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TECHNICAL SAFETY
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
This NORSOK standard is developed by NTS with broad industry participation. Please note that
whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of this standard, neither OLF nor TBL or
any of their members will assume liability for any use thereof. NTS is responsible for the
administration and publication of this standard.
Norwegian Technology Standards Institution
Oscarsgt. 20, Postbox 7072 Majorstua
N-0306 Oslo, NORWAY
Telephone: + 47 22 59 01 00 Fax: + 47 22 59 01 29
Email: norsok@nts.no Website: http://www.nts.no/norsok
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
3
3
1 SCOPE
2 NORMATIVE REFERENCES
5
5
8
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NORSOK standard
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Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
FOREWORD
NORSOK (The competitive standing of the Norwegian offshore sector) is the industry initiative to
add value, reduce cost and lead time and eliminate unnecessary activities in offshore field
developments and operations.
The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry as a part of the
NORSOK initiative and supported by OLF (The Norwegian Oil Industry Association) and TBL
(Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries). NORSOK standards are administered and
issued by NTS (Norwegian Technology Standards Institution).
The purpose of NORSOK standards is to contribute to meet the NORSOK goals, e.g. to develop
standards that ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness and thus are used in
existing and future petroleum industry developments.
The NORSOK standards make extensive references to international standards. Where relevant, the
contents of a NORSOK standard will be used to provide input to the international standardisation
process. Subject to implementation into international standards, the NORSOK standard will be
withdrawn.
Annexes B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I form a normat6ive part of this standard.
Annexes A, J, and K are for information only.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this standard is to present the principles and requirements for safety design of
offshore installations for production of petroleum.
ISO 13702 presents the general experiences and requirements from the International offshore industry
and NORSOK S-001 adds the specific requirements/experiences from the Norwegian operators.
Therefore ISO 13702 and NORSOK S-001 have to be read and understood in conjunction with each
other.
NORSOK standard
Page 3 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
SCOPE
This NORSOK standard for Technical Safety describes the principles and requirements for the
development of the safety design for offshore production installations; fixed platforms,
semisubmersibles and vessels. Where applicable this standard may also be used for Mobile Offshore
Drilling Units. Installations intended for short term exploration drilling, shuttle of crude to harbour
and general service are not covered by this standard.
This Standard together with ISO 13702 " Control and mitigation of fires and explosionsrequirements and guidelines" defines the required standard for implementation of technologies and
emergency preparedness to establish and maintain an adequate level of safety for personnel,
environment and material assets. This standard will further have to be applied together with
NORSOK standards for working environment and environmental care.
The principles and requirements for safety evaluation and safety management are described in ISO
13702 Chapter 4 while the objectives and functional requirements to installation layout are described
in chapter 5. These methodologies are clarified and detailed in S-001 chapter 4.
Requirements to Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analyses are described in NORSOK Z-013 and
are referenced concerning required input to the design process.
Requirements to Working environment are described in NORSOK S-002
NORMATIVE REFERENCES
The following standards include provisions, which, through references in this text, constitute
provisions of this NORSOK standard. Latest issue of the references shall be used unless otherwise
agreed. Other recognised standards may be used provided it can be shown that they meet or exceed
the requirements of the standards referenced below.
API 6FA
API RP 521
BS 6755
E&P Forum
ICAO BSL 5-1
IEC 60079-10
IEC 60079-13
IEC 61892-7
IMO Resolution A653
ISO 10418
NORSOK standard
Technical Safety
ISO 13702
ISO 5660
NFPA 11A
NFPA 13
NFPA 14
NFPA 16
NFPA 20
NFPA 72
NORSOK C-001
NORSOK C-002
NORSOK H-001
NORSOK I-CR-002
NORSOK L-002
NORSOK M-501
NORSOK P-001
NORSOK S-002
NORSOK S-003
NORSOK S-011
NORSOK T-100
NORSOK Z-013
NORSOK Z-016
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
(Replaces API RP14 C).
Petroleum and natural gas industries Offshore production installationsControl and mitigation of fires and explosions Requirements and
guidelines.
Fire tests - Reaction to fire - Rate of heat release from building products.
National Fire Protection Association part 11
Standard for medium- and high-expansion foam systems
National Fire Protection Association part 13
Installation of sprinkler systems
National Fire Protection Association part 14
Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems
National Fire Protection Association part 16
Deluge Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems and Foam-Water Spray Systems
Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps
National Fire Protection Association part 72
National Fire Alarm Code
Living quarters area
Architectural components and equipment
HVAC (Heating, ventilation and air conditioning)
Safety and Automation Systems (SAS)
Piping Design, Layout and Stress Analysis
Surface Preparation and Protective Coating.
Process Design
Working Environment
Environmental Care
Safety equipment data sheets
Telecom Subsystems
Risk and emergency preparedness analysis.
Regularity, management & reliability technology
3.1
Definition
Acceptance Criteria for risk Criteria that are used to express a risk level that is considered
acceptable for the activity in question, limited to the high level
expressions of risk.
Accidental event
Event or chain of events that may cause loss of life, health, or damage
to environment or assets.
Barrier
A measure which reduces the probability of realising a hazards
potential for harm and of reducing its consequences. Barriers may be
physical, (materials, protective devices shields, segregation etc) or non
- physical (procedures, inspection, training, drills)
Can
Verbal form used for statements of possibility and capability, whether
material, physical or casual.
Defined situations of
A selection of possible events that the emergency preparedness in the
hazard and accident (DFU) activity should be able to handle, based on the activitys dimensioning
NORSOK standard
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Technical Safety
Dimensional explosion
Dimensional Fire
Dimensioning accidental
events (DUH)
Dimensioning accidental
load (DUL)
Dimensioning explosion
Dimensioning fire
Emergency lighting
Emergency power system
External communication
Systems
Fire load
Functional specification
Hazard
NORSOK standard
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
accidental situations associated with a temporary increase of risk and
less extensive accidental events.
Explosion which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
represents an unacceptable risk, and which consequently serves as a
basis for design and operation of installations and for the
implementation of the relevant activity in general.
A fire which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
represents an unacceptable risk, and which consequently serves as a
basis for design and operation of installations and for the
implementation of the relevant activity in general.
Accidental events that serve as the basis for layout, dimensioning and
use of installations and the activity at large, in order to meet the
defined risk acceptance criteria.
The most severe accidental load that the function or system shall be
able to withstand during a required period of time, in order to meet the
defined risk acceptance criteria
Explosion, which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
represents an unacceptable risk and which consequently, serves as a
basis for design and operation of installations and for the
implementation of relevant activity in general.
A fire which in accordance with the defined acceptance criteria
represents an unacceptable risk, and which consequently serves as a
basis for design and operation of installations and for the
implementation of relevant activity in general.
Lighting which will ensure adequate light conditions on the
installation in the event of failure of the main power supply.
System to ensure continuos power supply to important equipment in
the event of failure of the main power supply. This includes
generators, control panels, hydraulic pumps, accumulators etc.
Safe areas by location where the emergency equipment such as fire
pumps emergency generators are located.
The pressure generated by violent combustion of a flammable gas or
mist which generates pressure effects due to confinement of the
combustion induced flow and/or the acceleration of the flame front by
obstacles in the flame front.
Systems which ensure necessary communication to and from the
installation.
The total quantity of heat released in the case of complete combustion
of all combustible materials in an area, including materials in walls,
decks and ceiling.
The total system, which supplies water for fire-fighting system, i.e.
water inlets with filters, fire pumps, risers, power sources, power
transmissions, fuel pipes/tanks and control systems.
As defined in ISO 13879 and 13880:
Document that specifies the requirements expressed by features,
characteristics, process conditions, boundaries and exclusions defining
the performance of the product, process or service.
Potential for human injury, damage to the environment, damage to
property or a combination of these.
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Technical Safety
Hazard assessment
Hazards Register
Informative references
Intermittently manned
Internal communication
Systems
May
Normally not manned
Normative references
NORSOK
Permanently manned
Recognised institution
Shall
Should
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Process whereby the results of hazard analyses are considered against
either judgement, standards, or criteria which have been developed as
basis for decision making.
A document providing a brief, but complete, overview of the identified
hazards and the measures necessary to manage them. The hazards
register also provides references to more detailed information relevant
to a particular hazard.
Shall mean informative in the application of NORSOK Standards.
Work area or work place where inspection, maintenance or other work
is planned to last at least two hours a day for at least 50 per cent of the
installations operation time.
Systems which ensure that messages can be communicated to and
from various areas on the installation.
Verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the
limits of the standard.
Work area or work place that is not permanently or intermittently
manned.
Shall mean normative (a requirement) in the application of NORSOK
Standards.
Norsk Sokkels Konkurranseposisjon, the Competitive standing of the
Norwegian Offshore Sector, the Norwegian initiative to reduce cost on
offshore projects.
Work area or work place manned at least 8 hours a day for at least 50
per cent of the installations operation time.
An institution which is internationally and/or nationally recognised
within a professional field, and which possesses adequate competence
and experience within that field.
Verbal form used to indicate requirements strictly to be followed in
order to conform to the standard and from which no deviation is
permitted, unless accepted by all involved parties.
Verbal form used to indicate that among several possibilities one is
recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding
others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily
required.
A place provided where personnel can take refuge for a predetermined period whilst investigations, emergency response and
evacuation pre-planning are undertaken.
All terms and phrases within the scope of this standard shall be regarded as defined in the regulations
and international codes and standards referred to in this document. Where this is not unambiguous,
the definition in this standard shall be used.
NORSOK standard
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S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
3.2
Abbreviations
AFFF
Aqueous film forming foam
API
American Petroleum Institute (US)
APS
Abandon Platform Shutdown
ASC
Area safety charts
BOP
Blow Out Preventer
CCR
Central Control Room
CFD
Computerised flow dynamic
DAL
Design Accidental Load
DHSV
Down Hole Safety Valve
DUH
Dimensioning Accidental Event
DUL
Dimensioning Accidental Load
EERS
Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Strategy (ISO 13702)
ESD
Emergency Shut Down
ESDV
Emergency Shut Down Valve
F&G
Fire and Gas
FES
Fire Explosion Strategy (ISO 13702)
FPDS
Fire protection data sheet
HAZID
Hazard identification
HAZOP
Hzard and operability
HC
Hydrocarbons
HSE
Health, Safety and Environment
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
IMO
International maritime organisation
IP
Institute of Petroleum (UK)
IR
Infra Red
KO
Knock Out
LEL
Lower Explosion Limit
LQ
Living Quarter
MOB
Man Over Board
MSF
Module support frame
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association (US)
NNMI
Normally Not Manned Installations
NPD
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
PA
Public Address
PCDA
Process control and data acquisition
PCS
Process Control System
PSD
Process Shut Down
RAL
Deutches Institut fur Gutesicherung und Kennzeichnung e.V., Bonn
RP
Recommended practice
SAS
Safety and Automation Systems
TR
Temporary Refuge
UPS
Uninterrupted Power Supply
UV
Ultra Violet
VDU
Visual Display Unit
NORSOK standard
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S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
4.1
General
A Health, Safety and Environmental Program (HSE) shall be developed according to the E&P forum
guideline: Guidelines for the Development and Application of HSE Management Systems. This
program shall among other issues address the follow up and closing of specific safety problem areas.
