Cahuc Zylberberg - Labor Economics (MIT 2004)

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Of Contents

2014 Scribd
Inc. AND LIFE-CYCLE EARNINGS
2.3Copyright
EDUCATION,
TRAINING,
Mobile
Site
3 EDUCATION AS A SIGNALING DEVICE
Language:
3.1 A MODEL WITH SIGNALING
English
3.2 OVEREDUCATION OR UNDEREDUCATION?
4 EVALUATIONS OF THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
4.4 SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUS!ON

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Cahuc Zylberberg - Labor Economics (MIT 2004)

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7 FURTHER READINGS
1 BASIC JOB SEARCH THEORY
1.1 THE BASIC MODEL
1.1.2 Comparative Statics of the Basic Model
1.2 EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MO.DEL
1.2.1 Eligibility and Unemployment
1.2.2 On-theJob Search
1.2.3 Choosing How Hard to Look
1.2.4 Nonstationary Environment
2.1 )OB SEARCH AND LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
2.1.1 The Inadequacies of the Basic Model
2.1.2 An Equilibrium Search Model
2.1.3 Labor Market Equilibrium
3 EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF JOB SEARCli
3.1 THE ECONOMETRICS OF DURATION MODELS
3.1.1 The Hazard Function
3.1.2 Parametric Estimation
3.1.3 Introducing Explanatory Variables
3.2 MAIN RESULTS
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
6 FURTHER READINGS
1 THE STATIC THEORY OF LABOR DEMAND
1.1 LABOR DEMAND IN THE SHORT RUN
1.2 THE SUBSTITUTION OF CAPITAL FOR LABOR
1.2.1 Minimization of Total Cost
1.3 SCALE EFFECTS
1.3.1 Unconditional Factor Demands
1.3.2 The "Laws" of Demand
1.4 BEYOND Two INPUTS
1.4.1 Conditional Demands
1.4.2 Unconditional Demands
1.5 THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WORKERS AND HOURS
1.5.2 The Optimal Number of Hours
1.5.3 Cost of Labor and Demand for Workers
2 FROM THEORY TO ESTIMATES
2.1 SPECIFIC FUNCTIONAL FORMS FOR FACTO!\ )MANDS
2.1.2 The Choice of a Cost Function
2.2 MAIN RESULTS
2.2.1 Aggregate Labor Demand
3 LABOR DEMAND AND ADJUSTMENT COSTS
3.1 THE COSTS OF LABOR ADJUSTMENT
3.1.1 Definition and Size of Adjustment Costs
3.1.2 The Specification of Adjustment Costs
3.2.2 Linear and Asymmetric Adjustment Costs
3.3.2 Linear and Asymmetric Adfustment Costs
3.11.1 On Estimates
3.4.2 Main Results
5 RELATED TOPICS IN THE BOOK
7 APPENDICES
7-1 APPENDIX 1: THE CONVEXITY OF ISOQUANTS
7.2 APPENDIX 2: THE PROPERTIES OF (OST FUNCTIONS
1.3.1 Social Norms and Wage Formation
1.3.2 An Illustrative Model

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Cahuc Zylberberg - Labor Economics (MIT 2004)

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2.1 MoNoPSONY
2.1.2 Monopsony and Discrimination
3.1 SELECTION PROBLEMS
3.1.1 Adverse Selection
3.1.2 Adverse Selection and Efficiency Wage
3.2 SELECTION AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
3.2.3 The Limits of Affirmative Action
4 WHAT EMP!RiCAl STUDIES TELL US
4.1.1 Considerations of Method
4.2 WAGE DISCRIMINATION
4.2.1 Questions of Method
4.2.3 Direct Assessment of Discrimination
4.2.4 Main Results
4.3 INDUSTRY AND FIRM WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
4.3.1 The Traditional Approach
4-3.3 Industry Effect and Finn Effect
1 THE LABOR CONTRACT
1.1 EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT CLAUSES
1.2 COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
1.3 THE AGENCY MODEL
2 RISK-SHARING
2.1 SYMMETRIC OR VERIFIABLE INFORMATION
2.1.1 An Individual Insurance Contract Model
2.1.3 Insurance and Labor Mobility
2.2 ASYMMETRIC OR UNVERIFIABLE INFORMATION
2.2.2 An Example with Two States of Nature
3 INCENTIVE IN THE PRESENCE OF VERIFIABLE
3.3.1 Multitasking
4.2.1 The "Shirking'' Model
4.2.2 Seniority, Experience, and Wage
4.3.1 Estimating the Return to Seniority
4.4.1 The Model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
4.4.2 Final Remarks on Efficiency Wage Theory
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
6 RELATED TOPICS IN THE BOOK
1 UNIONS AND hLLECTIVE BARGA!NING
1.2 THE BEHAVIOR OF UNIONS
2 BARGAINING THEORY
2.2 THE AXIOMATIC APPROACH
2.3 THE STRATEGIC APPROACH
2.3.1 A Noncooperative Bargaining Game
2.4 l.ABOR CONFLICT: STRIKES AND ARBITRATION
2-4-2 Arbitration
4 INSIDERS ANO OUTSIDERS
4.1 INSIDERS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
4.1.1 The Wage-Employment Relationship
4.2 INSIDERS AND LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION
4.2.2 Discrimination or Unemployment?
5 INVESTMENT AND HOURS
5.1 NEGOTIATIONS AND INVESTMENT
5.1.1 Contracts Without Renegotiation
S.1.2 Contracts with Renegotiation
5.2.2 The Optimal Number of Hours Worked

