HOUSE OF COMMONS: Defence Select Committee Scottish National Party (SNP) Written Evidence for Inquiry into Future

Maritime Surveillance Summary 1.1 As a result of the decisions taken in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) the UK has been left with a much diminished maritime surveillance capability. Much of this was created by the decision of the previous government to remove the Nimrod MR2 from service and of the current governments decision to cancel its replacement the Nimrod MRA4. The Scottish National Party (SNP) have asked a series of detailed questions regarding maritime surveillance as this decision has a particular importance for a maritime nation like Scotland and the challenges it faces. 1.2 The current combination of assets leaves a huge capability gap for the various nations of the UK. The ability to project power, conduct real time Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and maritime Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) operations, screen for undersea threats and conduct long range Search and Rescue (SAR) have all been drastically cut or no longer exist in a credible form. Recent events in Libya and Scotland have exposed this capability gap. 1.3 While we welcome some initiatives by the UK Government such as the Seedcorn Programme it is very limited in scope. We need only look at our near neighbours to see that they think a marine surveillance capability generated through Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is vital. For example Ireland and Spain have Airbus CASA CN-235 Military Surveillance 1 2 3 4 Aircraft, Icelands DHC-8-314Q, Netherlands Dornier 228-212, Portugals EADS C-295M 5 or Norway which has P-3 Orion Aircraft. 1.4 At a time that neighbouring countries are focusing their attention on the growing importance of the High North, a resurgent Russia, and increasing concerns about energy security the UK is moving in the other direction. The dilution of the UKs maritime surveillance capability stands in stark contrast to the importance that others place on it. This emphasises that Scotland needs to be able to take decisions about its defence and its priorities in Scotland. 1.5 This submission answers the broad questions as grouped by the terms of reference and possible questions suggested by the Committee. 2. what current maritime surveillance capabilities and assets will remain in service by 2020, including their specific roles, effectiveness, deployability, coordination, and interoperability; and what are the likely gaps and deficiencies? Military Capability 2.1 The mixture of scarce assets left to cover maritime surveillance has resulted in serious capability gaps and is taken at significant risk to the UKs security. The absence of a long range fixed wing Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability has increased the risk to the entire naval fleet. Parliamentary Questions (PQs) show that helicopters operated from sea or shore have a much shorter range than Nimrod, they also lack the advanced type of radar that 6 provides a crucial surface search capability for submarine detection.

1 Ireland http://www.transport.ie/viewitem.asp?id=12242&lang=ENG&loc=2537 Spain http://www.salvamentomaritimo.es/wp-content/files_flutter/1331035410plan-nacional-salvamento2010-2018ingles.pdf 2 Iceland http://www.lhg.is/english/search_and_rescue/ 3 Netherlands http://www.kustwacht.nl/en/aeronautical.html 4 Portugal http://www.emfa.pt/www/esquadrasdetalhe.php?lang=ing&cod=e501 5 Norway http://mil.no/organisation/about/norwegianmilitarybases/Pages/Andoya.aspx 6 PQ, Angus Robertson, 11/11/10, col ref [21442], [22138] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101111/text/101111w0002.htm#10111178000697

