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拉岡講座209

ANAMORPHOSIS
歪像

Of the foundation of consciousness. 意識的基礎


The privilege of the gaze as objet a 凝視作為小客體特權
The optics of the blinds 瞎子的光學
The phallus in the picture 圖畫中的陽具

In vain your image comes to meet me


And does not enter me where I am who only shows it
Turning towards me you can find
On the wall of my gaze only your dreamt-of shadow.

真是枉然,你的影像前來跟我相會
沒有進入我的主體真正顯示的所在
當你轉身向我,你能夠發現到的
只是你夢想中的陰影出現在我凝視的壁上

I am that wretch comparable with mirrors


That can reflect but cannot see
Like them my eye is empty and like them inhabited
By your absence which makes them blind.

我的悲慘困境可與鏡子倫比
鏡子只能反映,但是不能觀看
像鏡子我的眼睛空茫,像鏡子我的眼睛
停駐的是你的缺席,使我的眼睛盲瞎

You may remember that, in one of my earlier lectures, I began by quoting the poem, Contrechant, from
Aragon's Le Fou d'Elsa. I did not realize at the time that I would be developing the subject of the gaze
to such an extent. I was diverted into doing so by the way in which I presented the concept of
repetition in Freud.

你們可能記得,在我早先的一個演講中,我開始引述阿拉貢的這首詩。我當時沒有體會到,我會
將凝視的主題發展到這個程度。當我在呈現佛洛伊德重複的觀念時,我不知不覺被牽引到這樣做

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We cannot deny that it is within the explanation of repetition that this digression on the scopic function
is situated —no doubt by Maurice Merleau-Poiity's recently published work, Le Visible et l'invisible.

無可否認地,在解釋重複的觀念時,我離題談視覺的功用,無疑地,是因為當時梅洛、龐帝最近
剛出版的書「可見與不可見」。

Moreover, it seemed to me that, if an encounter were to be found there, it was a happy one, one
destined to stress, as I shall try to do today, how, in the perspective of the unconscious, we can situate
consciousness. You know that some shadow, or, to use another term, some 'resist' —in the sense one
speaks of 'resist' in the dying of material—marks the fact of consciousness in Freud's very discourse.

而且,我覺得那是一個快樂的邂逅,假如我們認為那是一個邂逅。我們終究要強調,如我今天所
要強調的,從無意識的觀點,我們如何能夠確立意識的位置。你知道,在佛洛伊德的學說,意識
是由某個陰影,或換個用詞,某個「抗拒」顯示出來。這個「抗拒」的意義指的是人及物不願意被消
滅。

But, before taking things up again at the point we left them last time, I must first clear up a
misunderstanding that appears to have arisen in the minds of certain members of the audience
concerning a term I used last time. Some of you seem to have been perplexed by a word that is simple
enough, and which I commented on, namely, the tychic. Apparently, it sounded to some of you like a
sneeze. Yet I made it quite clear that it was the adjective formed from tuché just as psychique
(psychical) is the adjective corresponding to psuché (psyche). I used this analogy at the heart of the
experience of repetition quite intentionally, because for any conception of the psychical
development as elucidated by psycho-analysis, the fact of the tychic is central. It is in relation to the
eye, in relation to the eutuchia or the dustuclzia, the happy encounter and the unhappy encounter, that
my lecture today will be ordered.

但是在重新開展這個上一次遺留下來的命題之前,我必須首先澄清一個某些聽眾似乎已經產生
的誤解,關於我上一次所用的術語。有些人似乎對我所評論的那個詞語,看來簡單,卻不免令人
困惑,那就是「tychic邂逅 」。顯然,對於你們有些人,它聽起來像個一個噴嚏。可是,我表達得
很清楚,那是一個tuche 邂逅所形成的形容詞,如同「psychical 心理的」是個「psyche心理」的 形
容詞。我相當刻意地使用這個類比,在重複經驗的核心,因為由心理分析學所闡明的任何心理的
發展的觀念,tychic 存在的事實是很重要的。就在跟眼睛的關係,跟eutuchia 及 dustuclzia的關係
快樂的邂逅跟不快樂的邂逅,就是我今天的演講主題。
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I saw myself seeing myself, young Parque says somewhere. Certainly, this statement has rich and
complex implications in relation to the theme developed in La Jeune Parque, that of femininity—but
we haven't got there yet. We are dealing with the philosopher, who apprehends something that is one of

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the essential correlates of consciousness in its relation to representation, and which is designated as I
see myself seeing myself.

