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could be victims of the offence regardless of gender.

Notes
1 The wide denition which the petitioner wants to be given to rape as dened in Section 375 IPC so that the same may become an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC has neither been considered nor accepted by any court in India so far, http://www.indiankanoon.org/ doc/11 03956/ 2 Prosecutor vs Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4, Judgment (2 September 1998) at para 686. http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ ICTR/AKAYESU_ICTR-96-4/Judgment_ICTR96-4-T.html accessed on 14 January 2013. 3 Prosecutor of the Tribunal vs Blagoje Simic and Others, http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/caselaw/tribunalen.nsf/eea9364f4188dcc0c12571b500379

4 5 6

8 9

10

d39/385630a682897645c12571fe004d3161?Op enDocument , accessed on 12 January 2012. See Kalpana Kannabiran, ed., The Violence of Normal Times, Women Unlimited, 2005. Katherine Franke, Putting Sex to Work, op cit, p 302. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ victim-city-deeply-scarred-article-1.235522, accessed on 12 January 2013. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/mikemcalary-1997-pulitzer-prize-winning-abnerlouima-columns-article-1.238109, accessed on 12 January 2013. http://newsone.com/2029939/abner-louimacase/, accessed on 15 January 2013. State of Gujarat vs Naresh Agarinh Chara and Others, Session Court judgment in case 235 of 2009 along with others. http://www.sabrang.com/kherlanji/reports.pdf, accessed on 12 January 2013.

11 http://articles.timesondia.indiatimes.com/ 2010-08-01/all-that-matters/28309828_1_surekha-bhotmange-khairlanji-sudhir-and-roshan, accessed on 12 January 2013. 12 Peoples Union for Civil Liberties Karnataka, Human Rights Violations Against the Transgender Community, 2003, pp 29, 37 and 40, http:// ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/PUCL/ PUCL%20Report.html, accessed on 27 April 2010. 13 Ibid.

References
Brownmiller, Susan (1975): Against Our Will, Bantam, New York. Franke, Katherine (2002): Putting Sex to Work, cf Wendy Brown and Janet Haley, Left Legalism/ Left Critique, Duke University Press, p 314. Kannabiran, Kalpana, ed. (2005): The Violence of Normal Times, Women Unlimited.

Italian Elections: Rejection of Austerity

Marina Forti

There are two clear messages from the polls in Italy. Those political parties or movements that campaigned strongly against austerity won most of the votes. Second, when politics is deaf to popular demands, the risk is that the political space will be occupied by populist forces, often dangerous.

Marina Forti ( fortimar@gmail.com) is Senior Foreign Correspondent at Il Manifesto, an independent daily newspaper in Rome.

