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Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann
Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann
In which forms and under which conditi ons has a certain system of meaning
(such as a discourse, a semantics or a system of communication) come into
being?
-
T
t
a
i
m i s to
.
d
eal9gy is a history .Cf the present designed to outline the histori cal
cgnficts and strat
Fi rst , the el ements of di scourse and self-technol ogy must have been
constructed as obj ects in preceding archaeological discourse analysis and
self-technology analysis befre they can be studied as ' fnctional elements
in-an-apparatus ' . Thus , i t is the discourse analysis and not the dispositive
analysis that constructs the individual discourse through i ts awareness of
the regularity in the dispersion of statements. Because of this, I find it
dificult to perceive of dispositive analysis as more than an extension of a
number of logically preceding analyses .
Dispositive analysis makes one aware of the logics that unfld through the
new technologi es, practi ces and i nsti tutions, and how these are linked
together i n an apparatus.
Notes
1 My exposi tion of The order ofthings draws on Raffos0e, 1 999.
2 For a frther discussion of Foucault's genealogy, see fr example, Megi l l , 1 979;
Roth, 1 981 ; Shi ner, 1 982; Kent, 1 986; Mahon, 1 992.
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ei nhart Koselleck's history of concepts probably represents the clearest
breakthrough of the linguistic turn within hi storical science. Koselleck's
history of concepts was developed at end of the 1 950s and, since then,
has become an extensive programme for the study of the rise of modernity.
The programme studies the origins of a great number of concepts , particularly
pol itical and administrative ones, in connection with the effects of their social
history. This has resulted in a comprehensive encyclopaedi a i n eight volumes
of the history of concepts entitled Ceschichtliche Crundbegrije, Historisches Lexikon
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutsch/and ( Brunner et al , 1 972) . The
encyclopaedia i ncludes concepts such as ' politics' , ' citizen' , ' publi c' , ' nature' ,
' interest ' , ' representation' , ' administrati on' and ' tyranny' .
Jan I fversen ( 1 997) characterises the hi story of concepts as a linguistic turn
within the discipli ne of social history. Although the history of concepts has
devel oped as an indication of limitations and problems i n traditional social
history, it has never proclaimed i tself to be a new, radi cal, historical science in
oppositi on to all traditional historiography. The history of concepts has
therefore been able to develop without a destructive conflict with the less
theoretical hi storical sciences. On the contrary, the history of concepts has
commanded respect fom traditional historians, while Foucault's discourse
analytical histori ography has never obtained recognition withi n traditional
historical disciplines. The history of concepts has been seen and has seen itself
as a niche withi n historical science, but not until recently has conceptual
hi storical thinking extended beyond the encyclopaedia to which it i s rooted.
This shif i s particularly visible in Scandinavia in the work of historians such
as Bo Std.ht, Henik Sidenius and Kari Pal onnen (see fr example, Std.ht,
1 990) .
This chapter focuses only on Koselleck's history of concepts. There have
been other attempts at writing the history of concepts, but fom the discourse
analysis perspective, Koselleck's contribution is of the greatest interest (see for
example, Pocock, 1 987; Tully, 1 988; Ri chter, 1 990, 1 995) . As I fversen points
out ( 1 997) , the other efforts ofen do not reach beyond assumptions in respect
of conceptual history. For example, Quenti n Skinner ( 1 984) , despite an
intention to do the opposite, remains located i n the history of i deas , fcusing
on canoni cal works without regard fr more anonymous texts (such as
2
33
Discursive analytical strategies
34
administrative texts) and without regard fr those semantic or discursive fields
of which the canonical works frm a part (Ifversen and Ostergard, 1 996,
p 25) .
The rel evance of the hi story of concepts can be summed up i n three
characteristics:
1 . I t presents a serious, anti-essentialist and constructivist challenge to traditional
historiography.
2. I t is founded on a reasonably simple theoretical apparatus that has not yet
been unflded, but which, in turn, has proved to be extremely sensitive to
the empirical, exceedingly operational and analytically powerfl .
3. I t has succeeded in fnctioning on two diferent levels at once by writing
the history of individual concepts, their origins, transformation and effects
on social and political practices , as well as combining these i ndividual
histories in a joined description of the transformation of pol itical semantics
in the notion of neuzeit (neuzeit is the designation by historians of concepts
of the transition fom premodernity to modernity) .
Ori gi ns of the history of concepts
The fndamental premise for the history of concepts is the idea that concepts
are central to the constitution of society, including the constitution of action
as wel l as agents of action. The shaping of concepts is hence not a simple
surfce phenomenon. If historical science is indeed seeking to raise critical
constitutional questions, it must do so by defning the shaping of concepts as
the central issue. Without concepts, notes Koselleck, there is no society and
no political fi elds of action (Koselleck, 1 982, p 4 1 0) . This does not imply that
everything can be reduced to concepts. According to Koselleck, the history of
concepts must include linguistic as well as sociohistorical data - any semantics
entail non-li nguistic content ( Koselleck, 1 982, p 4 1 4) . (We will return to this
point in connection with the notion of concept later in this chapter. )
The constitution of society can therefre be examined as a semantic battle
about the pol itical and social; a battle about the defniti on, defnce and
occupation of conceptually composed positions . Concepts must be perceived
of as reaching into the future: "Concepts no longer merely serve to defi ne
given states of affairs, they reach into the future. I ncreasingly concepts of the
fture were created, positions that were to be won had to be first linguistically
frmulated befre it was possible to even enter or permanently occupy them"
(Koselleck, 1 982, pp 4 1 3- 1 4) .
