Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Case For Strong Sustainability: by Konrad Ott
The Case For Strong Sustainability: by Konrad Ott
8
STRONG
SUSTA I NA BI LI T Y
by Konrad Ott
1. Introduction
R
egretfully, both scientists and political agents use the
umbrella term ‘sustainable development’ in an in-
creasingly indiscriminate and arbitrary way. The po-
litically most inuential concept of ‘sustainable development’ in
Germany is the three-pillar concept. It demands that we should
equally consider economic, social, and ecological development.
Initially, it improved the footing of environmental concerns
and helped to reconcile concerns that were formerly thought
contrary. However, the results of several research projects dem-
onstrate that the three-pillar model has been reduced to a list-
ing of any societal objectives that agents happen to think im-
portant.1 But for logical reasons, any concept that encompasses
very much (extension) must lose specic meaning (intension). If
so, we should try to overcome the three-pillar model, i. e., inte-
grate it into a comprehensive theory.
For greater clarity on the pathway towards such a theory,
it seems helpful to distinguish spheres or layers of the overall
debate on sustainable development. Döring & Ott (2001) pro-
pose the following model :
(1) Idea
(2) Concepts
(3) Guidelines (resilience, sufciency, efciency, etc.)
(4) Dimensions (environment and nature, social systems,
economy, education, culture, etc.)
(5) Management rules in single dimensions
(6) Objectives (targets, time frames, set of instruments)
(7) Indicators
(8) Implementation, monitoring, etc.
59
2. The Idea of Sustainability reasons to expect that rational persons are
to some degree risk-averse. Accordingly, the
On level (1) and at the starting point of theo- difference principle implies that, as rational
ry formation is the ethical idea of sustainabil- persons, we should decide to maximise the
ity. It is based on obligations toward future good at the lowest ‘normal’ social position,
generations and presupposes intergenera- i. e. that of an unskilled worker. When ap-
tional equity (see Chapter 6). Most ethicists plied in risk evaluation, the difference princi-
would agree to a denition similar to this : ple takes the shape of the ‘minimax’ criterion
Sustainability means that present and future (see Chapter 6.5c). I hold that the rational
persons have the same right to nd, on the aver- persons behind the veil will, indeed, adopt at
age, equal opportunities for realising their con- least such a rule of distributive justice.2 After
cepts of a good human life. The denition com- having agreed upon a concept of sustainable
bines an intergenerationally extended right- development, they may institute even more
based morality (‘same right’) with a broadly strictly egalitarian principles (e. g. limited in-
dened teleological objective (‘good human equality of income3) if they think that these
life’). Accordingly, sustainable development is are necessary for its implementation.
development that reaches or maintains a sus- Rawls himself asked what a fair inter-
tainable state. This straightforward denition generational saving schedule would be. The
avoids the many confusions that result from concept of a saving schedule makes more
the murky notion of development. Techno- room for environmental concerns than the
logical improvement and economic growth economically more restricted concept of a
are components of sustainable development saving rate. However, Rawls did not distin-
only if they contribute to a sustainable state. guish rate and schedule as sharply as I think
At the core of my argumentation on this it should be done. He writes :
level is a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ (see
In attempting to estimate the fair rate of sav-
Chapter 6.4d). Let us, again, imagine that
ing the persons in the original position ask what
we are a group of rational, free persons be-
is reasonable for members of adjacent generations
hind the veil and argue about which concept
to expect of one another at each level of advance.
of sustainability we should choose.
They try to piece together a just savings schedule
As quoted in Chapter 6 (page 48), Rawls
by balancing how much at each stage they would
identies three basic principles of justice.
be willing to save for their immediate descendants
The basic-liberty principle and the equal-op-
against what they would feel entitled to claim of
portunity principle are both lexically prior to
their immediate predecessors. (…) When they ar-
the so-called difference principle. It says that
rive at an estimate that seems fair from both sides
social and economic inequalities are partly
(…) then the fair rate (…) is specied.4
justied if they are ‘reasonably expected to
be to everyone’s advantage’. What this may It seems in good accordance with Rawls’
mean is open to interpretation. For three rea- theory to modify the veil of ignorance so that
sons, Rawls argues in favour of an egalitar- it, rst, hides one’s place of birth and the his-
ian interpretation that he labels ‘democratic torical period of one’s lifespan, while, second,
equality’ : First, he is deeply convinced that granting the persons behind it some general
contingent facts of life that impair an individ- ecological knowledge. They should know
ual’s prospects should be compensated for in why, how, and to which extent human so-
a just society. Second, his pre-analytic vision cieties depend on natural endowments (‘life
of justice is egalitarian. Third, there are good support systems’). They could, for instance,
60
acknowledge that ecological systems provide (a) Assuming that this is possible, sus-
a lot of valuable functions that are vital to hu- tain one welfare level W L 1 indenitely
mans (‘instrumental values’, see Chapter 5). (W L 1 ∞).
Considering all this, they should then discuss (b) Begin with an unsustainable welfare
the question of a fair intergenerational sav- level W L 2 and let it cause a subsequent
ing schedule. welfare level W L 3 (W L 2 → W L 3).
