Consti 2 Cases Compilation

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
on July 19, 2011 Agz
Police. Those participating in the demonstration were workers in the

1st shift, regular 2nd and 3rd shifts.
Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy National

Patrimony Qualified Filipinos
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, respondent

called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the
meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union.
But it was stressed that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable
constitutional rights to freedom of expression, speech and petition for
redress of grievances.
FACTS :
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS
decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders
participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid
was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was
the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning
bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH
matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under
par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to
accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the
perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among
others that:
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an
implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and
policy (not self-executing);
Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under national patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder
and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would

interrupt the normal course of their business, which may result to loss
of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that
the workers would lose their jobs if they continue with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated its
appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those
from the 1st and regular shifts should not participate in the
demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to withdraw, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO
were eventually dismissed for violation of the No strike and No
lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of
the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial relations for being filed two days late.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the
1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing. The
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and
ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore,
we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only
pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical
entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter-productive and inimical
to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when
a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital
is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.
Issues:
(nag kabuang ko pangita og net cafe) paita.
4 People v. Marti JM Facts: Andres Marti (appellant) and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" carrying with them 4 gift wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes attended to them. Andres informed Anita Reyes that he was
sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, namely, "WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland".
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. However, he refused, assuring that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts
to his friend in Zurich. Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size. Styro-foam was placed at
the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed
with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment
CASE 2
3. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION
(PBMEO) vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (PBMCI) -Ces
June 5, 1973
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO)
is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (respondent). Petitioner decided to
stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang on on March 4,
1969 to express grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig
CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as
1. Whether or not the petitioner's constitutional rights to freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress
of grievances should be upheld over the companys right to property.
- Yes. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property
rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not
prescribe. The companys right to property should yield to the
workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances which
are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to mans
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. The companys loss of unrealized profits for the day of the
strike is not as important as the workers' fight for their rights. In fact,
they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for
that day.
2. Whether or not the mass demonstration of the PBMEO was a
violation of the companys No strike and No lockout rule.
- NO. The demonstration was not a violation of the No strike and No
lockout clause but was in fact a valid exercise of the workers
constitutional rights to express their grievances against the Pasig
police, not against the company.
3. WON there was a justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners
by the respondent and the CIR.
- NO. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by
technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is
a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature
itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in
the denial of a persons constitutional right, the CIR should not have
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the
court divested itself of its jurisdiction, which rendered its decision in
favor of the company null and void.
A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND
IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVIL WHICH THE STATE HAS THE
RIGHT TO PREVENT. When a Court acts against the Constitution, its
judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend
its own rules whenever the purpose of justice requires it.
1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012
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Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or

Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When
he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers
and took several grams of the contents.
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the
Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. Job Reyes
brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed
and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The package which
allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried
marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars.
Thereafter, Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act and was
convicted.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence had been obtained in violation of
appellants constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and the same should be held inadmissible in evidence .
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant''s constitutional rights, be invoked against the state?
Held: We hold in the negative! The Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the
Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
1.) the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in
the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private individual and
other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant
must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935
Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in
the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was
procured by police authorities or private individuals.
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying
down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of
the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced
in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility
of the judge in the issuance thereof. The modifications introduced
deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint
stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree
with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill
of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result
in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual
effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the
alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.
FACTS:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug

Corporation on 15 August 1988.
31 July 1989 - Catolico received a memo from WATEROUS VP-GM
Emma Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees
chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a
prohibited practice and warned her not to negotiate with suppliers
of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department.
In another memo - a WATEROUS Supervisor warned Catolico against
the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents."
29 January 1990 a WATEROUS Control Clerk informed Co that he
noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP):
Catolico overpriced the 10 bottles of Voren Tablets (from P320 to
P384) she purchased from YSP and pocketed the P640.00 overprice.
Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, confirmed that the
check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. .
As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she
opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana
answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas."
Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension.
Catolico requested access to the file for her to be able to make a
satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's
invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope
addressed to Catolico.
Catolico explained that the check she received from YSP was a
Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that
the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an
earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
March 5, 1990 - WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a
memo notifying Catolico of her termination.
May 5, 1990 - Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal
suspension.
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter found no proof of unfair labor
practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of
Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as
complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was
conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due
process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of
the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay; back wages
for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal
suspension "representing 30 days work."
Petitioners appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it
aside.
In its decision, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on
the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's
evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in
favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter
opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of
Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in
violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights.
HELD: NO.
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires
that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity
to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if
the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable
him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an
opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in
the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after
receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever
conducted. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic]
in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on
the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a
finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Catolico was dismissed
because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP.
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Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that

there was an overcharge. It clearly appears then that Catolico's
dismissal was based on hearsay information. The difference in price
may be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase
order. Assuming that there was an overcharge, the purchase orders
were recommended, verified and approved by the WATEROUS
management. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners,
they should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently,
petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but
themselves.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion,
which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee
for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and
not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to
which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is
restricted.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC
anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that
Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the
parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico.
26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo

weight checks.
- When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed
at 212 pounds. Still, way over the ideal weight. On November 13,
1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was
given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his
answer and submit controverting evidence
- June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to
his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost
leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total
of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated
"effective immediately.
Issues:
I.
WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S
OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)
OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S
DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.
WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS
NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED
WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN
FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED.
IV.
WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A SPEARATION PAY
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Ruling:
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI VS. PAL
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article

282(e) of the Labor Code.
This is a case of an international flight steward who was dismissed

because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
Petitioner claimed that he was illegally dismissed. He argues that (1)
his dismissal does not fall under 282 of the Labor Code; (2) continuing
adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona
fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated
against because other overweight employees were promoted
instead of being disciplined.
Facts:
- Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight
steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands 5'8" with a large
body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166
pounds.
- The weight problem dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised
him to go on an extended vacation leave (Dec. 29, 1984 to Mar 4,
1985) to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to
meet the standards, prompting another leave without pay (Mar 5,
1985 to Nov 1985).
- Petitioner met the required weight, and was allowed to return to
work. But his weight problem recurred. He again went on leave
without pay from (Oct 17, 1988 to Feb 1989).
- April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, he was removed
from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally
requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight
checks on several dates
- February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. Instead of
losing, weight, he was overweight at 215 pounds. Consequently, his
off-duty status was retained.
- October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator personally visited petitioner
to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner gained
2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a
commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew
Group Manager.
- Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given to him to reach his
ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he
was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.
- Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was
given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As
usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates.
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks
- April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated
refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly.
He was given another set of weight check dates. Again, petitioner
ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June
An employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply

with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the
employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must
maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that establish
continuing qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the
failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a)
whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be
a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying
standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under
grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that
apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to
employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an
employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in
order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of
the faults for which an employee can be dismissed; the employee
can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job
irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or
intentional.
Petitioner invoked the Nadura v. Benguet case, he says his dismissal is
illegal:
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is
substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not
decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was
Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent
in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third,
in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work
because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his
failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed
due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the
dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages.
Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner
for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura,
the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was
accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to
comply with the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against
petitioner's claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to
reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for
him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and selfdiscipline.
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense.
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Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) - Employment in

particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the
job
- Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not
exist if there is no statute providing for it. Further, there is no existing
BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution, the Labor Code,and RA No. 7277 or the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission
(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service
Employee's Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted
the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment
policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the
performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that
work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the
legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v.
Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer
must prove that(1) the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and(2) that
there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used
because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance."
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied
if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and
CA are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances.
The law leaves no room for
common carrier. Thus, it is
standards of PAL show its
obligations imposed upon it
carrier.
mistake or oversight on the part of a

only logical to hold that the weight
effort to comply with the exacting
by law by virtue of being a common
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed

itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must
necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight
deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of
PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its
employees.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated
against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a
convenient excuse to discriminate against him. We are constrained,
however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "the element
of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position
for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of
dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-andavoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal,
including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the
private respondent's failure to comply." It is a basic rule in evidence
that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an
affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with
particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the
finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish
discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who
are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be
shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the
differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of
his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed
overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate
their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the
periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the
particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they
got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately
established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of
the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to
meet."
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative

agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded
respect, even finality. The reason is simple: administrative agencies
are experts in matters within their specific and specialized
jurisdiction. But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies
if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it
can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the
contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual
findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must
be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated
evidence. We thus annul their findings.
IV. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation
pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the
Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an
ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed
employee as an act "social justice," or based on "equity." In both
instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious
misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the
employee.
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2)
month's pay for every year of service. It should include regular
allowances which he might have been receiving. We are not blind to
the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to
any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also
recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a
decade.
7. FILOTEO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996) - Construction of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights
By Bai Monisa Gampong in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is
constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished
of these is the right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his choice. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its
predecessors, expressly covenants that such guarantee cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the
present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him
retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in
1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also
alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was
extracted through torture, and that the prosecutions evidence was
insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner,
the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was
committed is likewise motu propio addressed by the Court in this
Decision.
Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected
criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations
attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he
could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the
other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of
the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.
Along with his co-accused Martin
Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC
PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo
Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel
Gerardo Escalada.
Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt.

Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Exand civilians Ricardo Perez,
Liwanag, Severino Castro and
On May 3, 1982, in Meycauyan, Bulacan, the said accused, two of

whom were armed with guns, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the
Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway
of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob
and carry away with them the following:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Postal Delivery Truck

Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers
Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers
Treasury Warrants
Page |
4
5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US
Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare
Beneficiaries
and
Private
Individuals
from
Bulacan,
Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage
and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount.
On separate dates, Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles
pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza,
Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and remained at
large.
Mateo escaped from police custody and was
tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973
Constitution. Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial
on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were
thus ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the
case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in
absentia. Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court
rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution.
Issue
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession

executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer,
admissible in evidence against him? YES
Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment
and intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible? NO
Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper? Any irregularity
attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt?YES
What crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed? ROBBERY
Ruling:
Uncounselled Waiver
SC finds that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioners
extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the
crime. Petitioner contends that SC erred in admitting his extrajudicial
confession
notwithstanding
uncontradicted
testimony
and
documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through
torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation
and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims
that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was denied the
right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right was
likewise without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions
the respondent Courts admission in evidence of his extrajudicial
confession on the strength of cases upholding the admissibility of
extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel
especially where the statements are replete with details and
circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness. We shall first
tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution reads as follows:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims
of torture or similar practices and their families. (underscoring
supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right
against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is
provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution)
In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court

categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973
Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be
prospectively applied. This Court said:
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has
and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective
effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been
informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in
evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the
New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession
is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if
presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been
informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the
right to be so informed before that date.
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution
requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during
custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel
may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be
admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial
confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect,
should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive
ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court,
through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed
by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The court specifically
ruled that (t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter,
in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano vigorously taught:
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not
to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first
announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20
March 1985 in People vs. Galit.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section
12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to
appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined
inMorales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach
waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation
of Morales.
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits
of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed
his
extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May
30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective application of
judge-made laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of
Appeals where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides
that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,
and Article 4 of the same Code which states that (l)aws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, the principle of
prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to
judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means.
Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to
him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the RPC
provides that (p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual
criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional provision
specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a
penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the
individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to
protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or
groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand,
strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense
committed against the state which the executive of the state has the
power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment
imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its
law
Hence, petitioners vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison to make his
extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the
extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after
the promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983.
The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether
such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. The waiver must
also be categorical and definitive, and must rest on clear evidence.
Page |
5
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised

petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right but
petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a
lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy
Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General Assignment
Section, still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel.
It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been
ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year
criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic
course. Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the
investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics
used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects. in other words,
he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.
9 Taxicab Operators v. BOT 1982
By Monica Katherine Juezan in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST
POOL Edit Doc Delete
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO
and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF LAND TRANSPORTATION
FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs
within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible
to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and
Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being
an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe
and comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time
and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued
operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of
comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old
and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of
Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi
operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made
reasonable profit for his investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares
that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in
implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules
and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are
ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer
be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for
1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for
registration and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be
registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979,
only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration
and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be
a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 Model 1974
1981 Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby
ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of
registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall
be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent
turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules
herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its
implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after
the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after
the date has been determined by the Board.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the
Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No.
52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol
Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of
phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as
public conveyances.
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in
registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model
1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,
docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to
stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the

time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a
"Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of
their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners
presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the
same, and manifested that they would submit additional
documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981
attached to petitioners' pleading.
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a
"Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition"
praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than
December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of
their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on
January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups
of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case
could not be located.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum
circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree
No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101,
would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard?
HELD:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the
power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due
process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to
submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend
any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway
accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering
necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan
or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or
require the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the
options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state
with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other
sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators
of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data
aand information that may be desired by the BOT.
On Equal Protection of the Law
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT
Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that
the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment
be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically
or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject
of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required
under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance
would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be
clear, categorical and undeniable.
Page |
6
The Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed
11 DECS v San Diego - Lobaton
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and Director of
Center for Educational Measurement, petitioners, vs. Roberto Rey
San Diego and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,
respondents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists
who should
never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied
banking and
teachers who could be better as merchants
-- and of lawyers who may prove better as plumbers.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FACTS:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a

degree in Bachelor of Science in Zoology.
A check with the Department of Education showed that he took and

flunked the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) four times and
was applying to take a fifth examination.
DECS rejected his application following its rule that: A student shall be
allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT
for the fourth time.
To compel his admission to the test, private respondent went to the

RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, invoking his constitutional rights to
freedom and quality education and challenging the constitutionality
of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited
rule.
Respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition, holding that San
Diego had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE: Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
HELD:
(On Police Power)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the SC upheld the constitutionality of the
NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education. (Said rationale should also
be applied to the case at bar.)
As to the contention that private respondent has been deprived of
his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise
of the police power, the same holds no bearing. The police power of
the state is said to be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other
words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Lawful subject: It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
Lawful method: The method employed by the challenged regulation
is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to
aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor -- one cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patients.
Hence, no arbitrary exercise of the police power in this light.
(Minor Issues)
1.) The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent

is not absolute. The constitution also provides that every person has
the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
2.) The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate
with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Art. III,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution. There would only be unequal protection if
some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others
who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
Petition GRANTED, decision of respondent court REVERSED.
Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD (Police power)
By Joseph Madriaga in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
Facts: R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432 became effective on
March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: The senior citizens shall
be entitled to twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments
relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens. . .The establishment may claim the discounts as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered. Provided, that the cost of the discount shall be allowed as
deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative Order No 177
amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent
discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic
medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and nonprescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated
that [t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided
in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
Issue: Whether or not the State, in promoting the health and welfare
of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government
program.
Held:Yes, the law is a legitimate exercise of police power of the
State.
Reason: The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize
the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being
as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The
priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set
forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides: Pursuant to Article XV,
Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care
of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social
security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies provides: The State shall provide social
justice in all phases of national development. Further, Article XIII,
Section 11, provides: The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority
for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women
and children. Consonant with these constitutional principles the
following are the declared policies of this Act:
...
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the
improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek
their partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty
percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services,
and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by
theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of
culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a
form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim
the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet
all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
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7
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,

insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all
the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by
the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would
be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they
will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating
the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is
no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up
with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show
properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works
greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they
will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00
senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be
shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the
government by way of a tax deduction.
To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the antihypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According
to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at P37.57 per
tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20%
discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it
would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from
capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax
deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full
amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20%
discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores.
Petitioners computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement,
the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from
gross income,the amount of income derived from all sources before
deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here,
petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which
should not be the case. An income statement, showing an
accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for
a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the
discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners
cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss
should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was
erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted
wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on
income, not on the amount of the discount.
Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because
they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat
nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the
part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines
below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of
this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners
cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they
cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to
competition.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical
industry and the competitive pricing component of the business.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must
accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article
XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of
property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian
reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities,
continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be
relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of
public good.
(13) MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. G.R. NO. 135962
(March 27, 2000) kiji-
demolished. BAVA then, filed a case for injunction enjoining the

opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall. The trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in
the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the
public.
Held: No.The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune
Street which was not mandated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City, is illegal.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only
such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents.
Nature of Case
Petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive
Order No. 566 (EO 566) and Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 (RIRR).
Facts:
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (Government

agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila)
Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc (Government agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila and the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.)
Facts: Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a
notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic and that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
June 11 and 12 2006 - the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)

conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide.
June 2006 - licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that
handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated
during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at
the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The PRC
later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing
members.
June 19 2006 - the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board
Examinations.
August 18 2006 - the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on
August 22 2006.
Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo)
replaced all the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President
Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing Board
Examinations.
September 8 2006 - President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized
the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review
centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
November 3 2006 - the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S.
Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49,
series of 2006 (IRR)
In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association
of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review
centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing,
among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center
to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review
centers.
In a letter dated 3 January 2007, Chairman Puno wrote petitioner,
through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend
the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the
mandate of EO 566. hairman Puno also wrote that petitioner's
comments and suggestions would be considered in the event of
revisions to the IRR.
In view of petitioner's continuing request to suspend and re-evaluate
the IRR, Chairman Puno, in a letter dated 9 February 2007, invited
petitioner's representatives to a dialogue on 14 March 2007. In
accordance with what was agreed upon during the dialogue,
petitioner submitted to the CHED its position paper on the IRR.
Petitioner also requested the CHED to confirm in writing Chairman
Puno's statements during the dialogue, particularly on lowering of the
registration fee from P400,000 to P20,000 and the requirement for
reviewers to have five years' teaching experience instead of five
years' administrative experience. Petitioner likewise requested for a
categorical answer to their request for the suspension of the IRR. The
CHED did not reply to the letter.
On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR.
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8
On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to

Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations8 praying
for a ruling:
(1.) Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers
from the coverage of the CHED;
(2.) Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review
centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and
PRC-recognized professional associations with recognized programs,
or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and
(3.) Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722
(RA 7722) limiting the CHED's coverage to public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs
in post-secondary educational institutions.
Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and
from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said
newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine
or periodical of said province or city.
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in
Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be
printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections
of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which
manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly
or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or
political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by
the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that
the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
October 8 2007 - the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-200710 referring

petitioner's request to exclude independent review centers from
CHED's supervision and regulation to the Office of the President as
the matter requires the amendment of EO 566. To exclude the
operation of independent review centers from the coverage of
CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive
Order No. 566.
October 26 2007 - petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR,
the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the
prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.
April 23 2008 - a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support
of the Petition and a Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA
Review School of the Philippines, Inc. (CPAR), Professional Review
and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC), ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA),
CRC-ACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all independent CPA
review centers operating in Manila (collectively, petitionersintervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration of EO 566
and the RIRR as invalid on the ground that both constitute an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.
In implementation of this resolution, COMELEC sent identical letters to

various publishers of newspapers all members of the PPI, directing
them to provide free print space to the COMELEC to be used by
candidates for the senatorial field to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of
government.
Issues:
The OSG in its comment representing the COMELEC alleged that the
resolution did not impose upon the publishers any obligation to
provide free print space in newspapers as it does not provide any
administrative of criminal sanction for noncompliance with the
resolution. According to the OSG, the resolution merely provided for
guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of
COMELEC space. The OSG further maintains that Section 8 of the
resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the COMELEC over the communication and
information operations of print media enterprises during the election
period to safeguard and ensure the fair, impartial and credible
election.
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of

legislative power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rulemaking power.
** These are the main issues in the case. However, the focus
on our topic is on the issue ofPolice Power.
Held:
Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general
welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex - the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police
power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised
by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid
delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722
authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree
granting review centers.
In case the other issues will be asked...
(1) The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's
coverage under RA 7722. The CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is
limited to public and private institutions of higher education and
degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
Therefore, it is unconstitutional.
PPI now comes to the court seeking the declaration of

unconstitutionality of Resolution No. 2772 on the grounds that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. It also sought to
declare the letter directives of the COMELEC void for requiring
publishers to give free "COMELEC Space" and at the same time
process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of
involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On April 20, 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining COMELEC from
implementing the assailed resolution.
During the oral hearing, the COMELEC clarified that the resolution
and the letter directives were not intended to compel those
members to supply COMELEC with free print space, rather, they were
merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print
space which many publishers had voluntarily given to the COMELEC
during the 1992 elections.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor
General a manifestation which attached a copy of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995 which clarified the
previously issued resolution.
Issue: Whether or not Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a
valid exercise of power of eminent domain.
Held: No. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
(2) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20,
Title I of Book III of EO(invoked by the OSG to justify GMAs action)
requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of
the Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for
under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to
amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative
power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED's quasilegislative power.
Ruling:
15. PPI v. COMELEC (Pasquin)
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for

public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element
of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are
unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for
election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of
Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. 3Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
Facts:
On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772,
Sections 2 and 8 of which read,
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print
space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper
of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec
The power of eminent domain is one of the fundamental and

eminent powers of the State. Power of eminent domain is usually
understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign to appropriate,
not only public but private property of all citizens within the territorial
sovereignty, to public purpose. Eminent domain is the act in which
property can be seized from a citizen with due compensation. In
other words, the state can take over someone's land if they give a
monetary compensation, as long as there is a true reason for such an
action.
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9
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative

authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must
be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of a private property for public use is authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. And
apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec
space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as
petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require
newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec
purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to
donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper
and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to
Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain.
As for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Court ruled that the issue
on its constitutionality is not yet ripe for judicial review for lack of
actual case or controversy.
Telecom v. COMELEC
By BonChe Verana Quibo in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
TELECOM v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners Telebab and GMA Network incorporated are
questioning the validity of Section 92, B.P No 881 the Omnibus
Election Code with respect to broadcast media.
SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at
least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or
city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper,
publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said
province or city, which shall be known as Comelec Space wherein
candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be
allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission
among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is
circulated. (print ads)
SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as Comelec Time which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,
the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of the campaign. (tv air time)
Petitioners claim that such provision of the Omnibus Election Code
takes property without due process of law; that it violates the
eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the
payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the
equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the
terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. Petitioners
contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process
clause[6] and the eminent domain provision[7] of the Constitution by
taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations
without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property.
Question on Standing: Telebab has no standing, GMA has. GMA as a
broadcasting network, directly suffers loss as part of the effects of
Section 92.
ISSUE: Whether there is property taken by the government in
implementing Section 92 of B.P 881
RULING: In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a
franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service. In the granting of the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it
cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving
free air time.
The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in
unrealized revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that
air time is finished product which, it is said, become the property of
the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural
resources after undergoing a process for their production. But air
time is not owned by broadcast companies. As held in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,[ which upheld the right of a party
personally attacked to reply, licenses to broadcast do not confer
ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary
privilege of using them. Consequently, a license permits

broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the
one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the
exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.As radio and
television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the
COMELEC.
It is noteworthy that 49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which 92 of B.P. Blg.
881 was taken, expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should
be considered as part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public
information and education under their respective franchises or
permits. There is no reason to suppose that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881
considers the COMELEC Time therein provided to be otherwise than
as a public service which petitioner is required to render under 4 of
its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid
amendment of petitioners franchise but the enforcement of a duty
voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of
privilege.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of
public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. As radio
and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the
COMELEC.
To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The use of
property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to
intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just
and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they
may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that
common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
17 Estate of Suguitan v City Sagarino
SC 3rd DIVISION
G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,
vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.
DECI SI ON
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners prayed for the
reversal of RTC Pasigs Order that (1) declared that the City of
Mandaluyong has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land
together with existing improvements thereon (TCT No. 56264 Registry
of Deeds, Metro Manila District II) for the public use or purpose upon
payment of just compensation, and (2) directed the parties to submit
to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, a list of
independent appraisers from which the Court will select three (3) to
be appointed as Commissioners.
October 13, 1994 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong
City issued a RESOLUTIONauthorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos
to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto
Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in
Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more
particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of
the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose
of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center.
January 20, 1995 Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a
letter dated offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.
March 13, 1995 the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for
expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
following grounds
(1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in
accordance with law;
(2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject
property;
(3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property
without payment of just compensation;
(4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for
the payment of the property being expropriated; and
(5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor
Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use.
October 24, 1995 the trial court denied Suguitan's motion to
dismiss.
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10
November 14, 1995 the trial court issued an order allowing the City
of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property
upon the DEPOSIT of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market
value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration
of such property.
December 15, 1995 the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession
of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the
trial court on December 14, 1995.
July 28, 1998 the court granted the assailed order
of EXPROPRIATION.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong must exercise its delegated
power of eminent domain by means of an ORDINANCE as required
by 19 RA 7160, and not by means of a mere RESOLUTION.
the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent
domain is already being exercised.
C. EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING
Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation
proceedings are comprised of two stages:
(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety
of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends
with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;
HELD:
A. EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public
welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power
grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent
domain appertains to every independent government without the
necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in
modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of
property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to
the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without
limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." Furthermore,
the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional
safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is
firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to
local government units, other public entities and public utilities,
although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily
narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units is 19 of RA 7160 which provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ORDINANCE, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted; Provided,further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally,
That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
B. ORDINANCE vs RESOLUTION
Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the
power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the
delegating law. The courts have the obligation to determine whether
the following requisites have been complied with by the LGU
concerned:
1. An ORDINANCE is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose
or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section
9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted
differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for
a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
An examination of the applicable law will show that
an ORDINANCE is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with
(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the