Included in this propositi on i s the notion that semantics change a t a slower
pace than the events themselves. There are several fctors rel ated to this point:
how signifiers and the signified do not relate to each other in a predetermined
relationshi p;
how whi ch signifer is fixed above a given si gnified is very much a political
issue.
The discursive battle is therefore a confi ct or struggle over which signifiers
are to be tied to whi ch signified.
For exampl e . . .
A dead seal l ands on the beach. How shoul d we signif thi s event? There are sti l l
seals of the shore of xvi l i e; pol l ution takes new victi ms; the ruthless over-fi shi ng of
herring i s starving the seal populati on; or another fu epi demi c ravages the seals
of the sound? The signifier steps down i nto the signified and transfrms the seal
(the signi fi ed) i nto a signifier of its own - the dead seal signifies the diversity of
nature, pol l ution, a fu epi demi c, and so on. The signifier i s also obviously pol itical:
should we take measures agai nst fi shi ng or pol l ution, or si mply wonder about
the whim of nature?
53
Discursive analytical strategies
54
This battl e over fixing sliding signifi ers is, as I have noted befre, a battl e over
the defi nition of nodal poi nts (or, to use Lacan's term, privileged signiers) ,
which can arrest the sliding of the many signifi ers across the signifed.
Besides the application of these concepts, Laclau introduces yet another
concept - the notion of the empty sinier. (I believe this is Laclau's invention,
although, here too, he is heavily i ndebted to Lacan. ) The question of the
signifi er that signifi es nothing emerges i n Lacan's fmous article on the non
existence of the woman: "This the is a signifier characterized by being the only
signifier which cannot signif anything" (Lacan, 1 982, p 1 44) . Such a signifer
is the only signifer capable of ending and defning a limit fr the chain of
signification. The analogue question i n Laclau addresses the partial fnality of
the discursive game. The empty signifier is used to signif that which does
not alow fr signifcation, that is, the limit of the discursive signifi cation: "An
empty signifi er can consequently only emerge if there is a structural impossibility
in signifi cation as such, and only if this impossibility can signif itself as an
i nterruption of the structure of sign" (Laclau, 1 996a, p 37) .
Summary
A discourse consists of diferent elements of signifcation, which only obtain
identity through their mutual differences i n the discourse. The condition of
mutual diferences, however, is that the elements are i dentical or equivalent in
respect to belonging to the discourse and existing within the boundaries of
the discourse. On other words, on the one hand, elements can only form an
i denti ty through thei r mutual di ferences, while on the other hand, the
differences are cancelled out by the equivalent relation provided by the elements'
attachment to the discursive structure. This is only possible if there are diferent
types of diferences; if a difference exists that is radically constituent fr the
diferences of the system. Laclau identifi es this difference as the excl11ding
ho1 1ndary. Within the boundary exists a system of relational elements; outside
the boundary exists only pure, indiferent being i n rel ation to which every
element of the system is equally diferent. Thus, outside the boundary only
radical indifference exists (which is why the distinction i nside/ outside the
sys tem s houl d not be confs ed wi th Luhmann's di sti ncti on between
surroundings/ system) .
The empty signifer occurs, in effect, as a possibility fr the signifi cation of
"the pure cancellation of all diference" (Laclau, 1 996a, p 38) . Laclau summarises
the argument thus:
There can be empty si gni fi ers within the feld of si gnifi cation because any
system of signifi cation is structured around an empty place resulting fom
the i mpossibi l i ty of produci ng an object whi ch, nonetheless , is requi red to
be the systemati ci ty of the system. (Laclau, 1 996a, p 40)
An empty signifi er is that which signifi es the i ndiferent and the cancellation
of difference. All differences must be equally different in relation to it, while
The discourse theory of Ernesto Lac/au
also being diferent fom each other. Locating and analysing the empty signifi er
entails a signifi cation of the ultimate limit of the discourse but, since such a
signifer will always be inside the discourse, it will never be possible to represent
it fully.
Laclau illustrates the relationship between equivalence and diference as
portrayed in Figure 3 . 1 .
Hegemoni c analysis and the battle of fxati ng
The formulation of the problem of floating elements of signifcati on opens up
a redefnition of the question of hegemony or supremacy in society. The
concept of hegemony in Lacl au's discourse theory fncti ons, i n short, by
focusing the aim of discourse analysis . It is not the main purpose of discourse
analysis to produce i ndividual analyses of conceptual displacement or individual
battles over the fxating of signifers, but rather to uncover the general
hegemonic relationships in society, and conditions fr the transfrmation of
hegemony.
Wi th the discourse-analytical reconstruction of the concept of hegemony,
other traditionally Marxist concepts fi nd new frmulations as well, i ncludi ng,
fi rst and fremost, the concepts ' opposition' and ' antagonism' . However, fi rst,
we will only indicate the direction of the conceptual turn.
