Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COMELEC
88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of
the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the
KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89.
The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
that upon protest of the taxpayers, the Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the
assessments. It also shows he took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his
valuation; but said Court refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides, the
assessor had no personality to bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125, which reads as follows:
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any person, association or corporation
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an
appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or
ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu have the personality to resort to
the Court of Tax Appeals on his valuation on the taxes of Consuelo and Jesusa Samson.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the petitioner has
no personality to bring before the CTA. Supreme Court stressed out that The rulings of the
Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu 1
that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty
taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but
the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals
was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.
Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals did not grant it blanket authority to
decide any and all tax disputes. Defining such special court's jurisdiction, the Act necessarily
limited its authority to those matters enumerated therein.
household goods and effects of U. S. military personnel assigned to the Subic Naval Base.
From the aforesaid contract, SEA-LAND derived an income for the taxable year 1984 amounting
to P58,006,207.54. During the taxable year in question, SEA-LAND filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) the corresponding corporate Income Tax Return (ITR) and paid the
income tax due thereon of 1.5% as required in Section 25 (a) (2) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) in relation to Article 9 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, amounting to
P870,093.12. Claiming that it paid the aforementioned income tax by mistake, a written claim
for refund was filed with the BIR on 15 April 1987. However, before the said claim for refund
could be acted upon by public respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitionerappellant filed a petition for review with the CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 4149, to judicially
pursue its claim for refund and to stop the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the
then Section 243 of the NIRC. On 21 February 1995, CTA rendered its decision denying SEALANDs claim for refund of the income tax it paid in 1984. On March 30, 1995, petitioner
appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals. After due
proceedings, on October 26, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has committed grave abused of discretion.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court sees no reason to
reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals. The Supreme Court will not set aside lightly the conclusion reached by the Court of
Tax Appeals which, by the very nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to the
consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject,
unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err or gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition
for review
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals
477 SCRA 49
FACTS: Far East Bank and Trust Company herein referred to as the petitioner is a domestic
banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. In the
early part of 1992, the Cavite Development Bank [CDB], also a domestic banking corporation,
was merged with Petitioner with the latter as its surviving entity [under] the merger. Petitioner
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being the surviving entity, [it] acquired all [the] assets of CDB During the period from 1990 to
1991, CDB sold some acquired assets in the course of which it allegedly withheld the creditable
tax from the sales proceeds which amounted to P755,715.00. In said years, CDB filed income
tax returns which reflected that CDB incurred negative taxable income or losses for both years.
Since there was no tax against which to credit or offset the taxes withheld by CDB, the result
was that CDB, according to petitioner, had excess creditable withholding tax. Thus, petitioner,
being the surviving entity of the merger, filed this Petition for Review after its administrative
claim for refund was not acted upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals are not
based on Facts and the Law.
HELD: The petition is denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Court
stressed out that The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise
on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court,
especially if these are substantially similar to the findings of the CA which is normally the final
arbiter of questions of fact. The findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal unless a
party can show that these are not supported by evidence, or when the judgment is premised on
a misapprehension of facts, or when the lower courts failed to notice certain relevant facts which
if considered would justify a different conclusion
Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses,
capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in
the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. Proceeding from the
premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the
Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government
Code, business is defined as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of
livelihood or with a view to profit. It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium
corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the
Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels
of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under
its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it
did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The
protest was rejected by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit
owners was effected primarily to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with
the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium
occupants and to command better marketable prices for those occupants who would in the
future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the chances of getting higher
prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that
condominiums with poor managed common areas, the corporation activity is a profit venture
making. The CA reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay
business taxes to the City of Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium
corporations.
HELD: No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the
Makati Revenue Code (Revenue Code), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072.
The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue
Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses
which are covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the
Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is
the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax
on petitioner.
of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be
considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at
the discretion of the appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted
the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative
remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on
considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give
the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC. About a
month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise
Tax, was issued by the BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall
of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993,
the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334.
00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA
upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law.
HELD: A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has
been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or
merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"
within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
have them covered by RA 7654. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it
legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court is convinced
that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance.
lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis
for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and
that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board"
is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as
to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in
the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction
and control of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by
Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which
is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General
countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing
barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main
import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of
which consists of several barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently
legislative in character not administrative.
rendered another Order dated 26 January 1999 cancelling the registration of the same OCT No.
P-106 and ordering the issuance of a TCT ex parte in favor of Madarieta. He also approved the
motion of execution filed by Madarieta.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: Respondent's non-observance of the DARAB Rules on notice and hearing and his grant
to Madarieta of her motion for execution pending appeal in effect deprived complainant of the
land he tills and the source of his income. Complainant woke up one day not knowing that the
emancipated land which he thought was already reallocated to him was lost by order of
respondent. He was not given the chance to defend his claim over the property. This is
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law, a constitutional guarantee
available to every individual. The actual review of the subject issuance of the respondent should
be undertaken in the proper judicial proceedings and not by this Court at this time via an
administrative action. Nevertheless, respondent's culpability under the Code of Professional
Responsibility is indubitable. As a lawyer, the IBP determined, and we subscribe to such
determination, that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states: Canon 1A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes. While the duty to uphold the Constitution and
obey the laws is an obligation imposed upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities
well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should
moreover make himself an exemplar of others to emulate. A member of the bar who assumes
public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on 21 June 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from
Canon 6 of the said Code. Lawyers in government service are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus they should be more sensitive in the performance of
their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public. Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, was reposed with a higher
gravamen of responsibility than a lawyer in private practice. The recommended penalty of two
months suspension is too light under the circumstances, and a penalty of six (6) months'
suspension more appropriate. As held in recent cases, the penalty for a judge found to be guilty
of gross ignorance of the law is six (6) months.
investigation since it has exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses and to prosecute the same and to review their commendation or resolution of
investigating officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exclusive power to prosecute election cases?
HELD: Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to
investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. The grant by the Constitution to
the petitioner of the express power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to
enable the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
election. Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly
authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same.
The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government but as
held in Margarejo vs. Escoses until revoked, the continuing authority of the Provincial or City
Prosecutors stays
15
FACTS: Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibits the importation
of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries.
The Act provides: SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five
existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it
shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from
foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General,
with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely
or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers.
HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to lift the
prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the legislature, if he should determine
after a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The
lifting of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the
prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the
local livestock.
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SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957
Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the
provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn
the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to
regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that
the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the
President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended
by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur
recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO
80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for
injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of
Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void.
The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned
from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not
the said Executive Orders were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly
delegated to the President.
Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the
President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66
and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by
authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress
intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such
restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When
the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued
EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San
Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said
coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.
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was adopted in P.D. No. 525 Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that
P.D. No. 525 prescribes. Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the
President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the
Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement.
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LWUA has quasi-judicial power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts,
which it may review to establish compliance with the provisions of PD 198.
29
FACTS: This case involved a number of Presidential Decrees which the petitioners claim that
had not been published as required by law. The respondents argued that while publication is
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it is otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. On
April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of the decrees. The
petitioners went to the Court for reconsideration or clarification of the said decision.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a law before it becomes effective need not be published when it is
otherwise provided; and (2) What are laws to be published?
HELD: The answer to the first issue is in the negative. The term otherwise provided as
enshrined in the Civil Code on the publication requirement, refers to the date of effectivity and
not on the publication. As to the second issue, all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
FACTS: Teachers of Catarman National HS filed before MSPB administrative complaint against
petitioner Rubenecia, the School Principal: dishonesty, nepotism, oppression, and violation of
Civil Service Rules. MPSB investigation: charged Rubenecia, required him to answer.
Rubenecia did not file answer, requested instead to be furnished with copies of the documents
submitted by complainants. CSC Regional Director invited him to visit their office to identify and
pick up the document that he might need but he deferred, saying he still had enrollment
problems. Later, CSC Regional Office reiterated that he answer but he reiterated request that
he be provided with copies of supporting documents. Hearing scheduled but complainants did
not appear, nor did he file his answer though he was there. On the same day, Regional director
issued order that the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the documents
filed. Rubenecia wrote to Chairman of CSC for his dismissal. Regional Director submitted to
MSPB the investigation report but before MSPB could render a decision, CSC issued
RESOLUTION 93-2387 which provided, among other things, that cases then pending before the
MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision. In accordance with the Resolution,
Rubenecias case was elevated to CSC. CSC: GUILTY, dismissed from service. MR (lack of
jurisdiction), denied "I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS: The
records show that Rubenecia committed the said offense. He himself admitted that he did not
accomplish his DTR but this was upon the suggestion of the Administrative Officer. Rubenecia
cannot use as an excuse the alleged suggestion of an Administrative Officer. As the principal of
a national high School, he is expected to know the basic civil service law, rules and regulations.
II. DISHONESTY: The Commission finds Rubenecia liable. He was charged for misrepresenting
that he was on 'Official Travel' to Baguio City to attend a three-week seminar and making it
appear in his CSC Form No. 7 for the month of October 1988 that he has a perfect attendance
for that month. Rubenecia in order to rebut the same simply reiterated previous allegation that
he attended the SEDP Training in Baguio City during the questioned months without even an
attempt on his part to adduce evidence documentary or testimonial that would attest to the truth
of his allegation that he was indeed in Baguio during those weeks for training purposes. A mere
allegation cannot obviously prevail over a more direct and positive statement of Celedonio
Layon, School Division Superintendent, Division of Northern Samar, when the latter certified
that he had no official knowledge of the alleged 'official travel' of Rubenecia. Moreover,
verification with the Bureau of Secondary Schools reveals that no training seminar for school
principal was conducted by DECS during that time. It was also proven by records that he
caused one Mrs. Cecilia Vestra to render service as Secondary School Teacher from January
19, 1990 to august 30, 1991 without any duly issued appointment by the appointing authority. III.
NEPOTISM: With respect to the charge of Nepotism, Rubenecia alleged that he is not the
appointing authority with regard to the appointment of his brother-in-law as Utilityman but merely
a recommending authority. With this statement, the commission finds Rubenecia guilty. it should
be noted that under the provision of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative Code, the
recommending authority is also prohibited from recommending the appointment to non-teaching
position of his relatives within the prohibited degree. IV. OPPRESSION: Rubenecia is also guilty
of Oppression. He did not give on time the money benefits due to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr.
Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers of CNHS, specifically their salary differentials for
July to December 1987, their salaries for the month of May and half of June 1988, their
proportional vacation salaries for the semester of 1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla, for
the month of June, 1987. Rubenecia did not even attempt to present countervailing evidence.
Without being specifically denied, they are deemed admitted by Rubenecia. V.
INSUBORDINATION: He is not liable for Insubordination arising from his alleged refusal to obey
the 'Detail Order' by filing a sick leave and vacation leave successively. The records show that
the two applications for leave filed by Rubenecia were duly approved by proper official, hence it
cannot be considered an act of Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia when he incurred
absences based on an approved application for leave of absence. Rubenecia is therefore found
guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violations of Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves
to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and Violation of Civil
Service Rules and Regulations. Accordingly, he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the
service."
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and
assume jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner; and (2) Whether or not
petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with rendition of CSC Resolution No.
94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service.
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HELD: (1) Yes it has authority to issue the said resolution and YES it has jurisdiction over the
administrative case.
RUBENECIA: Since MSPB was a creation of law, it could only be abolished by law and not by
CSC.
The questioned resolution in sum does the following:
1. Decision in administrative cases appealable to the Commission pursuant to Section 47 of the
present Civil Service Law may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and not to the
MSPB.
2. Administrative cases already pending on appeal before the MSPB or previously brought
directly to the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-2387, were required to be
elevated to the Commission for final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the
determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in other words, re-allocated to the
Commission itself. WHY RELOCATE: to "streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn
required the "simplification of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an] unnecessary
bureaucratic layer." The previous procedure made it difficult for cases to be finally resolved
within a reasonable period of time. The change, theretofore, was moved by the quite legitimate
objective of simplifying the course that administrative disciplinary cases, like those involving
petitioner Rubenecia, must take. We consider that petitioner Rubenecia had no vested right to a
two-step administrative appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to an office of
the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission
itself (i.e., the Chairman and the two (2) Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission), a
procedure which most frequently consumed a prolonged period of time. It did not abolish the
Merit System Protection Board, and if it did, he is not an employee of MSPB to be a real-party-in
interest. He cannot argue that he was not notified that his case was elevated to CSC because
(a) CSC Resolution 93-2387 did not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in
administrative cases pending before the MSPB; (b) CSC Resolution 93-2387 was published in
the Manila Standard so it would be deemed substantially complied; and (c) it was Rubenecia
himself who insisted on pleading before the Commissioner (he filed MTD before commissioner
and not before MSPB). History of the Merit System Protection Board: PD 1409 created in the
CSC the Merit Systems Board and gave it power to hear and decide administrative cases. If the
Board orders the removal of the public officer, it would be subject to automatic review of the
CSC. All other decisions of the Board are subject to appeal to the CSC. 1987 Admin Code recreated the Merit System Board as Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) which was intended
to be an office of the Commission like any other 13 offices in the CSC. MSPB was made a part
of the internal structure and organization of the CSC and thus a proper subject of organizational
change which CSC is authorized to undertake under SECTION 17 of the CIVIL SERVICE LAW.
(2)YES. Due Process = Notice + Opportunity to be heard. NOTICE: Formal charge which
contained the essence of the complaint and the documents in support thereof that had been
furnished to Rubenecia + testimony of the principal witnesses against him given during the
preliminary hearing. ON THE NONFURNISH OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: he was given
the opportunity to obtain those documents but he did not avail of it + he sent a formal letteranswer to CSC Chair controverting the charges against him and submitted voluminous
documents in support of his claim of innocence. MR CURED WHATEVER PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS DEFECT: MR gave him opportunity to be heard. ON FINDINGS OF THE CSC: The
settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the finding of fact of an administrative agency must be
respected, so long as such findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate
court, like this Court, to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect of sufficiency
of evidence. In the present case, in any event, after examination of the record of this case, we
conclude that the decision of the Civil Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the
administrative charges prepared against him is supported by substantial evidence.
the resident COA auditor on PITC's car plan benefits; and Decision No. 98-048 dated January
27, 1998 of the COA denying PITC's motion for reconsideration. The PITC is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 252 on July 21,
1973, primarily for the purpose of promoting and developing Philippine trade in pursuance of
national economic development. On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of Directors approved a
Car Plan Program for qualified PITC officers. Under such car plan program, an eligible officer is
entitled to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent (50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by
PITC while the remaining fifty percent (50%) will be shouldered by the officer through salary
deduction over a period of five (5) years. Maximum value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges
from Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) to Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P350,000.00), depending on the position of the officer in the corporation. In addition,
PITC will reimburse the officer concerned fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration,
insurance premiums and costs of registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of
five (5) years from the date the vehicle was purchased. The terms and conditions of the car plan
are embodied in a "Car Loan Agreement". Per PITC's car plan guidelines, the purpose of the
plan is to provide financial assistance to qualified employees in purchasing their own
transportation facilities in the performance of their work, for representation, and personal use.
The plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility during official trips especially within Metro
Manila or the employee's principal place of assignment, without having to rely on PITC vehicles,
taxis or cars for hire. On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled "An Act
Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and
For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates save for certain
additional compensation such as representation and transportation allowances which were
exempted from consolidation into the standardized rate. Said section likewise provides that
other additional compensation being received by incumbents as by of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
The legislature has similarly adhered to this policy of non-diminution of pay when it provided for
the transition allowance under Section 17 of RA 6758 which reads: Sec. 17. Salaries of
Incumbents. Incumbents of position presently receiving salaries and additional
compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other
emoluments the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed,
shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition
allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that
the incumbent shall receive in the future. Based on the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner
correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing
benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the virtue of
Sections 12 and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who availed of the
subject car plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989. Thus, it was
legal and proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five year period from date
of purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of COA is not valid.
HELD: The repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of "all corporate charters that exempt agencies
from the coverage of the System" was clear and expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes
for which the law was enacted, that is, the standardization of salaries of all employees in
government owned and/or controlled corporations to achieve "equal pay for substantially equal
work". Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as covered by laws prescribing a
compensation and position classification system in the government including RA 6758. This is
without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-diminution of pay of incumbents as
of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law. Wherefore, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED, the assailed Decisions of the Commission of Audit are set aside. RA 6758 which is
a law of general application cannot repeal provisions of the Revised Charter of PITC and its a
mandatory laws expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being special laws. Our rules
on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by
a subsequent general law by mere implication; that a statute, general in character as to its terms
and application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the
legislative purpose to do so is manifested; that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to so express it.
35
freedom of worship and speech, among others. They also contend that the order is not valid for
it was not published in the Official Gazette as required by law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Department Order is invalid.
2. Whether or not RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD: (1) No, the contention that assailed Department Order has no binding effect; not having
been published in the official gazette is without merit. The assailed order being addressed only
to the directors of Public and private schools and educational institutions under their
supervision, cannot be said to be of general application, requiring previous publication in the
Official Gazette before it could have binding force and effect. (2) No, the requirements constitute
an adequate standard.
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against respondents alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Panel for assuming jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the charge of coup detat against petitioner. Respondents filed their respective
comments and petitioner his reply thereto. An oral argument on the case was held on
November 18, 2003. Parties submitted their respective memoranda as required by the Court.
On April 13, 2004, the Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition and upholding the
concurrent jurisdiction of the respondent to conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioner
received a copy of the decision on April 22, 2004, thus he has until May 7, 2004 to file his
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on
petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513.
HELD: In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated November 18, 2003, respondent had
stopped from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation while the case is pending
before the court. Respondent issued its assailed order requiring petitioner to submit his counteraffidavit after receipt of the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 upholding respondents
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation on the charge of coup detat against
petitioner. Although the Courts decision dated April 13, 2004 is not yet final as of the date of the
issuance of the said assailed order, the court finds no contemptuous intent on the part of
respondent to impede the administration of justice. As respondent has explained in its
Comment, the charges against petitioner was filed with the DOJ in August 2003 and since then,
the preliminary investigation has been pending, thus with the Courts decision upholding their
jurisdiction, respondent issued the assailed order taking into account petitioners right to a
speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, respondents intention is to give respondent all the
opportunity to controvert the accusation against him and to adduce evidence in his behalf. The
Court finds respondents explanation satisfactory and does not see the act of respondent as
contumacious, as herein earlier defined by the Court. Petitioner asserts in his Motion that he
received on April 22, 2004, a copy of the Courts decision upholding respondents authority to
conduct preliminary investigation, and that he has until May 7, 2004 to file his motion for
reconsideration. However, verification with the Courts docket section reveals that petitioner filed
his motion for reconsideration only on June 8, 2004, or thirty days late. The Courts decision
dated April 13, 2004 has already attained finality as of May 8, 2004. Hence, there is no longer
any impediment for respondent to proceed with the preliminary investigation and for petitioner to
comply with the respondents order to submit his counter-affidavit. Petitioners motion to cite
respondent in contempt of court is DENIED. Respondent is required to give petitioner a fresh
period from receipt of this Resolution to submit his counter-affidavit.
1989. However, the Supreme Court in the case of Rodolfo de Jesus, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No.
109023 dated August 12, 1998, declared CCC No. 10 as ineffective and unenforceable due to
non-publication. Consequently, the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1856
directing the payment of COLA and amelioration backpay to PPA personnel in the service
during the period July 1, 1989 to March 16, 1999, the date of publication of CCC No. 10.
Doubting the validity of said Resolution, the PPA Auditor requested the opinion of the General
Counsel on the propriety of the payment of the backpay. In fully concurring with the
recommendation of the then Director, CAO II, the General Counsel ruled that in order for a PPA
employee to be entitled to backpay representing COLA and amelioration pay equivalent to 40%
and 10% respectively, of their basic salary, the following conditions must concur: (1) he has to
be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) has been receiving the COLA and amelioration pay
as of July 1, 1989. Aggrieved, PPA sought reconsideration of the said advisory opinion which
was denied by the General Counsel in a 1st Endorsement dated September 13, 2001, since she
found no cogent reason to set aside the earlier opinion. The PPA Auditor accordingly ruled
against the grant of the subject backpay. The COA ruled that in the absence of effective
integration of the COLA and amelioration allowance into the basic salary in 1989, the inevitable
conclusion is that they are deemed not integrated from the time RA 6758 was promulgated until
DBM-CCC No. 10 was published in March 1999. During that period, it thus disallowed the
disputed allowances on the ground that these fell under the second sentence of Section 12 of
RA 6758. It held that only officials hired on or before July 1, 1989 was entitled to receive back
pay equivalent to the additional compensation (COLA and amelioration allowance) mentioned.