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6.1 WAGES
6.1.1 The Union/Nonunion Wage Differential
6.2 PROFITABILITY
6.2.1 Productivity and Profits
6.2.2 Investment
1 SOME FACTS
1.1 THE DIFFERENT UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCES
1.3 LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT
1.4 FLUCTUATIONS IN REAL WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
2.1 THE CLASSICAL THEORY
2.2 THE INFLATION-UNEMPLOYMENT TRADE-OFF
2.2.1 The Phillips Curve
2.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY
2.3.1 Demand Side Policies
2.3.3 Supply Side Policies and Supply Shocks
3.1 THE FRIEDMAN VERSION
4.1 THE HYSTERESIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
4.1.1 The Sources of Persistent Unemployment
5 ESTIMATES OF THE NAIRU ANO WAGE EQUATIONS
5.1 ESTIMATES OF WAGE EQUATIONS
5.2 ESTIMATES OF THE NAIRU
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
7 RELATED TOPICS IN THE BOO!<
8 FURTHER READINGS
9 APPENDICES
1 JOB FLOWS AND WORKER FLOWS
1.1 Joa CREATION AND DESTRUCTION
1.1.1 The Extent of Within-Sector Reallocation
1.2 WORKER REALLOCATION
1.2.1 Employment Inflows and Outflows
1.2.2 On Displacements
1.2.3 Unemployment Inflows and Outflows
1.2.S The Beveridge Curve
2 THE COMPETITIVE MODEL WITH JOB REALLOCATION
2.1 JOB REALLOCATION AND LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
2.2 THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
3 THE MATCHING MODEL
3.1.1 The Matching Function
1.1.1 Different Forms of Technological Progress
1.1.2 Technological Progress and Growth
1.2 THE CAPITALIZATION EFFECT
1.3 CREATIVE DESTRUCTION
1.4 EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
2 GLOBALIZATION, INEQUALITY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
2.1 THE FACTS
2.2 BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
2.2.1 Exogenous Technological Progress
2.2.2 What Empirical Research Tells Us
2.2.3 Technological Progress and Labor Supply
2.3 INTERNATIONAL TRADE
2.3.1 The Facts
2.4 MIGRATIONS
2.4.1 The Characteristics of Migrations

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Cahuc Zylberberg - Labor Economics (MIT 2004)

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2.4.3 Empirical Results

2.5.1 Unions and the Minimum Wage
2.5.2 Organizational and Institutional Changes )
2.6.3 A "European" Labor Market
Than the Anglo-Saxon Model?
3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
4 RELATED TOPICS IN THE BOOK
1 LABOR MARKET POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
1.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES
2.2 WHY PROMOTE TRAINING?
2.2.1 Acquiring General Training
2.2.2 Acquiring Specific Training
2.3 EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES
2.4 THE CREATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR Joas
3.1 THE METHOD
3.1.3 The Main Estimators
3.2 THE MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.2.1 What American Studies Tell Us
3.2.2 What European Research Tells Us
3.2.3 A Provisional Sum. )
4.1.1 The Replacement Ratio
4.2 ELIGIBILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT
4.3 IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY
4.4 A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
5 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
6 RELATED TOPICS IN THE 8001<
1.1.2 The Populations Concerned
1.2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE MINIMU,M WAGE
1.2.1 Negative Effects on Employment
1.2.2 What the Monopsony Model Tells Us
1.3.3 Following up Individual Histories
1.3.4 The Minimum Wage and Inequality
1 APPENDIX A: STATIC OPTIMIZATION
1.1 UNCONSTRAINED AND CONSTRAINED MAXIMUM
1.2 THE TECHNIQUE OF THE LAGRANGIAN
1.3 THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAGRANGE MULTIPLIERS
2 APPENDIX B: DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION
2.1 THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM
2.2 THE FIRST-ORDER CONDITIONS
2.3 INFINITE HORIZON
2.4 CALCULUS OF VARIATIONS AND THE EULER EQUATION
3.1 RANDOM VARIABLES AND PROBABILITY DENSITIES
3.2 INDEPENDENCE AND CORRELATION
5.1 A PARTICULAR SOLUTION
5.2 THE GENERAL SOLUTION
5.3 STABILITY
5.4 A USEFUL FORM FOR THE STABILITY CONDITIONS
5.5 THE PHASE DIAGRAM
NOTES
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