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A double analysis of stakeholder interaction in public infrastructure management

Telli E. van der Lei and Paulien M. Herder
Energy & Industry Section, Faculty of Technology Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
Abstract
Purpose This work is part of a research project that seeks to gain insight into the applicability of different actor analysis methods. This paper aims to describe the analysis of the predictive value of two different actor analysis methods applied to the redesign of the water management of a Dutch polder. Design/methodology/approach The papers approach is a parallel application and comparison of the results of two separate actor analysis methods: conict analysis and transactional analysis. Findings Transactional analysis was more accurate regarding the prediction of the real world outcomes than conict analysis. Research limitations/implications The choice of analysis method may be of signicant inuence on the quality of understanding of the risks involved with different stakeholders. There may not be a single silver bullet. Practical implications An asset manager needs to apply multiple actor analysis techniques to fully grasp the impact of the threats posed by the stakeholders on the asset and its risk register. Originality/value The parallel application of the two methods and comparison of their predictive value is new. Keywords Infrastructure management, Stakeholder analysis, Actor analysis, Multi method research, Risk-based asset management, Risk analysis, The Netherlands, Water supply engineering Paper type Research paper

Analysis of stakeholder interaction 563

1. Introduction Many infrastructure companies are changing their asset management processes into a risk-based approach, in which decisions are taken based on the risk position of the company. The risk position of the company is impacted by stakeholder behavior and interaction in the environment of these companies. That is, the decisions regarding infrastructural assets are also inuenced by actors other than the company responsible for the infrastructure itself. Therefore the value of different types of stakeholder valuation, engagement, and management methods is increasingly being acknowledged (e.g. Furneaux et al., 2008; Hayles et al., 2010). As a result, actor analysis methods that can help to gain insight into possible outcomes of stakeholder interaction are receiving interest in these companies from a strategic management point of view (e.g. Alliander, 2009). There is a wide range of actor analysis methods and different overviews of actor analysis methods exist. What characterizes many of the reviews is that they keep to their application eld (e.g. Grimble and Wellard, 1997; Mingers and Rosenhead, 2004) or to a single method or set of similar techniques (e.g. Bryson, 2004). Others have taken

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the challenge to map a broader spectrum of actor analysis methods (Hammond, 1996; Hermans, 2005, Van der Lei, 2009). Regarding the broader overviews, the list of actor analysis method differs depending on the research perspective taken. Hermans (2005) is interested in the way actor analysis methods may help to understand the policy making process. He classies three main theoretical perspectives on multi-actor policy making. The perspectives focus on actor networks, the perceptions of actors, and on the resources and objectives of actors. Hammonds (1996) is interested in what way political actors can be modeled with purposive mathematical methods of decision-making. He classies the formal mathematical decision-making methods into four classes with the help of two types of assumptions about the individual actor. These assumptions regard the computational power of the actors and the amount of information available to the actors. Van der Leis (2009) categorization is based on methods that allow for the study of some or one characteristic of multiple actors. She makes a distinction into two different kinds of groups of actor analysis methods. First, actor analysis methods that allow an analyst to model decision-making methods that say something about the possible choices or resolutions that actors will or can take and call these methods of multi-actor decision-making. The actor analysis methods that describe multi-actor decision-making can be subdivided into two groups: bottom up and top-down methods. Second, actor analysis methods that study the relationships or associations between actors; we call these structural actor analysis methods. This view is different from the Hammond (1996) and Hermans (2005) as it focuses on what the method itself models and not what mathematical principle or policy theory it adheres to. The knowledge of the different actor analysis methods that are available has been recorded in different reviews. The knowledge on the applicability of these methods for different types of problems is underdeveloped. The key problem for many asset managers and other professionals confronted by risks from stakeholder behavior is how to choose a suitable method from the many different actor analysis methods available. While scientic literature has shown that actor analysis methods can be fruitfully applied to public infrastructure problems (e.g. Hermans and Thissen, 2009), the literature linking specic tools to specic problem situations has been less well developed (French and Geldermann, 2005; Peters, 2005; Van der Lei, 2009). The work described in this paper is part of a research project that aims to gain insight into the applicability of different actor analysis methods for given problems. The approach taken in the research is to apply two equally applicable actor analysis methods to the same problem and evaluate the performance of the methods. The objective is to gain insight into the applicability of different actor analysis methods by comparing the results of the two methods to the actual decision taken regarding the water management of the polder. Ultimately it would result in diagnostic rules that guide the choice of method. In this paper we compare the results of two different actor analysis methods that belong to the group of methods of multi-actor decision-making: transactional analysis and conict analysis. Both of these methods have been used to predict stakeholder interaction (Van der Lei and Thissen, 2008) and we use the predictive ability of the methods as a proxy for applicability. We apply both of these methods to the water management of a polder that is part of the Dutch water infrastructure. Finally, we compare the predictive results of the two methods to the actual decision taken regarding the water management of a Dutch polder.

