward.
g. Pal l et s will not be stacked in landing craft.
h. Bach SP crane will land with necessary v/ire rope
replacements, barrel s slings, and oallet slings.
i . 3<ii'iotor Transport-Battalion company commanders will
function as directed by respective ECU?SP commanders, for the control of SP
transportation.
j . Division SP Commander will be prepared to furnish one
t ract or with blade for use of Division Graves-Registration Section.
1
. k. SP labor elementp will be landed in complete organizationa
"units of one ( l ) officer and twenty-five (25) men, or combinations thereof.
1, Prior to beginning of debarkation, the assistant
(Shore Party) will proceed to and report at VPhib Corps Shore Party OP,
as Shore Party Liaison Officer for 3d iiarine,Division.
Pagektf5Pages
MCLOSUBE
SHOES P-iJRTT Fluff;. (Cont'd),
m.SPreportforashowingstatusof
1
SPsupplyasof1800,
will"besubmitted"byBC5SPsdirecttotheDivisionS?Commander,"by1900.
Thiareportwillbeconsolidated"bytheDivisionSPCommanderandsubmitted
direettoCorps; duplicatecopyofallSPreportstoOr-k,3dMarineDivision,
DivisionSPOoamanderwillberesponsiblefordistributionofSPreportforms*
n. Telephonic SP report tr< <K> O/J190C, giving statue of
SP transportation and supply*
3TCOKMuEDOF
R . 3
%
K C ,
Colonel, ll
o
S* iurine Corps-.
Chief of Staff,
Same as administrative Plan
s / j . 35, HIMtJ
J. D. HITTLE,
I t Col, US*JO,
, G-k,
Page 5 of 5 Pages
EIICI.OST1HB
76
-i Atr 2, Gunnery
t Map.' iwo'Ji^a. 1:10,0
ENCLOSURE "B
ENCLOSURE K
HEADQUARTERSBATTALION
ACTION REPORT
JUKPDB DIVISIOil, $ KmtMltOW
C/O PUBSTPOST ttnftOB, Satf JR*30X$OO,
7April,
dingOfficer,
andingGeneral,3dMarinoDivision*
Subject; Action BepOrt, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands*
fieference: (a) 3d Marine Division General Order No* 137*
(b) 3d Marine Division Staff Memo &o, *
Enclosure* ( A) *cti oa report, 3d Joint assault Si^ial Company.
(B) Motion report* 3d war Dog Platoon*
1. (a) Period covered from 7 November, 19*& to 16 March*
(b)Theparticipationofthisunitintheoperationforthe
captureofIwoJima*VolcanoIslands,wasprimarilylimitedtothefunction*
ingoftheDivisionCommandPottinastaticsituation*
2. (a)ThiscommandwascomposedofthefollowingUnitst
HeadquartersCompany*
SignalCompany.
ReconnaissanceCompany*
MilitaryPoliceCompany*
(0)Thefollowingunitswereattachedforadministrative
purposes:
3dJoint SignalCompany,
3dWar Platoon,
7thWat Platoon,(attachedon13March,
(c)Thetrainingm& participationofthis/battalioninthe
IwoJiaacampaigndepartedinnomannerfromthatnormalforanamphibious
operationonasmallisland,orforlimited'beachheadoperation. Planning
andtrainingwasbasedontheassumptionthateitheranassaultlandingor
thelandingofthedivisioninreservemight00required*Shiploadingand
embarkationofpersonnelworeplannedaccordingly, Thotrainingperiod
coveredtheperiodto8February*19^5.
wiientiae
firstporsonnelWore'eia-
Markedaboardship. Shetrainingfortheunitsofthobattalionwasnormal.
OneDivisionCStJCwasheldusingasituationbasedonassumptionssimilarto'
thoseexpectedatIwoJimajallpersonnelparticipatodandtheQpwasdag,
in. Horehearsalsweroheld*
J* UnitsofthisbattalionbeganlandingonIwoJic#atQ90Q*
2kFebruary,1^5. ThoDivisionCosa&iandPoatwasestablishedonthenorthern
endofAirfieldIfuaborOne,andbeganoperationthosameday* On 5March.
191*5*thoDivisionCommandtostwaemovedfourhundredyardstothenorthbetwoon
AirfieldsOnandTwo,andremainedinthatlocation,fortheremainderfth$
operation. Nofurthermovementwasnecessarybecauseoftholimitedareain-
volved. Thecentrallocationofthecommandost servedto facilitatecom-
monicationswithhigherechelonsandsubordinateunite* iToSeriouseffects
fromenemyfiroweresufferedandnoattemptatinfiltrationbytheenemywas
experienced* Normalfunctionswereperformedbyallunitsfromcentral
location,andreduceddistancessimplifiedcommunications,supply*andevac-
uation. On4Mnrch,19U5,thoHooonnftissanceCompany.wasattachedtothe
^LttMarinesandrevertedtodivisioncontrolon13Maroh,19^5?normal'
dutiesofareflecompanyinregimental,resorvowereperformedinthisperiod*
Sectionsofthe3dWarDogPlatoonwereattachedtoinfantryregimentson
severalocasionsforsecurityandpatrollingmissions.