Issue: Whether or not herein petitioners who were hired by the Philippine Ports Authority on
various dates after July 1, 1989 -- are entitled to the payment of back pay for cost of living
allowance (COLA) and amelioration allowance?
Held: Court held that the COLA of government employees from 1989 to 1999 was not deemed
integrated into their salaries. This means that the COLA during that period is a legally
demandable and enforceable right. Employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether incumbent or not, are entitled to the COLA from 1989 to 1999 as a matter
of right. Hence, in consonance with the equal-protection clause of the Constitution, and
considering that the employees were all similarly situated as to the matter of the COLA and the
amelioration allowance, they should all be treated similarly. All -- not only incumbents as of July
1, 1989 -- should be allowed to receive back pay corresponding to the said benefits, from July 1,
1989 to the new effectivity date of DBM-CCC No. 10 -- March 16, 1999. The principle of equal
protection is not a barren concept that may be casually swept aside. While it does not demand
absolute equality, it requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike, both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Verily, equal protection and security shall be
accorded every person under identical or analogous circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Commission on Audit ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
39
Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by
law even if authorized by the LWUA.
Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government
agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original
charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of
government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant
to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if
authorized by the LWUA. Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good
faith, without knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be
refunded.
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).The Committee of the
Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called
Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to
information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464,
however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to
become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound
by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its
penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquits the
appellant, with costs de oficio.
HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in May '79 (at the time
he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a
bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act.
Following the special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on 6/29/79. The copy editor of
the OG made a certification that the penal statute in question was made public only on 6/14/79
and not on the printed date 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP
22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must
be published and the people officially informed of its contents. For, it a statute had not been
published before its violation, then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated
and, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. The effectivity
clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15 days after publication in the OG." The
term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to make
known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to make the printed date of issue
of the OG as the point of reference, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity
provision of BP 22.
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary
238 SCRA 63
Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation
whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in
Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of the executive
branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and
collection of taxes and other imposts. It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax
(VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production
or distribution. The petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of
Health and not the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the competent government agency to
43
determine the proper classification of food products. It cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar
of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it
is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible. The
respondents, on the contrary, argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency
charged with the implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect.
Likewise, petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are
exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add
that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. Thus, the
present petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular
No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax
(VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization.
Issues:
1. Is copra an agricultural food product for purposes of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), thus exempting the petitioner from payment of the Value Added Tax
(VAT)?
2. Whether or not the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should be accorded
respect in interpreting the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
3. Is RMC No. 47-91 violative of the equal protection clause?
4. Are oil millers exempt from payment of the Value Added Tax (VAT)?
Held:
1. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not
considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of Section 103(b) of the
NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for
human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners
considered it so is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the
contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws. Under Section
103(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their
original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of
the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a
trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under Section 103(b) the sale of
agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or
distribution regardless of who the seller is. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the
petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food
product under Section 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
2. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In interpreting Section 103(a) and (b) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict
construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is
entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings
on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."
3. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is a material or substantial difference
between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and
dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The
Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a
reasonable basis for classifying them differently.
44
4. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to Section 102 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under Section
104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and
dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is
VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax
on the sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by
the producer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the
military or naval authorities concerned.
"A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal
Code."
The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his
fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon III registered in
his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of
Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United
States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
Issues: Whether or not violation of section 28 of administrative order No. 2 can give rise to
criminal prosecution.
Held: Act No. 4003 does not contain a provision prohibiting boats not subject to license to fish
within the stipulated areas without the written permission of the Secretary. Since the act itself
does not contain such prohibition, the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture to carry into effect the provisions of the law cannot incorporate such prohibition. For
the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of
section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred
upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not
been and cannot be delegated to him.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged
do not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil
courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
US vs. Panlilio
28 Phil. 300
Facts: The accused is charged for violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the
accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine,
to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An
amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify the section of Act No. 1760 alleged
to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial. The
defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the
Director of Agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico,
Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that
said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral
designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by
further order of the Director of Agriculture. It further appears from the testimony of the
witnesses. for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to
46
remove them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this,
the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place
to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they
had not been quarantined.
Issues: Whether or not violation of Administrative orders issued by the department of
agriculture constitute a criminal offense.
Held: Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for
not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court,
for each offense." 'A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act.
The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of
law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a
penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and
penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.
47
Justice and fairness dictates that the public must be informed of that provision by means of
publication before violators of the Exec. Order can be bound thereby.
Peralta vs. CA
462 SCRA 382
Facts: Petitioner Israel G. Peralta (PERALTA) is the Director/Officer-in-Charge of the PPA,
Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City. On the other hand, private respondent Nida Olegario
(OLEGARIO) holds a permanent position of Budget Officer I in the same office. On March 23,
1995, PERALTA issued an Order, directing OLEGARIO and a co-employee Visitacion U. Enilo,
to cease and desist from performing their duties and functions effective April 1, 1995 and to go
on leave with or without pay, as the case may be, on the ground of insufficiency in the release
of allotment under the plantilla of the office. On March 24, 1995, OLEGARIO sought the opinion
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Cotabato City, anent the legality of the aforesaid Order.
In a letter dated March 27, 1995, the CSC informed PERALTA that OLEGARIO, being a
government employee holding a permanent appointment, cannot be removed or separated from
the service without valid cause. In the same letter, the CSC declared that the assailed Order is
illegal because going on leave is a matter of personal choice and decision of the employee
concerned. The CSC further held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is
48
not among the valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the
service. It also advised PERALTA to cease and desist from enforcing the void Order.
Issue: Whether or not, the authority to issue opinions and rulings by CSC regarding personnel
management for both national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction is binding
to the said government agencies.
Held: It is clear from the provisions of Section 13 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 16(15), Chapter
3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 that the Regional Offices of the CSC are
empowered to enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel
management or personnel actions of national and local government agencies within their
jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the
conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to
issue opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local
government agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned
government agencies, otherwise, the authority given by law to these Regional Offices would
become useless and said Regional Offices can be rendered impotent by government agencies
which can simply choose to ignore their opinions and rulings on the convenient ground that they
are not binding. In the present case, the provision of law being enforced by the Regional Office
of the CSC is Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 and Section 46 of E.O. No. 292 which both provide
that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law and after due process. Hence, the ruling of the CSC Regional Office
that the memorandum of Peralta, dated March 23, 1995, directing private respondent Nida
Olegario to cease and desist from performing her duties and functions and advising her to go on
leave with or without pay is contrary to existing Civil Service law and rules, is binding upon
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is denied.
49
Issue: Whether or not private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs
valuation of their properties thus exhausting administrative remedies first before filing a petition
for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.
Held: Petition Denied. The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In
fact, private respondents did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation
summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for
the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting
private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court. At any rate, in Philippine
Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the
DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which
includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.
The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In
accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR
to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The
resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
50
Held: There is nothing contradictory between the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC over (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses
under R.A. No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such
determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR,
as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that
matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable.
Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly
dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
by RTC because LBP failed to pay the docket fee as required by the court on a certain period
before the court had to take action on the matter.
On the other hand RARAD had issued writ of execution for the payment of Four Million Two
Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) by
the LBP to Mr. Suntay. Instead of paying the land compensation, LBP had filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction
[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The petition,
docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the
RARAD. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order enjoining the RARAD from
momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and directing the parties to attend the
hearing for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent
injunction.
At this instance, On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay,
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710.
The petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from
further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubrica's
prayer for a temporary restraining order. This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24,
2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB has to take cognizance to act in the Certiorari petition of the
LBP with regards to the writ of execution issued by the RARAD against the LBP.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court had held that the DARAD has no jurisdiction to act on any
petition on certiorari lodge on them because being a quasi-judicial court they have limited
powers. Jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action must
exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by
the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the
writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory
provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated. In
the case at bar, the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction,
cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank's petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial
authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
June 27, 1986 PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized
signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations.
Sept. 4, 1986 PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung
Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo.
Feb. 3, 1987 Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon
finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a
mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter,
Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations for
payment of the salaries of the staffs.
Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an
action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG,
the Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questioning the aforesaid revocation of the
authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO.
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yims prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the
subject of the case. RTC judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss and granted Yims prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over
the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII,
sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the
orders and actions of the Commission.
Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of
the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or
Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their
Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether
civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan"
and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise
under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court.
However, the Secretary of Department of Education Culture and Sport (DECS) were
administratively charged them on the basis of the principal's report and had given them five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807".They filed correspondingly to the Commission on Human
Rights for the DECS violation of their peaceful assembly and replacement of them by the other
teachers without validly informing them. The CHR summons the DECS personnel but the latter
declared that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency, which has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that
it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
continuous acts of defiant by the petitioner issued preventive suspension order for grave
misconduct and to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and
failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to ask assistance or to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo.
HELD: The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty; it is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a
public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute. In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors
for assistance. Sect. 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel
of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided
shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
Republic who by virtue of the sequestration of the PCGG of the IBC will now be the new party
to be impleaded as party of interest.
In other words, the case will fall within the circumstances described in RA 8799 and thus, a
controversy considered as intra-corporate issues shall now lodge at the RTC pursuant to the
mandate under RA 8799.
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provision of
the Civil Code and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the
regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against the
petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising cost of electricity consumed for the
common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of fifteen thousand (15,000.00) a
year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside
as null and void.
58
Issue: Whether or not Board of Energy has jurisdiction to question of determining the
breakdown and itemization of the purchased power adjustment billed by an Electric power
company.
Held: CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the
power rates to be charged by electric companies but the regular courts power to adjudicate
cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. CCM Gas did
not question the fact that the law (P.D 1206) vest upon the BOE Supervision, control and
jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates, it also did not question the fact that the purchased
power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy and it did not, before the Trial Court,
question the purchased power adjustment formulated by the BOE. Trial Court concluded that
CCM Gas was not questioning before it the purchased power adjustment in question but simply
to demand a breakdown and itemization on which MERALCO based the purchased power
adjustment amount of P213, 696.00 which it was trying to collect from CCM Gas, it is clear that
the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way
pertains to BOEs supervision, control and jurisdiction. The question CCM Gas rose before the
trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of BOE because it falls within the field of judicial
determination and adjudication. Thus, it is the trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has
jurisdiction to entertain civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment
therein.
