Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IMU Watch Keeping and Procedures
IMU Watch Keeping and Procedures
Block
UNIT 2
,Bridge
Procedure
19
Weather Routeing
39
UNIT 3
UNIT 4
Navigation Safe Practices
53
Ship operation entirely, depends on optimum use of available manpower resource in a safe
manner whether it is on the bridge or the engine room, while navigating the vessels or
while working cargoes having different characteristics. Safety, therefore, must be considered
as central to all operations.
In the aftermath of the attack on world Trade Centre and Pentagon, USA, in 2001,
possibility of the terrorists making ships as targets is on the increase. The international
maritime, organization has brought about a legislation for the safety and security of the
ships, passengers and crew. This course aims at making ng you aware of the safety and
security measures which must be strictly followed for prevention of accidents.
First block deals with the watch kec ping and procedures which are required to be followed
on the ship for safe naviga-ion. Block 2 deals with the general aspects of safe practices to
be followed on ships ani I in detail, contents of ISPS code as applicable on ships.
A substantial part of this self learning module is extracted from an article from the
seaways of the nautical institute by Captain Eric Beetham FNI, FRfN.
Introduction
Objectives
Steering Systems
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Master or the Captain of a ship has the overall charge of the ship and is therefore
responsible to ensure that every one on board understand the Master's plan of navigation
and other operations carried out on the ship. It is with this intention that master puts his
orders in writing so that there is no confusion in implementing the same.
Objectives
After studying this unit, you should be able to
discribe the process of informing all and obtaining its acknowledgement, and
Various conventions, codes and guides provide the framework within which officers' duties
shall be performed in nearly all cases of routine and many extraordinary circumstances.
Operational procedures are based upon the owner's navigation policy and these should
work without conflict within the safety management system.
The master should provide his own standing orders which will be supplemented on a
daily basis by night orders to spell out to his officers his own personal requirements. This
may be with regard to the particular ship, her trade, the bridge team and their experience.
These standing orders may reflect points that have caused him concern in the past and
lessons he has learnt and will set the standard that he requires from his watch keepers.
Among the mass of written guidance on board, this is the opportunity for the master to
set down quite simply the ground rules for exactly what he expects the officers to do in
different circumstances, to reinforce practices that he expects to be followed and to
create a relationship in which a mutual confidence is established. The officers will know
'when the master wants to be called and the master will know that they will do so._
5
SAQ I
(a)
Check the Master's night orders on your ship when the vessel was altering a
course to enter a VTS and indicate its meaning.
(b)
The company has a normal printed set of orders, why then the master needs
to write separate orders in addition'?
Ensure that access to/from the ship is kept as safe as possible, well
lighted and the gangway net properly rigged; make sure watchmen
are on deck and shore people do not smoke in unauthorized places.
The chief officer will see that the gangway and safety net are set up
on arrival but it is then up to the OOW to keep it that way.
(b)
Keep the ship alongside and moorings tight; replace any ropes that
break and call the Master or the Chief Officer if the ship starts ranging
or weather becomes adverse. Some officers don't appreciate that
mooring winches have much more holding power 'on the brake' than
they do 'on heave' and if the ship comes off the berth in strong winds, it
can make things worse by trying to heave her back alongside.
(c)
Never hesitate to call for shore assistance (tugs, pilots, fire brigade or
ambulance) in any emergency and keep engineers advised. In
practice, the captain or chief officer will be on the ship if cargo is being
worked but it does not mean that OOW does not have any authority.
(d)
As there are many thefts from ships in port and stowaways are a
major problem for checking on people coming aboard, that they do have
business on the ship and, if in doubt, take them to the person they
wish to see or send the watchman with them. The ISPS code instruction
in this respect must be followed strictly. The co-operation of
everybody on board is necessary to minimize thefts and stowaways
but the example of a duty mate who takes this task seriously
motivates others on duty.
Test all the bridge gear in accordance with the checklist; switch on
both steering motors, radars and check alignment of radars, gyro
repeaters and course recorder. Prepare pilot information card.
(b)
Give the engine room 'one hour notice' meaning that at the end of the
one hour on arrival we shall want to manoeuvre; and likewise one hour
before 'stand by' on departure. This is best defined to avoid confusion and
of course, the engine room has to be advised of this.
(c)
(d)
Log Books
All operations on board ship are always recorded in appropriate logs. Sounding
logs to record the sounding of tanks and bilges, Mates log book which shows
important happenings and cargo books are only some of the logs maintained on
board ships. In maintaining such records, following should be kept in mind :
(a)
(b)
If the wind is force 7 or more, log the weather every two hours and the
barometer every hour if it is changing. In addition record whether ship
is shipping seas and whether they are moderate/heavy' as the case
may be. In port, ensure that weather remarks continue to be made
in the log book. In cyclone areas or adverse weather, further detail would
be given in the night orders.
(c)
, While the log book only needs the important times, keep a complete
movement book with details of tugs, whose lines, moorings used,
fendering of the quay, which side alongside and number of the berth.
Routine again, but so often records are incomplete.
At Anchor
Quite often, time at anchorage is considered a time to relax. The master shall order
whether the anchor watch is to be kept on the bridge
or on deck. In any case, the
If
OOW is responsible for the safely and he shall 'ensure to
7
(a)
Keep a good check on position of his ship and others close-by ships
may drag soon after anchoring, when the tide changes, when the
weather freshens or when the brake won't hold with a lot of yawing.
The danger is not only of his ship dragging but of others drifting down
to us. The bow stopper must always be in use when at anchor. In
adverse weather, it is helpful to paint a link on the aft side of the gypsy
so it can easily be seen if the brake renders.
(b)
(c)
(d)
Try and get the other ship on the VHF or flash them with the Aldis
lamp if it tries to anchor too close or starts to drag.
(e)
Try to get a position on the chart and note the ship's heading at the
moment of letting go the anchor that way the swinging circle can
best be worked out on the chart. If the scale of the chart is good enough,
it gives a circle within which the ship should remain and is handy when
weighing anchor in a crowded anchorage.
At Sea
Watch keeping officer on the Bridge is totally responsible for navigation and the
safety of the ship in general. Besides using the education and training that you have
obtained you have to make use of the experience that you have gained from your
seniors and the instructions that they give. In such process :
(a)
Make sure the navigation lights are on at night and that a good
lookout is kept at all times. The seaman on watch is always available to
the OOW and should be used as a lookout at night, in rain or in fog.
Usually single seaman watches are kept at sea but the OOW must know
that a man is available to him if required during daytime.
(b)
Comply fully with the regulations for preventing collisions with other
ships and use sound signals when within two miles.
(c)
(d)
Respond to any requests from the engine room to reduce speed and, in
the event of a blackout with other ships around, try to get
maximum helm on quickly and switch on emergency NUC lights. Not
always possible but, if it can be done; this is the best way of reducing
travel as running the way off may take the ship over a long distance.
(e)
On taking over the watch, check the position, check the course to
steer and the course actually being steered; check the distance to go
to the next alteration, soundings or picking up land. In the night watches,
please read and initial the night orders. The routine of using the night
orders every night is preferred as it reduces the risk of
Compare magnetic and gyro compasses at least every hour and take
azimuths every watch. This is not an outdated routine, but good
navigational practice.
(g)
Change to hand steering and back each watch (tests both) and check the
course recorder. Aim for the minimum use of rudder but don't fiddle
with the settings unless you think you can improve the situation.
Small alterations, of course, may be done on the autopilot but always
change to hand steering for bigger alterations. When a helmsman is
engaged in hand steering, keep a close watch on him until you are sure of
his ability, both in steering and following helm orders. The ability of
helmsmen, due to the small amount of experience they gain (both in
general and in any particular ship), causes concern, particularly in canals
and restricted channels. (It is in this context that it is recommended that
helmsmen should be given steering practice when the ship is in open
waters.)
(h)
Use the navigational aids fully (including the echo sounder) but only as
a backup to visual position fixing and do not rely on the aids to the point
where common sense is ignored. Always check the chart details for
WGS details when using GPS in coastal waters and in restricted waters
always use visual bearings and radar distances. Ships have passed
through the era of 'radar assisted collisions' and may now be into that
of GPS assisted stranding. When a 'black box' (voyage data recorder) is
fitted, ensure that it is being provided with the inputs. Ensure that the AIS
is working and check the data being sent and compare the data being
received with the help of the radar when possible. Continue to fix
positions on the chart, particularly in restricted waterways.
(i)
If not already running, always put the radar on in good time if there is
rain around or visibility is doubtful. In open waters, the best use of radar
is in tracking ships from 12 miles so that 8 miles assess their movement
and there is then plenty of time to alter course if necessary and to make
sure the alteration is having the desired effect. This clearly spells out the
philosophy required by the master to avoid close quarter situations the
other ship may be fast, may not be keeping an efficient watch and may
unexpectedly alter course.
Approaching heavy rain or fog, have a good look around, switch on
radar, warn the engine room, call up the seaman for lookout, switch
on the navigation lights, fix the position of the ship, switch on fog signal
to automatic and call the Master. Extra manning or plotting routines will
be arranged then, depending on the locality/situation. Specific
arrangement for bridge manning in fog is wise for ships trading to the
USA, and a lookout forward may be required.
(k) Keep the ship on the course lines laid off on the chart and allow set as
necessary to do so (and use GPS for this in open waters). In coastal
waters, bring the ship back to the course line and use set to keep her
there, rather than simply laying off a new course line to the next
w a yp o i n t . T h e p a s s a ge p l a n ni n g n o t e s s h o u l d h e l p w i t h
tides/currents. The whole point in laying off courses is fixing the route
we want to follow. Laying off new ones when the ship has set inside can
take her much closer to dangers than was the intention.
(1)
of the ship despite the presence of the pilot. Position fixing and track
monitoring should be continued in just the same way as without a pilot
aboard. Language difficulties or unusual expressions sometimes confuse
helmsmen. The ability of each helmsman must be verified and every
order by the pilot must be clearly explained if confusion exists.
