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SOCRATES AND OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW Author(s): Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 18, No. 1 (June 1984), pp. 10-18 Published by: De Gruyter Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913520 . Accessed: 22/08/2011 04:32
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SOCRATES AND OBEDIENCE TO THE LAW

In theCrito, seems toargue that oneought Socrates todisobey never thelaw,orany or The such is at legalpower body. strongest obligation suggested Crito51B-C, state: where of the Socrates says ... ifsheorders or imprisoned or ifsheleads youto be scourged orslain, herwill is tobe done,andthis is youto wartobe wounded and must not or draw or back leave you way give your post, right, butinwarandincourt andeverywhere, do whatever the youmust or youmust showherbypersuasion state, demands, your country . . .' whatis really right It is on suchgrounds thathe refuses Crito'soffer to assist himin escaping prison Yet in theApology,thereis at least one instance where (and thusexecution). Socrates seems to saythat hewould, under theright a legally circumstances, disobey constituted AtApology to 29C-30C,Socrates authority. saysthatwerethejurors tellhimthathe couldgo free, on thecondition thathe discontinue thepractice of hisreply wouldbe: philosophy, I respect Men of Athens, and loveyou,butI shallobeythegod rather thanyou,and while I liveand am able to continue, I shall never or and out giveup philosophy stopexhorting you pointing the truth toanyoneofyouI may meet. . . (29D) Critics havebeenled,bycomparing suchpassages as these, to argue that there is a contradiction in Socrates' viewofthemoral of civil disobedience.2 acceptibility Others haveurged this that shows Socrates' with to be intended less Crito arguments as decisive thanas rhetorically to persuade himself.3 Crito philosophically adequate Still othershave soughtto defendthe consistency and sincerity of Socrates' a variety of interpretations of theproblematic byproviding arguments arguments that either weaken their orrecast their conclusions andthus focus, apparent purport to allowa consistent In thisbrief formulation of Socratic discussion, philosophy.4 we do notwantto evaluate all of these as such,butrather to point interpretations out an aspectof Socrates'arguments in theconthathas gonewholly unnoticed siderable literature on this issue.Ifweareright, attention to Socrates' giving proper in theApologyremoves the apparent even if we contradiction, legal situation assume for these thestrongest ofSocrates' compurposes possible professed reading 5 In thisway,we shallshowthat mitment to thelaw in theCrito. no reading of the Crito conflicts with Socrates' vowinthe Weshallconclude that byarguing Apology. no non-trivial conflict between god and law can evenbe imagined. I The general is whether or notin theApology Socrates is prepared to do question that woulddefy and thus hisownproscriptions intheCrito. things legalauthority, Thepassages cited above(Apology 29C ff.)is nottheonly oneinthe where Apology Socrates but it is theonlyone thatcan be argued of authority, appearsdefiant to causeserious forconsistency with of theCrito. concern thearguments plausibly Forexample, at 32B-C,Socrates recalls thetime when healoneopposed theplanto for their dead afer the sea-battle en masse the try responsible leaving eight generals at Arginusae, the other were in Thisis favor of such action. an although prytanes nota problem, trial because such a would be its however, illegal, despite appealto 10

