Self-Enforcing Clientelism

Jorge A. Gallego
February 15, 2012

Abstract
Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives
material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political
support. If, at different stages of this relationship, both the patron and the client
have incentives to defect and not honor informal agreements, what makes clientelism self-enforcing? The following paper presents a game-theoretical model of
political clientelism in which a candidate disciplines a majority of voters through
the promise of a future flow of benefits. A mixed strategy involving a randomized
allocation of resources among constituencies makes clientelism feasible when the
politicians action is contingent on the result of the election. Higher campaign
budgets and lower voter aversion towards clientelistic parties, as well as higher
patience and higher heterogeneity across groups of voters, make clientelism more
likely. Swing voters tend to be gifted more frequently than core supporters with
this frequency increasing as group heterogeneity increases, presenting a positive
association.

Introduction

July of 2007 was the month in which the Colombian government reported that in the
weeks prior, in 16 states of the country, the Sisben (the system used for allocating
welfare state expenses) had been manipulated by politicians for electoral purposes.
This system classifies people according to their income and socio-economic status,
and offers benefits, subsidies, and services according to this classification. It can,
thereby, be inferred from this report that the system is an important instrument

Forthcoming, Journal of Theoretical Politics. I would like to thank Rebecca Morton, Adam

Przeworski, Alastair Smith, Joshua Tucker, Leonard Wantchekon, two anonymous referees and the
editor of the journal for their helpful comments.

Department of Politics, New York University. Contact: jorge.gallego@nyu.edu

used by politicians for the establishment of clientelistic links: citizens that give political support and votes to certain candidates that may influence the assignment of
subsidies, may benefit from the system. The problem is that some medium-income
people are classified as belonging to the first tier of the system, which implies the
biggest flow of benefits. In contrast, some low-income citizens are erroneously classified as those not deserving subsidies. This shows that clientelism may become an
important obstacle for redistributive programs and may perpetuate income inequality and poverty.
However, clientelism is not an exclusive Colombian phenomenon. Urban politics
during the twentieth century in some of the most important cities in the US reveal
that patronage and clientelism can be found in other latitudes. In his analysis of
Chicagos machine politics, Gosnell (1937) presents the results of a survey involving
over 300 and 600 Chicago precinct captains in 1928 and 1936, respectively.1 One
half of the captains interviewed in 1928, and almost 70% of those interviewed in
1936, acknowledged that they handed out food to those constituents who were in
need. Naturally, they expected political support for their candidates in exchange
for this benevolent behavior. Many of these captains also revealed that they helped
their voters with other goods and services such as coal, Christmas baskets, temporary
shelter, legal aid and juvenile guidance, among others. Not surprisingly, most of them
also acknowledged that they acted in the role of job brokers at different governmental
offices, at the federal, state, county, sanitary district, city, school, and park levels.
As such, this phenomenon seems to present in a global capacity. Important
studies have reported characteristics of clientelism in Southeast Asia [Scott (1972)],
tropical Africa [Lemarchand (1972)], Southern Italy [Golden & Picci (2008)], Japan
[Kobayashi (2006)], Mexico [Greene (2001)] and Argentina [Stokes (2005); WeitzShapiro (2007)], as well as several other countries and regions. How can we define
clientelism? Is clientelism exclusive to twentieth-century democracy or is it found in
other political regimes along human history?
Clientelism is a dyadic (two-person) relation in which a patron gives material
goods, services, benefits, or protection to a client, who reciprocates with some type
of general, political, or military support and assistance. Political clientelism, on
the other hand, is a special case of what we could term general clientelism. Political
1

In Gosnells words precinct captains are the backbone of any metropolitan political organiza-

tion, since upon them rests the responsibility for seeing and winning the voters (p.51). They are
extremely important for the party machine as they act as the link between the party organization
and the voters in a determined precinct.

clientelism is characterized by a politician who acts as the patron, offering goods, services, jobs, resources, protection, or other variables of value to a (group of) voter(s),
in exchange for political support, which in most cases, includes the vote, itself. The
conjunction of several dyads and relations forms a clientelistic network, as those described in the examples given above. Nation-level leaders are linked with regional,
rural and urban brokers that establish relations with voters. Although some scholars
typically refer to patronage as the exchange of jobs in the bureaucracy for political
support, in this paper this term is used interchangeably with clientelism.
If clientelistic relations cannot be enforced through contracts, what makes the
agents comply and respect this type of informal agreement? For instance, given
that in many countries (after the introduction of the Australian Ballot) the vote is
intended to be confidential, why should a voter who received a gift from a politician
he dislikes honor the agreement and give him his vote? If during his campaign a
politician promised to his constituency certain goods and services that are costly, why
should he comply after he is elected? The main purpose of this paper is to explain
why clientelism is self-enforcing, meaning that the nature of the relationship between
the patron and client gives them incentives to cooperate with each other and respect
the informal agreement. This paper also tries to solve other questions related to
patronage systems. Some scholars recognize that clientelism is a typical phenomenon
related to poor and unequal societies [Robinson & Verdier (2003); Medina & Stokes
(2007); Stokes (2007)]. If this is the case and a context of scarce resources exists,
then how does a candidate allocate his limited budget among different groups of
the electorate, which are interested in becoming the clienteles? Are core voters
more frequently awarded for being loyal to the candidate? Or, on the contrary,
are swing voters the real target of the politician, given the political value of their
votes? Is group heterogeneity within a society, in terms of ethnic, social, or economic
characteristics, beneficial for clientelistic politicians?
In light of these questions, this paper presents a theoretical model that seeks
to address these issues. Within an infinitely repeated setting, in which elections
take place periodically, a budget-constrained clientelistic candidate has to allocate
his resources among three groups of voters. These groups share a common dislike
towards the candidates party, but differ in their attitude towards the candidate,
him or herself. The repeated nature of the interaction helps both the candidate and
the voters construct reputations and sustain cooperation in the long run. In order
to efficiently allocate campaign resources, the clientelistic candidate plays a mixed
strategy during each period. This involves rewarding more than one group with
3

positive probability, sacrificing the group that is ideologically more distant to the
candidate. Groups play grim trigger strategies in which each periods cooperation is
contingent on observing the politicians provision of gifts in the previous stage. The
politician, in turn, observes the aggregate result of the election and gives a gift in
a certain period, only if he has won the election. Consequently, aggregate electoral
results, as opposed to individual monitoring, discipline voters and motivate them to
comply with clientelistic politicians. The model shows that conditions for clientelism
are more favorable as dislike towards the party diminishes, diversity among the
groups rises, and as voters increasingly value the gifts offered by the candidate. In
this context, increased heterogeneity among the voters is beneficial for the candidate.
The model also predicts that swing voters tend to be gifted more frequently than
core supporters, and that this frequency increases as the groups become more distant
in their political preferences (i.e. as diversity increases).
This paper is divided into five sections, beginning with this Introduction. It then
proceeds to Section 2, which relates the subject of the article to existing literature on
the topic. Section 3 then presents a simple model of political clientelism, demonstrating how patron-client relations become more or less feasible as a function of several
parameters of interest. The basic feature of this model is that a candidate plays
a mixed strategy when allocating certain goods and benefits among constituencies
and utilizes this as an instrument for disciplining voters. Finally, Section 4 expands
on this analysis, incorporating random shocks into players preferences. A unique
mixed strategy that maximizes the candidates probability of being elected is found.
Comparative statics of this equilibrium show how ideological dislike towards the
clientelistic party, group heterogeneity, and the candidates wealth, affect the allocation of goods among ideologically close or distant groups. Section 5 then presents
the conclusion to this paper.