The notion of hegemony is linked directly to the argument about the
incompl eteness of structures and to the continually flly or partially floating
elements of discourse. The basic understanding is that hegemony is only
possible when something exists that can be hegemonised, and that this is only
the case when di scourse lacks fnal fi xation, when the discursive elements
hol d a surplus of meaning and when the signifi ers are not irreversibly linked
to the signi fed. Consequently, hegemony signifi es the never-concl uded
attempts to produce a fxation, to whi ch there will always be a threat. As
Laclau metaphori cally notes, hege1 11ony"is like writing in water. I t is something
i mpossible, unstabl e, and vulnerable, but to a certain extent still something
Fi gure 3 . 1 : Chai ns of di ference and equi val ence
Chain of difference between
elements
X/XIXIXIXIX/XIXI a a
X equals an el ement
Chain of equivalence between the elements
of the left side through a common
constitutive difference to 'other'
x
5 5
Discursive analytical strategies
56
that can be accomplished" (Laclau, 1 985, p 1 07) . Hegemony creates the space
fr "a politics of si gnifers" (Laclau, 1 983) .
Hegemonisation subsequently consists in the i mpositi on onto elements of a
certain way of relating to each other. This also means that hegemonisati on
brings elements together that have not previously been brought together (Laclau
and Moufe, 1 985, pp 1 34-45) . The economic hegemonisati on in society
appears in elements that were not earlier cons i dered socioeconomic being
suddenly recognised as such, and, furthermore, in these elements now relating
to themselves as social economy. One example could be the emergence of
policies for older people fom the mid- 1 980s.
For exampl e ...
Unti l the mi d- I 980s the el ements of residential homes, ol der peopl e, home care,
and ol der people's housi ng in Denmark were not associated with el ements such
as social-economi c bal ance, i nfl ati on, fi nance and so on. From the mi d- I 980s,
however, pol i cies for ol der people became a central socioeconomi c and pol i tical
issue. Subsequently, a number of pol i cy works are commi ssi oned. This results in
two things. Fi rst, residential homes, ol der peopl e's housi ng, home care and other
issues are brought together under the same policy umbrel l a through the joi nt
frmulation of pol i cies fr ol der peopl e (whi ch has never happened before).
Second, pol i cies fr ol der people establ i sh themsel ves through the frmul ation
of a political expendi ture issue about the social-economic coordination of publ i c
services fr ol der peopl e. Hence, the hegemonisation of pol i ci es fr ol der peopl e
withi n the socioeconomi c conception appears not as a hi erarchy of relations of
superi ority and i nferiority, but as the i nvestment of a parti cul ar l ogic in the
construction and shapi ng of pol i ci es for ol der peopl e.
Di scourse analysis versus deconstructi on
As highlighted in t he introduction t o this chapter, there appears t o be a traceable
shif of focus in Laclau 's writings, from discourse analysis to deconstruction.
I n this section, I will argue that discourse analysis and deconstruction provide
two completely diferent perspectives, but that Laclau brings them i nto a
complementary relationship in which the output of one becomes the input of
the other. The bridge between them appears as that which Laclau calls 'logi cs ' .
Discourse analysis i s , as already noted, an analysis of the discursive system of
dispersion - of the way discursive elements are dispersed and placed i n relati on
to each other. Deconstruction is in no way synonymous with discourse analysis.
Nei ther i s it one ' technique' among several techniques wi thi n discourse analysis,
but is in fact in clear opposition to discourse analysi s.
The discourse theory of Ernesto Lac/au
Origins and defnition of deconstruction
The concept of deconstruction derives from Derrida. In the article ' Letter to
a Japanese friend' (Derrida, 1 988) , Derrida replies to a letter he has received i n
which he is asked t he question: what, really, is deconstruction? Derrida, however,
refuses to answer the questi on on the assumption that deconstruction in itself
should be anything defi nite. I nstead, Derrida chooses to elaborate on what
deconstruction ought not to be, and i n relation to discourse analysis the answer
is rather interesting. Derrida emphasises that deconstruction is neither analysis
nor criticism (Derrida, 1 988) : deconstruction is not analysis because it refses
to be reduced to simple principles and it is not criticism because there exists no
place fom which criti cism can be conducted. Conversely, discourse analysis is
precisely analysis because discourse analysis reduces and refers the many
arti culations to a particular system of dispersion. Even though discourse analysis
does not claim, as does structuralism, to be able to refer to one simple principle
but rather maintains the structural openness, the act of conducting a discourse
analysis still requires a reductive description. I will leave whether or not discourse
analysis is a frm of criticism open to discussion. But I am of the definite
opinion that deconstruction cannot be incorporated in a discourse analysis.
But then what is deconstruction? Derrida gives the answer to that question
in a subordinate clause: "' deconstructi on' is precisely the delimiting of ontology"
(Derrida, 1 988, p 4) . But, since deconstructi on consists of such ' delimiting' ,
Derrida must also insist that deconstruction cannot be reduced i n this way
since it would then stand outside itself The result is thus : "What deconstruction
is not? Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course! "
(Derrida, 1 988, p 5) .