2.2 The only aircraft that is capable of deploying sonar buoys and torpedoes that are utilised 7 in ASW warfare is the Merlin Helicopter. However, these have a greatly reduced endurance compared to that of a fixed wing ASW asset and also require a ship to enable them to work at reach within the UKs Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This is less cost effective, time consuming and manpower intensive. 2.3 The UKs ability to effectively conduct wide area above water and under water find, fix, prosecute in the absence of fixed wing ASW has become seriously degraded. It also means that when submarines leave and enter HMNB Clyde, Faslane their ability to sanitise against other nations submarines is now much more difficult with the removal of Nimrod. It was telling that with the scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4 and retirement of the Nimrod MR2 that they were 8 stripped of useful electronics for use on other platforms. 2.4 In the near future two aircraft carriers will be commissioned into the Royal Navy, given the level of importance that the UK government place on the projection of naval power with retirement of Nimrod there is a lack of assets that can provide deep field protection for a Carrier Strike Task Group. Unless action is taken to reverse the lack of capability in sanitising water space, we can expect it to affect littoral manoeuvre and the ability to maintain sea lines of communication in the medium to long term. ELINT 2.5 The RAF currently lacks a significant ELINT platform. The current Sentinel aircraft which are tasked in Afghanistan on battlefield and ground surveillance duties are not ELINT platforms. Instead they provide a synthetic picture of the surface which can contribute to the overall understanding of the battlespace. Only limited trials have been conducted in terms of the aircrafts ability to operate effectively in the maritime environment. In order to achieve this it would need many years of research and trials to develop a probability of detection sufficiently high enough to warrant its inclusion in the maritime surveillance role as a bespoke contributor to the recognised surface picture. In particular it has no identified capability in undersea detection. Also the UK Government stated in the SDSR that they would be withdrawn on completion of kinetic operations in Afghanistan. SIGINT 2.6 The last UK Government purchased three RC-135W Rivet Joint aircraft & ground systems from the US Government to replace the capability of the Nimrod R1. These assets built in 1964 are the youngest of the modified USAF KC-135Rs. PQs show that all of the airframes that are due to enter service have over 22 000 air hours which is actually more flying hours 9 than the retired Nimrod R1 that they replace . RAF personnel are currently being trained in America to operate these aircraft which are expected to remain in service until 2045. These aircraft will also be maintained in Texas, unlike the Nimrod that was maintained in the UK. Rivet Joint aircraft can be operated over ocean but are not suitably equipped to conduct the full gamut of MPA duties. Anti-Crime Capability 2.7 The current assets that are available also limit the ability of the armed forces to support Other Government Departments in Counter Terrorism and Counter Drug Operations. In the event of a request from Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to track an ocean going vessel suspected of drug trafficking, there is no on scene commander that can remain airborne at a suitable standoff distance. Nimrod provided the capability to remain on scene with the relevant communications suite, detection equipment and tracking to ensure a joint operation could be suitably conducted to a successful conclusion.

PQ, Angus Robertson, 04/11/10, col ref [21443] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101104/text/101104w0003.htm#10110464000289 8 PQ, Angus Robertson, 10/01/12, col ref [87596] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120110/text/120110w0001.htm#12011052001210 9 PQ Angus Robertson 18/01/11 col ref [33448] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110118/text/110118w0004.htm#1101192000704 and PQ Angus Robertson 17/01/11 col ref [33449] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110117/text/110117w0004.htm#11011739000507

Search and Rescue 2.8 An often overlooked aspect of maritime surveillance is the ability to conduct and organize long range and complex search and rescue missions in all weather conditions. This is particularly acute if there was a major maritime incident. 2.9 The Nimrod MR2 and the now cancelled Nimrod MRA4 were the premier long distance work horse of the UK Search and Rescue Fleet. Its electronic suites were uniquely suited to provide top-cover to vessels in distress. It organised and co-ordinated other assets such as SAR helicopters, acting as an instant data link to the Aeronautical Rescue and Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) based in RAF Kinloss. It should be noted that this vital centres future remains 10 uncertain some year and half after the SDSR as RAF Kinloss transfers to an Army base. 2.10 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) in their 2008 Search and Rescue Framework described the capability of the Nimrod: The Nimrod can fly at high speed to a distance of approximately 800 nautical miles from base and then search for a period of 5 hours. Range can be extended at the expense of search time, or both may be extended by the use of in-flight refuellingThe aircraft has a comprehensive suite of search sensors, with radar optimised for over-water searches. A limited number of aircraft may also be fitted with an Infra Red (IR) capability. The Nimrod has a variety of communications equipment including UHF, VHF, HF and IMM VHF(FM) radios, and the combination of a powerful radar, long endurance and excellent communications, make the aircraft the platform of choice for directing activities at the scene. The aircraft itself can drop life rafts and survival equipment to persons in distress but is more frequently 11 employed in vectoring shipping and helicopters to the scene. 2.11 After the previous government decided to retire the Nimrod MR2 they responded that in terms of Search and Rescue (SAR) a variety of assets would replace the capability of Nimrod. The only aircraft that has a similar, although shorter range, slower speed, and less loiter time on scene is the C-130 Hercules. It does not have the same advanced electronics such as Search Water 2000 radar nor the same high-skilled crews trained in SAR. Also PQs which asked how active the Hercules was on search and Rescue missions have produced 12 alarming results. 2.12 There have only been two SAR flights flown by a Hercules and one by an ED-3 Sentry in 13 14 the last three years. A PQ also revealed that no Hercules is on SAR level readiness. This can be compared to the Nimrod MR2 which has flown over 108 long distance search and rescue missions in the last 5 years spending over 473 hours in the air during that time doing search and rescue. On average they flew 22 missions a year, just under 2 a month responding to emergencies. They spend on average 8 hours a month in the air doing search and rescue. Many missions are out of the range of helicopters with one mission was 29hrs long. Another two saw a Nimrod fly over 1100 miles to reach the emergency and in the final month the Nimrod MR2 was in service it flew both longer and farther than the Hercules has in 3 years. It is vital that Scotland, like its neighbours has a dedicated fixed wing SAR MPA with a full range of capabilities.