Safety objectives established by operator/project other than those specified by this NORSOK standard
and ISO 13702 shall be identified and expressed in the form of design objectivesand performance
standards (See 4.4). These shall be developed specifically for each development or modification
project.
The FES shall reflect the mitigating and consequence reduction measures to be implemented.
Ambient conditions (normal operations or emergencies) shall be clearly defined and included in
requirements to equipment and systems covered by this standard.
4.2
Risk reduction principles
The probability reducing measures shall be given priority over consequence reducing measures.
The incorporation of this overall principle in the design calls for consideration of the following, listed
in order of priority:
Inherent safety
Simplicity, comprehensibility, maintainability and recognisability e.g. by elimination of
complexity that may lead to human failure
Failure mechanisms. E.g. leading to leaks and releases of hazardous substances, ignitions or
mechanisms reducing the reliability and survivability of barriers and safety systems.
Escalation prevention, e.g. by safety barriers
Experience retention from operational reliability and incident databases.
4.3
Analyses and optimisation
The design principles presented in clauses 5 to 12 reflect a normally adequate standard for safe
design, whereas the project risk acceptance criteria are reflecting the maximum risk level, not
necessarily achieved through a standard design. This is because the safety level depends on several
factors, partly outside the range of standardisation, e.g. detailed layout and arrangement, operational
aspects, environmental conditions, and new technology.
Therefore a fit for purpose approach shall be performed through consideration of possible Hazards
and Hazardous events in the design. The Hazards and Hazardous events shall be systematically
identified and updated regularly along with the development of the project. This process shall be
documented, e.g. in a Hazards Register.
Risk and emergency preparedness analysis shall be carried out with the objective to identify the
hazards, their frequency, causes and consequeces and to verify that the risk acceptance criteria are
met. Timing, scope and method of risk and emergency preparedness analysis shall allow for the
analysis to be both a tool for decision making as well as, when relevant, a verification of acceptance
criteria being met through implementation of technical and operational safety requirements.
NORSOK Z-013 states the requirements on the planning, execution and use of risk and emergency
preparedness analysis.
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A vulnerability/availability analysis shall be carried out to ensure that safety critical systems and
functions maintain their integrity and perform their duty during credible accident scenarios for the
time period their functions are required. The effects from fires and explosions on operation and
stability on ESD, Fire & Gas detection and PA/alarm systems are typical examples of targets for such
analysis. See NORSOK Z-013 Clause 5.3.8.
HAZOP according to ISO 10418 shall be used as a tool in the system optimisation process to achieve
system safety and operability.
Cost/benefit evaluation should be applied to study different design alternatives. See NORSOK Z-013
and NORSOK Z-016.
4.4
Documentation
The safety design shall be documented to present how the design fulfils regulations, standards and
norms as required by the internal control system and to document the basis and assumptions for Risk
and Emergency preparedness evaluations. Further, the project documentation provides the basis and
necessary information for safe operation, modifications and development of the facility.
Documentation should be produced as follows, but with the necessary additions where this is
considered necessary the particular needs of each project. The documentation may be one or several
documents.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
HSE program
FES (Fire and Explosion Strategy).
EERS (Evacuation, Escape and Rescue strategy).
Performance Standard for Safety systems. See Note 1
Design accidental load requirements
Documented sectionalisation of the process plant including categorization and location of ESD
and PSD valves.
7. Fire and gas detection arrangements.
8. Fire Protection Data Sheets / Area Safety Charts
9. Reliability/sensitivity/availability/vulnerability analyses for safety systems
10. Safety arrangements drawings as follows:
- Passive fire and blast protection.
- Escape ways, muster areas, means of evacuation
- Area classification- schedule of sources
- Miscellaneous safety equipment.
- Active fire protection
Safety interface documents shall be produced where relevant to demonstrate how these safety
requirements are met, e.g. between:
- Fixed platform and mobile offshore units, e.g. drilling rig or accommodation rig.
- Fixed platform and storage units
- Different contractors.
Safety evaluations as required by this standard shall be documented.
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Note 1 Performance standard for Safety systems shall define the functional and specific requirements
for the design of the ESD/PSD/F&G systems, firewater system, HVAC and isolation of ignition
sources. Further it will be presented how these systems is meant to work together to minimize
escalation and consequences of mishaps and accidents.
5.1
Introduction
An EERS shall be developed for the installation based on ISO 13702 Chapter 4/Annex B 12 and
Emergency preparedness analyses as described in NORSOK Z-013. The EERS for the installation
will define and document the adequate strategy and requirements to escape evacuation and rescue
installations and equipment.
In addition to the requirements in the referred standards the following requirements shall apply:
-
All evacuation equipment shall be type approved according to SOLAS and national maritime
regulatory requirements.
The layout of presentation mimics and monitors in the Central Control Room shall consider
management of emergency situations.
The design of the facilities shall consider and cater for an effective execution of the Emergency
Preparedness activities.
Helicopter.
Free fall lifeboats.
Escape chute with life raft.
Bridge to neighbouring installation
Number, size and location of evacuation means shall be established based on manning, risk analyses
(e.g. risk exposure of escape routes towards main shelter area), and emergency preparedness analysis.
The time for evacuation, together with the required search and rescue operations shall be established
and the escape routes and other facilities as firewalls, radiation shields etc. designed accordingly.
The minimum number of free fall lifeboats for fixed installations available during a dimensional
accidental event shall be corresponding to the maximum number of personnel (100%) on board plus
one additional boat. Latter is meant to provide escape for the damage control team. If there is an
additional lifeboat located in an area on the installation other than the main evacuation area, this
lifeboat shall not be counted, as the additional lifeboat required
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The number of free fall lifeboats for floating installations shall correspond to the maximum number
of people onboard and be available in design weather conditions and with dimensional accidental heel
angels, plus the significant dynamic heel in the same weather and accidental condition.
The manning to be considered shall comprise all personnel on board, including day visitors.
The total life raft capacity at escape chutes shall as a minimum correspond to the total number of
personnel (100%) on board as documented in the EERS and according to the emergency preparedness
analyses. The life raft and boarding rafts shall be lowered together with the chute. By lowering the
chute, the boarding chute shall automatically inflate.
The distance between lifeboats and escape chute shall be large enough to ensure that a dropped boat
will not hit a lowered escape chute.
For detailed recommendations related to safety equipment see Annex C.
5.3
Rescue
Generally the installation shall be covered by one Man Overboard Boats (MOB`s). This one should
be evaluated for use together with the one on the stand by vessel. Other combinations will be
acceptable as proven by the emergency preparedness analyses.
The functional requirements for time from man overboard alaram until being seaborn shall be defined
by the emergency preparedness analyses. Utilisation of the deck crane to lift the MOB on to the
installation shall be evaluated.
6.1
General requirements
Reference is given to clauses 5, 7 and 13 in ISO 13702 for layout, orientation and location of
equipment and functions. The main principles for layouts are listed below.
For further details see Annex D.
The wellhead area should be located and designed so as to allow for external fire fighting
assistance.
Allow for identification of the blowing well in a possible blow out situation.
The utility area should serve as a barrier between hazardous areas and LQ/emergency service
areas. Good access to areas and equipment shall be ensured in order to achieve effective manual
fire fighting both from the installation and by external assistance.
Routing of hydrocarbon piping to, or through, the utility area shall be minimised and flanges
avoided. One flange connection can be arranged in each fuel line to combustion engines in utility
the area.
Routing of hydrocarbon piping is not allowed in the living quarter areas.
Routing of liquid piping of any kind is not allowed through electrical, instrument and control room
Routing of hydrocarbon piping within emergency service areas shall be limited to diesel fuel
supply lines for the emergency services themselves.
The use of explosion panels and weather protection shields shall be kept to a minimum, with a
preference to open naturally ventilated areas. Where such arrangements are likely to cause an
unacceptable working environment special solutions such as erection of temporary shields for
maintenance operations should be considered.
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Where explosions panels, walls or shields are provided, the possible utilisation of fire fighting
vessels during emergencies should be considered. 6.1.1 Area classification
6.2
Area Classification
The definition of hazardous areas shall be in accordance with IEC 60079-10 and IEC 61892-7.
For design principles related to pressurisation of rooms, alarms and disconnection upon loss of
pressurisation, ref. is made to IEC 60079-13.
Gases with molecular weight between 21 and 35 shall be regarded as both heavier and lighter than air
(molecular weight air = 29).
The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on events and situations associated with normal
platform operations, e.g. continuous or periodic venting, evaporation from open handling systems,
small leaks from flanges and gaskets, escape of flammable substances during maintenance and workover operations. See Annex D Layout.
All electrical equipment in naturally ventilated areas shall be certified safe type apparatus. Where
certified safe type apparatus is not available, the apparatus shall be electrically isolated on single gas
detection or confirmed gas detection dependent on the importance of the equipment.
6.3
Escape routes
The escape routes and the temporary refuge shall be in accordance with ISO 13702 clause 14.
Guidelines for the design of escape routes are listed in Annex B. For large manned installations the
escape route system and the temporary refuge (TR) shall be available for at least 1 hour, i.e. at least
one route of escape from each area not directly affected by the event shall be available.
Escape routes shall be well marked, including signs. Escape routes on decks shall be provided with a
non-skid, oil resistant coating in the safety yellow colour RAL 1023. On deck grating, two parallel
100mm wide yellow lines shall be painted indicating the width of the escape route. Marking shall
show the preferred direction of escape.
6.4
HVAC
Natural ventilation and open modules shall be preferred and the effect of natural ventilation shall be
assessed and documented.
A strategy for active control of possible smoke from fire in living quarters, TR and other
mechanically ventilated areas shall be developed and included in the design of HVAC system. Ref.
NORSOK H-001 HVAC.
All air inlets shall be located in non-hazardous areas, as far as practicable away from possible HC
leakage sources, and minimum 3 m from any zones 2 boundary. Simulation studies or wind tunnel
tests should be used for location of main HVAC air inlets to ensure operation of HVAC systems
serving quarters and emergency equipment rooms to be minimal affected by smoke and escaped gases
from incidents onboard.