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Held: The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of
Communication being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such
jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by
statute. The functions of Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and
it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it
by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of
Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in
the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd.
412 SCRA 101
Facts: On July 12, 2000, WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement,[4] sold to herein petitioner
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company its shares of stock in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc. for
$10,000,000.00. Petitioner requested the approval by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary of the transfer to and acquisition by it of WMCPs FTAA on
account of its (petitioners) purchase of WMCs shares of stock in WMCP. The Tampakan
Companies notified the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR of
the exercise of their preemptive right to buy WMCs equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc., seeking
at the same time the MGB Directors formal expression of support for the stock transfer
transaction. Petitioner wrote, by letter the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said
agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares.
WMCP and WMC, respondents herein, by letters to the MGB, proffered their side. Several other
letters or position papers were filed by the parties with the MGB or the DENR. Petitioner filed
before the Makati RTC a complaint against herein respondents WMC, WMCP, and the three
corporations comprising the Tampakan Companies, for specific performance, annulment of
contracts, contractual interference and injunction. Defendants-herein respondents filed before
61
the Makati RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction and
that petitioner is guilty of forum Shopping and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether or not MGB has jurisdiction.
Held: The questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and
between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock
from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or
interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the
questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably
linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law.
Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from both the MGB and the RTC.
Facts: Boiser, the petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and
other municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the
name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the
petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound
itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT
relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of
62
Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of
the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation
to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching
services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the
operation of facilities under the agreement. On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to
the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents,
PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's
relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol.
Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited "Interconnecting
Agreement.", the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil Case No.
17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction
and damages.
Issue: whether or not respondent Judge has the authority in trying and hearing the case
considering the issue is of the complaint for which the said order was issued properly devolves
within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunication Commission.
Held: The petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is granted. The issuance of the order
devolves within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission and not with
the regular courts. The questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals is set aside.
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Issue: Whether or not respondent judge has the authority in trying and hearing the said case.
Held: The writ of certiorari is granted. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction
for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters and not vested in regular courts.
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Issue: whether or not Construction Industry Arbitration Commission has jurisdiction on the said
case.
Held: The petition is GRANTED. It would be preposterous for NIA to have the power of granting
claims without the authority to verify the computations of such claims.
Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Assoc. of the Phil.
465 SCRA 532
Facts: The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a
definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission.
After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA, the DTI
Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the
conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors
application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the
Tariff Commissions negative findings.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI
Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that
the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment
independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under
the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff
Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent
inferences and erroneous methodology. The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision
penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion, partially granted
Philcemcors petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the
Tariff Commission, it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of
the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the
ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant
the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions
recommendation. On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a
petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the
Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of
general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court
of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary
when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the
appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding
Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination that,
contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious
injury as a result of the import surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure
on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the
amount ofP20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.
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Digested by:
Lacastesantos, Regin Eral F.
LLB II-A
Montemayor vs. Bundalian
405 SCRA 264
FACTS: Private respondent (Luis Bundalian) accused petitioner (Edillo Montemayor), of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, that results
to his dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highway. Petitioner
explained that in view of the unstable condition of the government service in 1991, his wife
inquired from her family in the US about their emigration. After the investigation, the PCAGC
concluded that a petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion
to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. That it recommended petitioners dismissal from
service.
ISSUE: Whether or not he was denied of due process in the investigation before the PCAGC
HELD: We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 6In the case at bar, the
PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence
could not be located.7 Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due
process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was
duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence,
attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the
President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in
every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there
was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the
procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.
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Corona vs. CA
214 SCRA 378
FACTS: On May 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 25
creating a Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability. Pursuant to the mandate
of A.O. No. 25, former DOTC Secretary Rainerio Reyes issued Office Order No. 88-318 creating
the Administrative Action Board (AAB) to ac, decide and recommend to the Secretary
appropriate measures on cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of
corruption in the Department. In line with the said order series of complaints where then filed in
the AAB. Bungubung as one of the respondents filed his answer and questioned the
jurisdictional competence of the AAB on the ground that it was the General Manager of the PPA
who had jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of the DOTC and/or the AAB has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
PPA?
HELD: That the DOTC Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, has jurisdiction over PPA
personnel like the private respondents herein, is correct only to a certain extent. The DOTC
Secretarys jurisdiction is circumscribed by the aforequoted provisions of the PPA Charter and
the Civil Service Law which give him only appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary matters
involving personnel below that of Assistant General Manager. He does not have the power to
initiate proceedings against a subordinate official of the PPA; otherwise, we shall witness the
absurd spectacle of the DOTC Secretary acing as complainant-initiator of an administrative
case which later falls upon him to review.
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FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal by certiorari assails the
appellate courts ruling that mandamus lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry
superintendent in the provincial government of Laguna who was initially detailed or transferred
to another office, then suspended and finally dismissed following his expos of certain
anomalies and irregularities committed by government employees in the province. Engineer
Mariano L. Berroya, and been the quarry superintendent in Laguna since May 31, 1959. In April
and May, 1973, he denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the provincial
government of Laguna. On July 20, 1973, Gov. Felicisimo San Luis, issued an order to transfer
Berroya to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. On October 25, 1973, the Civil Service
Commission ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry superintendent.
But instead of complying with the order of the Civil Service Commission, the governor on
December 12, 1973, suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency and
insubordination on February 26, 1974. The Civil Service Commission reiterated its order for the
immediate reversion of Berroya to his former position, and ruled the one (1) year suspension
illegal. In the interim, respondent-appellant provincial governor issued an order on April 81,
1977 dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of office, which order of dismissal was
appealed by Berroya to the Civil Service Commission. On January 29, 1979, the Civil Service
Commission declared the dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of charges and directing his
reinstatement as quarry superintendent. Berroyas petition for reinstatement having been denied
by the governor despite orders for reinstatement by the Civil Service Commission and despite
factual antecedents aforestated he filed on May 27, 1980 the antecedent Civil Case No. SL1834 for Mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry superintendent with basic
salaries of the entire period of suspension and dismissal and for moral and exemplary damages
and expenses of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can review the facts or the decisions rendered by the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President.
HELD: Since the decision of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executor y the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well
established in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
FACTS: On February 11, 1964 Atlantic Container Corporation (Atlantic) and Federation of
Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which
was amended on August 31, 1964, claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private
respondent Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the CBA, and its amendment, petitioners and
FEDLU struck on February 16, 1966 and filed a case with the CIR charging Atlantic, Roberto
Jacinto and Hedy Jacinto for unfair labor practices on November 16, 1972. CIR rendered its
decision on the case stating that Atlantic and Roberto Jacinto were guilty of unfair labor
practices, to cease and desist from committing the same and reinstate the striking complainants
without loss of seniority and privileges. Considering, however, that not all the complainants
evinced their desire to prosecute the case, the award is extended to only those who testified
and presented their respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action. Petitioners
were ordered reinstated on November 27, 1972 and December 6, 1972, the Atlantic Container
Employees Organization and FEDLU filed motions to reconsider aforesaid decisions for the
reinstatement of all petitioners herein, but the CIR denied the motions for being pro forma and
for having been filed out of time. When the CIR was abolished, their case was transferred to the
NLRC where the NLRC Arbiter Jose T. Collado rendered a decision that Atlantic, Roberto
Jacinto, et al. were ordered jointly and severally to reinstate complainants without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, but again not all petitioners were included for reinstatement.
The respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC to set aside the decision of NLRC Arbiter Jose
Collado and dismiss the complaint for unfair labor practices which was gained by NLRC on
September 15, 1976. The dismissal was based on the following grounds: (1) res judicata in
which their case to as barred by a prior judgment; (2) the petitioners cause of action has
prescribed; and (3) that Atlantic and Inland Industries, Inc. were distinct and separate entities.
The petitioners then appealed to the Secretary of Labor through respondent Deputy Minister
Amado Inciong, but the respondent affirmed the decision of the NLRC. On July 3, 1989,
petitioners filed petition charging public respondents NLRC and Minister Amado Inciong with
grave abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and respondent Minister Amado Inciong acted with grave
abuse of discretion in annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering the dismissal of
the unfair labor practice complaint.
HELD: Since the judgment has become final and executory the subsequent filing of another
unfair labor practices charged against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its
existence, is barred by res judicata, the bringing of the same action in the name of the individual
members of the union will not take out the case from ambit of the principle of res judicata.
FACTS: this case involved the alleged of thief wherein Private respondent Juanito Collado was
employed as security guard on September 9, 1970 he was assigned as 1st sergeant of the
NALCOs security force at Nasipit, in the course of Collado employment or on august 20 1976,
four crates of lawanit board containing 1,000 panel were stolen from petitioner premises,
Collado was implicated in the theft and was thereafter place under preventive suspension, on
September 8,1976 NALCO file a petition for clearance to dismiss Collado with office of
Regional Office No. X, Collado filed a motion for the reconsideration on the ground not given an
opportunity to rebut the false finding or adduce evidence in his favor. But the acting Secretary of
Labor Amadog Enciong issued an order affirming the order of officer in charge Roy Seneres
granting Petition application for clearance to dismiss Collado. On October 9, 1978, Collado filed
a complaint before the Butuan District Labor Officer for unjust dismiss and reinstatement with
back wages and benefit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the respondent Collado is valid
HELD: It is sufficient if the employer has some bases to lose confidence or that employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position. On the other hand, the dropping qualified theft charges against Collado is not
binding upon a labor tribunal the sensitivity of Collado job or a security guard vis-a-vis the cause
of his dismissal cost him his to be rehired to the same position reinstatement is not proper
where termination of employment was due to breach of trust and confidence.
100
FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of clinics of the Caloocan City
general Hospital, Caloocan city. Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident
Physician thereat. When the position of assistant, hospital administrator of the Caloocan City
general hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan city
mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as assistant hospital
administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner,
Dr. Medalla, Jr, Protested Dr. Mackay designation and subsequent appointment alleging among
others that, chief of clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank, the then acting city Mayor Virgililo P.
Robles, who succeeded former mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th
endorsement dated September 20,1978, sustained Mackay appointment state that as of April
18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospital administrator from
his previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by
reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the certificate in Hospital
administration contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.
ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as assistant hospital
Administrator is valid
HELD: when a presidential act is challenged before the court of justice, it is not to be implied
there from that the executive is being made subject and subordinate to courts the legality of his
acts are under judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because
the law is above the chief executive himself, and the court seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it a judicial review of the President decision of a case of an employee decided by the
civil service board of appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the
courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative act of all administrative officer. The court may always examine into the exercise
of power by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether it is a legal power that
could have been granted to him and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. And
under the civil service section 19 (3) of the civil service PD no. 807 the recruitment of selection
of employees for promotion is drawn from the nix-in-rank.
101
FACTS: On January, 1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of
Land for the purchase of a tract of land situated in the Municipality of San Jose province of
Camarines Sur. An investigation conducted by the bureau of land but it was rejected on the
ground that the petitioner is a Chinese citizen, Fortunato Ortua contest that he was a Filipino
citizen, born in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur and being a natural son of Irene Demesa a
Filipina and Chinese father, but he was sent to china to study and return to the Philippine when
he was 21 years of age.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner may Purchase of tract Public land, due to the question of
his citizenship
HELD: One condition for the purchase of a track of public agricultural land provided by the
Public land law, act no. 2874, in its section 23 and 88, is that the purchaser of land shall be a
citizen of lawful age of the Philippines Island or of the United States. One or born in the
Philippines of a Filipina mother and Chinese father, educated in china who returned in the
Philippines when he was 21 years of age is presumptively a Philippine citizen. Has not by his
own acts expressly or impliedly repudiated his Philippines citizenship and chosen Chinese
citizenship, but has always considered himself to a Filipino and has elected to remain as a
Philippines citizen therefore that a clear error of law resulted in not considering of a Philippine
and so qualified under the Public land and to Purchase Public agricultural land.
telecommunication Pursuant to requisition no. 18792 dated march 9, 1965. The bidding took
place on May 15,1965, among the bidders were IPSI and DELTA, the bid deliberated on by the
committee on award, and authorized representative of the bureau of communication, and the
committee thereafter recommended the award to IPSA at 52,00 each. On june11, 1965 the
DELTA protested the award to IPSI by telegram sent to the bureau of communication claim that
the truck offered by IPSI were not factory build and the next move of DELTA was to filed with
the office of the secretary of general services a letter of protest against the Proposed award to
IPSI accompanied by a protest bond in the amount of 44, 000 executed by the meridian
assurance corporation, thereon acting secretary Puma Sin Suat indorse on September 3, 1965
to the director of the bureau that only the DELTA corporation has complied with the technical
specification originally called for Requisition No. 1982792 dated 9,1965, only approved by Abad.
The award should be made to DELTA at a price equal to that offered by IPSI, IPSI filed with the
Quezon city court of first instance on September 21, 1965 with application for preliminary
prohibition and mandatory injunction which was docketed as case no Q 9477 and a bond in the
amount of 100, 000 given by capitol insurance & surety co.INC.
ISSUE: Whether or not that the DELTA corporation has complied with the requisition no.
1982792
HELD: Before said action may be entertained in the court of justice, it must be shown that all the
administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted, and second that
the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that
the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. Therefore the respondent secretary his act must be nullified and the trial
court judgment upholding those acts must be set aside
Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Assoc. Inc.
461 SCRA 517
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa city, Branch 205 dismissing civil action no. 02-237 on the ground of litis pendentia
103
any forum shopping. The petitioner Sherwill development corporation is the registered owner of
two farce of land in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Lot 88 is covered by transfer of certificate of title no.
131918 consisting of 8,774 square meters while lot 86, with an area of 16,766 square meters, is
covered by TCT no. 131919 both lots form part of the Muntinlupa estate, while the title thereon
were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on September 24, 1913. On October 16, 2002,
the petitioner filed a complaint for Quieting of title against respondent Sitio Sto. Nio Residents
Association Inc. (SSNRAI), Nilda Devilleres and the lands management Bureau (LMB)
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the fraud had been committed in securing such title.
2. Whether or not the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping insofar as SP
Civil No. 02-237 is concerned are applicable
HELD: The director of lands original certificate of title over the same authority of the director of
lands to investigate conflicts over public and is derived from section 91 of the Public land act. In
fact, it is not merely his right but his specific duties to conduct investigations of alleged fraud in
securing patents and the corresponding title. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as
indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation by the
director of lands as to how such title had been acquired, if the purpose of such investigations to
determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the government. As a rule then, courts have no
jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB. The court ruled
that the petitioner action was barred by the pendency of the proceedings before the LMB for litis
pendentia to lie; the following requisites must be satisfied 1.) Identity of parties or representation
in both cases; 2.) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; 3.) The relief must be founded
on the same facts and the same basis and identity of the two preceding particulars should be
such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration. To determine
whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present or whether final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in pendentia barred the filing of SP Civil Action No. 02-237, the RTC correctly
dismissed the same on the additional ground of forum sopping.
shareholdings (for 5 million) and of 63,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and
covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her for P1,674.450.00 and Spouses
Agapito Braga and Virgina Braga, erstwhile majority stockholders holding 56% of the
outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell. In 1982, Telectronics
requested the corporate secretary to register and transfer to its name and those of its nominees
the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares but Norberto Braga (son of Agapito), the corporate
secretary refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate books asserting
that their claim preemptive rights over the Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga never
transferred her 63,000 shares to Teletronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing
those shares. The intertwined actions between the protagonists, centered on the question of
jurisdiction over the dispute which were culminate in filing two cases at bar.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND SEC HAS THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS OF POCKET BELL.
HELD: Under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 902-A, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the said case clearly fall within the SEC. As stressed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
SEC, the Court has held that Nowhere does the law (P.D. 902-A) empower any Court of
Instance (RTC) to interfere with the orders of the Commission and any ruling by the trial court
on the issue of ownership of the share of stock is not binding on the commission for want of
jurisdiction.
contrary to law and made subject to forfeiture proceedings by Petitioner Bureau of Customs. It
was only on January 12, 1967 that the warrant of seizure and detention was issued. The
respondents contend that the issuance of warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent
Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the case. On March 7, 1967 respondent Judge
Pedro S. Navarro issued an order for the release of the articles in question, thus preventing
Bureau of customs from proceeding with the auction sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court acquires jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases
for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
HELD: No, The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance
and then the commissioner of Customs. This is the field where the Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A Court of
First Instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial review,
but only by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its certiorari decision. Consequently, a
Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitute a tribunal upon which the
law expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and
further disposition of subject matter of such proceedings.
Cable wholly- owned subsidiaries by Unilink, which is owned by Mediaquest Holding, Inc.
controlled by PLDT Group. In pursuant to a Master Consolidation Agreement, the ownership,
rights and interest in Sky Vision and Unilink were placed under a holding company owned by
Benpres Group, owned by Lopez Inc. and also Benpres and ABSCBN owned 33.5 % thereof is
owned by PLDT Group. That the re-channeling of its cable television broadcast resulted to
damages to GMA business operation. That re-channeling of GMA from channel 12 to 14 in SKY
CABLE AND SUN CABLE results to noticeable dropouts and spillover of extraneous sound and
in clear visual transmission resulting in distorted and degraded visual presentation and also
shows no signal and snowy reception and that it did not occur in the shows of defendant ABSCBN on the channels of the defendant cable companies. On July 15 2003, Sky Cable and Sun
Cable moved for dismissal of complaint on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum-shopping
that there was a similar case pending before National Telecommunication Commission that
involves same cause of action and same parties except for ABS-CBN. Respondent Sky Cable
and Sun Cable also asserted that the NTC has the primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NTC HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT.
HELD: The petition is denied. The complaint failed to state a cause of action against ABS-CBN
and the other respondents. The wrongful acts complained of and upon the damages prayed for
are based, have to do with the operation and ownership of the cable companies. So the factual
matters undoubtedly pertain to the NTC and not with the regular courts.
Agreement, IEC assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal
blocks which are subject of IECs coal operating contract. However, IEC thereafter filed an
action of rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the
Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC Makati, branch 150.alleging that MMIC
took over the subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum had finalized and approved by
BED. It found out that the President of both IEC and MMIC is Jesus S. Cabarrus. In a summary
judgment, coal operation contract was in favor of IEC and ordered to BED to issue its written
affirmation but the Court of Appeals reverse RTCs decision that it is BED has the power to
decide the controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE BUREAU OF ENERGY
JURISDICTION OVER SAID ACTION AND NOT THE CIVIL COURT.
DEVELOPMENT
HAS
HELD: It was ruled that the cause of action by IEI is not merely the rescission of the Agreement
but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. That the decision of the
rescission of the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating
contract to IECs favor and directed to the BED to give due course are matters properly falling
within the domain of the BED, and not with the civil court.
restoration of the cancelled export authorization. Petitioner AIFC contends that, respondent
GTEB cancellation of AIFCs EQs is a confiscation of property without due process. It further
argues that E.O 537 did not gives the GTEB any powers, nor any jurisdiction to hear and decide
actions and in as much as the litigants were private (AIFC and Glorious Sun) it has no
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not GTEB have the power and authority to grant or cancel export
authorizations.
or
HELD: Yes, it has. GTEB as an administrative agency has in its favor the presumption that it
has regularly performed its official duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature, so
much so in the exercise of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Thus, the power and jurisdiction
to adjudicate on the questions of AIFCs entitlement to the export allocations (be it export quotas
or export authorization), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export
allocations, belongs solely to GTEB, and not to the regular courts.
for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but it was denied. Thereafter, she filed a
petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review Committee, which referred the same to
the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the CSC. In a resolution, the CSC directed the
immediate reinstatement of Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her
termination. She then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's order and manifested that
the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988, the Board set
aside its previous Order affirming her dismissal in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the
case. The GSIS also filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the board and stated
that the CSC is a higher administrative appellate body on matters concerning of the removal of
officers and employees from the service. The Board cannot in any manner modify or alter the
determinations and actions of the Civil Service Commission. Then they appealed but the CSC
denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to review the said case.
