First Case: United States v Toribio (1910)

Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao
described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147,
an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that
under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the
slaughter
of
large
cattle
without
a
permit
of
the
municipal
treasure.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition
contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a
permit
duly
secured
from
the
municipal
treasurer,
and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly
secured
from
the
municipal
treasurer.
Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse
without
such
permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food
at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal
treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the
office
of
the
municipal
and
also
of
the
provincial
treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should
be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of
the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

Second Case: Ynot v Intermediate Apellate Court (1987)

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo
on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the
present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the
second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful
method." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it
must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Third Case: Villacorta v Bernardo (1986)

Or for clarifications.
CRUZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City.
The ordinance reads in full as follows:
ORDINANCE 22
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF
LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN.
Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City in session assembled:
Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan,
shalt before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau

of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to

the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on
any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent
rules and regulations are observed.
Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amount equivalent to P0.30 per square
meter of every lot resulting or win result from such subdivision shall be charged
by the City Engineer's Office.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow
the registration of a subdivision plan unless there is prior written certification
issued by the City Engineer that such plan has already been submitted to his
office and that the same is in order.
Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding two hundred (P200.00) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months or both in the discretion of the judge.
Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the
enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly
conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require
subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is
submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office
or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of
the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the
latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject
of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also
conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a
certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows
registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance
imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose.
In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision
owner additional conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a
halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as
already intimidated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable
ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights

granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local

ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the
validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce
disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would beultra
vires.
So many excesses are attempted in the name of the police power that it is time, we feel, for a
brief admonition.
Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more and more
complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for the
individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the time honored justification
of Salus populi est suprema lex.
In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interest
directly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the police power.
Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative and municipal
requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive.
It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially
private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free
society: individualism.
Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be
deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the Idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As long as he
does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed.
We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into
an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general
welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness.
Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the
individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public.
This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power
only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare
clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this
authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court annulling the challenged ordinance is
AFFIRMED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fourth Case: City Government of Quezon City v Ericta (1983)

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the
respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate
the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it
is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon
City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to
make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art.
Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three
inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property
rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said
to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal
any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power
granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to
regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in
order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is
deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy
in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not
recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace,
safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a
well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights
of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power,
is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general
health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any
positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised
in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive
wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to
the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
court is affirmed.