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    1) According to Dr. Kelly, the September dossier on Iraq's WMD program was an accurate reflection of open source information and the government's assessment, as it was consistent with his own views from decades of experience monitoring Iraq. 2) On the issue of Iraq's ability to deploy biological weapons within 45 minutes, Dr. Kelly said he was not familiar with intelligence or weapons systems that could achieve that timescale. 3) Dr. Kelly believed there was a 30% chance Iraq had specific chemical weapons production capabilities in the six months before the war, and it was more likely they had a small chemical weapons program. This view was similar to what Gilligan's source told the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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    1) According to Dr. Kelly, the September dossier on Iraq's WMD program was an accurate reflection of open source information and the government's assessment, as it was consistent with his own views from decades of experience monitoring Iraq. 2) On the issue of Iraq's ability to deploy biological weapons within 45 minutes, Dr. Kelly said he was not familiar with intelligence or weapons systems that could achieve that timescale. 3) Dr. Kelly believed there was a 30% chance Iraq had specific chemical weapons production capabilities in the six months before the war, and it was more likely they had a small chemical weapons program. This view was similar to what Gilligan's source told the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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    3 views2 pages

    Mod 6 0015to0016

    Uploaded by

    Bren-R
    1) According to Dr. Kelly, the September dossier on Iraq's WMD program was an accurate reflection of open source information and the government's assessment, as it was consistent with his own views from decades of experience monitoring Iraq. 2) On the issue of Iraq's ability to deploy biological weapons within 45 minutes, Dr. Kelly said he was not familiar with intelligence or weapons systems that could achieve that timescale. 3) Dr. Kelly believed there was a 30% chance Iraq had specific chemical weapons production capabilities in the six months before the war, and it was more likely they had a small chemical weapons program. This view was similar to what Gilligan's source told the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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    of 2

    RESTRICTED - STAFF

    ;' Defence~~
    Intelligence

    n-t tuts IT YO FDnaFr:NCt.


    Old W .n Ollic.e 13wlcling
    w'hiich.tll, London SW IA : I;U
    I'elcphouc (Uucu 1)iolhng) 020"72 1 S 2407
    (Swuc.hhoaid) 020 7218 9000

    l~rom 11,10111 110i1'aid


    Ocpui~Cl .iefnjUefencc Intelhsence

    CD12n2/5i2

    John Scarlett
    JlC Chairman
    Cabinet Office
    70 Whitehall
    London B July 2003

    ex-~

    GILLIGAN ACCUSATIONS : DR DAVID IQ?LLY

    You asked for a short note on Dt Kelly's views of the Itaqt WMD programme and the
    Government's dosstei, published last September What follows reflects points made by
    David Kelly in his letter in which lie admitted to his meeting with Gilltgan on 22 May, and
    fiom mtctviews conducted with him by MOD

    According to Di Kelly, based on his extensive and authoritative knowledge of lraq's WMD
    piogramme, notably it's biological piogramme, lie believes that the Septembei dossier was a
    fait tefleclton of open souice mfoimauon and appieciations about Iraq's WNID piogramme
    lie claims that he has never attempted to tmdet mme Government policy as lie was petsonally
    sympathetic to the wai because he iecogmsed fjom a decade's work the menace of Iraq's
    ability to fwthet develop a non-conventional weapons piogiamme lie feels no unease ovci
    the dossier because it is completely coincident with his pasonal views on ILaq's
    unconventional weapons capability

    On (lie 45 mmutc deployment issuc, Kelly says that his standard view is that lie does not
    know tile intclligcncc and is ]lot f.imiliai with tin liacli Weapons system that matchcs that soit
    ol tiirncsc.tlc

    raFSTr,ICTED - STAFF
    RESTRICTED-STAFF

    The onlYotha point that we have elii.tcd liom Di I<clly is 111,11 lie hclieves dime J, a 30%
    chtuu,c that Viq had specific CM pioducunn cnpubilily in the six months bclore the wai and
    [flat 11 w,is moic My that dime was ,i small I3W hioducUon piogiammc Thns is not
    dissimilai to the views ascnbed by Gilligan to his souice in his evidence to the Foucign
    Af(tuis Committee (see answei to Q51 I) It is worth pointing Out dial I-' clly distinguishes
    between amduction and hossession where he bclicves that it is ncaiei 100°l0 likely dint thme
    was some exrsung CW In 1 ; a(I's possession

    I hope this is helpful 1lappy to-discuss furlhci if you wish

    A copy goes to Sn Kevin Tebbit's office

    Rf=S-1-RICTr_n - STAFF
    HoDj6jco/b

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