Fires in hotel rooms and scenario predictions

Diane Roberts
Head of Department of Hospitality and Tourism, University of Central Lancashire,
Preston, UK
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Consulting Fire Engineer, Hinkey Technical Services, Hong Kong
Introduction
Hotel occupancy rates continue to dominate
the thinking of strategic managers in the
Hong Kong hospitality industry, where an
over-supply of hotel facilities, and reduced
tourist receipts since the change of
sovereignty in July 1997, and the financial
crisis in Asia, have produced erratic and
worrying occupancy figures (HKTA, 1998). In
such circumstances, hospitality strategists
are increasingly exploring possibilities for
developing competitive edge, and it could be
argued that as business travellers and
tourists widen their expectations of the
hospitality experience, aspects of
accommodation, not hitherto considered
important, might receive attention as
offering value added to the normal hotel
package. Currently, most hotel guests take as
a given, the notion that their personal safety
is almost guaranteed once inside their hotel
room, or ocean liner cabin. However, the
events in Pattaya, Thailand (July 1997) in
which 74 were killed in a hotel fire, and the
need for the total evacuation of the burning
cruise liner Romantica in the Mediterranean
(October 1997), demonstrate that even in
today's sophisticated hospitality
environments, the satisfaction of the most
basic need, personal safety, cannot be
assumed, and the idea that research is
necessary to enhance our understanding of
the potential danger of the unprotected hotel
room, gathers credence.
In discussing the approach to fire
protection, and fire safety management, of
one large international hotel group which
does exceed the regulatory requirements, the
paper offers a model of good practice for all
hoteliers, and recommends enforceable fire
safety legislation, to ensure fire safety in all
properties rather than purely in those where
responsible management attitudes prevail.
In most countries, hotels are classified as a
type of residential premise in a hazard
category lower than other occupancies such
as office or industrial buildings.
Nevertheless, when a fire occurs in a hotel
with high occupancy, and even in one which
is modern and with certain fire protection
systems, a large number of people will be at
risk, and as a result the hazard potential
should be fully appreciated.
A number of factors contributing to the
hazard can be suggested, not least of which is
the nature of the building which will always
contain high fire risk areas such as kitchens,
combustible storage, engineering workshops,
high voltage and low voltage distribution
equipment rooms, diesel fuel storage, LPG
storage/distribution, steam boilers, large air
conditioning plants, etc.
Compounding these innate characteristics,
are highly-populated assembly areas such as
ballrooms, banquet halls, discos, restaurants
and conference centres, and the likelihood
that guests will be unfamiliar with the
building environment and experience
difficulties in finding the way out, presents
another problematic dimension. Additionally
foreign guests may be slow to respond to
evacuation alarms because they do not
understand the local situation, and worst of
all, since hotels are designed to accommodate
people overnight, there is a high probability
that during a fire, guests may be asleep,
possibly drunk, and be less alert and slower
to react.
Finally, the guest room floors are usually
the upper ones, while the higher risk areas
are the lower floors. Where fire occurs at
these lower levels, the escape route(s) from
the guest room floors will be blocked,
especially in the case of high-rise buildings.
It can be understood, therefore, that hotels
present quite specific problems for fire
protection personnel, and that the potential
fatalities from fire in such situations, are
substantial. Indeed in the last 30 years over
1,000 fatalities and many more than 1,695
injuries have been recorded in major hotel
fires in Asia and USA as indicated in Table I.
As can be seen from Table I, no known or
suspected cause is logged for 65 per cent (28 of
43) of fires recorded, but of those with causes
confirmed or suspected, the results shown in
Table II can be calculated.
The imprecision of data collection clearly
poses a problem in the interpretation of such
figures, but what can be said with certainty, is
that many fire incidents in guest bedrooms
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[ 37]
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
# MCB University Press
[ISSN 0959-6119]
Keywords
Hotels, fire, Disaster prevention
Abstract
Contributes towards the research
into the potential dangers of
unprotected hotel rooms by
highlighting the incidence, and
cause, of some major hotel fires in
Asia and USA. Additionally,
through the use of fire modelling
computer software, predicts
various fire scenarios inside the
guest room, demonstrates how
little time is available for
evacuation, and states that
without specific precautions, fire
fatalities will continue to occur.