HELD: CSC has no jurisdiction over the said case, under Presidential Decree No. 1409 it states
that the Merit Systems Board provides a Merit Systems Board that has the function to Hear and
Decide cases brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the
determination of appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail,
reassignment and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the
government arising from abuses arising from personnel actions of the these officers or from
violations of the merit system. It is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it is
proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. PD No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems
Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers
involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the
cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of
the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power, to wit:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
System Plus Computer College of Caloocan City vs. Local Govt. of Caloocan City
408 SCRA 406
FACTS: Petitioner System Plus Computer College was established in 1997. It is a non-profit
and non-stock educational institution, it enjoys tax exemption on its buildings from the local
government but it does not cover the parcels of land which petitioner is renting in the amount of
P5, 000.00 monthly from Consolidated Assembly, Inc. and Pair Management. Petitioner
requested to extend the tax exemption on the said parcels of land invoking Article VI, Sec. 28(3)
of the 1987 Constitution and other provisions in Local Government Code. The request was
denied by the respondent on the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by
Consolidated Agency and Pair Management and that it is not used exclusively for educational
purposes. On February, 1999 the petitioner entered into separate agreements from Contract of
110
lease to donations. But still respondent again denied the application for tax exemption.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with the RTC.
ISSUE: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY AVAIL THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IN REGULAR COURTS. (2) WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER VIOLATED
THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
HELD: The court ruled that before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that
petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes. The
petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly
seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law
without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law
provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the
case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein.
Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner
should first avail of all the means afforded by the administrative processes.
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Subsequently, the case was brought by the
petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution of the appeal, a suit for replevin was
filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan which issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to private respondents.
Issue: Whether an action for replevin to recover a movable property which is the subject matter
of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held: Yes. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts
intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one
thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of
comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
the United States and the National City Bank of New York at Manila for the properties in the
Philippines. Both of these trustees accepted the trust. After Stevenot's death, administration
proceedings were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila, H. P. Hoskyns, plaintiff in
the instant action, being appointed as administrator. The action for declaratory relief prays that
the court "determine the question of construction or validity of the declaration of trust and for the
declaration of the rights and duties of the defendant hereunder."
Issue: Whether an aggrieved party may institute an action in court without first resorting to an
administrative remedy.
Held: No. The courts are given discretionary power to refuse to make a declaration of rights in
any case where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all the
circumstances. The reason for this rule is that a declaratory judgment proceeding is intended to
supplement, and not to be a substitute for, or supersede, other existing remedies, in use at the
time of the enactment of the declaratory judgments acts; it may be used as an alternative or
auxiliary to other proceedings for an executory judgment; and it is within the discretion of the
court to permit such an action or proceeding to be maintained where another remedy is
available to plaintiff. As a general rule, however, to justify such an action the situation must be
such that adequate relief is not presently available through the means of other existing forms of
action or proceeding, and, conversely, jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment ordinarily will not
be entertained where another equally adequate and appropriate remedy is already available for
the issues or rights sought to be determined and declared, as where another equally
serviceable statutory remedy has been specially provided in cases of similar import, and
particularly where such statutory remedy is exclusive.
defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC both alleged that the complaint states no cause of
action and the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
Issue: Whether the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to
administrative agencies need not be made before going to court.
Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first
made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within
the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before
going to court. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without
cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason for this is that prior availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with.
The matter of determining whether there ispollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary
now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special
law provides for another forum. Clearly, the claim of petitioners that their immediate recourse to
the regular courts is justified because the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief is
without basis.
connection with the NPC which granted PSCs application and also made the determination that
BATELEC II was neither technically nor financially capable of supplying the 69 kv of power
supply to PSC. Consequently, private respondent PSC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas to enjoin petitioner BATELEC II from committing
acts that would prevent direct power connection between respondents PSC and the NPC.
Displeased, BATELEC II filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari ascribing grave
abuse of discretion to the Bureau for issuing a resolution allegedly sans the benefit of a hearing
and for its alleged failure to resolve inter alia the issue of NPCs disqualification from distributing
electric power directly to consumers within the franchised area of BATELEC II. Said appeal was
dismissed, one of the grounds is that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether the principle of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in
this case.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities to accord them the prior opportunity to decide
controversies within their competence before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice
for review. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon
a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum.
Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining
cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the
courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.
In the present case, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner availed of
administrative relief before filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It did not
appeal the Bureaus Resolution dated 16 March 1998 to the Secretary of Energy, which under
Section 8 in relation to Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 7638 has the power over the bureaus under
the Department. It has not, as well, suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to the
Court of Appeals against the Resolution in question. Neither has petitioner shown that the
instant case falls among the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Issue: Whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to the instant
case.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first
made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
competence. This is because the administrative agency concerned is in the best position to
correct any previous error committed in its forum.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, we see no urgent need for judicial intervention. Note that the
case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioners free patent application for
the subject unregistered agricultural land. Clearly, the matter comes within the exclusive primary
jurisdiction of the DENR in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. The impugned Orders of the
DENR Regional Office are subject to review by the DENR Head Office. Petitioner cannot
circumvent this procedure by simply invoking a supposed loss of faith in the said agency.
Respondent court, instead of dismissing the case, conducted a hearing to determine the
propriety of the issuance of the writ prayed, and shortly after, it issued the challenged order
granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon the filing of a bond in the
sum of P2,000.00. Frustrated in their move to have the said order reconsidered,petitioner filed
a petition.This petition seeks to annul and set aside (1) the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the respondent Court of First Instance of Baguio- Benguet in Special Civil
Action No. 2779, ordering petitioner Cipriano Abalos, municipal mayor of La Trinidad, Benguet,
to recognize respondent Dorothy Oidi "as the legitimate assistant municipal treasurer of La
Trinidad, Benguet, and to approve payment of her salaries from November 6, 1970 to the
present and thenceforward, " and (2) the order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether or not it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative
remedies have been exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers
should not be entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief.
Whether or not the above rule is absolute.
HELD: While it is true that no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies
have been exhausted, and that special civil actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief, the rule is not absolute. It is
subject to certain exceptions. It is not applicable where the questions involved are essentially
judicial, where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent officer acted in utter disregard of due process.
The petition filed by respondent Oidi before respondent court contains allegations which remove
the case from the ambit of the general rule. She repeatedly asserted therein the want of
authority of Mayor Abalos to order her suspension from office and the similar lack of authority of
the members of the municipal council to conduct an administrative investigation against her and
to order her dismissal from the service. Said averments indisputably make out a legal question
that is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body.
What is more, her claim that she was denied the right of due process makes the rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies inapplicable.
administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are
reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from
the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not
exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action. To this objection, petitioners claim that
they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents
sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls
under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of
administrative remedies.
HELD: Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed
to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain
a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject
to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v.
Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30,
1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.]
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is warranted.
HELD: It is further contended by the Commission that the petitioner should have first exhausted
her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her failure
to do so is a bar to her action in court. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this
rule, considering that in its resolution reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice, who is the legal adviser of the Executive Department, the Commission
declared that the opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which
may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party
has the court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial
ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.
of First Instance of Laguna, docketed therein as Civil Case No. SC-719, seeking his
reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and
damages. In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that
the appointment of the petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having
no civil service eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure
of the appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner needs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the
action for quo warranto and mandamus in court.
HELD: The appellants contend that the appellee should have first exhausted all administrative
remedies before he reported to the courts. They suggested that the appellee should have
appealed the order of dismissal to the Commissioner of Civil Service in view of the provisions of
Sec. 16(i) and Sec. 16 of Republic Act No. 2260 which grant the Commissioner of Civil Service
the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent
officers and employees in the competitive or classified service; and to hear and determine
appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be aggrieved by an action or determination
of any appointing authority contrary to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and rules. While
there are precedents which hold that before a litigant can bring a matter to court, it is necessary
that he first exhaust all the remedies in the administrative branch of the government, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It has been
repeatedly held that the principle requiring previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter disregard of due process. The
rule does not also apply where insistence on its observance would result in nullification of the
claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.
Held: No. it appears from the petition that the reason for filing it without awaiting the final action
on the part of the respondent Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the
automatic reversion as of July 1, 1958, after the expiration of then current fiscal year, whatever
action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner would be of no
avail after the reversion of the funds appropriated for the purpose of salary adjustment. Hence,
he claims that to require him to exhaust the administrative remedies would, in the circumstances
of the case, in effect amount to a nullification of his claim.
shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the
total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.
await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the
matter.
123
3. The procedural due process in the case at bar was equally explained based on the issuance
of execution order no. 101 as party stated hereunder:
xxxx it is the policy of the state, as swiftly as possible to improve the deplorable condition
vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor and eradicate the harmful
and unlawful trade of clandestine operators..xxxxx
the middle of the year 1938. Since then Tiangco has not been paying any rental to the plaintiff.
As to Jose Lazaro, his testimony is to the effect that he had been occupying the portion of 113
square meters upon an annual rent of P12.00. The Supreme court constrained to modify the
decision appealed from by (1) declaring plaintiff-appellee and appellant Faustina Lauchang to
have the preferential right to buy the whole of Lot No. 10 of Black No. 2 of the Tambobong
Estate and (2) ordering the Division of Landed Estates of the Bureau of Lands, successor of the
Rural Progress Administration which was abolished by Executive Order No. 376, the Land
Tenure Administration, or the agency or instrumentality of the Government concerned to sell
said lot to her." The question raised by the parties was correctly decided by the Court of
Appeals in its amended decision or judgment sought to be reviewed wherein the pertinent parts
of the opinion of this Court rendered in Santiago, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. L-8271-72, 29
December 1955, are quoted. The proposition advanced by the petitioners that this Court should
depart from the strict application of the order of preference laid down in the cases decided by it
cannot be sustained, because unlike in this case where the respondent owns no other realty
except an inchoate right over the lot in litigation, in the case of Gutierrez vs. Santos, G.R. No. L12253, 28 March 1960, the lessee had four (4) lots the total area of which was 3,279 square
meters, aside from the then litigated lot, which was more than sufficient to answer for the needs
of the lessee and his family. Furthermore, the 480 square meters lot being inadequate for the
needs of an already growing family of the respondent (consisting of 7 children all of age and 7
grandchildren), petitioners Lazaro and Tiangco bought or became co-owners of lots in Malabon,
Rizal, as evidenced by TCT No. 58148 and 61615, issued by the Register of Deeds in and for
the province of Rizal. The contention of the petitioners that the action brought in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action, in view of
respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is untenable. It is well to recall that
the lot, subject of the litigation, is not a part of the public domain, but of private ownership
acquired by the Government for resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved
party may bring an action in court without the need of exhausting all administrative remedies.
all involve fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover, upon formal statement of the
Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor
and In-Charge of the Export Department (such position being primarily confidential and highly
technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the
service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the best interests of the Central Bank and,
therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the
respondent R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension."