Naturally, this is a completely satisfctory definiti on, so I will endeavour to
answer the question even if Derrida refuses to. My understanding of i t i s that
deconstruction is about showing how di ferences are contingent, that i s,
deconstruction i s about retracting or deconstructing differences by showing
that they are not differences at all; that the ' bar' between two elements, which
isolates one fom the other, cannot be maintai ned. Even afer the difference
has been established, i t is still contingent what it consists i n, if at all . It i s not
a questi on oflocating differences within a system, or a discourse, but a question
of addressing the i ndividual diference in order to prove that it is not valid.
One example of this is the diference between speech and writing, which
Derrida deconstructs i n Ofgrammatalagy ( 1 980) . Here the issue is the dissolution
of the difference between speech and writing, first by showing that writing
precedes speech and second by posing the argument that speech and writing
are both writing - one phonetic, the other graphic.
Deconstructing diference
The deconstruction of a diference does not end, however, once i t has been
shown that the diference is not valid. The illustration of the non-difference
of the di ference (so to speak) i s simultaneously an il l ustration of those
5 7
Discursive analytical strategies
58
mechanisms or games that are present in each diferentiation. The point is to
see the difference as a mechanism in a game of signification. Usually, there
appears to be a hierarchical relationship between the two elements in a difference
- one tries to subjugate the other. By deconstructing differences, the relationship
is usually reversed in such a way that what appears to be the norm is recognised
as a game of dominance. This could, for i nstance, pertain to the concept of
sign, which I have previously mentioned in this chapter. I t would appear
obvious to assume that the signifi ed would hold the dominant side in the
relation between signifer and signifed. Without something to refer to, how
can there be reference? But the deconstruction of the sign puts hol es i n the
bar dividing the signifi er fom the signifi ed and the signifi er appears on the
same level as the signified. Subsequently, the hierarchy of difference is reversed
- the signifi er becomes the dominant element and suddenly our attention is
drawn to a central mechanism of signifi cation. This type of mechanism is
often referred to by Laclau as ' logi c' , and we are thus able to talk about a l ogic
of signifcation as the mechanism present in signification and i n the displacement
of signifi cation onto the signifi ed.
The relationship between deconstruction and discourse analysis
Deconstructiou cannot be incorporated i nto discourse analysis, but what, then,
is the relationship between them when Laclau insists on using both. The
answer is that the relationship is circular ( see Figure 3. 2) . Deconstruction
pinpoints mechanisms or l ogics whose unfolding wi thin the discursive battles
of history can be studied in di scourse analysi s. Discourse analysis , in return, is
able to provide deconstruction with pol itically central concepts and dualities
(two-sided differences) and so on. The logic of signifcation fnctions as a
point of departure fr a discourse anal ysis of, for example, the ecological
di scourse. What we examine here is the battle over how floating signifers are
to be fi xed above the signifed. We examine how names are interchanged;
how some signifiers are sought out as privileged i n order fr them partially to
fi xate other signifi ers (fr exampl e, ni trate pollution of drinking water) ; and
fi nal ly, whether there is a breakdown in the signifcation logic in the frm, fr
exampl e, of an empty signifi er, which causes al l meaning to implode. This
could fcus on the notion of ' the ecol ogi cal latitude' .
Fi gure 3. l: The relati onshi p between deconstruction and di scourse analysis
Opening of the
political
through the
il l ustration
of the
undecidabi l ity
of a difference
logics
dualities
Demonstration
of hegemony
The discourse theory of Ernesto Lac/au
Logi cs therefore become clues or points of reference for discourse analyses.
Discourse analysis analyses the hegemonic constellations within which logics
play themselves out. Without logics as deconstructive i nput, discourse analysis
could not obtain the same sensitivity in relation to the central mechanisms or
to structural incompleteness. Laclau describes it thus :
Deconstruction and hegemony are the two essential dimensions of a single
theoretico-practical operation. Hegemony requires deconstructi on: without
the radical structural undecidability that the deconstructive i ntervention
brings about, many strata of social relations appear as essentially linked by
neces s ary l ogi cs and t here woul d be nothi ng to hegemoni s e. But
deconstruction also requires hegemony, that i s , a theory of the decision
taken i n an undecidable terrain: without a theory of decision, that distance
between structural undecidability and actuality would remain untheorised.
(Laclau, 1 996b, 59-60)
Logics
In recent years Laclau has conducted a number of deconstructions of different
important pol itical conceptual couples. Some of the l ogics that result from
these are described bel ow.
Logic ofsignification
We have already touched on the loJic <?f s(<n{fcation. It is important to note
that a number of Laclau's deconstructions in relation to the logics discussed
below are simply applications of the logic of signifi cation on the relationships
of specifi c signifers to their specific signified. Therefre, once one has a better
understanding of the l ogic of si gni fi cati on, it is possi bl e to explore much
further.
Logic ofrepresentation
The des i gnat i on of the logic cf representati on happens as a resul t of a
deconstruction of the diference representative/represented (Laclau, 1 993b) .
It is an assumption of prevailing political theory that the represented side of
the diference is the dominant side. Representation only makes sense if it
actually represents something. Furthermore, prevailing pol itical theory discusses
how representation can be distorted in rel ation to what it represents, which
l eads to a democracy-theoretical discussi on about which institutions ensure
the most accurate representation. Deconstruction l eads to a reversal of the
di fference and to a displacement of the theoretical question of representation.
