Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Persons and Family Relations Case Doctrines
Persons and Family Relations Case Doctrines
Case Doctrines
(Diory Rabajante)
CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS
I. PRELIMINARY TITLES (Articles 1-18)
Article 2
The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
Taada vs.
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It must be
Tuvera
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after 15 days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.
(Nota Bene: Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, modifying Article
2 of the Civil Code, now provides for the publication of laws either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
as a requirement for effectivity.)
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to fill in the details of the Central Bank
Act (RA 265) which that body is supposed to enforce.
Circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published
People vs. Que Po
before becoming effective. This is based on the general principle and
Lay
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provision, a law, regulation, or circular must first be published, and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and the
penalties for violation thereof.
- EXECUTIVE ORDERS WITH PENAL SANCTIONS; PUBLICATION IN
Pesigan vs.
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE, INDISPENSABLE Executive Order No.
Angeles
626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and
forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to
another should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
because it was published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
- LAWS (in Art. 2, Civil Code) INCLUDES CIRCULARS AND
REGULATIONS WHICH PRESCRIBE PENALTIES The word "laws" in
Article 2 (Article 1 of the Old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties.
- * PURPOSE OF PUBLICATION Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on persons affected thereby
- Case at Bar: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
Phil.
under which applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples
International
Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export
Trading Corp. vs.
program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone
Judge Angeles
from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able
to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter
they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order
of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for
being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process
Article 3
Delgado vs.
Alonso
Article 4
Co vs. CA
Article 6
D.M. Consunji vs.
CA
and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133
issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking
the reversal of the said decision. Issue: Whether or not PITCs
Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such
order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of
the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that
all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity since it is punitive in character.
A person who charges usurious rates of interest cannot claim justification
in his ignorance of the Usury Law. He can, therefore, be made to pay
reasonable attorneys fees of the debtor.
Case at bar: The defense presented no evidence to show that the
conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by the parties
when they obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas. Said divorce
therefore between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions
prescribed by the Koran and consequently said divorce seems to be of
doubtful religious validity. However, even admitting that this divorce was
secured in accordance with the conditions prescribed by Mohammedan
doctrines, is such divorce legal? The laws governing marriage and its
incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to public
policy.
In the Philippine Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the
causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured and
granted. Any divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands of causes and
under conditions other than those enumerated in said law, would have no
legal effect. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and
doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over
laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect
public policy.
The court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by the
defense was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines, such
divorce cannot prevail against the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands
prescribing the causes and conditions under which divorce may be
obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated, the divorce in question
has not been obtained in accordance with the law.
Article 8
Floresca vs.
Philex Mining
Corporation
Article 15-16
Miciano vs. Brimo
the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not
the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Ruling: The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of
their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation
Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held
that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private
Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and
not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda
value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase
the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent
with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver
signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school
unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship
grants, is void.
Case at bar: An alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines
stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law, and not that of his nation.
The provision in the will is not valid. The Turkish law should govern the
disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof,
e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined
by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
Roehr vs.
Rodriguez
United Airlines
vs. Court of
Appeals
(G.R. No. 124110)
A party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later
on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the
principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution.
The principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum
jus summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong).
However, in order that it will be actionable, the following elements of an
abuse of right under Article 19 must be present:
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith;
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 19 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights
Spouses
Quisumbing vs.
MERALCO
but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain
herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Hence, Reyes invoked Article 21.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with
intent to injure. Under Articles 19 and 21 the nature of the act to be able
to claim damages must be intentional. It has been proven in the case,
however, the Lims acts were otherwise.
Doctrine of Violenti Non Fit Injuria (to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury) pertains to the self-inflicted injury which will
not entitle a person for damages because of the very fact that it in the first
place it was his fault on why he was injured. This doctrine was invoked by
Nikko Hotel in the petition, claiming that Reyes exposed himself to the
injury of being thrown out of the party as a gate crasher. The Court,
however, said that this is not applicable in this case because despite
Reyes improper behaviour of gate-crashing, Nikko Hotel and Lim should
still observe proper treatment towards him under Articles 19 and 21 as to
not expose him to humiliation and shame.
