Total War

Danny O’Donohue
Military History

The Civil War was not a total war, and those that believe otherwise have bought into

Confederate propaganda and not truly examined all that a total war entails. A grasp on the

definition total war and all the factors it includes is necessary to both understand and to make the

case that the Civil War cannot be categorized as totalitarian warfare. The distinction between

combatant and noncombatant remained in place from the assault on Fort Sumter in 1861, up to

General Lee’s surrender to General Ulysses S. Grant in 1865. Abraham Lincoln’s objectives in

waging war against the South, never matched the ultimate purpose intrinsic to waging total war.

The Civil War simply does not meet the criteria of a total war and should not be classified as

one.

Total war was a term first used by Giulio Douhet in 1921 and defined by him as when

“the entire population and all the resources of a nation are dragged into the maw of war.” Those

waging total war did so to achieve unconditional surrender and with the goal to destroy an enemy

nation and reshape its society. During World War II a further characteristic of total war was that

the economy of a nation shifted direction in order to fuel the war effort. The idea of total war

came to constitute a war “without scruples or limitations” that made no distinction between

civilians and soldiers. James Turner Johnson elaborates on the dissolving of barriers in his study

of Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War where he writes, “total war bears hardest on

noncombatants, whose traditional protection from harm according to the traditions of just and

limited warfare appears to evaporate here.”1 By comparing the characteristics of a total war to

how civilians were treated by Union generals and the intent of Union political leaders it becomes

evident that the Civil War simply does not match up to the definition.
1
Mark E. Neely, “Was the Civil War a Total War?” Civil War History, (Kent State University Press 2004), 30.
 The policy that Lincoln favored was to have no policy which meant no standardized set

of rules in dealing with civilians. It is important to note that interpretation was open to Union

commanders. While there were vast differences in doctrines ranging from draconian and brutal to

understanding and lenient, at no point in the Civil War was the distinction between civilians and

soldiers ignored. As the policy went from conciliation, to pragmatic, to hard war citizens were

still recognized as just that, even if punishment for active secessionists became harsher. When

General Halleck was general-in-chief during the pragmatic stage, supporters of the enemy had

their property confiscated but civilian lives were never threatened.2

Even when Grant assumed the position of general-in-chief and “took off the kid gloves”

with his operations beginning in 1863, citizens were still treated with distinction from soldiers.

The significant shift from pragmatic is seen in the systematic, routine, large-scale destruction

carried out by large bodies of troops to achieve a military advantage.3 However, as specific

examples will show, this destruction of property and supplies were for military purposes and

civilians were still held distinct from combatants. Philip Sheridan’s mission was to lay waste to

the Shenandoah Valley but his operation orders read that “no villages or private houses will be

burned” and that enough food be left for civilians’ personal use.4 Hardships and injustices were

undoubtedly inflicted on civilian secessionists but the Union army never broke the barrier

separating combatants and noncombatants.

Lincoln and the Union did not hope to achieve unconditional surrender from the South or

destroy the states that seceded. Civilians who supported secession were, at least in the beginning

of the war, regarded as fellow brethren who were merely misguided. For the first fifteen months

2
Mark Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 51
3
Mark Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 141
4
Mark Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 171-175
of the war, conciliation warfare was the policy. The reoccupation of government positions

wrongfully taken from the Union was Lincoln’s primary objective for the war.5 On July 9, 1864

Lincoln’s conditions for surrender were that the Confederacy accepts both the restoration of the

Union and the abolishment of slavery.6 Granted, these conditions would completely reshape the

South’s economy which was currently dependent on slavery, but that is the only link found

between the outcome Union leaders desired and the outcome resulting from total war.

Additionally, the Federal government initially had no intention of getting involved with slavery

in the fear that it would legitimize the South’s secession, a policy that only changed when it

became evident that a quick and decisive victory was not feasible.7 The ultimate goal in waging

the Civil War was to restore the Union, not to destroy the Southern nation or receive

unconditional surrender.

Brutal tactics were resorted to by the North in order to bring an end to the Civil War but

the policies and actions of Union leaders never escalated to the level of total war. Citizens were

never classified as combatants and viewed as fair game as objects of attack by the Federal army.

Lincoln and the North’s ultimate goal were to restore the Union of the states. The Emancipation

Proclamation ended up transforming the South’s society and economy but it was not the primary

intention of the Federal government. The civil war, although ruthless and bloody in many

instances, never crossed the distinguishable line separating a hard war, which employed strategic

punitive tactics on disloyal citizens in order to restore the Union from a total war, which viewed

civilians as combatants in order to destroy the South.

5
Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 23.
6
Neely, “Was the Civil War a Total War?” 30
7
Grimsley, Hard Hand of War, 121