Not only does the representative distort the represented, i t also i ndispensably
partakes in constructing the represented and can therefore never stay neutral
in relation to it: "The relation representative-represented has to be privileged
59
Discursive analytical strategies
60
as the very condi tion of a democratic participation and mobilization" (Laclau,
1 996b, p 49) . This opens up the question of how the struggle of representation
is always a struggle over the construction of the represented.
Logic oftolerance
The logic of tolerance indicates the mechanism that is present in the diference
tol erance/i ntol erance. Here, too, the di ference is reversed t hrough
deconstruction which shows that tolerance cannot be explained in itself without
turning into its opposite. Consequently, intolerance is simul taneously the
condition of the possibility and the impossibility of tolerance; the undecidability
of the distinction extends the possibility of both pol es. With the logic of
tolerance we are able to study the hegemonic battle over what should be
tolerated and what should not be tolerated (Laclau, 1 996b, pp 50-2) .
Logic ofpower
The logic of power indicates the mechanism present in the diference power/
liberati on. Once agai n, the diference is reversed. Jurisprudence assumes that
freedom is the condition of power; power is the restriction of freedom and
therefore earns its potential through feedom. Laclau reverses the difference
and points out that what restricts feedom is also what makes i t possible - a
society free fom power is an impossibil ity. Once again, this provides the basis
fr a discourse-analytical study of the continued negotiation and displacement
of the power/feedom boundary (Laclau, 1 993b, 1 996b, pp 52-3) .
Logic ofequivalence; logic ofdierence
Moreover, Laclau confgures what he calls logic of equivalence and logic of
diference. It is not clear whether these logics are used in the same way as in
the above examples. If so, they could be understood thus. Laclau chooses as
his point of departure a deconstruction of the very diference diference/
equivalence in order to show how diferenti ation holds i mplications i n relation
to the arti culation of equivalence and, conversely, how, at the same time,
equivalence affects diferentiation. The two logics are central i n Laclau 's
discourse analysis.
The logic of equivalence is the logic of simplifcation of the political sphere.
Through the articulation of equivalence between elements, the possibility of
an i nterchangeability of elements is increased. At the same ti me, the number
of subj ect positions i s reduced. For example, by making almost everything
equivalent to social economy - from tax issues and the environment to equality
- more and more elements can be incl uded and interchanged within the same
chain of values . Meanwhile, the number of posi tions through which one is
able to parti cipate in the conflict over taxes, the environment and equal ity is
reduced.
The discourse theory of Ernesto Lac/au
Conversely, the logic of diference signifi es the logic through which the
pol itical sphere is widened and increases its internal complexity. The elements
do not become particularly interchangeable, but the number of subject positions
(that is, the positions from which one can be pol itical) is increased (Laclau and
Mouffe, 1 985, p 1 30) .
Logic ofuniversalisation
Finally, I wish to mention the logic of universalisation, which is based on the
deconstruction of the diference particular/universal (Laclau, 1 996b, p 59) .
Precisely because the universal is universal it ought to be able to stand alone.
Deconstruction shows, however, that this is not possibl e: "The conclusion
seems to be that the universality is i ncommensurable with any parti cularity
yet cannot exist apart fom the particular" (Laclau, 1 992, p 90) . This forms the
basis fr studies of how attempts are made to universalise the particular, and
how universalisation defi nes what can be articul ated as particular.
Conclusion
Laclau also confi gures a few other logics that are usually presented as aspects
of almost all logics, including the loic (supplement and the lop,c (if impossibility.
The concept of logic does not therefre appear to be exercised completely
consistently. The logic of supplement and the l ogic of impossibility involve a
retalogic that might also apply to the l ogi c of difference and the logic
equivalence, but not to the logic of representati on, which, one must assume, is
bound by a particular historicity. We can therefre observe a division of
duties between deconstruction and discourse analysi s, but also a l ack of
theorisation of their mutual relationships, which appears as an inconsequent
and insuffi ciently defned concept of logic. This raises a number of questions,
particularly about universality:
On the level of the first order, the outlook is mono-contextual. The observer
sees what he sees. He makes use of a distinction without being able to
distinguish.
Why not a different distincti on, which could lead to the replacement of
the chosen guiding disti nction by a different disti nction capabl e of re
entry?
I n systems theory there is no concept of essence forcing a second-order observer
to view reality in a particular way. Reali ty, as such, is not observable anyway
and does not therefore demand anything specifi c from the observer. Reality i s
observer-dependent and i n that respect i t i s a construction and al so a reality.
The observer of the second order can al so always i nquire about the
conditioning of the guiding distincti on:
l s it possible to condition the particular guiding disti nction diferently and
more productively?
For example, in his earli er writings Luhmann condi tioned social systems as
systems of action, but later fund it more productive to condition social systems
as systems of communication.
Finally, there i s always the option of moving the observation poi nt. It is
always possible to move backwards in the process of re-entry so that that
which was seen as system now appears as sub-system, or move forward in the
process of re-entry so that that which was seen as system now appears as
environment. This applies, not only to the distinction system/ environment,
but to al l concepts capable of re-entry (that is, all second-order concepts) .
