Case 8:14-cv-01636-DKC Document 1 Filed 05/20/14 Page 1 of 12

IN TILE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Candice Quinn Kelly
)
8400 Old Stagecoach Road
)
La Plata, MD 20646
)
Plaintiff )
)


) C.A. No.
JURY
DEMANDED
v. )
)
Anthony B. Covington
)
Charles County State's Attorney
)
200 Charles Street
)
La Plata, MD 20646
)
Defendant
)
)
)

COMPLAINT
1. This lawsuit seeks redress for harms inflicted by Defendant Anthony B.
Covington, the Charles County State's Attorney (hereinafter "Defendant Covington"),
who misused his governmental prosecutorial power and deprived Plaintiff Candice Quinn
Kelly (hereinafter Plaintiff Kelly") of her Constitutional rights.
2. State's Attorneys are elected officials and hold a special position of power and
trust because they are entrusted with the power to enforce criminal laws.
Defendant Covington did not prosecute Plaintiff Kelly for any crime, yet made a series of
statements in his official capacity that were designed to mislead the public into believing
Plaintiff Kelly engaged in criminal conduct.
3. This lawsuit seeks to enjoin Defendant Covington's continued wrongdoing and
obtain damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiff Kelly for her losses, and punish and
deter Defendant Covington.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983.
5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1331.
6. Venue is proper in this district. 28 U.S.C. 1391(b).
PARTIES
7. Plaintiff Candice Quinn Kelly resides in Charles County at 8400 Old Stagecoach
Road, La Plata, Maryland 20646. She presently serves as President of the Charles
County Board of Commissioners after having been duly elected in November 2010.
8. Defendant Anthony B. Covington resides in Charles County and serves as Charles
County State's Attorney. His office address is 200 Charles Street, La Plata, Maryland
20646.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
9. Defendant Covington graduated from American University College of Law in
1990. From 1991 to 1997, Defendant Covington served as Assistant State's Attorney for
Charles County. In November 2010, the voters of Charles County elected Defendant
Covington to a four-year term as the State's Attorney for Charles County. Defendant
Covington serves as a State's Attorney, and thus has a duty to represent the State of
Maryland, not any individual. See Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure ("Md. Crim.
Code"), 15-102.
10. Defendant Covington exercises prosecutorial discretion on the part of the State of
Maryland, and may act only to further the State's interest in public safety. See Jones v.
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Ziegler, 894 F.Supp. 880 (D.Md. 1995), aff'd Jones v. Wellham, 105 F.3d 620 (4th Cir.
1997).
11. Defendant Covington serves on a full-time basis, is paid the same as a circuit
court judge, and cannot engage in the private practice of law. See Md. Crim. Code,
15-409 (b) and (e).
12. Defendant Covington has the power to issue subpoenas to compel the production
of testimony and documents. See Md. Crim. Code, 15-102.
13. Defendant Covington has the power to appoint deputy State's Attorneys and
assistant State's Attorneys. See Md. Crim. Code, 15-409 (c). Defendant Covington
used this power to appoint a Deputy State's Attorney who later became a judge.
14. Defendant Covington is not overseen or supervised by anyone. Rather, Defendant
Covington has the power and responsibility to prosecute all criminal cases arising in
Charles County. See Maryland Constitution of 1851, Art. V, 1-5 and Md. Crim. Code,
15-101 through 15-109, 15-409.
15. Defendant Covington knows he is entrusted by the public with a significant
amount of law enforcement power, and knows he is required to carry out his job duties in
a professional manner not influenced by any private pecuniary or other interest.
16. Defendant Covington receives guidance and training by the State's Attorneys'
Coordination Council, which establishes standard and specialized training programs and
coordinates legal education programs and services for States Attorneys and their
professional staffs. See Md. Crim. Code 15-102. Defendant Covington also learned of
his obligations to act professionally in law school and in the mandatory professional
responsibility training administered by the State of Maryland.
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17. Defendant Covington is well-versed in the ethical rules that govern the conduct of
prosecutors.
18. Defendant Covington intentionally and knowingly abused his power as State's
Attorney in a manner that harmed Plaintiff Kelly. Defendant Covington is vested with
prosecutorial power by the State of Maryland, and his malfeasance violated Plaintiff
Kelly's rights protected by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
Maryland.
19. Defendant Covington's course of wrongful conduct persists to date.
20. On or about April 16, 2012, Defendant and his Deputy States' Attorney began to
interview several Charles County employees.
21. Defendant Covington immediately discovered that he lacked any basis
whatsoever to commence a criminal investigation of Plaintiff Kelly because no witness
testified to any conduct by Plaintiff Kelly that rose to the level of any crime set forth in
the Criminal Codes of either the United States or Maryland.
22. Instead, Defendant Covington learned within days that the witnesses alleged only
the following: On or about December 29, 2011, Plaintiff Kelly obtained a copy of an IRS
W-2 Form prepared by Charles County and issued by Charles County to a Commissioner
in the year prior to her election as President of the County Commission.