Related Literature

In recent years, clientelism has been actively studied in economics and political
science.2 Stokes (2005), using an infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma, gives a
theoretical explanation of why candidates and voters have incentives to honor their
agreements and establish clientelistic relations. Politicians use what the author refers
to as perverse accountability, by threatening to cease the flow of benefits to a citizen
2

Stokes (2007) and Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) survey much of the classic and recent literature

related with clientelism and patronage in modern societies.

if he fails to comply with a previous agreement. In this model it is assumed that machines (clientelistic parties) are able to (imperfectly) monitor individuals votes and
reward them, accordingly, in an ongoing interaction. During each period, a weakly
opposed voter either opts to vote for a candidate or not. In turn, the candidate
then simultaneously rewards the citizen or not. Players use grim trigger strategies,
punishing defection whenever the counterpart fails to honor the tacit cooperation.
Nevertheless, even though Stokes (2005) proposes some interesting questions pertaining to the dynamics of patronage and clientelism, some of them remain unanswered. For example, according to the author (p. 315):
Yet in the societies where clientelistic parties or machines are active,
not all poor voters receive benefits. Limited resources force political
machines to choose among poor voters. Machine operatives everywhere
face a version of the dilemma that an Argentine Peronist explains. About
40 voters live in her neighborhood, and her responsibility is to get them
to the polls and get them vote for her party. But the party gives her only
10 bags of food to distribute, ten little bags, she laments, nothing
more. How does she (. . . ) decide who among her neighbors shall and
who shall not receive handouts?
The aforementioned quote reveals one of the main puzzles posed by clientelism.
In a context of scarce and limited resources, how does a clientelistic politician allocate
them among his constituency? Nonetheless, Stokes fails to answer this important
question. In her model, the machine distributes gifts (or at least makes the offer) to
every weakly opposed voter and budget limitations never constrain this distribution.
Some voters are excluded and do not receive a gift, but not because of budget
limitations. Loyal voters are never gifted because they always vote for the party,
regardless of whether or not they are a recipient of a gift. Similarly, opposition
voters never receive gifts, either, because their dominant strategy is to vote against
the party, even if a reward is given. Therefore, only weakly opposed voters are
rewarded. However, the model fails to discuss if the party has to select among this
class of voters due to gift scarcity or other considerations. In particular, if there are
40 weakly opposed voters, but only 10 bags of food, it cannot be inferred from the
model how the machine is going to allocate these resources.
Robinson & Verdier (2003) recognize that for clientelism to be self-enforcing,
neither public goods nor investment are attractive instruments for politicians to
use for the purpose of obtaining votes. For this reason patronage, understood by
5

the authors as employment in the bureaucracy, emerges as a politically efficient

strategy that enforces the relation, although it is economically inefficient. This model
explains why clientelism is significant, as well as frequent in countries that boast high
inequality and poor technology. It is cheaper to buy voters with jobs in a context
of low incomes. It also shows that clientelistic redistribution, with its associated
inefficiencies, tends to be worse in situations where productivity is low, the desire to
hold political power is high (rents are large), where money is relatively un-important
compared to ideology in determining political preferences, and where inequality is
high (p.21).
Wantchekon (2003) is one of the few empirical papers on political clientelism.
Using Benins 2001 presidential election and attempting to understand the effect of
voting platforms on voting behavior, the author randomizes the content of electoral
campaigning across villages. With the active participation of parties in the design of
the experiment, randomized villages were exposed to purely clientelistic platforms,
purely national public-policy platforms, or to a default mix of platforms. From the
results of the experiments, it can be inferred that clientelism is an effective vehicle
for acquiring votes and that, in certain cases, it is, indeed, self-enforcing. Further, it
has been found that clientelism has a greater effect on men, as well as less informed
and segregated voters [Vicente & Wantchekon (2009)]. Clientelism has also been
found to be electorally effective, especially for incumbents and regional candidates.
Incumbents have the advantage of making their clientelistic promises more credible,
perhaps because of their access to public resources. Nonetheless, challengers might be
provided the opportunity to highlight the failure of the incumbent should he neglect
to fulfill previous promises. The experiment also reveals that targets of clientelistic
politicians have traditionally been men, co-ethnics of the candidates and voters with
better access to information.
Myerson (1993) presents a static game-theoretical model that studies candidates
incentives to cultivate minorities and special interest groups, instead of appealing
equally to all voters under different electoral systems. Both in a two-candidate election framework and in multicandidate electoral system, politicians choose independently and simultaneously an offer distribution made to homogenous voters, in the
beginning of the game. Next, voters go to each candidates campaign headquarters,
receiving a randomly and independently selected offer from each one. Afterwards,
on the day of election, each voter compares the offers and votes for the candidate
that promises a bigger transfer. This framework is especially useful for explaining
why candidates have incentives that favor minorities and special interest groups un6