Suggests that once such an
appreciation becomes wide-
spread, together with the
worldwide publicity resulting from
fires in hospitality environments,
this may influence the demands
made by travellers, and that
hoteliers might be well advised to
exceed the requirements placed
upon them by statute, and
advertise such personal safety
guarantees alongside their usual
facilities, as part of an overall
strategy in the battle for
competitive edge.
Table I
Major hotel fires in Asia and the USA
Date Location Fatalities
Injuries Cause
(If known)
Other
information
3.7.97 Hotel in Pattaya,
Thailand
74 65 Kitchen
gas explosion
3.12.94 Ying Yuen Hotel
inzhou Shandong,
China
11 30
16.3.93 Hotel in Illinois, USA 20 140 guest
rooms; 4 storeys;
no sprinkler
5.5.93 Magellan Hotel,
Cebu, Philippines
140 guestrooms
5.2.92 Indianapolis Athletic
Club, Indiana, USA
3 (2 fire-
fighters)
8 Electrical fault
in refrigerator
9 storeys; no
sprinkler
25.12.91 YuenHua Hotel,
Lian Yuen Gang, China
14 Electrical fault
in plant room
18.7.91 Hotel in Taipei,
Taiwan, China
5 12
28.5.91 Dalian Hotel, Dalian,
China
5 19 7 storeys
..88 Hostel of Foreign
Affairs Dept,
Beijing, China
1
1.1.88 First Hotel,
Bangkok, Thailand
13 80+
2.11.87 Motor Hotel, USA 2 6 storeys
5.4.87 Seaside Hotel,
Manila, Philippines
1
5.4.87 Elilo Hotel,
Manila, Philippines
1 Electrical cable
fault
6 storeys
2.2.87 Hotel in Kaoshiung,
Taiwan, China
18 Obstructed
egress
12.1.87 Hotel in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia
7
31.12.86 Du-Pont Plaza Hotel,
San Juan, Puerto Rico
97 140+ 20 storeys; no
sprinklers; no fire
detection system;
building seriously
damaged
3.3.86 Hotel in Caracas,
Venezuela
5
..86 Hotel in
New Delhi, India
38
15.7.85 Wang Dao Hotel,
Kaoshiung,
Taiwan, China
7 Many
19.4.85 Swan Hotel,
Harbin, China
10 7 Cigarette ingited
bedding mattress
13.2.85 Hotel in Manila,
Philippines
25 Arson suspected
28.5.84 Times Hotel, Taipei,
Taiwan, China
19 51
1.2.83 Hotel in Yamagati,
Japan
11 2 Electrical fault
6.3.82 Westchase Hilton
Hotel, Houston, USA
12 3 Cigarette ignited
chair in bedroom
13 storeys; no
detection and auto-
extinguishment
8.2.82 New Nippon Hotel,
Kyoto, Japan
33 28 Smoking in
bedroom
513 guest rooms;
10 storeys
(continued)
[ 38]
Diane Roberts and
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Fires in hotel rooms and
scenario predictions
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
are never reported, having been extinguished
by housekeeping staff who are trained to be
vigilant spotting potential fires in unoccupied
guest bedrooms resulting from smouldering
cigarettes in the ashtrays or waste bins, or
overheating of electrical appliances.
Supporting the notion that guest behaviour
within bedrooms is a genuine concern for
hotels, are statistics from the NFIRS, NFPA
Survey (1982-1986), indicating that 36.7 per
cent and 30 per cent respectively of all
civilian deaths and injuries by fires in US
hotels and motels were the direct result of
smoking materials. Table III highlights the
problems of guest carelessness in this
connection.
