968
3, AUGUST 2000
Energy and Ancillary Service Dispatch for the Interim
ISO New England Electricity Market
Kwok W. Cheung, Senior Member, IEEE, Payman Shamsollahi, Member, IEEE, David Sun, Member, IEEE,
James Milligan, and Mike Potishnak
Abstract—Since the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
(FERC) order no. 888 has mandated the establishment of unbun-
dled electricity markets in the newly deregulated environment,
competitive bidding of ancillary services, along with bidding
of energy, becomes increasingly important. In this paper, an
optimization-based framework for solving a multi-commodity
electricity market dispatch problem is presented. In compliance
with New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) Market Rules and Pro-
cedures, a hybrid dispatch method which combines the sequential
dispatch method with the joint dispatch method is proposed to
solve the energy and ancillary dispatch problem for ISO New
England (ISO-NE). Numerical results on a 6-unit test system and
the 324-unit ISO-NE system are included.
Index Terms—Automatic generation control, deregulation, elec-
tricity market, energy and reserve dispatch, system operator.
I. INTRODUCTION
I SO NEW England Inc. (ISO-NE) was established on
July 1, 1997 following its approval by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC). In the newly deregulated
environment, ISO-NE will operate both the bulk power genera-
tion and transmission systems and the wholesale electric power
market for New England. In compliance with FERC’s orders,
like other competitive power pools, ISO-NE is designing and
implementing new methods of operation and dispatch that are
based on bids and offers submitted by market participants [1].
In this “brave new world” of deregulation, energy price is no
longer cost-driven but energy itself is treated as a competitive
commodity [2]. Market participants offer energy into the com-
petitive pool for each trading interval. At the first glance, it may
seem that the energy dispatch process in a price-based competi-
tive pool is very similar to the conventional, cost-based dispatch
except the incremental costs of energy production are replaced
by bid prices. However, it should be noted that bid prices can
vary according to bidding strategies that a supplier might follow
and may be quite different from actual costs which are much
more predictable and manageable from a dispatcher’s point of
view.
The other challenge for operation and dispatch is the issue
of dealing with competitive bidding of other products such as
contingency reserves and regulation capacity, or the so-called
ancillary services. As the electric industry moves toward full
Manuscript received February 14, 2000.
K. W. Cheung, P. Shamsollahi, and D. Sun are with ALSTOM ESCA Corpo-
ration, Bellevue, WA 98004 USA.
J. Milligan and M. Potishnak are with ISO New England Inc., Holyoke, MA
01040 USA.
Publisher Item Identifier S 0885-8950(00)07730-0.
0885–8950/00$10.00 © 2000 IEEE
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 15, NO.
competition and deregulation, the various services previously
provided by utilities are being unbundled. Much of the attention
given to some ISO development has focused on the structures
of markets for energy and transmission, but the design of mar-
kets for ancillary services also requires serious attention and is
getting more critical.
Beside ISO-New England Electricity Market, other elec-
tricity markets including New Zealand Electricity Market
[3], Australian National Electricity Market [4], WEPEX in
California [5], also allow competitive bidding of energy and
ancillary services. In these markets, market participants can bid
in ancillary services, similar in principle to their bids for the
energy commodity. The ISO would then dispatch these other
types of bids, along with energy bids, according to applicable
market rules.
In the literature, several alternative methods are available for
energy and ancillary service dispatch: merit-order-based dis-
patch, sequential dispatch, and joint dispatch. These methods
reflect tradeoffs among the rigor of feasibility and optimality
for efficient market operation, the practicality of results for
physical power system operation, and the complexity of
implementing bid clearing application software [6]. This paper
presents experience gained from the design and implementation
of the ISO-NE Electricity Market System project. In particular,
our focus is on our proposed dispatch method for energy and
ancillary services, and the framework which supports the
development of such a dispatch method. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. Section II describes the basic market
structure of ISO-NE. An optimization-based framework for
solving multi-commodity electricity market dispatch problem
is presented in Section III. In compliance with NEPOOL
Market Rules and Procedures [7], a hybrid dispatch method
which combines the sequential dispatch method with joint
dispatch method to solve the energy and ancillary dispatch
problem of ISO-NE is presented in Section IV. Numerical
results on a 6-unit test system and the 324-unit ISO-NE system
are included in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. MARKET STRUCTURE OF ISO-NE
The evolution of ISO-NE operation to market orientation in-
cludes the following seven wholesale electricity market com-
modities to be provided by NEPOOL market participants:
1) Energy
2) Automatic Generation Control (AGC)
3) Ten Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR)
4) Ten Minute Non-Spinning Reserve (TMNSR)
CHEUNG et al.: SERVICE DISPATCH FOR THE INTERIM ISO NEW ENGLAND ELECTRICITY MARKET
5) Thirty Minute Operating Reserve (TMOR)
6) Operable Capability