court of the just compensationfor the property sought to be taken;
this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners.
D. IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR (of Eminent Domain) which provides
that:
If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose,
or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said property
through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its (local) chief
executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
19 of RA 7160 prevails over IRR which merely seeks to implement it. It
is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is
a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since
Article 32, Rule VI of IRR, also requires that, in exercising the power of
eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to
an ordinance. SC cannot grant judicial sanction to a local
government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.
However, SC ruling in this case does not preclude the City of
Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary ordinance and
thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has
complied with all other legal requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998
decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No.
875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
18 ESTATE vs. CITY OF MANILA
By Bembem Sarno in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
FACTS:Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are
the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land
situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila. These parcels of land are being
occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom are
respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent
Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). On
November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, they filed
ejectment complaints against respondents Rosario Abiog and
Angelina Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes
was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners obtained favorable judgments
against said respondents. Respondents Abiog and Maglonso
appealed to the RTC and to the CA but both appeals were denied.
As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of eviction against
respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in
1998.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases
against respondents Abiog and Maglonso,respondent City filed a
complaint for eminent domain (expropriation)]of the properties of
petitioners. The properties sought to be acquired by the City
included parcels of land occupied by respondents Abiog, Maglonso
and members of respondent SBMI. The complaint was based
on Ordinance No. 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing
the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land.
According to the ordinance, the said properties were to be
distributed to the intended beneficiaries, who were the occupants
of the said parcels of land who (had) been occupying the said lands
as lessees or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years.
Thus, respondent City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent
the petitioners a written offer to purchase the subject properties
forP10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. Respondent City
prayed that an order be issued fixing the provisional value of the
property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on the current tax
declaration of the real properties and that it be authorized to enter
and take possession thereof upon the deposit with the trial court of
the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid value.
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On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock

corporation composed of the residents of the subject properties
(including as well as representing herein respondents Abiog and
Maglonso), filed a motion for intervention and admission of their
attached complaint with prayer for injunction. Respondent SBMI
alleged that it had a legal interest over the subject matter of the
litigation as its members were the lawful beneficiaries of the subject
matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting the occupants
of the subject properties. The trial court denied the motion for
intervention in an order on the ground that the movants interest
(was) indirect, contingent, remote, conjectual (sic), consequential
(sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it (existed) at all,
purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that may or may
not be granted.
On the day SBMIs motion for intervention was denied, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain for lack of
merit.
On June 6, 1995, the trial court allowed respondent City to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit of the amount
of P1,542,793, based on the P10,285,293.38 offer by respondent City
to petitioners which the trial court fixed as the provisional amount of
the subject properties. On October 3, 1995, the Citys complaint for
eminent domain was dismissed.[15] The trial court held that
expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners were in
fact willing to sell the subject properties under terms acceptable to
the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer
was rejected by petitioners. Respondent Citys motion for
reconsideration was denied.
However, on January 27, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as
valid respondent Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain over
petitioners properties.
There can be no interpretation of the letter of the defendantappellee other than that the valid and definite offer of the plaintiffappellant to purchase the subject property was not accepted or
turned down. The lower court held that the defendants-appellees
were actually willing to sell, in fact, some of the tenants have already
purchased the land that they occupy. However, we agree with the
plaintiff-appellant that the contracts entered into by the defendantsappellees with some of the tenants do not affect the offer it made.
The plaintiff-appellant was not a party in those transactions and as
pointed out, its concern is the majority of those who have no means
to provide themselves with decent homes to live on.
What followed were incidents leading to the filing of the petition
for certiorari against the resolution of the Court of Appeals which
essentially sought to enjoin the petitioners from enforcing the final
judgments against respondents Abiog, Maglonso and SBMI
(hereinafter, respondent occupants) in the ejectment cases.
Maglonso filed for a protective order but was not granted.
Thgereafter, SBMI sought for the same o stop the execution of the
final and executory judgments in the ejectment cases against them.
On September 4, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to set aside as
ineffective and/or null and void the said August 19, 1998 resolution.
But the Court of Appeals denied the same enjoining JBL and herein
petitioners from disturbing the physical possession of all the properties
subject of the expropriation proceedings.
On 27 January 1998, we held that the plaintiff-appellant validly
exercised its power of eminent domain and consequently may
expropriate the subject property upon payment of just
compensation. The record before us shows that on 6 June 1995, the
lower court allowed the plaintiff-appellant to take possession of the
subject property upon filing of P1,542,793.00 deposit. The property to
be expropriated includes the same properties subject of the
ejectment cases against the intervenors. There is nothing in the
record that would show that the order of possession was ever set
aside or the deposit returned to the plaintiff-appellant. in insisting
that its offer was valid and that the amount it deposited was
sufficient, respondent City reiterates the reasons cited by the Court of
Appeals. According to respondent City, there is nothing in the Local
Government Code of 1991 which requires the offer to be made
before enacting an enabling ordinance. The actual exercise of the
power of eminent domain begins only upon the filing of the
complaint for eminent domain with the RTC by the Chief Executiv e
and not when an ordinance pursuant thereto has been enacted. It is
therefore safe to say that the offer to purchase can be made before
the actual filing of the complaint, whether that is before or after the
ordinance is enacted.
ISSUE: WON the respondent cuty may legally expropriate the subject
properties
HELD: Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property
without due process of law depends on whether the City complied
with the legal requirements for expropriation. Before respondent City
can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be
sanctioned and must not violate any law. Being a mere creation of
the legislature, a local government unit can only exercise powers
granted to it by the legislature. Such is the nature of the constitutional
power of control of Congress over local government units, the latter
being mere creations of the former.
When it expropriated the subject properties, respondent City relied
on its powers granted by Section 19 of the Local Government Code
of 1991]and RA 409 (The Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The

latter specifically gives respondent City the power to expropriate
private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
program.]Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the
conditions and standards prescribed by RA 7279 (the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992), the law governing the
expropriation of property for urban land reform and housing. Sections
9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized
housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands
of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle
lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development,
Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong
Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not
yet been acquired; and (f)
Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this
section shall not apply. The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.
Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands
for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property
owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally,
that abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and
escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure
laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. [italics supplied]
In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals,]we held that the above-quoted
provisions are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring
private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a
means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of
due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public
use.
We find that herein respondent City failed to prove strict compliance
with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Respondent
City neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the
proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said
requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, respondent City in its
pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of
Appeals was likewise silent on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a
clear violation of the right to due process of the petitioners.
We also take note of the fact that Filstream is substantially similar in
facts and issues to the case at bar.
In that case, Filstream acquired a favorable judgment of eviction
against the occupants of its properties in Tondo, Manila. But prior
thereto, on the strength of Ordinance 7818 (the same ordinance
used by herein respondent City as basis to file the complaint for
eminent domain), respondent City initiated a complaint for
expropriation of Filstreams properties in Tondo, Manila, for the
benefit of the residents thereof. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and
the City opposed the same. The trial court denied the motion. When
the judgment in the ejectment case became final, Filstream was
able to obtain a writ of execution and demolition. It thereafter filed a
motion to dismiss the expropriation complaint but the trial court
denied the same and ordered the condemnation of the subject
properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied Filstreams
petition on a technical ground. Thus, the case was elevated to this
Court for review of the power of the City to expropriate the
Filstreams properties.
Meanwhile, the occupants and respondent City filed in separate
branches of the RTC of Manila several petitions for certiorari with
prayer for injunction to prevent the execution of the judgments in the
ejectment cases. After the consolidation of the petitions for certiorari,
the designated branch of RTC Manila dismissed the cases on the
ground of forum-shopping. The dismissal was appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed the trial courts dismissal and granted
respondents prayer for injunction. Filstream appealed the same to
this Court, which appeal was consolidated with the earlier petition for
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the main
expropriation case.
Due to the substantial resemblance of the facts and issues of the
case at bar to those in Filstream, we find no reason to depart from
our ruling in said case. To quote:
The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of
preliminary injunction is but a mere incident to the actual controversy
which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the parties
in this case over the disputed premises. In order to determine
Page |
12
whether private respondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs

granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the
source of discord.
Due to the fatal infirmity in the Citys exercise of the power of
eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation must necessarily fail.
Considering that the consolidated cases before us can be
completely resolved by the application of our Filstream ruling, it is
needless to discuss the constitutionality of Ordinance 7818. We herein
apply the general precept that constitutional issues will not be
passed upon if the case can be decided on other grounds.
In view of the dismissal of the complaint for expropriation and the
favorable adjudication of petitioners appeal from the decision of
the Court of Appeals on the expropriation of the subject properties,
the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the Court of
Appeals resolutions (allowing respondent occupants to intervene
and granting their motion to enjoin the execution of the executory
judgments in the ejectment cases) becomes moot and academic.
19 MCWD v J. Kings & Sons
By Mac-mac Sinsona in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
19 MCWD v J. Kings & Sons
Facts: - Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its purposes are to acquire,
install, improve, maintain and operate water supply and distribution
systems within the boundaries of the District.
- Petitioner wanted to acquire a five square meter lot occupied by its
production well. The lot is part of respondents property covered by
TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City.
- Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons
Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the latters property.
Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioners proposal.
- After the negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter
initiated
expropriation proceedings through Board Resolution No. 015-20049
which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA).
- November 10, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the
five square meter portion of respondents property.
- February 7, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of possession. Petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court the
amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent of the
current zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal
Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter. The trial court
granted the motion and issued the writ of possession. Respondent
moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
- Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus, petitioner was
not able to gain entry to the lot.
- July 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting respondents petition. It ruled that the board resolution
which authorized the filing of the expropriation complaint lacked
exactitude and particularity which made it invalid; that there was no
genuine necessity for the expropriation of the five square meter lot
and; that the reliance on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 in fixing the
value of the property contravenes the judicial determination of just
compensation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion
was rejected.
Issue(topic - eminent domain): Whether or not petitioner may
exercise the power of eminent domain.
purpose. Being a corporation, petitioner can exercise its powers only

through its board of directors.
- For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two
requirements should be met, namely:first, its board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by
the LWUA. In this case, petitioners board of directors approved on
February 27, 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-200432 authorizing its
general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover,
the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a
complaint for the expropriation of respondents lot. Specifically, the
LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners
manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated February 28, 2005
authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case "against the
owner of the five square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by
TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended."
- The letter not only explicitly debunks respondents claim that there
was no authorization from LWUA but it also identifies the lot sought to
be expropriated with sufficient particularity.
It is settled that the validity of a complaint may be questioned
immediately upon its filing through a motion to dismiss or raised
thereafter as an affirmative defense. However, there is no need to
further belabor the issue since it is established that petitioner has the
legal capacity to institute the expropriation complaint.
- Anent the second issue involving the issuance of a writ of
possession, a discussion on the various stages in an expropriation
proceeding is necessary.
The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the
plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is
provided by R.A. No. 897434 . It requires the payment of one hundred
percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated
to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.
- In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages, first, is the
determination of the validity of the expropriation, and second is the
determination of just compensation.
- Petitioner was supposed to tender the provisional payment directly
to respondent during a hearing which it had failed to attend.
Petitioner, then, deposited the provisional payment with the court.
The trial court did not commit an error in accepting the deposit and
in issuing the writ of possession. The deposit of the provisional amount
with the court is equivalent to payment.
- Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that "upon
compliance with the guidelinesthe court shall immediately issue to
the implementing agency an order to take possession of the
property and start the implementation of the project." Upon
compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation
caseis entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it
becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the
writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither
exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the
provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the
legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974.
- It is mandatory on the trial courts part to issue the writ of possession
and on the sheriffs part to deliver possession of respondents
property to petitioner pursuant to the writ.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 26 July 2006 and
Resolution dated 28 September 2006 are REVERSED. The ORDERS of
the Regional Trial Court dated 01 April 2005 and 9 May 2005 are
hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is further DIRECTED to
immediately REMIT the amount of P17,500.00 to respondent and to
REQUIRE the sheriff to implement the writ of possession. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Held: Yes!
- Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property
for public use upon payment of just compensation. The power of
eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is
proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there
must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
- As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate
pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often
does, delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies,
public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner is one of the
numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter, P.D.
No. 198, as amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the power of
eminent domain.
- A corporation does not have powers beyond those expressly
conferred upon it by its enabling law. Petitioners charter provides
that it has the powers, rights and privileges given to private
corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in
it. All the powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be
exercised and performed by and through the board and that any
executive, administrative or ministerial power may be delegated and
redelegated by the board to any of its officers or agents for such
20 Republic v de Castellvi - Solis