While hotels are usually classified as
buildings for residential occupancy, it is not
surprising that child playing and electrical
fires are not among the highest causes as
they are for domestic occupancy, since
children in a hotel would be fewer than in a
domestic dwelling, and would normally be
under adult supervision. Additionally,
electrical equipment in a hotel is generally
serviced regularly and would, therefore, be
relatively less likely to cause fires in such an
environment, than in a domestic dwelling. It
should be noted, therefore, that although
Table I
Date Location Fatalities
Injuries Cause
(If known)
Other
information
10.2.81 Las Vegas Hilton,
Las Vegas, USA
8 350 2,783 guest rooms;
30 storeys
.12.80 Stouffers Inn, USA 26
21.11.80 MGM Grand Hotel,
Las Vegas, USA
85 700 Electrical fault 26 storeys; lack
of fire-resistant
barrier
20.11.80 Prince Hotel,
Tokyo, Japan
45 Gas welding
(suspected)
4 storeys
.1.78 Coates House
Hotel, USA
>20
.1.77 Stratford Hotel, USA 17
3.11.74 Pui Lai Win
Hotel Complex, Seoul,
Korea
89 50+ Smoking
(suspected)
7 storeys;
1 basement floor
8.9.74 Virginia Beach Hotel,
Virginia, USA
1 11 storeys
25.12.71 Tae Yon Kak Hotel,
Seoul, Korea
163 64 Liquid petroleum
gas cylinder
explosion
223 rooms,
22 storeys
23.7.71 Motor Hotel in
New Orleans,
Louisiana, USA
6 300 guest rooms;
17 storeys
.-1.71 Hotel in Los Angeles,
USA
19
.-1.71 Hotel in Seattle, USA 20
20.12.70 Pioneer Hotel,
Tucson, Arizona, USA
28
5.8.70 New York Hotel, USA 2 50 50 storeys
25.1.70 Conrad Hilton,
Chicago, USA
2 36 2,600 guest rooms
5.2.69 Hotel in Fukushima,
Japan
30 Liquid petroleum
gas cylinder
explosion
4 storeys
24.1.69 Hotel in Chicago, USA 4
2.11.68 Hotel in Kobe, Japan 30 Gas stove fire 124 guest rooms
Source: Chan, H.W., available records
Table II
Fires with causes confirmed or suspected
Incident
Percentage
yield of fatalities
Five incidents of
gas explosion/fire 33.0
Four incidents of smoking
in guest bedrooms 13.9
Six incidents of electrical
faults 11.0
One incident of arson 2.4
[ 39]
Diane Roberts and
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Fires in hotel rooms and
scenario predictions
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
there is no proper statistical data on how
many, or what percentage of fires were
initiatied in guest rooms, considerable
numbers do occur in this category, and some
examples are as follows.
Case 1. Fire in a hotel in Harbin, China,
April 1985
At midnight on 19 April 1985, fire broke out
in the 262 room, 15-storey Swan Hotel in
Harbin, a city in the north-east of China. Ten
people were killed and seven were seriously
injured. Responsibility for the fire lay with a
drunken foreign guest who returned to
his room and fell asleep while smoking in
bed. The bed smouldered, ignited and fire
spread.
Case 2. Fire in a hotel in Kyoto, Japan,
February 1982
At 3.00 a.m. on 8 February 1982, fire broke out
in the ten-storey New Nippon hotel. A total of
33 people were killed and 28 injured. The
ignition was caused by a drunken guest
falling asleep while smoking in bed. The bed
ignited and fire spread.
Case 3. Fire in a hotel in Houston, USA,
March 1982
On 6 March 1982, fire broke out in the
13-storey Westchase Hilton Hotel. A total of
12 people were killed and three injured. The
fire began when a cigarette ignited a chair in
a fourth floor guest bedroom. There was no
detection system or auto-extinguishing
equipment.
Case 4. Fire in a hotel in South Korea,
November 1974
At 2.50 a.m. on 3 November, 1974, fire broke
out in the seven-storey Pui Lai Win Hotel
Complex in Seoul. A total of 89 people were
killed (14 in guest bedrooms, 65 in the night
club and others elsewhere). The fire began in
a sixth-floor guest bedroom and was believed
to have been caused by a cigarette on a bed. A
power failure occurred, fire spread to the
night club and a natural gas bottle exploded.