「我看到我自己看到我自己。」年輕人巴奎在某個地方說。的確,這個陳述有豐富而複雜的意涵,
關於我在巴奎個案所發展的主題,那就是女性的主題。但是我們還沒有進展到這裡。我們正在處
理一位哲學家,他理解到意識跟符號再現的基本相關因素,這個因素被指明為:我看見我自己
看到我自己。

What evidence can we really attach to this formula? How is it that it remains, in fact, correlative with
that fundamental mode to which we referred in the Cartesian cogito, by which the subject apprehends
himself as thought?

我們有什麼證據可以証明這個公式?它跟我們所提到的笛卡爾的我思故所在這個基本模式,事
實上如何扯上關係?

What isolates this apprehension of thought by itself is a sort of doubt, which has been called
methodological doubt, which concerns whatever might give support to thought in representation.
How is it, then, that the I see myself seeing myself remains its envelope and base, and, perhaps more
than one thinks, grounds its certainty?

孤立對於這個思想本身的理解的是一種被稱為方法論的懷疑,懷疑任何可能給予支持思想作為
再現符號。因此,我看見我自己看見我自己這個命題,如何保持它的表面跟基礎,或者,超乎我
們想像的,如何肯定它確實成立。

For, I warm myself by warming myself is a reference to the body as body—I feel that sensation
of warmth which, from some point inside me, is diffused and locates me as body. Whereas in the I see
myself seeing myself, there is no such sensation of being absorbed by vision.

我以溫暖我自己,來溫暖我自己,等於是提到身體當著身體。從我身體內部某一點,我感覺到溫
暖的感覺散發出來,將我定位為身體。而在我看見我自己看見我自己這個命題,並沒有像這樣的
感覺被視覺所吸收。

Furthermore, the phenomenologists have succeeded in articulating with precision, and in the most
disconcerting way, that it is quite clear that I see outside, that perception is not in me, that it is on the
objects that it apprehends. And yet I apprehend the world in a perception that seems to concern the
immanence of the I see myself seeing myself. The privilege of the subject seems to be established here
from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations belong to me.

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而且,現象學家成功地準確表達,雖然令人倉皇困窘:我看見的顯然是外在,感覺不是在我身
體內部,它所理解的部份是在客體。可是我理解這個世界,是以一種感覺,這種感覺似乎關心到
我看到我自己看到我自己這個命題的內在性。主體具有特權在此似乎可以成立,因為從兩極的反
身代名詞的關係而言,只要我一感覺,我的再現符號就屬於我。

This is how the world is struck with a presumption of idealization, of the suspicion of yielding me only
my representations. Serious practice does not really weigh very heavy, but, on the other hand, the
philosopher, the idealist, is placed there, as much in confrontation with himself as in confrontation with
those who are listening to him, in an embarrassing position.

這就是世界如何會陷於理想主義的假設,然後又懷疑產生我的只是再現符號。不過,這個命題也
沒有真的必要小題大作。在另一方面,哲學家,理想主義者的角色被定位在此,會面對他自己的
質疑,也會面對傾聽他演講的那些人質疑(他的演講是主觀或客觀的真理,立場可是尷尬。

How can one deny that nothing of the world appears to me except in my representations? This is the
irreducible method of Bishop Berkeley, about whose subjective position much might be said—
including something that may have eluded you in passing, namely, this belong to me aspect of
representations, so reminiscent of property. When carried to the limit, the process of this meditation, of
this reflecting reflection, goes so far as to reduce the subject apprehended by the Cartesian meditation
to a power of annihilation.

我們如何否認,世界對於我,除了我的主觀再現符號外別無它物?這是柏克來主教哲學認識論
的徹底方法。關於他的主觀論的立場,被談論過很多,包括某個你們可能不知其詳的命題,換言
之,再現符號「屬於我」這個觀點。沉思的過程,思維的思維過程,若是從事到走火入魔,會將笛
卡爾我思故我在的主體,變成為具有毀滅性的力量。

The mode of my presence in the world is the subject in so far as by reducing itself solely to this
certainty of being a subject, it becomes active annihilation. In fact, the process of the philosophical
meditation throws the subject towards the transforming historical action, and, around this point, orders
the configured modes of active self.consciousness through its metamorphoses in history. As for the
meditation on being that reaches its culmination in the thought of Heidegger, it restores to being itself
that power of annihilation—or at least poses the question of how it may be related to it.