der different electoral systems. However, it fails to explain why this mechanism is
self-enforcing. In particular, it is assumed that voters are homogenous (so that they
do not show an ideological preference for any candidate and they only care about
the amount offered). As such, the model then cannot explain if candidates favor
swing or core voters. Additionally, as in Dixit & Londregan (1996), it is assumed
(and not endogenized) that candidates and voters trust each other and believe in
their promises (of distributions and votes).
Dixit & Londregan (1996) analyze the determinants of success in special-interest
(pork barrel) politics. In the presence of what they term tactical redistribution,
they ask the question: do politicians prefer to favor core voters or to favor swing
voters whose voting decision is not completely determined? Through their theoretical
model, the authors find that when political parties are equally effective in delivering
resources to any group in the society, swing voters are favored by transfers. On the
other hand, when groups have party affinities and parties are better at delivering
economic favors to their own groups, core voters (machine politics) prevail. Given
the static nature of this model, it is assumed that citizens trust politicians and that
they implement their campaign promises of transfers and taxes once they get elected.
In other terms, in this model what this paper seeks to explain is taken as granted,
because it is assumed that politicians honor their campaign promises, while citizens
trust politicians and, therefore, vote accordingly. Thus, even though the model gives
interesting answers to the question of how governments allocate economic benefits
among its constituencies, it does not explain why pork barrel politics is self-enforcing.
It is unclear why politicians redistribute and comply with tax and transfer promises,
as well as why citizens honor their commitment and do not simply vote for the
candidate that they ideologically prefer. Naturally, the static nature of the model
greatly explains this flaw.
One of the main puzzles that scholars aim to solve within this literature is why
clientelism and ethnicity tend to present together. For Fearon (1999), political coalitions are motivated to limit their size, so that the portion of the political pork
assigned to each member is not too low. In this sense, ethnicity becomes a natural
and efficient barrier that deters the entrance of people into winning political coalitions, limiting its size and thus maintaining a higher amount of material benefits for
each member. But, why is ethnicity the salient trait that identifies clientelism in
some societies, rather than religion, social class, education, party affiliation or any
other characteristic? Fearons basic argument is that a barrier is efficient as long
as potential members cannot choose the criterion that determines if somebody is
7

included or excluded from the group. The politics of pork favors coalitions based
on features not easily chosen or changed by individuals (p. 5). Ethnicity, to some
degree, satisfies this requirement.
Chandra (2007) also studies the relationship between patronage and ethnic politics. In her theory, patronage adopts the form of ethnic favoritism as the result
of a self-enforcing equilibrium, in which information constraints bias voters to favor
politicians of their same ethnic group, while politicians respond to these biases favoring such categories. In her theoretical reasoning, Chandra questions the role of
secret ballots in patronage democracies and its impact on the enforceability of the
relationship between voters and politicians. She concludes that voting procedures
are unlikely to be confidential under patronage and for this reason candidates and
incumbents are motivated to offer material benefits to citizens in exchange for their
political support.
Signals as time spent in the booth, or aggregate results at group levels, provide
valuable information for the politician and motivates citizens to use their votes as
instruments to extract material benefits (p. 90). This paper follows a similar approach in the model presented herein. A candidate might ignore who did or did not
vote for him, but observes the aggregate result of the election. This serves a signal
of compliance of the different groups involved in the political transaction. Therefore,
secret balloting is not a barrier for the self-enforcing nature of clientelism. From this
analysis, it is also interesting to note that in patronage democracies citizens have
motivation to form groups in the pursuit of material benefits and politicians have
the motivation to target groups rather than free-floating individuals. In this paper,
clientelism is modeled precisely as the interaction between a candidate and different
groups of voters.
Yet another commonality between Chandras approach and the one developed
within the paper presented here is that, in both cases, it is argued that voters
evaluate candidates promises by checking the past record of patronage transactions.
In this paper this is modeled through an infinitely repeated game in which citizens
follow a grim trigger strategy, penalizing those candidates who do not comply with
the commitment. In Chandras words By probing for broad patterns in the history
of previous patronage transactions by incumbents, they [voters] identify the principle
on which patronage benefits were distributed in the past, which is their best guide
to how they will allot benefits in the future. Perhaps, the main variation between
both approaches is that in Chandras analysis, imperfect information governs the
relationship between citizens and politicians, and consequently ethnicity serves as
8

a signaling device that reduces the impact of this imperfection. For this reason,
Chandra provides an endogeneous mechanism that explains why groups are driven
to conform by members of the same ethnicity. In contrast, in the approach presented
within this article, this feature is not explained and can only be exogenously assumed,
at best. Nonetheless, this is not considered a major flaw of the model given that in
some countries (of which Colombia is a good example) patronage does not adopt the
ethnic flavor that it has in other latitudes.

A Model of Political Clientelism

In a context of scarcity and given that politicians are budget-constrained, how does a
patron allocate his gifts among those constituencies interested in becoming the clienteles? Are core voters awarded for their loyalty? Or, are swing voters the target
of candidates, given that they can be pivotal in an election? To answer these questions, consider a game in which a candidate to a public position interacts with three
equally-sized groups (1, 2, and 3). Each group casts one vote for the candidate or
his contender, and at least two out of three are needed in order to win. One of the
most interesting puzzles that the study of clientelism should solve is why citizens
who dislike a candidate and a party will vote for them in an election. Therefore, in
the following model, this paper ignores those citizens who prefer the candidate to his
contender. Instead, this article concentrates on groups that share a natural (ideological) dislike towards the candidates party. This dislike will be measured through
the parameter < 0, which represents the disutility that each group experiences
each time the party is in office.
Even though the three groups share a common dislike towards the party, they
differ in their sympathy, neutrality, or antipathy towards the candidate. This is measured by > 0, so that the ideological payoffs for each group when the politician
(p) is elected is given by

1 (p wins) =
2 (p wins) =
3 (p wins) = +
with > , so that the third group still experiences disutility if the candidate
is elected. Hence, group 1 totally dislikes the candidate, group 2 remains neutral,
while group 3 likes him. Also, can be interpreted as a measure of heterogeneity
9

between the three groups, with a higher implying a higher degree of diversity in
their political preferences. For simplicity, assume that if this candidate is not elected
and his contender wins the election, the ideological payoff for each group is zero. This
means that i (p loses) = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3.
To answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section, it is important to
recognize that the candidate has scarce resources he must use in order to obtain at
least two votes from the three groups. Assume that g > 0 represents an indivisible
benefit that the politician can only give to one of the groups. We can think of g as
a public job, a local public good, or any other indivisible commodity that cannot
be shared simultaneously by two distinct groups. Consequently, the total payoff for
group i, when the clientelistic candidate is elected, is given by

i + g
ui (p wins) =

if i receives a gift
otherwise

Finally, assume that ps benefit for winning the election is given by v > 0, and that
g < v, so that the office is sufficiently valued regardless of the cost of buying the
clientele. The timing of the interaction, which will be called the clientelism-game,
is as follows:
1. The candidate p offers g to group 1, group 2, or group 3, or does not offer it
to anyone.
2. After observing ps action, the election takes place and each group votes simultaneously for or against p.
3. Payoffs are realized and p wins if he gets two or three votes. Otherwise, his
contender is elected.
Solving this extensive-form game yields five subgame perfect equilibria (SPE): in one
of them the candidate is elected with three votes, and in the other four he receives
less than two votes and loses the election. In every case, the politician chooses not to
give the gift to any of the groups. Clientelism does not exist in equilibrium because
the candidate never has incentives to favor any of the groups. Consequently, if the
game is played once, the underlying structure makes it unsuitable for explaining the
emergence of clientelism within electoral systems.
Now assume that the clientelism-game described above repeats during t = 1, 2, . . .
periods, so that the players ignore the time horizon. Every period the candidate
10