Case at bar: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the
owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City.
Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as
standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the
plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had
been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors
advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further
verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant
had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an
hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and
asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01
representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected.
The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
Issue: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent
manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs
rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them
accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.
Ruling: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to
pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is
ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including
attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due
process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are
imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the
effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any
action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people.
University of the
East vs. Jader
(G.R. No. 132344)
Gashem Shookat
Baksh vs. CA
(G.R. No. 97336)
Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio
Corp. vs. CA
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately
disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but
only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to
by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official
or ERB representative was present.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article
19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the
school that has access to those information and it is only the school that
can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and
policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the
way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance
with the schools rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is
the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over
the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the
students standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity
had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or
injury.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In
civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no
intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon
them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due
care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community
exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of
society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is
justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
In the light of the laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where
a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance
of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
Thus, when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Art. 19 of the Code and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
Pe vs. Pe
Hermosisima vs.
Ca
Constantino vs.
Mendez
Tenchavez vs.
Escano
The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in
order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married
again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy for which No. 10 of Article 2219 authorizes an award for
moral damages.
Article 36
Spouses Yu vs.
PCIB
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding
since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately
and take their own direction independently of each other.
A case for annulment can be considered as a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioners
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence,
and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determined juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into
by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean the prejudicial
questions are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of criminal case.
Geluz vs. CA
The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she
was carrying and an independent cause of action for damages. This is
because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of
the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors,
even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of the same Code holds
that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and
Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for
reversal of order.
Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused per Article 21 of
the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
Only one with a juridical personality can die. Here the unborn child never
died because it never acquired a juridical personality. Article 40 limits the
provisional personality of a conceived child by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently born alive.
Case at bar: Wife went to a medical clinic for abortion without the
knowledge of her husband. When the latter learned of the abortion, he
brought an action against the wife basing his claim upon the provision of
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the damages recoverable
in case of death caused by a crime or quasi delict. The husbands claim is
untenable, the child being not considered alive when separated from the
De Jesus vs.
Syquia
(G.R. No. L-39110)
Article 43
Limjuco vs. Estate
of Pedro
Dumlao vs.
Quality Plastics
mothers womb.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status
The estate of a deceased should be considered an artificial or juridical
person for purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which
includes the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of his rights
and the fulfillment of obligations which survived after his death.
lack of jurisdiction over a dead person; civil personality is extinguished by
death; even juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, was lost through death.
Goitia vs.
Campos-Rueda
Balogbog vs. CA
Articles 2-6
Cosca vs.
Palaypayon
Silverio vs.
Republic
(G.R. No. 174689)
Articles 7-10
Navarro vs.
Domagtoy
Occiano
Laxamana vs.
Baltazar
People vs Whipkey
[69 O.G. No. 42, p.
9678 (1973)]
People vs.
Janssen
Article 22
Lim Tanhu vs.
Ramolete
The solemnizing officer is not required to investigate w/n the license was
issued in the place required by law. It is sufficient to know that the license
has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty of
ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides
habitually in his municipality.
Article 25
Republic vs. CA
of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Art. 3,
which while it may affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability (obiter dictum).
The vice-mayor, by operation of law, assumes the office of the acting
municipal mayor during the suspension of the mayor.
A marriage performed by a minister whose authority to solemnize a
marriage has expired is void ab initio.
The certification by the Civil Registrar that the alleged marriage license
and Castro
[236 SCRA 257
(1994)]
Article 26
Garcia vs. Recio
could not be found in his records is adequate to prove that no license was
issued.
