Reid Vapor Pressure

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Reid vapor pressure (RVP) is a common measure of the volatility of gasoline. It is defined as
the absolute vapor pressure exerted by a liquid at 100 F (37.8 C) as determined by the test
method ASTM-D-323. The test method applies to volatile crude oil and volatile nonviscous
petroleum liquids, except liquified petroleum gases.
The matter of vapor pressure is important relating to the function and operation of gasoline
powered, especially carbureted, vehicles. High levels of vaporization are desirable for winter
starting and operation and lower levels are desirable in avoiding vapor lock during summer heat.
Fuel cannot be pumped when there is vapor in the fuel line (summer) and winter starting will be
more difficult when liquid gasoline in the combustion chambers has not vaporized. Thus, oil
refineries manipulate the Reid Vapor Pressure seasonally specifically to maintain gasoline engine
reliability.
The Reid vapor pressure (RVP) differs slightly from the true vapor pressure (TVP) of a liquid
due to small sample vaporization and the presence of water vapor and air in the confined space
of the test equipment. That is, the RVP is the absolute vapor pressure and the TVP is the partial
vapor pressure. Conversion between the two measures can be found here, from p. 7.1-54
onwards.

Seems it is caused more by the lower Hydrocarbon like methane, ethane etc
Answer:
Improve

It is absolute vapor pressure exerted by a liquid at 100 F. It is a measure of volatility. It is measured

by ASTM-D-323 test method.
Note: There are comments associated with this question. See the discussion page to add to the
conversation.

Read more: http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_Reid_vapour_pressure#ixzz1cuVs3Cyu

Accidents during the offshore oil and gas development

by Stanislav Patin, translation by Elena Cascio
based on "Environmental Impact of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry"

Below you will find a short overview of drilling, transportation and storage accidents
during the offshore oil and gas activities. To find more information on Environmental
Impact of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry click on the links at the end of the page.

Oil and gas accidents

Accidents inevitably accompany offshore development. They are the sources of environmental pollution at
all stages of oil and gas production. The causes, scale, and severity of the accidents' consequences are
extremely variable. They depend on a concrete combination of many natural, technical, and technological
factors. To a certain extent, each accidental situation develops in accordance with its unique scenario.
The most typical causes of accidents include equipment failure, personnel mistakes, and extreme natural
impacts (seismic activity, ice fields, hurricanes, and so on). Their main hazard is connected with the spills
and blowouts of oil, gas, and numerous other chemical substances and compounds. The environmental
consequences of accidental episodes are especially severe, sometimes dramatic, when they happen near
the shore, in shallow waters, or in areas with slow water circulation.

Drilling accidents
Drilling accidents are usually associated with unexpected blowouts of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons
from the well as a result of encountering zones with abnormally high pressure. No other situations but
tanker oil spills can compete with drilling accidents in frequency and severity.
Broadly speaking, two major categories of drilling accidents should be distinguished. One of them covers
catastrophic situations involving intense and prolonged hydrocarbon gushing. These occur when the
pressure in the drilling zone is so high that usual technological methods of well muffling do not help. Lean
holes have to be drilled to stop the blowout. The abnormally high pressure is most often encountered
during exploratory drilling in new fields. The probability of such extreme situations is relatively low. Some
oil experts estimate it at 1 incident for 10,000 wells [Sakhalin-1, 1994]. The need to drill lean holes
emerges, on average, in 3% of accidental episodes.
The other group of accidental situations includes regular, routine episodes of hydrocarbon spills and
blowouts during drilling operations. These accidents can be controlled rather effectively (in several hours
or days) by shutting in the well with the help of the blowout preventers and by changing the density of the
drilling fluid. Accidents of this kind are not so impressive as rare catastrophic blowouts. Usually, they do
not attract any special attention. At the same time, their ecological hazard and associated environmental
risk can be rather considerable, primarily due to their regularity leading, ultimately, to chronic impacts on
the marine environment.