decides who receives g and each group votes or not for the candidate. The feasibility
of this interaction naturally results from the fact that elections are held periodically
and politicians run for reelection, with the possibility of interacting with the same
(group of) citizens every period. Given this new structure, the candidate has no
incentives to give the gift to the same group during each period. But it might be
the case that making uncertain this allocation is in his interest, because this could
discipline at least two groups and make them vote for him. Consequently, in what
follows this paper assumes that the politician might follow, in each period, a mixed
strategy of the form (0, 0, , 1 ), where 0 < < 1 is the probability that group 2
receives the gift, while 1 is the probability that the benefit goes to the third group.
The first two zeroes in the vector indicate that the candidate assigns probability zero
to the event of not giving a gift to any group, and to give it to group 1, respectively.
In this context, the candidate randomizes between the neutral and the sympathetic
group, and excludes the group that is less likely to vote for him.3
Being more precise, it assumed that players follow grim trigger strategies with
the following characteristics: the candidate plays (0, 0, , 1 ) in t = 1; For any
t > 1, he plays (0, 0, , 1 ) if he won the election in t 1; Otherwise, he plays
(1, 0, 0, 0) forever. Group 1 votes against the candidate in every t = 1, 2, . . .. Groups
2 and 3 vote yes in t = 1, and in t > 1 if the candidate won and played (0, 0, , 1 )
in t 1. Otherwise, they vote against this candidate forever. Define (0, 1) as
the common discount factor for the players. Under what conditions these strategies
form part of a SPE in the infinitely repeated version of the game? Proposition 1
establishes sufficient conditions for the above strategies conforming a SPE.
Proposition 1:
Consider the infinitely repeated clientelism-game defined above, in which the candidate and groups 2 and 3 follow grim trigger strategies while group 1 always votes
against the candidate. Then, any mixed strategy of the form (0, 0, , 1 ) can be
part of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as
+

1+
g
g

(1)

for sufficiently close to one.

3

In the context of repeated games, we might interpret as the proportion of periods in which

group 2 is honored with the gift. Nonetheless, being strict with the definition of mixed strategy,
is just a probability. Assuming that g in fact is divisible, it is also possible to interpret as the
fraction of the gift given to group 2 during each period.

11

Proof:
It is straight forward to show that the politician has no incentives to unilaterally
deviate from his strategy. Suppose that groups 2 and 3 vote for the candidate. If he
follows his strategy, his discounted payoff is

up (coop) =

t1 (v g)

t=1

vg
1

If he cheats and deviates from giving a gift in every period, gets up (cheats) = 0.
Then, because v > g, the candidate always honors his strategy. In subgames that
come from a defection of either group 2 or 3 (or both), the present value of the
candidates payoff after following the grim trigger strategy is 0, while a one-stage
deviation (which implies giving g to either group after losing the election) yields a
payoff of g. Then, the candidate has no incentives to deviate from his strategy.
Consider a subgame in which in the first period of the stage game, g is given to
group 2. In this case, group 2s payoff for cooperating is
u2 (coop) = g + +

t (g + )

t=1

=g++

(g + )
1

After receiving the gift, if group 2 cheats, its discounted payoff is

u2 (cheats) = g + (0) + 2 (0) +
=g
Then, group 2 has no incentives to deviate from the grim trigger strategy as long as
g++

(g + ) g
1

which is equivalent to

(2)

It is easy to show that (2) is also the necessary condition so that group 2 has no
incentives to deviate in subgames in which the gift was given to group 3. In these

12

type of subgames, group 3s payoff for following the grim trigger strategy is
u3 (coop) = g + + +

t [(1 )g + + ]

t=1

=g+++

[(1 )g + + ]
1

If this group cheats, receives u3 (cheats) = g. Therefore, group 3 has no incentives

to deviate from the grim trigger strategy as long as
g+++

[(1 )g + + ] g
1

or, equivalently, if
1+

(3)

Again, (3) is also the condition for group 3s compliance in subgames in which the
gift is given to group 2. Finally, if the candidate and groups 2 and 3 follow their
strategies, no matter what group 1 does, it always receives an average payoff of
u1 () =

1 .

For the result of the election and the materialization of payoffs, it does

not matter if this group votes against or in favor of the candidate. Hence, summing
up, a grim trigger strategy that supports a candidates mixed strategy of the form
(0, 0, , 1 ) constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the clientelism-game as
long as

+
1+
g
g

which completes the proof. 

Proposition 1 shows that there an infinite number of mixed strategies that can
be implemented by the politician, in a SPE of the clientelism-game. Within this
paper, the set of mixed strategies that satisfy (1) is referred to as the feasible set.
What are the basic properties of this set of equilibria? How does the feasible set
respond to changes in dislike towards the party, heterogeneity among the groups, the
magnitude of the gift, or players patience? Proposition 2 shows that some interesting
comparative statics of the infinitely repeated clientelism-game can be described.
Proposition 2:
Consider the clientelism-game in which any mixed strategy played by the candidate in a SPE satisfies condition (1). Then, there exist:
1. A minimum gift (gmin ) necessary for equilibrium which is
(a) Increasing in the magnitude of dislike towards the party ().
13

(b) Decreasing in the overall level of group heterogeneity ().

(c) Decreasing in players patience ().
2. A maximum level of dislike (max ) towards the party, which is
(a) Increasing in the gift given by the candidate (g).
(b) Increasing in the level of heterogeneity among groups ().
(c) Increasing in players patience ().
3. A minimum level of heterogeneity (min ) necessary for equilibrium, provided
that 2 > g. This level is
(a) Increasing in dislike towards the party ().
(b) Decreasing in the gifts value (g).
(c) Decreasing in players patience ().
Proof:

1. From condition (1), the minimum necessary gift that the candidate must pay,
in equilibrium, is given by

gmin =

2
gmin
1
gmin
=
> 0 for any (0, 1); b)
= < 0
()

gmin
2 +
for any (0, 1); and c)
=
< 0 for any (0, 1) because we

2
assumed > .

which implies: a)

2. The magnitude of the maximum level of dislike towards the candidate, in equilibrium, is given by

max =

g +
2

(max )

(max )
= > 0 for any (0, 1); b)
= 1/2;
g
2

(max )
g
and c)
= > 0 for any g > 0.

which implies: a)

14

Figure 1: Set of feasible mixed strategies as a function of g

(2+)

3. From (1), the minimum level of heterogeneity admissible for equilibrium is

min = 2 g
Therefore: a)

min
min
= 2; b)
= < 0 for any (0, 1); and c)
()
g

min
= g < 0 for any g R++ . 

