ErinNorton

LawandEthics
April29th,2016
Rossv.Blake
Ross v. Blake (Supreme Court Case)
Issues: Does a prisoner's reasonable belief that she exhausted her administrative remedies in a
claim against prison officials excuse her from the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion
requirement, which compels prisoners to use all available administrative remedies before seeking
relief in federal court?
Now, before I began to understand what this court case was truly about, I knew I had to look into
some details to understand what was going on. I had to look up what the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's was and understand it some more. This is what I found out about it; "The Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) is a U.S. Federal Law that was enacted in 1996. Congress
enacted PLRA in response to a significant increase in incidence of litigation within the court
system.
The next question I had was to wonder what litigation meant. Litigation is the process of taking
legal action.
Now, why is this such a big thing to talk about? Well, there is where the court case of Ross v.
Blake comes in. Michael Ross versus Shaidon Blake is the court case I listened/read through to
type about and share the information I had learned about in the paper I am about to type for you.
My information comes from the website www.supremecourt.gov . This court case happened on
March 29th, 2016. Before I pull out direct quotes from text, I will now tell you how the court
case ended so then after I tell you the conclusion, I will pull direct quotes from the court case to
show you what happened that lead up to the conclusion. The conclusion was as followed; "This
case will clarify the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA. Ross argues that the Fourth Circuit
improperly created a "special circumstances" exception to the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion
requirement. Blake argues that the Constitution does not stop at prison walls, but instead requires
prisons to have comprehensive yet uncomplicated remedial processes for handling prisoners'
complaints. The Court's resolution of this case could impact prison administration and the level
of judicial scrutiny over states' administrative remedy procedures."
The facts of the case are as stated; On June 21, 2007, Lieutenants Michael Ross and James
Madigan were escorting Shaidon Blake from his cell when Madigan shoved Blake several times.
The incident escalated to Madigan punching Blake in the face several times with a key ring
wrapped around his fingers while Ross held him. Blake was then taken to the medical unit and
later diagnosed with nerve damage. Blake reported the incident to senior corrections officers, and
the Internal Investigative Unit of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services conducted an investigation and issued a formal report. The formal report determined
that Madigan had used excessive force against Blake and that Blake was not at fault in any way.
Blake subsequently sued Ross and Madigan in addition to two supervisors and three government
entities under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and argued that they violated his constitutional rights by using
excessive force. Nearly two years after Blake initially filed the suit, Ross filed an amended

answer to the complaint that alleged that Blake had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required. Ross also moved for summary judgment
based on the same argument, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the special circumstances exception to
the PLRAs exhaustion requirement was met in this case. Because the internal investigation
provided the correction officials time and opportunity to address the complaints internally and
Blake reasonably believed that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by participating in
an internal investigation, the requirements for the special circumstances exception to the PLRA
were met.
Now, the case is still in pending according to www.oyez.org it was granted on December 11th,
2015 and was argued on March 29th, 2016. What makes me question about this is that it took
this long for it to just reach the court. This incident happened in 2007, but almost 10 years later it
is finally being looked at. This makes me question our justice system and wonder how long some
of the other cases have been waiting to be heard/looked at.
Here are some of the quotes from the case that makes me think some more;
Elena Kagan
Well, why do all of these cases suggest that, when that happens, the ARP throws out the case on
the view that there's an IIU investigation?
Julia Doyle Bernhardt
When this case arose in 2007, the warden was not required to dismiss it. And so in some cases -in some of the cases that are before the Court, that is, indeed, what occurred.
There's cases with three wardens where -- a collection of cases where there was a dismissal, but
-Sonia Sotomayor
Do you have any example anywhere of the AR -- ARP responding and actually investigating and
looking at the issue and making a recommendation or ruling?
To continue on
Sonia Sotomayor
The recent amendment.
Paul W. Hughes
It's at page 367 of the Joint Appendix. And this is part of the directives. It's -- it's a long directive
that provides several different pieces of guidance as to how the ARP procedure works.
And at -- towards the bottom of Joint Appendix page 367, it explains: "The warden or

institutional coordinator shall issue a final dismissal of a request for procedural reasons when it
has been determined that the basis of the complaint is the same basis of an investigation under
the authority of the IIU." It provides some additional details, and it says -- it provides the text
that now appears on the rubber-stamp, which is, "Your request is dismissed for procedural
reasons. Final.
The issue is being investigated by IIU. Case Number," blank.
"Since this case shall be investigated by IIU, no further action shall be taken within the ARP
process." So this is, I think, a quite clear regulation as to how the system now works. I will note
that Maryland's view at -- at footnote 9 of their reply brief is that even today, notwithstanding
this new directive, their view is the way the system works is a prisoner still has to go to the ARP
to properly exhaust their claims in these circumstances, despite the fact that this regulation, I
think, is crystal clear that, if you do so, your claim is going to be denied. And you're not told,
contrary to the suggestion that you would be -- you would know to appeal, you're not told that
you should appeal this dismissal anywhere.
There is not a shred of guidance that says, when you have your ARP dismissed because you've
told -- been told you have come to the wrong place, the proper thing is just to keep appealing it.
You're told that you're -- it's being dismissed because of the IIU investigation.
So I think a reasonable prisoner would be quite clearly led to believe that the IIU is, in fact, the
only thing that needs to happen in his particular case and would clearly be misled into not
actually appealing. So I think it's -- it's much more likely that it's the unreasonable prisoners who
disregard the clear guidance that they're getting who continue to appeal in these circumstances.
Now, one additional point: The -- Maryland referenced the McCullough case, saying that there is
State authority that -- that indicates that the Inmate Grievance Office is the exclusive avenue for
these sorts of cases, and it rests on the McCullough case here.
I think that argument is misplaced. The McCullough case that they cite was decided in 1989.
The internal investigative unit that's at issue here was not established until 1999, a full decade
later.
So I think the -- the use in the reply brief of the McCullough case to say that the IGO is this
broad-based mechanism is not responsive in any event to what happens now with the IIU
investigation, because the IIU simply didn't exist at the time that -- that the McCullough case was
decided. So I think that our view is quite clear that if Maryland's system in this case were
endorsed, that would become a very clear model for what other prisons could enact, this sort of
upside-down system, where you're told you have to go to the ARP process to properly exhaust,
but once you get there, you're told that you've absolutely come to the wrong place and, despite
any guidance, you have to somehow know that you need to appeal, contrary to the instructions
that you're being given, in order to properly exhaust your claim. As the Court said in Woodford,
to properly exhaust and to avoid procedural default, the prisoner needs to use the steps that the
prison properly holds out.
Here, the State is doing the very opposite of holding out these steps as available to the prisoners.

The State is saying, you've come to the wrong place; you're using the wrong steps.
That can't be what I think the Court meant for proper exhaustion as is required by Woodford. I
would be pleased to take any more questions that the Court might have.
John G. Roberts, Jr.
Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted.
It took about ten years for this case to just be submitted. I am now following the case to see what
is going to be happening in the future. I will keep you updated as well and I promise I will keep
you updated, or follow the cases online!