By Revelen Radam Solis in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
20 Republic v de Castellvi Solis
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.CARMEN M. VDA.
DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
The land owned by defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de
Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de
Castellvi, was occupied by the Republic from July 1947 under a
contract of lease, which was renewed yearly. In 1956, before the
contract expires on June 30, plaintiff sought to renew it but
defendant refused. When the AFP, particularly the Philippine Air
Force, refused to vacate the lot owned by Castellvi after the
termination of the contract, the defendant informed the AFP,
through a letter to the Chief of Staff, that the heirs of the property
had decided not to renew the contract of lease of the property in
question because they have decided to subdivide the land to be
sold to the general public. Furthermore, she demanded that the
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13
property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter and

that the property be returned in the same condition prior to the
occupancy of the AFP. The Chief of Staff refused alleging that it was
difficult for the Air Force to vacate the property since there are
permanent installations and other facilities erected and established
therein amounting to almost P500,000.00. It was also alleged that the
acquisition of property by means of expropriation proceedings is
subject to recommendation to the President.
The defendant brought the suit to the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for the ejectment of the Philippine Air Force from their
land. While the ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed, on
June on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against
Carmen vda, de Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun, over two
parcels of land.
The Republic, among other things, alleged:
that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according
to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was
not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of
P259,669.10;
and prayed (1) that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at
P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate
possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;
(2) that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to
be expropriated,
(3) and that the court issues thereafter a final order of
condemnation.
On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional
value of the lands at P259,669.10.
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that
the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was
actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of
P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands. On May 16, 1960 the
trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay
defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of
the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to
deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the
supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16,
1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.
After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their
respective memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of
time, had adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of
the Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its
decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots is fair and just;
and required the Republic to pay interests.
On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or
reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence,
that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the
decision was against the law, against which motion defendants
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions. On July
8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or
reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a
supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional
newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961.
The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time
within which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on
appeal was finally submitted on December 6, 1961.
In December 1961, the trial court dismissed both appeals for having
been filed out of time. On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a
"motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for
reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal,
against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun
filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order,
stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may
be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at
the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on
appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein.
In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the
Republic's record on appeal as amended. Both Castellvi and
Toledo-Guzon did not insit on appeal.
the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of

Castellvi.
(2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of
but a moment's duration. The aforecited lease contract was for a
period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the
entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although
renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land.
(3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered
as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
Castellvi property as lessee.
(4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded
that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is
present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as
owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because
the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the
agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for
eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the
property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi
that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and
occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use
the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the
Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959.
The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of
26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
21 NPC v CA - Soriano
By Renie Jay Soriano in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
G.R. No. 113194 March 11, 1996
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MANGONDATO, respondents.
MACAPANTON
Facts:
In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of
a 21, 995 sq.m land, a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated
in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, under the mistaken belief
that it forms part of the public land reserved for use of the NAPOCOR
for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the
President of the Philippines dated Dec. 3, 1974.
ISSUE: Whether the taking be reckoned from the year 1947 or 1959.
HELD: Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined
generally as entering upon private property for more than a
momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of
property for purposes of eminent domain.
(1) The expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance
is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement
NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed
and administered by Marawi City so that in exchange for the citys
waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had
paid the city a financial assistance of P40.00 per sq.m.
Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered
private property and that he is not privy to any agreement between
NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment to the city
cannot be considered as payment to him.
Later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the subject property
belongs to Mangondato.
Page |
14
On July 13, 1990, NAPOCORs National Power Board (NAPOCORs

board) passed Resolution No. 90-225 resolving to pay Mangondato
P100.00 per sq.m for only a 12, 132 sq.m portion of the property plus
12% interest per annum from 1978. However, said resolution was
deferred to allow the NAPOCORs regional legal counsel to
determine whether P100.00 per sq.m is the fair market value.
On August 14, 1990, NAPOCORs board passed Resolution No. 90-316
resolving that Mangondato be paid the base price of P40.00 per
sq.m plus 12% from 1978 pending the determination whether P100.00
per sq.m is the fair market value.
NAPOCORs regional legal counsels findings state that
Mandondatos property is classified as industrial which has a fair
market value of P300.00 for those along the national highway and on
the basis of recent Supreme Court decisions, NAPOCOR has to pay
not less than P300.00 per sq.m. NAPOCORs board on May 17, 1991
passed Resolution No. 91-247 resolving to pay Mangondato P100.00
per sq.m for the property excluding 12% interest per annum.
In a letter dated December 17, 1991 and February 4, 1992,
Mandondato disagreed with Resolution No. 91-247. At the same
time, to get partial payment, he asked that he be paid in the
meantime, P100.00 per sq.m without prejudice to pursuing his claim
for the proper and just compensation plus interest thereon.
On February 12, 1992, NAPOCORs general counsel filed a
memorandum for its president finding no legal impediment if they, in
the meantime were to pay Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m without
prejudice to the final determination of the proper and just
compensation.
On March, 1991, the parties executed a Deed of Sale where
NAPOCOR paid Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m excluding interest
and without prejudice to Mandondatos pursuance of claims for just
compensation and interest.
In a letter dated April 20, 1992, Mangondato asked for the payment
of P300.00 per sq.m plus 12% interest per annum from 1978. However,
NAPOCORs board passed Resolution No. 92-121 granting its
president the authority to negotiate for the payment of P100.00 per
sq.m for the land plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 less
payments already made.
On July 7, 1992, Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil case
against NAPOCOR seeking to recover the possession of the property
described in the complaint as Lots 1 and 3 of the subdivision plan,
the payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 until the
surrender of the property, and other related costs.
On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed before the lower court a Civil
Case which is a Complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato
over the subject property.
Upon agreement of the parties, the two cases were ordered
consolidated and appointed Atty. Saipal Alawi representing the
lower court, Atty. Connie Doromal for NAPOCOR and Atty. Alimbsar
Ali from City Assessors Office to ascertain and report to the court the
just compensation.
On July 28, 1992, Commissioner Doromal filed his report
recommending a fair market value of P300.00 per sq.m as of
November 23, 1978. On August 6, 1992, Commissioners Alawi and Ali
filed their joint report recommending a fair market value of P1000.00
per sq.m as of 1992.
After receiving the reports and comments from the parties, the court
denied Mangondatos request for recovery of possession of the
property but ordering NAPOCOR to pay monthly rent of P15,000.00
from 1978 up to July 1992 with 12% interest per annum and
condemning the property in favor of NAPOCOR effective July, 1992
upon payment of P1000.00 per sq.m as a just compensation.
Two issued raised by the petitioner:
1) THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE PROPERTY IS ITS VALUE IN 1992, WHEN THE
COMPLAINT WAS FILED, AND NOT ITS VALUE IN 1978, WHEN THE
PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY PETITION.
2) THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION AT
P1,000.00 PER SQUARE METER INSTEAD OF P40.00 PER SQUARE METER.
Issues:
1) At what point in time should the value of the land subject of
expropriation be computed: at the date of taking or the date of
filing of the complaint for eminent domain?
Side issue: When is there Taking of Property?
2) What is the fair market value of the property?
1) The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent

domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of
complaint, as follows:
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or
when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may
enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment
of just compensation to, be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint
The general rule however, admits of an exception where this Court
fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at
the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
In Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled
that ". . . the owners of the land have no right to recover damages
for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the
public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to
Pasay) for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would
be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the
time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages,
or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of
important public improvements."
Following the above doctrine, in the case of Municipality of La
Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, ". .
. the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to
according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as
of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived
thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be
despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law
guarantee's just compensation. It would be an injustice to him
certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of
what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the
expropriator if by a delay in the collection; the increment in price
would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has
been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency
fraught with unfairness."
Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner
would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use
to which the government devotes the property expropriated as for
instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was the case in
Caro de Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is difficult to
conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase
in the value of the owner's land arising from the expropriation, as
indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of
P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly caused by
petitioner's use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an
exception to Rule 67, Section 4, 17 it has the burden of proving its
claim that its occupancy and use not ordinary inflation and
increase in land values was the direct cause of the increase in
valuation from 1978 to 1992.
Side issue: This Court has defined the elements of taking as the
main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, in the
following words:
A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking"
of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator
must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without intent to
expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal
authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by
Proclamation No. 1354.
2) The fair market value as held by the respondent court is the
amount of P1000.00 per sq.m. In an expropriation case where the
principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to
present the evidence on the issue of just compensation. Inasmuch as
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls
within the recognized exceptions, which is not the situation in this
petition, we see no reason to disturb the factual findings as to
valuation of the subject property.
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed
to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general rule
in determining just compensation provided under Section 4 of Rule
Rulings:
Page |
15
67. On the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that,

indeed, such general rule should in fact be observed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the judgment
appealed from AFFIRMED, except as to the interest on the monthly
rentals. which is hereby reduced from twelve percent to the legal
rate of six percent (6%)per annum. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
22- NPC v. Gutierrez 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
By Janina Marie Sto.Domingo in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and
controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is
invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction,
operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for
distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230
KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the
lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule
and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax
declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively.
Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way
easements over the aforementioned lots for the construction of its
transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was
constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against the herein
defendants on January 20, 1965.
The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the
reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation
fee of the expropriated properties.
Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just
compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three
commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one
for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were
empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the
premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and
just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots.
FACTS:
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision,2 the decretal portion of

which reads:
1. Denying [respondents] prayer for [NPC] to dismantle the
underground tunnels constructed beneath the lands of
[respondents] in Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278;
2. Ordering [NPC] to pay to [respondents] the fair market value of
said 70,000 square meters of land covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as
described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less the area of 21,995 square
meters atP1,000.00 per square meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for
the remaining unpaid portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6%
interest per annum from the filing of this case until paid;
3. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] a reasonable monthly rental
of P0.68 per square meter of the total area of 48,005 square meters
effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in 1978 or a total
of P7,050,974.40.
4. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as
moral damages; and
5. Ordering [NPC] to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees and the costs
RTC modified its judgment hereby rendered:

1. Reducing the judgment award of [respondents] for the fair market
value of P48,005,000.00 by [P]9,526,000.00 or for a difference
[of] P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject
of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of
[P]4,878,500.00 which may be the subject of execution upon the
finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from the
filing of the case until paid.
2. Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein [respondents] Omar
G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G.
Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G.
Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible
from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to [respondents].
3. Ordering [NPC] embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision to pay
[respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and further
sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs.
CA
Lucman Ibrahim and NPC then filed their separate appeals with the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57792. On June 8, 2005, the CA
rendered a Decision,7 setting aside the modified judgment and
reinstating the original Decision, amending it further by deleting the
award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals and
attorneys fees.
To satisfy the judgment, respondents filed with the RTC a motion for
execution of its August 7, 1996 decision, as modified by the CA. On
November 13, 2007, the RTC granted the motion, and issued the
corresponding writ of execution. Subsequently, a notice of
garnishment was issued upon NPCs depositary bank.
On May 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed
Decision,10 dismissing NPCs petition for certiorari. Rejecting NPCs
argument, the CA declared that this Courts Decision in G.R. No.
168732 intended NPC to pay the full value of the property as
compensation without ordering the transfer of respondents title to
the land. According to the CA, in a plethora of cases involving lands
traversed by NPCs transmission lines, it had been consistently ruled
that an easement is compensable by the full value of the property
despite the fact that NPC was only after a right-of-way easement, if
by such easement it perpetually or indefinitely deprives the land
owner of his proprietary rights by imposing restrictions on the use of
the property. The CA, therefore, ordered NPC to pay its admitted
obligation to respondents amounting to P36,219,887.20.11
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE

EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY
ITS TRANSMISSION LINES.
RULING:
The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held
that:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and
effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled
to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which
the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the
time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining
just compensation.
Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent
domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the
expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to
payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable NPC's
purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable
that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity.
It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and
arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the
affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable.
On the issue of ownership being claimed by petitioner in the event
that the price of P5.00 per square meter be sustained, it is well settled
that an issue which has not been raised in the Court a quo cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Petitioner only sought
an easement of right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, the power of
eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred
to the expropriator.
23. NPC v. Ibrahim (2009) -Jennidy-
Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G.

Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G.
Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G.
Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G.
Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim and
Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim (respondents) are owners of a 70,000-square
meter lot in Saduc, Marawi City. Sometime in 1978, NPC, without
respondents knowledge and consent, took possession of the
subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground
tunnels. The tunnels were used by NPC in siphoning the water of Lake
Lanao and in the operation of NPCs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII
projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in
Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.
Respondents only discovered the existence of the tunnels sometime
in July 1992. Thus, on October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that
NPC pay damages and vacate the subterranean portion of the
land, but the demand was not heeded. Hence, on November 23,
1994, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession of
land and damages against NPC with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 1298-94.
RTC
SC
Page |
16
NPC is now before us faulting the CA for dismissing the formers

petition for certiorari. It also prayed for a TRO to enjoin respondents
and all persons acting under their authority from implementing the
May 30, 2008 Decision of the CA. In its July 9, 2008 Resolution,12 this
Court granted NPCs prayer, and issued a TRO enjoining the
execution of the assailed CA Decision. In the main, NPC insists that
the payment of just compensation for the land carries with it the
correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land taken. It
stresses that this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732 is replete with
pronouncements that the just compensation awarded to respondents
corresponds to compensation for the entire land and not just for an
easement or a burden on the property, thereby necessitating a
transfer of title and ownership to NPC upon satisfaction of
judgment.NPC added that by granting respondents motion for
execution, and consequently issuing the writ of execution and notice
of garnishment, the RTC and the CA allowed respondents to retain
title to the property even after the payment of full compensation.
This, according to NPC, was a clear case of unjust enrichment.
ISSUE: W/N the payment of just compensation for the land carries
with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land
taken.
HELD: NO!
[NPC], by its selective quotations from the Decision in G.R. No.
168732, would have Us suppose that the High Court, in decreeing
that [NPC] pay the full value of the property as just compensation,
implied that [NPC] was entitled to the entire land, including the
surface area and not just the subterranean portion. No such
inference can be drawn from [the] reading of the entirety of the High
Courts Decision. On the contrary, a perusal of the subject Decision
yields to this Court the unmistakable sense that the High Court
intended [NPC] to pay the full value of the subject property as just
compensation without ordering the transfer o[f] respondents title to
the land. This is patent from the following language of the High Court
as quoted by [NPC] itself:
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents
ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and
exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be
emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without
expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on
respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive
them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are
clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that [NPC] only occupies the sub-terrain
portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of
the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial
use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated,
are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor
less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property.14
As we explained in Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:16
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds
support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court
sustained the award of just compensation for private property
condemned for public use.
The Supreme Court, in Republic v. PLDT thus held that:
"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement
transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full
ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can
continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that
would result in contact with the wires.1avvphi1
In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals19 and National Power Corporation v. Manubay AgroIndustrial Development Corporation,20 this Court sustained the
award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full value of
the property even if petitioners only sought the continuation of the
exercise of their right-of-way easement and not the ownership over
the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment
of fair market value without the concomitant transfer of title
constitutes an unjust enrichment.
24 NPC v IBRAHIM 2007 Faizah Tejero Topic: What may be taken
This case is about plaintiffs Mr. Ibrahim and his co-heirs complaint
against NAPOCOR or the National Power Corporation. NAPOCOR
built underground tunnels under the parcels of land owned by the
plaintiffs without their knowledge and consent. One of the plaintiffs