Proposition 2 describes the basic comparative statics of the feasible set of equilibria, in which the candidate disciplines groups 2 and 3 through clientelism. Even
though an infinite number of mixed strategies might be possible in the SPE of this
repeated game, particular conditions on heterogeneity, dislike towards the party, patience, and the size of the gift, constrain the politicians ability to establish patronclient relations with the constituent. From this analysis, it should be clear that a
lower level of dislike towards the party, a higher level of heterogeneity, a higher magnitude of the gift, and a higher level of patience, favor the candidates intention of
establishing a clientelistic relation with groups 2 and 3.
In figure 1 the set of feasible mixed strategies is plotted as a function of the
gift. The lower bound (i.e. the necessary condition for making group 2 comply) is
decreasing in g, while the upper bound (i.e. the necessary condition for disciplining
group 3) is increasing in this parameter. The shaded region represents the set of
mixed strategies that can be implemented by the candidate, for any given value of
15

Figure 2: Set of feasible mixed strategies as a function of

g+
2

the gift. The intersection of and determines the minimum gift necessary for
equilibrium: gmin =

2
.

Naturally, this amount is positive because, 2 > .

It is interesting to note that if the magnitude of the dislike towards the party ()
diminishes, equilibria in which the given gift is lower are still admissible. In other
terms, if citizens feel more identified with the party, lower gifts are needed in order to
buy their votes. In a multidimensional policy-space setting, if citizens and candidates
are less distant in certain issues, like religion or security, it might be easy to explain
why voters support candidates that are apparently more distant in another issue,
even if gifts are not so tempting.
Additionally, this minimum gift is decreasing in the level of diversity among
groups (). Higher heterogeneity means that group 3 feels more sympathy for the
candidate when he is elected, while group 2s ideological utility remains unchanged.
This makes things easier for the candidate, which has to offer a lower gift because
group 3 will be more easily convinced. Finally, players patience (measured through
the common discount factor ) makes groups 2 and 3 value more the cooperative
agreement in which they vote for the patron, making gifts less important.
Figure 2 depicts the set of feasible mixed strategies, but now as a function of
the magnitude of dislike towards the party (.) The lower bound is increasing in
while the upper bound is decreasing. This implies that as dislike increases, less
extreme or degenerate mixed strategies are implementable in equilibrium. The
intersection of both bounds yields the maximum level of intolerance to the party:

16

Figure 3: Set of feasible mixed strategies as a function of

g 2

g +
. This level is increasing in g, , and . Richer candidates can buy
2
voters that dislike more their party. More diversity makes party dislike less costly

max =

to the politician. As stated above, this is because represents the sympathy that
group 3 feels when the candidate is elected. This attenuates and makes clientelism
easier. Higher patience makes intolerance towards the party less important because
the groups value more their future flow of payoffs.
Finally, figure 3 plots the set of feasible as a function of diversity . The lower
bound is constant in this case, because it does not depend on . Group 2s utility
does not depend on this parameter, so that the necessary condition for making
them comply is not a function of heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the upper bound is
increasing in . The intersection of both lines yields the minimum admissible level
of heterogeneity:
min = 2 g
As rises, more heterogeneity is needed to compensate the increased dislike
towards the party. Higher gifts or higher patience, make group 3s sympathy less
necessary for the establishment of clientelism. In this section a simplified model
of political clientelism and the comparative statics just described serve to illustrate
how the feasibility of patronage varies as a function of ideological and economic
conditions.

17

Clientelism-Game With Random Shocks

Even though the model presented in the previous section provides some interesting
predictions pertaining to how clientelism becomes more or less feasible as relevant
parameters change, the fact that an infinite number of mixed strategies can be implemented does not solve some of the most interesting questions. As such, the following
section presents an extended version of the clientelism-game, incorporating random
shocks into the groups ideology payments. It was argued that groups exhibit a
natural aversion towards the party ( < 0) and that group 1 dislikes the candidate,
group 3 feels sympathy towards him, and group 2 remains neutral. This paper now
assumes that during each time period t in which the clientelistic candidate is elected,
the three groups are exposed to a random shock i , for i = 1, 2, 3, which increases or
decreases group is ideological payoff at time t. More specifically, groups ideological
payoffs now are given by

1 (p wins) = + 1
2 (p wins) = + 2
3 (p wins) = + + 3
where E[i ] = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. For simplicity, assume that i is uniformly distributed
over the interval [k, k], for k R++ . Naturally, this implies that E[i ] = 0 for each
group.
As before, assume that the game repeats during t = 1, 2, . . . periods and that
the candidate and groups 2 and 3 follow the grim-trigger strategies specified in the
previous section. Consequently, during each period the politician plays a mixed
strategy (0, 0, , 1 ) in which he assigns the gift g to group 2 with probability
(0, 1). In the last section necessary conditions for equilibrium where established
on . But how is really determined? What motivates the candidate to give the
gift with a higher probability to the close or to the distant group? Does he prefer to
more frequently solicit the group that ideologically is more distant to him, or is the
group that sympathizes with him awarded for this?
Given these conditions, it is natural to consider cases in which group 1 votes for
the candidate, even though they strongly dislike him and never receive a gift. Define
pi , for i = 1, 2, 3, as the probability that group i votes for the candidate. Therefore,
if [0, 1] represents the probability that the candidate gets elected in a given
period, = p1 [1 (1 p2 )(1 p3 )] + (1 p1 )p2 p3 . Assume that in equilibrium the
18

three groups play according to the following rule: If i xi , for certain threshold
value xi R, group i votes for the candidate. Hence, xi simply represents a cutpoint
which determines if a group supports or not the clientelistic candidate. Therefore,
the probability of having group i voting for the candidate is
pi = 1 F (xi )
where F (xi ) = P r(i < xi ) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of i . Consider the case in which the candidate chooses in order to maximize his probability
of being elected in any given period. Then, the clientelistic politicians problem for
each period can be stated as
max = p1 [1 (1 p2 )(1 p3 )] + (1 p1 )p2 p3
s.t.