(m) Never respond to calls on VHF to 'ship on my starboard bow', etc. For
any action unless you are positive of her identification (an Aldis lamp
may be used for such identification at night). Even then, do not agree to
any action that contradicts normal safe practices. This is a frightening
habit in some ships but is better controlled rather than banned, as it is
going to happen anyway. With the advent of AIS, you are in a better
position to know the identity of the ship but even here, do not
determine the action to be taken on the strength of a VHF talk. Stick to
the rules and if in doubt call the master.
(n)
All 'cancelled' charts should be removed from the chart room as they
are replaced but there is a time lag in getting corrections/new
editions. Do check and identify. Buoys can shift very easily so try not
to use them for position fixing without using the land as well. In some
overseas ports, foreign charts are used for the channels and for these we
may receive no corrections.
(o)
The 'man overboard' response and manoeuvring data are posted on the
bulkhead in the wheelhouse; you should be fully familiar with the former
to respond immediately and be aware of the stopping distances
and turning circles of this ship. The manoeuvring data is posted and
available to pilots; the 'man overboard' response regarding
release of the bridge wing 'man overboard' and Williamson turn should
be detailed if they are not already available.
(p)
(q)
Rounds of the decks must be made after securing the anchors on any
departure. These include ropes, forecastle doors, deckhouse and
superstructure doors and lights, hold/tank access hatches, ventilators,
any items stowed on deck being adequately secured and equipment left
on deck being collected and secured. Rounds of the decks are to be
made each evening at the end of the working day but before darkness and
these are to be entered in the log. It is then a matter of naming who shall
make the rounds; after sailing it will either be the chief officer or the
officer on the forecastle for unmooring and at sea either the chief officer
or the 1200-1600 OOW. It is a good practice to involve other officers in
addition to the chief officer in these basic routines that are only too often
neglected in many ships.
(r)
Master's presence on the bridge does not mean that he has taken over
control from the OOW. Handover to the OOW or takeover from the
OOW shall be made clear by the Master on each occasion.
SAQ 2
(a)
(b)
10
(c)
What instructions would you expect to be written by the chief officer when
the vessel loading hazardous cargoes?
General
All the deck officers should be familiar with the steering systems and changeover
procedures, with all the bridge gear and with all the lifesaving/fire fighting
equipment, regardless of whose duty it is to look after them. All the publications
watchkeeping, passage planning, codes of practice and manuals, etc. are there for
your guidance. We may all think we have read them, but it is wise to look through
them again from time to time. The background of the officers varies and ability to
read pages of English may be limited; the deck officers are bridge watch keepers
firstly and secondly have their individual duties and responsibilities.
If the weather gets bad and we may have to slow down or alter course, call the
Master. Solid water washing aboard will damage deck fittings and ships do not slow
themselves down in head seas (the power is being used to drive the ship into the
seas rather than through the water). If we are losing more than 25 % of our speed
(comparing rpm and log), it may well be time to do something about it. The safety of
the ship, the crew and the cargo are always the first considerations and are all in
your care while you are on watch. The theory that ships slow themselves down in
heavy weather is totally wrong. If the officers cannot sense when the ship is going
too fast in heavy weather, give them a mathematical guideline to follow.
Call the Master at any time if in any doubt whatsoever for navigation, traffic,
weather, breakdowns, safety or anything else. The Master would rather be called
many times, apparently unnecessarily, rather than just once too late.
SAQ 3
(a)
(b)
Describe the steering arrangement on your ship and the process to change
over the motors if one of them fails.
(c)
What would you expect the masters night orders to be taking into account if
the vessel coasting in poor visibility.
11
on the steering engine. The quartermaster can be relieved from steering and employed on
ship's maintenance and routine duties about the bridge.
Control System
with
Early Auto-pilots
Early pilots were more analogue controlled and suffered from reduced sensitivity.
Even then the course steered by such auto-pilots was considerably better than an
expert helmsman. They were a little sluggish in rough seas as the equipment needed
manual corrections on the yaw and rudder angle to be allowed for given deviation of
the course. The change over system was mechanical and helmsman as well as watch
keeping officers needed to be aware of the process to be followed.
12
In the modern auto-pilots also the change over process, though comparatively easy
Modern Auto-pilots
Auto-pilots have the ability to detect changes in the ships heading in real time. A
helmsman also detects a deviation in the course steered but it notices the changes
after it has happened. However an auto-pilot would detect the changes as they are
happening.
The Versatile Multipurpose Marine Autopilot
L y s
1
I
=
1
rudder limit
yaw
rudder
counter rudder
magnetic variation
13
14
(c)
Masters Standi
attention is Drawn to
If ship owners do not use all the control options, which may be
incorporated by the various manufacturers into a control console, positive
measures should be taken to p revent r edund ant control settin gs
b ein g us ed inadvertently, and the labeling arrangements should be
amended accordingly.
15
Whilst the vessel is on passage and continuously using the automatic pilot,
the manual steering gear is tested at least once a day. To meet this requirement
the wheel (or equivalent) steering should be engaged at least once every day
and the ship steered by hand.
Assignment
Describe the auto-pilot on your ship and its various capabilities and the process of
changing over.
SAQ 4
(a)
(b)
What do you understand by monitoring the steering of the ship when the
ship is on Auto-pilot?
1.10 SUMMARY
Many of these 'standing orders' help the anticipation of the OOW and explain what is
wanted. Orders on your ship may vary, nevertheless such orders help the officers to know
just what the master who is relying on them not only to manage but also to call him if
they are unsure of anything expected from them.
You are expected to read and sign the standing orders if you have fully understood them.
You should go through them with other officers together explaining the 'whys' if there
was any difficulty with English reading.
Night orders would give courses, rpm, manned/UMS, clock changes' (always at 0200 as
far as the log book is concerned) and anything that was going on fire pump under repair,
cargo ventilation, gas freeing, hatch lids or doors that are deliberately left open, etc. A
copy is normally sent to the owners for their retention.
The aim of providing these standing orders and night orders is to spell out the framework
within which the OOW or duty officer is expected to work. It avoids any questions of `but
I wasn't told to do so' by the officers. For all of us in the bridge management team it removes
any opportunity for anybody to suggest that we have been negligent in the conduct of our
duties. Any such suggestion would be an affront to our individual professionalism. You have
in this unit, also learnt about the heading control systems, the steering systems and
precautions required when using auto pilots which are very important, as auto-pilot till this
day regularly contributes to the shipping casualties.
(b)
16
SAQ 2
(a)
Often the OOW may feel that calling the Master is an indication of his
capability. It must be remembered that being in doubt is not the measure of
capability. Remember the Master is in charge and calling him allows him to
correct the situation if causing difficulty. Also remember that waiting till the
last minute and then calling the Master is of no use.
(b)
The master should clearly say e.g. "second mate, I am taking over" or that
"Second mate take over please". At each of these, the OOW should clearly
indicate the course the ship is steering and if the engine is on manoeuvring,
then its status. He should also state the time the last position was plotted and
the status of the various ships in the area. Similarly, when the master takes
over the con the OOW should clearly indicate the status of course, speed and
traffic in the vicinity.
(c)
The loading plan shall be a part of the instructions. It should include safety
precautions to be taken and segregation and separations that are to be applied
to the different commodities.
SAQ 3
(a)
Ensure that no crew is working en deck. All openings are tight and on
general cargo ships, ventilators are covered. Life-lines are rigged on open decks
if not already rigged. Obtain weather report and record weather report every
hour.
(b)
To be described with sketches taking into account the system on your ship.
(c)
In poor visibility when coasting, concerns are, collisions and groundings the
orders therefore shall require position plotting, continuous use of Radar and
plotting of target vessels. Calling master whenever the ship approaches any
particular position or when the visibility reduces say less than three miles or
when OOW considers the master's presence on the bridge necessary.
SAQ 5
(a)
(b)
Steering of the ship is affected because of natural elements such as sea and
swell and strong with conditions. These cause the ship to yaw and needs to
correct by the auto-pilot. These corrections are available on the instrument. It
must be remembered that if correction is over done the steering mechanism
may also be over worked.
Monitoring of the steering of the ship means ensuring that the auto-pilot is
maintaining the course and is neither using helm too frequently nor is it
allowing the ship to yaw too much.
17
Introduction
Objectives
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Various aspects of bridge watch keeping were covered in BNA - 022. In this module, we
shall go through a few more steps to understand the process.
Objectives
After studying this unit, you should be able to
establish watch keeping arrangements and procedures,
list and explain responsibilities of the officer of the watch in all waters, and
describe composition of the navigational watch.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
19
Under the STCW you are primarily responsible at all times for the safe navigation of the
ship with particular regards to avoidance of collision and stranding.
As master's representative, you are in charge of the bridge and therefore in charge of the
bridge team, until you are properly relieved. You must ensure strict -compliance with
Maintaining a Safe Manning Level for bridge watch at all times for the
prevailing circumstances and conditions.
Wrong actions on your part could be detrimental to the safety of life property and
protection of environment. It is imperative that you fulfill your duties to best of your
ability.
For maintaining a safe watch, you :dust keep in mind the three letters ASK :
A for attitude,
S for skill, and
K for knowledge.
Accident statistics indicate that the majority collisions and grounding incidents are
attributed to carelessness or a complacent attitude and not due to lack of knowledge
and skill.
Upon departure from a port, when the vessel reaches deep and safe waters, a course is set
and engines brought to maximum revolutions. The Master writes down his instructions
in the bridge order book or advises verbally when he needs to be called. He then hands
over the watch to the Officer in-charge of the navigational watch (OOW).
The OOW, having assisted the Master/Pilot to navigate through the narrow channels or
confined waters of the port, now has the duty to :
Inform Port Control VTS pilot disembarked.
Plot the position at the start of the sea passage.
Bring the distance measuring log in operation and confirm its reading and input.
Verify the ship's intended track.
Verify errors of gyro and magnetic compass and adjust the course being steered.
(This is then marked on the course board).
Recheck on the readiness of vessel for sea including
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Though these processes should have been completed prior sailing, the same need to be
checked again and a positive report about such securing obtained and entered in the log.