For arrangement and protection of non-hazardous rooms with access to hazardous areas, ref. is made
to IEC 60079-13 and IEC-61892-7.
NORSOK standard
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6.5
Helicopter deck
The helicopter deck is subject to approval by the national civil aviation administration, ref. BSL D 51.
The turbulence effects from wind across and around the installation as well as influence from turbine
exhausts and flare/vent shall be considered. Simulation studies or wind tunnel tests shall be
performed during design of new installations or modifications of existing ones.
The arrangement shall be evaluated with the assistance of an experienced helicopter pilot.
The helicopter deck should have 3 access ways, sufficiently separated from each other (one pr. 120
degrees).
A continuous walkway around the helicopter deck edge at a level below helicopter deck surface
should be provided. (Approximately 1500 to 1200 mm below the level of the helicopter deck)
The helicopter deck surface shall be self-draining type, suitable for use by trolleys. The friction
coefficient on a wet deck shall be minimum 0,65.
The helicopter deck should be provided with an AFFF system (Pop-up, Safedeck or similar). The
system shall be functioning according to specification within 20 seconds after activation. The system
shall be activated and deactivated from the helicopter deck control room. The system shall be
protected against unplanned activation.
Details regarding drain system on helicopter deck are covered in Annex D.7.
6.6
Emergency service areas
An emergency service area is defined, as an area containing equipment and systems required during
emergency conditions. This includes firewater systems, emergency generators and emergency power
distribution systems, safety and automation system, communication equipment, emergency
ventilation, ballast system and position keeping system. (Ref. ISO 13702).
The location and protection of these systems as well as system design shall secure operations during
and after an emergency condition. The equipment necessary during evacuation is of particular
importance.
6.7
Process area
Fire and explosion evaluations shall be made along with the development of the lay out to minimise
the built in escalation potential. This shall be ensured through the following principles:
1. Equipment and piping containing high-pressure gas should be located in the upper decks above the
Module Support Frame or main hull.
2. Liquid vessels should be located lower than gas equipment.
3. Low-pressure equipment containing large amount of liquids should be located and arranged so that
exposure to jet fires is minimised. If jet fire exposure can not be eliminated, the need for passive
fire protection shall be evaluated.
Process piping, pig launchers and receivers and equipment shall be protected from external impact,
e.g. from dropped objects or missiles due to disintegration of rotating machinery or as found required
through analysis.
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The flare system shall be protected from fire and explosion loads so that its integrity is maintained
until the process plant has been depressurised.
6.8
Riser area
For all hydrocarbon risers; protection from external impact such as ship collisions and drifting objects
shall be evaluated. Locating the risers behind main support structures or dedicated protection
structures may be required to mitigate the risk.
The following means of protection shall be considered:
For two or more gas risers, or one gas riser together with several oil risers: passive fire protection.
Pig launchers and receivers: location in open, naturally ventilated areas, at the periphery of the
platform, and with hatches directed away from equipment and structures.
ESDV's: location in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the sea as practicable to minimise
exposure of the risers from topside accidental events.
Flanges and instrument connections on the riser side of the ESDV shall not be used on fixed
risers. For flexible risers special considerations have to be made.
Subsea barriers.
Utilisation factor
6.9
Flare boom, flare tower, cold vent
Flare booms and flare towers shall be located and designed with due attention to all relevant flaring
rates and wind conditions to ensure that the heat radiation level (ref. Annex E, clause E.4 Flaring)
will be within acceptance limits in all areas of the installation, with due regard to exposure of
operators, structures such as cranes and towers, electrical and mechanical equipment and piping.
The flare flame or hot gases shall not represent a hazard due to increased surface temperature in
exposed areas. Particular attention should be paid to crane and drill tower wires/structures and
personnel in exposed areas. Further the design of the cold vent systems shall cater for heat loads
caused by a possible ignition of the discharge.
A flare/vent study is required, identifying the potential effects in all exposed areas.
6.10 Drilling and wellhead area
The drilling and well head areas shall be located with maximum distance to the living quarters and
areas with emergency equipment and functions, and be separated from utility and processing areas in
order to minimise the consequences from a blow out.
Possible collapse of the derrick shall be evaluated.
The well heads shall be located as high as practicable and above the main support frame or main hull
in order to minimise exposure from a well head fire, and to facilitate control of a blow out on the
installation.
Consideration shall be given to the protection of well and BOP equipment, such as control panels and
hydraulic systems and their related signal paths.
Simultaneous drilling, work over and/or production shall be evaluated in detail taking into account
operational procedures to ensure an acceptable safety level of the operation of the installation.
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7.1
Design accidental loads
Accidental loads shall be identified and taken into account in the structural design. The probability,
magnitude and potential consequences of identified loads shall be assessed and analysed.
Relevant loads are:
Impact loads caused by dropped object, ship collision or others.
Dropped objects:
Protection of structure to be dimensioned for falling container, pipes etc. based on estimated
weight, probable drop height, vulnerability and criticality of the exposed areas.
Ship collision:
The possibility of collisions caused by merchant vessels and the need for adequate sea traffic
surveillance system shall be evaluated. For supply vessels operating alongside the installation, a
collision load of 14MJ shall be assumed.
Explosion loads:
Explosion loads affecting main structures
Explosion loads affecting secondary structures, e.g. walls acting as barriers between main areas.
Explosion loads acting on support of pressure vessels, flare headers, fire ring main, ESD valves
etc. shall be considered.
Explosion loads shall be established by use of recognized computer models, e.g. FLACS. See
clause 10.8.
Heat loads caused by jet fires or pool fires on the installation or adjacent installation, from risers or
from the sea surface in case of large oil releases to the sea or in case of sub sea gas releases.
- Fire:
Installations that can be exposed to a dimensioning fire on the sea shall be able to withstand this
for a time period sufficient for safe evacuation of the installation. The endurance shall not be less
than 1 hour. Fixed installations shall be protected against fire on sea, as identified by risk
analyses. For blow-out/fire on sea concerning floating installations, see clause 11.6.
Loads caused by extreme weather, earthquake, damage to structural elements (damaged condition)
or extreme temperatures.
Design accidental loads shall be specified in the design accidental load specification.
A weight control database shall be maintained to ensure that jacket or hull loads do not exceed
their design weight limit.
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8
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO PROCESS AND AUXILIARY
FACILITIES
8.1
General requirements
Process and auxiliary systems shall be designed, manufactured, equipped and installed in such a way
that the installations can be operated and maintained safely.
Process and auxiliary facilities shall be designed such that no single failure during operations can lead
to unacceptable hazardous situations. This principle shall apply to operational errors as well as
equipment failure.
8.2
Safety shutdown systems
A safety shutdown system shall be independent of and in addition to other systems and equipment
used for normal operation, control and monitoring, and shall act as a safety barrier in case of
malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment.
The safety shutdown system shall be logically divided into three main levels of shutdown:
Abandon platform shutdown (APS).
Emergency shutdown (ESD).
Process shutdown (PSD).
Basic system philosophy is that a signal on a certain level should never initiate shutdowns or actions
on higher levels, but shall always include shutdowns on lower levels.
The APS and ESD system shall be separate from the PSD - system
For more details reference is given to clause 9.3 Emergency shutdown.
8.3
Process safety
Two levels of protection according to ISO 10418 shall control abnormal operating conditions leading
to potential hydrocarbon release:
Primary level of protection.
Secondary level of protection.
As far as possible, the two levels of protection shall operate on functionally different basis.
Duplication of identical safety devices given different set points does not satisfy the requirement of
two levels of protection.
The PSD system shall automatically detect abnormal operating conditions within systems or
equipment and initiate actions so that uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons is prevented.
The systems shall be designed to avoid cascading effects due to partial shutdown within PSD, i.e.
shutdown signals should trip all affected systems so that a new abnormality is not developed as a
result of the initial trip action.
The system philosophy shall ensure that the fail safe principle is applied. I.e. components shall move
to, or stay in the predetermined safest position upon loss of signal or power.
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The degree and extent of a PSD situation will depend on type of abnormality, and may vary from
equipment shutdown with minimum effect on the production rate, to a total process shutdown.
Pressure relief and depressurising of hydrocarbon systems is covered in Annex E.
9.1
General requirements
The general requirements to safety and communication systems shall be in accordance with ISO
13702 clause 10 and 14.
The line of actions performed by personnel and automatic safety system during emergencies shall be
automatically recorded to the extent it can ease investigations and experience retention after any
incident.
9.2
9.2.1 General
All F&G detection system display and information facilities shall be centralised, and located in a
continuously manned area, normally the central control room
Loop faults and -supervision shall be identified according to NFPA 72.
With the installation divided into fire areas the design of the F&G system shall presume that each fire
area shall be covered by a sufficient number of detectors suitable for detection of probable fires or
accidental releases of toxic or flammable gases in the area.
The gas detection system shall have detectors for hydrogen sulphide in relevant areas on installations
where such gas can occur. The alarm presentation in CCR should in addition to screens (VDUs) be
given on a simple fire and gas mimic. Further details regarding screen presentation is found in
NORSOK I-CR-002 Safety and Automation Systems (SAS).
Local F&G display and status facilities shall be provided in the drilling area incorporating F&G
monitoring of the drilling facilities.
The F&G system shall be designed so that maintenance, function testing etc. can be carried out
without disabling the system. The location of fire - and gas detectors shall be based on defined
scenarios, simulations and actual tests.
Detail requirements for F & G system is incorporated in Annex F.
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Emergency shutdown
9.3.1 General
References are given to ISO 13702 clause 6.
The installation shall be analysed to identify potential hazardous conditions and their consequences.
The critical operating parameters shall be selected and emergency shutdown logic developed. Due
consideration shall be given to the event sequence in relation to the overall installation safety. In the
detail assessments of ESD philosophy, actions associated with time delays in the achievement of a
state of no escalation potential shall be identified and the implications on ESD philosophy
determined. Consideration shall be given to interrelations between fields and installations
interconnected e.g. by pipelines or control systems.
The ESD hierarchy shall be kept simple with respect to sub-levels. This to ease understanding and
future updating. Three main shutdown levels shall be included, see clause 8.2.
The ESD principle hierarchy presented in figure 9.1 shall be applied for complex installations and
used as guidance for simpler installations. For drilling operations see clause 9.3.4.
9.3.2 ESD valves
ESD-valves shall be located and arranged in such a way that the exposure from fires and explosions
is minimised. Pneumatic and hydraulic tubing shall be capable of resisting loads from fire and
explosion until they have completed the shut down sequence.