[0, 1]
pi = 1 F (xi )

Naturally, we have to carefully establish the cumulative distribution functions F (x1 ),

F (x2 ) and F (x3 ) in order to solve this game. We know that each period group 1
votes for the clientelistic candidate as long as
+ 1 0
This equation implies that group 1s threshold value is
x1 = +

(4)

Similarly, group 2 supports the candidate if

+ 2 + g 0
which implies
x2 = g

(5)

Finally, the candidate receives support from group 3 if

+ + 3 + (1 )g 0
Consequently, group 3s threshold value is
x3 = (1 )g

19

(6)

Now that we explicitly know the threshold values for each group, it is time to present
the main result of the model: the optimal value that the candidate chooses in
order to maximize the probability of being elected.
Proposition 3:
Consider the infinitely repeated clientelism-game with random shocks in which the
candidate chooses in order to maximize his probability of being elected in each
period. Then, in the optimal mixed strategy supported by a SPE, group 2 receives
the gift in every period with probability
=

1
+
2 2g

Proof:
We know that i is uniformly distributed in the interval [k, k]. Then, if f (x) is the
probability density function for any x [k, k] it is true that f (x) =

1
2k .

Therefore,

for group i
pi = 1 F (xi )
Z k
=
f (x)dx
xi
k

1
dx
xi 2k
1
xi
=
2 2k

Substituting (4) into the last equation, we find that

p1 =

1
+
2
2k

(7)

Similarly, using (5) we find that for player 2

1 + g
+
2
2k

(8)

1 + + (1 )g
+
2
2k

(9)

p2 =
Finally, from (6) for player 3
p3 =

The candidate wants to maximize the probability of being elected, which can be
written as
= p1 [1 (1 p2 )(1 p3 )] + (1 p1 )p2 p3
= p1 (p2 + p3 ) + p2 p3 (1 2p1 )
20

From (7) it is clear the p1 is not a function of , so we can treat it as a constant.

Also, from (8) and (9)
2 + + g
2k
Consequently, p2 + p3 also does not depend on and can be considered as a constant
p2 + p3 = 1 +

in this analysis. Therefore, in an interior solution of the candidates maximization

problem, the first order condition is

(p2 p3 )
=
[1 2p1 ] = 0

From (7), it is clear that p1 < 1/2. Hence, the first order condition implies that
(p2 p3 )
=0

Also, from (8) and (9) we know that




k + + g
k + + + (1 )g
p2 p3 =
2k
2k
Consequently, the first order condition reduces to




g k + + + (1 )g
g k + + g

=0
2k
2k
2k
2k
and solving, we find the optimal mixed strategy for the candidate:
=

+
2 2g

(10)

The second order condition is

g 2
<0
2k 2
for any . Therefore, is a maximum. 
It is important to note that since

2g

> 0, it is always the case that > 1/2.

This means that group 2, the neutral group (which at the same time is more distant
from the candidate than group 3), receives the gift with a higher probability than
the sympathetic group 3. The politician gives the gift more frequently to the
group that is ideologically less identified with him, probably because a bigger effort
is necessary in order to make this group comply. In other words, 1 < 1/2 is a
consequence of group 3s sympathy to the candidate. This does not mean that the
politician only allocates resources to one group. He still has incentives to randomize
in order to make clientelism self-enforcing. Some interesting features characterize
this randomization, as established by proposition 4.

21

Proposition 4:
In the SPE in which the candidate and groups 2 and 3 use the grim trigger strategies
established in the clientelism-game with random shocks, the optimal mixed strategy
implemented by the politician has the following properties:
1. Higher heterogeneity between groups implies higher odds of giving the gift to
the neutral group.
2. Higher gifts available to the candidate imply lower probability of giving them
to the neutral group.
3. In equilibrium, groups 2 and 3 vote for the clientelistic candidate with the same
probability
Proof:
Partial derivatives (comparative statics) of the optimal mixed strategy reveal that:
1. is increasing in :
1

=
>0

2g
for any pair g > 0.
2. is decreasing in g:

= 2 <0
g
2g
for any pair (g, ) R++ R++ .
3. Substituting (10) into (8) yields
p2 =

2k + 2 + g +
4k

p3 =

2k + 2 + g +
4k

(11)

While (10) into (9) yields

Therefore, in equilibrium, p2 = p3 . 
Proposition 3 describes the unique mixed strategy that a clientelistic politician follows in equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows how this mixed strategy varies as a function
of the relevant parameters of the model. First, as diversity between groups rises, the
probability that group 2 receives the gift also increases. This should be intuitive.
22

More diversity, in the context of this model means that group 3 feels more sympathy
towards the candidate, while group 2 remains neutral. Consequently, the candidate
makes a higher effort trying to convince the more distant group (2). Second, as the
gift is higher, is lower. Higher gifts make it unnecessary to bribe the same group
so frequently. A richer candidate will have the capacity to bribe with a relatively
more egalitarian frequency both groups. In other terms, a higher budget makes the
politician more democratic. The third result of this proposition shows that in equilibrium the candidate chooses in order to make equally likely that groups 2 and 3
vote for him. This explains why > 1/2: It is necessary to reward with a higher
probability (or in a higher proportion) the more distant group in order to compensate
its larger dislike towards the candidate. For this reason, in order to make equally
likely core and swing voters support, in equilibrium the probability of rewarding
swing voters should be higher. Propositions 5 and 6 show how group heterogeneity,
dislike towards the party, and the candidates budget, affect the politicians likelihood
of being elected, and his expected time in office.
Proposition 5:
Define the expected time in office of the candidate, R+ , as the expected number
of periods in which the politician serves for the public position he is competing
for. For simplicity, assume that group 1 never votes for the candidate. Then, for
the clientelism-game with random shocks, in equilibrium, the probability that the
politician is elected in every period, and the expected time in office are given by
=
and
I =

(2k + 2 + g + )2
16k 2

16k 2
16k 2 (2k + 2 + g + )2

if the candidate is the incumbent at the beginning of the game, or

C =

(2k + 2 + g + )2
16k 2 (2k + 2 + g + )2

if he is the challenger.
Proof:
If group 1 never votes for the candidate, p1 = 0 and = p2 p3 = p22 . Therefore, from
(11) we find out that
=

(2k + 2 + g + )2
16k 2
23

(12)

Also, if the candidate is the incumbent at the beginning of the game, the expected
time in office is given by
I = 1(1 ) + 2(1 ) + 32 (1 ) +
= (1 )

ii1

i=1

which simplifies to
I =

1
1

(13)

Substituting (12) into (13), yields

I =

16k 2
16k 2 (2k + 2 + g + )2

If the candidate is the challenger at the beginning of the game, his expected time in
office is
C = 0(1 ) + 1(1 ) + 22 (1 ) +
= (1 )

ii

i=1

which is the same as

C =

(14)

Using (12) and (14) we find that

C =

(2k + 2 + g + )2
16k 2 (2k + 2 + g + )2

Which completes the proof. 