7) Installed Capability
Of these seven commodities, only the first five which affect
system operation decisions in real-time are addressed in this
paper. All commodities except the first one are considered as
ancillary services.
Energy is the primary commodity of all markets. An energy
bid is an offer to supply or consume energy (MWh) at a price
($). The energy bid must include the entire capability range of
the resource, which may be modeled, for each hour, by up to ten
blocks of energy with monotonically nondecreasing prices. Zero
priced energy block may be used to represent self-scheduled
energy.
AGC is the regulating capability, under automatic generation
control, that responds in an effort to continuously balance the
ISO-NE Control Area’s supply resources with minute to minute
load variations in order to meet the NERC and NPCC Control
Performance Standards. An AGC bid will be in the form of $ per
hour to provide AGC service. Regulating capacity is converted
to an AGC commodity called a “Reg” which is a weighted av-
erage of the MW’s of response available in ten minutes and in
sixty minutes.
TMSR is a resource capacity synchronized to the system
which is a) able to immediately begin to supply energy or
reduce demand, b) fully available within ten minutes, and
c) able to be sustained for a period of at least thirty minutes to
provide first contingency protection. A TMSR bid submitted by
a market participant is an offer to supply TMSR to the market
at a price ($ per MW).
TMNSR is a resource capacity nonsynchronized to the
system, which is a) able to supply energy or reduce demand,
b) fully available within ten minutes, and c) able to be sus-
tained for a period of at least thirty minutes to provide first
contingency protection. A TMNSR bid submitted by a market
participant is an offer to supply TMNSR to the market at a
price ($ per MW).
TMOR is a resource capacity nonsynchronized to the system,
which is a) able to supply energy or reduce demand, b) fully
available within thirty minutes, and c) able to be sustained for a
period of at least sixty minutes to provide second contingency
protection. A TMOR bid submitted by a market participant is
an offer to supply TMOR to the market at a price ($ per MW).
For the interim market, market participants submit hourly
bids for the next day for all energy and ancillary services.
ISO-NE uses this information to dispatch generating resources
based on bid-clearing methodology. The interim market
methodology calls for dispatching and scheduling based on
optimized use of daily bids for energy, reserve and regulating
capacity. Most information necessary for the settlement process
will be derived from market data and dispatch solutions. The
new dispatch and scheduling subsystems require interfaces with
the existing Energy Management System (EMS), a bidding and
settlement system, and a resource commitment application.
The objective of scheduling and dispatch is to provide optimal
solutions to the ISO New England market using bids of energy,
regulating capacity and reserve to satisfy the demand for energy
while maintaining the required levels of generating reserve and
969
regulating capacity and operating within the safe capability of
generation and transmission equipment.
The scheduling function optimizes the clearing of bids for en-
ergy, regulating capacity and reserve to meet forecasted hourly
demand. The scheduling horizon should be variable and se-
lectable by the operator, but not to exceed 48 hours. The length
of each trading period for scheduling is one hour except for the
first period which is the fractional hour remaining in the current
hour. Only valid bids from available resources will be sched-
uled. The scheduling function will not perform inter-temporal
optimization except for ramp rate constraints from the previous
trading interval.
The dispatch function runs automatically every five minutes.
Its bid-clearing results are used to update generation setpoints as
input to automatic generation control. In addition, five-minute
dispatch computes clearing prices for the ancillary service mar-
kets and calculates Lost Opportunity Costs (LOC) for TMSR
and AGC markets.
For the AGC market, the dispatch function ranks eligible
AGC bids according to rules reflecting system condition and
regulation capacity price, and recommends to the operator
which generators should be selected for AGC duty. Based on
the rank from the dispatch function, the operator can make
rational decisions of assigning generators on or off AGC.
III. OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK
The bid-clearing model of the ISO-NE dispatch and sched-
uling functions is formulated as a constrained optimization
problem. The objective is to maximize market benefits which
is equivalent to minimizing the sum of costs to energy and an-
cillary service offers. The objective function of the bid-clearing
model is described as follows:
Min MW
(1)
where
is an index to a market node; A market node defines
the location of a market participant;
denotes an index to a bus (reference node) of the net-
work;
denotes an index to a bid type in the bid type set
ENOF, LDOF, AGC, TMSR, TMNSR, TMOR ;
ENOF and LDOF denote energy offer and demand
bid, respectively;
denotes an index to a trader;
denotes the study interval within the study period;
denotes an index to a MW band of a bid.
MW denotes the band MW of band
of bid type at market node , reference node at time
by trader . By convention, Band MW is negative for demand
bids and positive for all the other bids.
A. Band (Bid Block) MW Limits
Band MW is constrained by band MW limit.
For energy and reserve bid blocks (positive):
(2.1)
970 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 15, NO. 3, AUGUST 2000

For energy demand bid blocks (negative):
(2.2)
Note that denotes the band price
($/MW) of band of bid type at commercial market node
, reference node at time by trader . Band price,
, is calculated with reference to the
reference node based on the original band price at market node
and intra-regional loss factor as in (3):
of AGC ranges of trader at market node ;
denotes the AGC range selected by the dispatcher for each
generator on AGC.
C. Capacity Constraints
Generators have limited capacities to produce energy and at
the same time to provide ancillary services. These are defined
as capacity constraints as follows:

(7)
(3) where denotes the maximum of capacity
available, denotes the capacity assigned
where denotes the raw band to AGC in the upward direction,
price ($/MW) at market node submitted by trader , and
denotes the intra-area loss factor at market MW
node connected to reference node at time .
(8)
B. Ramp Rate Constraints MW
A generating unit has limits on its ability to move from one
level of MW generation to another within a specified time pe- (9)
riod. Generation ramp-rate constraints are modeled as follows: MW
Up-ramp rate constraints are:
(10)

(4.1) are the capacity for TMSR, TMNSR and TMOR, respectively.
For generators on AGC, the following additional constraints
Down-ramp rate constraints are: apply:

(4.2) (9a)
where
(10a)
where denotes the capacity assigned to
AGC in the downward direction, and
if (5)
are the automatic high and low limits
is dispatchable of the selected AGC range for the AGC-capable generator of
Fixed if trader at market node at time , respectively.
is non-dispatchable The following inequalities describe the constraints of ten-
minute reserve coupling and thirty-minute reserve coupling for
denotes the MW energy generation at market node by generators, respectively:
trader at time denotes the dispatch period in minute: 60
for 60-min pre-dispatch scheduling, and 5 for 5-min dispatch;
FixedMW is the fixed basepoint at market node
by trader at time if the generator at time is considered if is online
as fixed. if is offline
(11)

(6)
if is on AGC if is online
if is o AGC if is offline
(12)
denotes the ramp rate limit (MW/min) for the generator
of trader at market node ; and and are the capacity of
denote the automatic response rate and the trader at market node can be claimed in ten minutes
manual response rate, respectively; denotes the number and thirty minutes, respectively, when the trader is offline.
CHEUNG et al.: SERVICE DISPATCH FOR THE INTERIM ISO NEW ENGLAND ELECTRICITY MARKET 971

D. System Requirements
The following equality and inequalities characterize the
system requirements of ISO-NE:

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

where
is the system demand which includes
area net interchange and load,
, , and are the requirements for TMSR,
TMNSR, and TMOR, respectively,
, , and are the requirements for upward, down-
ward, and total AGC regulation, respec-
tively.
Fig. 1. Flow chart of ISO-NE hybrid dispatch method.

This approach is intuitive. However, its inability to determine

(20)
(21)
(22)
where is a tunable constant used to weight the mix of ten
minute and sixty minute response for the AGC commodity.
Note that the clearing of the AGC market (20)–(22) is a set
of procedures based on ranked price and energy dispatch tar-
gets. As a result, the optimization framework does not directly
enforce AGC requirements for the system. However, as part of
the hybrid dispatch method described in the next section, the ef-
fects of AGC clearing are fully recognized by the energy and
other reserve markets.
IV. HYBRID DISPATCH METHOD
Sequential dispatch and joint (simultaneous) dispatch are
two current alternatives for dispatching energy and ancillary
services.
Based on a priority sequence of market commodities, the se-
quential approach progressively reduces available capacity of
each resource to meet system requirements for each commodity.
the best tradeoffs in sharing limited resource capacity for en-
ergy and ancillary services may result in higher prices or even
insufficient supply for the lower priority commodities. On the
other hand, the simultaneous approach is based on formulating
the dispatch problem in the context of constrained optimiza-
tion which provides improved coordination of energy and ancil-
lary service dispatch to achieve the most secure and economic
solution.
For the interim market of ISO-NE, it is necessary to explic-
itly evaluate TMSR lost opportunity, AGC lost opportunity, and
the clearing of AGC market which require the intermediate so-
lutions of a sequential dispatch. In order to meet the functional
requirements for the interim market, a hybrid approach of com-
bining sequential dispatch with joint dispatch is developed to
clear all markets. The hybrid dispatch method consists of a se-
ries of Linear Programming (LP) solutions as depicted in Fig. 1
which not only provide intermediate solutions for the calcula-
tion of lost opportunity costs as well as the ranking and the
clearing of AGC market, but also try to minimize the nega-
tive impact on performance and effectiveness that sequential
clearing may result. Note that the prime character associated
with each market in a particular LP solution denotes that the dis-
patch solution of that market is frozen when the LP solution is
performed. For example, in LP4 means the energy dispatch
solution is frozen in the fourth LP solution.
There are four LP solutions in the present configuration for
each dispatch run:
972 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 15, NO. 3, AUGUST 2000

[LP1] —pure energy dispatch honoring manual oper-

ating limit and manual response rate constraints
[LP2] —pure energy dispatch honoring AGC range
limit and auto response rate constraints for units
selected to be on AGC
[LP3] —simultaneous dispatch of energy
and TMSR honoring AGC constraints and AGC
capacity reservation for units selected to be on AGC
[LP4] —simultaneous dispatch TMNSR
and TMOR honoring previous clearing of the
other markets.
The AGC Bid Evaluation process calculates potential Regs
(up/down & total) and computes AGC ranking price for each
eligible AGC range using an estimated energy-only solution of
LP1. The AGC ranking price includes estimates of payments for
AGC capacity reservation, AGC service, lost opportunity, and Fig. 2. Calculation of TMSR LOC for settlement.
uplift. It also has some look-ahead features to improve stability
of the AGC market. where
The AGC Suggestor process suggests generators and their
ranges for AGC duty, based on AGC ranking price, until the up-
ward, downward, and total Reg requirements are met. The AGC
suggestion process is only a recommendation to the operator for
the dispatch function. For the scheduling function, AGC sugges-
tion could actually be used for clearing the AGC market. such that
The AGC Capacity Reservation process will reserve upward
AGC capability for units selected for AGC so that five minutes
of upward AGC response is excluded from the TMSR market.
All market clearing prices, except for the AGC market, are set and
by the shadow prices of their corresponding market requirement
constraints, which may be over-written by floor prices under (24)
specific, special conditions. The AGC Clearing Price (AGCCP),
on the other hand, is calculated by the following procedures: denotes the energy bid price as a function of MW, is
I. For each generator selected for AGC, calculate the Reg the index pointing to the bid band of MW, and denotes the
for the range and response rate being used Energy Clearing Price. Note that the shaded area in Fig. 2 repre-
II. Divide its AGC bid price in $/hr by its Reg calculated sents the payment of TMSR Lost Opportunity for .
in (22) The AGC lost opportunities are also computed similarly in the
III. Set AGCCP to the highest values of $/Reg-hr LOC Calculation module.
For settlement purpose, intermediate energy dispatch solu-
tions for LP1 and LP2 are buffered so that they can be com- V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
pared against that of LP3 for the purpose of calculating lost op-
This section presents the results of case studies. Two case
portunity cost for AGC and TMSR markets, respectively. For
example, the TMSR Lost Opportunity MW (TMSRLOMMW) studies are performed, one using a 6-unit system and another
is determined by comparing the generation assignment (Gen) using ISO-NE system data. The first study is used to illustrate
between LP3 and LP2: the steps involved in the hybrid dispatch method as described in
the previous section. The second study is used to demonstrate
results and the impact of ancillary services on clearing prices
on a real system. The scheduling function is employed to obtain
results for both cases.
where
A. 6-Unit Test System
for
In this system, system demand is 1650 MW. TMSR, TMNSR
and TMOR requirements are 130 MW, 120 MW and 120 MW,
TMSR Lost Opportunity Cost ($/MW) is computed as:
respectively. Total, up and down regulating reserve (AGC) re-
quirements are 90, 45 and 18 Regs, respectively. It is assumed
that the operator has chosen units C and G to be on AGC. Bid
price data for the system is shown in Table I.
Table II shows the MW dispatch of each unit in LP1. It also
(23)
shows the Manual High Limit (MHL), Manual Low Limit
CHEUNG et al.: SERVICE DISPATCH FOR THE INTERIM ISO NEW ENGLAND ELECTRICITY MARKET
TABLE I
BIDDING PRICES FOR DIFFERENT MARKETS AND UNITS
TABLE II
RESULTS OF LP1 (ENERGY SOLUTION ONLY)
TABLE III
RESULTS OF LP2 AND AGC CAPACITY RESERVATION
(MLL) and the energy bid price of each unit. Note that, in this
LP1 solution, units F and G are constrained at their lower limits
because of their high energy bid price while units A, B and C
are at their upper limits because of their relatively cheap energy.
The next step after LP1 in the flow chart (as shown in Fig. 1),
is AGC Bid Evaluation based on which AGC Suggestor works.
At this point, AGC Suggestor chooses units D and G to be on
AGC. It is important to note that the outcomes of AGC Sug-
gestor is solely a recommendation to operators. However, if the
suggestion were implemented, AGCCP would be $0.047.
Since unit C has actually been selected by the operator to be
on AGC, it is backed down from 400 MW to 300 MW in order to
honor its Automatic High Limit (AHL). In this case, the AGCCP
becomes $0.083 which is higher than that of the AGC Suggestor.
Table III shows the energy cleared, Automatic High/Low Limits
(AHL/ALL) and Up/Dn AGC capacity reserved.
After LP2 and AGC Capacity Reservation, LP3 is performed
which clears energy and TMSR markets simultaneously while
freezing capacities reserved for AGC. The mutual coupling of
energy, AGC and TMSR markets are clearly observed. As a re-
sult, the most expensive energy bid is now cleared at $50 instead
of $40 in LP1 and LP2. This is because of the fact that gener-
ating capacity is limited. Therefore, part of capacity cleared for
973
TABLE IV
RESULTS OF LP3 AND AGC REGS
TABLE V
RESULTS OF LP4 (FINAL MARKET SOLUTION)
energy has to be backed down to make room for reserve require-
ments. This will make the system to use capacity of a more ex-
pensive unit for energy market, resulting in higher ECP. Table IV
demonstrates the result of this study. As it is seen in the table,
unit D has been backed down 40 MW to provide TMSR. There-
fore, a TMSR LOC is expected for this unit. Unit F has picked
up the extra 40 MW (hence the reason for $50 ECP). Up/Dn
AGC Regs provided by each unit are also shown in the table.
LP4 is the last LP to be solved. In this step, the previous solu-
tions for energy, AGC, and TMSR are frozen and the nonspin-
ning reserve markets are dispatched simultaneously. Results of
LP4 are shown in Table V.
TMSR and AGC lost opportunity compensation is accounted
in the last step of the flow chart, LOC Calculation. Since unit D
has been backed down to provide TMSR. This creates 40 MW
of TMSRLOMW and 10 $/MW of TMSRLOC.
B. ISO-NE System
The ISO-NE system consists of 324 generating units in
180 market nodes. There are about 2500 constraints and
3800 variables, a big portion of which is due to sophisticated
reserve and ramp models. The simulated data contain a total
number of 1300 bid blocks. System demand and energy
clearing price are 15 500 MW and $20 respectively. Reserve
requirements of TMSR, TMNSR and TMOR are 800 MW,
450 MW and 400 MW respectively. Total, up and down AGC
regulating requirements are 600, 210 and 90 Regs respectively.
AGC, TMSR, TMNSR and TMOR clearing prices are $0.1, $5,
$0 and $0, respectively.
If regulating and reserve requirements are kept constant, en-
ergy price will vary with demand. This effect has been shown in
Fig. 3. In this figure, series 1 represents the results with TMSR,
TMNSR and TMOR requirement equal to 800 MW, 450 MW
and 400 MW, respectively. For series 2, these requirements are
974
Fig. 3. Energy price vs. demand for ISO-NE System.
1200 MW, 550 MW and 500 MW. For both series, the AGC re-
quirements are kept constant.
For demands higher than 15 300 MW in series 2, the simu-
lated system has deficiency in capacity and therefore no price is
shown. As it is seen in the figure, when reserve requirements in-
crease, the system goes to deficiency state sooner and the price
is higher for near saturation demands.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the design and implementation of the
energy and ancillary service dispatch for the interim ISO-NE
electricity market. An LP-based bid-clearing framework is
presented and a hybrid dispatch method is proposed to solve
the multi-commodity electricity market dispatch problem for
ISO-NE. As of this writing, April 1, 1999 is the tentative market
opening day for the interim electricity market in New England.
After a review of the existing market rules, potential areas
of improvements which include location-based transmission
congestion pricing, demand-side bidding, and multi-settlement
have already been identified for the final market of ISO-NE. As
the ISO-NE Market System continues to mature, experiences
gained from operation will help facilitating enhancements and
implementations of market rules and operation procedures in
the future.
REFERENCES
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“Functional requirments of energy and ancillary service dispatch for
the interim ISO New England electricity market,” in Proceedings of
IEEE/PES 1999 Winter Meeting, New York, NY, USA.
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[2] F. C. Schweppe, M. C. Caramanis, R. D. Tabors, and R. E. Robn, Spot
Pricing of Electricity: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
[3] “Rules of New Zealand electricity market,”, http://www.emco.co.nz/.
[4] “Australian national electricity code, Version 2.0,”, http://elec-
tricity.net.au/codrule.htm.
[5] “California ISO scheduling applications functional requirements
(Revised 1/21/97),”, http://www.energyonline.com/wepex/reports/re-
ports2.html#ISO bus.
[6] X. Ma, D. Sun, and K. Cheung, “Energy and reserve dispatch in a
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Kwok W. Cheung received his B.S. from National Cheng Kung University,
Taiwan, in 1986, his M.S. from University of Texas at Arlington, in 1988, and
his Ph.D. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY in 1991, all in elec-
trical engineering. He joined ALSTOM ESCA Corporation in October 1991. His
current interests include deregulation applications and power system stability.
Dr. Cheung is a registered Professional Engineer of the State of Washington.
Payman Shamsollahi received his B.S. (1989) and M.S. (1990) degrees from
Tehran University, Iran, and Ph.D. (1997) degree from University of Calgary,
Canada, all in electrical engineering. He joined ALSTOM ESCA Corporation
in 1997. His main interests are deregulation applications, artificial intelligence
and power system control.
David Sun joined ALSTOM ESCA Corporation in June 1980. He received his
B.S. and M.S. from Rensselaer Polytahnic Institute, and his Ph.D. from Univer-
sity of Texas at Arlington, in 1974, 1976, and 1980, respectively, all in electrical
engineering. His current focus is on the planning and development of deregula-
tion applications.
James Milligan received his B.S. in electrical engineering from Western New
England College in 1976. He has been with NEPOOL and ISO-New England
since 1976 and is presently Manager, Engineering for ISO-New England System
Operations and Reliability. In this capacity his primary responsibility is the
overall coordination of the Energy Management System support for ISO-NE
Operations functions.
Mike Potishnak received his B.S. in electrical engineering from Newark Col-
lege of Engineering (NJIT) in 1972. He was an Engineer with Con Edison from
1972–1976. He received his M.S. in mechanical engineering from Colorado
State University in 1978. From 1978 to 1989, he was a Senior Engineer of Public
Service Company of Colorado. Since 1989, he has been with NEPOOL and is
currently a Principal Engineer of ISO New England.