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Statcon Case Digest For Tuesday
Statcon Case Digest For Tuesday
Facts: This case actually involves 17 petitions, in which informations in each petition were filed against the respective accused with
illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3. The accused in each petition filed a
motion to quash, and the judge concur...red with the motions filed, filing an order to quash or dismiss the said informations on the
ground that that the information in each petition did not assert facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9, paragraph 3
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. In one case, the information contended that the accused carried a carving
knife 6 inches long, which the accused carried outside of his residence, not being used as a tool or something for him to earn his
livelihood, nor being used in an activity that has connection therewith, which the information concluded as contrary to law. The judge
who handled the case, Amante Purisima, ruled that the information should have shown that the possession of the bladed weapon was
for the purpose of carrying out or worsening of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. in accordance to what is being
mentioned in Proclamation 1081. The information filed didnt have the requirement, since the accused didnt have the motivation to
carry out lawlessness as was in Proclamation 1081, since the bladed weapon is concealed. Hence, it doesnt establish the facts to
constitute an offense against P.D. 9(3). The petitioner argues that P.D. 9(3) punishes mala prohibita acts, hence for public policy.
Furthermore, the presidential decree here doesnt only condemn carrying a bladed weapon in connection with the commission of the
crime, but in relation to criminality as a whole which characterized the pre-martial law era. The petitioner further said that the
preamble of a statute, usually introduced by the word whereas, is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers,
or cure inherent defects in the statute, and that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it provides limits to the
violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself because the explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which
prompted the issuance of the decree.
Issue: Whether the informations filed by the prosecutors in each petition are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of illegal possession of deadly weapon punishable under P.D. No. 9(3).
Ruling: The Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner. First, the Court said that the preamble or the explanatory note of a
statute contains the legislative intent and spirit of the decree if there will be problems as to how we should construe a statute. The
Court then stated that the results of implementing P.D. No. 9 (3) should be within its legislative intent. The Court accorded with Judge
Purisimas ruling, saying that it is only the act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with an intention or motivation connected with or
in relation with desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. No. 9(3), and nothing else. Furthermore, in
construing this presidential degree, there should be an inquiry concerning the consequences of a word-for-word implementation of
which, and it is a presumption that in any statute, maladaptive consequences where never intended by the legislator, and this is a
characteristic of P.D. No. 9(3), and the way the petitioner claimed the presidential decree is to provide hardships for the citizens. The
Court also found, as did Purisima, that the elements[1] to constitute the violation of P.D. 9(3) were not mentioned in the informations,
the second element being absent, hence upheld the decision of Purisima. The petition therefore was denied.
Statutory Construction Issue: 1) pursuit of legislative intent; 2) preamble and explanatory note as construction aids; 3) construing vis-vis the consequences of the statute
[1] The first element is the carrying outside ones residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool
or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection
with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
1J 6, CN 6
G.R. No. 110097, December 22, 1997
Panganiban, J.
Facts:
On December 29, 1991, Astorga (accused) brought Yvonne (who was 8 years old at that time) to buy a candy. Some stores were closed
and the others were open because of the brown out. However, they never went to any store to buy a candy, Astorga then dragged
Yvonne until they were inside Maco Elementary School. They were strolling inside and when Astorga saw that theres nobody else
there, they went out for the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.
Yvonne asked where they were going and Astorga said that they were going home. She told Astorga that their home is in Sitio
Binuangan, Maco which is opposite to where they were headed, to no avail, he even placed his hands on her shoulders and dragged
her. She even cried but she was forced to walk some more. While the two were walking near the Luponlupon bridge, they came across
a group of young men. These men noticed that Astorga kept on looking back at them which made them suspicious of him, hence, they
followed Astorga and Yvonne. Upon seeing that the young men were behind them, Astorga walked fast and even carried Yvonne but
they were overtaken of a distance of half a kilometer. One of young men asked where they were going and who the girl was, Astorga
said that they headed towards Binuangan and shes Traya. This made the young men doubt Astorga because they are towards Tagum.
One of the young men also knew the Traya family, so they got Yvonne and returned her to their home. Astorga wanted to talk to
Yvonnes parents but her aunt prevented him from doing so, otherwise, hell be stabbed by Yvonnes father.
Issue: The trial court erred in convicting the Astorga despite the fact that he had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
Ruling: Was there kidnapping or coercion?
The prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping which is the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. Art 267
of the Revised Penal Code lays down the elements of kidnapping, to wit:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
6. That it committed simulating public authority; or
7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
The Spanish version of the cited article in the same Code used the term lockup (encerrar) rather than kidnap (secuestrar or
raptrar). Lockup is included in the broader term detention which refers to the placing of a person in an enclosed place which he
cannot leave but also to any other deprivation of liberty not necessarily involving locking up. Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was
originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English version,
as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Based from the testimonies of the witnesses of prosecution, they indeed failed to show that there was locking up. There were no
signs of detainment neither the forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only Astorga knew cannot be said to be an actual detainment.
Hence, Astorga cannot be convicted with kidnapping but only grave coercion under Art. 286 of the same code. The elements are as
follows: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something
against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or
such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Statcon relation: The Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is
controlling in cases of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code.
AGCAOILI vs. SUGUITAN
Eugenio v. drillon
Facts.
On May 10, 1972, Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment basis from Florencio Eugenio and his co-owner / developer Fermin
Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. The Delta Village Homeown ers' Association, Inc. complained to the
National Housing Authority for non-development of their subdivision and the NHA rendere...d a resolution on January 17, 1979
ordering Florencio Eugenio to cease and desist from making furthur sales of lots in said village or any project owned by him. Prospero
Palmiano filed a complaint case against against Eugenio because, Eugenio sold a lot to the spouses, Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo.
Palmiano alleged that he suspended his payments because of the failure to develop the village.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of Eugenio to cancel the contract with private respondent
and dismissed Palmiano's complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered Eugenio t o complete the
subdivision development and to reinstatem Palmiano's purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other. The Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit
and for having been filed out of time. Eugenio filed a Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
In his Petition before this Court, Eugenio avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the nondevelopment of the E & S Delta Village justified Palmianos non-payment of his amortizations. Eugenio avers that inasmuch as the
land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the
transaction.
Issue.
Whether or not the petition of the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so
as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
Held.
The Court ruled that the Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be giv en retroactive effect so as to
cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
Stat Con relation.
The relation is that the statute was enacted to protect small lot owners from abuses of subdivision and d evelopers. The principle of
social justice was adhered by giving the law retroactivity effect.
G. R. No. L-47757-61
Aquino, J.
Facts: On October 25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen (16) persons
charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The said decree penalized squatting and similar acts in
urban communities. In separate informations, each of the accused was claimed to have occupied and cultivated the agricultural land
without the consent of applicant-possessor-occupant Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. Five (5) of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo,
Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr.
of Branch II. Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order which the five informations even before the arraignment of the
accused, based on the following grounds: (1) the allegation that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy" is not the
same as "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", which was
the one specified in the decree; and (2) under the rule of ejusdem generis, the decree did not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
The fiscal amended the information by claiming that stealth and strategy was in accordance with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner." However, the lower court denied it. Hence, the fiscal
appealed to the Supreme Court based on R. A. No. 5440.
Issue: Whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalized squatting and similar acts in urban communities, applied to agricultural
lands
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal. Based on the preamble of Presidential Decree No. 772, the
decree was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. On the other hand, the squatting complained of involved agricultural lands in rural areas. Moreover, based on
the clarity of the intent of the said decree, the rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) did not apply in this case.
Stat Con relation: The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree
is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is
merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).