Finally, proposition 6 presents the comparative statics of both the candidates
likelihood of being elected in each period, and his expected time in office.
Proposition 6:
Suppose that groups dislike towards the party is sufficiently small, so that 2 <
2k + g + . Then, the probability that the candidate gets elected in each period, the
expected time in office when he is the incumbent at the beginning of the game, and
this expected time if he is the challenger, are increasing in group heterogeneity and
the size of the gift, and decreasing in dislike towards the party.

24

Proof:
From (12) we know that

2k + 2 + g +
=
;

8k 2

2k + 2 + g +
=
;
g
8k 2

2k + 2 + g +
=

4k 2

These three partial derivatives are all positive as long as 2 < 2k+g+. Also, from
the chain rule we know that

j
n

j
n ,

for j = I, C and n = , g, . Additionally,

I
C
1
=
=
>0

(1 )2
Therefore, it is also the case that

j j
, g ,

and

are all positive when 2 <

2k + g + . 
The last couple of propositions show how the clientelistic candidate gets affected
by changes in the structural parameters of the model. Not surprisingly, if something
increases the probability that the candidate gets elected in a given period, it also
increases his expected time in office. Consequently, when the groups do not dislike the
candidate so much (when is sufficiently small), an increase in group heterogeneity
() is beneficial for the candidate. Diversity is valued by clientelistic candidates,
because in this model a more diverse society implies that the core group of supporters
(group 3, in this case) will be more likely to vote for the politician. Naturally, the
likelihood of being elected and the expected time in office are higher for richer
politicians (higher g) whose parties are less disliked (lower ).
It is natural to ask how the relative size of the groups affects the allocation
of clientelistic resources. So far, it has been shown how intergroup heterogeneity,
captured by the parameter , affects this allocation. Nonetheless, there are other
potential sources of heterogeneity. Recall that groups are composed by voters whose
preferences towards a clientelistic candidate differ. Therefore, intragroup heterogeneity is another trait that may alter the distribution of resources made by a clientelistic
candidate. As a whole, a group might be more sympathetic towards a candidate,
but it can also be composed of more swing voters. More specifically, these swing
voters may be less extreme citizens whose voting choices might be completely altered
by random shocks, such as wars or natural disasters. Consequently, it is obvious that
if a politician is able to predict which group has more swing voters, this knowledge
will influence the distribution of clientelistic rewards.
To model intragroup heterogeneity within the framework developed above, changing the probabilistic mass of each group is a natural next step. So far, it has been
25

assumed that the random shock i is uniformly distributed in the same interval for
the three groups. This implies that the density is also the same. Now, assume that
for every group i, i is uniformly distributed in the interval [ki , ki ]. This way, the
probabilistic mass of each group differs, such that the group-specific density is given
by

1
2ki .

Hence, given that a higher ki implies a higher variance for i , it is possible to

infer that a group with a bigger support is more extreme in terms of ideological preferences. If blocks are composed by a continuum of voters whose distribution differs
across groups, this property could be interpreted as a divergence in the number of
swing voters in each group. If ki < kj , then group i has more swing or undecided
voters that are less extreme and easier to convince or bribe. How does this alter the
analysis? Proposition 7 gives us the answer.
Proposition 7:
Consider the infinitely repeated clientelism-game in which the random shock i is
uniformly distributed in the interval [ki , ki ], for i = 1, 2, 3 and ki > 0. Then, in
the optimal mixed strategy supported by a SPE, group 2 receives the gift in every
period with probability
=

k1 (k3 k2 )
1
+
+
2 2g 2g( + )

Proof:
Following the same procedure of proposition 3, we know that groups support the
clientelistic candidate with probabilities:
p1 =

1
+
;
2
2k1

p2 =

1 + g
+
;
2
2k2

p3 =

1 + + (1 )g
+
2
2k3

Once more, assuming that in order to win the candidate needs the support of at
least two groups, he is elected with probability



+ g + + (1 )g
k1 +
1+
+
=
2k1
2k2
2k3




+
k2 + + g
k3 + + + (1 )g
+
k1
2k2
2k3
Given that the candidate chooses to maximize , in an interior solution we have



(k1 + )(k3 k2 )g
+
g(k3 k2 + + g 2g)
+
=0
4k1 k2 k3
k1
4k2 k3
and solving, we find the optimal probability of rewarding group 2:
=

k1 (k3 k2 )
+
+
2 2g 2g( + )
26

(15)

The second order condition is



+
k1



2g 2
4k2 k3


<0

Therefore, is a maximum. Given that playing forms part of a Nash Equilibrium

of the stage game, the grim trigger strategy supporting in every round of the
repeated game is a SPE. 
Hence, the probabilities (frequencies) at which groups 2 and 3 are rewarded by
the candidate are now functions of the relative densities of the groups. In other
words, the distribution of clientelistic benefits now also depends on how many swing
or undecided voters comprise each group. Additionally, there are other important
changes in the comparative statics of this equilibrium. Of particular relevance, the
effects of heterogeneity, party identification and the candidates budget on the distribution of clientelistic benefits, now depend on the relative amount of swing voters
in groups 2 and 3.
Proposition 8:
In the SPE in which the candidate and groups 2 and 3 use the grim trigger strategies
established in the clientelism-game with random shocks and heterogeneous density
functions, the optimal mixed strategy implemented by the politician has the following
properties:
1. Lower density in group 1 implies higher odds of giving the gift to the group
with more swing voters.
2. If k3 k2 increases, the probability of rewarding group 2 increases as well.
3. Higher intergroup heterogeneity increases the probability of rewarding group 2
if k3 k2 is sufficiently small. Otherwise, higher heterogeneity implies that
this probability is lower.
4. A higher candidates budget increases the probability of rewarding group 2 if
k3 k2 is sufficiently small. Otherwise it decreases such probability.
5. Higher dislike towards the clientelistic party increases the probability of rewarding group 2 if its density is lower than group 3s. Otherwise, it decreases
such probability.
Proof:
Partial derivatives (comparative statics) of the optimal mixed strategy of the game
with heterogeneous densities reveal that:
27

1. Opposers density:

k3 k2
=
k1
2g( + )
Therefore

k1

> 0 if k3 > k2 .

2. Relative density between neutrals and supporters:

k1
=
>0
(k3 k2 )
2g() +
3. Intergroup heterogeneity:

1
k1 (k3 k2 )
=

2g 2g( + )2
Hence,

> 0 if k3 k2 <

(+)2
.
k1

4. Candidates budget:

k1 (k3 k2 )

=
2
2
g
2g ( + )
2g
Consequently,

> 0 if k3 k2 <

(+)
.
k1

5. Party identification

k1 (k3 k2 )
=
()
2( + )2
Therefore,

()

> 0 if k3 < k2 .