There were a number of problems in the
management of the incident. The automatic
alarm and fire protection system failed, the
revolving door jammed as people panicked in
an attempt to escape, and staff in the night
club contributed towards the fatalities by
delaying the escape process, insisting that
guests paid before leaving, then ensuring
their own escape first. Interestingly, the
building management had received
abatements to improve fire safety after
having had an explosion in the kitchen, but
no improvements had been made.
Case 5. Fire in a hotel in Virginia, USA,
September 1974
At about 11.30 a.m. on 8 September 1974, fire
broke out in the 11-storey Virginia Beach
Hotel. The fire began in a ninth-floor guest
bedroom and spread to the corridor when an
employee who opened the door attempting to
fight the fire with a portable extinguisher,
was lightly burned, trapped in the corridor
and subsequently killed from carbon
monoxide poisoning. There was neither
sprinkler, nor smoke detector on this floor.
The guest room doors were 45mm composite
core wood. The analysis said damage would
probably have been confined to the source
room had the door been kept closed and the
Fire Department called promptly.
It is important to remember that if a fire
breaks out into the corridor from the fire-
originated guest room, all the occupants on
that floor will be in immediate danger, and if
no sprinkler system to control the fire is
installed, all floors will be at risk, since the
fire may spread through shafts, windows or
vertical openings, as in the case of the Las
Vegas Hilton Hotel Fire on 10 February, 1981,
when 22 floors of the 30-storey building were
involved in the fire which injured 350 people,
and caused eight fatalities.
Given the above intelligence, it is logical
that in very large hotels such as those in Asia
where it is possible to have up to 1,000 guest
rooms on many storeys, there should be a
concern to protect guests, and staff, from fire,
whilst simultaneously sustaining occupancy
at levels economic to the enterprise. It was
therefore decided to investigate a number of
factors relating to the guest room, pertinent
for management and engineering
information. Specifically, the objectives of
the research were to:
.
predict the possible scenario in a hotel fire
initiated in a guest room;
Table III
Causes of civilian deaths and injuries of hotel and motel fires, 1982-1986:
annual average unknown-cause fires allocated proportionally
Cause
Civilian
deaths
Civilian
injuries
Smoking materials 21 143
Incendiary or suspicious causes 18 138
Cooking equipment 4 43
Heating equipment 4 29
Open flame, embers or torches 3 14
Electrical distribution 2 39
Child playing 2 8
Other equipment 1 18
Other heat 1 7
Natural causes 1 4
Appliances, tools or air conditioning 1 32
Exposure (to other hotel fire) 1 2
Total 59 475
Source: NFIRS (1982-1986)
[ 40]
Diane Roberts and
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Fires in hotel rooms and
scenario predictions
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
.
evaluate the tenability and escape
conditions in the fire room and corridor;
.
evaluate the response time of the
sprinklers and smoke detector in the fire
room; and
.
evaluate the fire safety provisions and
code requirements.
Methodology
A luxury four-star hotel with main features
typical of modern hotels in Asian cities, was
chosen as the case. The hotel has 12 storeys,
with the ground floor as the main hotel lobby;
floors 1-3 as shopping arcades, and floors 4-12
as guest rooms. Each typical guest room floor
has 20 rooms, two exit stairs, back-of-house
areas and a corridor of about 35m long. The
normal fire service provisions as prescribed
by the local code, such as two wet risers at
the stairs, hose reel, manual stations, alarm
bells, spinklers, smoke extraction in the
corrider, are installed.
Doors of the guest rooms, exit stairs and
shafts are of 30 minutes fire rating to BS 476
Part 20. The typical guest room has a
bedroom area, a foyer and a bathroom, and
the overall dimension of the room is 8.5m
long and 4.3m wide, the ceiling height being
2.9m in the living area. In accordance with
the Code of Practice for Minimum Fire
Service Installation of Hong Kong, sprinklers
and smoke detectors are provided, one
horizontal sidewall spinkler in the bedroom
area, one pendant sprinkler in the foyer and
one pendant sprinkler in the bathroom. A
quick response sidewall sprinkler, with a
response time index (RTI) of 32, is provided at
the wall separating the living room from the
bathroom. The RTI, is an indicator of the
speed with which the sprinkler comes into
action, and according to Loss Prevention
Council ratings, sprinklers with an RTI
below 50 are considered to be quick-acting,
while those with an RTI above 50 (and up to
100) are considered to be slow-acting. It
should be noted that no fire regulations exist
relating to RTI ratings. A smoke detector is
provided near the centre of the bedroom.