at 32C-E, Socratesrecallsthetimewhenthe thirty the populace. Similarly, tyrants himto go out and bringLeon of Salamis forexecution werein powerand directed a man who had apparently done no wrongand had neverbeen triedforhis alleged offenses.Socrates did not carryout theirorder,however,since neither was their orderlegal accordingto the laws underwhichhe had grownup,6nor did theyhave underthose laws to give any such command(despitetheirmanifest legal authority or defiance politicalpower).The same goes forall othercases of apparentarrogance in theApology,withthesole possibleexception of his resistance to thejurorsat 29C ff.:none commitSocratesto defying law or legal authority. If thereis a contradictionto be foundbetween theApology and Crito,therefore, it can be foundonlyin thisone passage. But theseothercases provideat leastsome groundsfordeciding whatwillcount as a problemforthe claim thatthetwo dialoguescontainan inconsistency. For exSocrates imaginesthe jurors to ample, if it can be shown eitherthat the directive issue could neverbe a legal one, or thatthe jurors had no legal authority to issue such an order,Socrates' vow to disobeywould be no moreinconsistent withthedoctrinethatone oughtalwaysobey the law thanhis resistance to the mass trialof the had been. Though we concede thattheremightbe other generalsor to the tyrants his obligationto thelaw as waysto resolvetheparadox, forexample,by construing wherethereis a conflict withthedictates onlyprimafacie, and capable of exception of piety7 or even morality in general,8 we shall arguethatno such moralhierarchies need to be constructed in orderto maintainconsistency in Socrates' view. II It is important to recognize thecircumstances underwhichSocratesmakes his controversial vow: He is on trialforimpiety and corrupting theyouthof Athens.More it has been claimedby the prosecution thateither he should not have immediately, been broughtto trial(were he innocent),or giventhathe has, he should surelybe foundguilty and sentenced to death(29C). Socratesimagines thatthejuryis notpersuaded by Anytus,but is also not utterly convincedof Socrates' blamelessness and harmlessness,and thus offer to let him go on the condition that he give up philosophy.Socratesrespondsby sayingthathe would neverobey. Thereare twopossiblewaysin whichsucha situation could occur: Either(a) the offers to Socrates of all with this or (b) thejuryfinds jury acquit charges, provision, Socratesguilty of the charges,but electsto sentence him to silencerather than the the Let us consider these in order. death-penalty proposed by prosecution. If thesituation Socrateshas in mindis of sort(a), thenwhatis supposedto occur is thatSocratesis foundinnocent of any charges,but is nonetheless requiredto eschewphilosophy, on pain of death (29D). But thereis not the slightest historical evidencethatthe jury was empoweredto provideany such conditionalacquittals; nor is thereany sense in supposingthatthereshould have been provisionsforthis. Afterall, if the man is legally guiltyof no crimes,then he surelydeservesno penaltiesor restrictions. If, on theotherhand, he would deservedeathforrepeating his actions,thensurely thoseactionsare blameworthy and should thusmerit a conviction,and not an acquittal. Of course, it mightbe that one who is chargedas Socrateswas, and put forward fortrial,9 theoutcome,feelwarned should,whatever thatwhatever he had done had the potentialof getting himin serioustrouble.But, reason to believethatAthenianjuries in trialsof thistype again, thereis excellent 11

to finda man innocent, on theone hand, and yetissue a did not have theauthority shouldthedirective of a penalty, be disobeyed.Had they directive havingtheeffect himto no made such a directive anyway,Socrates' vow to disobeyit would commit disobedienceof the law - forno law allowed thejury to make such a directive. demandsis thatthejuryacquit Socrates Now it might be thatwhatthesituation of any kind,but thensubsequently that without a provision pass a law sayingeither was a crimepunishableby death,or thatSocratespracticing philosophy philosophy of thiswould be thatwhiletheyfound was a crimepunishableby death. The effect Socratesguilty of no crime(forwhathe had done was notagainstthelaw), theyhad thatitoughtto be againstthelaw, and thushad resolvedto make becomeconvinced it so. Thus, theysay to Socrates,"we will let you go now, foryou have brokenno law, but we will make it so that if you go out and repeat the actions that have thelaw - a law thebreaking of which you beforeus, you willbe breaking brought earns the death-penalty".This would provide a reasonable readingof the jury's themto theproblemsconsidered without above, but it would directive, committing thattheydo not have. Juries are not emstillrequirethemto take on prerogatives before mayonlyacquit or condemnthosebrought poweredto pass laws, but rather restriccircumstances themon formalcharges,and, undercertain (and withcertain to be tions,about both of whichwe willhave moreto say below), selectthepenalty paid by those that are convicted.Thus, if thejury acquittedSocrates,theywould as a group to have no further power over him as a group,nor could theycontrive someor forthatmatter all maintain anysuchpoweroverhim.Of course,as citizens, of therelevant of thejurycould proposelegislation sortto thecounof themembers cil. But, as jurors,theycould not guaranteeits passage, and so theycould not with issue such a directive as Socratesimagines, actual or potential, any legal authority, hisconHence, werethejuryto findSocratesinnocent, havingfoundhiminnocent. would violateno law or legallyconstituted tinuedpracticeof philosophy authority, no matterwhat the jury had otherwiseproposed to him. His vow to continue, would in no way violatehis avowed commitment therefore, alwaysto obey thelaw. But Socratesmay have had situation(b) in mind,wherethejuryconvicts him, deathif he disobeys.This himto giveup philosophy, but thensentences threatening not only makes more conceptualsense than situation(a) (for now theywould be but coincideswell such a penaltyas a sentencefora convictedcriminal), assigning he reconsiders withSocrates' discussionat 37E-38A, wherehavingbeen convincted, as the appropriatesentence. the proposal thathe quit philosophy, Now it is clear that the jury is empoweredto penalize convictedcriminals of sentences.And were a sentenceassigned,the convict throughthe assignment would be in violation of the law, or at least disobedientof a legallyconstituted werehe to fail to behave accordto make such assignments, authority empowered to eschew Were Socrates sentenced philosophy,disobediencewould legally ingly. viewthathe oughtalwaysto do as his thenat leastprimafacie violatehis purported commands. country on whatsentences We do not know all of the limitations juries werepermitted thatat leastsomeminimal restrictions were to assign,though we can be fairly certain in effect. But we do knowthattherewas an important distinction betweentypesof trialprocedures, a distinction to thiscase. Althoughthere thatis crucially relevant was apparently not a clear distinction made between civiland criminal proceedings, sortsof cases: those forcrimesthe Athensdid have a provisionfortwo different