2. The water management problem explained The polder Groot Mijdrecht (GM) is a deep subsiding polder in the Netherlands of about 2000 hectares. Parts of it are as low as six meters under sea level. The shape of the polder is somewhat like an hour glass (see Figure 1). On the right the Northern part directly connects to a series of lakes called the Vinkeveense Plassen. The northern part is sparsely populated while the southern part contains an industrial area and urbanization. The water management of this polder will become unsustainable in the long run and there are ve factors that inuence this. First, the polder is deep which causes it to function as a drain for the groundwater from the surrounding area. This water percolates in the polder, each year 47 million m3 of water is pumped out of the GM polder of which only 5 million m3 comes from precipitation (Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV), 2005). The pumping of the water from the GM polder costs a considerable amount of money. Second, the percolating water is somewhat polluted. That is, the percolating water is phosphate rich and slightly brackish because the water passes through a 6000 years old sea deposition (Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV), 2005). In dry periods when most of the water in the outlet comes from the GM polder, the outlet sees a sharp increase in salt concentrations (Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV), 2006). When this water is used to compensate for water shortage in surrounding polders, there too the salt concentration increases. A third factor is the subsidence of the land in the polder. This subsidence is estimated to be 6 mm per year for the southern part of the GM polder and 9 mm per year for the northern part (Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV), 2005). The subsidence of the land is a problem as in order to keep the current level of land reclamation the water level should be

Analysis of stakeholder interaction 565

Figure 1. The contour of the polder Groot Mijdrecht located in the center of the Netherlands

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lowered according to the subsidence making the difference between the water level in the polder and outside the polder even larger. Fourth, ooding due to heavy rainfall is expected to happen more often. When this happens parts of the polder are ooded. Finally, although not directly related to the water management within the polder, there is a need for water storage in the area that can contain oods with a risk of happening once in 100 years. Six strategies that can help alleviate the water management of the polder have been explored by the responsible province and water board (Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV), 2006). These strategies range from doing nothing to raising the level of the polder with dirt, to ooding the polder in such a way that a lake is created (see Table I). The do nothing strategy does not change the current water management of the polder. The local peat plan provides in the construction of swamp nature in the eastern half of the northern part of the GM polder. For this strategy the water level will need to be raised 50 cm. The strategy called techniques is based on the idea to actively pump out ground water from the polder. Part of this water can be used to create drinking water. This strategy has the least effect on the appearance of the polder. Like the local peat plan the last three strategies focus on creating more counterweight in the polder in order to decrease the amount of percolation. These strategies are called heighten, grow along, and lake. In the heighten strategy the polder is raised 2.5 meters with sand. In order to pay for this strategy the area needs to be urbanized. In the grow-along and lake strategy the water level of the polder is raised to create a lake. The strategies differ in the sense that the raising of the water level is done over 50 years in the grow-along strategy, allowing the swamp to grow along with the increasing water level. Table I shows the different strategies developed by the responsible province and water board. It shows that only the grow along and lake strategies have a positive effect on all identied factors and that the grow along and lake strategy can be considered best. However, these strategies might not be the strategies the stakeholders will support or prefer. In the following part of the paper we analyze the two different actor analysis methods and explore the strategies suggested by conict analysis and transactional analysis. 3. Methodology We studied the water management problem of the GM polder with two different actor analysis techniques: conict analysis and transactional analysis. Our aim was to compare the strategies the methods predict regarding the water management of the polder. We chose the methods as both methods belong to the same group of actor analysis methods (Van der Lei, 2009) and can predict the outcome of stakeholder interaction.
Strategies factors Percolation Polluted water Subsidence (east/west) Flooding Water storage Do nothing / Local peat plan 0 0 / 0 Techniques 0/ 0 Heighten / Grow along/Lake /