Case at bar: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony in the city court of Pasay w/o the knowledge of Angelina's
parents. The marriage lasted only for a couple of mos. Angelina decided
to migrate to the US but wanted to put in order her marital status bef.
leaving. She consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment of her
marriage. It was discovered that there was no license issued to Cardenas
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig. The Civil Registrar certified that the
alleged license no. does not appear from the records. The trial court
denied the petition. The CA reversed the trial court, hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. HELD: The presentation by the Civil Registrar is
sanctioned by Sec. 29, R 132, ROC. The certification of due search and
inability to find, issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion, and pursuant to Sec. 29, R 132 of ROC, a
cert. of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue the marriage license. There being no marriage license, the
marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio
A divorce decree obtained abroad by a foreigner may be recognized in
the Philippine, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing national
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proved. Our
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments.
Both the divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must be
alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Therefore, before a
foreign divorce can be recognized by our Philippine courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is
concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this
case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of
no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for
the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.
an American husband granted absolute divorce in his country is estopped
from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as
Romillo
[139 SCRA 139
(1985)]
Cang vs. CA
Tenchavez vs.
Escano
[15 SCRA 355
(1965)]
Republic vs.
Orbecido
Cosca vs.
Palaypayon
Mariategui vs. CA
In the case at bar, not all of the aforesaid requirements are present. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed and sworn to
before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." The fact
that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family
Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true
all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and
Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really
Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that
they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization
and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living
together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With
respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that
there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is
hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34
of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering
that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been
living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However,
it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6
years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint
affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they
started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have
been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order
to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
Case at bar: Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married
in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by
Lupo to his son who testified that when his father was still living, he was
able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be
such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present. Under
these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,
Republic vs.
Quintero-Hamano
[G.R. No. 149498
(2004)]
Armida Ferraris
vs. Brix Ferraris
The respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-thehouse" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but
Navarro vs.
Navarro
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic
requirements of Santos.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then
already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules)
promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently
provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations
of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence
presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to
consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to
us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was
the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. YuTe (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Te thus assumes it a basic
premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application.
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is
consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,
that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not
a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that
when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form
of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic
marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the
resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and
be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at
other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting follows
Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant
of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact
that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in
the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, merely stands for
a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its
evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases
on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of
the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
Weigel vs.
Sempio-Dy
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty
on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the
law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses
of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules
on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the
"family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime
of the spouses.
People vs. Aragon
Mercado vs. TanMercado
Lukban vs.
Republic
Armas vs.
Calisterio
Republic vs.
Alegro
Articles 45-46
Anaya vs.
Paraloan
Buccat vs. Buccat
Jimenez vs.
Caizares
Articles 48-49
Sin vs. Sin
Ocampo vs.
Florenciano
Tuason vs. CA
Brown vs.
Yambao
[54 O.G. 1827
(1957)]
Pacete vs.
Carriaga
(G.R. No. L-53880;
1994)
separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes
within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.
In an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery filed by the
husband, even though the defendant wife did not interpose the defense of
prescription, nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree of legal separation or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no
such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record. Also, the husband was guilty of commission of the same offense
by living with another woman.
In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally
sanctioned. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code,
and it is, in substance, reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code.
Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily
explain the mandatory tenor of the law. In Brown v. Yambao, the Court
has observed:
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings
for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88),
is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the
parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43
Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil.
252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal
should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified
or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for
the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage
to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in
the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter
within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.
Macadangdang
vs. CA
[108 SCRA 314
(1981)]
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
womans free choice.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor
is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. The Court
defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
Article 69
Romualdez vs.
COMELEC
Article 73
Ayala
Investments vs.
CA
The fruits of the paraphernal property, which form part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and
expenses of the spouses (including those incurred in the legitimate
exercise of industry or profession), but not to the payment of the personal
obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it is proved that
such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. There
must be the requisite showing of some advantage, which clearly accrued
to the welfare of the spouses.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Therefore, to hold the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss
resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the
family must be presented.
