Piagets Early Theory of the Role of Language

in Intellectual Development: A Comment

on DeVriess Account of Piagets Social Theory
by Joe Becker and Maria Varelas
In the March 1997 Educational Researcher, Rheta DeVries presented
a thought-provoking account of the social factors in Piagets conceptualization of intellectual development, primarily in his early
works. However, DeVries ignored the fact that in these early writings Piaget made language an integral part of his ideas on intellectual
development. DeVriess elision is unfortunate for two reasons. First,
it raises an issue of validity: Are we justified in simply discarding the
linguistic element of these writings? Second, DeVries missed the opportunity to show how Piagets early ideas on the role of language
might be relevant to contemporary interest in socio-cultural aspects
of development.

In an article in Educational Researcher DeVries (1997) sought to

make the social aspect of Piagets ideas on intellectual development
more widely known. Especially in work he published in the 1920s
through the 1940s, Piaget emphasized the importance of social interaction to intellectual development, and DeVries drew heavily
on these writings. However, DeVries did not address a major aspect of how Piaget considered social factors in this period: Reference to the very sources cited by DeVries indicates that, during the
above-mentioned period, Piaget linked the role of social interaction in intellectual development to the role of language.
As a first example, DeVries (1997, p. 7) cites the following remark by Piaget (1950/1995b, p. 94): The isolated individual
would never be capable of complete conservation and reversibility. Conservation and reversibility are fundamental constructs
in Piagets conception of logical thought. Therefore, the quotation supports DeVriess argument that according to Piaget the
development of logical thought is dependent on social interaction. However, reference to DeVriess source shows that Piaget
completed the sentence as follows: and it is the exigencies of reciprocity which allow this double conquest, through the intermediary of a common language and a common scale of definitions (p. 94,
emphasis added). Thus, Piaget related the importance of social
interaction for intellectual development to the role of language.
As a second example, DeVries writes that Piaget noted that
the symbolism of individual images fluctuates too much to account for conservation, reversibility, and equilibrium leading to
the necessity of the social factor (p. 13). DeVriess point is that
Educational Researcher, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 2223

22 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER

Piaget saw social interaction as the key to how we overcome the

instability of the symbols we each individually construct. In the
essay cited, Piaget (1945/1995a) does write about the fluctuation
of the symbolism of individual images. However, Piaget also
clearly considers that language plays a crucial role in overcoming
this fluctuation: This point is missing from DeVriess account.
Here is the relevant passage from Piagets essay:
Complete reversibility presupposes symbolism, because it is only
by reference to the possible evocation of absent objects that the assimilation of things to action schemes and the accommodation of
action schemes to things reach permanent equilibrium and thus
constitute a reversible mechanism. The symbolism of individual
images fluctuates far too much to lead to this result. Language is
therefore necessary, and thus we come back to social factors. (Piaget,
1945/1995a, p.154, emphasis added)

Again, we find that Piaget tied the role of social interaction to the
importance of language.
That these references of Piaget to the role of language in intellectual development are by no means marginal is apparent from
a consideration of Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood
(Piaget, 1945/1962a), published in the same period. This book is
considered by some to be significant because it develops Piagets
ideas on pretend play. However, originally titled La Formation
du Symbole Chez LEnfant, the book presents the theory Piaget
then held of the role of language in the development of conceptual and logical understandings. This theory provides an account
of two developments of the semiotic function. The first is a development from the absence of representation to the generation
of mental images that arise from perception and action, which
Piaget considered to be strongly tied to experiential knowing.
The second is a development from such mental images to arbitrary conventional signs, which Piaget considered to be less directly tied to experiential knowing. In this theory, the signifier is
at first an internal image derived from perceptions and actions
and resulting from extended accommodation. At this point,
thought is still particular and individual. The development from
the first signifiers to signifiers that support the development of logical thought arises from the intervention of language. The following passages (Piaget, 1945/1962a) illustrate this perspective:
We have to attempt to determine the connection between the imitative image, ludic symbolism and representative intelligence, i.e.,
between cognitive representation and the representation of imitation and play. This very complex problem is still further compli-

cated by the intervention of language, collective verbal signs coming

to interfere with the symbols we have already analyzed, in order to
make possible the construction of concepts. (p. 214, emphasis added)
It is moreover unnecessary to emphasize that this irreversible centration of the first conceptual representations is mainly expressed
socially as egocentrism of thought, since a concept centered on typical elements corresponding to the lived experience of the individual
and symbolized by an image rather than by language, could neither be
a general notion nor be capable of being fully communicated. (p. 242,
emphasis added)