When satisfied, the OOW shall inform the Master and take over the watch.
20
At sea, the vessel is operational throughout the 'day and night. The vessel is navigated in
accordance with the requirements of the planned passage. The OOW maintains the
navigational watch during his hours of duty as per watchkeeping arrangement
established by the Master. A series of activities are carried out during each watch.
Bridge Procedure
The position,
Such checks allow correction to prevent continuation of any error. It also requires that
the watch keepers should also check that :
All the risks have been recognized and the preventive measures are being
taken, and
Key Elements
As stated earlier, maintenance of continuity is paramount. The changing over of watch
is an opportune time to check all aspects of navigation and to ensure that no errors or
omissions are being carried over.
The errors or omissions though not intentional could cause serious consequences
and therefore need a closer review. The types of errors or omissions that have been
made are :
Position fixes being obtained from only one source and not being
verified by other navigational aids,
The watch-keeping officer may carry on with these errors without realising the
same. This is the reason that the relieving officer is required to review the status
all over again.
These errors are not figments of imaginations. An officer laid a course on the chart
as 256 but set the auto-pilot to 265. The error was observed only at the handing
over process.
21
Unexpected VHF call which occupies the full attention of the OOW and
results in the exclusion of more urgent needs,
These errors, if not rectified in time, could result in formation of an error chain.
An effective way to detect an error is by cross checks. Error thus detected can be
eliminated. The effective time to correct such errors is at the time of handing
over/taking over watch as the crosschecks can now be carried out by a
second person.
Check on errors are traditionally explained as "a stitch in time saves nine" or " but
for the horse shoe nail the battle was lost."
This process of error proliferation occurs every day and some times it is fatal.
The key elements to successful handing/taking over and to reduce possibility of
errors therefore are :
Receive true course, gyro course and compass course from the outgoing
00W.
(b)
Ensure helmsman/lookout is capable of carrying out his duty and has taken
over duty properly.
(c)
Read, understand and sign the Master's standing instructions and daily
orders.
(d)
Check the ship's position, planned course and course being steered by gyro
and magnetic compass. Ensure the course board is updated with current
courses.
(e)
(f)
Verify the speed and draught of the ship. Ensure present draft is
prominently displayed on the draft board.
(g)
Observe prevailing weather and sea condition, visibility, sea-state, tides and
their effect on present course.
(h)
(i)
(k)
Be aware of the effects of heel, trim, water density and squat on under keel
clearance.
(1)
Understand the state of internal ship systems, engine and cargo monitoring,
communications and crew availability.
(m) Ensure that the required lookout and helmsman, as appropriate, are on duty,
alert and properly instructed.
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
Bridge Procedure
Read the log entries made at the end of watch by OOW, copy them in your
technical journal and explain them.
Traffic density and other activities occurring in the area in which the ship is
navigating.
The fitness for duty of any crewmembers on call that are assigned as
members of the watch.
The experience of each OOW, and the familiarity of the OOW with the ship's
equipment, procedures and manoeuvring capability.
Activities taking place on board the ship at any particular time, including radio
communication activities, and the availability of assistance to be summoned
immediately to the bridge when necessary.
The size of the ship and the field of vision available from the conning
position.
Where necessary, precautions against wet weather, rolling or pitching, are taken in
sufficient time so as not to cause damage to persons, the ship or the cargo.
Navigational warnings,
Records to be Maintained
Some of the orders may be of lasting importance and need to be noted in the bridge
order book. For example, maintaining a minimum specified safe distance from all
traffic during a passage across ocean.
Orders/Information of current importance may only be marked as annotations on
the chart or may be passed on verbally. These may include the times of calling the
master at course alteration points. The OOW needs to be aware of such
orders/information.
Changes of Status
Monitoring the changes in situation as the status of the situation may be different
towards the end of a watch from what it was at the start of the watch. The changes
in such situation may include
24
Bridge Procedure
(b)
(c)
(d)
At night, the watch shall not be taken over till the relieving OOW gets used to
night vision.
STCW9' requires that the relieving officer shall personally satisfy himself
regarding :
Procedures for the use of main engines to manoeuvre when the main
engines are on bridge control; and
25
(b)
Note the words "at the commencement of the voyage." Very often the entire ship's
complement, including officers and other watch keepers, are busy in completing cargo
operations and other essential tasks before sailing. The Master may therefore specifically
rest some of the officers and watch keepers so that they can keep watch immediately on
sailing.
Fitness of Relief Watch
When handing over the watch, it is imperative that the OOW ensures that the
relieving officer and members of his team are in complete fitness and are capable
of performing the navigational watch at sea.
In this regard, the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall not hand over the
watch to the relieving officer if there are reasons to believe that the latter is not capable
of carrying out the watchkeeping duties effectively. In such case the Master
shall be notified.
This is not as easy as it sounds. If the relieving officer is your senior, you may
have to use some tact to ensure that he goes back to sleep and the Master makes
some other arrangements.
The relieving officer shall ensure that the members of the relieving watch are fully
capable of performing their duties. Whenever there is any doubt the Master shall be
notified. Particular attention shall be given to the adjustment of night vision of the
relieving team. Relieving officers shall not take over the watch until their vision is
fully adjusted to the light conditions.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(2)
26
(e)
(f)
Check the charts to see which lights will be seen during the watch and
which navigational hazards to expect during the watch.
Bridge Procedure
(4) Plot present position and ensure that it conforms to earlier charted positions,
in so doing verity.
(a)
The depth obtained from echo sounder matches with charted position
(adjusted for vessel's draft and location of transducer).
(b)
(c)
Check azimuth book for error obtained and that it is being correctly
applied.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Check navigation lights sentinel for bulbs glowing and test failure
buzzer.
(6) Check that the inputs to radar, GPS, course recorder are appropriate
Normally most integrated navigational equipment relies on data that is supplied
automatically. However, this needs to be checked. One way to ensure is to ascertain
that the logs and gyros are working in efficient condition. Remember we are
moving to an automated world to ease our labour but this brings along more
monitoring in any case.
Note in your journal the data that each of the instruments receives from external
source.
(7) Use and check of main engines
The main engines are under the control of the OOW. This brings some
responsibilities as each ship's engines have peculiar requirements and it is
necessary to familiarise with them. However, all said and done the engines are at your
disposal. Be familiar with the procedures for the use of main engines to manoeuvre
when the main engines are on bridge control. Check the tachometer for the rpm and
the status of engine to ensure that they are in accordance with planned passage. Check
that the UMS control settings are appropriate.
(8) Check on the operational condition of any safety equipment being used including
Smoke detector
Engine room fire alarm on UMS vessels and the emergency STOP
device
Frequently step outside the wheelhouse and make yourself familiar with
the situation. Simultaneously ensure that
27
~ %
a t c h
k e e p i n g
a n d
P r o c e d u r e s
necessary make appropriate sound signals, switch on the navigation lights even in
daytime as when close quarter situation develops, the navigation lights indicate the
aspect better. Reduce speed to safe speed.
Bridge Procedure
Priorities between visual lookout and radar lookout vary under different conditions
of visibility.
Electronic Navigation Aids
When out of the sight of land, the navigational accuracy depends greatly on
instruments. It is therefore necessary that the officer of the watch monitors the
equipment and ensures its accuracy. During each watch, the principal instruments
directing the navigation of the ship should be checked with other sources of position
fixing as well as with estimated position. Any deviation detected should be
investigated and corrected.
Gyro-compass is more commonly used to steer the vessel during ocean passages. It
is therefore important to check the compass error, compare the compasses and
monitor the courses steered.
Celestial Navigation
In case of failure of electronic navigational aids, the only recourse a navigator has,
to fix his vessel's position, is with the help of celestial bodies. There is therefore a
need to practice this art. Learn to calculate position based on this observation as
accurately as possible and cross check positions obtained from electronic navigational
aids.
carried out at the appropriate time and in accordance with the required accuracy and
efficiency.
Where the OOW has to plot the ship's position, he shall ensure that the lookout is alert.
He shall also assess the situation around him and avoid being absent when ships are
approaching and a risk of collision is present. This again calls for planning so that collision
avoidance and position fixing get equal priority. In cases when the OOW finds it difficult
to manage both, he should not hesitate to call the Master. OOW must understand that calling
for assistance is not a sign of inefficiency.
Continuous monitoring of vessel's position for safe navigation and collision avoidance is
of equal importance. The officer of the watch will therefore have to understand how to
set the priorities and how to manage time.
In coastal waters, the navigator has to allow for :
Take avoiding action such that sufficient depth is maintained under keel. Plan in
advance to ensure vessel does not come in close proximity to other
navigational hazards.
Note Under keel clearance is not totally covered in your course but it is sufficient to
mention here that the vessel's draft increases in direct proportion to the cube of
the speed and the depth of the water.
Use the largest scale chart suitable for that area and corrected up-to-datc
Adjust course if vessel is found to have deviated from the planned track due to
any cross track error
Where navaids are available, vessel's position to be fixed by using more than
one method.
Where necessary allow for set and drift to keep vessel on the planned track.
Bridge Procedure
Study the chart and expect to pick up landmarks before they are actually seen.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Any restrictions on draught, air draught within limits for bridges and berth,
trim, speed, entry times, etc.
(9)
Relevant approach charts and nautical publications are corrected up to date and
course laid off.
(10)
(11)
ETA sent to pilot station at appropriate time with all relevant information
required e.g. details of dangerous/hazardous good carried.
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
Manual Steering has been tested and engaged in sufficient time for the
helmsman to become accustomed before manoeuvring commences.
(21)
The crew has been advised of the time of "stand by" for entering the port.
(22)
The VHF channels for the various services (e.g. VTS, pilot, tugs, berthing
instructions) have been noted and a radio check carried out.
(23)
(24)
Engine room has been notified at least one hour prior arrival.
(25)
(26)
Steering gear system has been tested (both motors be running when manoeuvring).
31
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Deck cargo lashings are tight and are in order. If necessary, the crew should
be called out and lashings tightened in presence and to the satisfaction of
relieved OOW. A positive report of this should be made to the bridge.
equipments.