Partosa-Jo vs. CA
Article 102
BA Finance Corp.
vs. CA
(161 SCRA 608)
Johnson &
Johnson vs. CA
(262 SCRA 298)
Article 109
Spouses Laperal
vs. Spouses
Katigbak
(90 Phil 77)
Villanueva vs.
IAC
Articles 115-116
BPI vs. Posadas
-
partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the
defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives
any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his
marital duties and rights.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by a prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although
able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. In this case,
physical separation, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to
give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during
the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only
one of the spouses. However, for the said property to be held liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bar, the obligation which the
petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by
the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for
his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had
already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
The husband cannot be held liable for the debts of the wife which were
incurred without the husbands consent and which did not benefit the
conjugal partnership. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be
held liable. And since the power of the court in execution of judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor alone, the conjugal properties and the capital of the husband
cannot be levied upon.
"Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against the wife, and
she is not a necessary party defendant. The husband cannot by his
contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been
transferred to him. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to
answer for debts incurred by the husband.
If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the property is
conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal.
Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the
will of one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can
change the character of conjugal property.
Case at bar: A husband insured himself during his marriage and made his
estate, not his wife, as his beneficiary. The premiums paid were borne by
the conjugal partnership. Later, the husband died.
The heirs of the husband as well as the wife are entitled to the proceeds
of the insurance. The proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to an
insured persons estate, on which the premiums were paid by the
conjugal partnership, constitute conjugal property, and belong one-half
exclusively to the husband and the other half to the wife. If the premiums
were paid partly with separate property, and partly with conjugal funds,
the proceeds are in like proportion separate in part, and conjugal in part.
This is the just interpretation of the article. To have the estate as the sole
beneficiary would be to sanction a fraud upon the wife.
The properties were acquired during the marriage and in the absence of
proof that they are exclusive property of the husband, they are presumed
to be conjugal property. They cannot answer for the personal
indebtedness of one spouse as his or her rights to her share are inchoate
and only materialize upon dissolution of the property.
Articles 121-122
Ayala
Investments vs.
CA
Carlos vs.
Abelardo
The fruits of the paraphernal property, which form part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and
expenses of the spouses (including those incurred in the legitimate
exercise of industry or profession), but not to the payment of the personal
obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it is proved that
such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. There
must be the requisite showing of some advantage, which clearly accrued
to the welfare of the spouses.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
A loan obtained to purchase the conjugal home may be charged against
the conjugal partnership as it has redounded to the benefit of the family.
Notwithstanding, therefore, the alleged lack of consent of the other
spouse, under Art. 121, the husband shall be solidarily liable for the loan
together with his wife.
VII.
Property Regime of Unions without Marriage
Article 147
Art 148 provides that properties acquired through the parties joint
Malilin vs. Castro
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. The determination of the
contributions needs to be made in a judicial proceeding as it requires a
finding of facts.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause the property of the parties
Valdes vs. RTC
during the period of cohabitation is governed by Art 147 or 148 as the
case may be. Art 147 applies to a void marriage where the parties are
capacitated to marry each other. On the other hand Art 148 applies to
void marriages where the parties suffer from an impediment to marry
each other.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
Francisco vs.
invalidates such marriage, apply Art. 148. Absent proof that the
Master Iron
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property or industry to the
Works
properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership
Construction
will not arise.
Corp.
(G.R. No. 151967)
Article 148
An actual contribution is required under Art 148 in contrast to art 147
Agapay vs.
where care and maintenance of the family and the home will suffice.
Palang
Absent actual proof of such contribution, no co-ownership
(276 SCRA 341)
A married man is the registered owner of a jeepney which was involved in
Juaniza vs. Jose
an accident and was held liable for damages. His common-law wife
(89 SCRA 306)
cannot claim co- ownership over the jeepney because Art. 144 CC (Art.
147 FC) applies only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry.
Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful
wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held
liable for damages caused by its operation.
Tumlos vs.