Piagets central idea in these passages is that the arbitrary nature of the signifiers of a language facilitates a relative detachment
of the concept from the lived experience to which it refers and
that this relative detachment is necessary for the concept to become an instrument of logical reasoning.
Piaget saw language as inherently a social factor partly because
of the conventional nature of words (the arbitrariness of the link
between a particular sound form and its referent), and it is just this
conventional nature of words that Piaget saw as crucial for conceptual development. Although this theory about the role of language in intellectual development underlies the passages DeVries
cites, her article reveals no inkling of it.
The disappearance of Piagets views on the role of language
from an account of his views on the importance of social interaction is unfortunate in two ways. First, Piagets views on the role
of language changed. Thus he wrote, It took me some time to
see, it is true, that the roots of logical operation lie deeper than the
linguistic connections, and that my early study of thinking was
centered too much on its linguistic aspects (Piaget, 1962b, p. 5),
and Some forty years ago, during my first studies, . . . I believed
in the close relation between language and thought (Piaget
1972/1973, p. 109). Piaget might not have been referring to the
particular ideas about language that we have indicated. On one
hand, if Piaget retained these ideas, they surely constitute an important component of Piagets conception of the role of social interaction on intellectual development. On the other hand, if he
changed his mind on these ideas we need an analysis that explicitly examines the coherence of his early views on social factors
once the linguistic thread is withdrawn. DeVries might contend
that the withdrawal of the linguistic thread leaves Piaget with a
coherent account of the role of social factors. However, she does
not take up this point as a question for analysis in her paper. Instead, she simply ignores Piagets references to language in the
earlier sources she cites.
Second, Piagets early ideas on the role of language are especially
relevant in the context of researchers contemporary interests in
socio-cultural aspects of development. In this connection we offer
two points. First, currently, researchers often turn to Vygotsky for
help in theorizing the role of sociocultural factors, particularly
language, on intellectual development. Through his early ideas
on language, Piaget offers an avenue for extending Vygotskys
approach to the interplay of conceptual and semiotic aspects in
intellectual development. For example, Piaget offers the idea that
the conventional terms of a language work to attenuate the links
between schemes and the particular idiosyncratic experiences of

the individual, freeing the schemes to interact with each other to

produce new schemes with new logical properties. Second, some
contemporary work on the role of sociocultural factors in intellectual development has specifically drawn on Wittgensteins
later thought (e.g., Chapman & Dixon, 1987). It may be productive to explore the relationship between Piagets early views
and Wittgensteins later views or, indeed, the opposite directions
in which the views of these two thinkers developed. In his early
writing, Piaget showed a concern that people do not achieve the
stable symbolism required for conceptual thought without the
conventional signifiers of language. Piagets concern bears an interesting relation to Wittgensteins (1953) ideas concerning the
impossibility of a private language. Piaget and Wittgenstein built
on the same idea: Individuals cannot by themselves in isolation
establish consistency in their use of symbols. Wittgenstein incorporated this idea into an argument for a social approach to thought
and language, one in which mental entities are not emphasized, and
may even be superfluous. In contrast, Piaget used this idea to argue
that the formation of the mental structures underlying feelings of
logical necessity requires social interaction using a conventional sign
system. Contrasting such divergent uses of the same basic understanding of social aspects of intellectual development (the idea that
individuals cannot by themselves establish consistency) may help
us construct a more articulated network of the different possibilities for the relations between thought and language.
REFERENCES

Chapman, M. & Dixon, R. A. (1987). Meaning and the growth of

understanding: Wittgenstein's significance for developmental psychology.
New York: Springer-Verlag.
DeVries, R. (1997). Piagets social theory. Educational Researcher, 26(2),
417.
Piaget, J. (1962a). Play, dreams and imitation in childhood. New York:
Norton. (Original work published 1945)
Piaget, J. (1962b). Supplement to L. Vygotsky, Thought and language.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Piaget, J. (1973). The child and reality: Problems of genetic psychology.
New York: Viking. (Original work published 1972)
Piaget, J. (1995a). Logical operations and social life. In L. Smith (Ed.).
Sociological Studies (pp. 134157). London: Routledge. (Original
work published 1945)
Piaget, J. (1995b). Explanation in sociology. In L. Smith (Ed.). Sociological Studies (pp. 3096). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1950)
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
AUTHORS

JOE BECKER is an associate professor in the College of Education (M/C

147), University of Illinois at Chicago, 1040 W. Harrison St., Chicago,
IL 60607; joe@uic.edu. His research interests include constructivist theory and mathematical cognition.
MARIA VARELAS is an associate professor in the College of Education
(M/C 147), University of Illinois at Chicago, 1040 W. Harrison St.
Chicago, Il 60607; mvarelas@uic.edu. Her research interests include
constructivist approaches to teaching and learning and science education.
Manuscript received September 13, 2000
Accepted February 18, 2001

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2001 23