Remember
Bridge Procedure
(a)
You are responsible for safety of lives of your crew, property and the
environment. An error on your part may cause a disaster including deaths.
(b)
You should be well versed with the handling characteristics of your ship
including procedures for use of engine in an emergency. You will have no
time to learn the ship's manoeuvring characteristics in an emergency.
(c)
(d)
Navigation
General
It is important that you execute the passage plan as prepared and monitor
the progress of the ship relative to that plan.
Deviation from the Plan
If you have to deviate from the passage plan for any reason, you should return
to the original plan as soon as practicably possible. If you need to deviate
from the original plan for a longer time, due consideration must be given to
all the dangers, restrictions, etc. The deviated plan should be made in the
same manner as a new plan. A briefing to this effect should be given to the
other concerned team members.
Do you Know the Grounding Accident of Torrey Canyon?
The Tanker Torrey Canyon ran aground on the 18`h March 1966 off Scilly Isles. On
making the landfall, the vessel was found to be about 17 miles off the course. The
watch officer altered the course to port in order to come back to the original track.
However, he decided to take the different route in order to save I some time. The
deviated route was decided without considering the proper passage planning
procedures_ The result was a disaster both for the ship and for the environment.
Monitoring the Progress of the Ship
Good Navigational Practices Demand that
You are well versed with and fully aware of the capabilities of your engines,
steering systems, turning circle, stopping distances, navigational aids and any
other navigational systems being used. Monitor their performance
continuously.
You should cross check the position fixes using independent source of
information. This is particularly important when electronic position fixing
systems such as GPS, LORAN-C are used. Visual position fixing must be
used for cross checking the electronic aid fixes,
You should keep in mind that automation and automated navigational
equipment is very good but over reliance on it can be very, dangerous., In
most of the cases, these work well however, any rrialfunctiom should be
promptly noticed and appropriate actions taken.
33
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Note time of passing of danger points and arrange for any extra
precautions to be taken.
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
0)
Use the most suitable largest scale chart available for the area.
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
Time and efforts needed to keep radio watch keeping and Radio
Communications.
Monitor and control safety systems e.g. fire extinguishing system, fire
petrol, etc.
Have you heard of the following accident, which occurred off the coast of
Australia?
34
A second officer, soon after taking over the midnight watch, left the bridge and
descended two decks down to his cabin to get a jacket and some cigarettes. There
was no lookout. While in cabin, he decided to smoke a cigarette and thereafter fell
off to sleep. Next, every one woke up at 0515 hrs when the ship had run hard aground.
The second officer slept through the watch, no quarter call was given to the chief
officer, he slept through an intended 30 degrees alteration and he also slept through the
grounding.
Bridge Procedure
35
When the master has arrived on the bridge, his decision to take over control of the
bridge from the OOW must be clear and unambiguous.
Vessels starts to swing rapidly and the off course alarm is ringing.
(b)
After sunset, the navigation light sentinel gives an alarm and visually
it appears that the forward masthead light is not functioning.
(c)
(d)
(e)
2.13 SUMMARY
As an officer on watch, under the standards of training, certification and watch keeping,
you are responsible for the safe navigation of the ship.
In this unit you have learnt about your responsibilities while keeping a navigational watch,
while handling it over to your reliever and the need for maintaining an effective bridge
organization at all times when the vessel is at sea for her safe navigator).
The officer on watch must be fit for duty and discharge his watch-keeping duties efficiently,always remembering that he is responsible for the not only the safety of lives of the ship's
crew and property, but also for the environmental pollution which the ship may cause.
36
(a)
Switch over to hand steering, call the master, check if the steering is
working, if in traffic bring engines on stand by and inform the engine room of
the malfunction of the steering so that they can depute someone to check.
(b)
Switch to the second light provided, if the same is also not functioning; then
send out a message to all ships indicating that your ship is plying only with
one masthead light, call the master and the engineers to make effective
repair to electrical circuit.
(c)
Recheck the visual position by an alternate method such as two ranges from
Radar or by LORAN. It is possible that the GPS has developed a fault without
giving an alarm. In coastal waters call the master if close to danger.
(d)
Accept that light as a warning, proceed with caution, engines on stand by,
recheck with port authorities and if there is not sufficient sea room stop
engines and call the master.
(e)
Call the Master and tell him your problem. Do not feel embarrassed as you
may not be functioning correctly and it is unsafe to continue watchkeeping
and the Master shall understand the same.
Bridge Procedure
37
Introduction
Objectives
3 .8 Sum m ar y
3.9 Answers to SAQs
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Routeing systems and ship reporting systems are established to improve safe passages
for ships and thereby the safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation, and
protect the marine environment.
In this self learning module, we shall study the ship routeing systems, ship position
reporting systems and weather routeing systems. All these are related to the ships
progress directly as
The routeing system ensures that ships follow planned routes without
disturbing other traffic and protect the environment.
Ship reporting system ensures that the progress of the ship is provided to the SAR
authorities and the ship manager/owner, and
Weather routeing on the other hand ensures that the ships get advance
information from meteorological and marine experts ashore on the route to
follow taking into account the adverse weather that the ship may encounter
and the capability of a particular ship.
Routeing systems are established to improve safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of
navigation, and to increase the protection of the marine environment.
Once upon a time, ships were smaller with lesser drafts and less dangerous cargoes on
board. However, as the ship numbers increased with variety in their speeds and capacity it
became necessary to regulate the traffic in congested areas and to ensure that ships carrying
hazardous cargoes did not endanger the sensitive maritime environment.
39
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
Objectives
After studying this unit, you should be able to
The width of navigable channels had generally not kept pace with the
increase in sizes of ships, and
the Dover Straits. A significant fall was seen in the number of collisions between
ships on opposing courses. Although most ships follow the rules, a few "rouges"
don't. The Dover straits have a controlling station on both the French and the English
side and they have the necessary equipment to spot the rouges and report them to
their flag administration. Most of violations or infringements were when entering or
leaving a traffic separation scheme or when crossing it.
Weather Routeing
In the early days, observance of the schemes was voluntary. However, in 1971 a
series of accidents in the English Channel led to calls for immediate action.
Do you know?
In the most serious of incidents, the tanker Texaco Caribbean was in collision
with a freighter off the Varne shoals (please look up the English channel chart)
and the following night the freighter Brandenburg struck that wreck. The freighter
also sank. Some six weeks later, the freighter Niki struck the same wreckage and
sank with the loss of all 21 people on board.
IMO's Maritime Safety Committee, when they met in March 1971 recommended
that observance of all traffic separation schemes be made mandatory. The IMO
Assembly adopted this recommendation later the same year. The Conference,
which adopted the Collision Regulations (COLREGs) in 1972 made observance of
traffic separation schemes mandatory.
Ro
ute junctions and convergence areas should not be placed where crossing traffic is
expected to be heavy.
41
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
IMO takes into consideration the following before a proposal for a mandatory
routeing system is accepted.
Existing and Proposed Aids to Navigation
Routes should be designed to allow optimum use of aids to navigation in the
area. For traffic separation schemes, such aids to navigation should enable
mariners to determine their position with sufficient accuracy to navigate in
accordance with rule 10 of the 1972 Collision Regulations.
Traffic Patterns
Information should be provided to the extent possible on
traffic patterns,
vessel interactions,
Information on Surveys
Adequacy of the state of hydrographic surveys and nautical charts in the
area of the proposed routeing system;
Alternative Routeing Measure
If necessary, alternative routeing measure for certain categories of ships, or
, ships carrying certain cargoes which may be excluded from using a routeing
system or any part thereof; and
Offshore Structures
Governments should ensure, as far as practicable, that any drilling rigs,
exploration platforms, and other offshore structures are not established
within the traffic lanes or routeing systems or near their terminations.
Marine Environmental Considerations
The proposal should contain information on environmental factors, such as the
prevailing weather conditions, tidal streams, and currents, and the possibility of
ice concentrations. Routeing systems should not be established in areas where the
instability of the seabed is such that frequent changes in the alignment and positions of
the main channels, and thus of the routeing system itself, are likely.
For proposals intended to protect the marine environment, the proposal should state
whether the proposed routeing system could reasonably be expected to significantly
prevent or reduce the risk of pollution or other damage to the marine environment of
the area concerned. The proposal should also contain information on any
limitations to the sea area available for navigation given the overall size of the area
to be protected and the aggregate number of environmentally sensitive areas
established within the area concerned.
Deep water routes (for the benefit primarily of ships whose ability to
manoeuvre is constrained by their draught),
Weather Routeing
Ships' routeing systems and traffic separation schemes that have been approved by IMO
are contained in the IMO Publication, "Ship's Routeing", a thick volume, which is
updated when schemes are amended or new ones added and which is available on all
ships. This should be in the chart room and be corrected as all other navigational
publications.
The publication includes General provisions on ships' routeing, first adopted by IMO in
1973, and subsequently amended over the years, which are aimed at standardising the
design, development, charted presentation and use of routeing measures adopted by IMO.
The nomenclature used in the system are as follows
Traffic Lane
A zone or line separating traffic lanes in which ships are proceeding in opposite or
nearly opposite directions; or separating a traffic lane from the adjacent sea area; or
separating traffic lanes designated for particular classes of ship proceeding in the
same direction.
Roundabout
A separation point or circular separation zone and a circular traffic lane within
defined limits.
Inshore Traffic Zone
This is the designated area between the landward boundary of a traffic separation
scheme and the adjacent coast.
Recommended Route
A route of undefined width, for the convenience of ships in transit, which is often
marked by centreline buoys
Deep-water Route
A route within defined limits, which has been accurately surveyed for clearance of
sea bottom and submerged articles.
Precautionary Area
An area within defined limits where ships must navigate with particular caution
and within which the direction of flow of traffic may be recommended.
Area to be Avoided
43
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
Unless stated otherwise, routeing systems are recommended for use by all
ships and may be made mandatory for all ships, certain categories of ships
or ships carrying certain cargoes, or types and quantities of bunker fuel.