23. Defendant Covington knew that the Maryland Code on Local Government grants
Charles County Commissioners, including Plaintiff Kelly, the powers needed to operate
County government, including the right to hire and fire employees, and the right to
establish compensation plans for employees and for the Commissioners themselves. See
Md. Code, Local Government, 12-106, 12-102 and 12-201.
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24. Defendant Covington knew the Maryland Code on Local Government grants
Commissioners the power to control property owned by the County. See Md. Code,
Local Government, 9-104.
25. Defendant Covington knew that federal law requires employers, including local
governmental employers such as Charles County, to prepare and submit accurate W-2
Folios to the federal government.
26. Defendant Covington knew that the Internal Revenue Code requires employers,
including local governmental employers such as Charles County, to report any personal
use of government vehicles. Such personal use is considered a taxable form of income by
the federal government.
27. Thus, Defendant Covington knew that Plaintiff Kelly, President of the County
Commission, acted well within the scope of the powers vested in her and the other
Commissioners when she requested the IRS W-2 Form to ascertain whether Charles
County was failing to fulfill its obligations either (1) under federal law by substantially
understating on W-2s the mileage attributable to one or more Commissioners' personal
use of County-owned vehicles, or (2) under state law by providing certain
Commissioners a de facto salary increase without any public notice or legislation.
28. Defendant Covington knew that Plaintiff Kelly and all of the County
Commissioners have the responsibility to ensure that the County does not overpay
Commissioners and does not permit County-owned vehicles to be appropriated for
personal use without such personal use being properly reflected by the County payroll
staff on the federal tax forms sent to the Commissioners.
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29. Defendant Covington knew that Plaintiff Kelly is peimitted, and on occasion
obligated, to review IRS W-2 Forms prepared by the County.
30. Defendant Covington knew that no one alleged that Plaintiff Kelly improperly
released any confidential personnel information revealed by the W-2 forms to any
member of the public or used the IRS W-2 Form for any improper purpose.
31. Defendant Covington knew that Plaintiff Kelly's actions indisputably were
permissible and appropriate actions that did not violate any federal or state law but
instead were acts taken to ensure that the County did not continue to understate personal
vehicle usage in federal filings made by the County.
32. Defendant Covington knew that the Office of Special Prosecutor advised
Defendant Covington that Plaintiff Kelly should not be prosecuted.
33. Despite knowing Plaintiff Kelly had not committed any crime, Defendant
Covington abused his power and authority by waging a defamatory campaign publicizing
his "criminal investigation" of Plaintiff Kelly.
34. Defendant Covington abused his position of authority as law enforcement to
mislead the public into believing that Plaintiff Kelly was a criminal who violated federal
and state laws.
35. Reasonable discovery will show that Defendant Covington did not act alone, but
instead conspired with others, discussing how best to use the pendency of the ongoing
investigation to harm Plaintiff Kelly's reputation and to interfere with her performance of
her duties as President of the Charles County Commission.
36. Defendant Covington improperly released grand jury transcripts to the public in
order to harm Plaintiff Kelly. The United States and Maryland conduct grand juries in
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secrecy and seal grand jury transcripts into order to ensure that innocent persons are not
harmed by false or mistaken allegations of criminal activity. Prosecutors, including
Defendant Covington, have a public duty to ensure that their offices maintain that
confidentiality, and do not reveal details about ongoing investigations or do anything else
to give rise to false impressions of criminality.
37. Defendant Covington lacked any evidence with which to charge Plaintiff Kelly
with a crime, and he never charged her with any criminal conduct. Instead, knowing he
lacked any evidence on which to press charges, Defendant Covington orchestrated the
improper release of grand jury transcripts as a way to damage Plaintiff Kelly.
38. On or about January 7, 2014, Defendant Covington sought and obtained from his
fall ler Deputy State's Attorney an ex parte judicial order permitting the release of grand
jury transcripts generated during the "investigation" of Plaintiff Kelly. Reasonable
discovery will show Defendant Covington bypassed and subverted the judicial
procedures in place that require filings to made through the Clerk of Court, not directly to
a judge. This procedure is designed to ensure the unbiased assignment of judges.
39. Defendant Covington knew that the ethical rules governing judges prevented his
former Deputy State's Attorney from ruling on the Petition in his new position as a judge,
as he had personally participated as Deputy State's Attorney in the "investigation" by
interviewing witnesses.
40. Reasonable discovery will show that on or about January 7, 2014, Defendant
Covington brought the Petition directly to his former Deputy, engaged in ex parte
discussions, and obtained his signature on an order dated January 7, 2014, authorizing the
release of the grand jury testimony.
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41. Reasonable discovery will show that on or about January 8, 2014, Defendant
Covington attempted to obscure his wrongdoing by bringing the Petition to the Clerk of
the Court and having it file-stamped on January 8, 2014.
42. Reasonable discovery will show that the Clerk of the Court did not have the
opportunity to assign a judge to proceeding because Defendant Covington had already
obtained his former Deputy's signature on an Order authorizing the release of grand jury
testimony elicited during the "investigation" of Plaintiff Kelly.
43. Reasonable discovery will show that either Defendant Covington or his former
Deputy States' Attorney altered the date from January 7 to January 8 on the Order to
prevent detection of their effort to bypass the proper judicial procedures.