Instrument tubing from accumulators and hydraulic oil return lines should be protected from
mechanical damage, which could adversely affect valve performance.
If hydraulic or pneumatic accumulators are used to move emergency shutdown valves to safe
position, they should be positioned as close to the valve as possible to ensure the best possible
availability. The accumulator capacity should be adequate for at least three operations (close-openclose). Spring return type of valves shall be used when required size is available.
On installations that are normally manned, only manual, local to the valve resetting of emergency
shutdown valves shall be possible, as advised from the control centre.
If an emergency shutdown valve is used as process safety valve, the signal from the emergency
shutdown system shall be conducted to the actuator or to a hydraulic/pneumatic control valve for the
actuator separate from the process safety system. An evaluation shall be carried out to determine
which system design will represent the highest availability during an emergency shutdown.
If an ESD valve is connected to the PCS system, the process control function shall be performed
completely separate from the ESD functions.
Emergency shutdown valves that may be exposed to fire shall preferably have metal to metal seats. If
other seats are used, the valve shall be fire tested in accordance with API 6FA or BS 6755.
The location of ESD valves shall be determined based on the FES.
The design of the emergency shutdown system shall be such as to allow extensive function testing to
be carried out without interrupting the operations.
Valve leak testing procedures with acceptance criteria shall be developed.
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Local position indicators shall be installed and end position indications presented in the control
room through the PSD system.
The valve shall fail to safe position. Usually closed position.
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Manual Push Button
APS
Activation of:
!
DHSV s
!
Automatic depressurisation
Manual Push
Button
Gas detected in
a non-hazarea
ESD1
!
!
Isolate non-Ex
equ. in area
Shutdown
fans/heaters
and close
dampers
Shutdown of:
!
Main generator
!
All non-ex equip.
Start of:
!
Emergency generator
ESD2
PSD
Figure 9.1
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Confirmed gas detection at HVAC air intake to local electrical/instrument rooms or emergency
generator room shall close inlet dampers, shut down fan(s), shut down heater(s) and isolate all nonEx equipment inside the respective room.
For above mentioned circuits, no hot conductors shall be found outside their feeding switchboards
when isolated.
9.5
Alarm and communication system
The objective of the alarm and communication system is to warn and guide personnel as quickly as
possible in the event of a hazardous or emergency situation.
Location, number, type and effect from alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be easily recognised in
any area where distribution of the alarm is required. Alarm voice communication shall be heard in a
surrounding noise level up to 83 dB. In areas with noise levels of 85 dB and above the audible alarm
shall be supplemented by light signals.
Audible alarms and messages shall be recognisable in the muster areas even if initiation of the safety
systems or the accident itself increases the background noise level.
The alarm signals shall be in accordance with table 9.5.1.
An audible alarm signal shall always be followed by an announcement on the Public Address system.
For zoning of alarms, see table F.1 and F.2 found in Annex F.
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Table 9.5.1
Alarm Type
Muster Alarm
General Alarm
Alarm signals.
Signal
Continuous audible signal of
variable frequency. Yellow
flashing light or rotating visual
lamp
Intermittent audible signal of
constant frequency.
(1 sec. on, 1 sec. off). Yellow
flashing or rotating visual lamp
Intermittent audible signal
(0,1 sec. on, 0,1 sec off). Yellow
flashing or rotating visual lamp
Local red light at entrance.
Local high freq. tone in room/area
and in adjacent room/area
providing access.
Local red light at entrance.
Two level audible tone on PA
system.
Indicates
Prepare to abandon installation
Gas released.
Note 2.
Gas released.
Note 3.
Important announcement to
follow on PA system
Notes
1. At small local occurrences, local alarm may suffice.
2. Pre-warning signal shall be used in and at doors to rooms protected by gasses that could
be lethal.
3. Pre warning before release to be considered in inert gas protected rooms.
Note 1 Frequencies for the different alarms are found in NORSOK T-100 Telecom Subsystems.
The system shall be designed to give appropriate access priorities.
Radio signal transmission for internal communication shall be catered for allowing communication to
and from every location on the installation.
9.6
Emergency power
The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency generator, capable of
supplying the consumers with emergency power for at least 18 hours. The emergency generator shall
be exclusively dedicated for supply of emergency power during emergency mode of operation. The
emergency generator system shall be self-contained. Arrangements for black start shall be provided.
Start and monitoring of the emergency power system shall be possible from the CCR where a matrix
panel or dedicated VDU picture shall display the status of the generator.
In addition to automatic starting provisions a manual starting and testing device shall be provided.
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The prime mover for emergency generators can be stopped automatically in the event of:
1. gas detection in ventilation air inlet
2. overspeeding,
3. loss of lubricating oil pressure
4. Item 1 and 3 above do not apply to emergency generator(s) supplying firepump(s)
The following equipment/systems should be supplied from the emergency generators.
An uninterrupted power supply (UPS) for emergency equipment and systems shall be installed.
Emergency batteries shall have a capacity to supply emergency power for a minimum period of 30
minutes, ref. ISO 13702, table C1.
The emergency power distribution system shall be sufficiently protected against fire and explosion to
operate during an emergency situation until safe evacuation has been performed. The emergency
power generation and distribution shall be separated from normal power generation and distribution
to the extent that a local fire cannot put both systems out of operation. The following principles shall
be the basis for arrangement/layout of emergency power systems
1. prime movers of emergency equipment with associated equipment shall be located in separate
rooms in non-hazardous areas,
2. equipment for emergency power supply is appropriately located and preferably in separate rooms,
3. emergency generators with distribution boards, chargers etc. shall be located in separate rooms in
non-hazardous areas,
4. emergency batteries shall be located in separate rooms in non-hazardous areas except for sealed
batteries can be located within emergency switchgear rooms,
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5. combustion air for prime movers of emergency equipment is supplied from non-hazardous areas,
6. the combustion air inlet is separated from the ventilation air inlet of the room,
7. fuel for prime movers should not represent an explosion hazard under anticipated operating
conditions,
8. exhaust pipes from prime movers of emergency equipment should neither emit sparks nor have a
surface temperature which exceeds the ignition temperature of the gas mixture which is produced
or stored on the installation.
IMO MODU CODE, Chapter 5 provides additional useful guidance.
9.7
Communication through signs and markings
Means of communication through signs and markings shall include:
a. An emergency preparedness station bill, which shall be efficiently communicated to all personnel
on the installation.
b. Marking by painting, reflection materials/light surfaces that can be recognised visually or by
touching, e.g. a characteristic roughness.
c. Signs showing the way to or marking the location of the following:
1. Emergency preparedness equipment.
2. Safety and first aid equipment
3. Evacuation routes.
4. Safe areas.
5. Evacuation equipment.
6. Muster stations
Text on signs shall be both in English and Norwegian.
Recognised standard for the design of signs is to be found in Norsk Standard (Norwegian Standard)
NS-ISO 6309.
10
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heat loads. Possible failure of the firewater systems and its effect shall be considered. For Major
Hazards like riser fires or burning blow outs, the required time period before impairment shall be
defined.
Shielding of escape-routes and evacuation stations shall be as required to ensure escape from all areas
and evacuation from the installation Necessary input will be provided by the risk and emergency
preparedness analyses)
The fire loads to be considered within an area may be limited through location of ESD or PSD valves.
An evaluation shall therefore be made regarding location and categorisation of these valves.
Other means to limit the consequences of liquid fires are bunds and drains.
Fire protection data sheets shall document the fire protection design / area safety charts see Annex J.
10.3 Requirements for passive fire protection of equipment, piping and secondary structures.
A procedure for evaluation of protection of pressure vessels and process piping is included in Annex
G.
Saddles and secondary structures supporting HC pressure vessels shall be passive fire protected to
avoid failure during the defined fire-scenarios.
10.4 Fire technical requirements relating to materials
Materials on the installation shall, as a rule be non-combustible. If it is justified from a safety point of
view to make use of materials that do not meet the requirements to non combustibility, such materials
shall have limited flame spread properties, low smoke development and heat generation.
An assessment shall be made of the toxicity of gases emitted in the event of a fire.
Documentation shall be available to support the basis for the decision regarding selection of
materials.
Materials used in the living quarters should to the extent possible be non-combustible. If surface
treatment of paint or other coating is used, the properties of the product with regard to flame spread
shall be considered. A corresponding evaluation shall also be carried out with regard to textiles.
Floor, wall and roof finishes shall pass the fire test requirements in IMO Resolution A 653 (flame
spread). In addition, the materials shall comply with the requirements of ISO 5660 (smoke and
ignition properties).
10.5 Passive fire protection
For separation between main fire areas reference is made to ISO 13702 table C.4. Fire partitions
exposed to hydrocarbon fires shall be rated according to an H-class.
Living quarters shall be designed and protected so as to ensure that the safety functions they are
designed for can be maintained during a dimensioning accidental event. See ISO 13702 Clause 12.
If fire technical calculations indicate that the outer surfaces of living quarters in the event of a
dimensioning fire may be subjected to a heat flux exceeding 100 kW/m2, they shall be fitted with fire
divisions of minimum class H-60.
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10.7.1 General
Fixed fire-fighting systems shall be installed in areas representing a major fire risk, and particularly
cover equipment containing significant quantities of hydrocarbons. For definition of fire area see ISO
13702. Firefighting systems other than fire water systems are covered in ISO 13702.
The fire water system shall be operable at all times including periods of maintenance and shall ensure
adequate supply of water for fire fighting. The system shall be designed and calibrated such that
deluge nozzles will receive water not later than 30 seconds after a confirmed fire signal has been
given. For the fire water system the fail-safe principles shall apply. Design according to the latest
edition of NFPA is the minimum requirement if no requirements are given in this standard. See
Annex H.
The capacity and efficiency of the system shall be verified through realistic full scale testing during
commissioning.
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PRESSURE
MAINTAINANCE
MANUAL
EQUIPMENT
F&G /
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
CONTROL
SYSTEM
UNITS
FOAM /PUMP
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
OVER BOARD
DUMP/TEST LINE
Fig 10.1
AUTOMATIC
EQUIPMENT
DRAIN
Wellhead area
Manifolds located on FPSO turrets
Area for circulation and treatment of mud
Processing area
Surface of pressure vessels and tanks containing combustibles
20 l/min m2
20 l/min m2
10 l/min m2
10 l/min m2
10 l/min m2
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Fire water pumps with a capacity above 2500 m3/h (each) shall be avoided.
Fire pump systems shall be independent of other systems.
If other system designs are chosen, the reliability of the firewater system shall be equal to an
independent system.
Automatic stop of diesel operated fire pumps shall normally only be permitted due to overspeeding.