he European press basically used one word to summarise the outcome of the recent Italian parliamentary elections: instability (again). Italy plunges into instability; a dramatic anti-austerity vote leaves the south European country with a hung parliament and a political stalemate. In a dispatch from Frankfurt (the seat of the European Central Bank, or ECB), the Reuters news agency regretted that the perspective of a durable, reformminded government in Rome was now slim (28 February 2013). This raises a danger of contagion across other vulnerable European countries, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said (27 February). Italy being one of the biggest economies of the continent (at $2.19 trillion, its gross domestic product (GDP) remains larger, at market exchange rates, than Indias $1.85 trillion), one of the larger European countries with 57 million inhabitants, a founding member of the European Union and, more important here, one of the founders of the euro as a single currency back in 1990, the Italian political uncertainty poses a danger for the entire eurozone, as many commentators noted.
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In the weekend after the elections, The Economist titled its story, just as the results were coming in, A Dangerous Mess. Two months ago, when the Italian premier Mario Monti stepped down, The Economist opined that the coming elections will be above all a test of the maturity and realism of the Italian voters. Clearly, to borrow the language of the British magazine, the Italian voters did not pass the test of maturity that the European markets were expecting. Undiplomatically, the German social-democratic leader Peer Steinbrueck said what many across Europe must have thought and The Economist splashed on its cover that the Italians massively voted for two clowns, referring to the former premier Silvio Berlusconi and a new face, the actual comedian Beppe Grillo, who together made up more than half of the popular vote. Uncomfortable Messages Yet it would be wrong to dismiss the Italian vote with such an easy irony. Yes, Rome has now a hung parliament and this opens new and uncharted political scenarios; and yes, some colourful characters came to the fore. But the fact is that the Italian vote also contains some strong, if uncomfortable, messages that should be read carefully at the European level. After all, Italy is the rst European country where voters massively dared to reject the mantra of economic and scal austerity that dominated Europe in the last three years, or ever since,
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Greeces crisis sounded an alarm in the euro fortress. Let us summarise the results rst. Indeed, the Italian political scene was shaken. The rst and new fact is the spectacular advance of a movement that emerged barely three years ago: it is the Five Star Movement (M5S) founded by the comedian Beppe Grillo in 2009, who must be credited with clever management of his blog, of social media and of his personal popularity as a comic. Grillo violently mocks the politicians (he himself was not a candidate and will not sit in parliament), but his group is now the single largest party in the Lower House having secured roughly one vote in four, that is 25.5% of the popular vote in the Chamber of Representatives and 23.8% in the Senate (in Italy both chambers have equal legislative powers). Tsunami Grillo, said many headlines in the Italian press. Surely many expected a breakthrough, but this result went beyond most expectations. Largely descending from this, the other fact is that neither of the two traditional political alliances obtained a workable majority not the centre-left led by the Democratic Party, which is rst but with a disappointing 29.5% in the Lower Chamber and 31.6% in the Senate, nor the centre-right led by Berlusconis PDL, or Pole of Liberties (29.1% in the Chamber, 30.7% in the Senate). Third, the former premier Mario Monti was crushed. He was brought to the political scene at the end of 2011 as the saviour of a country on the verge of economic and political failure, taking over from a morally corrupt Berlusconi government. He presided over a technocrats cabinet meant to be above the factional politics that would lead the country to economic recovery. One year later, having shed the clothes of the technocrat to take those of a political leader, Monti and his centrist allies barely got 10% of the votes, both in the Chamber and the Senate. Here probably lies the rst message we should read in these results. Mario Monti was a creature of a certain Europe: that of the European bankers who from the heights of Eurotower (as the ECB headquarter is called) dictate the rules
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of scal austerity and of the German chancellor Angela Merkel, who imposed the austerity orthodoxy upon Europe. A university professor of economics, and former advisor at Goldman Sachs, Monti was the choice of the European institutions. As the Nobel economist Paul Krugman put it in his last New York Times column (24 February), he was essentially imposed on Italy by its creditors. This happened when Silvio Berlusconi had reached the deepest point of his personal discredit (his brave bunga bunga nights with underage girls for which he is now indicted and on trial) and his government was paralysed by inghting, corruption and ineptitude. He had lost the support of the business and nancial community both at the Italian and the European level, becoming an unreliable partner as the euro crisis was starting to bite. It is also true that many here in Italy felt some genuine relief when the president of the republic, Giorgio Napolitano forced Berlusconi to take a step back and gave Monti the premiership in November 2011, even though Berlusconi did not suffer a no-condence vote in parliament. He actually had one of the strongest majorities ever in post-war Italy. One certainly cannot miss the vulgarity of Berlusconi, but it must be recognised that such a transition was an undemocratic procedure, almost an institutional coup dtat. (The president of the republic in Italy, similar to India, is elected by parliament and is largely an honoric gure.) But in such extreme circumstances Napolitano stretched his power and acted as a power broker. Montis Cure Mario Monti took over as the cherished child of the European establishment and imposed on Italy the same strong cure of scal austerity that had already been imposed on our Mediterranean neighbours (Portugal, Greece, Spain), perhaps just a little less harsh than in Greece. To quote Krugman again, Monti was the proconsul installed by Germany to enforce the scal austerity on an already ailing economy; willingness to pursue austerity without limits is what denes respectability in European policy circles (New York Times, 24 February). One year later, the man