Table I. Effect of strategies on factors affecting water system

Source: Adapted from Van der Lei (2009)

The methods differ in the assumptions about how the actors come to an outcome. Transactional analysis is an actor analysis method that has its roots in microeconomic theory (Coleman, 1990). It assumes that a system of actors trade interest and control over issues. That is, some actors have an excess amount of control over issues and are willing to trade this for more control over issues of their interest. In this perspective a decision regarding a problem situation is the result of multiple exchanges between different actors (see for example Timmermans, 2004 for public infrastructure related examples). The equilibrium of control is calculated and represents the outcome of all the individual transactions. Conict analysis is used to analyze the strategic power of different actors and has its roots in game theory. Conict analysis helps to analyze the possible ways that actors play out the options that they have (Howard, 1971, Fang et al., 1993, Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). From the options that the different actors have, scenarios are constructed. These scenarios are analyzed and an equilibrium outcome is calculated. The equilibrium outcome is the outcome where no actor can change the outcome except the one whos perspective is taken. The data for the two methods was colleted from reports and media in the summer of 2007. There was sufcient material on the case as the possible reooding of the polder made it a high prole case that was extensively reported on. In order to verify the collected data from the reports and media 19 people were interviewed. From each interview, a detailed document describing the interview was prepared. Of the 19 reports, 18 were returned and approved with minor changes. The results of the interviews was in line with the data collected for conict analysis and transactional analysis. This increased the belief in the reliability of the input data. 4. Results of the stakeholder analysis 4.1 Predicted strategy for the GM polder with transactional analysis For the transactional analysis eight different actors and eleven different issues were determined. The stakeholders are the national government, provincial government, municipal government, provincial council, municipal council, water board, inhabitants, and Habiforum. Habiforum is an organization hired to facilitate the decision making process regarding the redesign of the water management. The public actors reect the three different governmental layers the Netherlands has. The national parliament was not added as a stakeholder as the decision making regarding the polder takes place at provincial and local level. The national government was added as it sets the boundaries of the decision-making that is possible in the polder through legislation and is an important nancing stakeholder. The water board is responsible for the day-to-day water management of the polder. The inhabitants are the inhabitants of the polder and Habiforum is the organization responsible for the project management. The factors identied by the responsible province and water board mentioned in Section 2 are represented by the issues water management and water storage. The table shows that more issues regarding the problem situation can be identied when more actors are taken into account. These issues are: multifunctional green hart, prestige, security and continuity, process objectivity, process transparency, respect for landscape, supported solution, housing and successful learning process. Due to space reasons we will not elaborate on these issues.

Analysis of stakeholder interaction 567

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Table II presents the results of the transactional analysis and shows how control and interest of the actors are spread over the different issues in the equilibrium. The table of equilibrium control is computed with the table of interest and the table of control that are presented in the Appendix (Tables AI-AII). These tables were contracted as a result of the desk research. Table II is only provided to give an impression of a table of equilibrium control again space is too limited to explain the whole table. We limit our discussion of the results to their relationship to the developed strategies for the polder. In Table II all stakeholders have gained control over the issue that interest them most. The equilibrium table thus suggests that a solution to the water management problem is possible where each actor gains on the issues that interest the actor the most. In the equilibrium situation the control over respect for landscape increases for the inhabitants and the control over water storage increases for the provincial government. This suggests a solution is possible that respects the landscape but also involves water storage. None of the developed strategies in Table I leave all actors better off by both respecting the landscape and also including water storage. The strategies do nothing, local peat plan, and techniques have little impact on the appearance of the polder and involve little to no water storage, while the strategies heighten, grow along, and lake have a severe impact on the appearance of the polder. It is therefore unlikely that the equilibrium situation reects one of the already developed strategies. Instead, the transactional analysis suggests an intermediate type of strategy where water is stored but the landscape respected is possible. 4.2 Predicted strategy for the GM polder with conict analysis For the conict analysis four different actors and eight options were selected. Table III states the actors and their options regarding the water management of the polder as gathered as input for the conict analysis. The number of stakeholders is less than in the transactional analysis but the amount is typical for a conict analysis. As the decision regarding the strategy is a provincial decision the provincial government and council are represented as stakeholders. The national government is a potentially important nancial contributor and is therefore also represented. Finally, the inhabitants of the polder are represented. From the options scenarios are constructed. Every possible combination of options is a potential scenario. Since there are eight options held by the actors there are 28 256 possible scenarios in total. After removing the infeasible scenarios 16 feasible scenarios are left. Table IV shows the scenarios after the infeasible scenarios are deleted. A 1 means the option is played and a 0 means an option is not played. Table IV shows that the provincial government will never accept an open problem formulation as there are no scenarios where option four is played. This option was added in the analysis as the inhabitants of the polder fundamentally disagreed with the problem formulation as represented in Section 2. Also the provincial government will always pursue options 2 and 3, lobby the national government and pursue lake. This is an interesting result. The provincial government will always pursue a lake as the lake strategy is eligible for funding from the national government. The table also shows that the inhabitants will always lobby the provincial council to vote against a lake as this option is always played in every feasible scenario. Overall the inhabitants prefer that the polder is left alone. However,