Fernandez
(G.R. No. 137650)
Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her
claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not
justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of coownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership
of respondents.
Albano vs.
Gapusan
(A.M. No. 1022MJ)
Articles 170-171
Liyao vs. Liyao
(G.R. No. 138961)
Article 172
Eceta vs. Eceta
(G.R. No. 157037)
A child is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children, for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the
information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent
says it is.
A child conceived or born during a valid marriage is presumed to belong
to that marriage, regardless of the existence of extramarital relationships.
A child cannot impugn his or her own legitimacy.
Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is
deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
The standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on
the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family of the
parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence.
An action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether
the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent
is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that
illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
Filiation based only on testimonial evidence is allowed, only if they are of
HIGH STANDARD. Material evidence for filiation must belong to the class
of "FAMILY OBJECTS," as in family photos, family bibles, etc.
Constantino vs.
Mendez
(209 SCRA 18)
Jison vs. CA
(G.R. No. 124853)
Article 173
Conde vs. Abaya
(13 Phil 249)
The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may
exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases
only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died
during his or her minority, or while insane, or after action had already
been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to
claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime, he or she
may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs.
The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not
transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
Article 176
Marquino vs. IAC
(G.R. No. 72078)
The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime, not during
the lifetime of the parents, and even after the death of the parents. In
other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.
Articles 177-180
Abadilla vs.
Tabiliran
(249 SCRA 447)
relations.
XI. Adoption
Teotico vs. Del
Val
(13 SCRA 406)
Mercado vs CA
Palisoc vs
Brillantes
(41 SCRA 548)
Amadora vs. CA
(160 SCRA 315)
Pasco vs CFI
St. Marys
Academy vs.
Carpetanos
(G.R. No. 143363)
Salvosa vs IAC
(166 SCRA 274)
Tamargo vs. CA
(209 SCRA 518)
are in their custody, does not apply to the school or the university itself or
to educational institutions which are not schools of arts and trades. The
provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
- As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the
death of child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. xxx Under Art. 2180, it is only the teacher and
not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of
arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.
- Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student following the first par. of the provision.
This is the gen. rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the gen. rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
w/c case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions, and
other affairs of the students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under the penultimate par. of Art. 2180, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain exten,
in loco parentis (as to the student) and (is) called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the (student.) Likewise, "the
phrase used in (Art. 2180)-- so long as the (students) remain in their
custody' means that the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority
is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was
yet lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling: GRANTED. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable
for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED
NEGLIGENCE. The simple reason is that the child was still under their
care and custody at the time of the incident. Parental liability is a
consequence of PARENTAL AUTHORITY.
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS:
Art. 2176: Quasi-delict Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict.
Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence The obligation imposed by Art.
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Luna vs IAC
(137 SCRA 7)
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Absent a showing of such diligence the parents
are directly and primarily liable for the damages arising from the acts of
their child.
The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should be taken away from the petitioners
(grandparents) and forced to live w/ her natural parents is a circumstance
that would make the execution of the judgment in the special proc.
inequitable, unfair, unjust, if not illegal. The threat may be proven empty,
but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her w/
love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and moral and
material security. But what if the threat is for real. Besides, in her letters
to the members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as
selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not lover her.
To return her to the custody of the private resps. would be traumatic and
cause irreparable damage to the child.
Calderon vs.
Republic
to the name of T Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in the birth
cert.) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals
w/ and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of
her new name. The petitioner has established that she has been using
the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her records
in school and elsewhere, put her name down as T. Ferrer; that her friends
and associates know her only as T. Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin
F.'s nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the
surname Ferrer.
A child may successfully petition to change his surname from the real
fathers name to that of the stepfather, who has no objection thereto. An
illegitimate child need not bear the stigma of illegitimacy during his whole
lifetime. The change of name allowed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
does not alter ones status, rights, duties, or citizenship. It merely changes
the appellation by which a person is known, identified, or distinguished
from others.