Behind the veil, we have reasons to adopt W L 2 is the highest of the three welfare lev-
a comparative standard of intergenerational els, W L 3 the lowest (providing for little more
justice. It requires that the average living than the basic needs), and W L 1 is in between.
conditions should be at least as good in fu- A rational person will prima facie prefer to
ture as they are today – if they can be sus- enjoy the highest welfare level possible dur-
tained indenitely. This is a big ‘if ’, indeed, ing her own lifetime (W L 2 > W L 1 > W L 3).
but it is not unreasonable to assume that a However, if the persons behind the veil are
high quality of life (as distinct from the stand- risk-averse enough to have agreed on the
ard of living) is sustainable without the deple- difference principle, they will prefer option
tion and over-exploitation of natural resourc- (a) when considering that anyone could be
es. If so, it would intuitively seem unfair to- among those born in the times of W L 3. De-
ward future generations to bequeath to them ciding to sustain one good, safe welfare level
only as much resources as they need to satisfy indenitely is the even more obvious choice
their basic needs (‘absolute standard’ 5). We when we act as representatives of family lines,
accept egalitarian standards in many realms as Rawls suggests. I see no convincing reason
of practical reasoning, e. g. in equal treat- why we should adopt an ‘absolute’ standard
ment before the law, equal liberty for any- of intergenerational equity under the condi-
one, or in the negative duty not to discrimi- tions dened by the veil of ignorance. There-
nate persons because of their race, gender, or fore, the standard should be egalitarian.
religious beliefs. Different concepts of sustainability are propos-
In other cases we act from a presumption als for different intergenerational saving sched-
in favour of equality that implies a burden of ules. This is certainly true if we assume that
proof for those who want to distribute goods all concepts of sustainability need to identify
unequally. (There are good reasons, though, an intergenerational bequest package and
to distribute goods unequally according to that, in effect, ‘bequest package’ means al-
criteria like responsibility, merit, contribu- most the same as ‘saving schedule’. It is be-
tion, or special needs.) When we picture hu- hind the veil of ignorance that our arguments
mankind as an ongoing chain of generations for different concepts of sustainability must
with the same basic qualities and needs, it be acceptable. Thus, they must be independ-
seems intuitively right to presume that hu- ent of individual concepts of the good life
mans are equal in terms of intergenerational and of religious doctrines. In Rawls’ words,
fairness. they must be ‘freestanding’.
This moral intuition is in reective equi-
librium with the reasonable choice that we
3. The Choice of a Concept
make behind the veil of ignorance. If we
are then asked to choose between different After accepting the basic ethical idea, we
developments of social welfare, dened in need to choose between general concepts.
terms of quality of life, we may consider the The fundamental choice is between ‘weak’
following options : and ‘strong’ sustainability. Both concepts
62
say the least, it is highly uncertain whether if economists accept the necessity of critical
we will be able to do so. The multifunctional- natural capital, they implicitly drop the as-
ity of ecosystems in conjunction with uncer- sumption of unlimited substitutability.
tainty speaks in favour of a ‘constant natural These arguments in mind, the choice be-
capital rule’. tween weak and strong sustainability is not
Fourth argument. The case of the Pacic is- a matter of belief. Rational persons behind
land of Nauru is a paradigm example against the veil of ignorance have good reasons to
weak sustainability. Heavy mining has almost discard weak sustainability. If so, our concept
completely destroyed the island’s natural en- of sustainable development should better
vironment. Today, the inhabitants afford a rest on the principle that, prima facie, natu-
high living standard from the interests of ral capital should be kept constant over time
their accumulated capital. They import food because it is almost impossible to draw a line
and freshwater. At a rst look, life seems between its critical and non-critical com-
comfortable in Nauru’s coastal settlements. ponents. We should better choose strong
According to the measures of weak sustaina- sustainability as a guide to our actions. In-
bility, it is the most sustainable country of termediate concepts that emphasise the pre-
the world. However, the average quality of cautionary principle and the safe minimum
life has not increased. Many people suffer standard come to very similar conclusions :
from poor health or alcoholism,9 and the Modern environmental policy must be an
life expectancy of males is decreasing. The actively precautionary policy that conserves
case of Nauru shows that weak sustainability and invests in natural capital.10
ignores some crucial parameters of human
welfare.
4. What Is Natural Capital ?
Fifth argument. Articial and natural capi-
tal are often complementary. This is Daly’s The contested notion of natural capital,
(1996) main argument. Complementarity, which is at the heart of strong sustainabil-
as Daly understands it, means that several ity, comprehends natural resources like fresh-
kinds of capital (i. e. means of production) water, soil, forests, sh, the ozone layer, the
are necessary to ensure a continued stream of climate system, ecosystem services and func-
useful goods. If one kind of capital vanishes, tions, species richness, genetic diversity, and
the stream of goods declines or stops. For units of cultural signicance. Many compo-
example, shing vessels and sh or sawmills nents of natural capital are living beings or
and forests are complementary goods. On results of life, like coal or crude oil.
their own, Daly’s argument do not justify Natural capital is characterised by inter-
adopting strong sustainability. But as part of nal and dynamic complexity. Its components
a more comprehensive line of reasoning, the form a network of relationships. In principle,
complementarity argument counts. they are mutually non-substitutable (e. g.,
Sixth argument. Many economists now ac- fertile soil cannot be substituted with clean
cept that a minimum stock of natural capital air). Landscapes are ‘units of signicance’ 11
is critical for human survival and well-being. and, as such, components of natural capital
If so, weak sustainability needs to integrate that should be preserved (see Chapter 9). Es-
a notion of critical natural capital, includ- pecially with regard to landscapes, a complex
ing criteria for its determination. These will understanding of natural capital must also
be both economic criteria for genuine sav- consider different degrees of ‘naturalness’.
ings and physical or ecological criteria. But
64