A,,:~J c .

ANWAR SADAT AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

COURSE 1: FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

LT COL STEPHEN D. BROWN SEMINAR L COMMITTEE 9

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SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

INTRODUCTION
On O c t o b e r 6, 1973, t h o u s a n d s of E g y p t i a n troops m a s s e d on the west b a n k of the Suez canal a w a i t i n g the order to cross and retake t e r r i t o r y o c c u p i e d by Israel since the 1967 s i x - d a y war. than 200 jets roared overhead enroute to Israeli targets As m o r e in the

Sinai, the E g y p t i a n s s w e l l e d into action, e a g e r to r e c l a i m not only the o c c u p i e d territory, but t h e i r honor. The Y o m K i p p u r W a r was it was a c a l c u l a t e d m o v e of the 1967 position of

m o r e than an A r a b a t t e m p t to evict Israel, by Anwar war, Sadat to reverse Egypt and

the h u m i l i a t i o n and d e f e a t the Arab world to a

restore

i n t e r n a t i o n a l strength, and p a v e the way for p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of middle east problems. for the war, Sadat had a clear v i s i o n and he a c h i e v e d but by those the of his p o l i t i c a l by

objectives decisive

objectives--not door for a

military

action,

opening

U.S.-

m e d i a t e d p e a c e process. The focus of this paper is statecraft, not generalship.

I n s t e a d of a n a l y z i n g h o w the w a r was fought, was Part fought, I deals with with specific the emphasis on the

it w i l l a d d r e s s w h y it role of and Anwar Sadat.

context

of w o r l d

events

circumstances

that led Sadat to b e l i e v e war was an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of his g r a n d strategy, part II describes how he used the instruments of

s t a t e c r a f t to d e v e l o p and e x e c u t e that g r a n d strategy, a n d p a r t III summarizes the aftermath of the militarily indecisive war as a

p o l i t i c a l v i c t o r y for A n w a r Sadat.

I. G R A N D S T R A T E G Y AND W A R
PRE- 1967 NASIRISM
When Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970 following the death of his colleague by the 'Abd al-Nasir, he inherited a world p o s i t i o n weakened defeat of the 1967 six-day war with Israel.

humiliating

Since

the mid-1950's, role among

his predecessor Arab nations,

had pursued

an aggressive Palestinian

leadership

championing

the

cause and representing the Arab world in its rocky relations with Israel. Arab bloc the Arab (PLO) in Nasir's objective was to create an Egyptian-controlled world. I When

that spoke with one voice League 1964, created it was the

to the outside Liberation

Palestinian under

Organization with a

largely

Egyptian

control,

military arm imbedded within the armies

of several Arab nations.

This PLO network not only strengthened Nasir's pan-Arab leadership role, it made Egypt a prime target for retaliation by Israel,

increasingly enraged by PLO attacks within its borders. Anticipating Nations an attack its by Israel, Nasir asked in the the United and

to withdraw military

forces

from positions with Syria and

Sinai

concluded

agreements

Jordan.

Israel,

prompted by the Arab sabre-rattling,

and confident of

m i l i t a r y and

I Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1991) 411. 2

Peoples

(Cambridge:

political 1967,

superiority, the

launched Arab forces

preemptive and

strike her

on

June

5,

decimating

expanding

territorial

boundaries. In the w o r l d ' s holocaust power under eyes, Israel had cast off the stigma of the of

to e m e r g e as a proud, east

invincible overnight

nation. and

The b a l a n c e

in the m i d d l e Egyptian of the

changed

the A r a b setbacks

nations, with no

leadership, Israeli

suffered Anwar

severe Sadat

resolution done

issue.

K n e w what

had to be

even b e f o r e

he came to power.

SADAT'S POST- 1967 GRAND STRATEGY

For Sadat, occupation weakness of the p o s t - 1 9 6 7 Arab a of status quo was u n a c c e p t a b l e . had expanded, made to the and Israeli Arab the The

territory stalemate little

relative of

created issue

that

resolution

Palestinian

interest

superpowers. state

Soviet U n i o n h a d a c o m f o r t a b l e and was ~ o v i n g States want toward detente

f o o t h o l d a n d client with the U n i t e d

in Egypt, The U n i t e d

States. ally

recognized

Israel

as a strong, of s t r e n g t h

desirable

and

did

not

to r e d u c e

her p o s i t i o n

in the region. could United Soviet

Sadat recognized, never States be resolved never

however,

that A r a b - I s r a e l i d i f f e r e n c e s involvement. of Israel, states. and The the

without

superpower conquest

would

allow Arab

U n i o n was not l i k e l y to a b a n d o n of the those Arab differences world Sadat was knew on terms the that very he

its client agreeable

Yet r e s o l u t i o n and the rest of

to Egypt of

foundation could 3 not

Egyptian Israeli

national withdrawal

interest.