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penalitiesfor whichwere set by law, and those forcrimesthe penaltiesforwhich werenot setby law. The trialprocedureforthefirst sortof case was called an &yti)v the latterwas an ftycov Socrates' Atim-titoq; tihtit6<;.The procedurefor impiety, alleged crime,was of the lattersort. There is a good deal that is not known about Athenianlegal practices,and muchthatis not knownabout trialprocedures of thissort.But we do knowenough to see in Socrates' vow of disobediencean aspect nevernoticedin thevast literature it. In an &y(bv would propose a penaltyat the ti^tit6c;,the prosecution concerning If thedefendant end of theindictment.10 is thenfoundguilty in theinitialpartof the One thing thatseemssecurein our knowledge trial,he proposesa counter-penalty.11 of thisprocedure,as it is presented in each source on this clearlyand consistently is thatthejurywas thenrequired issue,12 by law to have a secondvote in whichthey chose the penaltyfromthoseproposedby the prosecutor and the defendant. There was no provisionforthemto concoctyetanotherpossiblepenalty, and thenassign thatone. But giventhis,Socrates' vow to disobeythejury,weretheyto proscribe further would in no way commithim to disobeyingeitherlaw or philosophicalactivity, forthejurycould in no way legallymake such a prolegallyconstituted authority, forthecrimesof whichtheyhad even,as in situation scription, (b), as the sentence convictedhim. On the one hand, the prosecutionhas asked for death. Telling Socratesthathis sentenceis to cease philosophizing is not, therefore, to selectthe But it is not thepenalty penalty proposedby theprosecution. proposedby Socrates he explicitly either,forwhen he is called upon to propose a counter-penalty, says thathe will not propose to quit philosophy.Rather,he offers a fine.Were thejury to sentence himto silence,therefore, a penalty theywould be assigning proposedby neither of thepartiesempowered to offer an alternative. Hence, weretheyto direct Socrates to quit philosophy,theirdirective would not be legal. Socrates' commitmentto obey thelaw would thusnot be in ev ren withhis refusal primafacie conflict to obey thisdirective.13 Of course,if Socratesproposed such a penalty,thejurycould legallyselectit, and subsequentfailureto act accordingly would be a violationof the law (or legal to whichSocratesprofesses to owe utter obedience.But Socratesdoes not authority) do thiswhengiventhe opportunity, and thereis no reason to suppose thathe ever would do sucha thing. After all, theheartof his defense againstthechargesbrought by Meletusis thathe willneverdisobeythecommandof thegod, a commandhe into requirehimphilosophize.Alternatively, iftheprosecution had suggested terprets thatan abandonment of philosophy be thepenalty, thejurywould have had theopportunity legallyto commandSocratesto do whathe sayshe would neverobey. But the prosecution did not do this,and theirfailureto do so was already manifestly established In any by thetimeSocratesmade his vow to disobeyany such directive. conditions.First,thatany case, such an eventwould requirea numberof unlikely indictment for as serious a crimeas impietywould allow for even a conditional releaseof the accused is absurd. Impiety was fartoo seriousa charge.Secondly,if otherchargeshad been made - less seriouscharges- it is not certain thatSocrates would have been foundguilty of them,or thatchargescould have been foundwhere such a penaltycould be legallyassigned.Thirdly, all of theseproblemsaside, were thisthepenalty the it is not clear thatSocratescould nothave soughtby prosecution, - and an alternative that would have better suited the proposed jury- evendeath14