(over)
1 -
>>.T:T-*
*U<m depart, Iwo Jim&
t
Volcano
The foliowin^ oasualtios wore incurred dvurin^ the
m
0
o
a
0
o
o
i
I 37
THIRJ5WARDOG-PLATOON,
BATTALION,THIRD MARIN*fVISION,
F0RC.2,IHTHEIJIEUD.
C/OFLEETP^STOFFICE,SANFRANCESCO, OALIF.
21April,1945,
From
er.
To Jhe TJ<5ffla
1
fflH*tg*t*IM!ral, 3d Marine Di vi si on.
Via The Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battal i on,
Subject:
ActionReport,IwoJima,VolcanoIslands,
Reference
(a).3dMarineDivisionaeneralOrderNo
#
137.
1.
a.Periodcoveredfrom7November,1944to .
16March,1945.
b.Thedutiesofthisunitintheoperationforthe
captureofIwoJima,VolcanoIslands,were:
1.Providingnightsecurityforfrontlinetroops
andoutposts.
2.Forambushes.
3*Daylightpatrols.
2. Trainingofthisunitconsistedofscoutingand
patrollingwithdogs.,andtheusoofWarDogsonnight security.
Personnelweretrainedinallph-^esofconbatusingdogs,and
in>egular infantrytactics. Lecturesofpersonnelofinfantry
unitsweregiventoexplaintheproperutilizationofWarDogsin
connectionwi
;
;^Infantry. Thetrainingperiodcoveredthe
periodto9-February,1945,whenthefirstpersonnelwere embarked
aboard ship.
3. a.Personnelofthisunit;wereloadedontwoships.
Twenty-threedogsandtheirhandlerswereaboardtheU.S#S,Warrick;
c^enty-onemenwithoutdogswereaboardtheU.S.S.HarryLee.
fursonnelbeganlandingonIwoJimaon24February,,1945. Initially
clogswereusedforsecurityaroundtheDivisionCP.andonforward
outposts. Duringtheperiodoforganizedresistancehousewasmade
of'Iwardogswithinfantryunits. Assoonasorganised resistance
sensed, extensiveuseofwardogsT-
r
ithinfantrypatrolswasinstitut-
ed,.411battalionswereassigneddogsforthispurpose. On6March,
allmenwhowerewithout dogsweretemporarily attachedtothe
Marines,andrevertedtoHeadquartersBattalioncontrol'on18
March,1945. Normaldutiesofriflemenwereperformedinthisperiod
On12March,1945,fourteendogsandhandlerswereassignedtothe
NinthandTwenty-firstMarines',sevenbeingassignedtoeachregiment..
Dogswereusedfornightsecuritywithriflecompanies,fornight
ambushes,aspointonpatrolsandassecurityonoutpost.,
b.(1)*Onnumerous.occasionsdog"sassignedonnight
securityalertedtoJapaneseattemptingtoinfiltrateintotheposit-
ion. InmanyofthecasestheJapanesewerekilledbythedog
handlers. Duringtheperiod,to23March,..twelveofthedogsinthe
platoonwereinstrumentalinthekilling6fJapanese.
(2).On14MarchadogalertedtotwoJapanesetryir
toentsracompanyareafromtherearandthehandlerkilled them.
(3).On15Marchtwodogsalertedtoseveralenemy
soldiersattemptingtoinfiltrateintoacompanyarea;threeofthe
enemywerekilled.
(4).On16Marckadogalertedto agroup,oftiie
enemyastheyattemptedtoenterAcompanyarea. Two,oftheenemy
we>ekilledandtheremainderweredrivenaway.
(5).On19Marcha46gservingwithanambushgave
advancenoticeoftheApproachof the
;
enemyandanumberoftheene
werekilled. Anotherdogalertedtotheapproachofane,neaygroup
andintheensuingfightthedogazidblahandlerpwe^fi-jwoundedandoni
Japanesewaskilled. ' "
eport,IwoJlma,VolcanoIslands.21April,
1945, (ThirdWarBogPlatoon.Cont'd;
,{6}.fcn22Marchadogonpatrolalertodtothree
separateenemyambushes. ThedoghandlerbilledoneJapanesein.aol
o$thefirsttwoambushes. Inthethirdinstanceboththedogandth
handlerwerekilled inthefight*
>' 4. The following casualtieswfcrlfrincurred duringthe
operation.
KU
0.
0 e 5"
0
c 0
1
IF*
4
6\
,. The.-terrain;at
c
Iwp^&linawas jwty
us?ofdogsondaylightpatrolsbuttheyprovedtobe j
At
ho-timeweretheydetrimental,tohesucesspta$*atroloramfcuh
Duringtheoperationitwasnoticed.that dogswer#ineffectivein
searchingoutcavesanddeepemplacementsandtheiruseinsuch
situationsisnotrecommended* Bogscanbeusedinnight security
andwillproveeffective. Atalltimeswhendogswere aeeignedtb
:rpop8themoraleofthetroopswasincreased. Infantryunits ^,
requestedtheirassignmentonpatrols. Itisrecommended thattbe
usfofdogsbecontinuedwith.thisdivision.