With respect to the interior material and
combustible furnishings, known as the ``fire
load'', the total mass within the guest room is
estimated to be at approximately 420kg and is
rounded up to 500kg after including the
guest's luggage. The fire load of a 300-room
hotel in Hong Kong has been surveyed by
Chow (Chow and Kong, 1993) and found to be
218MJ/m
2
, while that for a typical bedroom
in a house was 6969MJ, a megajoule (MJ)
being a measure of heat energy that would be
released on combustion. A figure of 21kg/m
2
with a deviation of 5.6kg/m
2
is given in the
NFPA Fire Protection Handbook for a
bedroom. In this exercise, 20kg/m
2
is used.
Fire computer modelling was selected as
the method of predicting the scenario, the
advantages being its versatility in simulating
various environments, its non-destructive
nature, its low cost, and its expedience in
comparison with full-scale, or reduced-scale
testings. The computer fire model,
FPETOOL, which is a commonly-used
accumulation of well-established scientific
formulae hidden within the confines of a
sophisticated computer interface, was used.
Basically this allows for the input of data
which is then interpreted and delivered as
output information, and in this case the input
data were the spatial measurements of a
guest room in a modern 12-storey,
180-bedroom hotel in Hong Kong, together
with furniture details.
Output conditions were reviewed, with
particular attention to the smoke detector
response time, the sprinkler response time,
tenability limits (physical limits for human
survival), and flashover time (time it takes
for the room to be engulfed by fire). The
available time for escape was then obtained
to establish the occupants' chance of
survival. Trial runs were also done on
different situations including the door being
open, a failed, or absence of sprinkler, a
smaller room area, etc., to simulate the
various effects.
Limitations of the simulation were
considered to be as follows:
.
The input fire curve to the program is
based on that proposed by H.A. Allen
(1993) and is not validated or verified by
experiment. Allen's categorisation of fire
curves as slow, medium, fast and/or ultra
fast, has been argued to be a simplistic
representation, but for the purposes of
this simulation it is considered to be an
adequate model.
.
The general conditions of hotel rooms and
corridors differ to considerable extents
between different hotels, and results of the
exercise may not be applicable to other
types of building configurations.
.
The effects of air conditioning in
corridors, and pressurisation in stair and
wind effects are neglected.
.
FPETOOL is a two-zone model and the
same limitation of zone assumption as in
other zone models applies, i.e. that
averages of temperature, pressure, species
concentration can be calculated and input
with meaning to the problem. In actual
fact a whole range of variations might be
present which would distort the outcome,
but it is worthy of note that two-zone
models do operate more effectively when
the room size is closer to a hotel bedroom
than any other compartment.
[ 41]
Diane Roberts and
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Fires in hotel rooms and
scenario predictions
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
Discussion
In Hong Kong, the legal requirements for a
hotel building are quite similar to those
enforced in the UK, the current Code of
Practice for Minimum Fire Service
Installation of Hong Kong requiring the
following main items to be provided in guest
room floors for a high rise hotel, similar to
the example chosen in this research:
.
Automatic fire detection system this
should comprise mainly smoke detectors,
heat detectors, manual stations, alarm
bells, and central control panel. Smoke
detectors are required for the entire guest
room floors, due to the possibility of the
occupants being asleep. Normally, smoke
detectors are exempted in bathrooms.
.
Automatic sprinkler system automatic
sprinklers are required throughout the
interior of the hotel building, with the
exception of electrical/mechanical plant
rooms.
.
Audio/visual advisory system this is
required in guest rooms where the area
exceeds 2,000sq.m and for the example in
this research, was not required.
.