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that way. In short,the numberof suppositions, all conthus avoided the conflict case offtheground, to fact,thatneed to be made, evento gettheproblematic trary renders the problemprohibitively speculative. whichmight be used as an objectionto our viewthatno One finalpointremains seriousparadox is to be foundin Socrates' vow. After truth thereis in all, whatever the above observations, the factremainsthat Socrates does not say thathe would to cease philosophy would not be legal; he says disobeybecause any such directive thathe would disobeybecause such a directive would conflict withhis dutyto the god. If the factthatthejury could not legallyrequireSocrates to quit philosophy had anything to do withhis vow, surelyhe would have said so. Such an objectionis based upon a misunderstanding of our argument, however, and in any case ignoresthe specificpurpose of Socrates' vow. First,we have not to argue that therecould be no moral principleoverriding that which attempted obligesSocratesto obey the law, thoughwe will considerthispointin thenextsection. Secondly,we have not claimedthatthe factthatthe imagineddirective from thejurywouldnotbe legalis whatmotivated Socratesto vow disobedience.We have he is not vowingdisobeonlyarguedthatin vowingto disobeyany such directive, and thus his vow causes no conflict withthe dience to the law or legal authority, of the Crito. arguments But more importantly, Socrates does not raise this topic to explain eitherhis of obligationto thelaw, or anyinclination he might have to violatethelaw. feelings two pointsof fundamental in Rather,he raisesthistopic to underscore significance his defense:He wishesto show how muchmoredeeplyhe fearsdoingthatwhichis evil and shameful thandeath,and he wishesto highlight withwhich theseriousness he takeshis missionforthegod. In doingso, he uses thedeviceof considering what he would do ifthejurylet himgo unharmed, providedthathe gave up thismission. His answeris thatto do so would be shameful and impious.The ironyof thisis that it is on thegroundsof pietythathe willnot promiseto cease whathas led to his beand this ironywould not likelyhave been lost on his ing chargedwith impiety, audience,thejury. The gistof his vow, then,is onlythis:Even if it meantfreedom forhimwerehe to giveup his "mission", and deathwerehe to continue it,he would continueit - so much does he fear disgracemore than death. And even if the citizens of Athenswould neverforgive himforhis actions,thewillof thegod means more to him. The reasonthatSocrateswould make suchclaimsis thatit is vitalto his defense thatthe actionsthat have offended his accusers(and manyothersbesides) are the will of the god, and thus cannot providegroundsfor the chargeof impiety. And werehe seen to be sayingall of thesethings out of a fearof death,thejurorscould doubt the sincerity of his repeatedprofessions to the effect thathis workis serious and vitalto thewelfare of thestate.Thus, Socratesurgedboththathe servesthegod - so strongly and thathe has no fearof deathin thestrongest thatit possibleterms love and respectforhis fellowcitizens.His vow an openlyexpressed even overrides to disobeytheimagineddirective does not reflect an arrogant forthejury disregard or theirwishes.Ratherit stresses theextent to whichhe is deeplypious, contrary to theclaimsof theprosecution. of his defensethathis Indeed, it is a repeatedfeature actions are designedto better the stateand those thatcompose it - so far are his commitments from defiant forthosethatwould have himstopbehaving as disregard he does.