Automatic stop can however be accepted if this is documented safer than if the pumps continue to
run. The combustion air inlet shall be equipped with a damper initiated by over speed due to entrance
of gas. Failure of the overspeed securing device should not cause the prime mover for fire pumps to
stop. Simple reset of the systems shall be possible.
All active fire protection field equipment shall be certified for operation in Zone 1, gas type IIA, and
temperature class T3. Exceptions from this are the diesel engines, electric generators and motors
which shall be located in rooms located safe by location and which are not likely to be affected by
accidental gas releases. It shall be possible to operate diesel engines when ventilation to the room has
been shut off.
Dimensioning flow of the fire water pump duty points (100 %) shall include a contingency margin
covering:
-
Hydraulic imbalance.
Overlap of spray zones of deluge and sprinkler nozzles.
Shadow areas requiring additional nozzles
Two hydrants.
Freeze protection
Cooling of the pump and other emergency units.
Provisions for testing of the fire pumps shall be part of the design, including measurement of
capacities and pressures.
CCR shall be provided with a fire water/foam pump panel with the following control and monitoring
capabilities:
All fire water pumps and foam pumps on duty shall start upon confirmed fire detection.
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11
SAFETY ASPECTS RELATED TO FLOATING PRODUCTION,
DRILLING AND STORAGE INSTALLATIONS
11.1 General
This clause contains additional safety design principles related to floating production/ drilling/storage
installations. The risk analysis, emergency preparedness analysis and fire risk analysis, ref. clause 4, 5
and 10 shall be performed, taking the special aspects related to the floating installation into
consideration. In particular the call for automatic shutdown upon detection of hazardous situations
needs to be considered in light of the possible adverse effects. Other issues covered by these standard,
clauses 1-10 shall be applied as relevant. Items covered by clauses 11.3 - 11.9 are related to special
design solutions and should be applied accordingly.
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3. The use of flexible hose connections for well stream transfer, within the turret and between turret
and ship, should be minimised.
4. Fire protection of the turret can be arranged by fixed or oscillating fire monitors located on the
ship, e.g. on gantry structure.
5. Production or export/gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret by passive
means. Routing of risers within conductors is one acceptable design principle. At riser termination
end, the riser connector and first ESD valve shall be protected by passive means. For protection of
other parts of the structure, refer to other relevant parts of this standard.
6. Risers shall be protected against damage from wires and chains used for mooring. Arrangements
that provide both protections against such loads as well as fire protection are preferred.
7. Decks above moon pool where hydrocarbons leaks may occur shall have an adequate drain routed
to a collection tank.
11.5 Drainage/Ballast water systems
These systems on floating installations shall be designed to operate satisfactorily for all sea states in
which the installation is intended to be operable. Drainage systems for the process systems shall be
designed to operate satisfactory for all sea states in which the process system is intended to be
operable.
Necessary pumps and valve control of the ballasting system shall be fed from the emergency power
system during shut down of main power.
11.6 Emergency re-positioning
The need for quick re-positioning of the installation in case of specific emergency situations shall be
evaluated. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers, riser pressures, sub sea
ESDV and mooring arrangement.
Anchor moored or dynamically positioned installations located above well(s) shall be able to move
150 m from the normal position in 10 minutes, or as specified based on risk analyses.
11.7 Topside/floater interface
All interfaces between the typical maritime floater technology and offshore petroleum technology
shall be clarified at an early stage of the design process, and be monitored during the project to ensure
compatibility with lifetime operational requirements.
12
12.1 General
A "Normally Not Manned Installation" (NNMI) is an installation which can be left unmanned and
still maintain its intended principal function through remote control from a distant location.
This section outlines the safety design principles for the design of a NNMI and has been written for a
minimum wellhead platform, but the requirements apply in principle to other NNMI such as riser and
pipeline compressor platforms.
The need for well maintenance and reservoir stimulation has to be estimated for each location. These
operations are manned and will require people to be on board while performing the work.
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Dependent on the hours to be spent onboard a decision have to be made regarding possible limited or
temporary facilities for personnel to remain onboard for a defined period of time.
This clause is limited to the specification of the principle requirements for NNMI, but Annex K lists
the minimum requirements for a simple NNMI, which is not designed for any overnight stay of
personnel. For installations allowing personnel to stay overnight careful evaluations have to be made
regarding the quartering and safety facilities. This will have to be done on a case by case basis.
Therefore this standard does not establish requirements for such installations.
The standard will focus on principle evaluations and decisions to be made to achieve an adequate
safety level and not on detailed design solutions.
Operations and maintenance philosophies for a NNMI are important to be able to establish the
required manning onboard and are necessary to be able to develop the safety requirements.
12.2 Safety evaluation, management and documentation.
The design of the NNMI shall be documented according to the principles laid down in this standard,
including standards referred to. The design decisions have to be documented based on these
methodologies and standards.
Risk acceptance criteria have to be established. The risk evaluations shall take into consideration
drilling and process data, environmental conditions, ship traffic, manning and helicopter shuttling.
Simple, reliable and sturdy concepts for the purpose of minimising maintenance activities on the
installation shall be emphasised through system design and reliability requirements.
The following activities related to manned operations onboard shall be established:
Drilling/well operations onboard
Simultaneous activities.
Weather conditions for boarding and departing of the installation.
Helicopter shuttling and need for personnel to stay overnight.
.
An emergency preparedness analyses has to be performed to identify the requirements for emergency
planning covering:
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The main power source may be diesel generators onboard the NNMI or cables from neighbouring.
Emergency power may be by batteries only.
The auxiliary systems may further consist of a methanol system, a closed drain system, and a utility
drain system and seawater pump.
Requirements for possible quartering facilities have to identified based on the manning requirements
taking into account the following:
- Scheduled maintenance jobs.
- Well monitoring and maintenance.
- Start-up following shutdown.
The requirements to the support structure concerning resistance to impact from ship collisions shall
be developed based on an individual evaluation of each concept. This evaluation shall take into
consideration the types of vessel expected to be in the vicinity of the installation, boarding procedures
(boarding zone, weather restrictions, loading requirements, call frequency, anchoring philosophy etc.)
and the layout and arrangement of the installation.
Access to the installation will normally be by helicopter.
12.4 System requirements.
The safety system requirements for a NNMI shall be carefully developed based on the hazard
identification and risk analyses performed. The need for firewater shall be evaluated and installed if a
significant risk reducing effect can be documented.
To ensure simplicity, firewater may be provided by alternative means as long as an acceptable
reliability is proven.
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The muster area and the access to the evacuation station should be arranged and protected in order
to evacuate the actual number of personnel in an organised and efficient way.
Area allocation: 0.4 m2 per lifeboat seat.
One additional evacuation system in the far end of the installation should be considered if escape
to the main evacuation area is impossible. For scenarios where the possibility for gas/smoke on
the helicopter deck is within acceptable limits, helicopter may be considered as the primary means
of evacuation.
For installations connected by bridge to other installations and/or floating accommodation
installations, the primary means of evacuation should be the bridge. One additional evacuation
system in the opposite end of the installation should be considered if escape to the bridge is
impossible in dimensional accident scenarios.
Escape chute with rafts should be used as a secondary mean of evacuation in the main evacuation
area.
The emergency preparedness assessment shall be applied to identify any need for additional
evacuation means and the optimum location of these.
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Lifeboats
-Should be designed for 10 minutes running in a gas cloud or fire on sea. The external equipment
including the engine exhaust system shall not act as ignition sources.
-Recovery from sea shall be possible in up to 2 m wave height. Winches for recovery should be fed
by main power.
-The hoisting speed for recovery should be minimum 3 m/min.
-Main power should be provided for charging of lifeboat batteries. The disconnection point should be
in the vicinity of the lifeboat and disconnection shall be automatic when dropping or lowering the
lifeboat.
-Access ways should be provided with anti-skid coating
-Cabinet housing should be arranged for winches and consoles
-Heaters should be provided for electric motors for the winches.
C.2
Escape chutes
-Shall be readily available and easy to operate with clear operating instructions located on the wall
inside the container.
-Winch for recovery should be fed by main power.
-Removal of life rafts for re-certification shall be possible without affecting the suspension system
including lifting wire.
C.3
The MOB shall have a fixed lifting frame with one point suspension for handling by cranes. It should
be possible to reach the MOB from two cranes. The MOB shall be visible from the crane cabins
during handling.
It should be possible to launch and recover the MOB in 5 meters significant wave height. The MOB
shall have a minimum speed of 25 knots in calm sea with 3 men onboard.
The installation shall be provided with a basket suitable for transport of personnel and another for
transport of injured personnel.
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One watertight cabinet for storage of gear of the MOB crew should be installed in the vicinity of the
MOB.
The content of the cabinet should include:
- 4 swimsuits of wet suit type
- 6 survival suits
- 1 thermal protection blanket
- 1 VHF radio with suitable charger
- 3 life jackets
- 1 x 20 litres diesel can
- 2 bags, each containing
- 30 m lifeline
- 1 pair of flippers
- 1 divers knife
- 1 divers mask with breathing tube
- 1 standard size waterproof torch
- 1 mini size water proof torch and one 6 kg lead belt
- 1 pair of night glasses (for intallations with moon pool work)
C.5
Fireman's equipment
Fireman equipment should be stored in sets at not less than two locations separated from each other,
so that access to all equipment will not be blocked in the event of a fire in one area. The number of
sets of fireman equipment required and the contents of each set must be assessed.
The equipment shall be suitable for the tasks of the fire teams, including the need for internal
communication, during identified fire scenarios. Each set of fireman equipment should contain at
least 4 portable radio sets for internal communication. At least two of the breathing apparatus should
be equipped with radio sets. It is assumed that these radio sets shall not be able to become an ignition
source, and that they operate in the UHF frequency range in private channels assigned by the National
Telecommunications Authority with regard to application for use of private frequencies in the UHF
frequency range, or they operate in the international UHF frequency range for on board
communication. It should be ensured that the radio sets are suitable for the environmental loads to
which they may be subjected during an accidental event, e.g. water from a sprinkler- / deluge system,
without their functioning being impaired.
Installations should have suitable equipment for refilling breathing apparatus.
Replacement of the breathing air in all compressed air bottles shall be carried out at regular intervals
to ensure that the air is pure and has an oxygen content above 20 volume percent.
NORSOK standard
Page 40 of 66
Technical Safety
C.6
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Strategic locations shall be identified through a separate evaluation considering the chemicals
handled and spillage that may occur. The following list is considering typical areas and is not to be
interpreted as a complete list replacing the need for the evaluation.
