CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

File No. 5
III. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial Review the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in
light of their conformity with the Constitution.
CASES

This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. That means that the
Court has the right to review acts of Congress and, by extension, actions of the President. If
the Court finds that the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law. Marshall argued that
the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and that the Supreme Court has the final
say over the meaning of the Constitution. He wrote, it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137, 2 L.Ed.
60).

In the regular course, the regional trial courts and the Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional
and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, the Supreme Court has allowed
exceptions to this doctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House have been recognized as exceptions to this rule. In this country the
judicial supremacy is established, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no
one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable
but political questions as well (Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998).

The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government
in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." The
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution (Francisco vs. House
of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003).

1. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the Judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the Legislative or the Executive department or both when not
conformable to the fundamental law (Asso. Of Small Landowners of the Philippines vs. Sec.
of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts

superiority, non-nullifies an act of the legislative, it only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them (Laurel, Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139).

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative, or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purpose is null and void and without any force or effect.
CASES

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over
the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution
(Angara vs. Electroral Commission, 63 Phil.139).

2. POLITICAL VS. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

Political Question - has two (2) aspects:
1.

Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or

2. In regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or
executive branches of government (Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101).

Justiciable Question a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal interest which may
be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law (Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958,
January 3, 2001).
CASES

Justice William J. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, proposing a six-part
test for determining which questions were "political" in nature. Cases which are political in
nature are marked by:
1.
"Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department;" as an example of this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and
executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political
questions"
2.

"A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;"

3.
"The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion;"
4.
"The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;"
5.

"An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"

6.
"The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question (Baker vs. Carr, 396 US 186).

The Court held that the question whether or not the Senate rule violated the US
Constitution was nonjusticiable since the impeachment clause expressly granted that the
Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachment. The clause laid out specific
regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the court
would not rule upon the validity of other senate procedures regarding impeachment. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution, a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was a
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department (Nixon vs. US,
506 US 224).

Without oral argument, the divided justices found that the case was not justiciable.
Rehnquist lead a group of four (4) others who believed that the issue involved a political
question, namely, how the President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs.
Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. Congress had not formally
challenged the Carter's authority, technically there was no conflict for the Court to resolve
(Goldwater vs. Carter, 444 US 996, 62 L.Ed.2d 428).

It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of
such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds. The interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process
by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto (by the fact itself) the

prerogative (a right or privilege exclusive to a particular individual or class) of the regular

National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course
has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself
into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments
and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033,
which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution
provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law
shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the
Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act.
Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution,
but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how
it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no
power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori
not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose amendments to the
Constitution in the absence of a grant of such constituent power to the President, the Court
held that he could. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333).

The Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions
refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the
1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With

the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just
grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other
provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of
these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to
"x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of
habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x." (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2,
2001).

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by
providing that:
SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondent COMELEC that the issue
involved in the present petition is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
review. As the leading case of Taada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions are concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. The issue
raised in the present petition does not merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution
but focuses on its alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutional provisions. In
other words, that the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the
legality of the respondent COMELECs administrative issuance will not preclude this Court
from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
COMELEC in issuing Resolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not
override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to
carry out. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue
of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations
respected, is justiciable the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. In the
present petition, the Court must pass upon the petitioners contention that Resolution No.
6712 does not have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.
An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power
to determine the matter before it; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determined by
law. There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (Brillantes vs. Concepcion, GR 163193, June 15, 2004).

3. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
o
Laws are presumed constitutional. To nullify nullification of law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and
executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted.

CASES

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and
constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section
3 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still
exercised legislative powers (Lim vs Pacquing, GR 115044, Jan. 27, 1995).

4. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Actual case or controversy
a. ripeness
b. mootness
2. Proper party
3. Question must be raised at the earliest possible time
4. Constitutional Question Must Be the Very Lis Mota of the Case
a.

Actual Case or Controversy

Actual case or controversy a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial determination.
CASES

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet
no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand,
and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A.
No. 8050. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet, GR 122241, July 30, 1996).

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are welldelineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not
also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction (Mariano vs. COMELEC,
242 SCRA 211).

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional
question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of
judicial inquiry are met:
(1)
the existence of an actual case or controversy;
(2)
the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial
interest in the resolution thereof;
(3)
the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and
(4)
that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the final
determination of the controversy. 3
Appraising the present proceeding in terms of the foregoing requirements, the Solicitor
General urges that the petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy for having
been filed prematurely:
". . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not previously applied with the
Secretary of Labor for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the
aforequoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or
absolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is no allegation in the petition that
petitioners had previously sought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage
of the Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition must fail for
prematurity."
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General (Fernandez vs. Torres, 215 SCRA 489).

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since
any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing (La Bugal B'laa, Tribal Assn. vs. DENR
Secretary, GR 127882, Jan. 27, 2004).

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy
of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of this
Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution which emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government
including Congress. As the Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will
not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,

committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. As the

petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition
should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that,
in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon
the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will
it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs,
taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only
exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying
the WTO Agreement and its three annexes (Tanada, et. al. vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295,
May 2, 1997).
I)

RIPENESS
CASES

Issue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds meet the threshold
requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution? The Court held that federal courts
were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons
had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he would
again be stopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The
Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either
1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters,
or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus
limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.
Lyons case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his claim. Predictions of future
behavior are beyond the courts functions. The rule is that, ripeness arises when an actual
case has ripened or matured into a controversy worthy of adjudication. (City of Los Angeles
vs. Lyons, 449 US 934).
II)

MOOTNESS
CASES

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the
police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These
are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that
an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006).