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Ill of Socratic We have not arguedthatthereis no need to considerthe commitments duties to and of law. our claimthus on the issue Rather, conflicting god philosophy far is only that no such conflictarises fromSocrates' vow in the Apology. The could occur. groundsfor sayingthis,however,do not entailthat no such conflict to the not such is above, by the according argument required speculation, Though such a askingwhether juxtapositionof theApology and the Crito,it is worthwhile situationcould arise and, if it did, what Socrates' responsewould be. The optionsseemto be three:(i) Socrates' principles would requirehimto obey thegod's command;(ii) Socrates' principles would thelaw evenifitentaileddefying thelaw; and (iii) requirehimto obey thegod's commandeven if it entaileddefying once properly in whichobedienceto thereis no conceivablesituation, understood, the law and to the god conflict.15 whichof thesewould be theSocraticpositionis made at least proEstablishing blematicby the factthatthetextoffers addressedto thisissue nothing explicitly above the statements of theApology and Critothat foraccordingto our argument have caused such controversy on thispoint are not, once properly seen in context, sufficient to raisethequestiondirectly. leave onlythefeeling that Rather,they really such a conflict could occur. But (i) on its face appears to conflict withat least the sense of Socrates' defensein theApology; a defensethatis foundedupon repeated thathe has givenup all else in favorof pursuing his dutyto assertions to the effect the god. Moreover,even if our argumentabove is correct,Socrates ignoresthe of the jury's imagineddirective, illegality citingonly the god's will in his vow to of theApologyat leastsuggest thatSocratestook his dutyto disobey.These features the god as foremost. And just as such observationswould seem to render(i) an candidateforSocraticcommitment, unlikely theywould also seem to lend support to (ii), the option unanimouslychosen by those scholars inclinedto attribute a of commitments to Socrates. But thereis an homologousdifficulty with hierarchy neverexplicitly allow exceptions;theysay (ii). In the Crito, Socrates' arguments cannotbe persuadonlythatone mustobeythelaw, at leastwherethoseresponsible ed thatthe law in questionoughtto be changed.Of course,it might be arguedthat thesuggested is notprovidedin theCritoonlybecause suchreligious exception questionsare not at issue at thatpoint.16 The unqualifiedcharacter of Socrates' conclusions, however, stronglysuggest that the argumentsare not intended to be applicable solelyto those specificquestionsraised by Crito. On thesegrounds,then,(iii) appears to be the most attractive option, though forit to work,groundsmustbe givenforrulingout possibleconflict betweencivic and religiousduties. Let us consider,then,what evidencemightbe cited forthis. forthelegalcode weredivinein First,itwas generally supposedthatthefoundations But more importantly, Athenianlaw directly without origin.17 proscribed impiety, acts or beliefs.18 The conflictbetweenthe laws and the god proscribing particular such speculationssuppose, therefore, would be, to Socrates, conflictswithinthe laws themselves, since any law that requiredSocrates to disobey the god would directhim in a way exactlycontradictory to the legal directive prohibiting impiety. Socrates' categoricaldutyto obey the law could not in principleconflictwithhis categoricaldutyto the god undertheseconditions,forthe latterwas builtintothe former. Let us consider,for example, what would be the effectof this account on

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the practiceof Socrates' positionwere he to face a duly enacted law prohibiting he would disobeysucha law, yetin theCritoSocratesplainCertainly philosophy.19 lyassertsthateach of thestate'slaws mustbe obeyed(51C-D). But in thissituation, whatis to Socratesa manifest thusit contradicts theimaginedlaw requires impiety; When laws contradict one another,even the most a priorlaw prohibiting impiety. steadfastadherentto civil authoritycannot find a way to comply with both. to complywithone is to disobeytheother.That Socratescould notdefy Necessarily, a law of logic is no evidencethathe would defya law of Athens,yetit seems the in a nonin thiscase, in orderto achievethelatter is whatwould be required former trivial way. Thus, Socratescould arguethatbothduties- to thelaw and to thegod - are such as to allow forno exceptions.GiventhatSocratesmakes no exceptions we see no to such duties,and that Athenianlaw providesfor theircompatibility, of Socrates' claims,at leastso faras they reasonnotto assumetheliterality applyto theseproblems. in whichSocrates one possiblesetof circumstances This does, however, suggest we have so farruledout: We can generate sucha case if would encounter theconflict of impiety and subsequently outlaw we imagineAthensto repeal her proscription can be generated froma proper philosophy.We have shownthat no such conflict of of theApology, evenwhenconjoinedwiththestrongest rendering understanding the arguments of the Crito. We have further arguedthatgiventhe Athenianlegal as we know it, and as it was when Socrates arguedthe viewsforwhichwe system can be generated. have come to knowhim,no suchconflict Thoughwe concedethat as to how Socratesmight have had to modify interest be foundin speculations might his views wereAthensto undergoone or more drasticchanges(or, forthesepurto destroy the if the god wereto demandthatSocratesattempt poses equivalently, laws), such speculations lie considerablybeyond the scope of philosophical Socratic And thoughit may be desirableon othergroundsto interpret exegesis.20 we have taken here to be claims in such a way as to weaken the commitments Socrates' arguments can be takenat face we have shownthatin context, categorical, value, withno violenceto sense or logic. Thomas C. Brickhouse, Lynchburg College Virginia. NicholasD. Smith, Virginia Polytechnic and StateUniversity. Institute