Actor issue 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.16 1.86 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.23 2.53 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.11 1.22 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.14 1.58 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.76 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.12 1.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.03 1.18

Nat gov

Prov gov

Mun gov

Prov council

Mun council

Water board

Inhab

Habi 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.80

Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11.00

Multifunctional green heart Water storage Prestige Security and Continuity Process objectivity Process transparency Respect for landscape A supported solution Water managementa Housing Successful learning process Total

Notes: aThe water management issue consists of the following factors: percolating water, polluted water, subsidence, and ooding

Analysis of stakeholder interaction 569

Table II. Table of equilibrium control

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Stakeholder National government Provincial government (GS)

Options 1. Provide money for project 2. 3. 4. 5. Lobby for money from national government Pursue lake Restart process with open problem formulation Issue more research on water problem

570
Table III. Table of options for conict analysis Inhabitants Provincial council

6. Go to court 7. Lobby provincial council 8. Approve plans of provincial government

the scenarios where the provincial government does nothing have all been marked as infeasible illustrating change in the management or appearance of the polder. There is also no scenario where the process is restarted with an open problem formulation, the scenario that is preferred by the inhabitants. The best scenarios the inhabitants can pursue are the scenarios where the national government provides no money for the project and/or where the water problems are further researched. This is an interesting result as the inhabitants had predominately been lobbying the provincial council. This result suggests that the inhabitants should also be lobbying the national government, or seeking to inuence independent research bodies. Scenarios 107 and 235 are marked bold in table IV and these are the equilibrium scenarios. The difference between the two equilibrium scenarios is that in the rst no money is provided by the government and in the second the government does provide the money for the project. The scenarios further show that the provincial government will issue more research on the water problems in the polder: if they do not do this the inhabitants would most likely go to court to contest the legitimacy of the policy project. Issuing more research prevents this measure. Issuing more research on the water problem is also strategic with regard to the provincial council, the council has a preference for solving the water problems but cannot approve of them when the inhabitants seriously oppose as the council represents the inhabitants of the province. Thus issuing more research also prevents the disapproval of the plans by the provincial council. Overall, the conict analysis predicts that a new process with an open problem formulation, something that the inhabitants would like to see, is not feasible. The analysis also shows that it is unlikely that the provincial government can unilaterally pursue the option of a lake; it has to consider the stakes of the local inhabitants in order to get the plans through the provincial council. It is therefore most likely that the provincial government will allow for additional research on the water management problems in the polder. More research on the water problems is the best the inhabitants can opt for, as a new process is out of the question. 5. Discussion: real world events related to the outcomes of the methods In 2008 the responsible provincial government decided to issue more research on: an improved ground water model to have better insight on the effects of the developed strategies, the subsidence in the polder on the long term till 2050, and the possibilities for drinking water extraction from the polder (Provincie Utrecht, 2008a). This was an action that was predicted by the conict analysis. The results from the additional

Actor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 98 99 102 103 106 107 110 111 226 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 227 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 230 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

Option

Scenarios 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 234 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 235 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 238 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 239

National government

Provincial government

Inhabitants

Provincial council

Decimal

Analysis of stakeholder interaction 571

Table IV. Overview of the feasible scenarios for the water management of the GM polder

