Recalibrating the Moral Compass 1

Josephine Padgett
Dr. Helen Lovejoy
Honors English 101
26 Nov. 2014
Recalibrating the Moral Compass:
The Inclusion of Great Apes in the Moral Community of Equals
For those people who have had the honor of interacting with a great apegranting basic
human rights to them is obvious. The dedicated research and observations of multiple
psychologists and anthropologists have all led to the same conclusion regarding the non-human
great apes: they are sentient, self-aware, emotional, and incredibly intellectual individuals. The
scientific professionals awarded the chance to study and interact with non-human great apes
cannot deny that these apes are so similar behaviorally to humans that they are often
unintentionally experienced as persons. The common arguments against including great apes
into our community of equals tend to be poorly thought out and come from a place of ignorance.
When educated on the likeness of great apes to humans, the reactions of the general public are
still often dismissive and default to an automatic species superiority. Of course, most people
have never come face to face with an intelligent, emotional ape. The popular consensus is that
humans are humans and animals are animals; but, we are also great apes. By looking at some of
the more common arguments against the inclusion of non-human great apes into personhood,
along with the research into the individual lives and behaviors of captive and free-living great
apes, it is difficult to deny that they should be granted some very basic rights that we have
commonly thought of as exclusively human.

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Basic Rights for Great Apes

The classification of great apes includes the common chimpanzee, pygmy chimpanzee,
human, gorilla, and orangutan. The basic rights that I believe should be sought for these great
apes are as follows: The right to life, the protection of individual liberty, and the prohibition of
torture. The general right to life for the members of the community of equals means that these
members must not be killed except in extenuating circumstances, like self-defense. The
protection of individual liberty means these members must not be held captive or imprisoned
unless in the event of a crime and only then with due legal process, or if imprisonment or
containment is in the interest of the community at large or in the interest of the individuals
personal safety. The prohibition of torture is stated without exception. Any individual included in
the community of equals must not be tortured under any circumstances.
Those Who are Similar Ought to be Treated Similarly
The only species currently included in the community of equals is Homo sapiens. These
basic rights are universally accepted as the rights of all mankind regardless of race, stature,
nationality, creed, gender, or community status. It is absolutely true that although these basic
rights are universally accepted, they are not universally adhered to. There are people all around
the world who do not currently enjoy these rights. This is not morally acceptable. It is in the
interest of all human kind to fight for the basic rights of every human being on the planet. It may
also be in our best interest to expand the community of equals to include our cousins: the great
apes.
The community of equals is the concept that those beings who are equal in the moral
sense ought to be treated equally. This has not always been a popular concept. We have come a
long way from segregation and gender inequality. We have fought to include all Homo sapiens

Recalibrating the Moral Compass 3

into the community of moral equals based on our mental capacities and emotional lives. The
bases of those inclusions are the basis of the proposed inclusion of the great apes. We cannot say
that great apes are human, but we can say scientifically that they are relevantly similar and ought
to be treated in a relevantly similar manner. Although the non-human apes are not intellectual
equals to most human beings, they are relevantly similar intellectually and emotionally to most
human children and intellectually superior to many persons with severe intellectual disabilities.
The fact that they are not human should not exclude them from the community of equals
(Anstotz, 1993, p. 165). They are similar enough to be considered members of the community of
moral equals and therefore deserve the right to life, the right to be free, and the right to not be
tortured.
Not so Different After All
We now know a great deal about the emotional capacity and intellectual capabilities
along with the diverse personal lives of many great apes. The research on captive great apes
living in labs and sanctuaries has also shone a light on the emotional and intellectual capacities
of these human-like individuals. Many characteristics that we thought were uniquely human we
have since found out are not unique to Homo sapiens. We know that they can learn sign language
and pass that sign language down to their own offspring (Fouts, 1993, p. 32). We know that they
make up their own signs for things and also self-sign, showing the ability of self-awareness and
personal thought. They recognize themselves in mirrors. They make jokes (Patterson & Gordon,
1993, p. 67). They refer to the past and the future, as well as physical items that are not present in
their environments. They can rhyme. They convey emotions that can only be described in
anthropomorphic terms, such as: joy, despair, sadness, anger.