Angus Robertson PQ col ref 1/11/10 [20213] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101101/text/101101w0004.htm#1011026000611 11 http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/uksar.pdf - Page 31 Sec 2.6 12 PQ, Angus Robertson, 25/02/10, col ref [318839] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100225/text/100225w0005.htm; PQ, Angus Robertson, 08/11/10, col ref [22037], [22038] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/text/101108w0001.htm#10110817000536 13 PQ, Angus Robertson, 07/02/12, col ref [93460] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/text/120207w0001.htm#12020789001137 14 PQ, Angus Robertson, 21/01/11, col ref [34223] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110121/text/110121w0002.htm#11012147001589

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3. what are the future capabilities needed by the MoD and UK Armed Forces for maritime surveillance and what measures are being taken to address these, including applying lessons learned from recent operations? 3.1 The future capabilities needed by the MoD were many that were available in the Nimrod MRA4. Two recent examples have shown these deficiencies. The first was the ability to scan the coast and shore and direct naval fire during OP Ellamy in Libya. PQs revealed that the UK had to, with its own personnel from the 148 Battery Royal Artillery onboard, rely on Canadian CF 140 Aurora and American P-3 Orion aircraft to direct naval fire from its Frigate 15 on shore. Further they would have relied on these aircraft more generally in protecting its naval assets and providing ISTAR and ELNIT intelligence gathering. This real world combat scenario highlights the vital role that maritime surveillance MPA provides in the modern battlespace. 3.2 A second example was the recent visit to the Moray Firth by the Russian Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and her accompanying group. It would not have been lost on the Russian Navy that they were parked just several miles offshore of the former home of the Nimrod at RAF Kinloss. The long 1000 mile journey from Portsmouth of HMS York to intercept and monitor the group showed the woeful lack of significant conventional vessels based in Scotland that can conduct maritime surveillance. This is compounded by the removal and cancellation of the next generation of the UKs MPA which would have provided crucial indicators and warnings capability. It would have been able to constantly shadow the group and direct other assets as required. 3.3 Looking to the future there are two areas that are of immediate concern. Both regard the UKs ability to maintain its treaty obligations and good relations with its near neighbours. The first is regarding international obligations under the four main international treaties that states 16 ratify governing search and rescue. They detail what states are obliged to provide in terms of resources, assets and control centres. The UK Search and Rescue area is massive 17 covering some 1.25 million sq km and over 10.5 thousand nautical miles of Coastline. It reaches so far to the west that it actually borders Canadas Eastern search limit, effectively dividing the North Atlantic Ocean in two. 3.4 Included in those obligations is to provide a list of assets available to undertake certain missions and also where the various co-ordination centres are located. However PQs that since the retirement of Nimrod show that only shorter range helicopters and light aircraft are 18 listed as being available now. They do not list the C130 Hercules which means that the UK has no long range military fixed wing SAR aircraft listed under section 2.1.11.4 of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, raising serious questions about the UKs ability to effectively meet this obligation. Indeed from 2005 until the retirement of the 19 MR2 in early 2010 the aircraft provided help to neighbouring countries 23 times. It appears that since its retirement the UK has not provided fixed wing RAF top cover to any neighbouring states. 3.5 A fire two years ago on the fish factory ship Athena off of the Scilly Isles exposed the current state of UK capability as a French Falcon 50 provided a communication link because