was denied a permit to build a well because it is dangerous.
NAPOCOR argued that the subsoil is not part of the property of the
plaintiffs.
FACTS:
o On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his

personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom,
Elias G. Maruhom, and other Maruhoms, instituted an action against
petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of
possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lanao del Sur.
o In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were
owners of several parcels of land described in Survey PlanFP (VII-5)
2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3)
lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square
meters each respectively. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through
alleged stealth and without respondents knowledge and prior
consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and
constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels
was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then
later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a
memorandum issued by the latters Acting Assistant Project
Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in
siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of
NAPOCORs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran,
Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan
and Fuentes in Iligan City.
o On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested
the Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a
motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his
request was turned down because the construction of the deep well
would cause danger to lives and property. On October 7, 1992,
respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate
the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate
much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the
construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives
and properties as MarawiCity lies in an area of local volcanic and
tectonic activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused
them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby entitling
them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the
public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages.
o The RTC ruled that the plaintiffs be given just compensation.
However, this first judgment of the RTC was modified as it gave
NAPOCOR the right to the parcels of land which the plaintiffs strongly
averred.
o The CA modified the RTCs ruling by deleting the moral damages
and reducing the attorneys fees.
1) Reducing the judgment award of plaintiffs for the fair market value
of P48,005,000.00 by 9,526,000.00 or for a difference byP38,479,000.00
and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject of the execution
pending appeal leaving a difference of 4,878,500.00 which may be
the subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment
with 6% interest per annum from the filing of the case until paid.
2) Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein petitioners Omar G.

Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G.
Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G.
Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible
from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to plaintiffs.
o The case was elevated to the SC.

Ruling of Supreme Court:
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just compensation

to respondents, and, by extension, the basis for computing the same.
The threshold issue of whether respondents are entitled to just
compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied
by petitioner.
o Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the

underground tunnels were constructed does not belong to
respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents
owned the property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not
extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the
utility and convenience that such property can normally give. In any
case, petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the
subject property even with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an
example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G. Maruhom,
had established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner
concludes that the underground tunnels 115 meters below
respondents property could not have caused damage or prejudice
Page |
17
to respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely

conjectural and speculative. The contention lacks merit.
All the foregoing evidence and findings convince this Court that
preponderantly plaintiffs have established the condemnation of their
land covering an area of 48,005 sq. meters located at
Saduc, Marawi City by the defendant National Power Corporation
without even the benefit of expropriation proceedings or the
payment of any just compensation and/or reasonable monthly rental
since 1978.[12]
o The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought to it from the CA is

limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being as a rule conclusive and binding on the Court.
In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence
demonstrating grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA or to
any other circumstances which would call for the application of the
exceptions to the above rule.
o Consequently, the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial
court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that
its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the
underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court
sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of
the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is
drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property
without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after
many years, the property owner may demand payment of just
compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither
convenient nor feasible.[13] This is in accordance with the principle
that persons shall not be deprived of their property except by
competent authority and for public use and always upon payment
of just compensation.[14]
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works
or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws
and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.
Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case

constitute an easement upon the property of respondents which
does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which
the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due
process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity
to them and did not go through proper expropriation
proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised
the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over
respondents property as this power encompasses not only the taking
or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated
property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden
upon the owner of the condemned property.[15] Significantly,
though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land
until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must
then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of
just compensation and that there is due process of law.[16]
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents

ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and
exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be
emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without
expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on
respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive
them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are
clearly
entitled
to
the
payment
of
just
compensation.[17] Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only
occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an
easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so
because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives
the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners
of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation
which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to
make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property.[18]
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the

subsoil under it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the
Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of
interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a wellknown principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace
above it up to a reasonable height.
In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug
upon their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from
doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and
existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their
property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the subterrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for
the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was
appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with
respondents enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its
full use and enjoyment, thus:
Has it deprived the plaintiffs of the use of their lands when from the
evidence they have already existing residential houses over said
tunnels and it was not shown that the tunnels either destroyed said
houses or disturb[ed] the possession thereof by plaintiffs? From the
evidence, an affirmative answer seems to be in order. The plaintiffs
and [their] co-heirs discovered [these] big underground tunnels in
1992. This was confirmed by the defendant on November 13, 1992 by
the Acting Assistant Project Manager, Agus 1 Hydro Electric Project
(Exh. K). On September 16, 1992, Atty. Omar Maruhom (co-heir)
requested the Marawi City Water District for permit to construct a
motorized deep well over Lot 3 for his residential house (Exh. Q). He
was refused the permit because the construction of the deep well
as (sic) the parcels of land will cause danger to lives and property.
He was informed that beneath your lands are constructed the
Napocor underground tunnel in connection with Agua Hydroelectric
plant (Exh. Q-2). There in fact exists ample evidence that this
construction of the tunnel without the prior consent of plaintiffs
beneath the latters property endangered the lives and properties of
said plaintiffs. It has been proved indubitably that Marawi City lies in
an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Lake Lanao has
been formed by extensive earth movements and is considered to be
a drowned basin of volcano/tectonic origin. InMarawi City, there
are a number of former volcanoes and an extensive amount of
faulting. Some of these faults are still moving. (Feasibility Report on
Marawi City Water District by Kampsa-Kruger, Consulting Engineers,
Architects and Economists, Exh. R). Moreover, it has been shown that
the underground tunnels [have] deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful
use of the land and considerably reduced its value. On March 6,
1995, plaintiffs applied for a two-million peso loan with the Amanah
Islamic Bank for the expansion of the operation of the Ameer
Construction and Integrated Services to be secured by said land
(Exh. N), but the application was disapproved by the bank in its letter
of April 25, 1995 (Exh. O) stating that:
Apropos to this, we regret to inform you that we cannot
consider your loan application due to the following reasons, to wit:
That per my actual ocular inspection and verification,
subject property offered as collateral has an existing underground
tunnel by the NPC for the Agus I Project, which tunnel is traversing
underneath your property, hence, an encumbrance. As a matter of
bank policy, property with an existing encumbrance cannot be
considered neither accepted as collateral for a loan.
Petition DENIED. Decision of the CA affirmed.

25- REPUBLIC v. PLDT
By Aeje S. Timosan in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
G.R. No. L-18841
January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendantappellant.
Facts:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising

governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one
of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was
created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the
following powers and duties, in addition to certain powers and duties
formerly vested in the Director of Posts:
SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the
following powers and duties:
(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radiotelegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established
to restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau
of Posts, as well as such additional offices or stations as may hereafter
be established to provide telecommunication service in places
requiring such service;
Page |
18
(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain

wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service
throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities,
towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such
terms and conditions or arrangements with the present owners or
operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all
concerned;
(c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system
and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by
said system;
(d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or
aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the
international telecommunication service in agreement with other
countries desiring to establish such service with the Republic of the
Philippines; and
(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the
International Telecommunication Convention relative to the
accounting, disposition and exchange of messages handled in the
international service, and those that may hereafter be promulgated
by said convention and adhered to by the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
After its creation, in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up

its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT
to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application
for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications
for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature
of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations
of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of

Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls
received by RCA's station to and from local residents. Actually, they
inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a
"provisional" agreement.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company

(PLDT), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise,
Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install,
operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines
and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages
within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone
systems of other countries. The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is
not a party to the present case but has contractual relations with the
parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business in
the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative
franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and
transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to
operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic
communications services (Act 3180).
would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on
14 April 1958, issued an order for the defendant:
(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk
lines that it has disconnected between the facilities of the
Government Telephone System, including its overseas telephone
services, and the facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying
into effect its threat to sever the existing telephone communication
between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant, and
not to make connection over its telephone system of telephone calls
coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said
Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA
Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through its
telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines
from foreign countries until further order of this Court.
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that
said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities,
referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk
lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public, in competition with the
business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not
stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the
telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight
on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on
telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United
States.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its
complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a
contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities
of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under
such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable,
and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant
company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone
connections and/or restore those severed.
Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the
severance of telephone connections by the defendant company
It is said that after trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it
could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the
Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under
Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications,
said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone,
nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the
PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the
Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau
was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT;
and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the
disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction
permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the
counterclaims.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
may be compelled to enter into such agreement.
Held:
The Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with
it, but the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to
the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It
is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way (Guys, this is the case
doctrine jud kunuhay nalibog pud ko sa iyang gi-yawit. Basta mao
na).
Reasoning:
The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service

connection between both telephone systems is not much different.
In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use
and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the
State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation---Then, there is no
reason why the State may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
therefore. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service
would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive

Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio
telephone communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing
existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and
conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators as may
be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is
nothing in this section that would exclude resort to condemnation
proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are
exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the
operations of said Bureau.
Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of
Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section
79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire
telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout
the Philippines", and, in subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to
approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for
messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other
services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these
provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it
from serving the general public. It may be that in its original
prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would
be limited to government offices: but such limitations could not block
future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the
Page |
19
1.
2.
Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the
Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law.
It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of
the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct
application of the statute (PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90
Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or
error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724).
The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair
competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse
under its contract are likewise untenable for the following reasons:
the objections of defendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold

the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general
public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future
expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise.
The decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is
affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of
the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system
upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may
determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of
the original complaint or petition.
26 Carlos Superdrug v DSWD (2007)
By Jamel Macacua in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
Carlos Superdrug v Department of Social Welfare and
Development(2007)
First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for

telephone service being very much more than the supposed
competitors can supply. The PLDT had 20,000 pending applications
at the time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone
company's inabilities to meet the demands for service are notorious
even now.
Second, the charter of the defendant expressly provides:
SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and
the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or
person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or
electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or
affected by the granting of this franchise: (Act 3436)
3. Third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of
Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or
should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less
public and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the
Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216).
The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals,
despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the
trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies
assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship
has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized
both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public
convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its
facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical
connection of the trunk lines.
Note: It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies
in the fact that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's
telephone system would expand with such rapidity as it has done.
But this expansion is no ground for the discontinuance of the service
agreed upon.
4. The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to
compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of
the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the
PLDT charter reserves to the Government:
the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the

grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and
operate wires of its telegraph system thereon; Provided, however,
That the Bureau of Posts shall have the right to place additional crossarms and wires on the poles of the grantee by paying a
compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by the
Director of Posts and the grantee;
the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles
by the plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under
the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment
and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not for its telephone system;
that said section could not refer to the plaintiff's telephone system,
because it did not have such telephone system when defendant
acquired its franchise. The implication of the argument is that plaintiff
has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's
telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one
(1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes.
The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use
of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and
has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for
telegraphic purposes. However, there is no proof that the telephone
wires strain the poles of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires, nor
that they cause more damage than the wires of the telegraph
system, or that the Government has attached to the poles more than
one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter. Hence, so
long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT poles is not increased,
there is no reason why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires
of the government should not be extended to its telephone lines, any
time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of
communication.
Conclusion:
In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue
the link between its network and that of the Government is that the
latter competes "parasitically with its own telephone services.
Considering, however, that the PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it
is well-known that defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with
the current demands for telephone service, as shown by the number
of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just
compensation for the services rendered to the Government
telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved,
This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction

assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003.
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand,
include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to
monitor the drugstores compliance with the law; promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003), amending R.A. No. 7432 (the Old Senior Citizens Act), was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo which
became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) provides that:
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
1.
the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments

relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
The establishments may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),
(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold
or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year
that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount
of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable,
shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On November 12, 2004, the Department of Health issued
Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No.
177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase
of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both
prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or
generic. Thus, it stated that the grant of twenty percent (20%)
discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the
senior citizens.
Among other issues, petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant
the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1)
drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded
medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to just compensation.
RULING
No. petitioners are not entitled to just compensation. The permanent
reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to
the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify
the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer
Page |
20
full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not

meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in
promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can
impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing
a government program.
The Court believes so.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees;
admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for
domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers;
and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet
all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all
the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by
the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would
be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they
will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating
the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is
no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up
with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show
properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works
greatly to their disadvantage.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical
industry and the competitive pricing component of the business.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must
accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Other issue:
Whether or not section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 has constitutional basis.
Yes. RA 9257 is in accord with the states policy to provide social
justice in all phases of national development and to adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall
be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled,
women and children.
28.
LORENZO
SUMULONG
and
EMILIA
VIDANESBALAOING, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, respondents.
FACTS: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA)
filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering
approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including
the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing
with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters
respectively.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession
of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with
the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of
the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of
private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation." This was granted by thecourt.
After denial of petitioners, motion for reconsideration on the ground
that they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law, thus they challenged the constitutionality
of Pres. Decree No. 1224.
Issue: WON the "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation

proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is for a public purpose.
HOLDING: Yes.
Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres.
Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not of "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful
of people, bereft of public character."
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units
for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the
construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres.
Decree No. 1224, par. 1)
Citing the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, the term "public
use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public
has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction
of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only
because of the expanded concept of public use but also because
of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made
it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure
adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7].
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare.
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized
housing" fans within the confines of "public use".
Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds
of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why
should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to
landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of
private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people
who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is
vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property
owner may not interpose objections merely because in their
judgment some other property would have been more suitable.
The Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be
deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family
should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the
greater may only of the inhabitants of the country."
29 ESTATE V PHIL. EXPO
By El Dinamita in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ VS PHILIPPINE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE
jan 16, 2011. -Deither
-petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of:
+CA dated March 25, 1998 and January 14, 1999.
+which ordered the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 17, to proceed with the hearing of the
expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B while setting aside the Orders dated
August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the said Regional Trial Court
which ordered the peaceful turnover to petitioner Estate of Salud
Jimenez of said Lot 1406-B.
FACTA:
xxxMay 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA), initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation
proceedings on three parcels of irrigated rice land in Rosario,
Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de
Malabon Estate, (29,008 sq ms), is registered in the name of Salud
Jimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
xxxJuly 11, 1991 the trial court upheld the right of private respondent
PEZA
to expropriate,
among
others,
Lot 1406
(A
and
B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner
contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized
for a public purpose.
xxxOctober 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order dated
July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the
expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained.
xxxPEZA appeals to CA
Meanwhile petitioner wrote two letters offering two proposals,
namely:
+ Withdrawal of private respondents appeal with respect to Lot
1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and loss
of income for the possession of said lot by private respondent.
+ The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772
since private respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot.
January 4, 1993,Private respondents Board approved the
proposal and the compromise agreement was signed by private
respondent
through
its
then
administrator
Tagumpay
Page |
21
Jardiniano assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I.

Garcia.
xxxThe Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into
between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal
with the Court of Appeals.
xxxAugust 23, 1993, the trial court approved the compromise
agreement.
xxxHowever, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434
to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the
covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on
March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a Motion to Partially Annul the
Order dated August 23, 1993.
xxxAugust 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties and directed private
respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. PEZA
moved for its reconsideration.
xxxDecember 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner,
corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by
declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be
surrendered and returned to petitioner.
xxxNovember 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the
Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the trial
court. Petitioner filed its Comment on January 16, 1998.
xxxMarch 25, 1998Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals
upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, ratiocinating
thus:
A judicial compromise may be enforced by a writ of execution, and
if a party fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is
in accordance with Article 2041 of the Civil Code which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the
other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision dated March 25,
1998. However, public respondent in a Resolution dated January 14,
1999 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors,
to wit:
ERAT:
WON THE CA ERRED IN ENTERTAINING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF RC.
WON THE CA ERRED IN INTERPRETING ORIGINAL DEMAND TO MEAN
FIXING OF JUST COMPENSATION.
WON ART 2041 WILL APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR
WON THE RESPONDENT HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO EXPROPRIATE
THE SUBJECT LOT 1406-B AND THE SAME WAS FOR VALID PUBLIC
PURPOSE (-topic)
RULING:
The supreme court ruled in favor of the respondent
ON APPEAL FORCERTIORARI
It appeared that on August 11, 1997, respondent received the Order
of the trial court dated August 4, 1997 annulling the compromise
agreement. On August 26, 1997, the last day for the filing of a notice
of
appeal,
respondent
filed
instead
a
motion
for
reconsideration. The Order of the trial court denying the motion for
reconsideration was received by respondent on November 23,
1997. The reglementary period to appeal therefore lapsed on
November 24, 1997. On November 27, 1997, however, respondent
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Petitioner
claims that appeal is the proper remedy inasmuch as the Order
dated August 4, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court is a final order that
completely disposes of the case. Besides, according to petitioner,
respondent is estopped in asserting that certiorari is the proper
remedy inasmuch as it invoked the fifteen (15) day reglementary
period for appeal when it filed a motion for reconsideration on
August 26, 1997 and not the sixty (60) day period for filing a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is
defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in
the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave
abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave
and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily and despotically.
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the
proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as well as
of procedure are involved However, in certain exceptional cases,
where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure
or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which
are technical rules may be relaxed.
ON EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS
Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase
ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff
to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be
devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a
final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase
concerns the determination of just compensation to be ascertained
by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to
be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be
done, this order finally disposes of the second stage. To both orders
the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11,
1991 order of expropriation became final and the parties
subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the
mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to
abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an
action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial could only
validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the
payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of
the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in
effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which
was already final and executory.
ON ARTICLE 2041 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
petitioner assails the interpretation by the Court of Appeals of the
phrase original demand in Article 2041 of the New Civil CoDE.
Article 2041 provides that, If one of the parties fails or refuses to
abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand
The incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise
agreement did not subject said order to rescission but instead
constituted an admission by petitioner of respondents authority to
expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for
which it was expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of
the compromise agreement which states that the swap
arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT No.
T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the
Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. It is crystal clear
from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to
petitioner. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the
issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will also
nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this
effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned
in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment.
This Court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting original demand to mean the fixing of just
compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the
purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order
dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by
petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to
petitioner. . Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was
supposed to receive respondents Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot
1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot
434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return
of the expropriated Lot 1406-B.
-After having invoked the provisions of Article 2041, petitioner
inconsistently contends that said article does not apply to the case
at bar inasmuch as it is only applicable to cases where a
compromise has not been approved by a court. In the case at bar,
the trial court approved the compromise agreement. Petitioner insists
that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should
apply.
- The applicability of art 2039 and 1330 will not change the outcome
of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement
was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not
about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B,
only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash
payment, was rescinded.
ON PUBLIC PURPOSE
-This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid
public purpose.
the public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial
trend has been summarized as follows:
xxxxxx- the court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for
public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets
or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not
anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Page |
22
xxxxxx- In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that
what ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as
broad as public welfare.
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980 issued by former
President Ferdinand Marcos.
The power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its
original charter,
EXERCISING OF POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of
eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in
their character.
xxxxx
In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial
court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was
approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the
present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to
the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to
petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to
the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile,
respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental
income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this
oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain by respondent.
----->Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner,
we cannot, however, grant the petitioners prayer for the return of the
expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July
11, 1991, has long become final and executory. Petitioner
cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. De
Villaroya to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the
lot where this Court ruled that under ordinary circumstances,
immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious
remedy. However, the said statement was not the ruling in that
case. As in other cases where there was no prompt payment by the
government, this Court declared in Sorsogon that the Provincial
Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as
directed. Should any further delay be encountered, the trial court is
directed to seize any patrimonial property or cash savings of the
province in the amount necessary to implement this decision.
However, this Court also stressed and declared in that case that In
cases where land is taken for PUBLIC USE, PUBLIC INTEREST, however,
must be considered.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case
be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation
proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B
and for its prompt payment to the petitioner.
32 Reyes vs. NHA

By Jade Canada and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST
Page 2 Public Use
importante diri anf PUBLIC PURPOSE. Gi pose lang nako ang uban
topic bcg ma chambahan og question.
love,
diet.
31 Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Cebu
By Adam Dandro Chua Jambangan and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd
Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete
Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Cebu
413 SCRA 502 (2003)
Facts:
National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of

respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 situated in Lahug, Cebu
City for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport.
To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government
assured them that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug
Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport.
In 1991, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was
opened for incoming and outgoing flights. Hence, petitioners wrote
then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging
them for the exercise of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos.
916 and 920, but they were not heeded. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue: W/N petitioners can exercise the right of repurchase over the
said land.
Held: Of course!
In the case of Reyes vs. CA, Supreme Court ruled that if the land is
expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its
former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated. If it is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it
for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as
a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary. If, upon the contrary, however, the
decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator,
whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case
the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired
by the expropriation proceedings. When land has been acquired for
public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in
the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may
be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate
or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner (The above
stated are principles. Murag mao ni ang point sa PUBLIC USE nga
topic)
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority36 is correct in stating
that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would
return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to
repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is
ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as
the Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the
inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation
would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary
nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or
repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be
readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the
trial courts underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue
to be in operation" when it granted the complaint for eminent
domain and the airport discontinued its activities.
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that
is akin37 to the implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code,
"If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure
the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee,
a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation
is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the
reconveyance of the property to him."
In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to the
government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the
expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the
government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the
parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the
use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived
nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED.
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority (NHA)

365 SCRA 494; GR No. 147577
Facts:
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the

expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners.
The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of
the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters
who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these
lots and the payment of just compensation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners alleged that respondent NHA had not
relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the
expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for
expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the
court.
Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by
respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the
construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different
from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings.
Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and
interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the
expropriated properties should now be returned to herein
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in

the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated
property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Held:
Page |
23
The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA.

Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
use.
It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been
held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public
welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real
estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the
expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries
cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of
private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private
homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the
common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will
make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of social justice.
33 Republic vs. CA
By Adam Dandro Chua Jambangan and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd
Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete
Republic vs. CA
383 SCRA 611 (2002)
Facts:
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square

meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-ininterest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated
land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, utilized for
the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter
facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through
the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises
after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its
operations thereat.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed
as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979,
or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation
proceedings, the trial court issued this order where the plaintiff has to
pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is
the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate
of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from
September 19, 1969, until fully paid;
However, the national government failed to pay to herein
respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision,
such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents
filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the
expropriated property.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated
property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its
facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the
propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was
retained by the PIA.
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the
Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their
case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation
and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of
P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated
property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as
might be approved by the court.
This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion,
submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00
per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current
zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the
alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated
property.
Issue: Whether the state has validly exercised its power of eminent
domain.
Held:
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate

right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.[7]Fundamental to the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely
confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the

due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power
is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police
power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property
the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all
separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public
interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature
of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not
adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority
is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus,
by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice
that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the
defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right
to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
However, the power is not without its limits:
first, the taking must be for public use, and
second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner
of the property.[10]
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the
necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the
one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively
restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.[11]
In determining public use, two approaches are utilized
the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and
thesecond is public advantage or benefit.[12]
It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant
growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon
the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued
utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for
the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for
the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with
the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public
nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property,
pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally
contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument
is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon
its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the
owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the
use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use,
which, decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents
would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of
Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners
were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property
there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved
the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited
application. However, the points in dispute are whether such
payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have
been the subject of expropriation proceedings. It follows that both by
virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as
the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled
to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still
devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but
only to demand the fair market value of the same.
Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet
unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment
of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter,
with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the
date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due
amount shall have been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
34 Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport v. Lozada -jeff
By Jefferson Pond Victoriano and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem
CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete
Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport v. Lozada
Facts:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88, with an area of 1,017 square meters,
located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings,
initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by
the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion
and improvement of the Lahug Airport.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent
Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market
value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter.
Page |
24
The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air

Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise
settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the
expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their
respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the
expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were
expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug
Airport.
Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.
Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of
the Republic.
The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug
Airport, however, was not pursued.
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a
Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the
transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the
Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such
transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up
to the present, the public purpose of the said expropriation
(expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or
implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a
commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as
Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex , while a portion thereof was
occupied by squatters.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the
recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the
complaint. The specifically denied that the Government had made
assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that
the property would no longer be needed for airport operations.
Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to
recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or
abandonment thereof.
Aggrieved, petitioners (MCIAA) interposed an appeal to the CA.
After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its
assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners
appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57,
Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise,
denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007.
Issue:
Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to
prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise
settlement between them and the Government
Holding:
The petition is DENIED. Respondents are ORDERED to return to

petitioners the just compensation they received for the expropriation
of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be
computed from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to
reconvey Lot No. 88 to them.
Reasoning:
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the

Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory
requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that
just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,
the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner
would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of
private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its
power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or
not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In
such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the
question of whether respondents were able to establish the existence
of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase
Lot No. 88 should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned,

we rule in the affirmative.
35 EPZA vs Dulay
By Kyrie Dea Maia and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST
EPZA vs Dulay
April 29, 1987
FACTS In 1979, the President issued a proclamation for the
establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) in Lapulapu, Mactan City, Cebu.
The area included four (4) parcels of land owned and registered in
the name of the private respondent. EPZA offered to purchase the
land but they failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property.
EPZA filed with the trial court of Cebu a complaint for expropriation
pursuant to P.D. 66 which empowers the petitioner to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of
export processing zones for the purpose of establishing the Mactan
Export Processing Zone.
The trial court issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take
immediate possession of the premises, issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to
take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of
just compensation. The respondent judge also issued a second order,
subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners
to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated. Three commissioners submitted
their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per
square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation
for the properties.
EZRA filed MFR on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded
Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment
of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D.
No. 1533. Trial court denied the MFR.
ISSUE * Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533
insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just
compensation is concerned.
Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining
just compensation in P.D. No. 1533(**fair and current market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or
the market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower) valid and constitutional?
RULING
P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to
appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is
unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine
the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. The prior P.Ds
Nos. 76, 464, 794 having the same method of determining just
compensation are also unconstitutional.
SC: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the
mentioned decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter
which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
The doctrine enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes,
supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold
this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and
as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against
constitutional rights.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All
the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the
petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the LapuLapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land
was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties
were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market
value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the
properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development
purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents
which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of
present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
36.) Eslaban vs. vda de Onorio
By Marxzxz Yap in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
36.) Eslaban vs. vda de Onorio
360 scra 230 (2001)
(Page 2, When should just compensation be fixed?)
Facts:
Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M.
Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato
Page |
25
.
Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is
the project manager of NIA.
The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that
the government will pay for the area that has been taken.
A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which
respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way
damages.
Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights
and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to
construction of the right of way.
After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55
for taking her property but the petitioner refused.
Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued
and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of
the homestead patent under CA no. 141.
The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of
P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have
been used for the construction of the canal.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be
determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality
of the decision.
Held: With respect to the compensation which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it
is the market value which should be paid or that sum of money
which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor. Further, just compensation means not
only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just
for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for
a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico,
Jr., there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over
the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just
compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of
the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however,
shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to
be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted
to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the
court deems just and equitable.
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. Even before the new rule, however, it was
already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the
price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage
of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It
was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just
compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of
the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the
NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation
to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In
the case of Burgos
, it was also the property owner who brought the action for
compensation against the government after 25 years since the
taking of his property for the construction of a road.
Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It
may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it
may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara: [W]here property is
taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the
value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is
taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural
increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the
time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The
owner of private property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend
beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that
compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., just not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay
for it.
37 NPC vs. Ibrahim- Silos
By Mitchai Silos in 1st yr 2nd
Doc Delete
NPC VS. IBRAHIM
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007
Sem
CASE
DIGEST
POOL Edit
FACTS: Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and

without respondents' (Ibrahim and his co-heirs) knowledge and prior
consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of the latters lands
and constructed therein underground tunnels. Ibrahim thus instituted
an action against petitioner NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of

land and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur. NAPOCOR
contended that the tunnels are a government project for the benefit
of all and all private lands are subject to such easement as may be
necessary for the same. It further contended that such easement did
not involve any loss of title or possession. Another of the errors
assigned by petitioner NAPOCOR is that assuming that it is liable to
pay just compensation, it should be made to pay the value of the
land from the time it constructed the tunnels.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation for
the acquisition of the easement over their land.
2. When should just compensation be fixed?
RULING:
1. Yes. The manner in which the easement was created by
NAPOCOR violated the due process rights of respondents as it was
without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper
expropriation proceedings. Landowners cannot be deprived of their
right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in
court.
2. In the present case, to allow NAPOCOR to use the date it
constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be grossly
unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal
authority or with intent to expropriate the same. In fact, it did not
bother to notify the owners and wrongly assumed it had the right to
dig
those
tunnels
under
their
property. Secondly,
the
improvements introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no
way contributed to an increase in the value of the land. The trial
court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the
valuation of the property as of 1992, when respondents discovered
the construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their
lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started negotiations for
their purchase but no agreement could be reached.
Policy:
The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where
the Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken
and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceeding.Such as in the case of:
Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled
that the owners of the land have no right to recover damages for
this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public
improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay)
from which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to
allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important
public improvements.
Simply stated, the exception finds the application where the owner
would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use
to which the government devotes the property expropriated.
38 Tan v. Rep 523 S 203 2007

By Ran Datukon in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
E. Just Compensation 1. When should just compensation be fixed?
Tan vs. Republic
523 S 203 (2007)
Facts: Julita P. Tan, petitioner herein, is the registered owner of a
parcel of land consisting of 7,161 square meters located at the
southern
bank of
the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa,
Las Pias City. Her ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 78188 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. She
acquired this property from the San Antonio Development
Corporation (SADC) as shown by a document denominated
Irrevocable and Exclusive Special Power of Attorney dated April 6,
2001, whereby she assumed SADCs obligation of paying all
imposable taxes due said land. In consideration of such assumption
and for value she stepped into the shoes of SADC free to
exercise such rights and prerogatives as owner of the subject
property, including the right to collect and demand payment for the
sale and/or use of the subject land or any portion thereof, by and
from any person or entity.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, organized and existing pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 representing in this case the
Republic of the Philippines, herein respondent. Among the properties
PEA manages is the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road (Coastal Road),
also known as the R-1 Expressway.
Prior to the transfer of the property to petitioner by SADC, or
on March 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC requesting permission to enter
the latters property, then covered by TCT No. 439101, for the
purpose of constructing thereon the southern abutment of the
Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. PEA also proposed to SADC to
Page |
26
start their negotiation for its acquisition of the latters property. SADC
replied authorizing PEA to enter the property, subject to the condition
that the latter should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. PEA then
directed its contractor, the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, to enter the property and begin the necessary
engineering works on the Coastal Road. PEA requested SADC either
to donate or sell the property to the government. SADC replied by
offering to sell the property to PEA. SADCs asking price
was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for the house
and other improvements thereon that were destroyed during the
construction of the Coastal Road.
PEA informed SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but
only the 1,131 square meter portion above sea level. PEA then asked
SADC to submit proofs of ownership and costs of the improvements
which were demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the
parties. However, for the past twenty (20) years, they failed to reach
an agreement. On April 6, 2001, petitioner Julita Tan acquired the
property from SADC. PEA has been collecting toll fees from the road
users in the average amount of P1,039,404.85 per day, as shown by a
document denominated Traffic Count of the Year 2002. Despite its
collection of huge toll fees, PEA continuously refuses to pay petitioner
any compensation.
On October 20, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to order
PEA to immediately pay her just compensation based on the zonal
valuation of the BIR. This was opposed by PEA. The trial court
decided in favor of the petitioner. PEA timely filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order. PEA
then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The CA decided in
favor of PEA. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; the CA
denied the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the just compensation
for petitioners property should be based on the BIR zonal valuation in
1985 when petitioner entered the subject property.
Held: The SC ruled that the CA erred in ruling that PEAs taking of
the property occurred in 1985 and that the compensation should be
based on the BIR zonal valuation in that year. Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution specifically mandates that Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.
In City of Manila v. Estrada, we held that compensation
means an equivalent for the value of land (property) taken. The
use of the word just is to convey the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. Thus, Estrada defined just compensation as a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. Then in Manila Railroad Co.
v.Caligsahan, we held that to be exactly just, the compensation
should be estimated at the time of the taking. Subsequently,
in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we ruled that just compensation is
determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, whichever came first.
PEAs entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous
owner, was not for the purpose of expropriating the
property. Records show and as stressed by Mr. Justice Renato
C. Dacudao of the CA in his Dissenting Opinion, SADC allowed PEA
to enter the land on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of
P10,000.00. Thereafter, PEA, in a letter dated May 28, 1985,
requested SADC to donate or sell the land to the government. On
October 22, 1985, SADC responded, offering to sell the land to PEA
for P1,288,980.00, plus P400,000.00 representing the value of the
improvements destroyed by PEA when it entered the
property. However, since 1985 up to the present, no agreement has
been reached between PEA and SADC or herein petitioner who
acquired the property from the latter. While PEA has been earning
huge toll fees, it has refused to pay petitioner any compensation for
the use of her property in violation of her right as an owner. The
above
circumstances
clearly
show
that
when
PEA
entered petitioners land in 1985, it was not for the purpose of
expropriating it. We stress that after its entry, PEA wrote SADC
requesting to donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed,
there was no intention on the part of PEA to expropriate the subject
property. It could have simply exercised its power of eminent
domain.
Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation) of the same Rules provides,
among others, that upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property. It bears reiterating that in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we
ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came
first. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ordering respondent,
through PEA, upon the filing of its complaint for expropriation, to pay
petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of
the subject property at P20,000.00 per square meter.
39 HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN et. al v. ATO

By Sigrid G. Mier in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
1. When should just compensation be fixed?
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN et. al v. ATO (Air Transportation Office)
G.R. No. 162779 June 15, 2007
This is a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated
August 20, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72404, which reversed the
Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. R-800.
FACTS:
Sometime
in
1935,
spouses
Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the homestead
provision of Act No. 2874[3] a parcel of land consisting of about 22
hectares situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Patent No. 33883
and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued on the
land, in the names of the Pidacanspouses.
In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Transportation
Office or ATO) used a portion of the said property as an airport.
Upon the death of the Pidacanspouses in 1974, the ATO constructed
a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The
ATO also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airports runway.
The
spouses
heirs
namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de
Robles demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the
property as well as rentals for the use of the occupied premises.
However, they were told that payment could not be made because
the property was still in their parents name.
With
the
loss
of
the
owners
copy
of
OCT
No.2204, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri filed a petition for the
issuance of another owners duplicate. On February 23, 1988, OCT
No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T7160 was issued in favor of the heirs. The heirs presented TCT No. T7160 and the death certificates of their parents to the ATO, but the
latter still refused to pay them.
The heirs claimed that they were entitled to payment of rentals plus
the value of the property. The ATO countered that the heirs were not
entitled to any payment, either of the value of the land or of the
rentals because the property had been sold to its predecessor, the
defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration for P0.70 per square meter.
The ATO claimed that even if it failed to obtain title in its name, it had
been declaring the property for taxation purposes.
The heirs subsequently filed with the RTC a complaint against the ATO
for payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for its use
and occupation. The ATO, in turn, filed a complaint for expropriation,
which was dismissed on the ground that it would be absurd for the
ATO to expropriate a parcel of land it considered its own.
On September 12, 1994, the trial court promulgated a Decision
ordering the ATO to pay rentals and the value of the land at P89 per
square meter. The ATO appealed to the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the trial court erred in fixing the value of the property on
the basis of its present value.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC
Decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings. The appellate court also ruled that just compensation
should be determined as of the time the property was taken for
public use.
After trial upon remand of the case to the court of origin, judgment
was rendered anew as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1.
Expropriating the actual area occupied by the defendant Air
Transportation Office of the plaintiffs property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling Two Hundred Fifteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Thirty Seven (215,737) square meters, in favor of
defendant;
2.
Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs
the amount of Three Hundred Four ((P304.00) Pesos per square meter
for the area herein expropriated which totals to Sixty Five Million Five
Hundred Eight (sic) Four Thousand Forty Eight (P65,584,048.00) Pesos
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from February 1,
2001, until the same is fully paid.
3.
monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the subject property
cited in item No. 1 above, computed as follows:
Three Thousand Fifty Eight Pesos and Forty Centavos (P3,058.40) from
1957 to 1977;
Four Thousand Twenty Two Pesos and Sixty five Centavos (P4,022.60)
from 1978 to 1979;
Six Thousand Thirty Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P6,034.50) from
1980 to 1984;
Nine Thousand Six Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Sixty Centavos
(P9,699.60) from 1985 to 1991;
Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred thirteen Pesos and Sixty
Centavos (P17,913.60) from 1992 to 1994;
Page |
27
Thirty Seven Thousand One Hundred Eighty One Pesos and Eighty
Centavos (P37,181.80) from 1995 to 1997;
Fifty Four Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Eight Pesos and Sixty Centavos
(P54,658.60) from 1998 to January 31, 2001;
or a total monthly rentals, from January 1, 1957 to January 31, 2001,
of Six Million Two hundred Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Forty Five
Pesos and Forty Centavos (P6,249,645.40) with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum, until the same is fully paid;
4.
ten (10%) per cent of the amount involved as and for attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation; and
5.
Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay the costs
of suit.
The ATO once again appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in its
assailed Decision reversed the trial courts ruling. The heirs moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Aggrieved, the heirs filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE: When should just compensation be fixed?
HELD: In the instant case, it is necessary to resolve the issues

concerning the taking of the subject property, the time when the
taking took place and the appropriate value of just compensation.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners private property was

converted into an airport by respondent ATO. As a consequence,
petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and
enjoyment of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept
of expropriation as early as 1948 when the airport was constructed
on petitioners private land.
As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is reckoned from the time of taking. In this case, however,
application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that
the ATO had been using petitioners property as airport since 1948
without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To
peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite
the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over
half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to
conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage
of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that
it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners.
In this particular case, justice and fairness dictate that the
appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners property
is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. As for
the fair value of the subject property, we believe that the amount
arrived at by the commissioners appointed by the trial court, P304.39
per square meter, constitutes just compensation to petitioners.
However, the trial courts award of rental payments to petitioners is
not supported by evidence on record and must be deleted. To justify
such award, the purported contract of lease must first be proven by
competent evidence.
Lastly, the interest accruing fixed by the trial court at the rate of 12%
per annum is not consistent with law and should be reduced to the
legal interest rate of 6% per annum.
PETITION IS GRANTED. The Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in
Civil Case No. R-800 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. The actual area occupied by respondent ATO covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling 215,737 square meters
is declared expropriated in favor of the ATO.
2. The ATO is ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P304.39 per
square
meter for
the area expropriated, or
a total
of P65,668,185.43 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from February 1, 2001, until the same is fully paid.
40-Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
By Mae Bungabong in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
September 7, 2000
Facts:
Edgardo Santos who is the plaintiff Trial Court, sitting as an Agrarian