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The research of Jane Goodall and Douglas Adams can offer us a glimpse into the very
human-like behavior of wild and free-living great apes. Goodall has written multiple books on
her interactions and observations of the wild chimpanzees living in the Gombe region of
Tanzania. Goodalls interpretation of the behavior of this particular troop of chimpanzees is
breathtaking. She was the first researcher to freely use anthropomorphic terms when describing
free-living chimpanzees; indeed, her findings have revolutionized the way we view the behavior
of non-human apes. Even though anthropomorphism is still taboo, in her book Through a
Window, Goodall (1990) bravely describes chimpanzees as being caring and helpful, showing
concern for the sick or wounded; she states, All of these reconciliatory, friendly, and helping
behaviors are, without doubt, very close to our own qualities of compassion, love and selfsacrifice (p. 211). After living with chimpanzees for thirty years, Goodall insists that each
chimpanzee has a distinct personality and is an autonomous individual; similarly, in the essay
Meeting a Gorilla, Douglas Adams (Adams & Carwardine, 1993) portrays his first encounter
with a free-living gorilla. As I read Adams account, I found striking similarities between this
gorillas behaviors and the behaviors of human acquaintances I have known. Adams sits down
next to a large male in the middle of the African jungle: as I moved again, he shifted himself
away from me, just about six inches, as if I had sat slightly too close to him on a sofa and he was
grumpily making a bit more room. Next, Adams pulls out a pen and begins to take notes as hes
sitting next to the gorilla: His eyes followed as my hand squiggled across the paper and after a
while he reached out and touched first the paper and then the top of my [pen] not to take it
away from me, or even to interrupt me, just to see what it was and what it felt like (p. 22). This
innocent and curious gesture is one I have personally witnessed in many human children. It is
incredibly moving and underlines this individuals gentle and intellectual nature.

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Conversations with Apes

The conversations between caretakers and captive great apes are easy to relate to and
come across much like a conversation with a human child. Francine Patterson (Patterson &
Gordon, 1993) communicated for over twenty years with a gorilla named Koko. Francines work
gained international recognition in the 1980s and Koko became a household name. Out of the
transcripts of conversations between caretakers and Koko, I like to think I came away with a
fairly comprehensive understanding of who Koko is, as a person. Koko is funny and incredibly
witty. Shes sensitive and loving; she likes to nurture and be nurtured. She has said some things
that I find incredibly smart: Teacher: What is crazy? Koko: Trouble surprise. Teacher: When do
people say darn? Koko: Work obnoxious. Teacher: What can you think of thats hard? Koko:
RockWork. She makes up phrases for things that she doesnt know signs for, referring to a
cigarette lighter as a bottle match and a zebra as white tiger, a mask as an eye hat and
calling peas bean balls (p. 64-65).1 Likewise, conversations between Chantek, a male
orangutan, and sociologist Dr. H. Lyn White Miles (1993) show the innate ability the various
great apes possess to be humorous and also to deceive. Chantek was known to distract Dr. Miles
and direct her attention elsewhere as he was simultaneously stealing food from her opposite
pocket. He also would hide items he desired by putting them in his mouth and then signing food
eat, open his mouth and show that he had eaten the item, when really he had hid the item in his
cheek and would stash them later in his room. Dr. Miles explains that these examples show
evidence of intentionality, premeditation, taking the perspective of the other, displacement and
symbolic use of language (p. 48-49). Research into the pro-social and helpful behavior of

Conversations between a female chimpanzee named Washoe and her caretakers are similar in nature to those
between Koko and hers (Fouts, 1993, p. 34).

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chimpanzees by Felix Warneken and Michael Tomasello in 2007 showed that human children
and chimpanzees will both pick something up that the researchers had dropped and hand it back
(p. 318). The efforts of this particular research were focused on whether human morality was
learned or instinctual, to which the researchers concluded that morality was less likely to be
learned than to have been evolved from a common ancestor.
Speciesism
The similarities between Homo sapiens and the other great apes are vast. We share many
of the same intellectual capacities. All great apes have language that is unique to their own
culture or tribe (troop) (Goodall, 1993, p. 13). We all have the capacity for imagination and
deceit. The characteristics that humans have historically argued are unique to Homo sapiens have
been methodically debunked by scientists and anthropologists in recent years. We now know that
the great apes are very similar to us. When trying to define what constitutes humanity, I find it
less time consuming to look at how we differ than how we are similar. A Dutch educationalist, J.
Stolk (1993), shares my sentiments, suggesting that in comparing the intellect of animals with
humans, we will undoubtedly run across the problem that many mentally disabled persons lack
these similaritieseven to their own species. But of course we still consider those persons to be
within the community of equals, and rightly so. He suggests rather that we not look at the
characteristics of what qualifies a person as being human, and instead simply conclude Human
is every being born from a human being (cited in Anstotz, p. 169). If we conclude that this is the
only concrete way in which humans differ from the other great apes, it becomes more difficult to
propose that only Homo sapiens be included within the community of equals when members of
other species can have a greater intellectual capacity than some members of our own.