15 PQ, Angus Robertson, 24/12/12 col ref [91024] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120124/text/120124w0002.htm#12012469000589 16 The UK organisation for civil maritime and civil aviation search and rescue is derived from the UK Governments adherence to the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (1974), the Maritime Search and Rescue Convention (1979) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) (Annex 12). http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/uksar.pdf Pg 9 17 http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga07-home/emergencyresponse/mcga-searchandrescue/mcga-hmcgsarsarsystem/coastguard_operations/area_of_operations.htm 18 PQ, Angus Robertson, 22/11/10, col ref [24404], [24405], [24408] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101122/text/101122w0001.htm#1011229001129 And PQ, Angus Robertson 23/02/2012 col ref [96183] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120223/text/120223w0002.htm#12022343000285 19 PQ, Angus Robertson, 23/11/10, col ref [24410] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101123/text/101123w0003.htm#10112346002739

of the limitations of the Hercules: An RAF C-130 Hercules from RAF Lyneham, which was 20 later stood down because of the endurance available from the French aircraft. 3.6 The second area of concern is the ability of UK properly protect, monitor its EEZ and beyond, including the farthest reaches of Scotlands continental shelf. The foreign policy directions of Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Russia all clearly highlight the importance that they put on the high-arctic. Scotland sits at the bottom of this triangle and that has many important implications, which in turn show how important a robust maritime surveillance capability is. The opening up of new energy fields further North, and maintaining security over existing infrastructure is essential. The environmental monitoring of increased shipping through the region with the receding icecaps poses another challenge. The ability to monitor above and below water assets from other countries and sharing that information with allies is essential. All of these things are growing in importance but are given a second tier rating by the current UK government, cumulating in the decision to scrap one of the most key assets in this area. A long range, long endurance MPA is the critical asset that is missing and that puts Scottish interests at risk and limits our ability to co-operate with our neighbours. 4.how does the MoD intend in future to coordinate its work with other Government departments and agencies, including its effectiveness, their interaction, the lines of demarcation and the consequences for, and impact on, UK Armed Forces; 4.1 Exercise Joint Focus 2010 provided the first Cross-Whitehall Exercise where Government Departments from the MoD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Stabilisation Unit were able to practice the Comprehensive Approach within a carefully crafted realistic scenario and to experiment in best practice. This was done to better understand ways of working between civilian and Armed Forces personnel, which included Non Governmental Organisations(NGO) and resulted in their appraisal and renaming of business as the Integrated Approach. The success was due to the lengthy planning of the Exercise with the involvement of all Government Agencies from the outset, utilising the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process which included the National Security Council (NSC). 4.2 In early 2011 when the Arab Spring came into being, Libya descended into a conflict zone. The work done through the Integrated Approach a few months earlier enabled contingent operations to be undertaken swiftly with all departments understanding what benefits were derived from the Exercise in December 2010. There is an appetite for further experimentation once the lessons have been fully identified from civilian and military operations and experiences in Libya. The outcome will be a more efficient process, an opportunity to consolidate on knowledge gained and appreciation of skills, strengths and abilities of Whitehall Departments. 4.3 The current Government established a National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) which was alleged to be the single point of contact for UK national maritime surveillance 21 information data exchange with the EU and current partners. The MoD lead cross Whitehall, Government & Agencies co-ordinated initiative failed at the first hurdle when the Russian Federation Navy Kusnetsov Task Group entered UK Territorial Waters in December 2011 and anchored in the Moray Firth. The NMIC were unable to provide MPA coverage due to a lack of assets suitable for maritime surveillance out to the northern edge of the UK's EEZ. While we support this EU wide initiative, unless it is funded and afforded the correct assets it will not be fit for purpose. It is pivotal that the NMIC has UK MPA assets to utilise in the pursuit of the EU Approach to Integrated Maritime Surveillance.