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal of the Central Bank authorities to be clearly
untenable. In the first place, the loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to
be predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject-matter
of the investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated
anything in the record which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration
from the charges; it nowhere pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied
only on the statement of the loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the
particular set of facts herein that the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the
inability of substantiating the charges upon which the investigation had proceeded. The court,
therefore, cannot rely on the so-called "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal. And
inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other
alternative but to follow the mandate that "No public officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. XII,
Constitution of the Phil.)Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be
afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are
"highly technical", the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause
as provided by law" at least demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence", if at all
allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists.
In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores the self-evident fact that the
constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy determining, primarily confidential, and
highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to
be made on the basis of merit and fitness as determined from competitive examinations, but
that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the principle
emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII, that "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law." and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus propounded is repeated almost
verbatim in Section 132 of the Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides in equally
absolute terms that "No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil Service
law or regulations shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." It is
well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260) divides positions into
three categories: competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt
service, the last being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3, R. A.
2260). In view of section 3 and 5 of the same law, providing that "SEC. 3 Positions Embraced
is the Civil Service. The Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, . . ." "SEC. 5. The non-competitive service. The non-competitive or unclassified
service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive
or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature." (R.A. 2260) it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the
Civil Service law and regulations as a member of the non-competitive or unclassified service,
and that his removal or suspension must be for cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 53
Off. Gaz., 132; Arcel vs. Osmea, L-14956, Feb. 27, 1961; Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L19748, Sept. 13, 1962). The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as
private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of
office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no
removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly technical posts, requiring special
skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly distinguishes the primarily confidential from the
highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and
erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that
while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security
of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist
or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
127
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. The entire
objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit,
would be thus negated. Of course a position may be declared both highly technical and
confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require. But the position of plaintiffappellant Corpus is not of this category. The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289,
relied upon by the appellant Bank, is not applicable, since said case involved the office of city
engineer, that the court expressly found to be "neither primarily confidential, policy determining
nor highly technical" .
Demaisip vs. CA
106 Phil. 237
FACTS: The first applicant for a fishpond permit covering Lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of
Dumangas Cadastre, Iloilo, was the late Geronimo Destacamento who filed his application on
April 1, 1927. On Dec. 31, 1930, the Fishpond Permit No. F-624-B granted to the late Geronimo
Destacamento expired, because he failed to make any improvements on the lots and to pay the
required rentals. Before his death on December 19, 1928, Geronimo Destacamento without the
knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in
question in favor of Serafin Villanueva, an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the
permit granted him. In a letter dated December 19, 1928, the District Forester of Iloilo,
notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid deed of sale, requested Serafin Villanueva to
apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots. In spite of the request, Villanueva neglected and
failed to file his application for a fishpond permit, such that no permit was ever granted to him
before or after the expiration of the permit of the late Geronimo Destacamento. It appears that
on October 15, 1935 the herein complainant Gaudencio G. Demaisip filed with the Fish and
Game Administration a fishpond permit application which was given No. 2285 for the same lots
Nos. 233, 236 and 237 of Dumangas Cadastre, containing an area of 13.9859 hectares of
public mangrove forest land located in Sitios Buang and Balabag, barrio Buang, Dumangas,
Iloilo. By March 6, 1936, the Demaisip had complied with all the pre- requisites necessary for
the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting of a
surety bond in the sum of P350. On March 19, 1936, when the fishpond permit in favor of
Gaudencio Demaisip was ready to be issued, Serafin Villanueva executed a deed of sale
covering the lots in question in favor of the herein defendant Luis E. Buenaflor; shortly thereafter
or in the same month, the latter started to occupy the land, and introduced improvements
thereon consisting of a big dam 27 meters long, 4 meters high, across the Balabag River, worth
P1,600. According to the result of an investigation conducted by a representative of the Fish
and Game Administration, the dam deprives other fishponds leased from the government of
129
fresh or flowing water and was illegally constructed because it violated a rule of that Office
prohibiting the introduction of any improvements on the land applied for before the issuance of a
permit. It was only on May 21, 1936, or 7 months after Demaisip had filed an application, that
Luis Buenaflor also filed his application for the area in question with the Iloilo branch of the Fish
and Game Administration, the Director of Fish and Game Administration was called upon to
decide who of the conflicting claimants Luis Buenaflor or Gaudencio G. Demaisip had a
better right to be regarded as the lessee of the land in question pursuant to Section 63 of Act
No. 4003.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable.
HELD: The plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of
Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be
denied and that of defendant Buenaflor be given due course upon compliance with certain
requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the
theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The
presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President
unless the same is disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action
should not be entertained because he has failed to exhaust first all the administrative remedies
available to him.
was not recognized or that the recognition of his guerrilla status was revoked. Thereupon,
Bartulata sought relief from the lower court, but the latter, on the basis of the stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties and the other documents admitted by them, dismissed his petition as
stated in the beginning of this opinion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not he should be retired with the rank of staff sergeant as contended by
respondents, or with the rank of second lieutenant as claimed by petitioner?
Whether the petitioner must, exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him
before coming to court?
Held: this Court, speaking of the probative weight of the revised roster, said that the entries in
the Army's roster of recognized guerrillas, assuming them to be the official acts of duly
authorized public officers, are merely prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In other
words, this roster or list is not to be considered the sole and exclusive evidence of the
government's recognition of guerrilla services. As there is nothing in the law making
inadmissible other proof of such recognition, where they are material and relevant. Further, this
Court said that the recognized roster (drawn up primarily for backpay purposes) must yield to
the initial roster (which in that case showed that Aragon was already serving six months before
the Leyte landing of the liberation troops). In the case now before this Court, respondents'
theory must be rejected. This Court holds that the Philippine Government had recognized not
only herein petitioner's wartime and post-liberation services in the Army, but also his rank as
2nd lieutenant. The recognition was made when his name was included in the initial roster of the
108th Infantry, 10th Military District; when he was given backpay for services rendered as
second lieutenant from April 1, 1943 to May 15, 1945; when he was paid his salaries and
allowances as second lieutenant; when he was allowed to wear the uniform as such officer; and
when he was honorably discharged with the rank of second lieutenant on January 31, 1947.
Even the approval of petitioner's retirement application indicated a clear showing of the
recognition of petitioner's guerrilla and post liberation services. It will be noted that in Special
Orders No. 126, which officially announced the approval of his retirement, it is stated that he
had completed 23 years and 15 days of service. And it will also be noted that in the stipulation
of facts, respondents admit that petitioner had rendered more than 23 years of continuous
military service. These 23 years and 15 days of service cover the period from January 15, 1924
(date of original enlistment) up to January 30, 1947 inclusive, as the records do not show that
he had rendered further military service. If the petitioner, as contended by the respondents, had
not served under the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, nor was he a member thereof or that
his guerrilla status was revoked, his wartime services, dating as early as October 1, 1942 and
ending May 15, 1945, could not have been included in the computation of his military service.
The inclusion of the period from October 1, 1942 to May 15, 1945 in petitioner's military service
record simply means his guerrilla services with the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District, the only
guerrilla outfit he was known and shown to have served in, was duly recognized by the
authorities of the Philippine Army. The fact that his name may not be included in the roster of
recognized guerrillas of the Philippines that is kept by the authorities of the United States
Government should not matter. What should matter are the records of the Philippine
Government regarding his military activities, including his services in the guerrilla during the last
World War II. We hold that on the basis of the evidence, amply and adequately showing the
Philippine government's due recognition of petitioner's guerrilla services, it is but fair and legal,
that he be accorded all the rights, the benefits and the privileges that are due him as a
recognized guerrilla to be retired with the rank of second lieutenant, which was his rank when
the afore-quoted Executive Order No. 121, confirming it, was promulgated, and which was the
rank that he was holding when honorably discharged from the Army. Respondents, however,
would contend that the present action should be dismissed because petitioner "has not
exhausted all administrative remedies" available to him before coming to court. Respondents
would want petitioner to appeal his case to the Office of the President before availing of court
processes. In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that the doctrine requiring the
previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. The present proceedings having been
brought against the Secretary of National Defense, respondents' contention is clearly untenable.
132
133
Held: (1) NO. There is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be
deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of
Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to
vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under PD 175 which
grants him the authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative officer has
only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable execution. (2) NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does
not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This
doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed.
There was no need to appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts
could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant
case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the civil code, the lessee cannot
assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In
the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary, the lessee is expressly
prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant
thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership.
Doctrine: The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of landowner, except as many be
provided by law. Inherent in the right of landholders to install tenant is their authority to do so;
otherwise, without such authority civil law lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the
landholding tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. Deforciants
cannot install lawful tenants who are entitled to security of tenure. A contract of civil law lease
can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease
agreement. Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and
the tenant;(2) The subject is agricultural land;(3) There is consent;(4) The purpose is agricultural
production;(5) There is personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of the harvests between
the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the
case an agrarian dispute. Claims that one is a tenant do no not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant
to security of tenure. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is
intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy
laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.
The act of subletting to third persons extinguishes the agricultural leasehold relations, as this
constitutes an abandonment of the landholding due to the absence of personal cultivation.
Obiter: Social justice is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper
in his hovel. It is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or
reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and
the rich alike according to the mandate of law. Interpretare et concordare legeslegibus est
optimus interpret and imodus. Interpreting and harmonizing the laws with laws is the best
method of interpretation.
136
petition for certiorari basically on the ground that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping. It
ordered the dismissal of the appeal filed by petitioner before the Office of the President
and reinstated the resolution and order of the DOTC Secretary enjoining petitioner from
operating its buses along the contested route.
Issue: whether or not appellate court has decided a question in a way not in accord with
applicable jurisprudence
Held: In order to deter the evils of forum shopping, Circular 28-91, dated 08 February 1994,
issued by the Supreme Court requires that every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals must be accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping. Administrative
Circular 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, expands the certification requirement to include
cases filed in court and quasi-judicial agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 0494 to become Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, to curb the
malpractice of forum shopping, the rule ordains that a violation thereof would constitute
contempt of court and be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice
to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. Undeniably, there
is identity of cause of action and reliefs sought between the petitioners letter-appeal filed with
the Office of the President and the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (C.A.