(b)
Routeing systems are intended for use by day and by night in all weathers,
in ice-free waters or under light ice conditions where no extraordinary
manoeuvres or icebreaker assistance are required.
(c)
(d)
(e)
At junction points where traffic from various directions meets, a true separation
of traffic is not possible, as ships may need to cross routes or change to another
route. Ships should therefore navigate with great caution in such areas and be
aware that the mere fact that a ship is proceeding along a through-going route
gives that ship no special privilege or right of way.
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
SAQ I
(a)
(b)
(c)
44
Sketch a typical TSS and show therein the various area and signs of
importance.
Weather Routeing
We on board know the position of the ship accurately most of the time but we have to find
some way of passing this information to owner, charterers, rescue organisations and others.
This is done through voluntary ship reporting systems.
Ship reporting systems came into existence to cater to the need of ships in distress so
that the rescue co-ordinators could identify the ships in the area and direct them to assist.
Almost all reporting systems are managed by administrations or rescue co-ordinators and
all messages transmitted to such organisations are free of charge.
A number of ships position and reporting systems exist worldwide for the co-ordination
of search and rescue operation.
In addition, mandatory ship reporting systems have been agreed by IMO in certain areas for
ensuring that the ships comply with the requirements of reporting on cargo and traffic
separation scheme. One such scheme is in the Dover strait.
3.6.1 Reporting Systems
A number of ship reporting systems are in operation the world over for SAR purposes.
The same are detailed in ALBS volume I (parts 1 and 3) and 6 (parts 1, 2 and 3)
It is obviously not necessary to describe these in details but we shall give details of the
US AMVER and the Indian Inspires system in brief.
THE AMVER (Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue System).
3.6.2 Description
US Coast Guard operates Amver. It provides important aid to the development and coordination of search and rescue in many off shore areas of the world. Merchant
vessels of all nations making off shore voyages are encouraged to send movement
reports and periodic position reports to the AMVER centres located at various places.
Information from these reports is entered into a computer, which generates and maintains
dead reckoning position for vessels. Characterising of vessels that are valuable is determined
by the computer. SAR capability is also entered into appropriate information. If required
these are passed onto search and rescue agencies for use during an emergency.
Predicted locations are only disclosed for reasons connected with maritime safety.
3.6.3 Format of Messages
IMO has specified a standard form for ship reporting, which is in use universally. Each of
the system may have some reporting requirements differing from the IMO guidelines.
There are four types of reports dealing with ship reporting.
Sailing Plan Report
Report Identifier: AMVER/Sp/1
Required Information: A, B, G, 1, L
Optional Information: Lines E, F, M, V, and X
Sailing/plans may be sent before or as near as possible to the time of departure
from a port within the system or when entering the area covered by the system.
Position Report
Report Identifier AMVER/Pr/1
Required Information: Lines A, B, G
Optional Information: Lines E, F, I, L, M, V, X
This Report should be sent when necessary to ensure effective operation of the
system.
45
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
Deviation Report
Report identifier DR/
Required information : lines A
Optional information : On the same lines B, E, F, G, I., L, M, V, X used to report
Changes to sailing plan.
Final Report
Report Identifier AMVER/Fr/1
Required Information: Lines A, K
Optional Information: Lines X
Arrival reports should be sent immediately prior to or upon arrival at the port of
destination.
In addition, messages formats to indicate dangerous goods (DG), Harmful
substances (HS), and Maritime pollutants (MP) can also be used using the IMO
format.
Form of Messages
The line Identifier and the data items on a Line are separated from each other by a
single slash/ lines, which are terminates by a double slash "//".
A/ Vessel Name/ International Radio Call Sign "//"
B/ Date & Time (UT GMT) "//"
C/ latitude/ longitude
E/ course "//"
F/ Average Speed "//"
G/ Port of departure/Lat./Long "//"
I/ Port of destination/Lat./Long/ETA "//"
K/Port name/Lat./Long/Time of arrival "//"
L/ Route information "//"
M/ Current coast radio station/ next station if any "H"
V/ On board medium used.
3.6.4 Indian Ship Position and Information Reporting Systems (INSPIRES)
It is Mandatory for all Indian merchant vessels including coastal and fishing vessel of more
than 300 Grt. Other vessels within the reporting area are encouraged to participate in the
system. The use of the system is to provide data for SAR operations, vessel traffic
management and weather forecasting. Vessels participating in the system transmit reports
through selected radio stations.
The details of INPIRES are given in Indian Notices to Mariners No. 8. It has been in
effect since 1 Nov. 1986. The Directorate General of shipping co-ordinates the
functioning of the system with Maritime Operation Room, Mumbai.
Reporting Area
The Sea AREA within the limits defined by the following :
46
(a)
(b)
12 N., 63 E.
(c)
African coast at 12 N.
(d)
African cast at 10 30 S.
(e)
10 30'S. 55 E.
(f)
30 S. 55 E.
(g)
Weather Routeing
Explain the purpose why ship-reporting systems are established for Search
and rescue purposes?
(b)
Prepare a full ship report for one of the days at sea and indicate which ship
reporting system you would send it to. Describe the mode and the process of
such transmission?
(c)
Describe in your own words the action that AMVER would take on
receiving a distress call? .
(d)
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
some seasonal variation on some routes. These days, there is usually more concurrent
planning that goes into it, at least on transoceanic passages.
3.7.1 Weather Planning
Most voyages require some level of weather planning. For cruising sailors, this usually starts
by looking into the historically tested seasons and routes such as might be found in the
British Admiralty, publication Ocean Passages of the World. The goal is to find
routes around the subtropical Highs, into the trades and avoiding hurricanes. On high latitude
routes, it involves avoiding ice. It also might involve taking advantage of favourable ocean
currents or avoiding adverse ones.
This type of planning, however, is not what is usually referred to as weather routing. This
term more refers to making last minute decisions on the actual route dependent on existing
conditions, not on climatic or average conditions. It usually refers to ship routing on
ocean passages, since smaller vessels do not have enough speed to take advantage of much
long term planning. Long term means more than a few days. If your max speed is some
100 miles a day, you can't do much to out manoeuvre something that is 700 miles across
moving up to 500 miles a day. Note, however, that in the tropics, you can indeed do useful
weather manoeuvring around tropical storms at this speed, and indeed one should know how
to do it.
Officially, "long term" or long range forecasting actually means more than 10 days;
"medium range" is 3 to 10 days; and "short range" means up to 3 days.
Ship weather routing allows us to take advantage of long term (i.e. extended) forecasts to
avoid bad weather, associated delays and hazards. The goal is to improve on the default route,
which is typically great circle point to point, staying away from the ice, in good current, and
out of bad.
Weather routing of any vessel hinges on long term forecasts and a knowledge of the vessel's
performance in various conditions. Generally, the term applies to getting this information
from outside of the vessel; hence, some issue of communications is also crucial. It has to
come from outside of the vessel in most cases, because it requires long range forecasts and
these are not routinely available on board from normal services. Communications are also
crucial since the route may have to be altered underway if the forecast does not evolve as
predicted.
The process also inevitably involves computers, since there are long term complex
projections that must be analyzed. In other words, as the wind and sea increase, the
vessel speed goes down. Therefore, the only way to evaluate what will happen when
along various routes any distance into the future is to play them through various trial
runs. Remember that in heavy seas you can only go in certain directions, or over a certain
range of directions.
3.7.2 Advantages of Weather Routeing
Advantages
Disadvantages
None for large companies, other than the additional overhead expense and
training, which should be recouped from the savings gained from the
advantages.
For smaller vessels it is simply too expensive in most cases to purchase the
Satcom equipment and hire the routing services but this is discussed further 48
below.
3.7.3 Weather Routeing Taking into Account the Performance of the Vessel
Weather Routeing
To our understanding, the British have a government program of ship weather routing
called "Metroute", whereas US vessels obtain this service from private companies. A leader
in this field is WNI "Oceanroutes", a division of Weathernews, Inc with US offices based
in Sunnyvale, CA. They provide some 1200 routes per month to over 700 shipping
companies worldwide.
As is true with any vessel (including sailboats and kayaks), a crucial factor in effective
routing is to know the performance data for the vessel in various conditions of wind and
seas over a range of drafts or trim. Such performance data then gives us the likely
performance of the ship in 10-foot following seas versus, say, 5-foot head seas when
fully loaded or empty. This crucial data must be gathered from either actual experience or
from theoretical computations. For ships, the performance data are often presented in
textbooks as reduced to primarily a dependence on wave height. The real world,
however, is much more complex and in actual practice careful computations considers many
other factors. In any event, the forecasters main job reduces to the difficult task of predicting
sea state a week or so in advance. North Pacific ship crossings are typically 10 to 14
days; Atlantic crossings are 5 to 7 days.
One of the extra factors, for example, is how the vessel matches the wavelength of the
seas. At least for larger vessels, it has been found that a wavelength matching the vessel
length puts significantly more stress on the hull when it is trapped riding along in the trough
or straddling the crest. In some cases, larger vessels matching the average wave length can
suffer more stress and damage than significantly smaller vessels in the same seaway.
In addition, the detailed nature of the seas (wavelengths, steepness, etc.) can affect other
factors such as how much the propellers stay in the water or how much power is lost in
rudder controls to maintain a course. Moreover, this depends then on the course relative
to the wave direction, etc. In addition, the water resistance of the hull and its response to
the seas depends on the draft and trim. In short, it takes a lot of analysis and a lot of data
to predict progress in various states of high seas. Put another way, it takes as much work
in the area of hydrodynamics and vessel design as it does in meteorology to advance these
programs.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Note the distinction here is that these services (even the last mentioned advisory) are
provided to individual vessels for their specific routes and specific schedules developed
from performance data of their specific vessels. This is in contrast to the traditional method
of captains or skippers gathering this information themselves 'from available public services
and then analyzing it entirely on their own.
A key advantage of the weather routing service is the companies providing it have ready
access to information that is not so easy to come by from public services although
these days with the various internet connections more of this specialized information is
available than it historically was. They are also professionals whose main job in life is to
do this type of analysis and they have developed the best software and communications
systems for providing it.