After being denied admission to a state-operated law school, petitioner brought this suit on
behalf of himself alone for injunctive relief, claiming that the school's admissions policy
racially discriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that because petitioner will complete law school at
the end of the term for which he has registered regardless of any decision this Court might
reach on the merits, the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art. III of the
Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues, and the case is moot.
(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's admissions
practices but upon the simple fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed
policy to permit him to complete the term.
(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since
petitioner will never again have to go through the school's admissions process, and since it
does not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because
this case did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's graduation (DeFunis vs.
Odegaard, 416 US 312, 40 L.Ed. 343).
b. Proper Party

Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party one who has sustained or in
imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
i)

Conventional Standing
CASES

The court was tasked to determine if the rules of standing should be considered part of the
'case or controversy' clause of Article III of the Constitution or, apart from that, if the court
can hear cases on "generalized grievances" or in the interest of third parties where none of
the complaintants have standing. The court found that as none of the plaintiffs could
demonstrate any injury actually done to them by the defendants, the plaintiffs were third
parties to the issue and had no standing to sue. The plaintiff's descriptions of their own
meager financial situations and subsequent inability to live in Penfield were found by the
Court to be the consequence of the economics and housing market of the area rather than
any wrong doing by the defendants (Warth vs. Seldin, 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343).
Tanada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997, supra.
ii)

Representative Standing

iii)

Jus Tertii standing

CASES

The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a statute that denies the sale of
beer to individuals of the same age based on their gender violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Additionally, the Supreme Court examined jus tertii (third party rights), in this case
the vendor of the 3.2% beer. The Court held that the gender classifications made by the
Oklahoma statute were unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were
insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended
to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court found that analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in
this case had not been changed. As to third party rights, the court, expanding on the
doctrine of standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be economically affected due to
the restrictive nature of the sales to males between 18 and 20. To have standing, one must
show a "nexus" of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of the statute. In
this case, the statute only directly affects plaintiff Craig. Only indirectly does it affect the
vendor, Whitener, the third party. The Supreme Court explains that Whitener and other
vendors have standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access
to their market or function" (Craig vs Boren, 429 US 190, 50 L.Ed.2d. 343).
iv)

Transcendental importance to the public

CASES

Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiate the instant action.
Petitioners, however, countered that the action was filed by them in their capacity as
Senators and as taxpayers. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or governmentowned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the
same when only municipal contracts are involved. For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing
of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action (Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436).

On the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved the issue in their favor. A party's
standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases,
the Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared
that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," or that it
"enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA
110).

Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law
because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized
interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in
the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) as would entitle them to bring this suit (Kilosabayan
vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540).

It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned
citizens in cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens
and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only
(1)
in cases involving constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds, or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to
question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such
laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of
"transcendental importance" which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua
legislators. Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants
have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392,
403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative
power", or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of
judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking
through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these
categories of taxpayers' suits (Kilosbayan vs. Morato (Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995).

v)

Standing of members of Congress

CASES

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested
on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature arises. It is true that the Constitution provides a
mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available
only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when
the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to
draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction begin (Philconsa vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506).

PETRON questions the locus standi of petitioners to file the action (Rollo, pp. 479-484).
Petitioners however, countered that they filed the action in their capacity as members of
Congress.
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19,
1994, we held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity
of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to
which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury which can be questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353

[1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of
petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no
legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine
laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers
may question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or
controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in
Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the
legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action (Bagatsing vs.
Committee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995).
vi)

Standing of Integrated Bar of the

Philippines

CASES

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors
its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart
from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general
an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In this case, a reading of the
petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because
peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo,
undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised
in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore,
behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later (IBP vs Zamora, GR 141284, Aug. 15, 2000).
vii) Standing of the Government to question its own laws
CASES

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. The Court held that the People of the

Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It
goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having
it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its
own laws (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).
viii) Taxpayers Suits
Two (2) requisites of Taxpayers suits:
1.
Public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality, and
2.

A law is violated or some irregularity is committed and that the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged ultra vires act.
CASES

In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of
the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in- the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes
aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the
early Emergency Powers Cases, 20 where we had occasion to rule:
". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection
that they were not proper parties and ruled that 'transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure (Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10, 2000).

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR). In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest that he will
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of
the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation. If
at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case since,
according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature's powers to create
a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. A taxpayer
is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that
public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
Thus, a taxpayer's action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR 140835, Aug. 14, 2000).

c. Question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity.
General Rule

Exceptions

:
a.
b.
c.

must be raised in the pleadings.

criminal cases at any time at the discretion of the court;

civil cases at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the
determination of the case itself;
every case (except where there is estoppel) at any stage if it involves
the jurisdiction of the court.

d.

Constitutional question must the very "lis mota" of the case

lis mota a controversy begun.

Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of
the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).
Therefore, the following must be avoided:
Political questions;
Advisory opinions;
Moot and academic issues;
No standing.
4. DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION
CASES

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality
upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the
questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or
both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined
after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of
those who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure
was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined
by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To
doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such
a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge
of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down (Drilon vs. Lim, GR
112497, Aug. 04, 1994).

5. EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

The law is either:

1.

void if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validity because it is patently
offensive to the Constitution. It produces no effect creates no office and imposes no duty.
(Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392).

2.

voidable if on its face it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. The law becomes
inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces no
retroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429).

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting unfairness
must be avoided.
CASES

6.

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as

being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never
existed. Here, of course, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution.
It is not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per se. Thus, it may
well be valid in its general import, but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. To
exemplify, an otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to
operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested
rights. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the
effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our
decisions on the moratorium laws, 6 we have been constrained to recognize the interim
effects of said laws prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have
likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also,
even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no
longer be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of
nullity of a governing statute (Republic vs. CA, GR 79732, Nov. 8, 1993).
RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY
CASES

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere

comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to
another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory,
its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions (Central Bank Employee Assn, Inc. vs. BSP,
GR 148208, Dec. 15, 2004).