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research showed that drinking water companies are not interested in making drinking water from the water from the polder. It also showed that the chance of percolating water due to the subsidence of the land is much smaller than was suggested, especially in the western part of the polder (Provincie Utrecht, 2008b). Furthermore in September 2008 the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment made it clear to the Provincial Government that it will not allow for the building of more houses in the polder as it would negatively affect the spatial appearance and quietness of the polder (College van Gedeputeerde Staten, 2008). This decision affected three of the six develop strategies, lake, grow along, and heighten, that all included the building of more houses making these strategies now too expensive to pursue. Following this prohibition and the research results the provincial government decided to develop an additional seventh strategy that would solve the water management issues and also be affordable (Provinciale Staten, 2008). Both stakeholder analysis methods thus captured parts of reality and predicted parts of reality. As decision making regarding the polder is still ongoing a denite conclusion at this point in time cannot be drawn. However, the transactional analysis shows that a strategy for the polder that is based on smaller changes than those that change the whole appearance of the polder by ooding it or heightening it is possible. This result is in contrast to the outcome of the conict analysis that suggests that the provincial government will always pursue the lake strategy. The transactional analysis showed that a strategy where everybody is better off is possible. It now seems that this strategy is being sought in reality by researching a seventh strategy. The impact of this strategy on the appearance of the polder is less than the Heighten, Grow along, and Lake as part of the landscape respected needs to be respected. This also means that the entire polder cannot be ooded to serve as water storage. It seems that this future strategy combines the issues water storage and respect for landscape as proposed by the transactional analysis. In contrast, conict analysis did not predict an intermediate strategy like transactional analysis. The options that were used in the conict analysis did not allow for this type of strategy. That is, there was no option available to the stakeholder that suggested developing a new strategy. This option was not included as at the time of analysis it was not an option considered by the involved authorities. At the time of analysis this option did not exist and was therefore not part of the input of the analysis. An intermediate option could in hindsight have been added by the researchers. However, the goal of the research was to model reality. 6. Conclusions The analysis of stakeholder involvement and behavior is important in infrastructure management as risks are related to stakeholder interaction. Furthermore, public infrastructure companies increasingly want to incorporate societal values into their decision-making, which also necessitates the analysis of the involved stakeholders. There is a need for methods that asses stakeholder behavior and involvement. This research applies two different actor analysis methods and shows that the there is no single best method to predict stakeholder behavior and thus possible threats. We suggest the application of more than one stakeholder analysis method to analyze multi-actor problems from different angles. For the asset manager this means that he or she should apply multiple stakeholder analysis methods to ll its risk register.

References Alliander (2009), Annual Report 2009 Energising the Future Together, Alliander, Arnhem. Bryson, J.M. (2004), What to do when stakeholder matter, stakeholder identication and analysis techniques, Public Management Review, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 21-53. College van Gedeputeerde Staten (2008), Statenvoorstel Groot Mijdrecht Noord, Registratienummer: 2008INT231563. 28 October. Coleman, J.S. (1990), Foundations of Social Theory, TheBelknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, and London. Fang, L., Hipel, K.W. and Kilgour, D.M. (1993), Interactive Decision Making, The Graph Model for Conict Resolution, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY. French, S. and Geldermann, J. (2005), The varied contexts of environmental decision problems and their implications for decision support, Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 8, pp. 378-91. Furneaux, C.W., Brown, K.A. and McCabe, A.C. (2008), Stakeholder engagement in infrastructure projects through art in infrastructure delivery, in Brown, K.A., Mandell, M., Furneaux, C.W. and Beach, S. (Eds), Proceedings Contemporary Issues in Public Management: The Twelfth Annual Conference of the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM XII), Brisbane, pp. 1-27. Grimble, R. and Wellard, K. (1997), Stakeholder methodologies in natural resource management: a review of principles, contexts, experiences and opportunities, Agricultural Systems, Vol. 55 No. 2, pp. 173-93. Hammond, T.H. (1996), Formal theory and the institutions of governance, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 107-85. Hayles, C., Graham, M. and Fong, P.S.W. (2010), Value management for sustainable decision making, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Municipal Engineer, Vol. 163, ME1, pp. 43-50. Hermans, L.M. (2005), Actor Analysis for Water Resources Management, Eburon, Delft. Hermans, L.M. and Thissen, W.A.H. (2009), Actor analysis methods and their use for public policy analysis, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 196 No. 2, pp. 808-18. Howard, N. (1971), Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Kilgour, D.M. and Hipel, K.W. (2005), The graph model for conict resolution: past present, and future, Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol. 14 No. 6, pp. 441-60. Mingers, J. and Rosenhead, J. (2004), Problem structuring methods in action, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 152, pp. 530-54. Peters, G.B. (2005), The problem of policy problems, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 349-70. Provinciale Staten (2008), Groot Mijdrecht Noord, Nummer PS: PS2008RGW28, Registratienummer: 2008INT231563. 8 December. Provincie Utrecht (2008a), GS wil nadere onderzoeken polder Groot-Mijdrecht Noord, Provincie Utrecht, 20 February. Provincie Utrecht (2008b), Verkenning water Groot-Mijdrecht Noord 2de fase, Provincie Utrecht, August. Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV) (2005), Voorverkenning wateropgave De Ronde Venen, Provincie Utrecht, June.

