Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370

March 4, 2004

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to annul the Order2of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special
Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S.
Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births
are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 19703

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and
their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite.
The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a
house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal
properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta.
Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training
Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of
stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the
eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto,
the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and
improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth
resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing
at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his
petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The
clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff
served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the
petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court
stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her
son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was
received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.

Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an
"Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at
8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The
public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the
respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the
petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued
an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk
of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in
civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the
RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross
misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a
resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at
Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to
deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment
without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the
service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent
was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the
petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of
the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the
extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual
basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the
petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended
to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting
the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14

On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and
specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is
there any averment or allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be
a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial, or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an
amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of
the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in
a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
were no longer available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the
said remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her.16

The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the
respondents marriage was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and
to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as
follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of
Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and
in not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17

The petition is meritorious.

An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to
annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two
grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is
subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer
available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails
to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy
under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through
no fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such
remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the
remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigants
rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by
subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own.
She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11,
2000. The petitioners amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition,
because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal
or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.

We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying
admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to
take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on
extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that
the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her.
While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states
a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any
allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege
in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so
because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and
void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by
laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the
material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff
to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to
give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will
show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the
Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial
court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the
complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus,
enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the
petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the
court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant
even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to
him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there

is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent
efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided
in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in
order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only
when a defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service
may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons
and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof
of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because
substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that
substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the
summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the
summons was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioners
son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995,
no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a
reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was
no mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor.
CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was
allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the
complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not
furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I
have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my
father as his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to
the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my fathers
lot), my father came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he
(my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the
Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her.
I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition. 34

We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the
petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the
trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as
shown by the records. The records show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the
complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default.
The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to
the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent
ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the
public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of
Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of
Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.38

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court
of Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer
negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as
the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 43 Whether or
not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological
imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby
SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.