The first item of proposition 8 illustrates that having less swing voters in group 1
(higher k1 ) favors group 2 only if this group is comprised of more swing voters than
group 3. In other words, as group 1 becomes less swing, the candidate allocates
more resources to the group with the higher population of swing voters between
groups 2 and 3. Item 2 depicts that, as the number of swing voters in group 2 increases relative to group 3 (higher k3 k2 ), the probability of group 2 being rewarded
also increases. Thus, with all else being equal, possessing a greater population of
undecided or easy-to-buy voters results in a guarantee of more resources. The
third item of this proposition concludes that when there are sufficiently more swing
voters in group 3 compared to group 2 (k3 k2 sufficiently small), more intergroup
heterogeneity increases the amount given to group 2.4 The rationale for this outcome
4

It makes sense to talk about amounts if we interpret as a fraction, instead of a probability.

28

is as follows: When group 3 has more swing voters, it is natural to infer that more
resources are given to that group. But if grows, group 3, as a whole, becomes more
loyal so more resources can be given to the neutral group.
The fourth item of proposition 8 suggests that if there are sufficiently more swing
voters in group 3 compared to group 2, more resources are given to group 2 as the
candidates budget increases. The rationale is similar to before. When group 3 has
many more swing voters than its counterpart, it is natural to infer that it receives
more resources. However, if the budget increases, those extra resources can then be
allocated to persuade members of group 2. Finally, item 5 reveals that as dislike
towards the clientelistic party increases (higher ), the probability of rewarding
the neutral group grows if there are more swing voters in group 3 and vice-versa.
Hence, the model predicts that as party identification grows, the group comprised
of more extreme (inflexible) voters will benefit, while the group comprised of more
swing voters will be punished.

Discussion: What is Clientelism?

The model presented in this paper describes a particular type of clientelism: the
transfer of material benefits (cash) in exchange for political support. This particular
choice does not mean that any type of transfer between a candidate and the electorate will equate to clientelism. For example, if an incumbent politician running
for reelection favors certain group of voters through a subsidy, it is not necessarily
representative of clientelism. Instead, such strategy could be another form of redistribution as it could simply be the result of the ideological and programmatic agenda
of the candidate. Nonetheless, the way clientelism is modeled in this paper distinguishes it from other forms of redistribution for one basic reason: the allocation of
gifts is conditioned in accordance with previous voting behavior.
In the context of the model, if g were to represent a subsidy, for instance, it
would then not be necessary to employ a grim trigger strategy, involving allocation
by the candidate only if the groups formerly supported him. Under programmatic
redistribution, allocation of resources would be modeled based on the maximization
of an ideological utility function and its outcome. Time would only matter if the
structural economic conditions that determine such allocation change. It would not
be because citizens vote in a particular manner. Therefore, in order to appropriately
model clientelism, this paper includes the repeated interaction between the candidate
and the groups of voters even when this is not mathematically required: the one-shot
29

version of the probabilistic voting model presented in section 4 would be sufficient.

But the repeated framework developed in section 3 is kept precisely to distinguish
between clientelism and other forms of redistribution.
Naturally, the transfer of material benefits or cash based on past or present
voting behavior is not the only plausible form of clientelism. In many cases, politicians discipline voters by using mechanisms that determine future flows of income
based on electoral results. Typical examples of this method include employment
in the public sector or public contracts. Robinson and Verdier (2003) discuss this
other form of clientelism, illustrating that, if incumbents and challengers compete
for votes through policies and transfers, then under certain circumstances the incumbent has incentives to reduce investment in order to attract supporters. A reduction
in investment makes the private sector less productive, which makes employment
in the public sector appear more attractive for certain groups. Hence, those voters
will support the incumbent, because his victory will promote public sector employment. Consequently, under a clientelistic regime, a lower level of investment results
in negative consequences to productivity and efficiency, thereby increasing poverty
and inequality.
There is no doubt that employment in the public sector is an important component of clientelism. But it is not the only one. In fact, most of the empirical literature on vote-buying and clientelism shows that cash and other immediate material
goods are widely used all across the globe [see Vicente (2010), Gonzalez-Ocantos
et al. (2012), Finan & Schechter (forthcoming), and Gallego & Wantchekon (2012)].
Robinson and Verdier (2003) do not have a satisfactory theory for this form of patronage. In fact, in their model the optimal amount of transfers that candidates give
to voters is zero. On the contrary, the model presented in this paper provides a theoretical description of why this form of clientelism takes place and is self-enforcing.

Conclusion

One of the major puzzles of political clientelism is explaining why agents comply with
these types of agreements, even when they have incentives to cheat and even provided
that in most democracies the vote is confidential. In this paper, a simple mechanism
that explains why clientelism is self-enforcing is presented. The result of the election
provides politicians with a signal of voting behavior. However, more interestingly, the
election results provide a powerful mechanism for disciplining voters. Therefore, in
a repeated context in which votes are unobservable but results are, clientelism might
30

emerge as a result of equilibrium behavior. Citizens have incentives to honor their

agreements in order to maximize their future flow of payoffs, which in many cases
is higher when the clientelistic candidate wins the election and gives future benefits.
In addition, the candidate has incentives to cultivate his clientele and provides them
with goods and benefits (even at a personal expense), in order to promote voter
compliance and secure their vote. It is interesting to note that in this model the
promise of future gifts attenuates the ideological disutility that a citizen experiences
when a disliked party comes into power.
Some contexts are more favorable than others for patron-client relationships. In
the model presented here, the clientelistic politician is favored when dislike towards
his party is not so high, when diversity among neutral and sympathetic groups is
higher, when agents are more patient and place higher value on the future, as well
as when his budget allows him to offer better and more valuable goods or benefits.
Nonetheless, its results are extremely important to understanding what determines a
politicians allocation of scarce resources. Under certain circumstances, swing voters
are more valued and, consequently, they receive higher benefits more frequently. But,
the case also exists that other circumstances make core voters more important in
relative terms, so that allocations are more egalitarian in equilibrium.
Nevertheless, several puzzles remain unanswered. What is the relation between
clientelism and poverty? And with income inequality? In the model presented,
groups differed in their ideological preference towards the candidate. However, it
would be interesting to understand how a clientelistic politician allocates resources
among groups that differ in income. Are poor voters more frequently bribed? Is the
medium class the main target of politicians? Some studies suggest (Stokes, 2005)
that clientelism is more frequent in poor and unequal societies. This seems reasonable
given that for a politician it is cheaper to buy poor voters. In addition, as inequality
increases, the gap between the rich elites that support certain candidates and the
poor voters increases. As such, it would be certainly intriguing to incorporate these
dynamics into the framework described in this paper.

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