force

from o c c u p i e d territories Egyptian that power alone, But he

and return the P a l e s t i n i a n h o m e l a n d with any coalition the of Arab degree of nations for

or with could

matter.

influence

superpower

involvement

in the process. grand strategy to achieve his

Sadat d e v e l o p e d a m u l t i - f a c e t e d

national s e c u r i t y objectives of resolving the P a l e s t i n i a n issue and elevating he had to the A r a b - I s r a e l i restore Egyptian dispute to the s u p e r p o w e r self-confidence Second, Third, and he level. First

promote needed to

pan-Arab isolate

unity Israel

under

Egyptian

leadership. opinion.

in w o r l d public

he had to retake and hold lost to Israel during the

portions 1967 war. lead

of the Sinai and Golan Heights Finally,

he had to shock the superpowers Arab-Israeli quo disputes. the Given 1967

into taking the the u n a c c e p t a b l e Sadat saw no

in r e s o l v i n g status

pro-Israeli alternative came to

following

war,

to war as a central promising the

element

of his grand strategy and people a "Battle of

power

Egyptian

Destiny."

II. INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Sadat's

adroit use of the instruments reality. was in the the

of s t a t e c r a f t

made his in

battle of destiny a successful restoring Union's affairs Egyptian heavy-handed of Egypt. He

One of his first m o v e s dealing with the

self-confidence involvement felt that

Soviet

political took

and their

military Egyptian

Soviets

access for granted, and feared world perception as a puppet leader under Soviet guardianship. As diplomatic relations became mired in Soviet concerning arms transfers to Egypt Sadat became increasingly

bureaucracy,

annoyed and shifted to coercive diplomacy. to the Soviet some leaders Soviet he gave them one

In a five-point message week to the buoyed they leave Egypt. the

Although Egyptians

advisors the glad

remained

beyond were of what

deadline, by

(especially stance and

military) to be rid

Sadat's a

aggressive crude,

considered

inconsiderate

element. example of Sadat's coercive diplomacy was

Another

effective

his use of an oil embargo to gain world acceptance of Arab demands and to isolate Israel. the light, but to the Arab Japan and Europe wasted no time in seeing United oil States, although did not shaken abandon by its

vulnerability

dependence, Israel,

Israel.

Sadat did not completely

isolate

but he gave the world a

very important lesson in unified Arab economic power and definitely got the attention he of the United States. of his Through grand Israel into coercive strategy: in world a

diplomacy, restoring public

advanced

three

elements

Egyptian and

self-confidence, shocking the

isolating States

opinion,

United

assuming

leadership role in Arab-Israeli affairs.

DIPLOMATIC

PERSUASION

Diplomatic persuasion was Anwar Sadat's most effective tool of statecraft in advancing his goal of pan-Arab unity. In the months

b e f o r e the O c t o b e r w a r he spent c o n s i d e r a b l e support Unity of the A r a b (OAU), and Socialist Union,

time c u l t i v a t i n g the of A f r i c a n The Arab

the O r g a n i z a t i o n Conference.

the

Non-Aligned

summit

S o c i a l i s t U n i o n was one of Sadat's the Soviets, "to inform them that

first c o n t a c t s a f t e r e x p e l l i n g my decision to expel Soviet

experts m e a n t we w o u l d be going to war, not the o t h e r w a y around. ''2 The A r a b S o c i a l i s t U n i o n was a N a s i r c r e a t i o n d e s i g n e d to channel i n f o r m a t i o n about g o v e r n m e n t i n t e n t i o n s to the people, an i m p o r t a n t contact b e c a u s e Sadat had come u n d e r i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m at home

for not l i v i n g up to his p r o m i s e of a b a t t l e of destiny. R e c o g n i z i n g the i m p o r t a n c e of A f r i c a n and t h i r d w o r l d support for his g r a n d strategy, Sadat c o u r t e d the O A U a n d the N o n - A l i g n e d This

Summit C o n f e r e n c e d u r i n g the s u m m e r and e a r l y fall of 1973.

d i p l o m a c y p a i d t r e m e n d o u s d i v i d e n d s w h e n m o s t A f r i c a n states c e a s e d diplomatic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Israel in support of Egypt, and m o s t of

the n o n - a l i g n e d c o u n t r i e s s u p p o r t e d his p l a n for the i n e v i t a b l e w a r w i t h Israel. Fortunately, Sadat did not have to use much diplomatic

p e r s u a s i o n w i t h the o t h e r m a i n s t r e a m A r a b c o u n t r i e s b e c a u s e he came to p o w e r w i t h Kuwait, close p e r s o n a l ties to the rulers and Tunisia. of Saudi Arabia, S y r i a was a l r e a d y of s o v i e t Iraq arms. not

Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria,

a military If the

a l l y of Egypt and a m u t u a l Arab countries such as

benefactor Jordan and

other

were

w i l l i n g c o m b a t a n t s they w e r e at least s y m p a t h e t i c s u p p o r t e r s of the

2Anwar el-Sadat, In S e a r c h of Identity: A n A u t o b i o g r a p h y Abul-Kum: H a r p e r & Row, 1977, 1978) 233.

6

(Mit

E g y p t i a n cause. That Sadat had the backing of the Arab world for his

campaign a g a i n s t Israel is not surprising, one issue that unites the Arab

for that seems to be the Had they fully

countries.

a p p r e c i a t e d that A n w a r Sadat's p u r p o s e was as m u c h to o p e n the door for n e g o t i a t i o n s as it was for m i l i t a r y gain, have b e e n as unanimous. of s t a t e c r a f t confidence, Nevertheless, that s u p p o r t m a y not

Sadat u s e d the i n s t r u m e n t s to r e s t o r e E g y p t i a n selfopinion, and create a

that were at his d i s p o s a l Israel

isolate

in w o r l d p u b l i c

sense of p a n - A r a b u n i t y in support of his g r a n d strategy. not, however,

He c o u l d

r e v e r s e the h u m i l i a t i o n of the 1967 d e f e a t or hope to military action, and m o b i l i z e d

r e g a i n a n y lost t e r r i t o r y w i t h o u t his a r m e d forces K i p p u r holiday.

for an a t t a c k on Israel to c o i n c i d e w i t h the Y o m

III. POLITICAL V I C T O R Y
Through numerical forces a combination and of strategic deception, weaponry, the first the surprise, Egyptian days of

superiority,

enhanced

Soviet during

achieved Having

notable

successes

fighting. however, Israeli

established bridgeheads

across

Suez

Canal, early

they failed to m a i n t a i n the i n i t i a t i v e and e x p l o i t confusion. and The cut Israelis off the managed Egyptian to g a i n Third the Army

initiative, before the

counterattack, U n i t e d States

i n t e r v e n e d to i n f l u e n c e a c e a s e - f i r e on O c t o b e r 23. m o m e n t u m was

A l t h o u g h n e i t h e r side c l a i m e d c o m p l e t e victory,

clearly

in

favor

of

the

Israelis,

especially

considering

the On

m a s s i v e U.S. a i r l i f t in p r o g r e s s at the time of the cease-fire.

the other h a n d the E g y p t i a n s a c h i e v e d h o n o r a b l e s u c c e s s e s and w e r e spared another little, defeat but by as the the cease-fire. culmination deal. of Militarily, Anwar Anwar the war

achieved strategy,

Sadat's

grand

it a c h i e v e d a great

In 1977,

Sadat p a i d a

h i s t o r i c v i s i t to J e r u s a l e m to o f f e r Israel an o p e n i n g for p e a c e by direct n e g o t i a t i o n s . 3 By 1978 b o t h he and M e n a h e m B e g i n s i g n e d the Camp D a v i d A g r e e m e n t mediation. meetings defeat. The best w a y to put the Y o m K i p p u r W a r into p e r s p e c t i v e is to imagine a s p e c t r u m of A r a b - I s r a e l i relations. On the far left of of 1967. Egypt On the far and Israel Sadat in the U n i t e d States w i t h P r e s i d e n t never have initiated or a g r e e d Carter's to those

would

if he had to go w i t h his hat in hand,

h a u n t e d by the 1967

the s p e c t r u m is the h u m i l i a t i n g A r a b defeat right is the Camp David Agreement,

with

n e g o t i a t i n g from m u t u a l p o s i t i o n s of strength. was the e s s e n t i a l element of A n w a r S a d a t ' s

The Y o m K i p p u r W a r strategy to get

grand

from one end of the s p e c t r u m to the other. important role in g a l v a n i z i n g Egyptian

Statecraft

p l a y e d an and in

and A r a b

support,

r e s t o r i n g Egypt to the E g y p t i a n s b y e v i c t i n g the Soviets, but Sadat could not have achieved his goal of bargaining strength or

superpower

involvement without

the O c t o b e r war.

Future s t r a t e g i s t s s h o u l d use c a u t i o n in a p p l y i n g the Sadat

3 A l b e r t Hourani, A H i s t o r y of the A r a b P e o p l e s The B e l k n a p Press of the H a r v a r d UP, 1991) 420.

(Cambridge:

spectrum

of w a r in c o n f l i c t the U n i t e d

resolution, and

because Union in

during

the

"battle

of d e s t i n y , " of nuclear

States

Soviet was not

reached Sadat's

the b r i n k plans and The a

mobilization. Clausewitz' point

This

underscores most

t h e o r y of the fog a n d f r i c t i o n Anwar a Sadat clear an pulled vision it of

of war.

important

is that who

off; his

he w a s

world-class objectives statecraft

statesman and achieved

had

political of

them

with

ingenious with

grand

strategy

a n d war.

It's

hard

to a r g u e

success.