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Speciesism to Extinction
A common criticism when discussing this proposal is that many members of our own
species do not currently enjoy these basic rights. Why would we grant rights to another species
when our own brothers and sisters are not treated as equals? This is a valid argument. I do not
deny that every human should be granted the right to life, to individual liberty, and to not be
tortured. I realize that many people on this planet are treated abhorrently and it pains me greatly.
While it is unfortunate that not every man, woman and child are treated with basic respect, I find
it appalling that our species would continue the oppression of the great apes and only consider
ceasing to exploit them once every human has ceased to be oppressed and exploited. We cannot
attempt to fix all of the problems within our own species before protecting the great apes; we do
not have the luxury of time. It is important to note that the number of free-living great apes is
rapidly declining. The gorilla and the orangutan are two of the most endangered species on our
planet. Their extinction is imminent. Proposing that we wait to grant them basic rights, especially
the right to life, is proposing their extinction altogether. The great apes cannot wait. Due to our
species exploitation of them and their habitats, this proposal of basic rights is time sensitive.
Waiting until every person enjoys their inclusion in the community of equals could be too long.
Extinction is permanent.
Apes in the US, Property, Personhood
Another argument against the proposal is that the countries in which these great apes
actually live may not adhere to the Wests granting of basic human rights. While it is important
to fight for the protection and survival of the apes living in Africa and Asia, a vast number of
great apes do, in fact, live within our Western reach. In an article in the New Scientist written by

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K. Douglas (2007), he quotes Michelle Stumpe, President of the GAP (Great Ape Project)
International, wherein she reminds us There are still more great apes in captivity in the US than
anywhere else. GAP estimates there are at least 3,000, with around half of these used in medical
research (p. 46). We now know that there are less than 6,000 wild lowland gorillas left in the
world; granting basic human rights to great apes would have a huge effect on 3,000 individuals
living right here in our own country. It is not an insurmountable goal. Europe has granted some
legal protections for great apes. Their use in biomedical research has been banned in several
European countries including Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden with the last
research facility closing its doors in 2002. On February 28, 2007, the Balearic Islands granted
personhood to the great apes, with Spain quickly following suit in 2008 (International Bans,
2014); and while Europes legal protections are a step in the right direction, basic human rights
(personhood) would be the only way in which great apes would not be treated as property.
Protecting these animals with basic animal rights, instead of human rights, leaves them still in
the precarious situation of being considered personal property and therefore subjected to the
every whim and potential abuse/neglect of their owners.
Here in the US, personhood is a heated topic. It is at the core of many debates involving
abortion rights, when a human fetus should be granted personhood, and therefore the right to life.
Personhood has also been debated in many criminal cases involving animal rights2. Many critics
of granting personhood to the great apes will cite that personhood cannot be granted to anyone
that is not human. The US legal doctrine has already proven though, that the definition of
2

In the legal case, State v. LaVasseur, Kenneth LeVasseur was charged and convicted of first-degree theft for
releasing two dolphins into the ocean from their tanks at a laboratory in Honolulu, HI, where he worked as a
research assistant. LeVasseur appealed his conviction, citing the Hawaiian law that states certain conduct, otherwise
criminal, can be justified if the actor believes that conduct to be necessary to avoid imminent harm or evil to
himself or another if the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged. LeVasseur based his appeals and defense on his belief that the
dolphins constitute the concept of another. He also argued that person as defined under the law could include an
entity other than a human being, as seen with corporations and associations (Francione, 1993, p. 250).

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persons is not always human, and humans are not always persons. Not too terribly long ago,
slaves in the US were treated as property and although they were clearly human, they could not
enjoy a human personhood. Women were also treated as property of their husbands and not
granted full personhood until 1920. Children are obviously human, although because of their
mental competencies, they cannot enjoy a full legal personhood until the age of eighteen.
Just as these humans cannot and did not enjoy a personhood status, persons are not
always human. The courts have granted corporations full personhood with the ability to sue
and hold property; when it is economically advantageous, our concept of personhood can be
stretched beyond our species. There does not seem to be a legal definition of what characteristics
qualify a being for personhood, although bioethicist Joseph Fletcher proposes a list of fifteen
attributes of personhood: minimum intelligence, self-awareness, self-control, a sense of time, a
sense of futurity, a sense of the past, the capability of relating to others, concern for others,
communication, control of existence, curiosity, change and changeability, balance of rationality
and feeling, idiosyncrasy and neocortical functioning (cited in Francione, 1993, p. 253). The
research and observations of many well-known zoologists and behavioral psychologists have
proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that the great apes have these abilities. It is unfortunate that
while other countries are beginning to question the morality of exploiting great apes, the US is
lagging behind in the evolution of moral ethics. If it is immoral to oppress human beings because
of our abilities to suffer and be self-aware, it is immoral to oppress our innocent cousins who
also possess these distinct abilities.
Utilitarian View
Granting basic rights to the great apes would surely put the brakes on some biomedical
research. As it stands, we use mainly chimpanzees in our laboratories to test and research a wide

