PANEL THREE

Visas and Watchlisting Today

9) Suggested Questions for Panel Three

10) Prepared Testimony

• Maura Harty
• Russell E. Travers
• Donna A. Bucella

11) Witness Biographies

• Maura Harty
• Russell E. Travers
• Donna A. Bucella

12) Background Materials

• Harty MFR
 SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL THREE
Visas and Watchlisting Today

Designated Commissioner: Jamie Gorelick

For Ms. Harty:

Visa Processing

In your testimony you refer to a "rules based process. " What do you mean by "rules
based process"? How effective is this process in stopping terrorists from getting visas?

Interviews

1. The 9-11 families have questioned why visa applicants in Saudi Arabia were rarely
interviewed. What is different today about the interview policy for visa applicants?

2. Now that we are interviewing far more visa applicants, are there any examples where
expanded interviewing led to our finding terrorists and stopping them from getting
visas?

3. How have the changes to the interview policy since 9-11 affected consular resources?

Waiting Times

What is the average waiting time as a result of changes in visa policy? How long, for
example, does a South Korean businessperson have to wait in applying for a U.S. visa?
Are there other consulates with similar waiting times? Do you see a solution to these
long waits?

Incomplete Applications

One of the major concerns of the 9-11 families is that the hijackers acquired visas without
filling out their applications completely or truthfully. Is visa policy different today on
these issues such that, were the hijackers to submit their applications today, they would
be rejected for their incompleteness?

Lies on Applications

1. Would the kinds of lies on the hijackers' applications - about having applied for a
visa previously and about having traveled to the U.S. previously - be detected today?

2. What databases are automatically checked when a person applies for a visa? Do we
search for prior visa approvals before adjudicating a visa? Do we search for prior
admissions to the U.S. before adjudicating a visa?
Foreign Service Nationals

What is the current policy on the use of FSNs in visa adjudication - are they being
phased out? What security advantages are there for using FSNs with knowledge of local
conditions, populations, and documents?

Passport Scrutiny

What facility and process is there for careful scrutiny of applicants' passports at post?

The Law

1. You mentioned that you now provide consular officers with training on the use of
Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which defines
terrorism as a basis for exclusion from entry into the United States. What are you
telling consular trainees on the use of this provision that was not told to them before
September 11,2001?

2. Does the law allow a consular officer to deny a visa to someone if they believe, based
solely on an interview with the person, that the person is a terrorist? If not, what level
of evidence is required to deny a visa based on terrorism?

3. Can a consular officer deny a visa to someone solely because they believe the person
is lying to them? If so, what provision of law do they use?

Intelligence Information and Consular Affairs

1. What steps are you taking to improve the availability to consular officers of specific
terrorist intelligence relevant to their post?

2. How is intelligence on terrorist document fraud practices communicated to consular

officers at post?

3. Was information have you conveyed to consular officers in Saudi Arabia about fraud
associated with Saudi passports?

TIPOFF

1. Have we stopped terrorists from getting visas since 9-11 using TIPOFF? How many
true TIPOFF hits have there been since that date?

2. What are the key aspects of TIPOFF that need to be preserved as it moves to the
TSC?

3. What would your ideal watchlist contain, and how would it work?

Suggested Questions for Panel Three

DHS

1. Is the new relationship with DHS on policy formulation working?

2. What is DHS doing at posts and are they adding value? To your knowledge, has
DHS identified any terrorists that were not identified by TIPOFF or consular officers
during interviews?

3. What is State's position on the DHS budget request to increase significantly their
overseas personnel involved with visa adjudication and why? If you don't favor
significant DHS increases, what do you favor for increasing border security?

4. Should Section 428 of the Homeland Security Authorization Act (which takes visa
policy from the State Department and gives it to DHS) be repealed?

5. Should consular personnel include law enforcement personnel and Diplomatic

Security personnel in its ranks?

6. Should fraud prevention and the law enforcement functions associated now with DS
be more incorporated into the work of CA?

Condor

We now have a terrorist screening center (TSC), run out of the FBI, to screen visa
applicants against terrorist watchlists. At the same time, we have the FBI performing a
separate name check on certain visa applicants through what is known as the Condor
program. You have testified previously that there have been 125,000 Condor name
checks, and that not a single applicant has been denied a visa based on one of these
checks. In addition, the CIA has declined to participate in this program, we understand,
on grounds that it adds no value beyond that of the terrorist watchlists run by the TSC.
Given these facts, is the Condor name check program a waste of resources that makes us
no safer? Should the CONDOR program be scrapped?

Visa Waiver

1. Are we going to make the October 4,2004 deadline for biometric passports by the
Visa Waiver Program countries?

2. If the Visa Waiver countries do not make the deadline, what will be the implications
for the Bureau of Consular Affairs in terms of visas that will need to be issued to visa
waiver country citizens?

3. Do you think that the passport requirements are enough to ensure full screening of
visa waiver country travelers? Are there other steps that could or should be taken?

Suggested Questions for Panel Three

4. Why is pre-clearance and pre-inspection—currently used in Dublin, Montreal, and a
few other locations—not more broadly in place to move out our borders in places
such as visa waiver countries?

Western Hemisphere

The fact that citizens of the U.S. and Canada are not required to present their passport in
order to cross into the United States from Canada is a significant vulnerability in the U.S.
border security system. It is widely acknowledged that many Islamic extremist groups,
including Al Qaeda, have terrorist cells in Canada. What is the current state of study on
this issue — to determine how many U.S. and Canadian citizens cross the border each
year -- and what would the State Department have to do to accommodate demand for
U.S. passports in the event such a requirement were imposed?

National Security

Are we safer than we were before 9-11, and if so, why?

For Mr. Travers:

1. Nominations. You have discussed the increase in names provided to the TIPOFF
database since September 11. Are you satisfied that all agencies have nominated the
names they have maintained in their own files?

2. Challenges. Your statement provides examples of continuing progress related to

information sharing, but alludes to continuing challenges. Why is this so hard to fix?

3. FBI nominations. We have learned that the FBI historically nominated very few
names to TIPOFF, because it did not focus primarily on non-U.S. person residing
abroad, and that after 9-11 has increased its submissions over 100 percent. Do you
have a timetable for ensuring that the FBI submits all the names it has in its files to
the terrorist database? What is TTIC's experience with FBI and information sharing?

4. Nominations process. Please discuss the standards the Community uses for
including people on a watchlist and for forwarding names to the Terrorist Screening
Center.

5. Removal of names. Is there a process for removing names from the database who
are demonstrated not to be terrorists?

6. Watchlisting training. You state the watchlisting training is mandatory for all line
offices in the Counterterrorism Center. Does that include mandatory training for
intelligence officers going overseas? Intelligence officers in DIA, NSA, and the other

Suggested Questions for Panel Three

 military human and criminal investigative services? For the FBI? Does TTIC have
the authority to ensure that proper training is conducted by all agencies that may
encounter terrorists?

7. Names-based watchlisting. Your statement suggests that there are limitations

associated with names based watchlisting. Would you discuss some of those
limitations and provide examples of what the Community is doing to overcome them?

8. TIDE and biometrics. You state that Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
(TIDE) will replace TIP OFF, and that it will include biometrics to form true
identities. What kind of biometrics will be included? How will TIDE relate to the
biometrics being captured by the new U.S. VISIT entry program being installed by
the Department of Homeland Security?

9. Aliases. We heard this morning that Khaled Sheik Mohamed was able to obtain a
passport using an alias. How big a problem do alias passports present in your view?
How frequent are they among al Qaeda and similar groups? How will the new U.S.
VISIT system affect terrorists' ability to use alias passports?

10. Lost and stolen passports. We heard this morning that lost and stolen passports
play an important role in al Qaeda travel. Do you receive lost and stolen passport
information from foreign governments? Should more be done in this area?

11. Al Qaeda in the U.S.? Will TIDE contain information on the known locations of
terrorists? Have you received any information that terrorists are in the U.S.?

12. Privacy. Your statement addressed advanced analytic tools and the role they can
play in watchlisting. Is TTIC reinventing Total Information Awareness?

13. TTIC Challenges. You have described TTIC's authority as based on a presidential
directive and a memorandum of understanding. There seem to be a lot of competing
ideas about how the U.S. government does terrorism analysis, and lots of competing
and overlapping centers of analysis. Should TTIC be authorized by law? Would this
increase the ability of TTIC to accomplish its mission? Is TTIC working properly,
and what are its biggest challenges as it confronts its mission? Is TTIC getting the
support it needs from CIA, FBI and other agencies that provide personnel? Does the
head of TTIC have budget authority, hire and fire authority, and the ability to task?
Will TTIC fall short in achieving its mission unless and until it achieves such
authority and resources?

Suggested Questions for Panel Three

For Ms. Buccella:

1. Mission. I want to understand very clearly. What is the mission of the Terrorist
Screening Center? What are you doing that was not done prior to 9/11 ? What is the
specific value-added of your work? How do you avoid overlap, on the one hand, and
avoid gaps on the other, as you work with other offices and agencies in the
government?

2. Personal. Would you tell us about your background and how you came to take the
job as the director of the Terrorist Screening Center?

3. Authority, budget, and oversight. You state that the authority for the TSC comes
from a Presidential directive. Who authorizes your budget? Which department funds
the TSC? Who provides your personnel? Do you believe you need specific
authorizing legislation to accomplish your mission?

4. Accountability. My understanding is that you are a DHS employee who reports to

the Director of the FBI. Your second in command is a DHS employee who reports to
DHS. Who is accountable for the activities of the TSC?

5. FBI or DHS? Would you explain why the TSC is located in the FBI and not the
Department of Homeland Security? Do you think it should stay in the FBI?

6. Al Qaeda in the U.S. Since the TSC was established in December, have you learned
of any Al Qaeda terrorists in the U.S. through call-ins from state and local officials?

7. Response time. Would you describe TSC rules for response time? Has there been
any change in the response time for queries from State Department offices?

8. Advanced passenger screening/Paris flights. Would you describe the process by

which airlines send advance passenger manifests to the National Targeting Center and
the TSC also becomes involved with that information? In December, a flight was
halted from Paris due in part to concerns that passengers may have had links to
terrorism. Was that a result of the passenger manifest being forwarded and analyzed
in the usual manner?

9. Misidentification and Deletion Process. Please describe the misidentification and

deletion process. Have you had to delete any names so far? How does your process
of misidentification and deletion relate to the equivalent process for the TTIC's
Terrorist Identities database?

10. Users. Which agencies are the biggest users of the TSC so far?

11. Nomination process. Do you accept names directly into the TSC database or is the
decision about what is included in your databases made by the TTIC Terrorist
Identities Group?

Suggested Questions for Panel Three