20 PQ, Angus Robertson, 8/11/10, col ref [21386] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/text/101108w0004.htm#10110837001522 21 European Security Committee http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmeuleg/5-x/5x14.htm

5. to what extent the UK should collaborate and is collaborating with allies, including through NATO, in the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities; and what provision is the MoD making for the possibility that maritime surveillance forces might have to be regenerated at relatively short notice? 5.1 It is absolutely vital that the UK collaborate, co-operate and consider joint procurement or pooling with its allies. The position of the UK on this issue is negative, confused and unclear. In response to PQs as far back as February and June 2011 the Government ruled out buying or leasing other aircraft with similar capabilities. However in November 2011 parliamentary questions showed that the government was discussing an exchange with the US Navy for 22 fully qualified RAF air crew to support the US P-8 Poseidon programme. 5.2 Pooling or sharing, whether through bilateral agreement, NATO Smart Defence or another multilateral arrangement could allow the UK to access a range of assets that other countries have. That is why we welcome the details of the Seedcorn initiative that revealed that 20 personnel from the RAF are training with NATO countries Canada and the United States and non-NATO allies Australia and New Zealand on a mixture of MPA. This will maintain some of the vital skills needed in this area and provide some ability to regenerate the capability 23 quickly. 5.3 The type of aircraft that the are involved in the Seedcorn could suggest that these would be the type of aircraft the UK would be interested in acquiring. However PQs suggest that 24 they have no plans on purchasing or leasing the P-8 Poseidon in the future or other 25 airframes like the P-3 that is in service with many countries. The Government does say however that it is keeping the requirement under review. 5.4 Given the co-operation in the Seedcorn initiative it seems to be a much missed opportunity to rule out participating in NATOs Smart Defence Initiative in the area of MPA capability. This includes the possibility of pooling or joint procurement. However it was put on 26 record in a recent PQ that the UK is, not currently planning on participating in this project. 5.5 This would be an ideal interim solution to the UKs current massive capability gap in this area. Just as NATO and PfP countries co-operate and share transport aircraft through the NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA) or how the European Defence Agency is exploring co-operation with its members around a pooled air-to-air refuelling capability, the UK must keep an open mind about working more closely with partners to provide an immediate 27 capability in this area. In a time of increasing pressure on defence budgets these options should be even more palatable. 5.6 Finally the co-operation within the European Union must continue to be supported but it must be properly funded and provided with the right capability. Maritime Surveillance Networking which aims at improving the Recognised Maritime Picture is vital to the effective sharing of information between EU states and non-EU states and between NATO and non28 NATO members. Also the UK should continue its participation in the European Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) programme whose research and technology may lead to unmanned assets that can fill the large gap in this capability that currently confronts the UK armed 29 forces.
PQ, Angus Robertson, 24/11/11, col ref [81670] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111124/text/111124w0003.htm#11112476001278 23 PQ, Angus Robertson, 24/11/11, col ref [81671], [81672], [81673] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111124/text/111124w0003.htm#11112476001267 24 PQ, Angus Robertson, 28/06/11, col ref [62104] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110628/text/110628w0002.htm#11062868000717 25 PQ Angus Robertson, 1/02/12 col ref [37263] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110201/text/110201w0003.htm#11020168000629 26 PQ, Angus Robertson, 21/02/12, col ref [95362] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120221/text/120221w0002.htm#12022174001233 27 NAMA: http://www.nama.nato.int/Docs/NewComersGuide.pdf 28 EU MARSUR: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Otheractivities/Maritimesurveillance/MARSURnetworking 29 UMS http://www.eda.europa.eu/Capabilitiespriorities/matureactions/Maritimeminecountermeasures/Unmannedmaritimesys tems
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Conclusion 6. Recent UK Governments have shown by their decisions that they do not take maritime surveillance seriously. As a maritime nation Scotland requires appropriate MPA capability. If the UK government does not take this capability gap seriously a Scottish Government with defence decision making powers certainly should. This submission is also being forwarded to the Scottish Government as part of its preparations for the Independence Referendum planned for 2014. Submission by Angus Robertson MP Westminster SNP Leader and Defence Spokesman 12 March 2012