Notes We are indebted to TerenceIrwin,HenryTeloh, and Gene Jamesforcomments on earlierdrafts of thispaper, and to the National Endowmentfor the Humanitiesfor funding thathelped to make this research possible. All errorsare, of course, ours alone. 1. This and thenextquote are theLoeb Classical Library translation by H.N. Fowler(Harvard, 1971). 2. Cf. forrepresentative examplesof thisview,Rex Martin,"Socrates and Disobedienceto Law", The Reviewof Metaphysics XXIV, 1970, pp.22 ff.; Gene James,"Socrates on Civil Disobedienceand Rebellion", Southern Journal of Philosophy XI, 1973, pp.119-127; and Howard Zinn, Disobedienceand Democracy(Now York, 1968, p.28). Cf. forrepresentative examplesof thisview, Gary Young, "Socrates and Obedience", Phronesis XIX, 1974,pp. 1-29; Ann Congleton,"Two Kinds of Lawlessness:Plato's Crito", Political Theory II, 1974, pp.432-466; FrederickRosen, "Obligation and Friendshipin Plato's Crito", Political 1, 1973,pp.307-308. JohnGrote,in Plato and theOtherCompanionsof Socrates(London, Theory, obedienceto law foundinApologyand 1888,Vol. I, Chapter10) holds thatthepositionsregarding Critoare inconsistent. But Groteattempts to explaintheinconsistency thattheApology by arguing

3.

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is a faithful account of the speech Socrates actuallygave at his trial,while the Crito represents Plato's attempt to portray his masterin a farmore favorablelightby writing discusan imaginary sion betweenSocratesand Critoin whichSocratesdefendstheprerogatives of thestate.A position similarto that of Grote is found in J. Dybikowski,"Was Socrates as Reasonable as Professor Vlastos?", The Yale Review LXIV, 1974, pp.293-296. 4. Cf. forrepresentative examplesof such interpretations, Vlastos, "Socrates on Obedience Gregory and Disobedience", The Yale ReviewLXII, 1974,pp.517-534; FrancesC. Wade, S.J., "In Defense of Socrates", The Review of MetaphysicsXXV, 1971, pp.311-325; Gerasimos Santas, Socrates in Plato's Crito", (London, Boston, and Henley, 1979, pp.54-56); R.E. Allen, "Law and Justice Journal of Philosophy LXIX, 1972, pp.557-567; A.D. Woozley, "Socrates on Disobeyingthe Vlastos (Garden City,New York, 299-318). Law", in The Philosophyof Socrates,ed. by Gregory A somewhatdifferent versionis taken by Woozley in his recentbook, Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito (Chapel Hill, 1979, ChapterIII, esp. pp.44-46). Thereare a variety of interpretations of thespecific conclusionsforarguments of theCritoare supto take sides on thisissue. Rather,we shall take at face posed to reach, and we shall not attempt value whatSocratesproclaimsof his viewin numerous thathe is moralplaces in theCrito,namely, of his country.It is worthnoting,however,that ly obliged to obey the laws and legal structures of the Crito seem to derivethisobligationfromhigherones, and so our manyof the arguments shouldnotbe takenas an attempt to refute of the argument anyof themoredetailedinterpretations Critothattakethisintoaccount. Rather,we seek onlyto showthatsuchmoderating interpretations are not requiredforconsistency withthe problematic vow in theApology. That one aspectof Socrates' feeling of dutyto thelaw is thathe had grownup underitsprotection is evident in his argument at Crito 51C ff.The degreeto whichthisin particular is vitalto his dutyis somewhat thatSocrates' commitment to thislaw would entailacunclear,thoughwe can be certain quiescence to the establishedprocess by which any new laws were to be made. Thus, it would thatany new law or legal decisionwould, by thissame argument, reasonablybe hypothesized prohibitSocrates' disobedience.Cf. pp.11-12 forthe limitsof this,however. Cf. Vlastos and Santas, forexamples.Thoughnot explicit in arguing thatSocratesholds a "hierarchical view" of moralobligation,such an attribution to Socratesseemsto be impliedby bothpositions taken by Woozley. Unfortunately, whateverphilosophicalmeritssuch a view mighthave, nowhere in theCritodoes Socratesallow thathis obligationto thestatecould be overridden by any otherobligation,thoughcf. note 5, above. Cf. Wade, forexample.Again similarconsiderations apply to thisviewas any other"hierarchical view". (Cf. notes 5 and 7 above). Not all plaintswereactuallybrought beforethe courtfortrial.The kingarchon, whose function it was to hear preliminary evidenceagainst a defendent in impiety actions, could for a varietyof reasonsrefuseto forward a case to the court. (Cf., A.R.W. Harrison,The Law of Athens,Vol. I, Oxford, 1971, p.90).