Transportation and storage accidents

Tanker transportation. Oil extracted on the continental shelf accounts for a considerable part (probably
at least 50%) of annual volumes of oil transported by tankers (the latter constitute over 1 billion tons). On
some fields, the shuttle tankers are the main way of delivering hydrocarbons to the onshore terminals.
The main causes of tanker accidents that lead to large oil spills include running aground and into shore
reefs, collisions with other vessels, and fires and explosions of the cargo. According to official data [IMO,
1990], the amount of oil spilled during tanker accidents in 1989 and in 1990 were 114,000 and 45,000
tons, respectively. At the same time, the total volume of oil pollution caused by marine oil transportation
was 500,000 tons a year.

Significantly, both large drilling accidents and large tanker catastrophes occur relatively rarely. The
frequencies of such incidents as well as the oil volumes released in large spills differ from year to year.
The history of tanker accidents has been thoroughly described by both the scientific literature and the
media. Analyzing the statistics and circumstances of such events indicates that they can hardly be
avoided. Although the rate of tanker accidents has been declining over the past two decades, we should
be prepared to deal with them in the future.
While speaking about the history of tanker transportation, we want to mention a sequence of large
supertanker accidents starting with the catastrophic grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in the English
Channel in 1967. The spill of 95,000 tons of oil caused heavy pollution of the French and British shores
with serious ecological and fisheries consequences. This accident was followed by a number of other
tanker accidents, including Amoco Cadiz (1978, 220,000 tons of oil spilled), Exxon Valdez (1989, 40,000
tons of oil spilled), and Braer (1993, 85,000 tons of oil spilled). Each of these episodes developed in
accordance with its unique scenario. In all the situations, though, the levels of oil pollution reached lethal
limits for marine fauna, mainly for birds and mammals. The consequences included much more damage
than just ecological disturbances in the sea and on the shore. Chapter 7 will discuss this in more details.
In some cases, the tanker accidents occurred right in the zone of the oil field development. One of them
happened in 1978 in the Shetland basin. The tanker Esso Bernica was holed during the mooring, and
1,100 tons of heavy oil fuel spilled into the coastal zone causing serious damage to nature and the local
population.
One of the most dramatic situations developed in 1989 in the shallow waters of Prince William Sound
near the Alaskan southern shore. The oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled over 40,000 tons
of crude oil. As the oil spread along the coastline, it covered sea animals, birds, and plants. It turned
hundreds of miles of this area (unique for its cleanness and biological resources) into an area of
ecological disaster.
This relatively recent episode in the history of the offshore oil and gas industry causes an alarming
association in the mind of a Russian reader. The Exxon Valdez catastrophe happened approximately at
the same latitudes where the grand projects of the oil and gas developments on the Russian Arctic shelf
have already been started (the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas in vicinity of the White Sea). The
association gets even stronger if we take into account that considerable amounts of hydrocarbons
extracted here are going to be transported by the tanker fleet. This will include tanker shuttles (including
the ice types), large tankers with dead weight up to 120,000 tons, and supertankers. Each of these
vessels is going to make hundreds of trips a year. This regular transportation activity is going to take
place with the rest of the traffic in the area of the oil field developments and in addition to the general
intense shipping and fishing in this Arctic basin. All of these factors considerably increase the probability
of accidental situations occurring in the region. We must remember the high productivity and high
vulnerability of the Arctic marine ecosystems. This region contains unique natural resources that are
comparable to the rich resources of the Alaskan shelf.
This primary background information and general statistics about large tanker accidents (about 2% a
year) allow us to conclude, without any calculations and modeling, that the risk of transportation accidents
occurring on the Arctic shelves is going to be high. The consequences of these accidents can be
catastrophic. Moreover, the environmental damage of possible accidents can exceed everything that has
happened before in such cases, including the accidents on the Alaskan shelf.