I have tried to summarise these notions of observation and observation of
the second order in Table 4. 1 :
Tabl e 4. 1 : Fi rst- versus second-order observation
Observation
Refrence
Di stinction
Outlook
Observation of the
frst order
Observations of somethi ng
in the world through i ndi cati on
withi n the framework of a
di stincti on
External reference
Object: this/something el se
Concepts: concept/counter
concept
Mono-contextual
Observation of the
second order
Observation of observations as
observations, that is, observations of the
boundaries of i ndi cation i n other
observations withi n the framework of
the same di sti ncti on
Sel f-reference
Second-order concepts: concept
that can appear as part of thei r own
whole, that i s, concepts capable of re-entry
Poly-contextual
7 1
Discursive analytical strategies
72
Conclusion
Having used a considerable amount of space on Luhmann's concept of
observation, I will continue with the rest of this chapter. First, some of the
central conditionings of the system/ environment distinction that follow the
concepts of meaning, consciousness and communication are discussed. Then,
some of the alternative guiding distinctions i n Luhmann's systems theory are
introduced, which exist in addition to the system/environment distinction.
The concept of meani ng
Luhmann's theory of observation avoids any kind of anthropocentrism. Not
only people observe: the observing system could be anything fom a thermostat
in a refigerator, or an organic cell to a national bureaucracy. Wi th the theory
of observation, therefre, we have only j ust begun. Thus, we must move on to
specif which type of system we are fundamentally interested in. What is our
systems reference? Although an organic cell is as capable of observation as a
bureaucracy, their systemic conditions of observation are obvi ously very
diferent . Luhmann's general systems theory assumes that all systems are
autopoietic, meaning that they themselves create the elements they consist of,
including the constitutive boundary between system and environment. On
this general level, systems can be compared to the basic element of autopoiesis.
Luhmann distinguishes between organic systems, psychic systems and social
systems - organic systems create themselves through lie, whereas psychic and
social systems create themselves through meaning.
Meaning
When fcusing on social systems, meaning thus becomes the first inevitable
concept. In part, the concept of meaning plays the same part in Luhmann's
systems theory as the concept of discoursivity plays in Laclau's discourse theory:
While all social identities in Laclau are embedded in a discoursivity and are
unable to go beyond this discoursivi ty, psychic and social systems in
Luhmann are similarly unable to operate outside of meaning.
=
~
=
~
1 1 1 1
83
Discursive analytical strategies
84
without preferences one way or the other and open to any consolidation,
make up the medium of observation, which can precisely only take place by
isolating a single form i n the medium of difference. I f we look at Spencer
Brown's form calculus reproduced in Figure 4. 7, we can see that the very line
or gibbet is the medium of form as the unity of the specific separation of m
from not m.
Fi gure 4. 7: The cal cul us of frm
l
By media, Luhmann understands l oosely coupl ed el ements . Media are
characterised by a high resolution and by being accessible to Gestalt fixations
( Luhmann, 1 986b, p 1 01 ) . Conversely ,form to Luhmann implies a fixed
connection of elements : "Forms emerge [ . . . ] through a condensation of the
mutual dependency between elements, that is, through the selection of the
possibilities ofered up by a medium" (Luhmann, 1 986b, p 1 02) . Moreover,
media always consist of numerous elements:
Forms, on the contrary, reduce size to that which they can order. No
medium creates only one frm since it would then be absorbed and
disappear. The combinatory possibilities of a medium can never be exhausted
and the only reason for restrictions to evolve is the fct that the creations of
forms mutually disrupt each other. (Luhmann, 1 986b, p 1 01 )
The relationship between form and medium is itself a form, meaning that any
speech on form is only form i n relation to a medium and vice versa. Forms
are only shaped when a medium makes itself available but, on the other hand,
form prevails i n relation to the medium, without any resistance on the part of
the medium i n regard to the rigidity of form. The difference between form
and medium, however, is relative in the sense that frm can be more or less
rigid.
For exampl e ...
One example of a medi um i s money, whi ch i s a medi um precisely because payments .
can:
be ofered as random notes, because one payment does not depend on the
signi fi cance and purpose of another payment, because the medi um i s
i ncredi bl y frgetful (since i t does not have to remember i n order to maintain
the paid amount), and because the solvency determi nes whether payment
i s possi bl e. (Luhmann, I 986b, p I 0 I )
Nik/as Luhmann 's systems theory
Deci si ons are an exampl e of frm; they constitute a frm because they i mpress
themselves i n a medi um and condense its elements i nto one deci si on, which i s
onl y a deci si on i n relation to previous deci si ons and deci si ons not taken. The
deci si on to pri nt the company's logo on paper forms the medi um of money by
requi ring expenditure. Thi s deci si on i s not i nterchangeable with other deci si ons
- i ts meani ng i s tied to ti me and space, and can only be understood i n relation to
the company's other decisi ons. Moreover, the deci si on has been made possi bl e
by previous decisi ons, for example the deci si on to have a company logo.
A form is not necessarily tied to one medium. It is possible to imagine a
situation in which several media make themselves available to the same form.
An organisation can frm numerous different media (fr example, money, law
and power) , although it can never do so simultaneously.