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seen then as the saviour is now defeated by the ballot, despite being sponsored by the industrial and business community in Italy and Europe from Sergio Marchionne, the boss of Fiat (the Italian automaker, a good example of the assisted capitalism Italian-style, a big private industrial group that has always prospered with huge state subsidies) to Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, the patron of Ferrari, to most of Conndustria, the Italian Chamber of Industry. Also, Monti lost despite the open support of the Vatican through the Italian conference of Bishops. This raises an interesting question: perhaps the political inuence of the Church on this largely Roman Catholic country is waning. Or perhaps it is being overestimated, both by Italian politicians and by the media, who are ever ready to bow to any suggestion coming from the Vatican. The Trojka Weakened In this sense, the Italian vote has sounded an alert to the Europe of the bankers, a defeat of the trojka, as the trio formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund is called. The representatives of this trojka negotiated aid programmes rst in Greece, then Portugal and Ireland, and nally Spain in the last two years always with strong and punitive debt-cutting conditions attached. Each visit of the trojka invariably translated into more social expenditure cuts, more reforms a term that has come to mean deregulating the markets, eroding the system of social and labour rights built in west Europe after the second world war, dismantling the very concept of universal rights upon which the welfare state and the idea of citizenship were built in this continent. Monti spared Italy the humiliation of negotiating an aid package as happened in Greece and the other countries. Italy is still a much stronger economy than its south European neighbours. But the Italians, like the Greeks, the Spaniards, the Portuguese (as well as the French and the Germans, for that matter) have heard repeatedly over the years, that their pensions and health systems are too expensive; that the trade unions are too powerful, the
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labour market should be more exible and that unless we accept more cuts we would not win the approval of the markets a superior entity that usually expresses its benevolency through the cost of borrowing money, or the oscillations of stock exchanges. The cure was drastic: Greece rst saw public employees salaries cut around 10 to 20%; then it was the turn of Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy, although to a lesser extent. It was a pattern: cutting salaries, slashing pensions and health entitlements, making entire contingents of the population dependent on aid. Often reform took a deliberate ideological avour, as when Montis government cancelled a certain law that prevented a rm from ring a worker without giving a clear reason: it was said that the law prevented businesses from investing and hiring workers. In fact many employers admitted that such a law did not appear very relevant when a real deterrent to starting a business here is the slow and complicated bureaucracy. But cancelling that law served the purpose of weakening the trade unions (similar reforms of the labour market were passed in Greece and Spain). But did these austerity policies help Italy or any other European economy to recover to regain the condence of the markets? Of course not. Austerity that is cutting spending and raising taxes deepened the depression. The ratio of the debt on the GDP did not diminish, rather it grew as state revenue dropped because of the general economic slowdown. Instead, millions of Europeans lost their jobs. Confronting a Social Disaster The result is that most of Europe is now confronting a social disaster. As far as Italy is concerned, the crisis hit an already stagnant economy: after the years of the miracle (1955-1980), GDP showed no growth (plus 1%, minus 1%) from 1990 onwards. In 2009, GDP contracted (minus 3.5%) in the wake of the recession started in the US. According to justreleased gures, growth was minus 2.4% in 2012, and personal consumption reached a record low with a minus 4.3% growth and was below the level recorded
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in 2001. One gure above all gives the sense that an entire generation of European citizens feels it has been robbed of its future: in Italy, according to these gures, 39% of the young people (under 25) are out of work (against a general unemployment rate of 11.7%). In Greece 60% of the young are unemployed, in Spain 50%. Most of these young people are educated, many highly educated and most of them are wasting their lives in short-term contract jobs or living on the pensions of their parents. One should not be surprised if they revolted. But the fact is they have not so far, apart from some short-lived movement Occupy style (the indignados, or indignants in Spain and Greece did not evolve into a stronger platform). On the contrary, we saw extreme right-wing violent movements gaining strength, like the Golden Dawn (neo-Nazi with an anti-immigrant agenda) in Greece. Coming back to Italy, the question is: why the anger at the austerity measures imposed upon us, this sense of discomfort at the diktats coming from the Eurotower and the discontent of the young? Why has all this beneted a survivor like Berlusconi (largely responsible for the current state of Italy) and an unpredictable character like Beppe Grillo, who does not have a coherent political platform? Besides Monti, the bigger losers in this vote were the Italian left because neither Democratic Party nor even the leftist Sel (Left Ecology and Freedom) beneted from the popular discontent. This is the second message we should read in the Italian vote. The centre-left parties did not dare to campaign openly against austerity. They said they would moderate the harsher measures, they would certainly care to better redistribute the burden of the cuts and taxes, and safeguard some of the social acquisitions. But they did not openly challenge the mantra of debt-cutting, tax-raising and austerity above all. Berlusconi, on his side, worked on the general sense of discomfort during his campaign in his demagogic style. For example, one poster by his party stated, Italian politics will be decided by the Italians on a picture showing Monti
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shaking hands with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Not a sophisticated message, but it interpreted some of the popular anger with the dictatorship of the Euro. Besides, Berlusconi, who probably came back to the political arena in order to avoid jail for his numerous corruption cases, and above all to save the family business, also showed that he still superbly manages the tricks of a personal campaign. For instance, he promised he would reimburse to each citizen the sums they paid as tax on home property imposed by Montis government (in Italy roughly 80% of the families are homeowners, so this tax weighed heavily on the middle class). Of course it was just a demagogic, unrealistic electoral promise, but many just wanted to believe in a ray of hope. Grillo, A Mercurial Character More serious is the second clown. Beppe Grillo is a controversial, mercurial character, with a penchant for authoritarian rhetoric. However, he often touched on very popular issues from corruption to a suffocating bureaucracy. He claims not being either right- or left-wing, but he was a magnet for people from both sides. He supports grass-roots movements like one against a new high-speed railway in the north-west Italy, or environmentalist issues. During the campaign he supported the demand for a universal citizen wage, an issue that certainly moved leftist audiences. Furthermore, when all pundits agreed that television is power (and the case of Berlusconi conrms this) and that the TV talk show is now the main political arena, Grillo shunned TV debates and instead lled public squares with hundreds of thousands of people. Again, tsunami Grillo is changing the political game but in which direction, it is too early to say. The message of the Italian polls is quite clear. Those political parties or movements that campaigned strongly against austerity won most of the votes. The Italians dared to defy the diktat of the trojka, signalling that the power of the Germany and the ECB to impose austerity policies is declining. Perhaps other European voters will follow. Hence the comments on the Italian instability and
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risk of contagion; hence the dismissive headlines about the two clowns and the rise of populism. No wonder the Italian vote alarmed European circles and not without reason. However, we should be clear about the danger of populism. This term has been used to label negatively every popular demand: if you do not accept exibility, ask for decent jobs, do