Very dangerous situations can emerge in case of a gas tanker accident. Gas carriers are going to be used
together with oil tankers in the Barents Sea as well as on the eastern shelf of Sakhalin to transport
liquefied natural gas. Gas tanker accidents, although less probable than the accidents with oil tankers,
can cause so-called flameless explosions. It happens due to the rapid evaporation of the liquefied gas on
the sea surface and formation of pieces of ice and gas clouds followed by combustion and explosions.
Such explosions can destroy everything alive in areas of up to 400 km 2.
At last, the tragic apotheosis of possible outcomes is an accident involving a tanker that is transporting
methanol - a rather toxic substance that is completely soluble in water. In case of an accident of such a
vessel with a freight-carrying capacity of 35,000 tons, for example in the coastal zone of the Western
Murman, the area of lethal impact to marine organisms will be from dozens and hundreds to thousands of
square kilometers. In fact, it could cover the whole fisheries regions [Borisov et al., 1994].
Storage. Underwater reservoirs for storing liquid hydrocarbons (oil, oil-water mixtures, and gas
condensate) are a necessary element of many oil and gas developments. They are often used when
tankers instead of pipelines are the main means of hydrocarbon transportation. Underwater storage tanks
with capacities of up to 50,000 m3 either are built near the platform foundations or are anchored in the
semisubmerged position in the area of developments and near the onshore terminals. Sometimes, the
anchored tankers are used for this purpose as well.
Of course, a risk exists of damaging the underwater storage tanks and releasing their content, especially
during tanker loading operations and under severe weather conditions. However, no summarizing
quantitative assessments and statistics of such events are available. After the spill of 1,200 tons of crude
oil in 1988 from an underwater storage tank during a storm in the North Sea, some countries introduced
restrictions on installing such structures near the shore [Cairns, 1992]. The most dangerous are the
accidents involving underwater storage tanks that contain toxic agents, for example methanol. Such
accidents are possible in the area of Shtokmanovskoe field developments in the Barents Sea where over
3,000 tons of methanol products are planned to be stored underwater.
Pipelines. Complex and extensive systems of underwater pipelines have a total length of thousands of
kilometers. They carry oil, gas, condensate, and their mixtures. These pipelines are among the main
factors of environmental risk during offshore oil developments, along with tanker transportation and
drilling operations. The causes of pipeline damage can differ greatly. They range from material defects
and pipe corrosion to ground erosion, tectonic movements on the bottom, and encountering ship anchors
and bottom trawls. Statistical data show that the average probability of accidents occurring on the
underwater main pipelines of North America and Western Europe are, respectively, 9.3x10 -4 and 6.4x10-4.
The main causes of these accidents are material and welding defects [Sakhalin-1, 1994].
Depending on the cause and nature of the damage (cracks, ruptures, and others), a pipeline can become
either a source of small and long-term leakage or an abrupt (even explosive) blowout of hydrocarbons
near the bottom. The dissolution, dilution, and transferring of the liquid and gaseous products in the
marine environment can be accompanied in some cases by ice and gas hydrates formation. The intensity
and scale of toxic impacts on the marine biota in the accident zone can be, of course, very different,
depending on a combination of many factors.
Modern technology of pipeline construction and exploitation under different natural conditions, including
the extreme ones, achieved indisputable successes. However, pipeline oil and gas transportation does
not eliminate the possibility of serious accidents and consequences.

It is important to take into consideration that in a number of cases, the accidental oil and gas spills and
blowouts on the onland main pipelines can pose danger to the coastal marine ecosystems. This can
happen when onland pipeline accidents take place near big rivers or in locations of their crossing. Any
pollution of river waters eventually affects the sea zone near the river mouth. Such a situation happened
at the end of 1994 in the Usinsk area, Russia. An onland pipeline rupture led to the spill of more than
100,000 tons of oil with the danger of heavy pollution of the basin of Pechora River. The potential hazard
of such situations can be even higher during oil and gas development on Sakhalin. The main pipelines
are supposed to be laid along the entire eastern coast of the island, right across the main spawning rivers
where reproduction of the unique populations of Sakhalin salmon takes place.

Hydrocarbon dew point

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

The hydrocarbon dew point is the temperature (at a given pressure) at which the hydrocarbon
components of any hydrocarbon-rich gas mixture, such as natural gas, will start to condense out
of the gaseous phase. It is often also referred to as the HDP or the HCDP. The maximum
temperature at which such condensation takes place is called the cricondentherm.[1] The
hydrocarbon dew point is a function of the gas composition as well as the pressure.
The hydrocarbon dew point is universally used in the natural gas industry as an important quality
parameter, stipulated in contractual specifications and enforced throughout the natural gas supply
chain, from producers through processing, transmission and distribution companies to final end
users.
The hydrocarbon dew point of a gas is a different concept from the water dewpoint, the latter
being the temperature (at a given pressure) at which water vapor present in a gas mixture will
condense out of the gas.