Which forms and media are available to communication is an historical
question, that is to say, the difference between form and medium varies
historically. Furthermore, the distinction form/medium is capable of re-entry
so that a specific form can later work as medium fr a new frm. This extends
to an evolutionary question about the way media arise and produce possibilities
for new forms of communication. In the words of Luhmann:
How language, how writing, how alphabetical writing, and how symbolically
generalised media appear. They provide a potential for the creation of forms
which would not exist without them, and we can take advantage of this
potential as soon as the social conditions permit i t. (Luhmann, 1 986b,
p 1 04)
Historically, we can trace a development in which frms have, over time,
become media of new forms. In theory, the only limit is the fct that media
cannot be developed beyond the communication of form. Thus , the number
and ways of forms and media offering themselves to communication is
fundamentally an empirical question. As a result of the historical evolution of
new media, one could possibly speak of a media/frm staircase on which the
next step is open (see Figure 4. 8) . Distinction is the medium for the frm of
meaning, which further constitutes the medium for the frm of language,
which i n turn works as the medium for media of distribution and so on. The
staircase is by no means complete.
The implications of this extend to how we observe observations whose
guiding distinction is form/medium. The capacity of distinctions fr re-entry
entails numerous potential points of observation. As with the guiding distinction
system/ environment, the point of observation can always be moved forwards
or backwards. With the guiding distinction system/ environment, one is always
able to choose a new systems reference, and with the gui ding distinction
form/medium one can always choose a new frm reference. Depending on
what we define as form in our second-order observation, diferent relationships
appear as medium (although no medium will appear, of course, if there are no
8 5
Discursive analytical strategies
86
Fi gure 4. 8: Medi a/frm staircase
media) . Luhmann provides the fllowing example: "A public organisation
can be considered a frm but also a medium in which interests clash and
impress themselves" (Luhmann, 1 986b, p 14) .
As we have already suggested above, Luhmann's theory of society ascribes a
more prominent position to some media than to others . As a principle rule,
he di stinguishes between three types of communication media:
language;
genealogy;
self-technology analysis;
dispositive analysis.
Archaeological discourse analysis
The guiding distinction i n archaeological discourse analysis is regularity I
dispersion of statements and it poses the question of why this and no other
statement appears i n a particular place. Archaeological analysis divides the
world into regularity and dispersion, where no regularity can exist without
dispersion, since regularity consists of nothing other than the regularity of the
dispersion. With this guiding distinction, Foucault allows fr of the
order of statements without turning the analytical operation ino a reductive
operation to reduce, fr example, many discursive events to one or
few causes and many discursive manifestati ons to one latent structure) , but
rather possessing the ability to sustain the statements i n their appearance.
Geneaology
The guiding distinction in the genealogical analytical strategy is continuit I
discontinuity, where continuity (that i s , the similar or i dentical) can be
continuous only i n relation to the dis continuous (that is, the dissimilar or
different) and vi ce versa. Thi s guiding principle allows for questions about
the way discursive formations and practices are shaped and transfrmed. With
this guiding distinction, Foucault lets his analysis be sensitive to any s tatement
and any practi ce that presents i tsel f as new (that i s , as feed of pri or
misconceptions) or as unique (that i s , as identical to its origins) . The guiding
distinction continuity I disconti nuity provides Foucault with an analytical
strategy that is not easily captured by the stories told by the present of the
present but which, in turn, can function as counter-memory.
A hall of mirrrs or a pool of analytical strategies
Self-technolog analysis
The guiding diference of self-technology analysis is subj ectivation/subj ection,
which opens up an inquiry into the way the subj ect i s proclaimed as self
proclaimer, the way self-technologies are created and how they prescribe self
activity through which the individual can give itself to i tself
Dispositive analysis
Finally, the guiding difference of dispositive analysis is logic/apparatus
but also apparatus/strategic logic. This allows fr inquiries into the way
discursive or technical elements are generalised within a s chematic that brings
about a strategic and i nquiries i nto how forms are linked together as
functional elements i n an apparatus through the unfolding of the strategic
logic. Dispositive analysis should be viewed as an extension of Foucault's
other analytical strategies, since the dispositive analysis i nquires about the
mutual of those orders addressed by the other analysis .
Koseleek
In the works of Koselleck we seem to find a distinction between two analytical
strategies:
deconstructivist analysis.
Hegemonic analysis
The frmer analysis corresponds to the hi story of concepts and archaeological
discourse analysis insofr as it aims to study the origins of discourses, but,
again, its gui ding distinction is which means that the question of
discourse presents i tself differently. The guiding disti ncti on of the analysis of
hegemony i s discoursivity I discourse. The shaping of discourses is therefre
always studied in i ts capacity to fx the fl oating elements of discoursivity.
Unlike in Foucault's work, the obj ect is not statements in their appearance,
but discursive elements that appear relationally and include practi ce as well as
utterances. In a sense, Laclau's hegemonic analysis is closer to Koselleck's
history of concepts than it is to Foucault's discourse analysis , because they
both emphasise ambiguity and the i ncessant fl oating of meaning as that which
establishes the political.
Deconstructivist analysis
Conversely, the deconstructive analytical strategy finds no equivalence i n
Foucault and Koselleck. The deconstructive eye makes an object of the
individual differentiation in order t o examine the logic that the distinction or
dual i ty might install in the discourse. Through deconstructi on, we are able to
unveil particular mechanisms of the creation of meaning, which operate as a
game of dominance between the two sides of the distincti on. The combination
i n Laclau of the two analytical by defi ning deconstructed dualities
as guidi ng distinctions in the hegemonic analysis, gives a very diferent result
to a concept-historical or an archaeological discourse analysis .