當我存在於世界的模式,就是將自己視為絕對真理的主體,它會成為激進的毀滅力量。事實上,
哲學沉思的過程,會將主體推向轉變的歷史的行動,然後透過歷史過程中自己的蛻變,制定激
進自我意識的調整模式。至於在海德格思想登峰造極的對於存在的沉思,他將毀滅的力量回歸給
存在本身,或至少提出這個問題:毀滅的力量如何跟存在相關。

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This is also the point to which Maurice Merleau-Ponty leads us. But, if you refer to his text, you will
see that it is at this point that he chooses to withdraw, in order to propose a return to the sources of
intuition concerning the visible and the invisible, to come back to that which is prior to all reflection,
thetic or non-thetic, in order to locate the emergence of vision

這也是梅洛、龐帝引導我們到達的地方。但是假如你閱讀他的本文,你會看出,就在這一點,他
選擇撤退,以便提議回轉到有關可見與不可見的本能的來源,回到所有思維之前的地方,不管
是主觀不主觀,這樣他才定位視覺出現的位置。

For him, it is a question of restoring—for, he tells us, it can only be a question of a reconstruction or a
restoration, not of a path traversed in the opposite direction—of reconstituting the way by which, not
from the body, but from something that he calls the flesh of the world, the original point of vision
was able to emerge. It would seem that in this way one sees, in this unfinished work, the emergence of
something like the search for an unnamed substance from which I, the seer, extract myself. From the
toils (rets), or rays (rais), if you prefer, of an iridescence of which I am at first a part, I emerge as eye,
assuming, in a way, emergence from what I would like to call the function of seeingness

對於他,這是個恢復的問題,因為他告訴我們,那只能是重建或恢復的問題,不是朝相反方向
跋涉前進,而是重新建設途徑。視覺的原初點的出現,不是從身體,而是從他所稱為世界肉身的
地方。似乎以這種方式,在他未完成的作品裡,我們看到某件東西的出現,像是追尋一個無以名
狀的物質,而我作為觀看者,就是從這裡將自己提昇出來。從眼睛的虹彩,換言之,從視網膜或
光線,我起初是它們的一部份,現在以眼睛的角色出現,從我想要稱為觀看的功用,以某種方
式,擺出出現的姿態。

A wild odor emanates from it, providing a glimpse on the horizon of the hunt of Artemis—whose touch
seems to be associated at this moment of tragic failure in which we lost him who speaks.

一種瘋狂的氣息從這裡散發出來,讓我們瞥見獵人阿特米思的狩獵的地平線,他的冒險前進似
乎被聯想到,在悲慘覆滅的這個時刻,我們失去他說話的這個主體。

Yet is this really the way he wished to take? The traces that remain of the part to come from his
meditation permits us to doubt it. The reference-points that are provided in it, more particularly for the
strictly psycho-analytic unconscious, allow us to perceive that he may have been directed towards some
search, original in relation to the philosophical tradition, towards that new dimension of meditation on
the subject that analysis enables us to trace.

可是,這真的是他希望前進的險路嗎?從他的沉思所遺留的痕跡,我們能夠懷疑。在他的沉思所
提供出來的蛛絲馬跡,特別是適合於當著嚴謹的精神分析學的無意識,我們能夠感覺到,他可

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能曾經被引導到某個追尋,就哲學的傳統而言是原創性,朝向新的向度沉思我們精神分析學能
夠追蹤的主體。

Personally, I cannot but be struck by certain of these notes, which are for me less enigmatic than they
may seem to other readers, because they correspond very exactly to the schemata —with one of them,
in particular—that I shall be dealing with here. Read, for example, the note concerning what he
calls the turning inside-out of the finger of a glove, in as much as it seems to appear there—note the
way in which the leather envelops the fur in a winter glove—that consciousness, in its illusion of
seeing itself seeing itself, finds its basis in the inside-out structure of the gaze.

就我個人而言,我對於某些他所遺留的這些記載,不禁肅然起敬,但是這些記載對於我而言,
不像對於其它讀者那樣難於索解。特別是有一篇,我今天要在這裡處理的。舉個例子,讓我們閱
讀一下,有關他所稱為的手套裡的手指的由內翻轉的記載。我們現在注意一下,在冬天的手套,
外面的皮涵蓋裡面的毛。那似乎是說,意識找到它自己的基礎,在凝視的由內翻轉的結構中,換
言之,在意識看到自己在看到自己的幻覺中。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw