Internal

Displacement in Acholiland, Northern Uganda

Simon Addison Refugee Studies Centre University of Oxford simon.addison@qeh.ox.ac.uk

Uganda

Uganda: Basic Facts (2006)

Independence: PopulaOon: Life expectancy: HIV/AIDS: GNI: GNI per capita: GDP growth: Poverty: Agricultural popn: Budget support: 1962 31 million; 3.2% growth rate 51 1.1 million $10.5 billion $340 5.1 % 38 % 82 % 11 % of GDP; 50% of expenditure
Source: World Bank (2007)

Yoweri Museveni
Came to power in 1986 aber a long guerrilla war against regimes of Obote and Okello Rapidly installed a new system of government: The NaOonal Resistance Movement (NRM) Sought acOvely to redress perceived imbalances of power between north and south Has faced over 20 insurgent groups since seizing power Highly militarized government that while seeking to liberalize the economy is highly dependent bilateral aid

 Uganda: Development
Full implementaOon of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP): macro-economic stabilisaOon, trade liberalisaOon, decit spending constraint, and privaOsaOon. First HIPC country to receive debt relief GDP growth rates increased from -3.3 % in 1985 to 11.3 % in 1995 before stabilising at 5.9 % in 2005

InaOon shrank from 155 % in 1985 to 5 % 2004.

 Uganda: Development
Incidence of poverty at the naOonal level declined from 56 % in 1992 to 37.3 % in 2003. NaOonal HIV/AIDS infecOon rates dropped from 18 % (1992) to 6.4% in 2005. Rural access to safe water sources increased from levels as low as 7.4 per cent in 1982 to 55 per cent in 2004 Universal primary educaOon introduced

Uganda: Uneven Development

Poverty Northern Uganda 66% NaOonal average 35% Increasing steadily in North while naOonal growth rates increases (04) Principle drivers of poverty: Colonial policies Chronic lack of investment Drought (climate change) Caile raiding by Karamojong and Sudanese Conict

Uganda: Conict
Almost constant conict over 40 years since independence Internal conict has claimed well over 500,000 lives PoliOcal violence and coups detat: Milton Obote (I) post-independence Idi Amin 1971 Milton Obote (II) 1980 Yoweri Museveni 1985 Various rebel facOons UDF, ADF, LRA, HSM etc. Pockets of communal/tribal violence Engagement in internaOonal conicts DRC South Sudan

Conict: Northern Uganda

Acholi Insurgencies
Dates March 1986 - July 1988 Late 1986 - December 1987 January 1988 - August 1989 Late 1987 - 1991 1991 - Present Insurgency Ugandan People's Defence Army Holy Spirit Mobile Forces Holy Spirit Movement Uganda ChrisOan DemocraOc Army Lord's Resistance Army UPDA HSM I HSM II UCDA LRA Leadership Former UNLA ocers Alice Lakwena Severino Likoya Joseph Kony Joseph Kony

Lords Resistance Army

Led by Joseph Kony since the late 1980s Millenarian spirit cult informed by Acholi religion, apocalypOc ChrisOanity and some Muslim doctrine. Purportedly sought to liberate Ugandans by overthrow of the Museveni regime, the conquest of evil and establishment of a state founded upon the 10 commandments Senior command of former UNLA soldiers Force size generally unknown but with a sizeable number of child/youth combatants (est. 5,000 in 2004; 75% abducted) Based in Southern Sudan with support from GoS unOl 2006 Now operates from within DRC (Garamba forest)

Violence in Acholiland
LRA: Arbitrary aiacks on villages, camps, public transport LRA targets civilians, rarely engages UPDF UPDF: Violence against civilians to force encampment UPDF: SystemaOc violence against civilians in camps, arbitrary arrest, torture and disappearances Rape and sexual slavery commonplace 1,000 violent deaths a month (WHO 2005) Rates of violent death : 142 per week Average of 19 people killed violently each day Excess death rates : 122 people per day Civil Society Organiza2ons for Peace in Northern Uganda (2006)

LRA AbducOon
Typically children between 12 and 18 Trained as soldiers or taken as wives Youngsters oben make the most eecOve killers UNICEF esOmate: up to 30,000 children had been abducted by 2005 Cycle of abductee suering: AbducOon, iniOaOon, forced labour, sexual violence, starvaOon, forced killing, execuOon

Internal Displacement
1.7 million known to be living in IDP camps (2005) 1 million living in 200 camps in Acholiland 95% of populaOon of Acholiland Area the size of Belgium depopulated Extremely high levels of populaOon density

Security & ProtecOon

Constant threat of aiack from LRA in camps, villages, elds and along highways SystemaOc failure of UPDF protecOon in camps (average of 1 soldier per 1,000 civilians) Threat of abducOon, parOcularly of youth 40,000 night-commuters across the region InOmidaOon and violence at hands of UPDF Murder of civilians by LRA & UPDF Increased general levels of SGBV

Service Provision
Collapse of health care system Closure of vast majority of health centres due to insecurity Collapse of water supply and sanitaOon infrastructure (2004) Average of 1 protected water source per 2,500 people (Sphere standard = 1:500) Per capita consumpOon of 2-6 l/day (Sphere = 15 l/day) Average of 6 hours waiOng Ome at boreholes Average of 1 latrine per 1,500 people (Sphere = 1:20) Collapse of educaOon system 80% schools closed 240,000 children without access to educaOon

Morbidity & Mortality

Increased public health risks in IDP camps
Malaria Diarrhoea Upper Respiratory InfecOon MalnutriOon

Excess deaths : 122 per day 3 x higher than recorded for Darfur in Oct 2005 CMR: 1.54/10,000/day across Acholiland; 2.79/10,000/day in some camps in Pader and Lira (0.46 rest of Uganda) 103 deaths from war-related disease per day <5yrs mortality rate : 3.18 /10,000/day; reaching 5.4/10,000/day in some locaOons

Livelihoods
Poor land access: PopulaOon density, land availability, security 78 % of households with no access to land Lack of access to seeds, livestock and land Lack of access to inputs and training Climate Change: More variability and less reliability in rainfall High land rents in camps Collapse of local culOvaOon Loss of assets via looOng, displacement and survival spending Market stagnaOon Acute inaOon in food prices 65% of camp inhabitants lived in absolute poverty

Food Security Crisis

Chronic food insecurity Global acute malnutriOon of 18-20 % (UNICEF 2003) Chronic malnutriOon in U5s in Gulu of 41.4 % (ACF 2003) 84% dependency on food aid Inadequate coverage by WFP WFP provided only 60% raOon 48% of children in Kitgum stunted

Social Collapse
Collapse of family life Reported collapse of local culture Inability to carry out ritual pracOces Collapse of tradiOonal leadership structures Collapse of judicial system formal and tradiOonal Collapse of educaOon ad health systems

Psychic & Moral Distress

An MSF survey in Pader Town (2004) reported that: 63% of the populaOon had experienced the disappearance or abducOon of a family member 58% reported the death of a family member due to the insurgency 79% had witnessed torture 40% had witnessed a killing 5% of the populaOon had been forced to physically harm another person 62% of women interviewed had considered suicide

Humanitarian Space
IDP camps accessible only with military escort Kitgum 19 86 per cent Gulu 35 66 per cent Pader 30 100 per cent IDP camps accessible without military escort Kitgum 3 14 per cent Gulu 18 44 per cent Pader 0 0 per cent
UNOCHA (2005)

Impacts

Extreme levels of physical and social suffering Collapse of regional economy Collapse of Acholi cultural and social relations Destruction of social, economic and political capital A lost generation of Acholi youth Development of a culture of fear and dependency

Impacts
worlds largest forgotten emergency (Jan Egeland, 2003) worlds most serious protection crisis (CSOPNU, 2004) Massive human rights violations committed by both LRA and GoU, principally against members of a single ethnic group Acholi Described as: social torture (Chris Dolan) structural violence (Sverker Finnstrom) genocide (Olara Otunnu)

Rights in Crisis

Humanitarian protection is concerned with preventing or mitigating the most damaging effects (direct or indirect) of armed conflict on the civilian population, and it relates to the principal threats that are experienced by civilians living in the field of conflict State has primary responsibility for protection of civilians affected by/displaced by conflict Principal threats in northern Uganda:

Violence: and the threat of violence Coercion: such as forced displacement, forced labour and movement restrictions Deprivation: Including lack of access to resources, services, security and freedom

Failure of Response: State

No systemaOc state humanitarian response Museveni: refusal to idenOfy as state of emergency or disaster area Focus on military strategy defeat of LRA in Sudan Poor capacity of Oce of Prime Minister Focus on development planning and MDGs World Bank Social AcOon Fund for Northern Uganda

Lack of Response: InternaOonal

Pre 2004, few humanitarian agencies present Inadequate CAP funding Lack of aienOon, both by Uganda programmes and internaOonally (esp UN) Focus on Ugandan development miracle

Jan Egeland
Visited country in December 2003 Damning assessment of the situaOon Massive increase in internaOonal response Pressure on Ugandan government to act

IDP Policy
Drabed by OCHA for the OPM 2001 Not passed by Parliament unOl 2006 Provided framework for relief intervenOons of both state and internaOonal actors Framed situaOon as one of internal displacement Advocated use of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as principal tool

Internally displaced persons are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to ee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in parOcular as a result of or in order to avoid the eects of armed conict, situaOons of generalised violence, violaOons of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internaOonally recognised State border." Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

PracOces of Displacement
A series of increasingly comprehensive displacement orders that were applied to the populaOon of a discrete territory which consOtuted only a porOon of the conict- aected region That this territory was the home of a disOnct ethno- linguisOc group the Acholi That these orders were execuOve order made by the President and executed by the Ugandan army The orders were made without reference to Uganda law and without consultaOon with Ugandan Parliament

PracOces of Displacement 2
Established a de facto state of emergency without actually declaring a state of emergency (for which adequate legal provisions exist) Enacted a state of excepOon which was dened territorially around the Districts of Acholiland The displacements transformed Acholiland into a free-re zone dissolving the disOncOon between civilian and combatant The UPDF was able to kill civilians with almost total impunity, Severe physical, social, poliOcal, juridical, cultural and psychological degradaOon reduced the populaOon of Acholiland to an abject animal existence

Regroupement, involves the massive forced movement of enOre communiOes to sites at varying distances from their homes. These sites typically lack all basic services, are someOmes on the sides or tops of steep hills and, while ocially administered by civilian authoriOes, are in pracOce under the control of military units. In many cases communiOes have been moved with no prior noOce, in the middle of the night, and are allowed to take only what they can carry. Their homes are then oben looted. Policy On Forced Reloca2on (Regroupement) In Burundi Inter-agency Standing CommiNee (2000)

The Failure to Protect

Encampment failed to protect civilians from any of the major threats of violence, coercion and deprivaOon The displacement was unconsOtuOonal in its operaOon in that it produced a de facto state of emergency that placed the Acholi territory and its residents into a state of excepOon with regard to the law The manner of displacement was in clear breach of the arOcles and principles of internaOonal law that govern such displacements in Ome of war

ProtecOon as Torture
The encampment of the populaOon became one of the principle causes of a chronic and highly destrucOve process of morOcaOon or social torture that undermined the physical, social, cultural and economic integrity of a quite clearly dened ethnic group Humanitarian organisaOons, due to a failure of analysis and will and because of poliOcal constraints became complicit in this process

Humanitarian Dilemmas
Humanitarian agencies were very slow to respond OperaOonal constraints security, funding, lack of analysis PoliOcal constraints Lack of willingness to acknowledge Uganda as a potenOal crisis state Failure to adequately acknowledge the GoUs role in creaOng and perpetuaOng the rights crisis, parOcularly with regard to the policy of encampment Provision of assistance in camps eecOvely concreOsed the camps and tacitly supported the strategy of containment that was the one of the main contribuOng factors to the humanitarian crisis Humanitarians faced a classic dilemma of whether or not to conOnue providing assistance or to pull out in an aiempt to do no harm None took the second opOon, even though most humanitarians agreed that intervenOons were achieving liile if any impact.

Discourses of Necessity
Ugandan state jusOed the regroupement on the basis of necessity: 1.Only means of protecOng populaOon from LRA 2.To enable clear disOncOon between civilians and rebels 3.To separate civilian collaborators from the rebels

The Movement
Beacon of modern, neoliberal, scienOc raOonalism RevoluOonary biopoliOcal movement for peace, democracy and development Threatened by forces of darkness and irraOonality from a) the North b) Sudan Seeks to eradicate ghosts of ethnic past and produce a new form of utopic space in Uganda of naOonal unity a new polis

Acholi / LRA
The vision of post-ethnic polis founded upon juxtaposiOon of the Movement with past regimes, especially those of Amin, Obote and Okello all Northern Northern regimes described as barbaric, fascist, primordial Acholi parOcularly idenOed as responsible for past wrongs of Ugandan state

Movement discourse established a clear boundary between those who conformed with the new vision of Ugandan ciOzenship and those who did not This boundary took shape: 1.Temporally: between the Movement present and the Northern past 2.SpaOally: around, rstly, the north, and secondly, and more parOcularly, the Acholi. Discursive foundaOons of process by which the relaOon of the sovereign ban came to be applied to the residents of the Acholi region.