Luhmann
For Luhmann it becomes difcult to maintain a comprehensive view of the
pool of guiding distinctions and the potential combinations. I believe I can
define fve different analytical strategies i n Luhmann:
A hall of mirrors or a pool of analytical strategies
frm analysis;
systems analysi s;
differentiation analysis ;
semantic analysis ;
media analysis .
Form analysis
Form analysis bears close resemblance to Laclau's deconstructive analyti cal
strategy, as i t concerns the logic of the creation of meaning (identi cal to paradox
i n Luhmann) , whi ch is i nstalled with speci fic disti ncti ons . The gui di ng
di sti ncti on of frm analysis is uni ty I di ference and i dent i fes frms of
observati on as object by means of t hi s distinction. Form analysis inquires
about the distincti on that controls observation and about the paradoxes
established by the distincti on. Form analysi s asks about the uni ty of the
separated. I n Luhmann, form analysis i s never a goal i n itself but rather a
strategy for the formulati on of further questions primarily the question of
how soci al systems de-paradoxif the very paradoxes on which they are built
through communicative operations.
Systems analysis
The guiding disti nction for systems analysis is system/ environment. With this
guiding distinction, the world is divided i nto system and environment, with
system the operative side. It is therefre fom the side of the system that the
boundary system/ environment i s defned. I n this perspective, communication
i s always communi cat i on wi t hi n a sys t em, and the boundary sys t em/
environment i s a boundary of meaning that determines t hat the creation of
meaning i n terms of communi cation happening on different terms outside
the system than inside i t . The guiding distinction system/ envi ronment poses
the question of how a system of communicati on comes into bei ng in the
communicative distinction between system and environment.
How is the boundary of meaning defined in the system and what are the
i mplications fr the continuance of the communication i n the system?
How does it develop a sensitivity to the environment, that is, how does the
system define the relevance of the environment?
There i s no equivalent to the guiding distinction system/ environment in the
other programmes fr observati on. The closest compari son i s Foucault's
occasional descriptions of the i ndividual discursive frmations as of
knowledge and truth ascri bi ng a self to discursive formations. I n fact, these
descriptions exceed Foucault's analytical strategy and i ts intention to describe
discursive frmations as the regularity of the irregular. In Koselleck, the closest
notion is i n the counter-concept us/them, but here we operate exclusively on
1 01
Discursive analytical strategies
1 02
a semantic level and not on an operative level as with Luhmann's concept of
systems.
Dqrentation analysis
Differenti ation analysis employs the guiding distinction similarity I dissimilarity.
I t can be argued that this is not an i ndependent analytical strategy but rather
a supplement to systems analysis , since the guiding distinction similarity I
dissimilarity presupposes the distinction system/ environment. However, the
guiding distinction similarity I dissimilarity poses questions that are not directly
accessibl e with the guiding distinction system/ environment:
How does meaning establish a pool of forms, that is, stable and parti ally
generalised distinctions available to systems of communication?
Luhmann's semantic analyti cal strategy is l argely i nspi red by Koselleck's
conceptual history, but differs fndamentally through its origins in the concept
of system. Thi s is critical to the analytical strategy because it can then be
linked with a social theory.
A hall of mirrors or a pool of analytical strategies
Media analysis
Luhmann's fifth and fnal analytical strategy uses the distinction form/
medium, where form can only be regarded as such i n relation to a medium
and vice versa, with frm the operative side. Media analysis only fnds its
equivalent i n Foucault's dispositive analysis , i n which apparatus corresponds
to form and logic corresponds to medium. The logics that
Foucault pursued largely resemble Luhmann's symbolically generalised medi a
in their characterisation. Foucault speaks about legal/illegal, Luhmann about
right/wrong; Foucault speaks about securi ty preparedness/insecuri ty and
Luhmann speaks about risk/ danger. Both medium and strategic logic can
only be brought about through something else; that something else is apparatus
in Foucault and frm i n Luhmann. However, Luhmann never ascribes a
strategic fnction to media. The concepts of form and apparatus both constitute
the context in which l ogi c and medi a are i nscri bed. However,
highlighted the similarities, the big diference is that Foucault's apparatus i s a
system of relations between whereas Luhmann appears not t o have
unflded the potential in the concept of form with respect to the relations of
the forms to other frms. (Although he does poi nt to a guiding diference,
which he terms element/relati on, and one could argue i ts potential fr
perspectives similar to those that Foucault opens with hi s concept of apparatus. )
Finally, like dispositive analysis, media analysis constitutes a double movement.
It can be approached fom the side of the frm as well as the side of the
medium. We can i nquire into the generalisation of a form into a medium,
which I call media analysis. But we can also ask which medium is formed by
a specifi c frm and with what which I call frmation analysis.
Media analysis asks the questions:
How are media shaped and how do they suggest a particular potential fr
formation?
When is the system identical with itself and when has it developed into a
new system?
Dierentiation analysis
In Luhmann 's diferentiati on analysis , the problem of condi tioning pertains to
the measures of similarity in a distincti on to be pinpointed as a frm of
diferentiation.
When are systems equal in their way of defi ning themselves in relation to
the environment?
language;
media of distribution;