Smoke extraction system this is required
at the internal escape corridors of guest
floor rooms, unless the aggregate window
area in the corridor can achieve 6.25 per
cent. In the selected example, this was
required and given the situation of most
hotels, would be required in those also.
.
Wet riser system this is required at the
two stair landings.
.
Staircase pressurisation system this is
required for exit stairs that do not have
sufficient window area or venting.
Results from the computer modelling are as
follows:
.
Run 1. This simulates a fire initiated on
the mattress of the bed in a guest room
with smoke detector and sprinkler
protection. The guest is assumed to wake
up and escape after the smoke detector
alarm sounded for 60 secondsThe results
indicate that the person inside the guest
room will have 75 seconds to escape after
the smoke detector activates before the
room becomes untenable.
.
Run 2. This simulates a fire initiated in a
guest room with smoke detector and a
functional sprinkler which suppresses the
flashover. If the occupant does not escape
because of unconsciousness or
drunkenness, he/she may have a chance
of survival if not subjected to prolonged
exposure.
.
Run 3. This simulates a fire initiated in a
guest room with the door open. The
occupant has approximately 83 seconds to
escape before untenable conditions are
reached in the room. The open door has no
significant effect on the flashover timing.
.
Run 4. This simulates a fire initiated in a
guest room with standard response
sprinkler (one with an RTI of around 50)
suppression. The chance of survival is
lower than using a quick response
sprinkler.
With regard to tenability in the guest room,
the smoke level affects the visibility and
possibility of escape. The occupant should be
capable of escaping from the room as the
smoke layer descends to 1.5m, and it is
assumed that visibility is not a major
problem since the guest room is a relatively
small area with a short travel distance to the
door. The untenable conditions actually
result from the smoke at head height of 1.5m.
With regard to tenability in the corridor,
the program predicts that the smoke travels
with high speed along the corridor, filling it
within 11 seconds. Owing to the usual low
ceiling height (around 2.4m-2.6m) of the hotel
internal corridor, this high temperature
smoke layer will be extremely dangerous to
other occupants on the floor. While toxicity is
the main concern for escaping people, it
should be noted that if the smoke is very hot
it could also initiate other fires by coming
into contact with combustible decorations.
Conclusions
The argument that hotel rooms without
proper fire prevention and protection,
represent death traps for their occupants, is
demonstrated. Additionally, it can be seen
from the fire scenarios computed, that even
with prevention and protection devices,
occupants are at risk because of the
configuration of hotel buildings, i.e.
corridors and stairways. In general terms,
the guest has approximately 70 seconds to
evacuate a room in which a fire has been
initiated a fact, not well appreciated by
occupants.
The task which appears to present itself is
that of enhancing fire prevention and
protection systems within hotels in a cost-
effective manner, and it is suggested that
considerations regarding the following
should be made:
.
Smoke detectors with built-in buzzers. In
Hong Kong, the code requires smoke
detectors to be provided in guest rooms,
the alarm to be raised for four floors, and
the notification of the Fire Services
Department by automatic telephone direct
link. Because of the false alarm problem
arising from the mis-activation of smoke
detectors, some hotels (illegally) isolate or
delay the alarm bells and direct link to
avoid disturbance to their operations.
[ 42]
Diane Roberts and
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Fires in hotel rooms and
scenario predictions
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
Research into the prevention of false
alarms is therefore warranted. Any delay
in giving an alarm to the occupant of a
guest room would imply reducing the
occupant's chance of survival and it is
therefore suggested that smoke detectors
with built-in buzzers should be used in
guest rooms. When activated, these will
sound immediately, sending a signal to
the main fire panel. The floor alarm bells
and direct telephone link to the Fire
Services Department could be delayed for
3-5 minutes and over-ridden at any instant
should a fire be found not to exist. This
arrangement is acceptable to Code 101 of
NFPA but is not included in the Hong
Kong Code requirement.
.
Optical smoke detector. Since fires in hotel
guest rooms often originate from
smouldering materials, optical smoke
detectors would be valuable. These were
found in Factory Mutual's experiment in a
hotel room, to have better response time
characteristics than ionisation smoke
detectors, and should therefore be
considered.