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Provincie Utrecht and Hoogheemraadschap Amstel Gooi en Vecht (AGV) (2006), Verkenning water Groot Mijdrecht Noord, Provincie Utrecht, November. Timmermans, J.S. (2004), Multi-actor information system for integrated coastal zone management, in Timmermans, J.S. (Ed.), Purposive Interaction in Multi-actor Decision Making, Operationalizing Colemans Linear System of Action for Policy Decision Support, Eburon, Delft. Van der Lei, T.E. and Thissen, W.A.H. (2008), Quantitative problem structuring methods for multi-actor problems: an analysis of reported applications, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 60 No. 9, pp. 1198-206. Van der Lei (2009), Relating actor analysis methods to policy problems, dissertation, Delft. Further reading Fraser, N.M. and Hipel, K.W. (1980), Metagame analysis of the Poplar River conict, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 31, pp. 377-85. Jensen, P.A. (2008), The origin and constitution of facilities management as an integrated corporate function, Facilities, Vol. 26 Nos 13/14, pp. 490-500.

About the authors Telli E. van der Lei obtained her Masters degree in Science and Policy in 2002 from the University of Utrecht. As part of her degree she studied Economics at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki in 2000; she also worked as an intern at the Government Institute for Economic Research in Helsinki. In 2004 she started working on a project called Safeguarding public values in infrastructure design through actor analytic techniques at the Policy Analysis Section at the Faculty of Technology Policy and Management of Delft University of Technology. In 2009 she obtained her PhD in Policy Analysis. Telli E. van der Lei now works as a postdoctoral researcher for the Energy & Industry section of the Faculty of Technology Policy and Management. Her main research interests are: asset management, public values, and actor analysis methods. Telli E van der Lei is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: Et.e.vanderlei@tudelft.nl Paulien M. Herder is a Professor in Engineering Systems Design in the Energy & Industry group at the Delft University of Technology, and Scientic Director of the Next Generation Infrastructures. Paulien M. Herder obtained her MSc degree in Chemical Engineering at the Delft University of Technology in 1994 and her PhD degree in 1999 in the area of the design and the design process of chemical plants. Her research interests concern the design and the design process of large-scale networked systems, with a focus on: engineering design, life cycle considerations in design (sustainability, life cycle costing), and asset management. Her work has been published in various national and international refereed journals.

Appendix

Actor issue 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.00 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.08 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.02 0.09 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.02 1.00

Nat gov

Prov gov

Mun gov

Prov council

Mun council

Water Board

Inhab

Habi 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.16 1.00

Total 0.68 0.72 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.59 0.84 0.74 0.59 0.67 8

Multifunctional green heart Water storage Prestige Security and Continuity Process objectivity Process transparency Respect for landscape A supported solution Water management Housing Successful learning process Total

575

Table AI. Table of interest in issues

Analysis of stakeholder interaction

576

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Actor issue 0.32 0.10 0.27 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.05 0.30 0.28 0.04 1.90 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.24 2.55 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.24 1.24 0.11 0.24 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.04 1.54 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.76

Multifunctional green heart Water storage Prestige Security and Continuity Process objectivity Process transparency Respect for landscape A supported solution Water management Housing Successful learning process Total

Table AII. Table of control over issues Nat gov Prov gov Mun gov Prov council Mun council Water board 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.24 1.10 Inhab 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.12 1.12 Habi 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.78 Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11.00