-The following areas should be equipped with both Safety Showers and eyebaths
-methanol pump and injection area
-chemical injection pump and injection area
-production lab
-tote tank area
-process utility area
-The following areas should be provided with eyebaths
-workshops
-cementer room, shale shaker room, sack storage room
-drill floor
-mudpit area
-battery room, paint store, and mud lab
The following areas should be provided with safety showers:
-process areas
-drilling areas
C.7
Lifebuoys
Life buoys shall be located at regular intervals along the periphery of the lower levels of the
installation.
C.9
NORSOK standard
Page 41 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Area classification
"Catastrophic" events such as pipe rupture or vessel burst, which may be a result of material
weakness, design error, falling loads, collision or sabotage, shall not be regarded as giving rise to a
higher classification. This as the area classification reflects normal conditions onboard.
"Catastrophic" events shall be reflected in the risk analysis, and may impose stricter requirements to
arrangements and equipment than defined by the area classification alone.
The area classification is an important part of the basis for layout, as it gives requirements to:
Location of ventilation air inlets and outlets.
Ventilation system requirements.
Location of combustion air inlets and exhaust outlets for internal combustion engines and fired
units.
Location and use of ignition sources.
Location of emergency equipment.
Location of vent points.
Location and design of doors and other connections between areas.
Operational- and maintenance procedures in hazardous areas.
Selection of equipment.
Drainage connections between areas
D.2
Escape routes
The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1m width (0.9 m for doors) and 2.3 m in height
(2050 mm for doors). Escape routes intended for use by more than 50 persons shall be extended to
1.5 m (1.2 m for doors) in width.
Required width of escape routes shall emphasise easy transport of injured personnel on stretcher in
addition to the no. off persons onboard during hook-up /installation and commissioning activities
offshore.
Other general principles are listed below.
There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from permanently or intermittently manned area
outside quarters and offices, leading in different escape directions.
The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows:
Living quarters.
Temporary refuge.
Lifeboats and life rafts-stations.
Boat landings (not normally manned installations)
Helicopter deck.
Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way.
The installation shall be equipped with at least one escape route running from far end and into
living quarter. The quality of this route shall be such that:
Personnel shall be able to use this route for a period of time sufficiently long to perform a
NORSOK standard
Page 42 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
NORSOK standard
Page 43 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
General
Installations for production of hydrocarbons will normally require a gas release system. If
inflammable and toxic gases can be conducted away from the installation safely without the use of
gas release system, such system may be omitted. Examples of such installations may be wellhead
platforms with small quantities of gas and subsea installations.
Inflammable, toxic or corrosive gases should preferably be burned in a flare to prevent the causing
damage or injury to people, the environment or to assets and financial interests.
A cold vent system may be permitted in cases when this cannot cause damage or injury to people, the
environment or to assets and financial interests.
Based on risk evaluations, a choice may be made between a centralised or local vent. The discharge
location must not represent any unacceptable risk. When necessary, the discharge point should be
fitted with a flame control device.
The design of the gas release system shall take into account low temperatures, vibrations and noise
that may occur as a result of gas expansion.
E.2
Depressurisation
Fast depressurisation shall be the mean of protection which should be utilised to its full potential for
the installation concept. Active and passive fire protection is to be considered to function as
supplement to depressurisation, if necessary to prevent any resulting unacceptable events (rupture or
explosion of pressure vessels/piping). All pressure vessels and piping segments, which during shut
down contains more than 1.0 ton of produced hydrocarbons (liquid and/or gaseous) or unprocessed
crude, should be equipped with a depressurising system. For gas segments, the maximum
containment should be set lower than 1.0 ton. Location of segment (enclosed or open area), risk of
segment being exposed to a fire, consequence of rupture, etc. should be considered.
Depressurisation systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because of the loss of
material strength during a fire.
Depressurisation systems may also be required for systems which are unable to contain flammable or
toxic materials by passive means alone. Loss of the active method of containment will require
depressurisation to prevent escape of the material concerned (e.g. centrifugal compressor's
dependence on seal oil systems).
The material properties at actual temperatures and pressures during depressurisation, steel thickness,
active or passive protective measures shall together ensure that a pressure vessel/piping segment does
not rupture at a stage where this may escalate the fire scenario beyond the control of the protective
systems and arrangement. This may call for a detailed study of each ESD segment in particular.
The design procedure is outlined in Annex G
The depressurising, manually or automatic, shall be applied the following way:
NORSOK standard
Page 44 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Manual field depressurisation sequence is considered initiated after 3 minutes from detection of
initial fire or gas.
Automatic depressurisation sequence is considered initiated immediately after detection of initial
fire or gas.
API RP 521 should be used as guidance in the design of depressurisation systems.
E.3
The release of hydrocarbons from relief and depressurisation systems shall be routed through a closed
system terminating at a liquid's disengagement vessel and with the liquid free gas being safely flared.
Vents which are not suitable for routing to flare (e.g. due to backpressure) should be terminated
outside the platform perimeter in such a way that accumulation of gases due to "dead pockets" etc. is
avoided.
Local venting of hazardous gases shall not be permitted unless it can be done without hazard to the
personnel or the platform, e.g. for small and normally not manned installations local venting may be
found acceptable.
Flare K.O. drums shall be sized for two criteria:
Disengagement of entrained liquid droplets.
Containment of liquid carryover.
The criteria for droplet removal will depend on the flare concept. The objective is to avoid
condensate dropping from flare. The particle size should be less than 400 microns. In case of vertical
flare tower using subsonic flare burner the droplet size should be less than 300 microns.
The K.O. drum liquid containment capacity should be based on the largest foreseeable liquid
condensation rate for a period of at least 20 minutes. This period should provide realistic time to
identify a problem and allow for operator intervention. Longer periods may be required, e.g. for sub
sea flow lines and inter field pipelines. This should be evaluated for each case. In addition the knockout drum should provide capacity for 90 seconds of liquid carry over from the largest source
(assuming overfilled vessel).
Progressive release of inventories from process piping and pressure vessels that can cause significant
escalation of a fire shall be avoided. As a minimum, the piping system and the pressure vessels shall
maintain their integrity during depressurisation. The depressurising system itself (blow down valves,
branch piping and headers and K.O. drums) is of particular importance. The ability to maintain
integrity when exposed to the fire loads depends on selection of material, wall thickness, pressure
rating and applied fire protection.
E.4
Flaring
The need for flaring should be minimised from an environment point of view. Ref. NORSOK
S-003, Environmental care.
Calculations shall be performed to determine the levels of radiation on all areas of the platform for
critical flare conditions.
NORSOK standard
Page 45 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Flare radiation calculations should account for variations in flaring quantities and wind conditions.
Maximum heat loads from flares on open areas where personnel may be present and on locations
where structures and equipment are exposed should be as follows:
Permissible radiation levels to personnel should follow radiation levels as given in API RP 521.
The heat loads from planned continuous flaring conditions on areas where personnel are supposed
to perform work tasks lasting for two hours or more the working environment requirements for
exposed areas should be considered and ample protection provided as required.
For long periods of flaring (continuous flaring), consideration should also be given to the radiation
level on the helicopter deck, i.e. the radiation/temperatures on the helicopter deck shall not become
intolerable to personnel or limit the necessary helicopter operations. Unless otherwise accepted by
2
the responsible for helicopter operations, max. 1.9 kW/m is allowed on helicopter deck.
Max. heat loads from flare on structures and equipment not designed for high heat loads should be
limited to meet the requirements below. Higher exposure for short times, e.g. during emergency
flaring conditions, that will not harm the structure or equipment can be accepted. Such deviations
shall be documented.
Protection of exposed areas may be necessary to meet these requirements.
Heat loads on steel- or aluminium structures shall not give temperatures that results in loss of
structural integrity.
Heat loads on wires or limit switches in drill tower and cranes should be limited depending on type
of lubrication and inspection- /replacement frequency.
Flare radiation shall not cause temperatures in areas classified as hazardous above 200oC or above
the ignition temperature of the actual gas, whichever is the lowest.
Heat loads on Ex-rated electrical equipment and instrumentation should not give temperatures
exceeding 40oC.
Based on a case to case evaluation of protective clothing, provision of local radiation shields, etc., the
limits for acceptable heat loads can be adjusted as applicable. Such deviations shall be documented.
E.5
Cold Flare
In systems were the relieved gas during normal operation is routed back to the processing system, the
following principles should be adhered to:
The diversion of relieved gas under emergency conditions, e.g. depressurization shall not
depend upon instrumentation and control valves. A rupture disk should be installed in parallel
with control valves.
The loop including control valves should have rapid response. A 2/3 voting system may be
considered.
It should be possible to test the entire control loop for both response time and set point
calibration without routing the gas to flare or isolate the rupture disk function.
A reliable system for detection of gas to flare should be provided. CCR should be alarmed.
A pilot should be arranged.
A robust and reliable system with back-up capacity should be provided for flare ignition.
Radiation levels shall be calculated. For permissible radiation levels, see E4.
NORSOK standard
Page 46 of 66
Technical Safety
E.6
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Cold vent
The design of cold vents shall be based on dispersion calculations to prove that the foreseen gas rates
can be released without creating explosive air/gas mixtures on the installation or in its vicinity.
Further, the possibility of an unintended ignition shall be taken into account in the design and
dimensioning of the cold vent, i.e. ignition of foreseen gas rates should not give unacceptable heat
loads or other consequences on the installation. For permissible radiation levels, see E4
The need for extinguishing ignited cold vent should be considered.
E.7
Drainage systems
NORSOK standard
Page 47 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
The following principles shall apply concerning detector layout and alarm initiation:
Location, type and number of gas detectors shall take into account:
- Leakage sources within the area.
- Borders between non-hazardous and hazardous areas.
- Gas density relative to air.
Detection principles.
Voting, if applied.
- Ventilation air flow patterns.
- Wind-direction and velocity.
- Critical reaction time/detector response time.
- Size of the area.
Criticality of the area with regard to safety.
Cloud size of the minimal leakage to be detected
HVAC
- HVAC intakes or ducts shall be monitored by an adequate number of gas detectors. The size of
the intake, air flow patterns, voting philosophy, etc. should be evaluated when deciding number
of detectors. The use of line detectors is regarded as equal to the use of IR point detectors.
- Gas detectors in HVAC supply should be located at the air intake, alternatively in the duct as
close to the duct opening as possible. Detectors in ducts should be positioned as near as
practical to the centre of the duct where the air velocity is greatest and where the response time
to gas ingress is consequently most rapid. At large intakes, the flow patterns around the opening
should be determined to achieve an optimum position of the detectors, ensuring fast response
under various wind directions/orientations as well as for possible leak positions.
The total response time from gas at intake to shutdown of the intake shall be determined by the
transport time of gas from intake to location of shutoff dampers and HVAC units.