44. Defendant Covington abused the public trust and his status as a prosecutor to
harm Plaintiff Kelly by telling the public she had committed a crime.
45. On or about February 5, 2014, Defendant Covington made a series of defamatory
statements to a reporter. Defendant Covington intended for his statements to be
published, which they were.
46. Defendant Covington stated words to the effect that "just because a case is not
prosecuted does not mean a crime has not occurred."
47. Defendant Covington intentionally misled the public into believing Plaintiff Kelly
had committed a crime, stating "W-2 forms are considered tax information. They are not
considered discloseable or releasable. To attempt to get that information is not right
unless you're entitled to it. I know Commissioner Kelly has said repeatedly there was no
wrongdoing. Well I just gave you what the law is, so I think people can look at the grand
jury documents and decide for themselves."
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48. By so stating, Defendant Covington was abusing his position of trust, and falsely
conveying to the public that the law prevented Plaintiff Kelly from accessing the W-2s
filed by Charles County, when he knew that the opposite was true. By so stating,
Defendant Covington acted with actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements, or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements, and violated Plaintiff Kelly's
Constitutional rights, including the right of confrontation, and misled the public into
believing that Plaintiff Kelly had committed a crime for which she could have been
prosecuted by his office.
49. Defendant Covington knew that Plaintiff Kelly was entitled to review W-2s, and
knew that no one alleged she released confidential social security numbers or other
confidential tax information to anyone. In short, Defendant Covington knew his
"investigation" had not elicited any evidence of any wrongdoing by Plaintiff Kelly.
50. Reasonable discovery will show that Defendant Covington continues to abuse the
prosecutorial power, and disseminate falsehoods about Plaintiff Kelly.
51. Reasonable discovery will show that during the pendency of this criminal
investigation, Defendant Covington provided confidential information about the criminal
investigation to persons outside his office.
52. Defendant Covington lacked any good faith belief to commence a criminal
"investigation" of Plaintiff Kelly, but instead commenced such an investigation as a
means to harm Plaintiff Kelly's reputation and impede her ability to perform her
responsibilities as President of the Charles County Commission.
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53. Defendant Covington conducted the investigation of Plaintiff Kelly, and
publicized that investigation, as a means to harm her reputation and interfere with her
performance of her duties as County Commission President.
54. Defendant Covington breached his obligations of confidentiality surrounding an
ongoing investigation and grand jury proceedings, and instead conspired with others to
violate Plaintiff Kelly's Constitutional rights, including her substantive and procedural
due process rights.
55. Defendant Covington lacks any form of absolute or qualified immunity for his
conduct. Defendant Covington never prosecuted Plaintiff Kelly, and his wrongful acts
were done in settings other than judicial settings.
56. Defendant Covington abused the public trust and violated his obligations as
State's Attorney.
57. Defendant Covington's past and ongoing malfeasance directly caused substantial
damages to Plaintiff Kelly, including damage to her reputation, damage to her ability to
perform her job responsibilities (thus further harming the public), damages caused by
Plaintiff Kelly being forced to expend her own resources to obtain legal assistance,
damage to her future income-earning capacity, and damage to her mental health and well-
being.
58. Plaintiff Kelly demands a jury.
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COUNT I VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
59. Each and every prior allegation is hereby incorporated in full by reference into
this Count as if fully set forth herein.
60. Defendant Covington's abuse of his governmental power has violated Plaintiff
Kelly's Constitutional rights, including her due process rights (both substantive and
procedural) and her right to confrontation.
61. Plaintiff Kelly brings suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which permits civil
actions for the deprivations of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the
Constitution and other laws.
COUNT II DEFAMATION
62. Each and every prior allegation is hereby incorporated in full by reference into
this Count as if fully set forth herein.
63. Defendant Covington made a series of factual statements about Plaintiff Kelly to
the media with the intent that the media publish those statements.
64. Defendant Covington acted with knowledge of the falsity, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, by making factual statements to the effect that Plaintiff Kelly had
committed a crime.
65. Defendant Covington lacks any privilege to make such statements to the media.
66. Defendant Covington's defamatory statements directly caused financial and
emotional harm to Plaintiff Kelly.
67. Plaintiff Kelly brings suit under the common law of Maryland, and seeks
compensatory and punitive damages for Defendant Covington's defamation.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff Kelly seeks all remedies permissible as means to redress the harms
inflicted by Defendant, including but not limited to
(1) all remedies available under the Constitution and statutes intended to
implement the Constitution, including but not limited to injunctive relief,
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees and costs;
(2) all remedies available under the statutory law of Maryland, including but not
limited to treble damages, and attorneys fees and costs;
(3) all remedies available under common law, including but not limited to an
direct, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and attorneys fees and costs;
(4) an award of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, as provided by law or equity
or otherwise;
(5) an award of pre-judgment and post judgment interest; and
(6) any and all additional remedies that justice may require.
Susan L. Burke
Law Offices of Susan L. Burke
1611 Park Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21217
Telephone: (410) 733-5444
sburke@burkepllc.com
May 20, 2014
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