49
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
MRF from NMC (medium range forecast from National Meteorological Centre)
provide surface pressures at 00 and 12 Z projected out to 3 days and lower
resolution data extending from 3 to 10 days.
(b)
(c)
50
In the statistical development of waves, however, the period is related to the length of the
wave, so it is essentially the length of a wave that determines wave speed. (You could equally
well say "period" rather than length here, but when judging a wave from some distance off,
we have a better gauge on its length than we do on its period, so this is perhaps a better
practical way to think about it.)
Weather Routeing
The height or steepness may have some small effect, but the primary factor is the length.
Long waves move faster than short waves. You can have a very low swell travelling faster
than a more menacing looking steep wave that is much higher. Indeed, the very fastest waves
are the very long low tsunami waves created by underwater earthquakes. These may only be
some inches high travelling at 100 knots or more! On the other hand, in a typical seaway,
the biggest waves (not necessarily the steepest) are also the longest waves and hence travel
faster than the little ones.
SAQ 3
(a)
What advice is received and used when on the passage? Is the master bound
to take the advice given?
(b)
(c)
3.8 SUMMARY
In this unit you have learnt about the historical aspects which brought about the of
introduction of the routeing system and traffic separation schemes. All such schemes are
contained in the IMO publication "Ship Roueting", which will be available on board
your ship, and unless otherwise stated, roueting systems are recommended for use by all
ship's by day and by night in all weathers. They may be made mandatory for all ship's or
for certain categories of ship.
You have also learnt that there are a number of ship reporting systems in operation the world
over for the purpose of search and rescue, details of which are available in ALBS volume I
and 6. Automated mutual assistance vessel rescue system (AMVER) is operated by U.S.
Coast guard and provides aid to the development and co-ordination of search and rescue in
many off shore areas of the world.
All ships in the world are required to comply with any mandatory ship reporting system
adapted by IMO which is applicable to them.
Ships' routeing systems contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of
navigation and/or protection of the marine environment. Ships' routeing systems
are recommended for use by, and may be made mandatory for, all ships,
certain categories of ships or ships carrying certain cargoes, when adopted and
implemented in accordance with the guidelines and criteria developed by the
Organization. If they were left to be followed voluntarily then some may follow
and some may not. Creating a lot of confusion as well as accidents.
(b)
Watchkeeping and
Procedures
(c)
SAQ 2
(a)
Ship reporting system assists the SAR (Search and Rescue) authorities in
location of a ship in distress and also they are able to provide early help as
they are aware of the status of the ships in a particular area.
(b)
From the ALBS find the ship reporting system working in the area and the
stations, which accept messages to such system. Also, ascertain whether
they need any information that is not in the standard format and then prepare
the message.
(c)
AMVER would plot your position and find all the ship in your area. If you
need a doctor, it shall also pin point a ship with a doctor on board and direct
that ship to the casualty. It shall thereafter keep in touch with the distressed
ship all the time till the distress is over or resolved.
(d)
SAQ 3
52
(a)
Weather routing service provides the master a route indicating the likely weather
pattern that may be experienced and the precautions necessary. The routing
takes into account the capability and the type of ship including its speed and
stability. In all cases the master is the best judge and he should treat the
advise received as advise only taking into account the actual weather
experienced by his ship and informing the service accordingly.
(b)
The service if accurate in its details provides the ship a comfortable and speedy
passage without causing any damage to the ship, crew and the cargo. By
avoiding rough weather, following weather routing, the ship owner saves in
terms of fuel and time.
(c)
On a long term if the ship maintains the record of weather forecasted and
actually experienced then it would be possible to analyse the reliability of
the system. Also a statistical analysis can be taken up to find out the amount
of fuel and time saved by following the weather routing.
Introduction
Objectives
4.3
4.2.1
4.2.2
Master's Responsibility
4.2.3
Passage Planning
4.2.4
4,2.5
4.2.6
4.2.7
4.2.8
4.2.9
Chart Corrections
Collisions in Fog
4.3.2
4.3.3
Use of VHF
Collisions in Heavy Rain
4.3.4
4.3.5
4.3.6
4.3.7
4.3.8
Radar Watchkeeping
4.3.9
Transverse Thrust
4 .4 Su m m ar y
4.5 Answers to SAQs
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Safe practices in navigation are an important aspect of the overall safety of the ship. Perhaps
more important than knowing the theory of navigation. Safe Practices are followed because of
good planning and commitment by the ships leadership. In the case studies given below it
shall be observed that experienced watch keepers and masters involve the ships under their
charge in accidents only because they failed to follow the established practices and the
well defined COLREGs. On studying them, you may observe that each one of us is
some time or the other, guilty of similar lapses. Experience no doubt, comes from
developing your own knowledge and skills but it also gained when learning from other
peoples mistakes. You shall agree that no one can afford to learn by making mistakes!
Objectives
After studying this unit, you should be able to
explain various ingredients basics passage planning and the unsafe practices that
should be avoided in its implementation,
discuss the problems that may arise with pilots on board, and
explain how ships get involved in casualties and particularly in collisions and
grounding and to give case studies of actual incidents as examples.
53
On his first trip as a Master, a ship grounded off Tasmania after the master
failed to make sufficient allowance for wind and tide. There was no passage
plan between the anchorage and the pilot station, or between the pilot
station and the berth. The pilot had ordered full ahead four minutes after
stepping on the bridge of a large ship. Although a pilot card had been
exchanged, the master had no idea of the route, which the pilot intended to
follow.
A passenger ship ran on to the rocks after the pilot missed an alter course
position. The bridge team included the Master, who was on the bridge had
failed to notice and correct the same.
There have been many different reviews of accidents. Most conclude that human
failure rather than equipment failure is responsible for almost every collision,
grounding or dock damage. The P & I clubs have identified following failures
recurring time and time again. For example .
Failure to use the radar properly and to plot the approach of the approaching
ships;
54
(c)
(d)
(e)
55
56
was carried out using a single radar range and bearing at 10-minute intervals. No use was
made of parallel indexing, which would have provided a continuous assessment of deviation
from the intended track.
An alteration, of course of 30 to port was made to regain the intended track, with the islands
on the north side of the channel dead ahead at a range of 2 miles. This had no discernible
effect and some 10 minutes later with the ship just a mile from the island, a further 20
alteration of course to port was made. The helmsman was despatched to assist with
rigging the pilot ladder, necessitating the third officer taking the helm and leaving the master
unsupported to both navigate and control the ship. This further alteration of course to port
again proved ineffectual and, some 10 minutes later, the ship grounded with the main engine
still turning ahead. The master had continued to monitor the radar in an attempt to
determine his position, without initiating any positive action, until the ship grounded. At
any time prior to the grounding, the incident could have been avoided by putting the engine
astern.
Efforts to refloat the ship failed and she was declared a constructive total loss shortly
thereafter.
Three separate enquiries into this incident have been held by the local port authority, the
Brazilian authorities and in Germany, as the issuing authority for the masters certificate,
respectively. Whilst the Brazilian authorities enquiry has yet to report, the other two
have concluded that the grounding was solely attributable to negligent navigation.
The stranding and subsequent total loss of this ship was entirely due to negligent navigation
arising from a failure to devise, agree and implement an effective passage plan for the
approach. In light of the catastrophic consequences of the failure to do so in this instance,
masers are reminded to ensure that passage planning and execution are accorded the
appropriate importance on their ships.
4.2.4 Passage Planning and Pilotage
Some masters consider it pointless to plan a river passage. There thinking is that as a
pilot is on board to navigate the ship and as it is impossible to predict the effects of wind
and current, the passage plan may not be necessary. Often a river chart may not be
detailed enough or its scale may be too small to allow a detailed plan for the passage of an
unfamiliar river. Their passage plans start and end at the pilot station. However, after
investigating many dock damage and grounding claims, the P & I club Managers are firmly of
the opinion that passage planning is necessary berth to berth. The Australian Maritime Safety
Authority (AMSA) recently reached the same conclusion when they investigated the
grounding of a ship at the entrance to the River Tamar in Tasmania.
The Sea Empress's grounding and spill of 70,000 tons of crude oil gives a similar lesson.
The preliminary report of the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch states that the ship
picked up a pilot at 1940 hours and he ordered full ahead towards the entrance channel at
1944 hours. She first grounded at 20.07. Four minutes cannot possibly be enough time for a
British pilot and a Russian master to discuss a difficult approach of a large ship through a
narrow channel. The interim report states that the master and the pilot had not
discussed and agreed a plan for the approach. This is just the point the clubs have learnt
from a host of far less serious claims.
A recent Club case involved a bulk carrier grounding in shallow water because of squat. The
ship was travelling too fast and squat caused the bow to touch bottom and resulted in loss
of steerage. The ship veered out of the channel and grounded. A small reduction in speed
gives a large reduction in squat. A passage plan in shallow water would indicate the
maximum permitted speed so that the effects of squat are minimised.
A simple passage plan is nothing more than a course on a chart telling the navigator which
way to steer, but a plan for coastal or river transits are more detailed. Regardless of the
type of passage, every plan should show :
The intended track (line on the chart),
Areas to avoid for safety reasons,
I
57
Wrecks,
Course changes and
The next chart position. Plans for river passages or passages in
narrow channels should also include
Tidal information,
Speed restrictions,
Position to change course,
Alternative routes in emergencies,
Parallel index lines,
Emphasis on leading marks and
Highlight sharp or difficult bends and areas of cross currents.
Once the passage has been planned, its contents can be circulated to the bridge team and a
copy given to the pilot when he boards. While passage planning, it is necessary to ensure that
checklists and procedures are understood and followed.
Execution and monitoring of a passage is as important as planning it and each member of
the bridge team will need to know his responsibilities and duties during pilotage, For example
:
When should the master be called? This is particularly important for Long
River or coastal passages when it may not be either practical or desirable to have
the master continuously on the bridge. Passage planning is not difficult but it
will require increased effort and discipline by the bridge team.
However, there is more to passage planning than looking at a chart and pre-planning the
passage. The plan has to be executed and monitored. Experience has shown that if the
passage has not been planned, then the probability of an accident will increase. Regrettably,
this appears to be exactly what is happening.
The number of high profile grounding incidents is startling and these can be prevented if
the officers plan the voyage from pilot station to berth as carefully as the rest of the voyage.
SAQ 1
(a)
58
Who all shall form the bridge team and what is their responsibility?
(b)
(c)
What actions are the bridge team required to take when the pilot is on
board?
Recent statistics from Det Norske Veritas indicate that 90% of all marine casualties
occur in restricted waters, 60% of them involving ships with a pilot embarked.
This is not altogether surprising. Ships in restricted waters are invariably constrained to
operating in closer proximity to other vessels and hazards than in the normal seagoing
environment, thereby placing them at greater risk. Nevertheless, the consistently high
incidence of casualties, which occur with a pilot embarked, is a major source of concern.
In theory, at least, the greater exposure to hazards in pilotage areas should be adequately
compensated by the addition to the bridge team of a pilot, employed for his expert
knowledge of local conditions. This expertise, combined with the knowledge and experience
of the master with respect to the handling characteristics of his ship and the assistance of the
bridge team, should be sufficient to assure the safety of the vessel under all but the most
unpredictable of circumstances. Regrettably, casualty statistics consistently prove this not to
be the case in practice.
In a somewhat subjective judgement, many in the marine industry attribute this to pilot error,
evidently believing that the training and competence of pilots has plumbed hitherto
unprecedented depths, as witness a recent description of pilots as dangerous additions to
the crew. However, the Managers do not accept that many of these casualties are solely
attributable to errors of commission or omission by the pilot. Rather, it is contended that
they are generally the consequence of a failure by the pilot, the master and his bridge team to
form an effective working relationship and to function as a cohesive team in a manner
conducive to the safe navigation of the vessel. An objective review of accidents attributed to
pilot error will, all too often, reveal a degree of contributory culpability on the part of the
master or a member of his bridge team, ranging from complacency to outright dereliction of
duty.
There can be no doubt that the establishment of an effective working relationship between
master and pilot, enabling the latter to function effectively as an integral part of the
bridge team whilst he has the con, is vital to the elimination of accidents in pilotage waters.
The requirements fundamental to the establishment of an effective working relationship
are encapsulated in the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
seafarers, the STOW Code, and are reproduced below for ease of reference.
4.2.6 Navigation with Pilot on Board
Despite the duties and obligations of pilots, their presence on board does not relieve the
master or officer in charge of the navigational watch from their duties and obligations
for the safety of the ship. The master and the pilot shall exchange information regarding
navigation procedures, local conditions and the ship's characteristics. The master and/or
the officer in charge of the navigational watch shall co-operate closely with the pilot and
maintain an accurate check on the ship's position and movement. It is also imperative
that all members of the bridge team understand the plan. Without this, the officer on watch
(OOW) may feel that he has been excluded from events and adopt the role of disinterested
spectator, in turn leaving the pilot feeling isolated and unsupported, which will do little to
foster harmonious and effective relations.
Masters frequently complain that discussing and agreeing a plan with the pilot for port
arrival or departure is difficult, either due to the lack of time available to do so, or because
the pilot is unwilling to enter into such a discussion. With regard to the timescale,
a productive discussion between willing parties need only take a few minutes.
Whilst recognising that the operating costs of modern ships are high and that time is
invariably of the essence, it is fundamental to safe navigation that the bridge team
understand the pilot's intentions. Consideration should therefore be given to delaying the
intended manoeuvre to allow this discussion to take place, provided always that such a
delay, of itself, does not place the vessel at risk.
59
The difficulties of holding an objective discussion with an unwilling pilot are acknowledged.
Nevertheless, masters are urged to insist that a discussion of the passage plan does take
place because, without it, the prospects of retaining effective command of the vessel when
under pilotage are considerably reduced.
It is recognised by the Managers that development of an effective working relationship
between the pilot and the master and his bridge team is not a panacea. Nevertheless, it is
believed that the will to do so, combined with a modicum of effort from masters and pilots,
will result in a significant reduction in the incidence of casualties, which occur with a
pilot embarked.
4.2.7 Error in Navigation Passage Planning
A containership ran aground on a reef near the approach to the Singapore Strait. At first
sight, the owner should have been entitled to the defence of negligence in navigation under
The Hague Visby Rules. The ship's officers had pre-planned the ship's course as a formal
passage plan. This course was one that took the ship only two miles to the east of the reef
in an area where tidal currents were known to be variable. A navigator should have
known that this distance was too close to the reef, which should have been passed at a
considerably greater distance. The cargo owners alleged that the ship had left her loading
port with an inherently unsafe passage plan and was therefore unseaworthy at the
commencement of the voyage. There was considerable doubt as to whether such an
argument would succeed, it was clear, at least after the event, that a course only two
miles off the reef was unsafe. The weakness of the case was that they did not have in
place any regular system for checking the quality of the navigation of their senior officers.
Few companies do. However, it must be accepted now that owners do have a duty to
check in some way the competence in navigation of their officers. It was recommend that :
(a)
(b)
As part of the audit, a random selection from the previous year's passage
plans should be checked against the charts in use.
(c)
60
supply of weekly notices to mariners on a regular basis by appropriate means are obtained
Positive reporting arrangement in this respect is maintained from the ship to management.
In the past shipowners may have generally left it to their masters to make sure that charts are updated. However, the
English House of Lords has held in the case of the MAR10N (1984) that shipowners must ensure that their ships are
supplied with up-to-date charts and that chart corrections are made. It is not sufficient for the owners to rely on their
masters'to obtain the necessary navigation publications and information. It may also be noted that masters are also being
prosecuted and ships detained for not maintaining charts on board up-to-date.
SAQ 2
(a)
What is the relationship between the Master and the Pilot? What information exchanged between them before
the pilot starts his actual job? Who is finally responsible in the event of the accident?
(b)
(c)
Explain the annual safety audit and what is checked during such exercise?
61
It states that every vessel should proceed at a safe speed with engines on
standby.
Rule 19 also states that on hearing a fog signal forward of the beam, or if close
quarters cannot be avoided by an alteration of course alone then, if
necessary, the ship should take off all her way.
In another case, there was a head-on collision off the eastern coast of Honshu
Island with both ships proceeding at full speed in fog. Ship A attempting to
pass ship B starboard to starboard was under the control of a second officer; the
master was below.
Rule 9 of the Collision Regulations, which deals with navigation in narrow channels,
reads in part :
A vessel proceeding along the course of a narrow channel or fairway shall keep as near
to the outer limit of the channel or fairway, which lies on her starboard side as, is safe
and practicable.
However, collisions commonly occur in narrow channels when one or both ships are found
on the wrong side of the channel. This is surprising as narrow channels are often areas of
compulsory pilotage.
This type of incident is common. The use of VHF to agree the manner of passing,
particularly an alteration of course to port in order to pass starboard to starboard is
dangerous. Warnings have been issued about the use of VHF to agree a manoeuvre, which is
contrary to the Collision Regulations. It is stressed again that it is much safer to reduce
speed or even stop to let the other ship 'get out of the way', than to alter course to port.
If the Collision Regulations had been followed, this is another collision, which would
have been avoided.
4.3.5 Collisions Timely Actions
The deplorable fact is that the Collision Regulations are disregarded all too frequently.
The structure of the Collision Regulations is designed to ensure that, whenever possible,
ships will not reach a close-quarters situation in which there is risk of collision and in which
decisions have to be taken without time for proper thought. The leading English admiralty
judge, Sir Barry Sheen aid in a collision case last year. He went on to say:
"Manoeuvres taken to avoid a close-quarters situation should be taken at a time when
the responsible officer does not have to make a quick decision or a decision based on
inadequate information. Those manoeuvres should be such as to be readily apparent to
the other ship. The errors of navigation are those errors, which are made by an officer
who has time to think. At such a time, there is no excuse for failure to comply with the
Collision Regulations.
Likewise, there is no excusefor a math r n,, o accepts low standards and bad practices
in his ship, particularly on the brill (,, (w o-, t he engine room. When a ship is being
. navigated in reduced visibility, the nia.s tier Should ensure that he is alerted in good time if
other ships are known to be in the vicinity and a close-quarters situation may develop.
The master must also ensure that the officer on watch is keeping an efficient radar watch
by observation and plotting of contacts. He should positively discourage distractions
such as RIT conversations and any reluctance to reduce speed or, if necessary, to stop the
ship. It is very probable that the use of VHF radio for conversation between these ships
was a contributory cause of this collision, if only because it distracted the officers on
watch from paying careful attention to their radar. I must repeat, in the hope that it will
achieve some publicity, what I have said on previous occasions; that any attempt to use
VHF to agree the manner of pasging is fraught with the danger of misunderstanding. Marine
superintendents would be well advised to prohibit such use of VHF radio and to instruct
their officers to comply with the Collision Regulations.
4.3.6 Collisions Low Standard of Watchkeeping
In one case, a ship 'A' collided with a tug and barge at night in good visibility, off Houston,
Texas. The tug and barge were showing proper lights for ships restricted in their ability to
manoeuvre. Therefore, the ship 'A' was the give-way ship. The ship was under the control
of the second officer who had only just joined the ship and was standing his first navigational
watch when the ship was leaving Houston. Traffic in these waters is dense and there are
many oil platforms. He mistook the tug and barge for a platform, with the tug standing by.
63
The second officer should have been able to distinguish easily between a tug towing and
a supply-boat standing by. He did not plot the tug and barge, neither on the radar nor by
taking visual bearings. If he had done so, he would have noticed that the bearing of the
other vessel was not changing. Since he was navigating in a buoyed channel, this would
have alerted him to the fact that he was approaching another vessel under way, rather than
passing a platform. The master should hive stayed on the bridge to evaluate the second
officer's Watchkeeping ability before allowing him to take control in such a difficult area. If
the master was too tired to do so, one must question whether the ship was properly
manned.