.
Quick response sprinkler. Sidewall sprinklers
are widely used in hotel rooms of Hong
Kong. This implies a greater radial distance
from the fire source axis, and as seen from
the program computations, the sprinkler
takes much longer to activate even when the
difference in distance is only 1.5m. It is
suggested that quick response sprinklers
should be mandatory for hotel guest rooms,
and in fact the updated version of Code 13 of
NFPA has already stipulated the use of such
sprinklers in these situations.
.
Fire load in the guest room. From the
survey and statistical information, the
fire load in the hotel room is quite high,
although it is still lower than the average
domestic bedroom. In Asian countries,
wood/timber is a common material for the
false ceiling (mainly in the foyer) and
cornice. The false ceiling in the foyer is
normally about 400mm-600mm deep and
the current practice of Hong Kong does
not require the sprinkler to be installed
above a false ceiling, unless the void
exceeds 800mm deep. It is suggested that
the use of combustible ceiling materials
should be prohibited in order to reduce
the fire load, unless an upper layer
sprinkler is provided inside the ceiling
void. Additionally, the uphostered
furniture in the guest room, including the
bed mattress, should be required to meet a
specific standard or be flame-retarded, to
reduce the chance of ignition by cigarettes
or other sources. Current Hong Kong
codes do not restrict the fire
characteristics for furniture and
furnishings in hotel guest rooms.
The Sheraton example of excellent
practice
Further, it is suggested that the corporate hotel
security policy adopted by the Sheraton Hotel
Group, recently embraced within the Starwood
Hotels and Resorts portfolio, be offered as an
example of good practice, especially in the area
of fire prevention which the Group considers
the primary function of its policy.
In a tragic incident, after the inception of
the hotel security policy, but during the fire
prevention upgrading phase, the luxury
600-room Cairo Sheraton sustained a severe
fire in which 19 fatalities and 70 injuries
occurred. On 1 March 1990, at approximately
01.00 hours, a large display tent positioned in
the hotel lobby was set on fire by sparks from
a clay oven which was used to make Arabic
dishes for the guests. The property had no
automatic sprinklers, and Fire Department
officials had previously signalled the risk,
requesting the removal of the tent from the
lobby area. When the tent was ignited, the
wind fanned the fire towards the hotel
reception area and disco before it engulfed
the entire six-storey hotel. The fire alarm
system failed to arouse guests, and of those
who did attempt escape, many were injured;
the fatalities being overcome by smoke (Fire
Prevention, 1990).
Now, almost a decade later, all Sheraton
properties are required to comply with the
regulations contained in the corporate
procedural manual, Fire Maintenance, which
is issued to each Sheraton hotel worldwide.
This manual details rulings on such matters
as the minimum thickness of fire doors,
distances between fire points, and the
number of smoke detectors per specified
area, as well as a host of other topics. All
Sheraton hotels, with the exception of the
Park Lane, a listed building in London, are
fully sprinklered in all bedrooms,
restaurants, kitchens and public areas, and
only fire-resistant certificated fabrics
obtained from approved suppliers may be
used in the furnishings. No-smoking floors
are being extended throughout the Group as
public demand for these increases, and the
use of flames is never allowed at any table in
the hotel, thus flambe dishes and candles are
not part of any Sheraton dining facility. Fire
doors, held open for safe passage in normal
conditions by electromagnets, are
automatically closed in hazardous situations,
the magnetic control being broken by the
alarm, and other facilities to help extinguish
a fire, such as fireproof lifts for use by
firefighters, are installed in all Sheraton
properties.
Supporting the physical fire protection aspects
is a robust system of fire safety management,
consisting of regular checks on all equipment,
and full induction and training of all hotel staff
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scenario predictions
International Journal of
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Management
12/1 [2000] 3744
in safe working procedures, and responses,
especially in relation to fire. All new personnel
are instructed in the three main elements of a
fire, i.e. heat, oxygen and fuel, they are given a
fire (contained within a bucket) to extinguish
using various types of extinguishers, and taught
other procedures such as the breaking of fire
glass, dialling the hotel emergency number, and
providing proper information relating to their
location and the nature of the problem. This
training is integral to the two-day induction
programme for all staff. Sheraton Security
Departments instigate a mock fire emergency
every week to check equipment, and on a
monthly basis a similar emergency is created
randomly, to test staff readiness and capability
to take responsibility for their own work areas.