not want to shed your pension, you are a populist. Raising demands for just taxation, defending the universal right to healthcare or to university studies, etc this is populism. But Grillo attracted many voters (and many traditionally left-wing voters) precisely because they perceived, rightly or wrongly, that he represented some true popular aspirations.

Perhaps this should be a warning to all Europe, and possibly beyond: when politics is deaf to popular demands, the risk is that the political space will be occupied by populist forces, be it a self-promoted comedian or some Golden Dawn as Europe experienced during another economic crisis in the previous century.

Right to Food and Foodgrain Policy

Kirit S Parikh

Identication of the poor and the scale of operation are the most critical challenges of the proposed legislation on the right to food. This article suggests universal entitlement that excludes clearly identiable rich. Food coupons could eliminate the need for the operations of public distribution system and eliminate diversion. Also cash transfers to the women of the household through Aadhaar cards could substantially reduce diversions and avoid the problem of distribution of food coupons.

he proposed legislation on the right to food poses a number of challenges. Identication of the poor and the scale of operation are the most critical ones. Apart from the large nancial outlay involved, the disincentive impact can lead to a signicant fall in production of foodgrains unless an effective mechanism is created either through the Food Corporation of India (FCI) or state agencies to procure foodgrains from every nook and corner of the country. These challenges can be better appreciated in the context of our food policy and experience so far. This article suggests a universal scheme excluding the clearly identiable rich to effectively provide food security to the poor. Present Policy The present foodgrain policy was initiated when foodgrains were the major item of consumption of people. It seeks to ensure adequate domestic production through assuring a minimum support price (MSP) to farmers, providing subsidised fertilisers and irrigation water as well as electricity for pumping. At the same time, it seeks to provide foodgrains to consumers at a low price through the public distribution system (PDS) under which ration card holders get subsidised foodgrains (and some other items) up to their ration entitlements. Consumers are free to purchase additional quantities in the open market. The government bears the burden of difference

between the ration price and the cost of supply. PDS was initially operated only in urban areas and covered all residents. It was expanded to rural areas and has been tweaked in many ways over time. At present under the targeted PDS (TPDS), households are classied as those below the poverty line (BPL) and those above the poverty line (APL). The BPL households get foodgrains at a much lower price than the APL households. The PDS is operated through the FCI which procures food from organised grain markets, stores and distributes to states for further distribution through ration shops under PDS. The FCI operations also serve the purpose of buffer stock management. The MSP is set by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Pricing (CACP). In recent years, the MSP has often become the maximum price when supply exceeds demand at MSP. The FCI then ends up buying foodgrains beyond its need for PDS or buffer stock operation and builds up stocks more than its desired level. Over the past few years wheat and rice stocks have been way above the desired stock levels. To facilitate procurement by FCI in surplus states, foodgrains movement across states was restricted. Under the Essential Commodities Act (ECA) 1955, movement and storage by traders was restricted. In 2003, this was modied by an order that stated:
[A]ny dealer can freely buy, stock, sell, transport, distribute, dispose, acquire, use or consume any quantity of wheat, paddy/rice, coarse grains, sugar, edible oil seeds, edible oil, pulses, gur, wheat products and hydrogenated vegetable oil or vanaspati shall not require any licence or permit thereof.

Kirit S Parikh (kparikh@irade.org) is Chairman, Integrated Research and Action for Development, New Delhi.
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The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act, a state-level Act, regulates agricultural marketing. Under this sale and purchase outside the market are
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