G.R. SP No. 61159). The DOTC resolution and order, dated 05 June 2000 and 30 August 2000,
respectively, were sought to be set aside in both appeals filed by petitioner. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President to review any
determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an
administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should
be priorly exhausted before the courts judicial power is invoked. The appellate court correctly
ruled that the action of a department head bears only the implied approval of the President, and
the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to review the decision of the former
pursuant to the Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of
the appeal by herein petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by
the petitioner of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction which has
attached in the first instance continues until the final resolution of the case. Incongruently, the
appellate court, while recognizing to be valid the exercise of jurisdiction by the Office of the
President, ordered the dismissal of the appeal pending with the said office based on forum
shopping. The decision of the appellate court ordering the dismissal of the appeal taken to the
Office of the President is clearly flawed. It is the latter, not the appellate court, which could
dismiss the case pending before that office. It also behooves courts of justice, if only for reasons
of comity and convenience, to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress is completed so as to give the administrative office every opportunity to correct its error
and to properly dispose of the case. In fact, the appellate courts order to dismiss the appeal
pending with the Office of the President could well constitute an undue intrusion into a valid
exercise of jurisdiction by the President over acts of subordinates within that office.
138
National Development Company and DOLE Philippines Inc. vs. Wilfredo Hervilla
GR No. L-65718, June 30, 1987
FACTS: The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed
on December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a
total area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-ininterest of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former],
filed with the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent
Application for the said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant,
filed with the Bureau of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural
plants. On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of
Candido de Pedro. Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for the
investigation of the said lots, to which a report was rendered and an order was issued as to the
adjustment of the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the action for recovery, to which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court decision and declared that
the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void.. A
motion for reconsideration was filed and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the
purpose of submitting original certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-ininterest by the Bureau of Lands while the case was pending. The two motions were denied.
Thus this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the court in a deciding a case involving recovery of possession declare
null and void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case?
HELD: In the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by law to the Director
of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of
rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public
lands. The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the
determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question
(in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts. In the case at
bar, the petitioners possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the issuance of
Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left for the
courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot and
academic by the decision of the Director of Lands. Defendants' possession of the lands
disputed, for purposes of the free patents, has been confirmed in the administrative case. The
administrative branch of the government has thus already spoken. Its action has lapsed into
finality. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of possession is lost. Moreover, records do not show that
private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
140
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in dispute in favor of petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the Philippines. In short,
Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court
review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts may no longer
interfere with such decision. The decision of the Appellate court is reversed and set aside.
evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in
this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. This petition
is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
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necessary to prevent loses and the same is proven; (2) Written notice to the employees and to
the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date thereof; and (3) Payment of separation
pay equivalent to one month or at least month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In this case, the respondent quasi-judicial agency failed to establish substantial evidence
due to the following: (1) Private respondent failed to prove the existence of a just and valid
cause for dismissing petitioners;(2) Conciliator Tamboboy took the statement at its face value
and never required Yap to substantiate his claim; (3) What it shows is that private respondents
led its employees to believe that the company was suffering losses when this allegation has not
at all been substantiated; and (4) Evidently, there was bad faith on the part of private
respondents which should not be countenanced as being prejudicial and oppressive to labor. In
view of the foregoing finding that retrenchment was unnecessary to prevent alleged business
losses which were never adequately proved by private respondents, the Court no longer finds
any need to discuss whether the remaining requisites outlined under Article 238 are present.
Hence, the petition was granted. The challenged decision of respondent NLRC and that
of Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan are set aside.
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driver. We agree with the NLRC that an imputation of habitual negligence cannot be drawn
against petitioner, since the earlier accident was not of his own making.
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153
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
GR No. 82544 June 27, 1994
FACTS: Petitioners were arrested on 27 February 1988 by agents of the CID by virtue of
Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner. Petitioners were suspected alien
pedophiles. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in
the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. On 7
March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code. On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied
considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. On 4 April 1988
petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a
self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed
under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988,
the Board of Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain
conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion
was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners detention is valid notwithstanding that there is no provision in
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners
pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative
investigation.
HELD: Yes. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance
with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien Section 37(a) is not
constitutionally proscribed. The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions,
which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature.
Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. Moreover,
The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings. There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. What is essential is that there
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should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair
hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the
charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code explicitly provides: Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign
power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands
or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which
such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the
charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation
of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. The denial by
respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by
the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that
the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional
guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
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HELD: 1. No. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rulemaking or legislative power. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President
of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D.
No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations
issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective.
2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by
the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will
not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is
not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the
number of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: Sec. 1. The Philippine
Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the
number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival
of the remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing
processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants
for the above purpose. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March
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24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new
coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby,
forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous
one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of
production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in
case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. Instead of determining
the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit,
the PCA now relies entirely on competition with all its wastefulness and inefficiency to do
the weeding out, in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat
of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition,
underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign
trade performance of the coconut industry.
PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine
Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.
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HELD: The Court ruled that, in resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the
merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order
of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own
determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He
failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC
judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should
have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and
irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same holds true with respect to the October 24,
2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and
merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. By relying solely on the manifestation of the
public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial
power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus
stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainants right to due process. They
were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever. The case was remanded
to the RTC for evaluation on whether probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.
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FACTS: Then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan entered into a compromise agreement with
PNOC for the payment of the latter of P93, 955, 479.12 total tax payment on the earnings
and/or yields from PNOCs money placements with PNB, which represents 30% of the basic
tax. The agreement is a result of the PNB failing to withhold the 15% final tax on the interest
earnings and/or yields from the money placements of PNOC with the said bank, in violation of
PD No. 1931, which withdrew all tax exemptions of GOCCs. The BIR also demanded from the
PNB, as withholding agent, for the payment of the final tax interest earnings and/or yields from
PNOCs money placement with the bank, from 15 October 1984 to 15 October 1986, in the total
amount of P376, 301, 133.33. BIR Commissioner Tan explained that the compromise was in
accordance with the provisions of EO No. 44, Revenue Memorandum Order No. 39-86, and
RMO No. 4-87. Private respondent Tirso Savellano then filed a petition for review ad cautelam
with the CTA and claimed therein that BIR Commissioner Tan acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction. PNOC averred that the BIR Commissioners
discretionary act in entering into the compromise agreement had legal basis under EO No. 44
and RMO No. 39-86 and RMO No. 4-87. The PNB asserted that the BIR Commissioners
decision to accept the compromise was discretionary on his part and, therefore, cannot be
reviewed or interfered with by the courts. Subsequently, the new BIR Commissioner Jose Ong
demanded that PNB pay deficiency withholding tax on the interest earnings and/or yields from
PNOCs money placements, in the amount of P294, 958, 450.73. PNB filed a Motion to
Suspend the Collection of Tax by the BIR. It alleged that despite its request for reconsideration
of the deficiency withholding tax assessment, BIR Commissioner Ong sent another letter
demanding payment of the P294, 958, 450.73. The CTA rendered a decision declaring the
compromise agreement between the BIR and the PNOC and PNB as without force effect and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to enforce the assessment against PNB which
has become final and unappealable by collecting the deficiency withholding tax, plus interest
totaling P294, 958, 450.73. The CTA denied the Motions for Reconsideration filed by PNOC and
PNB and the CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not deficiency taxes of PNOC could not be the subject of a compromise
under EO No. 44.
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2. Whether or not the CTA has no jurisdiction to question the compromise agreement
entered into by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
3. Whether or not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot unilaterally annul tax
compromises validly entered into by his predecessor.
HELD: 1. Yes. E.O. No. 44 granted the BIR Commissioner or his duly authorized
representatives the power to compromise any disputed assessment or delinquent account
pending as of 31 December 1985, upon the payment of an amount equal to 30% of the basic
tax assessed; in which case, the corresponding interests and penalties shall be condoned.
PNOC's tax liability could not be considered a delinquent account since (1) it was not selfassessed, because the BIR conducted an investigation and assessment of PNOC and PNB
after obtaining information regarding the non-withholding of tax from private respondent
Savellano; and (2) the demand letter, issued against it on 08 August 1986, could not have been
a deficiency assessment that became final and executory by 31 December 1985. Given that
PNOC's tax liability did not constitute a delinquent account or a disputed assessment as of 31
December 1985, then it could not be compromised under E.O. No. 44.
2. No. It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions by the administrative
officer is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the
courts to set matters right, with the Supreme Court having the last say on the matter. The
discretionary power of the BIR Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior
over the power of judicial review by the courts. In this case, the BIR Commissioner's authority to
compromise, whether under E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, can
only be exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said statutes. The BIR
Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the parameters set by the law, and in
case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may correct such abuse if the matter is appealed to
them.
3. No. The new BIR Commissioner, Commissioner Ong, had acted well within his
powers when he set aside the compromise agreement, dated 22 June 1987, after finding that
the said compromise agreement was without legal basis. It had been declared in Hilado v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, et al. that an administrative officer, such as the BIR
Commissioner, may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor
in office. The construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their
successors if, thereafter, the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be
given.
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A
Case List for Administrative Law
Prepared by: Leo Angelo Lacar
Chapter 1 General Considerations
1. Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
2. Maceda vs. ERB, GR Nos. 95203-05, Dec. 18, 1990; 192 SCRA 363
Chapter 2 Administrative Agencies
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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APPENDIX B
Case Assignment for Administrative Law Cases
Prepared by Leo Angelo N. Lacar
Aballe:
Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251
Beja, Sr. vs. CA, 207 SCRA 689
Ursal vs. CTA, 101 Phil. 209
Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. CA, 357 SCRA 441
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. CA, 477 SCRA 49
Abilla:
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 678
ACWSU Broadcasting Networks vs. NTC, 397 SCRA 574
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
TOMMI vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597
Roman Cruz vs. People, GR No. 110436, June 27, 1994
Albrecht:
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258
Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236
Tadlip vs. Borres, 474 SCRA 441
COMELEC vs. Espaol, 417 SCRA 554
Alzate:
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. CIR, 302 SCRA 241
Luzon Polymers Corporation vs. Clave, 209 SCRA 711
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418
Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC, 432 SCRA 157
Antanani:
Rubenecia vs. CSC, 244 SCRA 640
Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177
Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, 427 SCRA 46
Balbuna vs. Sec. of Education, 110 Phil. 150
Arbison:
PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1998 vs. COA, 469 SCRA 397
De Jesus vs. COA, 294 SCRA 152
Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006
People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance
Secretary, 238 SCRA 63
Asistido:
People vs. Santos, 62 Phil. 300
US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 300
Peralta vs. CA, 462 SCRA 382
Philippines Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139
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