W,T.
K
B toAction Report"of Headquarters Battalion,"3dMarine
Division".-\ -.
v
ir '<..' '**'-* *"
' i .
* ,
21 April, 1345.
llMjaMtofc-a, 3d Uarin Division,
action report, Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands,
Subject;
Ca) 3d Marine Division u-eneral Order Ko. 137
Reference;
(a) Period coverod i s from 7 November, l$kh t-o l6 March,
(b) Shi s uni t furnisliod Shore Party Conraunications, Air Liaisbn
Par t i es , and Shore Fi re-Cont rol Par t i os for ITaval Gunfiro durin^ t he occupation
and capture of Iwo Jima Volcano Islea&a. .
2
k
(a) The following soctions comijoso t hi s command*
Company H3adquartcrs - . ,
Shoro Party Comounications Section (10) Par t i es , -
A
Shore Pi re Control Soction (13 Pa r t i e s ) .
Air Liaison Section (13 Pa r t i e s ) ,
- ^ ,
("0) She throe major soctions of t hi s compnny woro ^iven a genera
communications training,, followed by specializ^d section,trainin ,. Personnel of
the 3PUS ondorwont training conducted "bytho 3d Pionoor Battalion withwhom
th^y o^jrated durin^ the occupation. 'Officers and Scout Ser&oaats of the S
underwent a six woeks training pro
0
r;?;n dt tho W advanced
4
Ir^iniii._
v
and
ounfire Shore Bombardment School, ro&rl Harbor, 2he peraoiuiol of the x
returned 9 iTovaabor, 19^ from toapora-y duty with Cin.0i3Wj?A whore they
ticipated in the landings at aorotai md.Leyte, J'or six \ie\jfc& ~>xioT to
erabarkation, air liaison prooloas wore conduot.od usin^ aircraft furnished
the local iiarino Air u-roup. All sectior-i's participated in.a clivisioa OxX,
a situation based on the assaui 0. xployaant of the division at Iwo
(c) x-rlor to locwm jv^ai, txia teacia of the AJItmd.SPO Sections
wore assigned to eacii Ji/x and ji\?xfor unbariiation and'operational oniployiaont*
She SJTO teams wore aabarked with 3L2
!
s out reverted to the control of the
Division'Shore.Party Oojjiraarider upon l^adin^* .
' . ' - . / : ' . ' " ' " ' ' . ' .
3. * Blomonts of t he SFC, SPG, andAt Sections embarked with.BCT-21
betjan landing on I**o Jiraa with t hat regiment on 21February, 19^5* <W0
elements with tho Division Headquarters ^foup and JLC2~9 landed with those
organi zat i ons on 2^ February,: 19U5. -i l l SPCt eaaa attached t o SOE-3 were
landed a few days"l at e* and used as replacements ajid r el i ef s for tho teams
with HQ2l andBC$*9. 5?wo of tho SPGtoaiaa wore landed at t hi s timo and
furnished t hepersonnel requi red by tho Corps Shore par t y, Throp S3PC toftfas
were temporarily at t ached t o BCT~9 and HCT-21 as dOianwnication personnel
replaccaaents.' Horiaal omployiaQnt wasmade of t he *TASOo teanls* Detailed ,4onnaent
on t hi s onQ)loyiaent i s incorporated i n tho 3d Marine Division, .action RopQ^t; Par
IV, paragraph ( F) , ( ^ i r ) ; par t IV, Paragraph (a)(2Tavftl Ounfiro); andPar t XV/
Paragraph (II), ( Si gnal ) , by the Division AI P ,Haval Chinfira and Signal Offi cer,
Casualties were incurred duringthe operation as followst
WIA
OFJ? 2JSL
ow
om
SirCS 10
SFOS
7
5L.
Sotal 22
Subject; Actionreport,IwoJima,
5. She following transportation wets taken forward and proved ade<juato
for the operation
CoHq >*1 ton W*
t
l*"2j t on 6x6 l*4iZ 1-300 gal water t r a i l e r
3ach SSP team l ~ i t on t ruck, 1- ^ t on t r a i l e r .
l i n e (9> SFO
11
1- ^ t on truck, 1-$ t on t r ai l e r * ^
112)
/
In addition the Division and each ROTS3FCteam had *tt ton, ,
and the Division SFCteam anK2 She Division ALSeamwas equipped with a radio
equipped personnel carrier.
6. Eepair
f
and replaoement of most signal oquipaent WAShandled%y
J^SCo, Heplaceaent material was drawn from teams not committed andutilised in th
section required, failures and oattle losses of signal eqaipaent.wore saall
7, Conclusions and recommendations for eaoh aection are included in
the aforementioned paragraphs (7), (G) and (M) of Part IT, 3dKarino Division
n
A
tt
to Action Report, Headquarters
6SE 16*00 S69I
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