In all the cases reported the officer who was on watch in each case, failed to apply the
Collision Regulations or, indeed the principles of good seamanship.
SAQ 3
(a)
Discuss Regulation 19 and the reasons why various collisions sited in the
Module Occurred. Explain why the use of VHF not recommended in collision
avoidance.
(b)
Discuss the collision in heavy rain and explain how this could have been
avoided?
(c)
Vessels required to keep out of the way should take early and substantial
action. Explain this and the actions that would satisfy these requirements.
yawing and the close proximity to shoal water, resulted in her grounding aft before the
situation could be retrieved, despite the immediate availability of main engines.
It is recommended that their bridge procedures require the masters to take early and positive
action under such circumstances and never to adopt a "wait and see" approach.
4.3.8 Radar Watchkeeping
When a collision occurs in fog, heavy rain or reduced visibility, a major contributing
factor is failure of one or both ships navigators to use their radar properly. Some
navigators fail to plot an approaching ship, some fail to look at the radar at all, and others
do not understand the use of the clutter control.
Two collision claims and one case involving a ship striking a buoy cost the Club S 3.4
million. Although, if the navigators had used their radars properly, these claims would
have been avoided.
In the first incident, two tankers were navigating on reciprocal courses, in visibility, which
was reduced by wind blown sand. Each ship detected the other by radar at twelve miles.
Neither navigator plotted the other ship's approach, but assumed that they were approaching
each other end on. With the aim of avoiding a close quarter situation, each navigator made a
course alteration, one, 5 to starboard, the other, 5 to port. Sometime later, each navigator
became aware that the approaching ship was still 'end on', so each navigator again made the
same course alteration (5 to starboard and 5 to port). This happened a third time, and even
then, neither navigator plotted the approaching ship on his radar. Inevitably, the two ships
collided in what was a classic radar assisted collision.
The Collision Regulations are clear in their instructions; Rule 19 (vessels not in sight of
one another) states that an alteration to port should be avoided, while Rule 14 (vessels in
sight of one another) instructs vessels, which are end on, or nearly end on, to alter course
to starboard. Had both navigators complied with the Regulations"and made a bold
alteration of course to starboard, there would not have been a collision.
The second incident involved a reefer ship and a VLCC navigating in a heavy rainsquall.
The reefer was the give way ship, having the other ship approaching on her starboard bow.
However, the ships were not in sight of one another. Both ships were travelling at their
full sea speed, on automatic pilot. The navigator on the reefer was busy in the chart room and
had posted a lookout (there being no radar in the chart room). To assist the lookout, he put
the radar onto long range and set the clutter control to the 75% setting. Periodically, he left
the chart room to look at the radar. On the VLCC, the navigator was alone on the bridge.
The collision occurred when both ships suddenly appeared out of the rain and ran into
each other. Neither navigator had detected the other approaching ship.
This incident clearly demonstrates the importance of keeping a radar watch when visibility
is reduced by rain and not just when navigating in fog. Indeed, the two ships were far from
land, neither expected to meet-crossing traffic, and apart from the heavy rainsquall,
visibility was excellent. One of the factors in this and the next incident was failure in the
correct use of the clutter control.
In the final incident, a supply vessel was standing off a rig in rough seas. As is the practice,
the navigator was keeping station with reference to visual points and was not plotting the
ships position on a chart, when suddenly the ship collided with an unlit but charted buoy. The
echo from the buoy had been lost in interference from sea waves (sea clutter).
There are clear lessons to be learnt from all these incidents with failure to plot the approach
of another ship being the most important. The first incident demonstrates the danger of
navigating in wind blown sand, when visibility may appear to be better than it really is. It
highlights the folly of attempting to put a ship, which is fine on the starboard bow further
to starboard by altering course to port, while in the second and third incidents the
clutter control was the primary cause.
65
Members are reminded that the purpose of clutter suppression is to eliminate echo
returns from sea waves (which are greatest near the ship) but the clutter control
suppresses rain. When the clutter control is applied, the 'tail' of an echo is cut off so that
only the leading edge is displayed. Echoes from ships and buoys are much stronger than
echoes from waves and, even though the strength of these echoes will be reduced, they will
still be displayed, even though echoes from waves, and to an extent rain, will not. However,
if clutter suppression is set to maximum, then even echoes from large ships may be lost.
While if clutter suppression is set too low, echoes from small buoys can be drowned by
echoes from waves or rain. For this reason, it is necessary to vary the setting of the clutter
control.
Navigators are reminded of the importance of using the radar in a searching manner that
is, changing ranges and adjusting the clutter suppression. The clutter suppression should
never be set and then left on one setting.
Navigators are also reminded that whenever visibility is reduced, a radar watch should
be maintained, the ship put on to manual steering, and a lookout posted until visibility
improves. Approaching targets should be plotted and their true course, speed and 'Closest
position of approach' (CPA) calculated. Masters are strongly recommended to encourage
their officers to practise radar plotting during periods of good visibility as this builds
user confidence in the equipment.
4.3.9 Transverse Thrust
The operation of a propeller is a complex interaction between fluid flow, after-end design
and propeller design. The main element of a propeller's thrust is forwards or backwards.
However, every ships master knows that a single screw ship fitted with a right-hand
turning propeller will have a tendency to turn more readily to port than to starboard when
going ahead and will do the opposite when going astern. This effect is referred to as
'transverso, thrust' and is thought to originate from fluid passing through the propeller
in close proximity to the ships hull.
Ship masters do not need to understand the complex hydrodynamics which cause this force,
but they do need to understand how the force affects their ship for different conditions of
loading and when operating in an open or restricted seaway. A recent dock damage claim
which occurred when an LPG carrier struck and demolished a mooring dolphin would
have been avoided if the master had realised that the full astern manoeuvre
would cause the stern to swing to port and consequently the bow to starboard.
The ship was manoeuvring to berth with her starboard side alongside. A tug was attached
forward and aft and a pilot was on board. The wind was light and variable and a current
was running from ahead at about 0.5 knots.
The approach was made at a relatively high speed, parallel and close to the jetty face. As
the bow came level with the mid-point of the jetty, engines were put to full astern to reduce
the headway and to stop the ship from overshooting. The bow swung immediately to
starboard. Transverse thrust, exacerbated by the current, was the cause. Even though the
forward tug tried to stop the swing, the ship's bow struck the mooring dolphin, which was,
sited 17.5 metres inshore from the quay edge and therefore protected from contact damage
during normal berthing manoeuvres. Furthermore, the after tug was attached on the port
quarter with a very short lead and could do nothing to stop the swinyg. Had the master
realised this would happen he would have allowed the ship safely to overshoot the
berth.
The effect of transverse thrust in a single screw ship should never be underestimated,
particularly when manoeuvring in close proximity to structures and when moving astern.
Masters should also bear in mind that manoeuvring in shallow water or close to canal or'
river banks may significantly alter the effect of transverse thrust, either increasing its strength
or, in some instances, reversing the anticipated direction. For this reason, it is essential to have
tugs properly deployed.
66
SAQ 4
(a)
No solutions are found by waiting and seeing policy. Explain the meaning
of this when taking an action when things are going wrong.
(b)
(c)
What difficulties were experienced when the ship master does not take into
account the transverse thrust.
4.4 SUMMARY
Reviews of most accidents reveal that the human failure and not machinery failures are
responsible for accidents of ships and these mainly occur due to enor of judgment, lack
of knowledge or failure to communicate on part of officer of the watch.
In this unit you have learnt about the accidents that have been caused due to above causes
and safe practices which are required to be followed from the passage planning stage
till the navigation with pilot on board.
You have also been made aware of situations where ships got involved into accidents
and various related case studies.
Out at sea mistakes are costly and are not permitted.
Mastef, OOW, helmsman and lookout are the bridge team. Master is overall
in charge and the OOW is in charge of navigation with assistance of the
helmsman and lookout. Important part of the Bridge team management is
that all are to look out for the navigational safety together and not wait for
the other person to point out if things are going wrong.
(b)
A number of examples are given earlier and one must realise that all these
happen because of the failure of the team even though in some cases, it may
appear that one or the other is to be blamed.
(c)
When the ship is under pilotage'the bridge team functions do not change
only that they are to follow pilot's advise and if found that things are not
going to plan to bring this notice of the pilot and the Master.
SAQ 2
(a)
Master is in control of all actions. Pilot provides the local knowledge. A form
is used on the ship to exchange information between the pilot and the master. In
the event of accident, the master is responsible even if it can be I proved that
he acted under pilot's advice. You may thing it unfair but then Master or his
officers should have corrected the pilot in good time.
(b)
Port pilot plan is from the pilot boarding area to the berth and includes the
track to be followed, critical areas to be avoided, way points where sharp turns
may be needed and the helmsman need to be alert, tug assistance if needed,
manoeuvring speeds, etc.
(c)
Any audit is for the purpose of ensuring that the procedures agreed are being
followed and changes where necessary are implemented. Audit should take
account of the accidents or incidents and ascertain whether the same has been
investigated and corrective actions are implemented.
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SAQ 3
(a)
(b)
(c)
Safe speed.
Engines ready.
If action is taken on radar observations, same should-be in
ample time and the effect of such action shall be watched.
SAQ 4
(a)
(b)
In any action waiting and seeing is no solution as problems don't get solved
by waiting. Right action has to be taken and has to be early. When things
are going wrong OOW may need assistance and it should be called for.
Remember again the OOW has the entire ship and its facilities at his command
and one should not feel shy of using them.
Using the radar properly means checking the following :
Is it tuned correctly?
Are you using the right range?
If there is too much clutter, have you adjusted the controls
correctly?
Are you plotting all the targets and checking their progress?
If in the coastal waters, is the ship in safe position?
Have you proper lookouts and are you at safe speed?
(c) Transverse thrust of the propeller swings the bow to starboard when the
ship is going astern in a right handed propeller and to port when going
ahead. If this property is not taken into account, the ship may swing to starboard
when going astern causing accident when such swing is not desirable. Swing to
port when going ahead is not so noticeable at full speed.,
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