Contents
[hide]

1 Relation of the term GPM to the hydrocarbon dew point

2 See also

3 References

4 External links

[edit] Relation of the term GPM to the hydrocarbon dew point

In the United States, the hydrocarbon dewpoint of processed, pipelined natural gas is related to
and characterized by the term GPM which is the gallons of liquifiable hydrocarbons contained in
1,000,000 cubic feet (28,000 m3) of natural gas at a stated temperature and pressure. When the
liquifiable hydrocarbons are characterized as being hexane or higher molecular weight
components, they are reported as GPM (C6+).[2][3]
However, the quality of raw produced natural gas is also often characterized by the term GPM
meaning the gallons of liquifiable hydrocarbons contained in 1,000 cubic feet (28 m3) of the raw
natural gas. In such cases, when the liquifiable hydrocarbons in the raw natural gas are
characterized as being ethane or higher molecular weight components, they are reported as GPM
(C2+). Similarly, when characterized as being propane or higher molecular weight components,
they are reported as GPM (C3+).[4]
Care must be taken not to confuse the two different definitions of the term GPM.
Although GPM is an additional parameter of some value, most pipeline operators and others who
process, transport, distribute or use Natural Gas are primarily interested in the actual HCDP,
rather than GPM. Furthermore, GPM and HCDP are NOT interchangeable and one should be
careful not to confuse what each one exactly means.
Methods of HCDP determination
There are primarily two classes of HCDP determination. One category is "theoretical" methods,
and the other is "experimental" methods.
"Theoretical" methods of HCDP determination
The Theoretical methods, use the component analysis of the gas mixture (usually via Gas
Chromatography GC) and then use equation of state (EOS) to calculate what the dew point of the

mixture should be at a given pressure. The Peng-Robinson and Kwong-Redlich-Soave equations

of state are the most commonly used for determining the HCDP in the natural gas industry.
The theoretical methods suffer from two sources of error. The first source is the error on the
analysis of the gas mix components. When using a C6+ GC these errors can be as high as 50F
depending on the gas mixture and the assumptions made regarding the composition of the C6+
fraction. For "pipeline quality" natural gas, a C9+ GC analysis will reduce the uncertainty to
approximately 10-15F. Using a laboratory C12+ GC analysis can reduce the error further to less
than 1C. However, using a C12 laboratory system can introduce additional errors, namely
sampling error. If the gas has to be collected in a sample bottle and shipped to a laboratory for
C12 analysis, sampling errors can be significant. Obviously there is also a lag time error between
the time the sample was collected and the time it was analyzed. [5]. The second source of error
relates to the errors embedded in the equation of state model use to calculate the dew point.
Different models are prone to varying amounts error at different pressure regimes and gas mixes.
The significant advantage of using the theoretical models is that the HCDP at several pressures
(as well as the cricondentherm) can be determined from a single analysis. This provides for
operational uses such as determining the phase of the stream flowing through the flow-meter,
determining if the sample has been affected by ambient temperature in the sample system, and
avoiding Amine foaming from liquid hydrocarbons in the Amine contactor.
GC vendors with a product targeting the HCDP analysis include ABB, Thermo-fisher, Emerson,
as well as some other companies.
"Experimental" methods of HCDP determination
In the "experimental" methods, one actually cools a surface on which gas condenses and then
measures the temperature at which the condensation takes place. The experimental methods can
be divided into manual and automated systems. Manual systems, such as the Bureau of Mines
Dewpoint Meter, depend on an operator to manually cool the chilled mirror slowly and to
visually detect the onset of condensation. The automated methods use automatic mirror chilling
controls and sensors to detect the amount of light reflected by the mirror and detect when
condesation occurs through a drop in measured light. The chilled mirror technique is a first
principle measurement which is not suspect to "calculation" or "choice of model" errors;
however, some liquids must condense before the detection of condensation on the mirror can
occur, and therefore reports values lower than the theoretcial methods[5].
The experimental method also suffers from two sources of error. The first error is in the detection
of condensation. A manual chilled mirror device relies on the operator to determine when a mist
has formed on the mirror, and is highly subjective. The automated chilled mirror devices are
significantly more repeatable but can be affected by contaminants that condense on the mirror

before the hydrocarbons. The second source of error is the speed of the cooling of the mirror and
the measurement of the temperature of the mirror when the condensation is detected. This error
can be minimized by controlling the cooling speed, or having a fast condensation detection
system.
The experimental methods only provide a HCDP at the pressure at which the measurement is
taken, and cannot provide the cricondentherm or the HCDP at other pressures. However, most
operators like to know the HCDP at their current line pressure anyways. Given that the input
pressure of the experimental systems can be adjusted by a regulator, one can also measure the
HCDP at other pressures by adjusting the input pressure.