- If gas is detected at ventilation air inlets, the ventilation fan in question shall be stopped, all
intake dampers shall be closed and the heating element shut off. The surface temperature of the
heating element shall not exceed the auto. ignition temperature of any gas present in the area.
- On installations where the sources of leakage of flammable or toxic gases are concentrated in
a small area, e.g. on mobile installations, gas detection at air inlets of mechanically ventilated
areas may be omitted. In such cases it is however required that the ventilation systems are shut
down automatically in the event of gas detection, and that there are gas detectors located in all
areas classified as Zone 1 or Zone 2.
- Gas detectors should be located at HVAC outlets from hazardous areas.
NORSOK standard
Page 48 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Voting philosophy:
Single philosophy:
Each project shall define alarm set point(s). Definition should be based upon whether a voting
philosophy has been applied, ventilation conditions within the area and the events to be detected
(minor or middle sized leakage or catastrophic events). In any case, high alarm level shall not be set
to values above 30% LEL.
For outdoor areas an alarm level of 20% LEL is recommended. For detection of internal leakage
within gas turbine hoods an alarm level of 5% LEL is recommended.
Alarm on gas detection
- Alarms should be automatically initiated upon confirmed low level alarm according to
Table F.1.
Table F.1
CCR
Confirmed gas
detected at:
HVAC intake LQ
Non-hazardous utility
area HVAC/air intakes
Process area incl.
HVAC outlets
Drilling area incl.
HVAC
Any single detector
low alarm level
X
X
Drill control
cabin/office
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Drilling
area
X
detector in
drilling area
Any gas alarm shall be presented in CCR. For alarms from detectors located in drilling areas the
information presented in CCR shall be mirrored in drilling contr. office and in drillers cabin.
NORSOK standard
Page 49 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Page 50 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Heat detectors should be used in enclosed areas where a significant and rapid temperature rise can
be expected, e.g. in combination with smoke detectors.
Manual detection:
Manual fire alarm buttons shall be provided at strategic locations, e.g. exits from process areas,
escape routes, fire stations. Automatic start of fire pumps upon manual fire alarm may be
considered. These buttons may be used for other accidents or situations where the attention of
CCR is required in accordance with established operational procedures. In this case automatic start
of fire pumps may not be implemented. Manual fire alarm buttons should be mounted at a height
of 1.4 meter above floor level and there should not be more than 30 meter walking distance to a
manual fire alarm button from any point on the installation.
Voting philosophy:
Single philosophy:
X
X
Drill control
cabin/office
X
X
X
detector in
drilling area
Any fire alarm shall be presented in CCR. For alarms from detectors located in drilling areas the
information presented in CCR should be mirrored in drilling contr. office and in drillers cabin.
NORSOK standard
Page 51 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Table F.3 below presents normative examples of fire and gas detection in the various areas on
installations. Alarms are described in the text above, and are not repeated in the table. The solutions
presented in the table can be deviated upon an evaluation of the specific risks in an area.
Reference is also made to figure 9.1 regarding the emergency shutdown philosophy, and clause 10.6
regarding active fire fighting.
Table F.3
Area/room
Well head area
Manifold area
Nat. vent./
outdoor H.C.
process area
Mech. vent.
process area
(separation/gas
compression)
Water injection
treatment area
Flame
ESD II
Area + HVAC
extr. Duct
ESD II
Flame or smoke*
ESD II
HVAC intake*
None**
ESD I*
Area assumed
non-hazardous
*) Mech. Vent.
Area
**) Nat.vent/
outdoor area
Gas compression
area
Drill floor
Drillers cabin
Degasser room
Flame
ESD II
Area
ESD II
None
Smoke
Flame
Area
HVAC intake
HVAC extract
Flame
Flame
Sack/bulk storage
area
Heat
Manual
Manual
Manual
Drillers
cabin
Manual
Drillers
cabin
Manual
Drillers
cabin
None
Manual*
Manual*
Manual*
Drillers
cabin
Manual
Drillers
cabin**
Manual*
Drillers
cabin
ESD II
NORSOK standard
Area, H2S*
Area + HVAC
extract
HVAC intake*
None**
*) See 9.3.6
*) See 9.3.4
*) See 9.3.4
*) Mech. Vent
non-haz. Area
**) Nat. vent.
Partly open area
Page 52 of 66
Technical Safety
Area/room
Mud lab
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Fire and gas detection / shut down actions
Automatic fire Shutdown Automatic gas Shutdown
detection
action
detection
action
Smoke
None
HVAC intake
ESD II
Cementing unit
room
Flame
None
HVAC intake
Central control
room (CCR)
Smoke in
cabinets* and/ or
at roof level
Smoke*
Manual
HVAC intake
Manual
from
Drillers
Cabin
ESD I
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD I
Smoke*
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD I
Local equipment
room (LER)
Smoke*
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD II**
Turbine hall
Flame *
Smoke **
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD I
Turbine hood
Unit
shutdown
upon area
fire
detection
Area (hood)
Unit**
shutdown
upon area
gas
detection
Instrument room
adjacent to CCR
Turbine
Switch board and
electrical room
Smoke*
Battery room
(lead acid)
Smoke*
NORSOK standard
Combust. air
intake
El.** power HVAC intake
switch off
HVAC intake
H2 detector at
extract
Comments
Assumes no
piped
connection to
mud system
See 9.3.4
*Fire detection
Early warning
system
*) See F.2
Early warning
system
*) See F.2
Early warning
system
*) See F.2
**) Shut down
of internal
equipment to be
evaluated
* Fuel system
**Electric
equipm.
*) Supplier to
confirm.
**) Continue
ventilation.
Block and bleed
fuel gas system
ESD I
ESD I
ESD I
Shutdown
boost
charge
*) See F.2
Early warning
system
**Manual or
automatic with
timer to be
decided
*) See F.2
Early warning
system
Page 53 of 66
Technical Safety
Area/room
Fire pump room
and emergency
generator room
with diesel engine
Air compressor
Mechanical
workshop
Instrument
workshop
Paint storage
HVAC intake
common for LQ.
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Fire and gas detection / shut down actions
Automatic fire Shutdown Automatic gas Shutdown
Comments
detection
action
detection
action
Flame
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD I,
*) Running fire
Close fire- pump will be
damper*
shutdown only
on overspeed
Smoke or heat
Manual
Air intake
ESD I*
*) Incl. unit
shutdown
Smoke or heat
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD I
Separate
welding HVAC
extract
Smoke or heat
Manual
HVAC intake
ESD I
Heat or flame
Smoke at intake
and in HVAC
room
LQ, cabins/rooms/
Smoke
Areas
Helicopter deck
Hangar
Chain locker
Turret area
Pump room in
column
NORSOK standard
HVAC intake
HVAC shut
Air intake
down
Manual
Heat
Manual
Heat
Manual
Heat or smoke*
Manual
None
Smoke and flame
None
Flame
Smoke, heat
ESD II
ESD I
ESD I
Combustion
air intake**
None
None
None
Area
HVAC intake
*) Covered by
gas detector in
HVAC intake
(see above line)
ESD**
*) Smoke for
Unit s.d.
electrically
timer delay driven cranes.
30sec
**) Depend on
crane location
ESD II
ESD I
Page 54 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
150 kW/m2
100 kW/m2
200 kW/m2
130 kW/m2
250 kW/m2
Note 1. In areas with unprocessed crude or crude in the first or second stage of separation, the heat flux loads should be
considered comparable to jet fire loads. Special considerations should be done for heavy crude fields.
NORSOK standard
Page 55 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Alternatively, heat loads could be based on a detailed evaluation/simulation of the credible fire
scenarios.
Application of qualified predicting tools for calculation of heat loads may be an integral part of the
evaluation.
The average heat flux density shall be applied where the global load over an area is dimensioning,
e.g. for boil off in pressure vessels. The max. point loads shall be applied in cases where local
damage is critical, e.g. for the integrity of a pressure vessel shell or of critical structural elements.
Step 4. Depressurising / rupture calculations.
Perform depressurising calculations for each major pressure vessel and piping segment, establishing
internal pressure fluctuation, wall material temperature and residual strength, as a function of time.
Determine whether rupture will occur during depressurising, and identify time to rupture if this will
occur.
The effect of manual versus automatic initiation is specified in Annex E, clause E.2.
Step 5. Evaluation of failure mode.
If a rupture of pressure vessels and piping occurs as a result of a combination of excessive heat load
and internal pressure, an acceptance of the situation will have to be judged based on the risk analyses.
Residual quantities, escalation potentials both within the area and towards adjacent areas shall be
taken into account. Simplified evaluations can be made when the pressures are considered low
(< 4.5 barg) or the potential leakage of hydrocarbon is low (less than 1 ton) in the pressure vessels
and piping when the rupture occurs.
Where rupture can not be accepted, i.e. the risk acceptance criteria are not met, the provision of
additional protective systems and arrangements shall be implemented. This can be:
Change from manual to automatic depressurising.
Modifications to depressurising system (increase its capacity)
Application of passive protection that will reduce the heat loads to the exposed pressure
vessels/piping.
Modifications to pressure vessel /piping design (material, wall thickness etc.).
Modifications to the general arrangements that have an impact on the time to rupture.
The procedure will then have to be repeated from step 1, 2 or 3 as applicable.
NORSOK standard
Page 56 of 66
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S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Stopping the fire water diesel engines shall only be possible local to the engines.
In case of gas in air intake to the fire water engine room, the room shall be automatically closed
and the cooling air shall be taken from the engine room itself.
Cooling of the engine room shall be by an air/fire water-cooling unit powered directly from the
diesel engine.
The fire water diesel start batteries shall be charged by the fire diesel generator while running in
addition to the main power.
Fire resistant cables shall be used between firewater generator and motor.
Each diesel engine shall have its own dedicated day tank sufficient for 18 hours continuous full
power operation.
Fire Water and Jockey Pumps
The fire water pumps and up- and downstream piping shall be completely filled with water at all
times.
The fire water system shall be pressurised in the standby mode. The pressure source shall have the
capacity of flow through frost protection bleed lines plus two hydrants.
NORSOK standard
Page 57 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
It shall be possible to start the fire water pump system without delay and without causing
unacceptable pressure surges. A pressure surge study shall be performed. Means that may be
considered for eliminating pressure surge problems are pressure vacuum valves, soft closing
minimum flow valves, pressurised overhead tanks, etc.
The deluge and monitor skid cabinets shall have doors with sufficient stopper arrangements to
prevent a personnel risk associated with the cabinet doors in strong winds. The skids shall
withstand the applicable explosion loads.
The deluge system shall comply with NFPA 16, Deluge Foam - Water System.
The sprinkler system shall comply with NFPA 13, Sprinkler Systems.
Deluge, monitor and sprinkler valves shall fail in last position upon loss of signal from F&G
logic.
The system design shall allow for complete system flushing in commissioning and operation.
Fire Water Piping
For general piping requirements, reference is made to NORSOK P-001, clause 8 and L-002 clause
4.7.
There shall be a minimum of two pressure transmitters in the Fire Water Ring main providing the
low-pressure start signal to the firewater pump diesels.
The FireWater Ring main shall be equipped with two points (min 6) for connection to external
water supply for commissioning. (SOLAS international shore couplings should be used.)
The fire water piping system shall be fitted with sufficient number of high point vents to achieve
the following:
Efficient frost protection at all locations.
Efficient removal of all entrained air pockets in the water.
All low points in piping downstream deluge and monitor skids shall be equipped with 3 mm weep
wholes to prevent pockets of water to be entrained. The weep holes shall be considered in the
firewater demand calculations.
Sprinkler systems shall have a test and flush connection in the far end of the piping system and at
the sprinkler valve(s). The connections shall be easy accessible from deck level and have one
drain box located below the connection.
Adequate venting facilities with valves shall be provided for wet pipe sprinklers.
Valves
Sprinkler valves shall be provided with full capacity manual by-pass
The arrangement of the isolation valves shall be such that not more than 50% of the fire water to
water hoses and hydrants for one area, is effected if one segment of the fire water ring main is
taken out of service.
All valves (> 1") shall be painted red and provided with a car-sealing system.
Control valves for sprinkler and deluge systems shall be located outside the area they protect.
Deluge control valves shall be automatically activated by the F&G logic.
All deluge valves, monitors and sprinklers shall be fitted with a test line with 100 % capacity.
For manned installations resetting of deluge, monitor and sprinkler control valves shall only be
possible local to the valves.
NORSOK standard
Page 58 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Activation of deluge, monitor and sprinkler systems shall trigger alarm in CCR. Pressure
transducers downstream deluge, monitor and sprinkler valves shall be fitted to provide confirmed
flow signal to CCR.
Quick operating isolation valves shall be provided for each hydrant.
Monitors
Automatic drain facilities shall be provided for each fire water monitor.
All monitors shall be adjustable through 3600 in the horizontal plane and + 600, - 400 in the
vertical and it shall be possible to manually lock them in any position.
Fixed firewater monitors with the possibility of foam mixing at predetermined ratio should in
general be used for areas with a high fire potential and which are not protected by fixed deluge
systems
Water monitors shall be sized to discharge at least 120 m3/h at a nozzle pressure of 7 barg. The
monitor nozzles shall be of the constant flow type, i.e. same flow at fog and at jet spray. The
spray angle shall be easily adjusted when in operation and return to maximum spray angle after
use.
When monitor valves are opened manually and local to the monitor, a signal shall automatically
be given to the F&G logic and to the starter logic for the fire water pumps. The fire water
monitors are flanged directly on the feed pipe. A considerable reaction force from the monitors
will normally require a pipe support immediately below the flange.
NORSOK standard
Page 59 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
4 off 1 1/2 inch fire hoses of an approved fire-resistant type, 15 meter in length with
instantaneous connection joints to hydrants and nozzles.
Two auto to fog nozzles with pistol grip. Capacity minimum 20 m3/hr with 2 hoses and a
nozzle hooked up.
Two sets of connecting key.
All hydrants shall have two outlets fitted with 1" quick connections of a standard approved type
throughout all areas (NOR No. 1).
The hydrants shall be located in weather resistant cabinets fitted with heating units where
required. The cabinets shall be designed for bolting to the deck.
Non collapsible hose reels shall have:
Within living quarter 25 meters of 1 bore hose with auto-to-fog nozzle, capacity approx.
8 m3/hr.
1
within all other areas 25 meters of 1 /4" bore hose with auto-to-fog nozzle, capacity
approximately 15 m3/h
NORSOK standard
Page 60 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
NORSOK standard
Page 61 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
NORSOK standard
Page 62 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
NORSOK
S-001
Rev. 3, April 1999
Package no.
SDS-001
Rev. 3, April 1999
Page 1 of 1
Doc. no.
AREA CLASSIFICATIONS
ZONE 1
ZONE 2
NON-HAZARDOUS BY LOCAT.
NON-HAZARDOUS BY VENT.
Rev.
VENTILATION
OCCUPANCY
NATURAL
MECHANICAL
OVERPRESSURE
UNDERPRESSURE
PERMANENT
INTERMITTENT
NORMALY NONE
NONE
WALLS / FLOOR /
CEILING
NONE:
WIND SHIELD:
HEAT SHIELD:
STEEL WALLS:
FIRE PARTITIONS:
EXPL. PANELS:
FLOOR
CEILING
SUSPENDED:
FALSE:
HAZARDS
RATE
AREA DELUGE
10 l/min/m2
CONDENSATE LIQUID
EQUIPMENT DELUGE
20 l/min/m2
AFFF
SPRINKLER
CRUDE OIL
CHEMICALS
MONITORS
METHANOL
SMOKE IN AREA
GLYCOL
HYDRANT
CO2
1 0/0
WATERMIST
EARLY SMOKE
LUBRICANTS
HEAT IN AREA
ELECTRICAL
FLAME IN AREA
OTHER COMBUSTIBLES
RADIOACTIVE
EXPLOSIVES
POWDER PORTABLE
HYDROGEN GAS
AREA RESET
WATER PORTABLE
ESD PUSHBUTTON
GASEOUS EXT.
54 m3/hr
2 x 20 m3/hr
13 m3/hr
8 m3/hr
BC
CO2
NOTES:
INPUT SIGNALS
FIRE ZONE:
AREA:
NORSOK standard
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
I
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N
A
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Page 63 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
General requirements
This Annex outlines detailed recommendations to a simple NNMI, which is manned only during
daylight and under weather conditions that allow safe access and departure by boat or helicopter. No
facilities are provided for overnight stay.
For more complex installations, or where personnel will stay onboard for shorter periods, additional
recommendations should be considered to achieve an adequate level of safety.
A simple NNMI considered in this annex will typically be arranged with means of access from the
sea, an access deck for the christmas trees and a helicopter deck.
The process equipment typically includes christmas trees, production manifold and a removable spool
for pigging.
The main power source should be a battery pack with recharging by a small diesel generator or by a
power cable from the service installation.
When manned, manual shutdown of the installation should be possible locally as well as from remote
control point.
K.2
Production systems
K.2.1
The well head system should be designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and
temperature occurring during operation, shutdown and maintenance of the wells.
In addition to local operation, wing control valves may be controlled from the remote control centre,
allowing remote shutdown and restart of the production. Blocking of remote start-up of production
should be possible while the installation is manned.
K.2.2
Piping systems and pressure vessels should be designed to minimise the instrumentation and control
equipment.
Piping systems designed to withstand the highest load combination of pressure and temperature, to
which the systems are expected to be exposed, need not be provided with full flow pressure relief
valves.
NORSOK standard
Page 64 of 66
Technical Safety
K.2.3
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Manual depressurisation of all pressurised systems should be possible from the platform when it is
manned.
Vent pipes from systems containing hydrocarbons should be terminated at a minimum of 3 m above
or outside decks. The location of vent pipe termination should take into account helicopter
operations.
The consequences of ignited vent pipes should be considered.
Vents on atmospheric vessels, which are not dimensioned to withstand a full inside explosion
pressure, should be provided with adequate flame arrestors.
K.2.4
Risers
Production and lift gas risers should be equipped with a riser emergency shutdown valve.
On risers for stable fluids, which may be depressurised from the main installation, omission of riser
emergency shutdown valves may be considered.
K.2.5
Auxiliary systems
Engines should be avoided, but if required, be certified for operation in hazardous areas.
K.3
Safety systems
Escape routes/Shelter
Escape routes to the shelter should be established. The shelter should provide for protection of
personnel until evacuation can be performed.
If the platform is provided with a boat landing for personnel transfer a secondary escape route to the
landing should be established if it makes a contribution to the evacuation options in an emergency
situation.
K.3.2
Life-saving appliances
Adequate life saving appliances for the crew that comes on board should be available. (Ref EERS)
Installation of at least one free fall lifeboat is recommended, but other arrangements such as a
combination of MOB /lifeboat may be used. This is to be decided based on the emergency
preparedness analyses.
An evacuations chute with rafts should be considered to achieve the required redundancy of the
evacuation means.
K.3.3
Emergency shut-down
Provisions should be made for emergency shutdown and operational shutdown of the installation to
be made both locally at the installation and at the remote control centre. Reset of the ESD valves
should be made at the valve itself, but may be done from the remote CCR when the NNMI is
unmanned if adequate means to evaluate the situation onboard from the CCR is provided.
The emergency shutdown signal from the remote control centre should be by a fail-safe signal (e.g. by
means of a radio link) which on disconnection shuts down the normally not manned installation. A
possible time delay in shutdown due to a link failure should not exceed 10 min.
NORSOK standard
Page 65 of 66
Technical Safety
S-001
Rev. 3, Jan. 2000
Emergency shutdown of the remote control centre or plant should result in operational shutdown of
the not normally manned installation.
It should not be possible to inhibit a local emergency shutdown system from the remote control
centre.
The emergency shutdown system should be in operation when the installation is unmanned.
The emergency shut down system should be separate from PSD and PCDA.
K.3.4
Communication
Voice communication between the installation and the remote control centre and directly between the
installation and standby vessel should be possible when the installation is manned.
If voice communication is based on portable radios, a minimum of two radios should be available on
the satellite installation.
The reliability of the communication links for the emergency and control systems between the CCR
on the main installation and the NNMI should be documented.
K.3.5
Fire detection should be provided and automatic shutdown initiated upon confirmed signal.
Gas detectors with shut down functions should be in operation when personnel is onboard the
installation.
If portable detectors with built-in alarm functions are used, the crew should place these in fixtures on
approved locations when ascending the installation.
K.3.6
Alarm systems
Upon gas detection an audible alarm should be activated. Portable gas detectors may provide the
alarm.
When the installation is manned, an APS signal should be operable, which can be perceived by all on
board.
K.3.7
Emergency power
An emergency power supply should be provided with a capacity of minimum four hours.
K.3.8
Helicopter deck
The helicopter deck should as a minimum be equipped with a dual agent extinguisher system based
on 250-kg dry powder and 250 l premixed foam.
On regularly operated decks (this means when shuttling have to be done for temporary periods.) a
built in fire fighting system is recommended.
NORSOK standard
Page 66 of 66