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

10. Cf., JohnBurnet, Plato's Euthyphro, Apologyof Socratesand Crito,Oxford,1963,p.152, noteon 36B3. 11. The penaltyproposedby the prosecution is called the tihtiok;;thatby the defendant, the dvirrluclear whether thiswas a legal requirement forthe defendant, iloiQ. It is not entirely or merely an option thathe had. 12. Cf., forexamples,Burnet, op. cit., p. 149; Harrison,op. cit., pp.80-82; J.H. Lipsius,Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren (1905, pp.248-253); Louis Gernet,Droit et Societe dans la greceAncienne (1955, pp.61-81, esp. 78-79); Otto Schulthess,RE cols. 1251-1255; Harpokration,s.v., Kai tinriibq. The principleancient source is Demosthenes,52.18, 53,26, 56.43, &t(htito<;&Y<bv 58.70, and 59.6. 13. Moreover,the jury could not sentenceSocrates to death, but thensuspendit underthe provision that it would be executedif Socrates continuedpracticing philosophy.We haven't the slightest evidencethatAthenian law providedthejurythepowerto assignand suspenda sentence. But in any case, evenifthejurydid legallyhave thepowerto do this,and optedto exercise it in Socrates' case, his failure to cease philosophy would not thenbe a violationof a law, but rather thechoice of death over silence- a choice providedby the termsof the suspension. 14. It is unlikely thatSocrateswould everpropose such a penalty, lack of fearof despitehis professed thathe might, undertheseconditions, is surely death,butthesupposition no moreunlikely thanare the conditionswe have imagined.

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to theviewthatfollows,TerenceIrwin'shelpful committed 15. Thoughhe is not necessarily comments on the way we have structured it. had a greateffect in theCritowhatSantas 16. This is themovemade by Santas to explainwhySocratesdoes not mention natureof his obligationto thegod. Thoughwe shouldnotbe takenhereas takesto be theoverriding thisview by flat,see notes 5 and 7, above. refuting 17. Cf. K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Moralityin the Time of Plato and Aristotle,Berkeleyand Los Angeles,1974, pp.255-56. 18. Cf. D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens,Ithaca, N.Y., 1978, pp.199-200. not considerit a law at all. In cases whereone believedthata law was passSocratesmight 19. Initially, a priorlaw, one could endeavorto have it cancelled by proposinga ypacpfi ed that contradicted of thelaterlaw is chargedwithhavingcreated in whichtheinitiator a legal procedure 7capav6iiG)v, and duringwhichthatlaterlaw is suspended.At least at theoutset,Socrates such a contradiction, such a procedure.However,it is conceivablethateven if he did this,the well have initiated might law would be upheld,leavingSocratesto face a dulyenacted- and now upheld- law offending theimaginedcase did not see theconhimto philosophize.The factthatthejurytrying forbidding and thisis crucialto thesituation however, does not entailthatthereis no contradiction, tradiction wouldwork, of how sucha legalprocedure Socrateswould now face. For a moredetaileddiscussion cf. MacDowell, pp.50-52. 20 Even on the most superficialreading of the Crito, however,some provisionis made for this: it is notclearthatthiswould notcompromise Socratescould alwayschoose to leave Athens,though missionin Athens.(Cf. Crito 51D, but cp. Apology 30D-E, and 37C-E.) his religious

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