WHAT IS HCDP (HYDROCARBON DEW POINT)

Principles of HCDP | Why Control HCDP | Specifications for HCDP | Cricondentherm Temperature |
Hydrocarbon Gas Dew Point Curve

Principles of Hydrocarbon Dew Point

Dew point is defined as the temperature at which vapor begins to condense. We see it in action
every foggy morning. Air is cooled to its water dew point and the water starts condensing and
collects into small droplets. We also see it demonstrated by a cold glass "sweating" on a humid day.
The cold glass lowers the air temperature below the water dew point temperature and the water
condenses on the sides of the cold glass. Water dew point is relatively simple and easy to predict
since it is a single component system. It is easily removed using conventional techniques, primarily
TEG (Triethylene Glycol) dehydration units.
Hydrocarbon dew point (HDP) is similar to the water dew point issue, except that we have a multicomponent system. Natural gas typically contains many liquid hydrocarbon components with the
heavier components found in smaller amounts than the lighter gaseous ends. It is the heaviest
weight components that first condense and define the hydrocarbon dew point temperature of the
gas. The dew point temperature also moves in relation to pressure.
One of the first questions we are asked by producers with a hydrocarbon dew point issue is:
"How can my hydrocarbon dew point be so high?"
In return, we ask the producer at what temperature does his high-pressure production separator
operate? By definition, a production separator separating oil from gas operates at vapor-liquid
equilibrium. Therefore, the gas leaving the separator is in equilibrium with the oil. In other words, the
gas leaving the separator is at its hydrocarbon dew point that equals the separator operating
temperature (and pressure.) If the separator is operating at 100F, then the gas has a 100F dew
point at separator pressure. As the gas leaves the separator and cools flowing through the piping
system, liquids condense and the dew point decreases as the heavy ends condense. The TEG
dehydration unit will remove some heavy hydrocarbons, in addition to water, and further reduce the
hydrocarbon dew point. At the sales meter, (without a conditioning unit) the hydrocarbon dew point is
usually close to the lowest temperature the gas has achieved on the location before it was sampled,
at operating pressure.

Why Control Hydrocarbon Dew Point?

The gas transportation companies have come to the realization that managing hydrocarbon dew
point reduces system liabilities, opens up new gas markets and generates operating revenue. By
managing hydrocarbon dew point, hydrocarbon condensation can be prevented in cold spots under
rivers and lakes where the liquids collect in the low areas and then often move as a slug through the
system, over pressuring the pipe, and overpowering liquid handling facilities, flowing into
compressors and end user sales points.
Most importantly, liquids in burners and pilots onsite and at end user locations at LDCs, can cause
fire and explosion hazards. Also, removing pipeline liquids helps prevent pipe corrosion in the low
areas where water is trapped under the hydrocarbon liquid layer and slowly destroys the pipe
integrity. Proper managing of gas dew point can also prevent liquids from forming as the gas cools
while flowing through pressure reduction stations (e.g. citygates) that feed end user supply systems.
Controlling dew point is also necessary to qualify the pipeline to market gas to high efficiency gas
turbine end users that require a dry and consistent quality fuel.

Specifications for HDP

Pipelines use two main methods to specify contractual natural gas hydrocarbon dew points.
1. Limit on C5+ or C6+ components by analyzing for:
o

GPM (gallons of liquid per thousand SCF)

Mole %

2. Specifying an actual HDP by:

o

Setting a hydrocarbon dew point temperature maximum at operating pressure

Setting a maximum cricondentherm hydrocarbon dew point

In addition, typical pipeline specifications, or tariffs, almost always specify a maximum GHV (Gross
or Higher Heating Value), which is greatly affected by heavy hydrocarbons contained in the gas
stream.