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variety of viruses and medicines. Many people who are otherwise animal rights advocates deem
this research a necessary evil. Surely most people living in first world countries have enjoyed
the fruits of biomedical testing on great apes. Vaccines, HIV and AIDS drugs, cancer and
Alzheimers treatments, along with numerous other pharmaceutical drugs and disease treatments
have all been tested on great apes. It is without a doubt that human kind has benefited from the
exploitation and torture of a variety of animals, great apes included. Many medical professionals
have claimed that animal experimentation is a cornerstone of medical research. Many other
medical and scientific professionals have claimed that tests involving animals could be
completely eradicated employing new methods. Authors of the books Animal Welfare, The
Limits of Medical Paternalism, and Critical Studies in Philosophical Medical Ethics, Heta Hayry
and Matti Hayry (1993), professor of practical philosophy and research fellow in the same
department at the University of Helsinki, respectively, theorize that it is possible, of course, that
experiments on chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans are irreplaceable. But it is equally possible
that they are only regarded as irreplaceable by scientists who do not have adequate information
concerning the alternative test methods (p. 181). It seems to me that there is ample reason to
explore alternative methods to those methods involving testing on great apes. We surely have
come leaps and bounds than in previous years scientifically; we can grow a human ear in a petri
dish from only a few human cells. If using apes in biomedical research has been banned in other
countries, surely we can find alternative methods in the United States. Moreover, the monetary
cost of using great apes in medical research is exorbitant; the moral cost incalculable. Claiming
that using animals, great apes specifically, in biomedical research is a necessary evil seems
ignorant and dismissive in this day and age.
Floodgates; Rights Based on Mental Capacity

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It is true that the inclusion of great apes into the community of equals leaves an openended question of what other beings may also be entered into the community; I believe that some
animals other than the great apes deserve our considerationbut that is for another essay. The
inclusion of other animals would change many human lives, much like the abolition of slavery
changed lives in the South. Of course, you wouldnt hear that argument being fought now in
favor of owning slaves. The integration of women into all workplaces most definitely disrupted
the lives of many a man as well, but you wont hear anyone (openly) using that disruption as the
argument against women in the workplace. The similarities between most civil rights movements
and the argument at hand are striking. The inclusion of great apes into the community of equals
is the next step in equal rights for moral equals. Once we have included the great apes, we could
begin to think about some other sentient species; we could easily base basic rights on mental
capabilities. There are some beings (humans, apes) who, are self-aware and can be caused injury
by their own demise or the thought of their own demise. These beings deserve the right to life.
There are also those beings (humans, apes, dolphins, whales etc) that can be caused injury by
being held captive and being contained. Those beings deserve the right to protection of
individual liberty. Not all beings that require liberty are self-aware and therefore, could be
considered as not deserving the right to life. There are also beings (all mammals and some non
mammals) that can feel pain and have the profound ability to suffer. Those beings should not be
tortured. The argument that expanding the community of equals beyond humanity could open a
floodgate that could not be closed is false. We are intelligent enough to consider the specific
needs of each species of animal; they do not all require the same protections.
Conclusion

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We humans are often astonished by the idea that an animal could display behaviors and
characteristics that were previously thought of as exclusively human. But wouldnt it be even
more astonishing if an animal that was so closely related to us did not display any common
behaviors? The great apes are not human, and that fact does not make them inferior; humans, on
the other hand, are great apes, we are not superior. We belong in the same taxonomic
superfamily as our cousins and neighbors, the pygmy chimpanzees, the common chimpanzees,
and the gorillas. We all branch under the taxonomic order of primates: chimpanzees, humans,
gorillas, and orangutan alike. Why is there such an inherent need to be prejudiced against and
demean other species? Historically, humans have exploited and been prejudiced against selective
human populations as well as other species. The key to the end of prejudice may lie in familiarity.
We are afraid of what we do not know and cannot understand. Maybe all it would take to get off
of our high horses, so to speak, would be to simply get to know that species and become familiar
with the individuals that occupy it. Every person may not have the honor of a personal
interaction or relationship with another species of great ape, but through the accounts of those
lucky few who can, we can rest assured that each great ape regardless of which species it belongs
to, is an autonomous individual, with a rich emotional life. Homo sapiens just happen to have a
higher intellectual capacity than the other species of great apes; with that capacity comes a
responsibility. Our closest living relatives desperately need our help. Their free numbers are
dwindling drastically every year; in the U.S. they wait imprisoned in zoos, laboratories, roadside
menageries, and in homes in our own neighborhoods as pets. If we know so much, why dont
we help them?

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