Supplementing this routine attention, is an
annual Safety Week in which all Sheraton Hotel
staff undergo a week of intensive fire and
security training on site. There is no doubt that
the Group's fire protection and management are
always well above those required by statutory
provision.
Internationally, there are many different
building regulations which clearly affect the
level of fire prevention and protection
available for hotel occupants. However, the
differential levels of protection are not
readily appreciated by hotel guests as they
holiday or undertake business in
surroundings which are unfamiliar to them,
but which they presume to be bound by the
same rules and regulations they believe to
exist in their home country. Regardless of
wherever a traveller might stay, however,
the facts are quite clear, that in a hotel room
of average size, fire load, and with smoke
detection equipment, there is approximately
one minute for the guest to escape from a
room containing a fire, unless an effective
sprinkler system is in operation. Even with
an effective sprinkler system, problems can
occur and injuries may result from exposure
to smouldering fires and toxic gases.
As business travellers and tourists become
more aware of the dangers of hotel fires through
the publicity attached to the Pattaya, and cruise
ship Romantica fires of 1997, there is the
prospect of hotels developing competitive edge
by investing in fire prevention and protection
which can be positively marketed, thereby
sustaining occupancy. Bloomberg (1997)
comments that the decline in tourist arrivals to
Hong Kong has set hoteliers the task of
developing new strategies to reverse the slump
currently in evidence in the hotel industry.
Perhaps, instead of chasing gimmicks and
offering cut-price rooms, these hoteliers might
consider upgrading and better marketing their
personal protection facilities as genuine and
lasting added value for the customer, rather
than advertising what are perceived by clients
as temporary incentives, enticements which
will evaporate once the economic turmoil
which threatens the hotel industry, eases.
The authors suggest that the many
messages from these findings should be
grasped by travellers, the hospitality and
tourism industry, and regulators alike.
References
Allen, H.A. (1993), The CSIRO Fire Safety
Engineering Method Using the Computer
Model FireCALC, Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO), Australia.
Bloomberg (1997), ``Dream year turns into
nightmare as visitor arrivals fall'', Hong Kong
Standard, 20 December.
Chow, W.K. and Kong, K.S.M. (1993), ``Hotel fires
in Hotel Kong and simulation of their fire
environment using zone modelling
techniques'', INTERFLAM 93, Department of
Building Services Engineering, Hong Kong
Polytechnic, Hong Kong.
Fire Prevention (1990), No. 232, September, Fire
Protection Association, Loss Prevention
Council, Hertfordshire.
Hong Kong Tourist Association (HKTA) (1998),
Year End Results 1997, Research Department,
HKTA.
National Fire Incident Reporting Service (1982-
1986), NFPA Survey, National Fire Protection
Association, NFPA 92B, NFPA, Quincy, 1991.
Further reading
Burrows, M. (1999), Security and Safety Services
Manager (London), Sheraton Group,
comprised of Sheraton Park Tower, The Park
Lane Hotel, Sheraton Belgravia, interview in
London on 1 March.
de Smedt, J.-C. S. (1999), Managing Director,
Principal Fire Consultant, NV International
Fire Safety Engineering and Technology SA
(IFSET) Belgium, Director FRS/IFSET Asia
Ltd, Hong Kong, Consultant to Airport
Sheraton Hotel, Brussels, interview in
Brussels, 4 March.
FPETOOL Vol. 2.3, National Bureau of Standards,
National Engineering Laboratory Center for
Fire Research, Gaithersburg, MD.
Walia, K.S. (1999), Chief Engineer, Oman
Sheraton, interview in Oman, 7 March.
[ 44]
Diane Roberts and
Daniel Hin-Wing Chan
Fires in hotel rooms and
scenario predictions
International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality
Management
12/1 [2000] 3744