Cricondentherm Temperature
The cricondentherm temperature is the highest dew point temperature seen on a liquid-vapor curve
for a specific gas composition over a range of pressure, e.g. 200-1400 psia. When you look at a
hydrocarbon gas dew point temperature curve (phase envelope,) the curve bends with pressure.
Shown below is a dew point curve, after conditioning, for a south Texas gas analysis. The
transporting pipeline requires a 20F cricondentherm temperature. At the time this sample was
taken, the cold separator on the gas conditioning equipment was operating at 9F and 875 psig.

Hydrocarbon Gas Dew Point Curve

Dew Point
Pressure
Temperature
F
PSIA
9.0
200
12.9
250
The temperature shown in the
15.6
300
HDP curve represents the gas
17.5
350
dew point at the corresponding
18.8
400
pressures.
19.5
450
A cricondentherm specification at
19.7
500
Cricondentherm
first seems like the best way a
19.6
550
pipeline can protect its assets.
19.1
600
The transporting pipeline
18.2
650
operator knows if it sets a
cricondentherm temperature
17.0
700
restriction below the lowest
15.4
750
temperature seen in its system, it
13.5
800
can raise and lower the gas
11.1
850
Operating at 9F and 875#
pressure in the pipeline
transportation system, and not
8.5
900
have to worry about liquid
5.2
950
condensation.
1.4
1000
-3.3
1050
The problem a pipeline operator
-9.4
1100
has in using a cricondentherm
specification is in the calculation
-18.7
1150
of the cricondentherm
temperature. The cricondentherm temperature is calculated by obtaining an extended gas analysis
and then inputting the analysis data into a software package, using equations of state to predict the
dew point temperatures at the range of pressures.
However, many gas-transporting companies tend to collect gas composition data using on-line
chromatographs or composite samples with a grouped C6+ component. The C6+ component does
not provide any information on the heavier hydrocarbon (C7+) components that determine the gas
hydrocarbon dew point. To calculate a cricondentherm the pipeline operator must make some
assumptions. It is these assumptions that are causing problems. The pipeline operator must decide
how to distribute the C6+ component for his calculation. The most commonly used distribution
assumptions are the Daniels/El Paso distribution (i.e. 48% C6; 35% C7; 17% C8+) and the GPA
distribution (i.e. 60% C6, 30% C7, 10% C8+). If the Daniels distribution shown in the previous
sentence is used on the gas represented in the dew point curve above, the cricondentherm dew
point calculates to be 38.1F, which is 18.4F higher than its actual cricondentherm temperature. The
producer would need to operate his cold separator on his conditioning unit at -10F (negative 10F)
to meet the system requirements due to the assumptions made in calculating the gas
cricondentherm. Another popular mistake is to perform an analysis that groups the C6, C7 and C8+
components, rather than using the detailed component-by-component breakdown. Grouping also
skews the cricondentherm. If you group the above components, the cricondentherm calculates at
32.6F or 12.9F high. It is DPC's experience that grouping will add a minimum of 3F to 5F to the
calculated cricondentherm temperature.
To be useful in a commercial environment, pipeline hydrocarbon dew point specifications must be
easily measured with existing equipment. The majority of the transporting pipeline systems measure
using a C6+ component system. These systems can be used to track cricondentherm based
specifications as long as the heavier components are not distributed arbitrarily.

It is DPC is recommendation that when using a C6+ based component analysis system, the
following steps should be taken to monitor a sales point location where the transporter is
receiving gas that is being dew point controlled based on a cricondentherm requirement.

At time of initial delivery, when the receiving gas is meeting pipeline specification, a spot
sample should be collected and analyzed with a detailed analysis through C8+.

The detailed extended analysis needs to be inputted into a software program using the full
analysis to verify the cricondentherm temperature requirement is achieved.

The C6+ mole percentage (or GPM) shown on the qualifying extended analysis can then be
used as the threshold standard that must be met by the gas being received at this sales
meter.

Online chromatography or composite samples can then be used to compare against the
threshold standard to verify qualification of the cricondentherm specification.

The threshold standard should be updated or qualified as needed to handle changing gas
compositions.

DPC does not recommend detailed analysis be taken beyond C8+ on dew point conditioned gas
streams as it is not useful and results in unnecessary expense.