Court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of in Agrarian Case
No. RTC 94-3206 for the determination of just compensation
regarding properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in
1972.
The Court rendered its decision for such case fixing the amount of
P49,241,876.00 to be the just compensation for the irrigated and
unirrigated ricelands with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares,
respectively, and situated at Pinit, Ocampo, Camarines Sur which
are portions of the agricultural lands. And ordering the Land Bank of
the Philippines to pay the plaintiff the amount of FORTY-FIVE MILLION
SIX HUNDRED NINE-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE AND
34/100 (P45,698,805.34) PESOS, Philippine currency, in the manner
provided by R.A. 6657, by way of full payment of the said just
compensation.
Land Bank released a preliminary valuation in the amount of

P3,543,070.66 in cash and bond. Leaving the balance of to
P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be
paid in accordance with RA 6657.
The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which
eventually dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated December 17,
1997. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial
Court on December 4, 1997 and a notice of garnishment was served
on the Land Bank on December 17, 1997.
On December 22, 1997, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
declaring that the Land Bank had complied with the writ of
execution and ordered the same to release the amount of
P44,749,947.82 to petitioner and the amount of P948,857.52 to the
Clerk of Court as commission fees for execution of judgment.
The Land Bank remitted the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of
Court on December 24, 1997 and released the amount of
P3,621,023.01 in cash and Land Bank Bond No. AR-0002206 in the
amount of P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
before the Regional Trial Court, praying that the payment of the
compensation be in proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and
P32,499,745 in cash, alleging that the cash portion should include the
amounts in the Decision representing the interest payments.
Before the motion could be resolved by the Regional Trial Court,
petitioner moved to withdraw the same and instead filed a motion
for release of the balance of the garnished amount. He claimed that
the payment of P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank Bonds was not
acceptable to him and that the said amount should be paid in cash
or certified check.
The respondent Land Bank, on the other hand, opposed the motion,
contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied
on December 24, 1997.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the
Land Bank to release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from the
garnished amount in cash or certified check.
The Land Bank moved for a reconsideration of the said Order,
maintaining that the payment was properly made in Land Bank
Bonds.
On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to hold the Land Bank in
contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished
amount in cash or certified check.
Respondent Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge,
resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment
of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for
in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. Thus, it ruled that: To summarize,
the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how
much should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in
bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the amount of
P49,241,876.00.
The Order of March 20, 1997 as well as that of December 22, 1997
should be reconsidered. It goes without saying that the payment of
just compensation must be made in accordance with Sec. 18,
Republic Act No. 6657 in relation to Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
The Court finds no merit in the motion to cite in contempt of court the
Land Bank of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, Defendant Land Bank of
the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the [p]laintiff the [c]ash
[b]alance of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND
EIGHTY-FOUR and 37/100 (P5,792,084.37), Philippine [c]urrency and
the amount of THIRTY FIVE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY and 16/100 (P35,336,840.16)
PESOS in government instruments or bonds to fully satisfy the
Judgment herein in the amount of forty-nine million two hundred
forty one thousand eight hundred seventy six (P49,241,876.00) pesos,
Philippine currency as just compensation due the plaintiff.
Petitioner appealed to CA: The CA upheld the questioned April 24,
1998 Order of the trial court. The appellate court opined that the
Order merely ascertained the mode of compensation for petitioner's
expropriated properties, as decreed in the final judgment, and was
issued pursuant to the court a quo's general supervisory control over
the process of execution.
Thus, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review of Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was
proper.
Held/Ruling: It is proper thus; there is no merit for this petition. All told,
we hold that the appellate court was correct in sustaining the
propriety and the efficacy of the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge
Llaguno. In the exercise of her supervisory powers over the execution
of a final and executory judgment,[i][14] such as her August 12, 1997
Decision, special circumstances attending its execution impelled her
to issue the Order clarifying the terms thereof.
Reasoning: The argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998 Order
was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment
which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order
did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order
iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment.
Page |
28
The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated compensation to the

petitioner "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657."[ii][9] There is
certitude with regard to this assertion. The confusion in the present
case, which required the issuance of the assailed Order, arose from
petitioner's belief that the Land Bank had obligated itself to pay in
cash the compensation due him. This fact can allegedly be gleaned
from its compliance with the December 4, 1997 Writ of Execution and
December 19, 1997 Notice of Garnishment.
Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August
12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment[iii][11] ought to have been construed
as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic
Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash
because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of
the final judgment, to which execution must conform.[iv][12] Paying
in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such
judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and
bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with RA
6657.
Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire
adjudged amount in the requiredproportion of cash and bonds, it
must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.
We understand petitioner's desire to be paid in cash; after all, his
compensation was long overdue. However, we cannot grant his
Petition because it is not sustained by the law. In this regard, we
recall the Court's explanation in Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:"It cannot be
denied from these cases that the traditional method for the payment
of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably,
has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium.
However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the
power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where
only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be
taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.compensation provided for in the afore-quoted
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do
not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of
society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest our people to see the goal of agrarian
reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our
peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification
of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the specter of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention
of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today."
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the
proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting
the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the
lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money,
primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than
the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and
other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are 'negotiable
at any time.' The other modes, which are likewise available to be
landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the
amount of just compensation.
entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units,
which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA
has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation
judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned
to herein petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in
the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated
property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA.
Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no
longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now
been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit,"
"public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and
urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed
area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the
common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will
make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of social justice.
42 Republic vs CA
By Shiela Basadre in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager
of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as
herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION
SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19
September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, covering
a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land in Bulacan, to be
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio
transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project.
This property was previously occupied by lessee, "Voice of America"
and now occupied by Petitioner, through the Philippine Information
Agency (PIA). Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum
provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property.
Out of the total area of 544,980 square meters, 76,589 square meters
are owned by Luis Santos, the predecessor-in-interest of the
respondents.
On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of
the expropriation proceedings,an order was issued by the court:
41. Reyes vs. NHA

By Alexand Rhea Villahermosa in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST
41. Reyes vs. National Housing Authority ( NHA ), Villahermosa
Facts: Respondent
National Housing
Authority (NHA)
filedcomplaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging
to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was
the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to
accommodate the squatters who were relocated from
the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of
just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA
violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the
Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the
squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular
inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of
the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise
question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it
for the condemnation of the whole property consisting of 544,980

square meters;
for the payment to defendants just compensation for said property
which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at
the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of
interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid;
In 1984, or more than five years after the decision of the court, the
respondents did not receive payment for just compensation which
lead them to file a motion seeking payment for the expropriated
property. The Bulacan RTC ordered for the payment of the said
property amounting to P1,058,655.05 but this was not complied with
and so the respondents filed an action directed to the provincial
treasurer of Bulacan for release P72,683.55, representing the share of
the deposit made by petitioner in 1969. This was granted by the trial
court.
Despite the 1984 court order, no payment was received by the
Santos heirs and no action was taken on their case. On 16
September 1999 the petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to
permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of
just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis
Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by
the court but the Santos heirs, opposed the manifestation and
motion. They submitted a counter-motion:
to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously
fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at
P5,000.00 per square meter
or, in the alternative
Page |
29
to cause the return to them of the expropriated property.

On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents
and issued the assailed order, The decision of 26 February 1979 was
declared to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription. The
RTC ordered the return of the expropriated property of the late
defendant Luis Santos to his heirs.
ISSUE: W/N the unpaid landowners are allowed the alternative
remedy of recovery of the expropriated property.
RULING: No. Unpaid landowners are not allowed to recover the
expropriated property as an alternative remedy.
In the case of Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de
Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed the
alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It
might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal
government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is
not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The
grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under
Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being the
pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative
branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield
the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the
national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent
domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of
inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority
would want it to be
In the case of Alfonso vs. Pasay City, the recovery of possession of
property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner
was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were
first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of
recovering compensation for his property computed at its market
value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.
Respondents can only claim just compensation.
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to
be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.[25] Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to
be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.[26] In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the
time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per
annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation
and inflation of the value of the currency over time.[29] Article 1250
of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or
deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment
of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to
contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual agreement
is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into
account to alter the value of the currency.
Private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet
unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment
of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter,
with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the
date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due
amount shall have been fully paid.
43. Republic v. Lim
By Aziraphale Zheng in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit
Doc Delete
From Philamie Soria
September 5, 1938- the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the CFI of Cebu
involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug,
Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for
the Philippine Army.
The said lots were registered under Gervasia Denzon and Eulalia
Denzon respectively.
October 19, 1938- Republic took possession of the lots after
depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank.
May 14, 1940- the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to
pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
April 5, 1948- An entry of judgment was made
In 1950- Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the
National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
denied knowledge of the matter. The claim on the said lot by

another heir, Nestor Belocura was likewise denied
September 20, 1961- the Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca
Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio filed with the same
CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the
Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
possession of the property.
Valdehueza and Panerio were issued the titles with the annotation
subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire
said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a
reasonable market value.
July 31, 1962- The successors in interests claim were favored by the
court declaring them as the owners because of the Republics failure
to pay the amount of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The records do
not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-ininterest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as
stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been
disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who
received the money. It is further certified that the corresponding
Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed
during the last World War, and therefore the names of the payees
concerned cannot be ascertained. However, because of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed
of sale in favor of the Republic.
Valdehueza and Panerio appealed the decision but the Supreme
Court held that the properties could no longer be recovered.
Although they remained the registered owners because of the
Republics failure to pay the compensation, the remedy left is to
demand payment of the fair market value.
Can such payment still be made and, if so, in what amount?
The payment of just compensation is no longer proper at this point.
By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were
condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to
the Government. In fact the annotations contained the right of the
National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire
them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their
expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which
they were expropriated but only to demand the fair market value
of the same.
1964- Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente
Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to
pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976.
A new TCT was issued in Lims name.
August 20, 1992- respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as
Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio
Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein
petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead
the Republic.
RTC- declared plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner
of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession.
CA- sustained the decision of the RTC
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation therefore pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early asMay 14, 1940
HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of hisprivate property without due process
of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use.
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III,of our Constitution mandates: "
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision
when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation.
The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings was entered
on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this
day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed.
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way,
be viewed as fair.
Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
just. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the
expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it
has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable
time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.
Page |
30
It is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its

petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court
mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest
the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market value of the two lots in
question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several
decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate.
Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private
rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is
tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all
private properties are subject to the need of government, and the
government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency
of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees
that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall
be attended by compensation.
Page |
31
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of

the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against
the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government,
and liberally in favor of the property owner.
Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[15] this Court ruled
that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with
the determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation
is said to have been completed.
The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave
danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an
overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport.
What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institutes.
And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot
932, eight (8) of which are residence apartments of military
personnel.
Respondent is entitled to recover possession of the expropriated lot
from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is
granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his
predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part,
will be perpetuated.
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is
immaterial considering that the Republic did not complete the
expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932
by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would
have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over
Lot 932.
It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot
932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their
title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never
did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we
categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: It is true that plaintiffs are still
the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of
said lots in favor of the Government.
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment
of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to
recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage
the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against
their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

Consti 2 Cases Compilation

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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS

on July 19, 2011 Agz

Police. Those participating in the demonstration were workers in the

Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy National

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, respondent

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would

(nag kabuang ko pangita og net cafe) paita.

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1. Whether or not the petitioner's constitutional rights to freedom of

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that

26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI VS. PAL

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article

This is a case of an international flight steward who was dismissed

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

An employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) - Employment in

mistake or oversight on the part of a

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative

Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt.

On May 3, 1982, in Meycauyan, Bulacan, the said accused, two of

Postal Delivery Truck

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a

A check with the Department of Education showed that he took and

To compel his admission to the test, private respondent went to the

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1.) The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential,

demolished. BAVA then, filed a case for injunction enjoining the

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (Government

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

June 11 and 12 2006 - the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to

October 8 2007 - the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-200710 referring

In implementation of this resolution, COMELEC sent identical letters to

1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of

PPI now comes to the court seeking the declaration of

15. PPI v. COMELEC (Pasquin)

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

The power of eminent domain is one of the fundamental and

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative